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GERMAN HISTORICAL THOUGHT

by

Milton Covensky

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OTTO HINTZE AND HISTORICISM: A STUDY IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF GERMAN HISTORICAL THOUGHT

by Milton Covensky

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the German historian, Otto Hintze (1861-1940), and historicism. Historicism is employed in this study to refer to the intellectual movement which arose at the end of the eighteenth century and developed during the nineteenth century, and which stressed the notions of historical individuality and dynamic development. Hintze's activity as a historian between 1880-1933 falls in the very period of the growth and crisis of German historicism and faithfully mirrors the leading issues in modern German historical thought. Not only are Hintze's writings on the growth and crisis of historicism examined and analyzed, but they are also treated as sources for the study of Hintze's development as a historian and for the general pattern of German historical thought.

After a chapter which surveys the chief events in Hintze's life and career, the problem of the relationship between Hintze and the growth of German historicism is investigated. It is demonstrated that three leading figures of nineteenth-century German historicism influenced Hintze's historical views -- Droysen, Ranke, and Schmoller. Hintze not only wrote an account of Droysen, but he was influenced by Droysen's concept of universal-historical development and Droysen's emphasis upon the relationship between Geist and Macht.

The influence of Ranke upon Hintze came by way of two devoted Rankeans -- Julius Weizsäcker and Georg Waitz. From his teacher,

Weizsäcker, Hintze received training in the philological-critical method of analyzing the sources. Waitz stimulated Hintze to examine systematically the social sciences and to pursue comparative constitutional history. The influence of Ranke is also revealed in Hintze's adherence to Ranke's concept of universal history and the structure of the state system, and in Hintze's opposition to Roscher.

An analysis of Hintze's articles on Schmoller provides a key to the understanding of Schmoller's influence upon Hintze. Through their collaboration on the Acta Borussica, Hintze was influenced toward institutional and Prussian history. Furthermore, as leader of the younger historical school of economics and precursor of interpretative sociology, Schmoller influenced Hintze's methodological views.

Hintze concerned himself with leading methodological questions which arose in historicism regarding the relationship between individual and general events in history. In the Lamprecht controversy, Hintze supported a position intermediate between the followers of an individualistic and a collectivistic point of view. Hintze's position led him to search for a typology of history. It is shown that Droysen and particularly Ranke provided Hintze with the basis for such a typology, and that Hintze's position gradually was refined under the successive methodological impacts of Schmoller, Dilthey, Jellinek, and Max Weber.

Finally, this study shows that a close relationship existed between Hintze and the crisis of historicism. This is demonstrated in terms of Hintze's studies on Troeltsch, Scheler, and Oppenheimer. It appears that Hintze reflected the three problems of the crisis of historicism -- the epistemic problem, the question of cultural synthesis, and the intrusion of sociological elements into historical interpre-

tation. Although Hintze became increasingly preoccupied with sociological questions, especially after World War I, he still regarded himself to the end as a faithful adherent of historicism.

PREFACE

The growth and crisis of modern historicism is one of the most significant developments of the Western world. Together with the rise of modern science, the formation of the modern historical attitude of mind ranks as one of the key factors in shaping the Western view regarding the nature of man and society. Yet, despite the importance of the topic, American historians have not devoted sufficient attention to the many problems involved in the rise, growth, and crisis of historicism. Compared to the contributions of the Germans, American achievements in understanding historicism are small and insignificant. This study has been undertaken with the conviction that the present work represents some small effort to correct this unfortunate trend. Naturally, this study by itself constitutes only a minor contribution to the subject and similar studies of personalities and problems in the growth of modern historicism could collectively throw considerable light on the subject.

The reader should be reminded of two major cautions. Firstly, this study is concerned with neither the validity of Hintze's ideas nor those of modern historicism. Secondly, it does not pretend to exhaust Hintze's scope as a historian. This study is mainly concerned with the attempt to relate Hintze to the broad movement of historicism, and not with the question as to whether his ideas are valid or not (though

of course, it cannot completely ignore the latter issue).

I would like to express my deep indebtedness to the Chairman of my Doctoral Committee, Professor Benjamin W. Wheeler. His scholarship in aiding me on many a difficult point and his warm humanity and kindness will always be remembered.

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INTRODUCTION

History has its own way of judging the reputations of men. Those, who in their own lifetime are regarded as only of secondary significance, take on, with time, a new importance. Others who seem destined for all-time greatness gradually lose their brilliance and recede into the twilight zone of the minor gods. The situation of the German historian, Otto Hintze (1861-1940), is illuminating in this regard. Esteemed during his lifetime as a capable and excellent historian -- but not a towering giant -- his stature has grown considerably since his death, and he is considered, today, one of the great figures of modern German historical thought.

Felix Gilbert, an expert on modern German historiography, unhesitatingly declares that "there is no doubt that with the perspective which only the passage of time provides, Hintze emerges as the most important figure in German historical scholarship of the twentieth century...."[1] On the occasion of Hintze's death in 1940, the leading American historical journal, the American Historical Review, carried a remarkable anonymous obituary notice which expressed the follow-

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[1]Felix Gilbert, "German Historiography during the Second World War: A Bibliographical Survey," American Historical Review, LIII (1947), 52-53.

ing judgment:

> He was by all odds one of Germany's profoundest and most original historians, comparable in his chosen field of economic, social, and comparative constitutional history to Max Weber or to Gustav Schmoller in the generation that preceded his. Modest, indifferent to fame and popularity, he became after his early retirement from his professorship at the University of Berlin, above all the historian's historian. The only book he ever wrote for a popular audience, Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk (1915), never achieved a wider popularity chiefly because of his unswerving intellectual and scholarly integrity, though it is easily the best history of Prussia ever written and is likely to remain so for some time. His first study in economic history, Die preussische Seidenindustrie (1893), exhibits that rare combination of conceptual clarity, exhaustive study of the facts, and comparative procedure which was to distinguish all his later work.... Yet if one is to grasp the immense scope of his later work, one should recall that he was an equally close student of political science and sociology. He became in his later years the nearest German equivalent of Joseph Barthelemy in France, Ernest Barker in Great Britain, and Charles Beard in the United States, though remaining always and essentially the historian.[2]

The foremost living German historian,[3] Friedrich Meinecke, retrospectively viewing Hintze's career in the first volume of his memoirs, states that "Hintze's continued development made him, as we had hoped, into one of the great men in his field."[4] One of the leading historians of the twentieth century, Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, in his two-volume survey of nineteenth and twentieth century

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[2] American Historical Review, XLVI (1941), 1010-1011.

[3] See the remark of Sidney B. Fay, in F. Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, Reflections and Recollections, translated by Sidney B. Fay (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. v.

[4] Friedrich Meinecke, Erlebtes, 1862-1901 (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1941), p. 158.

German historiographical writing, regards Hintze not only as the "last significant representative" of the "traditional Prussian conception of the state," but likewise "a leading investigator of the history of the modern state, without a too narrowly Prussian view."[5]

Brief appreciations of Hintze by Fritz Hartung[6] and Heinrich Otto Meisner[7] also leave no doubt concerning the positive reevaluation of Hintze's place in modern historiography. Equally indicative of Hintze's increasing significance is his inclusion in the important anthology, Geschichtswissenschaft, recently published by Fritz Wagner, a work which attempts to deal only with the most fundamental historians and their contributions to historical thought and methodology.[8]

The mere fact, then, that Hintze is presently adjudged one of the outstanding representatives of modern historiography would in itself justify a more careful examination of his conception of history. But, in addition, there are other factors of importance. Hintze was one of

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[5]Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Geist und Geschichte vom deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart (München: F. Bruckmann, 1951), II, 10.

[6]Fritz Hartung, "Otto Hintze," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, LII (1940), 201-233, and the introduction by Hartung to Otto Hintze, Gesammelte Abhandlungen: I, Staat und Verfassung, Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte, ed., F. Hartung (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1941), 5-23.

[7]Heinrich Otto Meisner, "Otto Hintzes Lebenswerk," Historische Zeitschrift, CLXIV (1941), 66-90.

[8]Fritz Wagner, Geschichtswissenschaft (München, Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1951), pp. 299-302; 448.

the great masters of Prussian history. His influence on the historical craft has been most direct in this field. In addition, Hintze exercised an influence in shaping the thinking of many students at the University of Berlin during the period prior to the First World War. Otto Lerche declares that at Hintze's public lectures, given at the University of Berlin, there "were to be found in growing numbers, besides hundreds of students, military academicians, general staff officers and young diplomats."[9] Moreover, Hintze played an important role in the mobilization of German academic opinion during World War I.

It is beyond the purpose of this dissertation to deal with all these aspects of Hintze's life, thought, and career. To do so would require several thick volumes and ten years of careful research. Instead, this dissertation is limited to one single but extremely significant problem: the relationship between Hintze and the great movement of modern historicism. We wish to examine Hintze's interpretation of the growth and crisis of modern historicism. In doing so, Hintze's development as a historian will disclose that he was influenced by the major currents of modern historicism. Hintze's writing, thus, provide us with a double opportunity. They enable us to trace the transformation of one of the most fateful movements in the Western world -- the growth and crisis of German historicism. And they pro-

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[9]Otto Lerche in a review of Hintze's book, Staat und Verfassung, in Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXVIII (1943), 197.

vide us with an illuminating picture of Hintze as a leading representative of the various currents within modern historicism. Thus, this dissertation is a historiographical study of a leading historian and his relationship to the currents of modern historical thought.

CHAPTER I

LIFE AND CAREER

Hintze wrote, during his lifetime, a number of historiographical essays on some of the greatest German historians -- Droysen, Schmoller, and Koser. These reveal a persistent attempt to weld together biographical detail and thought patterns in summing up the life work of these prominent scholars. Hintze thought it inadequate to separate too sharply personality from ideas in dealing with a historian. Yet, it seems both wise and necessary to furnish the reader initially with a general overview of Hintze's life and career before plunging into the complex body of his thought. This chapter, accordingly, is devoted to Hintze's life and career. Later chapters will enlarge upon some of the events mentioned here, expanding and relating them to the larger structure of Hintze's thought.

Otto Hintze was born August 27, 1861[1] in the small

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[1]The biographical material on Hintze is derived mainly from the following accounts: Fritz Hartung, "Otto Hintze," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, LII (1940), 201-233. Hereafter, this will be cited as Hartung, "Otto Hintze," and Fritz Hartung, "Introduction to Otto Hintze," Gesammelte Abhandlungen, I, Staat und Verfassung, Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte, ed., F. Hartung (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1941), 5-23. Hereafter, this introduction will be known as Hartung, "Hintze" (Introduction). Friedrich Meinecke, Erlebtes, 1862-1901 (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1941); Friedrich Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin,

town of Pyritz, situated in Farther Pomerania.[2] His father was a government official, the county secretary of Pyritz.[3] Here, in this Prussian town of about 5,000, some twenty miles east of the Oder, Hintze spent his childhood and youth. He attended the local Gymnasium and passed the Reifeprüfung, which enabled him to matriculate without further examinations at any German university he desired. Hintze selected the Pomeranian University of Greifswald and matriculated in the fall of 1878.[4] Greifswald held his interest for only two years, and in 1880, he enrolled for the winter semester at the University of Berlin.[5]

Hintze was then nineteen years of age. His previous life had been spent in the provincial atmosphere of Pomerania and, undoubtedly, this had some influence upon him. It is a mistake, however, to assume that provincial factors played a decisive role in his future life.[6] Not Pyritz and Greifswald but Berlin was to be of central importance in Hintze's further development.

The University of Berlin in 1880 was easily one of

Erinnerungen, 1901-1919, (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler Verlag, 1949); Heinrich Otto Meisner, "Otto Hintze's Lebenswerk," Historische Zeitschrift, CLXIV (1941), 66-90. Hereafter, this will be cited as Meisner, "Hintze."

[2]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 201.

[3]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 159.

[4]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 201.

[5]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 201.

[6]Meisner, "Hintze," p. 66.

the world's leading centers of learning. The student body then numbered only 4,000, but the University was engaged in a program of rapid expansion. The enrollment figures illustrated this fact. In 1871, there were some 2,603 students enrolled; in 1880, 4,000; in 1900, the number had risen to 6,000; while in 1910, there were 14,000 students at Berlin.[7]

At the University, Hintze encountered a host of great teachers and some of the leading intellectuals of Germany. Johann Gustav Droysen (1808-1884), approaching the end of a brilliant career, was still at the height of his powers.[8] He exercised real influence on Hintze, who, as a student, was close to him, and who became the last librarian of Droysen's "Historical Society."[9]

Georg Waitz, another teacher at Berlin, also had considerable influence over Hintze. A disciple of Ranke, Waitz, established the leading "medieval historical school in Germany"[10] at Göttingen, and in 1876, he succeeded Pertz at Berlin as director of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica.[11]

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[7] Max Lenz, Geschichte der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin (Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1918) II, 358.

[8] Otto Hintze, "Johann Gustav Droysen," Gesammelte Abhandlungen, II, Zur Theorie der Geschichte, ed., F. Hartung (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1942), p. 194.

[9] Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 201. See below, pp. 77-81 for details of Droysen's influence on Hintze.

[10] J. W. Thompson and B. J. Holm, A History of Historical Writing, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942), II, 199.

[11] Thompson and Holm, A History of Historical Writing, II, 201.

In his inaugural address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1914, Hintze acknowledged Waitz's influence upon him in calling his attention to the importance of juristic, constitutional, and systematic analysis in the political and social sciences (Staatswissenschaften).[12]

Hintze's teacher in philosophy, Wilhelm Dilthey,[13] a master in the field of the humanistic studies (Geisteswissenschaften), combined philosophical scholarship with genuine historical insight. There is no doubt that Hintze's concern with the philosophical implications of historical problems owed something to Dilthey. We shall have occasion to refer to the relationship between Dilthey and Hintze in the section on historical method.[14]

Two other professors at Berlin who influenced Hintze were Julius Weizsäcker,[15] and Gustav von Schmoller,[16] -- the former a historian and the latter an economist. While Weizsäcker influenced Hintze immediately, it was Schmoller who changed Hintze's life radically. Weizsäcker[17] had come to Berlin from Göttingen, while Schmoller had come

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[12]Otto Hintze, "Antrittsrede in der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften," Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Jahrgang, 1914, XXVIII (Berlin: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1914), 746. The influence of Waitz will be dealt with below in detail. See pp. 112-119.

[13]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 204.

[14]See below, pp. 254-259.

[15]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 204.

[16]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 205.

[17]Lenz, Geschichte der königlichen Friedrich-

from the recently established University of Strasbourg.[18]

Julius Weizsäcker, who had spent his best days at the University of Strasbourg before going to Göttingen,[19] was a medievalist with a reputation for critical studies of the sources.[20] Weizsäcker's most important achievement at the University of Berlin was the formal establishment of the historical seminar as an official part of the University activity.[21] Although he was much closer to Droysen, Hintze chose to work under Weizsäcker for his doctorate. Working under Weizsäcker's direction automatically meant that Hintze would write a dissertation in the field of medieval history. At Weizsäcker's suggestion,[22] Hintze selected The Kingdom of William of Holland for his subject and later received his doctor's degree on March 24, 1884.

Fritz Hartung furnishes some interesting details concerning Hintze's doctoral examination.[23] Present at the examination were Weizsäcker, Droysen, Dilthey, and the Germanist, Wilhelm Scherer -- an impressive group of scholars

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Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, II, Part II, 356.

[18]Hans Gehrig, "Gustav von Schmoller," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed., E. R. A. Seligman, Vol. XIII (1934), 576.

[19]Lenz, Geschichte der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, II, Part II, 356.

[20]Srbik, Geist und Geschichte vom deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart, I, 305.

[21]Lenz, Geschichte der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, II, Part II, 373.

[22]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 204.

[23]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," pp. 204-205.

indeed! With the exception of Scherer's, the comments regarding both dissertation and examination were most laudatory. Weissäcker praised the dissertation for its exhibition of "uncommon industry," independent judgment, "its decisive talent for presentation," and "its critical gift and penetration." He commended Hintze for his laborious investigation of details and his grasp of general perspectives. He praised Hintze's ability to detect hidden connections and relations which would otherwise lay obscure.[24] During the oral examination, Dilthey was impressed with Hintze's "very satisfactory philosophical background."[25]

Droysen, describing the hour-long, sharp and comprehensive examination, in a letter to his son, Gustav,[26] revealed much admiration for Hintze. Lauding Hintze as a young historian of exceptional competence, Droysen presented the brilliant scholar to the faculty which honored him Magna cum laude, a distinction, in Droysen's words, very rarely conferred. However, the most tangible result of Hintze's efforts on his dissertation, was its incorporation as a book, part of a series entitled Historische Studien.[27]

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[24]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 204.

[25]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 204.

[26]Letter of Johann Gustav Droysen to his son, Gustav, January 12, 1884, printed in Johann Gustav Droysen Briefwechsel, ed., R. Hübner (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1929), No. 1324, p. 974.

[27]Otto Hintze, Das königtum Wilhelms von Holland, (Historische Studien, ed., Arndt, Noorden, Voigt, No. 15;

Upon completion of his doctorate, Hintze found himself obliged to enter military service, but an eye condition from which he suffered throughout life brought an abrupt end to his army career.[28] Afterwards, he prepared himself for the examination, pro facultate docendi, and at the suggestion of Waitz, spent a year in legal studies and readings in political science.[29] These studies involved two important consequences. They opened up to a young scholar, who had hitherto been trained along the solid but narrow path of historical-philological scholarship, an area of knowledge -- the social sciences. Equally important, Hintze came under the influence of the most significant economist in Germany, Gustav von Schmoller, the leader of the younger "historical school."

Hintze's newly-awakened interest in political and social science is evident in the study on the Austrian council of state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which he contributed to the leading German journal of legal history.[30] The influence of Schmoller, in turn, led Hintze into the field of the administrative and internal history of Prussia. In 1887, Schmoller was commissioned by the Prussian Academy to head a new series, the Acta Borussica, designed to be a monumental source survey of every phase of

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Leipzig: Veit and Company, 1885).

[28]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 205.

[29]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 205.

[30]Otto Hintze, "Der österreichische Staatsrat im 16, und 17, Jahrhundert," Zeitschrift der Savignystiftung

Prussian state administration in the eighteenth century.[31] When he had become acquainted with Hintze, Schmoller chose him, in 1888, as one of the editorial assistants on the great project, and assigned him the task of collecting and editing the documents pertaining to the Prussian silk industry in the eighteenth century and its establishment by Frederick the Great.[32] In 1892, Schmoller and Hintze jointly published two volumes of documents on the Prussian silk industry,[33] while Hintze wrote an elaborate account of the silk industry as volume three.[34]

Hintze's preoccupation with the Acta Borussica revealed another significant consequence. The gathering of materials for a study of the Prussian silk industry rested upon a thorough exploitation of the resources of the Prussian archives, where Hintze spent innumerable hours pouring over documents. Amid the musty but precious archi-

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für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanische Abteilung, VIII (1887), 137-164.

[31]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 205.

[32]Gustav von Schmoller, "Die preussische Seidenindustrie im 18. Jahrhundert und ihre Begründung durch Friedrich den Grossen," Umrisse und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs Verwaltungs - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, besonders des preussischen Staates im 17, und 18. Jahrhundert. (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1898), p. 530.

[33]Gustav von Schmoller and Otto Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie im 18. Jahrhundert und ihre Begründung durch Friedrich den Grossen, (Acta Borussica, Denkmaler der preussischen Staatsverwaltung im 18. Jahrhundert, 2. Abteilung, Band 1 & 2, die einzelnen Gebiete der Verwaltung: Seidenindustrie, Akten; Berlin: Paul Parey, 1892).

[34]Otto Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie im 18. Jahrhundert und ihre Begründung durch Friedrich den

val collections, he encountered two young archivists who were to become lifelong friends -- Friedrich Meinecke and Otto Krauske.[35] At this point it is necessary to introduce Meinecke's early career, in view of the light it sheds on Hintze's personality and his activity as an archivist.

Meinecke, dean of present-day German historians,[36] was born in Salzwedel in Saxony in 1862.[37] In his charming and informative memoirs, Erlebtes, Meinecke describes his sensitive childhood and youth in Salzwedel.[38] When they moved, in 1871, to Berlin, Meinecke attended the University.[39] During his first semester in 1882, attending Droysen's unforgettable lectures, young Meinecke was stirred by the thought that the meaning of history lay in the "secret of personality."[40] Meinecke also attended the lectures of Scherer in German literature;[41] Kirchhoff in Greek literature; and Paulsen in philosophy.[42] He describes his first semester at Berlin as the richest and most varied of

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Grossen (Acta Borussica, Denkmaler der preussischen Staatsverwaltung im 18. Jahrhundert, 2. Abteilung, Band 1 & 2, die einzelnen Gebiete der Verwaltung: Seidenindustrie, Akten; Berlin: Paul Parey, 1892).

[35]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 149.

[36]Hans Kohn, "Re-thinking Recent German History," Review of Politics, XIV (1952), 325.

[37]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 17.

[38]Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 24-42.

[39]Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 42-86.

[40]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 87.

[41]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 88.

[42]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 89.

all his student days;[43] a contributing factor being the lectures of Reinhold Koser on Frederick the Great.[44] After two semesters at Bonn, Meinecke returned for a last semester at Berlin in the winter of 1884-1885.[45] At the suggestion of Koser, he reworked a seminar topic on the alleged deposition of the imperial vice-chancellor Stralendorff in 1609, concerning the threatening power of the house of Brandenburg; and this became the basis of his doctoral dissertation.[46]

Meinecke's doctoral examination turned out brilliantly. Like Hintze, he was awarded the distinction, Magna cum laude.[47] Three days after Meinecke's doctoral examination, Leopold von Ranke died on May 23, 1886. Meinecke, along with the entire historical seminar, followed the coffin from the Luisenstrasse to the church, mourning the passing of the greatest figure of modern historical scholarship.[48] Thus, the passing of one great historian occurred at the very time a brilliant career was opening for another.

Although Meinecke's main desire was to secure a position in the State Archives[49] which were under the direc-

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[43] Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 89-90.

[44] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 91.

[45] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 115.

[46] Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 116-117.

[47] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 123.

[48] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 125.

[49] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 125.

tion of Heinrich von Sybel, his family wished him to be a private tutor; and he spent a half year in this capacity.[50] On April 15, 1887, however, he received a trial appointment from von Sybel as an assistant in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv.[51] He entered into the service of the Archives with the feeling that he was at last fulfilling his desires.

Meinecke provides us in his memoirs with an invaluable picture of what the Prussian Archives were like in the 1880's, at the very time Hintze, Krauske and he were employed in its services. The building of the Geheimes Staatsarchiv was at that time located in Berlin proper, between the new Friedrichstrasse and Klosterstrasse. Upon entering the building, one found himself in a large room: very plain, with tables of great antiquity. During his beginning years there, Meinecke occupied, in a corner of this room, which was designed to serve visitors and patrons, a desk which dated from the time of Frederick the Great.[52] It was a great source of pride for Meinecke, the archivist, to know that he was dwelling in a repository containing rich, historical treasures. On the other hand, the extensive growth of archival material[53] from the nineteenth century had swollen the total collection to the point where an intelligent and observant archivist could occasionally come across mate-

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[50] Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 126-127.

[51] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 135.

[52] Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 137-138.

[53] Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 138-139.

rial that had fallen into neglect.

While there was a double satisfaction for the young archivist, there was also discontent associated with his kind of work. Meinecke, Hintze, and Krauske, engaged in the same locale -- the former as a permanent part of the service of the Prussian Academy -- all fluctuated between a realization that they were working with materials that reflected the glory of the Prussian past, and with an aching awareness, they thought of themselves dwelling in a narrow little bureaucratic universe. "We were birds with clipped wings," says Meinecke.[54] Yet the path that the three "archival Musketeers" had chosen was not unusual. As Meinecke indicates, between the achievement of the doctorate and Habilitation, there was a stony path which could and was frequently traversed only by hiring one's self out to a publication's institute. Beginning in the 1860's, there was a type of academic worker developing rapidly in Germany who made the transition to a university appointment by way of editing a volume of some great series, among the group of which Hintze was included.

The three archivists, Hintze, Meinecke, and Krauske frequently discussed their vexatious dilemma. As Meinecke so well put it:

> Life consists of the tensions of displeasure and pleasure, of soaring upwards and being constrained, of ideals and realities. We three, Krauske, Hintze, and myself were pleased and fre-

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[54]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 151.

> quently also displeased. We felt ourselves in a bird-cage, in which we had to fly. But we flew inside it. We quarreled or were united over ideals, which often sounded quite daring and heretical. We were imprisoned, body and soul, within the Brandenburg-Prussian reality, whose documents we studied.[55]

The friendship between Meinecke, Hintze, and Krauske was a binding one, cemented not only by a common love of the reality of Brandenburg-Prussia as a historical force, but even more by the emotional needs of each other. All were scholars and shared innumerable rich and stimulating conversations, while temperamentally, as Meinecke indicates, the three were different.[56]

Otto Krauske was a young man of handsome mien, with an almost feminine delicacy. There was a quality of warm humanity about him which radiated to all that he came in contact with. By sharing their sympathies, secret ambitions, and their lonelinesses, Otto made innumerable friends. "He really made me into a person for the first time," says Meinecke.[57] Because there was an air of light graciousness about him, Meinecke and Hintze nicknamed him "Crispulus" or the "Marquis of the Eighteenth Century." Krauske was sensitive to Meinecke's weak moments, his depressions, and constant uncertainties. With a sparkling phrase or gesture, Krauske would bring young Meinecke companionship and good cheer. It was Krauske who awakened in Meinecke a feeling of respect -- an almost religious reverence --

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[55]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 152.

[56]Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 152-161.

[57]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 154.

for life values, culture, and state -- the nuances of humanism, and the ethos of religiosity.[58] As for his historical scholarship, Krauske concentrated on the preparation of publications pertaining to the history of Frederick William I in the Acta Borussica.[59]

Krauske's attitude toward Hintze and Meinecke was one of warm humanity. The relationship of Hintze and Meinecke to Krauske was somewhat different. It was a fusion of spirit and learning, a spiritual-intellectual attraction that held the three.[60] "I need you both," Hintze once said, "Krauske as part of my humanity, Meinecke as part of my intellectual needs."[61] Meinecke's picture of Hintze is of unusual interest for our purposes. This throws light upon Hintze's personality in that Meinecke was more responsive to Hintze than the latter to him. It was Meinecke who took the initiative and invited Hintze to social gatherings. Hintze retained a taciturn quality -- an inborn restraint or native inhibition -- which required special situations and unique friendships to dispel, but once rid of these qualities, Hintze was lively and witty.[62]

Where Krauske was characterized by a direct humanity and Meinecke a brooding, inward sensitivity, Hintze had

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[58] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 154.

[59] Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 153-154.

[60] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 156.

[61] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 156.

[62] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 155.

a repressed nervousness which did not easily invite warmth. Krauske called Hintze "the God-like one," and indeed, there was an Olympian quality about him. One saw the external strength in Hintze. "In our discussions," says Meinecke, "Krauske's speech was like a gushing waterfall. Hintze's words were like a wide and mighty river, with heavy overhanging clouds, constructive, of compelling logic."[63] Krauske wore the softness of the human appeal; Meinecke the softness of a Mozartian perceptiveness; but there was nothing soft about Hintze. He possessed an outward austerity: a massive formidability not unlike the appearances of the great government buildings in Imperial Berlin. It is not difficult to imagine the powerful impression he must have made on students in his teaching days at the University of Berlin. "He appeared to them," noted Meinecke, "like a knight covered from head to foot with a coat of mail, who does not even open his vizier to allow a glimpse of his human face."[64] Later, whenever Meinecke met any of Hintze's students and told them about his pleasant archival days with Hintze, they were much amazed. They could never understand how the Hintze, who was so cold in the classroom and at seminars, so difficult to approach, could resemble the pleasant Hintze that Meinecke recalled with nostalgia.[65]

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[63] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 155.

[64] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 159.

[65] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 160.

Hintze's personality, constructed out of the matrix of inborn restraints, a touch of Prussian bureaucratic pedantry, and an appreciation of external forces in history, rather than the nuances of personality, was accepted with sympathetic understanding by his two friends. However, in their conversations on history and its meaning, Meinecke and Krauske invariably found themselves on one side with Hintze on the other. Often when the three held long discussions on the existence or non-existence of laws in history, Krauske and Meinecke took negative stands, while Hintze the affirmative. What impressed Meinecke was the belief that Hintze possessed no appreciation for the role of individual personalities in history. It was not that Hintze was unaware of the role that individuals played but Meinecke was dismayed that Hintze found institutional development, with its emphasis on collective forces, more important.[66] In 1891, when Meinecke and Hintze spent four weeks together in Switzerland, at Weggis and Engelberg, they sat for hours along the shore of Lake Lucerne, once again discussing the problem of the individual and the collective in history. There, Meinecke came away with two distinct impressions. One, a determination not to overplay the role of individual personality in history. The other, that there were "basic dispositions" that were innate (angeboren) and moved one's systematic thinking to "one position or the other."[67] For his

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[66]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 157.

[67]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 158.

part, Hintze also took an altered approach to the problem.

Now -- to return to Hintze's archival efforts -- the first major fruit of Hintze's activities in the Staatsarchiv was his edition and introduction to the Prussian Silk Industry. Schmoller was so pleased with his performance that he promptly employed Hintze for further tasks. This resulted in Hintze's spending a good part of his time in significant archival work for the Acta Borussica for a period of twenty years.[68] In 1901, volume six of the Acta Borussica, appearing in two parts, dealt with the administration and organization of the Prussian State during the eighteenth century. The first part was a classic introduction by Hintze of more than 600 pages on the administrative organization and general state administration in Prussia during the eighteenth century. Part two consisted of documents, containing over 1,000 pages, edited by Hintze and Schmoller, covering the period, 1740-1745.[69]

In 1904, volume seven appeared;[70] volume eight[71] in

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[68]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 206.

[69]Otto Hintze and Gustav Schmoller, Die Behördenorganisation und die allgemeine Staatsverwaltung Preussens im 18. Jahrhundert (Acta Borussica, Denkmaler der preussischen Staatsverwaltung im 18. Jahrhundert, Band 6, 1. Hälfte: einleitende Darstellung der Behördenorganisation und allgemeinen Verwaltung in Preussen beim Regierungsantritt Friedrichs II; Band 6, 2. Hälfte: Akten vom 31. Mai 1740 bis Ende 1745; Berlin: Paul Parey, 1901).

[70]Otto Hintze and Gustav Schmoller, Acta Borussica, Vol. 7, Documents from January 2, 1746 to May 20, 1748.

[71]Otto Hintze and Gustav Schmoller, Acta Borussica, Vol. 8, Documents from May 31, 1748 to August 1, 1750.

1906; while volumes nine[72] and ten[73] appeared in 1907 and 1910 respectively. These constituted an exemplary job of editing the documents of the Prussian administration from 1746-1756. They are monumental of Hintze's industry and laborious care and testament to his scholarship. Although Hintze, himself, ceased participation in editing individual volumes of the Acta Borussica after volume ten, he continued to take an active role in the organization and administration of the great project. After 1914, he became an academic member of the commission in charge of the Acta, and later, he was made president of the commission.[74] In recognition of his outstanding work with the Acta Borussica, the Prussian Academy of Sciences, in 1932, dedicated volume thirteen of the Acta to Hintze, on his seventieth birthday. The Academy spoke of him as the "carrier and leader of the Acta Borussica for so long a time."[75]

Schmoller is credited for directing Hintze's energies in the realm of Prussian history. Long preoccupation with thousands of archival documents gave Hintze an intimate and specialized knowledge of the institutions and history of Brandenburg-Prussia. His special competence in this field was recognized after the publication of his work on the

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[72]Otto Hintze and Gustav Schmoller, Acta Borussica, Vol. 9, Documents from August 1750 to the end of 1753.

[73]Otto Hintze and Gustav Schmoller, Acta Borussica, Vol. 10, Documents from January 1754 to August 1756.

[74]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 206.

[75]Ernst Posner, Acta Borussica, Behördenorganisation und allgemeine Staatsverwaltung, Vol. 13,(Berlin, 1932), p. v.

Prussian Silk Industry. It is also reflected in his activity in the "Verein für Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg."

Hintze first appeared before the "Verein" in a session held on December 12, 1888, when he spoke on an unpublished memorandum of the minister, von Heinitz, which bore the title "Memoire sur ma gestion du quatrieme et cinquieme departement." The report of Hintze's address in the official journal of the Verein, Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, declared that the address threw "significant clarification on certain moot questions regarding the internal administration of the Frederician state in the years, 1782-1784."[76] From that time on, Hintze took an active function in the Society, playing an increasingly important role. The first editor of the Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte was Reinhold Koser who edited the journal from 1888-1892. In 1892, Albert Naude, who succeeded Koser as editor, edited volumes five through nine. Upon Naude's death, Hintze was chosen as head in 1897.[77] He directed volumes ten to twenty-five of the Forschungen withdrawing as editor in 1912, in favor of Herman von Caemmerer. Hintze's choice as editor for volumes ten to twenty-five was a clear recognition of his active and fruitful years spent in the field of Prussian his-

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[76] "Report of the Sitzungsberichte des Vereins für Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg, Sitzung vom 12. Dezember 1888," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, II (1889), 310.

[77] See Gustav von Schmoller, "Zum Andenken an Albert Naude," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, IX, part II (1897), p. v.

tory.

As a scholar of such excellent attainment in the field of Prussian history, Hintze was not destined exclusively for a career in the Archives. In 1895, his Habilitation at the University of Berlin took place.[78] He became a Privatdozent at the age of thirty-four.[79] In 1899, he was an unpaid assistant professor and was made a full professor in 1902.[80] Since the total number of professorships authorized was already taken up, it was necessary to create a new chair for him, which was all to the satisfaction of Hintze. His professorship was connected with fields of Prussian history and general constitutional history, and during his years at the University of Berlin, Hintze gave a variety of courses concentrated on those subjects.[81] In the April-August semester of 1910, Hintze taught a course on "Prussian Constitutional and Administrative History," and one on the "Development of England as a Trade, Sea, and Colonial Power." He also gave a seminar, "Studies in Constitutional, Administrative, and Economic History."[82] In the semester, October 1910 to March 1911, he taught the following courses: "The Epochs of the History of European

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[78] Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 218.

[79] Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 218.

[80] Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 218.

[81] Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 218.

[82] Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen an der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin in Semester vom 16. April bis 15. August 1910 (Berlin: Universitäts - Buchdruckerei von Gustav Schade (Otto Francke), 1910), pp. 61-62.

State System," "General Constitutional History of the Modern States," "Studies in Prussian Constitutional and Administrative History."[83]

Hintze was extremely active in the "Historical Seminar" at Berlin. In the single year, 1909, he was conducting research on the relations between the Austrian and Burgundian administrative organizations at the time of Maximilian I, on the basis of documents brought to light by Adler, Fellner, Kretschmayr, Walther, and others.[84] He was also investigating, comparatively, American and French constitutional developments during the revolutionary period, and conducting researches of a general nature in English, French, and Prussian constitutional, administrative, and economic history.[85]

Hintze's teaching activity ranged from research on minute topics, of interest only to a specialist, to lectures of a general, broad, and comprehensive sort. He synthesized his findings into a course which he occasionally gave entitled "General Politics and Sociology on a Historical Basis."[86] Hartung, a leading German historian, who knew Hintze well, states that "all of his lectures were distinguished by a clarity of structure, a richness of knowl-

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[83] Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen...in Semester vom 16. Oktober 1910 bis 15. Marz 1911, pp. 61; 62; 64.

[84] Chronik der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin fur das Rechnungsjahr 1909, XXIII (Halle A. Saale: Druck der Buchdruckerei des Waisenhauses, 1910), 83.

[85] Chronik, XXIII, 83.

[86] Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 218.

edge and a breadth of viewpoint.[87] In his seminars, Hintze was a hard taskmaster. His austere nature demanded sober, conscientious work and conceptual clarity on the part of his students.

From 1900-1914, Hintze's stature at the University of Berlin grew steadily. In 1914, when Meinecke was called to Berlin from the University of Freiburg, he rejoined his old friend Hintze on the faculty. He noted that Hintze was at the peak of his power and activity.[88] While the two friends rejoiced that they were together again, they regretted the absence of Krauske, who since 1902 had been an Ordinarius at Königsberg.[89] Yet, a new trinity was formed, at Berlin, of Meinecke, Hintze and Troeltsch.[90]

When Ernst Troeltsch left Heidelberg in the Easter of 1915, he brought to Berlin not only a memory of his friendship with Max Weber at Heidelberg but a mind which was one of the most universal and all-embracing in Germany.[91] Compounded of an extraordinary knowledge of theology and the sociology of religion, the philosophy of history, and the Geisteswissenschaften in general, Troeltsch's mind ranged over vast areas of human knowledge.

These three friends often met at Hintze's dwelling.

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[87]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 218.

[88]Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, p. 154.

[89]Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, p. 155.

[90]Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, p. 155.

[91]Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, p. 155.

Hintze, who had married one of his own students, a younger woman, lived fashionably at the Kurfürstendamm. This marriage was without children. Hintze's wife, being an excellent scholar, the two set up separate workrooms in which each carried on individual research projects. Hintze's wife provided him not only with intellectual companionship but with affection and generous care, for Hintze's eyesight had been steadily failing him, and his general health was deteriorating slowly. The marriage was essential to Hintze's morale and, perhaps, even to his life.[92]

On Saturday afternoons the Hintzes customarily served tea to the students, and after tea hours, invited close friends. It was at these pleasant Saturday afternoon sessions that the three friends, Troeltsch, Hintze, and Meinecke would engage in fruitful conversation. On these occasions, Hintze lost his reluctance, as well as reticence. The warmth of friendship melted away his austere exterior and brought forth wit as well as learning. Hintze, occupying himself with the immediate tasks of being a convivial host, gave Troeltsch the opportunity of exercising the leadership which was formerly Krauske's privilege. Troeltsch possessed a wide range of interests and was a man of enormous and dynamic vitality.[93] Meinecke relates that after many occasions of sitting for hours, discussing the meaning of world history, all three confessed that the ultimate secret of the

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[92]Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, pp. 154-155.

[93]Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, p. 156.

meaning of Weltgeschichte was unfathomable. Yet, each believed, in his own way, that he had come closer to a solution of that mystery.[94] In these conversations Troeltsch and Hintze were often closer to one another than to Meinecke, because the two men shared common interests in the sociological and economic structures of history, whereas Meinecke was less concerned with these very subjects.[95]

The relationship between Hintze and Meinecke was centered in their archival contacts established in the 1880's, and in their teaching days at the University of Berlin. Between these two periods, although Hintze and Meinecke continued to meet occasionally, they maintained communication principally through the journal that Meinecke edited, the Historische Zeitschrift. Meinecke assumed co-editorship of Germany's leading historical journal in March of 1893.[96] Von Sybel, the editor, had fallen out with Max Lehmann, a professor at Marburg, because of Lehmann's attack upon his colleague, Albert Naude in a faculty wrangle at the college.[97] Shortly before Christmas of 1892, Sybel asked Meinecke whether he would take Lehmann's position on the editorial board of the Historische Zeitschrift. Meinecke assented and proceeded to assume full responsibility for approving and editing manuscripts

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[94]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 183.

[95]Meinecke, Strassburg, Freiburg, Berlin, p. 156.

[96]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 182.

[97]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 182.

submitted for publication, as well as choosing the reviewers. Von Sybel confined himself mainly to his activities as "Director of the State Archives."[98] He, "the most universal of Ranke's immediate students," died on August 1, 1895.[99]

Meinecke mourned the passing of his friend and feared for the future of the Historische Zeitschrift, in that he was young and inexperienced in matters affecting the control of a great historical journal. Moreover, the significant Methodenstreit involving Karl Lamprecht's interpretation of history was growing at this time. While the Historische Zeitschrift assumed a negative attitude toward Lamprecht, after von Sybel's death, he, who already controlled Quidde's Zeitschrift, maneuvered to secure control of the Historische Zeitschrift, in hopes of merging it with Quidde's Zeitschrift. Thus, a struggle for power was in the offing.[100]

Meinecke stated to the publisher, Oldenbourg, who asked his opinion on the matter, that the choice of Lamprecht would be a misfortune, and recommended Heinrich von Treitschke as co-editor.[101] At the time Treitschke had quarreled with Hans Delbrück, co-editor of his Preussische Jahrbücher, and the publisher had sided with Delbrück.

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[98] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 183.

[99] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 194.

[100] Meinecke, Erlebtes, pp. 194-195.

[101] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 195.

Treitschke was inclined to accept an offer from the Historische Zeitschrift, which he did in 1895.[102] He died in 1896, but in the short time he was with the Historische Zeitschrift, he proved stimulating and left quite an impression on Meinecke.[103]

Volume seventy-seven of the Historische Zeitschrift showed a new lineup on its title page -- Meinecke was designated as editor. Eight names were listed as contributing editors: Paul Bailley, L. Erhardt, Otto Hintze, Otto Krauske, Max Lenz, Moritz Ritter, Konrad Darrentrapp, and Karl Zeumer.[104] Meinecke's two friends, Hintze and Krauske, were contributing editors to Germany's leading historical journal.

Hintze's first article in the Historische Zeitschrift appeared the following year. It was entitled "Concerning the Individualistic and Collectivistic Interpretation of History."[105] The article was written at the specific request of Meinecke, as a contribution to the Lamprecht controversy.[106] In his memoirs, Meinecke states that he regards this article as one which furnishes the best appraisal made of Lamprecht.[107]

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[102] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 196.

[103] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 197.

[104] Historische Zeitschrift, LXXVII (1896), Title page.

[105] Otto Hintze, "Über individualistische und kollektivistische Geschichtsauffassung," Historische Zeitschrift, LXXVIII (1897), 60-67.

[106] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 205. See below, Ch. VI.

[107] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 205.

In the succeeding years, Hintze continued to be a contributing editor of the Historische Zeitschrift. He enriched the journal with articles and book reviews and generous, wise counsel. On the occasion of their seventieth birthdays, the Historische Zeitschrift dedicated Heft I of volume 145 as a Festgabe to "their old friends and advisors," Otto Hintze and Erick Marcks.[108] It is interesting to note that of the Historische Zeitschrift -- Friedrich Meinecke, Albert Brackmann as editors; E. Caspar, O. Hintze, M. Lenz, E. Marcks, H. Oncken, H. Rothfels, and P. Schramm as contributing editors -- only three: Meinecke, Hintze, and Lenz played a continuous role in the editorship of this journal from 1896 to 1932. In 1933, Hintze was relieved of his contributing editorship to the Zeitschrift partially because of his ill health.[109]

Ill health prescribed many a course in Hintze's career. The eye condition which he contracted early in life, plagued him until death. Shortly before his marriage, he had suffered badly. By 1918, Hintze's condition was so that he was forced to relinquish his teaching activity at the University of Berlin.[110] Two years later, he was relieved of all active duties connected with the school.[111]

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[108] Historische Zeitschrift, CXLV (1932), dedication page following p. xiii.

[109] Volume 147 of the Historische Zeitschrift, (1932-1933) was the last volume in which Hintze appeared as a co-editor.

[110] Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 220.

[111] Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 220. In the Personal-

He no longer participated in public lectures at the University nor did he take active role in the Verein für Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg.[112]

Though his illness curtailed his activities greatly, it did not curb all of them. Hintze still participated in the proceedings of the Prussian Academy, where he was first made a member on February 16, 1914.[113] He took part in sessions there, and after another illness, he continued in the 1920-1932 years to deliver lectures at the Academy.

That Hintze's mind was still remarkably alert, even though his body was deteriorating, can be ascertained from the number of significant essays and reviews that continued to pour from his pen between the years, 1920-1938.[114] Unable any longer to work with archival material, for the

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verzeichnis of the University of Berlin, 123 Rektoratsjahr, (1932-1933), p. 40, Hintze is still listed as being on the staff.

[112] Hartung, "Otto Hintze," pp. 220-221.

[113] Abhandlungen der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische klasse, Jahrgang 1914 (Berlin: Verlag der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Kommission bei Georg Reimer), p. xxxvi.

[114] The most important were the following: "Max Webers Soziologie," Schmoller's Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft, L (1926), 83-95; "Max Scheler's Ansichten über Geist und Gesellschaft," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXI (1926), 40-79; "Kelsen's Staatslehre," Historische Zeitschrift, CXXXV (1927), 66-75; "Troeltsch und die Probleme des Historismus," Historische Zeitschrift, CXXXV (1927), 188-239; "Gustav von Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, II (1928), 124-134. "Wesen und Verbreitung des Feudalismus," Sitzungberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische klasse, XX (1929), 321-347; "Wesen und Verbreitung des Feudalismus," Die Welt als Geschichte, IV (1938), 157-190; "Soziologische und geschichtliche Staatsauffassung; zu Franz Oppenheimers Sys-

lack of physical stamina for exhaustive "microscopic" researches, Hintze concentrated his energies on a series of studies concerning the "macroscopic" structure of historical forms. The results were admirable in insight and historical understanding, including, as Meinecke phrases it, "some magnificent investigations into the morphology of state forms."[115]

There was an undeniable parallel between the schism that Hintze detected in post-war Germany and the schism that was increasingly manifesting itself in him. His frequent reference to the unhealthy condition of Germany after World War I was likened to the unhealthy state within his own body. He contrasted the schism between the "mind" and the "social body" of post-war Germany, but that very separation was going on "in miniature" within Hintze. Thus, in the very

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tem der Soziologie," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXVI (1929), 35-106; "Der moderne Kapitalismus als historisches Individuum; ein kritscher Bericht über Sombarts Werk, Das Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus," Historische Zeitschrift, CXXXIX (1929), 457-509; "Wirtschaft und Politik im Zeitalter des modernen Kapitalismus," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXVII (1929), 1-28; "Typologie der ständischen Verfassungen des abendlandes," Historische Zeitschrift, CXLI (1930), 229-248; "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXVIII (1930), 1-21; "Weltgeschichtliche Bedingungen der Reprasentativverfassung," Historische Zeitschrift, CXLIII (1931), 1-47; "Kalvinismus und Staatsräson in Brandenburg zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhundert," Historische Zeitschrift, CXLIV (1931), 229-286; "Wesen und Wandlung des modernen staates," Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische klasse, XXX (1931), 790-815; "Die Entstehung des modernen Staatslebens," Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische klasse, XXXI (1932), 925-929.

[115]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 159.

breakdown of Germany there was much reflection in this man. Just as the Nazi revolution did not fundamentally prevent the disintegration of Germany, so too, the coming of Hitler signified nothing positive (spiritually or physically) for Hintze. The disintegration continued until April 25, 1940 in "sorrowful isolation,"[116] until Otto Hintze passed from this life -- a world gone -- never to be resurrected!

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[116] Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 154.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICISM AND DROYSEN

In his celebrated essay on "German Schools of History," Lord Acton observed that "historical writing was old, but historical thinking was new in Germany when it sprang from the shock of the French Revolution."[1] Previously, according to Acton, history lacked autonomy: it "was subordinate to other things, to divinity, philosophy, and law."[2] In the aftermath of the Revolution, history ceased to be a servant and became a master; "and the story worth telling would be the process of emancipation by which the servant of many masters rose to be a master over them, and having become a law to itself, imposed it on others."[3]

Acton's essay was written in 1886. Since then, the story of the gradual emancipation of history from intellectual "servitude and the rise of a specific historical consciousness" has frequently been told.[4] Perhaps the outstanding account of the origins and rise of the modern his-

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[1]John Dalberg-Acton, "German Schools of History," Historical Essays and Studies, ed., J. Figgis and R. Laurence (London: Macmillan and Company, 1907), p. 345. The essay first appeared in the English Historical Review, I (1886), 7-42.

[2]Acton, "German Schools of History," p. 344.

[3]Acton, "German Schools of History," p. 344.

[4]See, for example, Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung

torical "attitude" of mind is Meinecke's important work on the origins of historicism.[5]

With matchless skill and un unfailing sense for the nuances of intellectual currents and ideas, he has traced the origins of historicism in the application of

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des Historismus (2nd ed.; München: Leibniz Verlag, 1946); Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Geist und Geschichte vom Deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart, 2 vols., 1950-51; Fritz Wagner, Geschichtswissenschaft, 1951; Erich Rothacker, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, (2nd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag, 1930); Joachim Wach, Das Verstehen, Grundzüge einer Geschichte der hermeneutischen Theorie im 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag, 1926-33), 3 vols.; Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und Seine Probleme (Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag, 1922); Moritz Ritter, Die Entwicklung der Geschichtswissenschaft an den führenden Werken betrachtet (München, Berlin: H. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1919); Harry Elmer Barnes, A History of Historical Writing (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937); J. W. Thompson and B. J. Holm, A History of Historical Writing, 1942. Vol. II; Benedetto Croce, Teoria e storia della Storiografia (6th ed.; Bari: Laterza e Figli, 1948); Carlo Antoni, La Lotta contro la Ragione (Firenze: Sansoni, 1942); Carlo Antoni, Dallo Storicismo alla Sociologia (Firenze: Sansoni, 1940); Eduard Fueter, Geschichte der neueren Historiographie (3rd ed.; München, Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1936); George P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century (2nd ed.; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913).

[5]F. Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (2nd ed.; München: Leibniz Verlag, 1946); and consult the following discussions of Meinecke's book: Charles A. Beard and Alfred Vagts, "Currents of Thought in Historiography," American Historical Review, XLII (1937), 460-483; Erich Seeberg, "Zur Entstehung des Historismus," Historische Zeitschrift, CLVII (1937), 241-266; G. P. Gooch, "Some Conceptions of History," Sociological Review, XXXI (1939), 233-247. Walther Hofer, Geschichtesschreibung und Weltanschauung, Betrachtungen zum Werk Friedrich Meineckes (München: Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1950), 319-545; Eugene Anderson, "Meinecke's Ideengeschichte and the Crisis in Historical Thinking," Medieval and Historiographical Essays in Honor of James Westfall Thompson, ed., J. Cate and E. Anderson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 361-396; Philip J. Wolfson, Friedrich Meinecke: A Study in German Historiography (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of History, University of Chicago, 1951), pp. 97-125; Louis L. Snyder, German Nation-

new principles of life (Lebensprinzipien) to the realm of history during the period from Leibniz to Goethe's death.[6] This application was part of a larger intellectual development within the Western world. The precursors of historicism were to be found in Leibniz and Shaftesbury, Gottfried Arnold, Vico, and Lafitau. The Enlightenment, Meinecke shows, contributed its share to the rise of modern historicism with such historians as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Gibbon, and Robertson.[7] English preromanticism played an especially significant role in the rise of historicism by emphasizing the importance of taste and individuality of feeling; and in the case of Burke, of Christian religiosity, vitalistic historial tradition, and the function of the organic state.[8] But the crowning point in the rise of modern historicism took place in Germany, in what Meinecke called "the German Movement" (Die deutsche Bewegung).[9] This movement began with Lessing and Winkelmann, gaining momentum with Möser and Herder, and it finally attained a preliminary synthesis in Goethe, who united the diversities of relative and absolute, of idealised and individualised modes of thought.[10]

What, it may well be asked, is the focal point of

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alism: the Tragedy of a People, Extremism Contra Liberalism in Modern German History (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1952), pp. 255-283.

[6]Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, p. 2.

[7]Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, pp. 118-248.

[8]Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, pp. 248-307.

[9]Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, pp. 307-614.

[10]Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, p. 608.

historicism? What is its essence? What distinguished it as a way of looking at the world? Meinecke finds the answers to these questions in the idea that the "kernel of historicism consists in substituting for a generalised conception of historical-human forces, an individualised conception."[11] Instead of searching primarily after general laws and the typical, historicism emphasizes unique individuality and the idea of dynamic development. Instead of placing stress on natural rights, pragmatism, and intellectualism, historicism seeks to unearth a new world of unique, dynamically-developing, individual expressions.

The coming of historicism is, for Meinecke, one of the truly profound revolutions which the Western world has undergone.[12] It marks a decisive turning point in the life of Western man; for, from the time of the Greeks, through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, Reformation, and to the close of the Enlightenment, the structure of thinking of European man was largely shaped by his faith in natural law and rationalism. He accepted a belief in a fixed natural order as a primary datum of his existence; and the search for the immutable laws that governed and regulated this order was of principal interest to him. The rise of historicism was nothing less than a break with this ancient European tradition. It set up an elevation of importance of the particular over the general -- the irrational over the rational --

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[11]Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, p. 2.

[12]Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, p. 608.

in the pitting of historical world against the world of natural law and order.[13] The coming of historicism signifies for Meinecke a new way of looking at the world -- a specifically historical way. But this new historical approach to the world was not confined merely to the historian. Historicism signified a new way of looking "at human life in general."[14] Both the world and man were conceived as a process of growth and development -- of evolution and transformation.

For both Acton and Meinecke, the culmination of historicism was to be found in the situation in Germany after the French Revolution. It was here that historicism experienced its sharpest expression, and it was here that the growth of a historical attitude of mind assumed its most self-conscious form. Nineteenth-century historical thought and activity centered in Germany. Whether one thinks of its leading practioners such as Ranke, its methodology as in the case of Droysen's Historik, or of the grandiose attempts to historicize whole realms of culture as law, philology, and economics -- it is Germany that leads.

No other country was so profoundly affected by the growth of the modern historical attitude of mind during the nineteenth century; and paradoxically enough, no other country underwent so early and so deeply a crisis

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[13]See Karl Löwith, "Nature, History, and Existentialism," Social Research, XIX (1952), 83-84.

[14]Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, p. 609.

as did Germany after Nietzsche's time.[15] By contrast, the crisis of historicism has scarcely affected an Anglo-Saxon country such as England. Only since World War II, with historians such as Toynbee and Butterfield, has the problem there assumed a "Teutonic" seriousness.[16] France has likewise not been seriously disturbed by a crisis of historicism, although Borkenau contends that Sorel played a role

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[15]See, for example, Carlo Antoni, Dalla Storicismo alla Sociologia, (Firenze, 1940); Raymond Aron, La philosophie critique de l'histoire, essai sur une theorie allemande de l'histoire (2nd. ed.; Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1950); Gerhard Krueger, Die Geschichte im Denken der Gegenwart (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1947); Fritz Kaufmann, Geschichtsphilosophie der Gegenwart, philosophische Forschungsberichte, Heft 10 (Berlin: Junker und Dunnhäupt, 1931); Julius Schaaf, Geschichte und Begriff (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag, 1946); Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, (Tübingen, 1922); Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Überwindung, fünf Vorträge (Berlin: Pan Verlag, 1924); Eugene Anderson, "Meinecke's Ideengeschichte and the Crisis in Historical Thinking," Medieval and Historiographical Essays in Honor of James Westfall Thompson (Chicago, 1938), pp. 261-396; Karl Joel, "Geschichtsphilosophische Problematik seit der Jahrhundertwende," Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, XX (1930), 199-221; Karl Mannheim, "Historismus," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LII (1934), 1-60; Gerhard Masur, "Zur gegenwartigen Lage der Geschichtsphilosophie," Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, XVIII (1928), 104-125; Ernst Troeltsch, "Die Krisis des Historismus," Neue Rundschau, XXXIII (1922), 572-590; Friedrich Meinecke, Schaffender Spiegel, Studien zur deutschen Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsauffassung (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler Verlag, 1948), pp. 211-236; Karl Heussi, Die Krisis des Historismus (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag, 1932).

[16]Mario M. Rossi, "La filosofia della storia in Inghilterra," Nuova Rivista Storica, XXXVI (1952), 122-135; Karl D. Erdmann, "Das Problem des Historismus in der Neueren Englischen Geschichtswissenschaft," Historische Zeitschrift, CLXX (1950), 73-77. The writings of R. G. Collingwood should also be consulted. For nineteenth-century implications of Historismus in England, see Duncan Forbes, The Liberal Anglican Idea of History (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1952); and Klaus Dockhorn, Der deutsche Historismus in England; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1950).

analogous to that of Nietzsche in undermining confidence in traditional modes of historical thinking.[17] Of the Latin countries, it is only Italy, with Croce, Gentile, and the followers of neo-idealism, that has seriously involved itself in a genuine "crisis" of historicism.

Whoever wishes to understand the full meaning and development of modern historicism must concentrate on Germany. There, one can most adequately watch the full flowering of three great phases in the cycle of development of modern historicism. The first phase is the rise of historicism, centering in the "German movement" from Winkelmann to Goethe. The second phase might be called the "growth of historicism,"[18] and it extends from Ranke to Dilthey.[19] The third phase, the "crisis of historicism," extends from Nietzsche to the present. This last phase is characterized by a disturbing and persistent questioning of the meaning and validity of a purely "historical" approach to the world, by a dread that the historical attitude promotes either quiescent antiquarianism or a sterile relativism. The "crisis of historicism" is distinguished by

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[17] Franz Borkenau, "Die Krise des Historismus - ein deutsches Problem," Drei Abhandlungen zur deutschen Geschichte (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1947), p. 76.

[18] Friedrich Engel-Janosi, The Growth of German Historicism (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LXII, No. 2, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1944).

[19] Specifically from the publication of Ranke's Geschichte der Romanischen und Germanischen Voelker (1824) to Dilthey's Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1883).

various attempts to go "beyond" history through the employment of myth as in the case of the Nazis; through the idea of transcendence as in the instance of Max Scheler; or through the search for more permanent norms in science and society as in the example of developments within German sociology.

In the first period of historicism, that of its rise, the keyword is "freedom"; and the problem is how a specifically historical way of looking at the world could arise by "freeing" itself from the approach of the Enlightenment which stressed generic and typical uniformities in human nature and social patterns. During the second phase of historicism, that of its growth, the keyword is "expansion." The problem is how this new and specifically historical attitude of mind can expand to embrace and master new fields of activity. In the third and "crisis" phase of historicism, from Nietzsche to the present, the keyword is "containment." The problem is one of preventing the historical approach, which, seemingly, triumphs everywhere during the nineteenth century from exercising an intellectual tyranny. The question is how to do justice to the richness and infinite variety of the historical world, and yet provide room for some sort of absolute and normative pattern in human existence.

The full account of this great cycle of modern historicism in Germany -- its brilliant creative unfolding in German classicism and preromanticism, its rampant tropical growth spreading luxuriously over areas of knowledge, its

problematic "pathos" since Nietzsche has not yet been written. And no wonder! The task is a gigantic one. It is possible, however, to approach certain limited aspects of this problem more modestly and to hope that some light can be shed, by viewing the development and crisis of historicism through the narrower perspective of an individual personality.

In Otto Hintze, this opportunity is present. While Hintze's writings contribute nothing substantial to the understanding of the "rise" of modern historicism, they are a valuable commentary on the "growth and crisis" of German historicism. His writings afford us an interpretation of the growth of German historicism from the time of Ranke and Droysen to that of Dilthey and Lamprecht, and the onset of the great crisis in German historicism during the twentieth century can be studied by Hintze's information. Through his activities, intellectual and social milieu, writings, Hintze offers greater understanding of basic transformation in German historical thought.

Hintze began his career as a historian under the influence of two leading representatives of nineteenth-century German historicism -- Droysen and Ranke. Droysen's influence was direct, and Hintze studied under his guidance as a student at the University of Berlin. Ranke's influence came to Hintze mainly by way of two of Hintze's teachers who were devoted followers of Ranke: Julius Weizsäcker and Georg Waitz.

As Hintze saw it, the growth of German historicism,

reflected in Johann Gustav Droysen, could be studied in the biographical sketches of the latter. He devoted two important articles to Droysen: in 1904, he wrote an account[20] of Droysen's life for the monumental Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, and in 1930, on the occasion of the publication of Hübner's definitive edition of Droysen's Correspondence, Hintze wrote a second article on Droysen entitled "J. G. Droysen and the German Conception of State in the Nineteenth Century."[21] Together, these articles constitute a source for understanding Hintze's views on Droysen's place in nineteenth-century historicism.

A period of twenty-six years separates the appearance of the two articles. They reflect different stages in Hintze's development as a historian, but nevertheless, the two accounts are bound together by an inner unity. Hintze saw in Droysen not only an intellectual force and outstanding academic personality but, above all, a figurehead in the shift of German intellectual and spiritual life (Geistesleben) around the middle of the nineteenth century, from "literary-aesthetic to ethical-political interests."[22]

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[20]Otto Hintze, "Johann Gustav Droysen," Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1904), XLVIII, 82-114. This article is reprinted in Otto Hintze, Zur Theorie der Geschichte, pp. 150-195. All further page citations to this article refer to this latter work. Hereafter, it will be cited as Hintze, "Droysen."

[21]Otto Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXVIII (1930), 1-21; this article is reprinted in Zur Theorie der Geschichte, pp. 195-213.

[22]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 150.

In both articles, Hintze sought to interpret Droysen's life not only as pure biography, which mirrors the process whereby the Germans, the "people of the poet and the thinker, proceeded to create a state."[23] And so Hintze saw in Droysen leading ideas, forces, and large intellectual currents. The biography of Droysen became for him, as it did for Meinecke, a form of history of ideas (Ideengeschichte) and intellectual history (Geistesgeschichte).[24] In none of his later biographical writings, such as those on Schmoller and Koser, did Hintze reveal quite the same combination of the delineation of individual personality together with an awareness of intellectual-social background. The initial Droysen article possesses warmth of understanding and sympathetic comprehension, and it is indicative of a warm relationship between student and teacher. It is no wonder that Erich Rothacker, a leading authority on the development of the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) in Germany, considered this article on Droysen as the best account of the great historian yet written.[25]

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[23]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 150.

[24]Friedrich Meinecke, "Johann Gustav Droysen, sein Briefwechsel und seine Geschichtsschreibung," Historische Zeitschrift, CXLI (1930), 249-288; F. Meinecke, "Droysen's Historik," Vom Geschichtlichen Sinn und vom Sinn der Geschichte (5th ed.; Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler Verlag, 1951), 40-46.

[25]Erich Rothacker, in the introduction to Johann Gustav Droysen, Grundriss der Historik (Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaft, ed., E. Rothacker, Vol. I; Halle Saale: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1925), p. ix. It should be noted that Rothacker's remark was written in 1924, prior to the appearance of Meinecke's studies on Droysen. That Hintze's articles on

Hintze's aim in dealing with Droysen was to unfold his life and career in terms of developmental phases, and yet, he wished to reveal these phases as manifestations of an underlying unity. It was necessary to weave in the four great forces that influenced Droysen -- Prussianism, Hellenism, German idealism, and Christianity -- into the large pattern. It was essential for Hintze not to separate too sharply the scholarly and historiographical aspects of Droysen from the political, to place them all properly within the matrix of his colorful life.

On the basis of external circumstances and the exigencies of politics, Hintze distinguished three periods of development in Droysen's life. The first period extended from 1808 until his appointment at the University of Kiel in 1840. The classical-aesthetic motif was a leading one in this quiet Berlin phase of Droysen's life.[26] The second period of Droysen's life occupied the decade between 1840-1850. Droysen became actively involved in the national political struggles of the day. He shifted his orientation from an aesthetic Hellenism to a militant concern for the fate and destiny of his fatherland. Hintze was aware that in this second period of Droysen's life there was a remarkable fusion

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Droysen are fundamental in the literature on Droysen can also be gleaned from the statement of Felix Gilbert in Johann Gustav Droysen und die preussischdeutsche Frage (München und Berlin: Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1931), p. 1; Gooch, History and Historians of the Nineteenth Century, p. 134, ranks the initial Droysen article as among the best brief surveys.

[26]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 150.

of science and politics.[27] The shattering of political aspirations by 1850 led into the third phase of Droysen's life which extended from 1850 until his death in 1884. The symbiosis of science and active politics was severed, and the professorial, scholarly dimension in Droysen loomed larger than the activistic, political. And, yet, Hintze interpreted this third period of Droysen's life as shaped by a new union of science and politics. For both at Jena and especially at Berlin, Droysen rewrote the history of Prussia in terms of its "preordained" destiny to act as the unifying force of Germany.[28] Thus, scholarship and the political ideal were once again welded -- though on a different plane this time.

Despite these shifts in the external career of Droysen, Hintze found an inner unity in Droysen's total personality -- a unity which resulted from the fusion of three forces, a "spiritual individuality," a philosophical idea-world, derived from German idealism, and a "practical-political directive."[29] These blended together to produce in Droysen an inner dynamics which concretely united ideal and real forces.

In his account of the first period of Droysen's life, Hintze called attention to Droysen's Prussianism. He saw the uniquely Prussian, "specifische Preussentum," in Droysen as having its origins not in the particularistic state of Frederick the Great but stemming rather out of the reform period of

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[27]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 150.

[28]Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 150-151.

[29]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 151.

Stein and Scharnhorst.[30] Droysen's childhood recollections went back to the Wars of Liberation. In a letter to the minister of State Theodor von Schon, Droysen recalled his childhood memory of Blücher and Scharnhorst visiting his father, and Blücher, lifting young Droysen up unto his horse.[31] The Wars of Liberation, the cry of freedom from foreign domination, the attempt to reorganize state administration and transform bourgeois society and the army: these were regarded by Hintze as constituting the initial basis of Droysen's Prussianism.[32]

Hintze also discovered the roots of Droysen's Hellenism in the first phase of his life. Droysen's studies at the University of Berlin under Boeckh were a considerable influence. Other professors of classical philology at Berlin such as Lange, Stuhr, Lachmann, and Bernhardy, contributed to the shaping of Droysen into a classical philologist.[33] Yet, Hintze emphasized that Droysen's Hellenism never became the slave of an excessive philological preoccupation; instead it was always historically oriented. The main thing about Droysen's Hellenism, according to Hintze, was his overwhelming desire "to capture the living spirit of antiquity."[34]

The first great expression of this was Droysen's

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[30]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 152.

[31]Letter to Theodor von Schoen, Kiel, March 9, 1850. (In Droysen's Briefwechsel, Vol. I, 615).

[32]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 152.

[33]Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 154-155.

[34]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 155.

translation of the plays of Aeschylus. Hintze pointed out, that from a strict philological standpoint, the translation was not exact. Yet, what was lacking in literal accuracy was more than compensated for in Droysen's "fine feeling for the artistic intent of the poet."[35] Translated with poetic power, with understanding and empathy, the Aeschylus translation was an artistic masterpiece. But it was even more. Though it revealed the full scope of Droysen's aesthetic-Hellenism, it also carried undertones of Droysen's political interest. The translation of the "Persae" evoked the freedom cry of the Wars of Liberation.[36] In an elaborate introduction to the plays, Droysen infused political consideration into his classical aestheticism. He attacked the absolute state of the eighteenth century. He praised the Wars of Liberation. He approved a liberalizing of Prussian politics.[37]

Hintze noted that the political element became more and more insistent in Droysen's Hellenism. His first great historical work on Alexander the Great written in 1833,[38] was shaped by the "great political problem which confronted the German patriots since the Wars of Liberation." Hintze found in Droysen's Alexander a total conception and a political perspective influenced directly by the analogy with con-

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[35] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 156.

[36] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 156.

[37] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 157. See also Felix Gilbert, Johann Gustav Droysen und die preussischdeutsche Frage, p. 5.

[38] J. G. Droysen, Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen

temporary German conditions.[39] Nevertheless, Hintze did not regard Droysen as falsifying the historical picture.[40] There was a correct analogy between the Macedonian military monarchy and Prussia, the divergent and particularistic Hellenic city-states and the "deutsche Kleinstaaten," between Macedonia's ability to provide a form of national political regeneration and the demand for a national unified state under Prussian hegemony.[41]

Hintze found in this work on Alexander not only the living spirit of Hellenism and an expression of a political motif, but also an influence of German idealism.[42] When Droysen was a student at Berlin, the University was under the direct influence of Hegelianism, and Droysen attended the lectures of Hegel on the philosophy of history.[43] On the very difficult question of Hegel's influence on Droysen, Hintze insisted that Droysen was influenced by Hegel, but that he was no strict Hegelian.[44] In the work on Alexander,

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(Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1833).

[39]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 157.

[40]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 157.

[41]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 157.

[42]Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 157-158.

[43]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 154.

[44]See, for example, Hermann Heller, Hegel und der nationale Machtstaatsgedanke in Deutschland, ein Beitrag zur politischen Geistesgeschichte (Leipzig, Berlin: Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1921), pp. 176-182; Bertha Becker, Johann Gustav Droysen's Geschichtsauffassung, doctoral dissertation (Hamburg: Buchdruckerei Willgeroth und Menzel, 1928), p. 20; Ernst Meister, "Die geschichtsphilosophischen Voraussetzungen von J. G. Droysens 'Historik,'" Historische Viertel-

Hintze saw a Hegelian influence present in Droysen's notion that the great universal, historical-cultural idea of Hellenism was embodied in the person of Alexander. This represented an expression of world-moving ideas incorporated in the heroes of history.[45] Yet, according to Hintze, Droysen removed this conception from the vague arena of metaphysical-historical speculation. He grounded it instead on the firm bed of historical narration based on a knowledge of the sources. Moreover, Droysen's attempt to relate universal ideas to particular personalities was, as Hintze realized, an aspect of the development of the doctrine of the role of ideas in history (historische Ideenlehre) as represented in Wilhelm von Humboldt and other followers of German idealism.[46]

The work on Alexander revealed Droysen's great gifts at understanding historical personalities. Droysen's under-

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jahrschrift, XXIII (1926), pp. 35-36; 45; 52-63; Joachim Wach, Das Verstehen, Vol. III, 141-149; Hildegard Astholz, Das Problem "Geschichte" untersucht bei Johann Gustav Droysen (Historische Studien, ed.; E. Ebering; Berlin: Verlag Dr. Emil Ebering, 1933) passim; Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, p. 306; Willy Moog, Geschichtsphilosophie und Geschichtsunterricht in ihren wichtigsten Problemen (Handbuch für den Geschichtslehrer, ed., O. Kende, Vol. I; Leipzig und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1927), pp. 48-50; Hans Rother, Geschichte und Politik in der Gedankenwelt Johann Gustav Droysens (Historische Studien, ed., E. Ebering, Vol. 268; Berlin: Verlag Dr. Emil Ebering, 1935), pp. 22-26; E. Rothacker, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 2nd ed.; pp. 173-178; Felix Gilbert, Johann Gustav Droysen und die preussischdeutsche Frage, pp. 21-25.

[45] Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 157-158.

[46] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 158. See on the development of the historische Ideenlehre, J. Goldriedrich, Die historische Ideenlehre in Deutschland (Berlin: H. Heyfelder, 1902).

standing of Alexander functioned on two levels. He linked up the personality of Alexander with a great universal-historical process -- Hellenism. He also revealed Alexander's view on individuality of personality. Droysen sought to understand Alexander in each unique situation with which his hero was faced. He tried to grasp each decision of Alexander's as novel and individual views.[47] Now it is significant that Hintze paid considerable attention to Droysen's ability to understand Alexander as part of a world historical process -- Hellenism -- and scarcely any attention to Droysen's capacity to masterfully delineate the uniqueness of Alexander as a personality. Thus, Hintze's interpretation of Droysen's emphasis on individuality pertains not to the personality of Alexander but to the uniqueness of the whole Hellenistic Age.[48] Hintze found in Droysen's characteristics of the Hellenistic Age a cardinal indication of historicism, namely individuality.

Although Droysen did not wholly free himself from the idea of the normative perfection of the classical age, later Hellenism represented to him a new and unique development to be understood in terms of universal ideas and forces, inner principles, and distinctive dynamism. Hintze also recognized Droysen's interest in demonstrating the importance of this age for the general history of mankind.[49] And

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[47]See, for example, J. G. Droysen, Geschichte Alexandes Grossen, pp. 248, 324, 469.

[48]Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 158-159.

[49]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 159.

so it was of much importance to Hintze that Droysen showed the significance of the Hellenistic Age for the future development of the Roman, Sassanid, and Mohammedan empires.[50] But Droysen accomplished this by recognizing that the Hellenistic Age had smashed the old national cultures and fused together a unique constellation of eastern and western life.[51] Its development was part of a universal-historical process that continued well into medieval times. What was important to Hintze was that Droysen united in this work on Hellenism a conception of historical individuality of an epoch, together with a universal-historical idea of development.[52]

Hintze saw an important transition during the second period of Droysen's life, because it marked a break with his predominantly aesthetic-humanistic interests. It is true that these interests had gradually become suffused with a political ethos. Nevertheless, these interests still centered about a contemplative life. But in the decade from 1840-1850, Droysen turned to the active political life. His values shifted from antiquity to realistic politics. This transference was a miniature reflection in Droysen of a larger process in Germany, leading to the formation of a national state.[53]

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[50]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 159.

[51]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 159.

[52]Compare Hintze's treatment of Droysen's Hellenism with the following; Bertha Becker, Johann Gustav Droysen's Geschichtsauffassung, pp. 43-58; Felix Gilbert, Johann Gustav Droysen und die Preussischdeutsche Frage, pp. 25-35.

[53]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 162.

Hintze found an excellent expression of this new shift in Droysen in the latter's Lectures on the Wars of Liberation (1846).[54] These lectures, delivered by Droysen during the winter of 1842-1843, constituted a general European history from the revolt of the American Colonies to the Peace of Vienna and the Wars of Liberation. Not based on an exhaustive analysis of the sources, they lacked the meticulous scholarship of detailed research. Yet, they were regarded by Hintze as highly significant in the development of nineteenth-century historicism.[55]

The reason is that the Lectures incorporated, despite their popular tone, seminal ideas of the first order. Hintze found such a seminal idea in Droysen's concept of freedom. Droysen believed that freedom in Fichte's sense, the moral fulfillment of self-determination, characterized the age he was describing. But Droysen applied this concept of freedom in a novel and fruitful manner. He realized that "the external freedom and independence of states must correspond to their inner freedom."[56] The power of the state must be tied up "to the saving and reviving elements of free self-determination."[57] This concept that the inner and outer freedom of the state are interrelated, and that there is consequently a close relationship between the inner constitution

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[54]J. G. Droysen, Vorlesungen über die Freiheitskriege (Kiel: Universität Buchhandlung, 1846), 2 Vols.

[55]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 163.

[56]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 162.

[57]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 162.

of a state and its outer foreign policy, was influential on Hintze's interpretation of history. In addition to the concept of freedom, Hintze considered Droysen's Lectures as significant because they viewed the contemporary epoch from a wide historical horizon. Droysen paid attention not only to the life of states, but he grasped economic-social relationships, and he knew how to embrace the intellectual and spiritual life of a people. What is even more important, according to Hintze, is the skill with which Droysen revealed this role of the state, economic-social relationships, and intellectual-spiritual life as part of a unified total historical process (Gesamtprozess). His grasp of larger perspectives was remarkable.[58]

The second period of Droysen's life, which saw his intervention in active politics, was characterized by a growing awareness of the role of power in the formation, activity and behaviour of the state. Indeed, Hintze regarded this period as furnishing Droysen with concrete illustrations of the indispensability of power in the political arena. As Hintze interpreted Droysen, the problem was not simply one of power (Macht). Rather, it involved the relationship of spirit (Geist) and power (Macht). In the first period of Droysen's life, his interest had centered around the nature

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[58]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 163. Both Meinecke and Gilbert share Hintze's judgment regarding the Vorlesungen. Meinecke in the Historische Zeitschrift, CXLI (1930), p. 267, speaks of the Vorlesungen as exhibiting the "zusammenwirken politischer kultur-und universal-geschichtlicher Impulse..." On the same page he states, "Aber es leistete im Gesamtplane und in Auswahl wie Ausdehnung des Stoffes etwas, was seither von der grossen Geschichtschreibung, soweit ich sehe, nie wieder geleistet worden ist."

of Geist. Droysen's poetic endeavors, his aesthetic-Hellenism, his idealism, were all aspects of a realm of Geist. In his second phase of Droysen's life, his interests centered around the problem of Macht. From 1840-1850, as a professor in Kiel, he was involved actively in the Schleswig-Holstein question and in constitutional deliberations of the Frankfurt Paulskirche.[59]

Hintze traced Droysen's growing interest in the problem of power during this period.[60] Droysen had participated in the uprisings of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and the establishment of a provisional government on March 23, 1848.[61] He was sent by the provisional government to Frankfurt to seek acknowledgment by the diet of the German Confederation of the newly-created government; and he was part of the Committee of Seventeen invited to take part in the work of drafting a new constitution. In analyzing

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[59]Hintze, "Johann Gustav Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 196.

[60]The problem of Macht in Droysen and the relationship between Geist and Macht in his basic ideas is a controversial issue in the Droysen literature. Felix Gilbert's Johann Gustav Droysen und die preussisch-deutsche Frage attempts to prove that Droysen developed in the years, 1840-47, a political system which made a basic distinction between Macht and Staat, but that this distinction disappeared in Droysen, as a result of his unfortunate experiences in the revolution of 1848-49. See Ch. III of Gilbert's book, pp. 50-78, entitled "Droysen's politisches System 1840-1847." Gilbert is inclined to see a basic cleavage between the first period of Geist in Droysen, and the second period of Macht. See Gilbert, Johann Gustav Droysen, p. 120. On the other hand, Hans Rother in his Geschichte und Politik in der Gedankenwelt Johann Gustav Droysens (Berlin, 1935), argues that Gilbert exaggerates the cleavage in Droysen (p. 95) and that Droysen recognized the role of Macht early as part of the "Sittliche Aufgabe des Staates."

[61]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 167.

a book that Droysen published in 1849, on Contributions to the most recent Period of German History,[62] Hintze held that Droysen's work with the Committee of Seventeen did not rest on a belief that the main issue before the Committee was the drafting of a constitution. Droysen, in fact, regarded this as a doctrinaire issue.[63] The principal issue for Droysen, according to Hintze, was that of establishing a unified frame for Germany, a task which he believed could be entrusted to the Diet of the German Confederation. The proposal which the Committee of Seventeen submitted, under the direct advice and stimulation of Droysen, was directed toward such an end. It called for the energetic pursuit of military matters and foreign affairs. It recommended a general arming of the people by means of the extension of the Prussian system of universal conscription. It requested the creation of a German navy, and it demanded, finally, that the Diet actively take in its hands the management of foreign affairs.[64]

Nothing came of these measures. The task of framing a constitution did not devolve upon the Diet but passed to the National Assembly. Droysen was chosen a representative to the assembly from Holstein.[65] He belonged to the Right Center Party along with men as Dahlmann, Gervinus, Arndt,

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[62] J. G. Droysen, Beiträge zur neuesten deutschen Geschichte (Braunschweig: Vieweg and Sohn, 1849).

[63] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 167.

[64] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 168.

[65] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 169.

and Grimm. Droysen worked steadily for a strong imperial power under the Hohenzollerns. But as Hintze says, "He put the main emphasis on the question of power, that is, on the relation of the individual states to the central power, and especially on the relation of the new federal states to Austria."[66]

The rejection of the constitution by Frederick William IV marked the failure of the attempt to give Germany unity by means of parliamentary techniques. Droysen, henceforth, was more and more persuaded, argued Hintze, that the Frankfurt experiences meant only one thing: "that the German question must be a power one (Machtfrage), that the Prussian government must be left to find the way to solution."[67]

Hintze found the evidence for this contention in the essay on "Prussia and the System of Great Powers," which was published in Droysen's work on essays in modern history.[68] In this essay, Droysen found that the German question is primarily an askance of foreign policy (auswärtige Politik). To believe that it can be resolved through internal or national decisions alone is a mistake. To argue that the German problem is a matter of freedom, in so far as freedom means internal self-determination, is a fallacy. The problem is one of power, or, rather -- powers. Power does

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[66]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 170.

[67]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 172.

[68]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 172. See J. G. Droysen, "Preussen und das System der Grössmächte," Abhandlungen zur

not exist in a unitary sense. It is not substance but relationship, and to grasp its meaning, it is necessary to see Germany's power in relations to others, particularly that of Austria. And without the achievement of such a proper power relationship from without, internal freedom is meaningless. Prussia must thus adjust herself to an adequate power relationship with the other German states, and Germany must also find an adequate power relationship to the other great powers. Only in this manner can the German problem be solved.[69]

Hintze's interpretation of Droysen's concept of power during his second period having been described, it is necessary to indicate more closely the connection that Hintze saw in Droysen between Geist and Macht. It has been shown that Hintze's interpretation of Droysen focused the latter's interests during the first period of his life on the issue of Geist and during the second period, on the question of Macht. One might suppose that Hintze would detect a profound conflict in Droysen during these two periods. Hintze did find a contrast between the "contemplative" Droysen of the first period and the "activistic" of the second. But this contrast was not based on an ultimate dualism. In fact, Hintze regarded any such dualism as false.[70] To pred-

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neueren Geschichte (Leipzig: Veit and Co., 1876), pp. 135-152.

[69]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 172.

[70]Hintze's contention that there is no ultimate dualism in Droysen between Geist and Macht, that the two united concretely in his thought, is supported by Hans Herther, Geschichte und Politik in der Gedankenwelt Johann Gustav Droysen's, pp. 36-57; 95; and Erich Rothacker, "J. G. Droysen's Historik," Mensch und Geschichte (Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag,

icate it was to do violence to the underlying unity in Droysen, despite the presence of shifting emphases in the latter's life. Perhaps the relation of Geist and Macht, as Hintze saw it in Droysen, can be clarified in the following fashion.

Hintze saw clearly that there were two great developments in German history between the period of the Wars of Liberation and Bismarck; one was the unfolding of the idea of Geist as represented in German classicism, romanticism, and idealism. The other was the idea of Staat (state) as present in the attempt to consolidate real power interests and forces. The main characteristics of the political life of the pre-Bismarckian era was a false attempt on the part of many to solve the political problem by removing it to the realm of pure ideas.[71] Any attempt to transfer matters of power and interests to another realm is doomed to failure, according to Hintze. The great merit of Droysen, for Hintze, is that he did not commit this mistake. Droysen realized that the problem of Macht could not be resolved by shifting it to an altogether different realm, that of Geist. Instead, for Droysen, the two realms of Geist and Macht are fused into a concrete dynamic. They do not stand opposed to each other, nor are they resolvable into each other. Instead -- they are concretely united,[72] and it is for that reason that

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1950), pp. 56-58. See also J. G. Droysen, Historik, ed., R. Hübner, pp. 348; 352-353.

[71]Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 196.

[72]Droysen's use of the term of "sittliche Mächte"

Hintze spoke of the second phase of Droysen's life as an "ethical-political" period.[73] The moral ideas (sittlichen Ideen) of the first period were interwoven with the real political interests of the second to produce a genuine unity.

Hintze, therefore, regarded it as a serious mistake to talk only of Droysen's emphasis on the notion of power.[74] The question was not ultimately one of power, but one which set up a "demand for political and national ethics."[75] As a real interest, "power" is not opposed to "right" as an ideal interest. Rather, power for Droysen is the presupposition for the realization of right. And Hintze insisted that in Droysen "power is precisely the indispensable foundation of the personality of the state (Staatspersönlichkeit), just as bodily and spiritual health and power are the foundations of human personality."[76] Moreover, power is related vitally to freedom. "Without power there is no true freedom, without freedom, no lasting power." Freedom from within pre-

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State, where Droysen unites the spheres of Sittlichkeit and Macht. See pp. 352-353 of the Historik, ed., R. Hübner. Compare the following remark of Droysen's: "Die Macht ist am hochsten, wenn die vollste Arbeit, Gesundheit und Freiheit aller sittlichen Sphären sie speist," Historik, ed., R. Hubner, p. 353. It is important to note that Droysen distinguishes between Gewalt and Macht. See Historik, ed., R. Hubner, p. 353.

[73] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 150.

[74] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 150.

[75] Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 204.

[76] Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 206.

supposes power from without.[77]

Hintze consciously saw in Droysen's fusion of power and ethics the release of a concrete, dynamic energy. He compared it to the virtus of the Romans and the virtu of Machiavelli![78] But, whereas the ideas of antiquity and the Renaissance were fundamental forces for the Romans and the political humanism of the Renaissance, Hintze saw the specific sources of Droysen's virtu as laying in a fusion of two ideas: Prussianism and Protestantism. This Prussianism is not like the one represented by Frederick William I and Frederick the Great, but rather the Prussianism embodied in the ideals of 1807-1813, the Prussianism of Stein, Hardenburg, and Scharnohorst, the Prussianism of the Reform Period, and that in the Wars of Liberation. Protestantism in Droysen's mind meant the free interpretation reflecting the "thought-world of philosophical idealism and the new humanistic concept of German Bildung."[79]

In analyzing Droysen's Correspondence, Hintze found this fervent evangelical faith present in many letters,[80] especially in Droysen's correspondence with Perthes during

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[77]Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 206.

[78]Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 202.

[79]Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 202. Compare J. G. Droysen, Vorlesungen über die Freiheitskriege, Vol. I, pp. 150-178, and Vol. II, p. 640.

[80]See, for example, Letters 44, 52, and 60 in Droysen's Briefwechsel, ed., R. Hübner, Vol. I, pp. 86-88; 103-105; 117-120 for a confirmation of Hintze's views.

the 1840's.[81] But more significant was the fact that Droysen fused the two forces, Protestantism and Prussianism. He regarded Prussia as essentially a Protestant state and he traced Prussianism and Protestantism to a common source.[82] That is why, argued Hintze, Droysen traced the beginning of great politics in the Brandenburg-Prussian state to the conversion of John Sigismund to Calvinism -- an ethical-political decision.[83]

It is necessary now to turn our attention to Hintze's interpretation of the third period of Droysen's life. This period from 1850-1884 centered in the university atmosphere of Jena and Berlin. Droysen produced three great works during this interval: a life of Field Marshal Count Yorck von Wartenburg,[84] a history of Prussian politics,[85] and an outline of historical method.[86]

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[81]The importance of the Protestant-Lutheran element as a pervasive factor in Droysen's historical thought has been increasingly recognized in the recent literature on Droysen. See, for example, Meinecke in the Historische Zeitschrift, CXII (1930), 262-265; F. Gilbert, Johann Gustav Droysen und die preussischdeutsche Frage, pp. 28-30; H. Astholz, Das Problem 'Geschichte' untersucht bei Johann Gustav Droysen, pp. 148-204; and the profound study of Werner Schultz, "Der Einfluss lutherischen Geistes auf Rankes und Droysens Deutung der Geschichte," Archiv für Reformationgeschichte, XXXIX (1942), 108-172.

[82]Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 202.

[83]Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 202.

[84]J. G. Droysen, Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Yorck von Wartenburg (Berlin: Veit and Co., 1851-1852), 3 Vols.

[85]J. G. Droysen, Geschichte der preussischen Politik (Berlin: Veit and Co., 1855-1886), 5 parts in 14 vols.

[86]J. G. Droysen, Grundriss der Historik (Leipzig:

Droysen saw in Yorck, the hero of his great biography, an example of that unique fusion of Prussianism and Protestantism which produced the peculiar Prussian spirit of dynamic energy.[87] In choosing Yorck, said Hintze, Droysen was recalling to his "feeble and confused" contemporaries the memory of the Prussian past as it had flourished during the great days of the Wars of Liberation. Droysen drew a picture of a man in whom the old army tradition still lived -- a figure of old Prussian austerity and severity[88] and a personality who united a sense of soldierly obligation and "daring patriotic power of decision."[89] In reading the biography of Yorck, Hintze felt on every page the atmosphere of "moral energy" with which the book was charged. This book incorporated not only the spirit of Yorck, but it reflected the spirit of the "ideal Prussianism" in Droysen -- it served not only to inform but to exhort and stimulate.[90] It combined not only a historical-critical foundation but an artistic sweep.[91] It was not only an example of science (Wissenschaft) but also of politics. In it, Hintze felt that Droysen overcame opposites to achieve a concrete unity based on the idea of moral energy and dynamism.

Veit and Co., 1868). The third edition appeared in 1882.

[87] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 174.

[88] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 174.

[89] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 174.

[90] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 175.

[91] Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 175-176.

Droysen's second great work of this period, the History of Prussian Politics, was regarded by Hintze as the former's life work.[92] The first three volumes were written while Droysen was still at Jena; the remaining volumes were composed during Droysen's period at the University of Berlin. Droysen's call to Berlin in 1859 coincided with the "New Era" in Prussia, and the liberal atmosphere was more agreeable to him than that of the reactionary period of Manteuffel. Droysen wrote for Haym's Konstitutionelle Zeitung and for the Preussische Jahrbücher. But he concentrated his main efforts on the History of Prussian Politics.[93]

Hintze's analysis of Droysen's History of Prussian Politics[94] is valuable for the light it sheds upon certain features of nineteenth-century historicism. Hintze regarded the Prussian Politics as having in common with the biography on Yorck a desire to fuse together both scholarship (Wissenschaft) and politics. The work is at once "a patriotic act and a monument of immense, learned industry."[95] Hintze found the basic idea of the great work to be a belief that the Prussian State possessed an unchangeable char-

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[92]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 181.

[93]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 179.

[94]The best analyses of Droysen's Geschichte der preussischen Politik are in F. Gilbert, Johann Gustav Droysen und die preussischdeutsche Frage, pp. 121-130 and G. Küntzel's introduction to Leopold von Ranke, Zwölf Bücher preussischer Geschichte, Vol. I (München: Drei Masken Verlag, 1930), pp. xciii-ciii.

[95]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 181.

acter. The politics of Prussia were for Droysen merely the immanent unfoldings of ideas. To prove this, argued Hintze, it was necessary for Droysen to show that the ethical-political life principle of the Prussian State during the period of the Wars of Liberation was already found far back in Prussian history -- in the beginnings of Hohenzollern politics. This is precisely what Droysen attempted to do. He tried to show that Frederick I and his successors were nationally oriented princes who struggled to reform the Empire and its constitution. They failed, but they realized that Imperial reform was impossible without Church reform. Droysen sought to show a contrast between Hohenzollern and Habsburg at the start of Brandenburg history. The Reformation for him merely accentuated this difference. The principle of Protestantism first became politically fruitful and alive with Calvinistic conversion and John Sigismund. Since the time of the Great Elector, the principles of Prussian politics for Droysen rested on a union of Protestant and German-national interests. Austria's interests on the other hand, were based on universalistic, non-German and Catholic principles.[96]

Hintze rejected Droysen's contention regarding the unchangeable, immanent character of Prussian politics. He showed that scholars such as Koser and Erdmansdörffer, themselves students of Droysen, had proved that thesis untenable.[97] Yet, though this was a weak point in Droysen's

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[96]Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 182-183.

[97]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 184.

treatment and a manifestation of what Hintze called Droysen's "subjective idealism," Hintze did not consider Droysen's great work as lacking merits. It had its strength and its weaknesses.[98]

Hintze found that Droysen had based his work on certain "objective" factors, as well as on the "subjectively" untenable one (of Prussia's immanent character). What were these "objective" factors? In Hintze's estimation, Droysen was correct in thinking that the Austrian emperors had no capacity to regenerate the Empire. Droysen was equally right in emphasizing the progressive aspect of Prussian politics in terms of its military absolutism, its administration for social welfare, its tolerant church government. And Droysen was correct in stressing the contrast between Prussia and Austria.

In his discussion of the methodological structure of the History of Prussian Politics, Hintze brought out certain significant historiographical differences between Droysen and Ranke.[99] Hintze's point of departure was the differing use of sources or Quellen by the two historians. One of the objections directed against Droysen's History

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[98]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 184.

[99]On the historiographical differences between Ranke and Droysen, consult F. Gilbert, Johann Gustav Droysen und die preussischdeutsche Frage, pp. 72-77; O. Diether, "Ranke und Droysen," Preussische Jahrbücher, CXLII (1910), 1-20; Meinecke in Historische Zeitschrift, CXLI (1930), 283; G. Küntzel in his introduction to Ranke's Zwölf Bücher preussischer Geschichte, Vol. I, XCIII-CLII; H. Astholz, Das Problem 'Geschichte' untersucht bei Johann Gustav Droysen, pp. 110-113. W. Schultz in Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, XXXIX (1942), 108-172.

of Prussian Politics was that Droysen had not utilized foreign archives. Hintze remarked that Droysen's answer to this objection was that he was writing a history of Prussian and not European politics.[100] This did not altogether satisfy Hintze. He was convinced that Droysen's refusal to utilize foreign archives: a fond approach of Ranke, rested on a more fundamental difference in the procedures of the two historians.[101]

According to Hintze, Ranke employed an "objective" approach to the sources, Droysen a "pragmatic" one. Ranke sought to find the common or objective body of fact in a given political framework. He approached the sources by asking not how different parties interpreted the events, but rather what the "objective" relationship between these events was. Ranke was concerned with an approach that would stand aloof from special or partial interests, that would, as it were, stand above these interests. To achieve such an approach, Ranke had to isolate the pure factuality of events, to reveal them not as they appeared pragmatically to the interested parties, but as they actually were in themselves. Ranke "achieved" this by means of a careful source criticism (Quellenkritik) and by placing the events in a larger synoptic relationship. Ranke's examination of a number of foreign archives was essential for his purposes, because only thus could he arrive at a common body of "objective" events, by checking one event against the other

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[100] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 185.

[101] Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 185-186.

in the different archives. Finally, these events were drawn by Ranke into the larger framework of the European States system to indicate their wider relationships.

Hintze held that Droysen's pragmatic approach to the sources was different. Droysen approached the sources in an attempt to show how the events appeared to the interested parties. The pragmatic intent of the interested parties was vital. He read sources to find out how individuals and forces understood themselves in terms of their own limited, pragmatic, subjective understanding and not what the actual situation "objectively" was. A subjective, pragmatic, voluntaristic concept of understanding the sources prevailed in Droysen as against Ranke.[102]

Hintze brought out very billiantly another fundamental difference between Droysen's and Ranke's use of the sources. He showed that in one respect Ranke had a very limited notion of the breadth and extent of sources. Ranke, he said, approached archival sources with "spitzen-Fingern," that is, he was highly selective in the sources he used.[103] He utilized, for example, the communications of diplomatic envoys, memoirs of prominent statesmen, and political testaments. These were almost invariably direct expressions of the political actors themselves. Droysen, on the other hand, had a much more comprehensive notion of the range and extent of sources. He derived the meaning of political actions

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[102]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 186.

[103]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 186.

not only from the explicit declarations of the political actors but from a great host of documents which formed the background and the larger basis of their actions. Hintze quoted with approval Droysen's celebrated remark in his Historik that the problem for the historian is how history grows out of isolated events (wie aus den Geschäften Geschichte wird).[104] Thus, the range of sources for Droysen was immeasurably greater than for Ranke. Ordinary transactions could throw light on historical movements; hence, they deserved to be made part of legitimate source collections.

Hintze pointed out that it was literally impossible for Droysen himself to examine a host of foreign archives unless he accepted a Rankean concept of limited sources, restricted largely to the explicit remarks of leading actors. But if, as Droysen insisted, the range of sources was incredibly larger, if the business of the historian was to see how ordinary affairs produced history, then a historian would perforce need to concentrate in a limited direction.[105]

The difference between Droysen and Ranke regarding

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[104]Hintze, "Johann Gustav Droysen," p. 186. The original appears in Droysen's Historik in the following context: "Das, was heute Politik ist, gehört morgen der Geschichte an; was heut ein Geschäft ist, gilt, wenn es wichtig genug war, nach einem Menschenalter für ein Stück Geschichte. Wie wird aus den Geschäften Geschichte?" Consult J. G. Droysen, Historik, Vorlesungen über Enzyklopadie und Methodologie der Geschichte, im Auftrage der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed., R. Hübner (2nd. ed., München and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1943), p. 322. All further citations to Droysen's Historik refer to this edition unless otherwise indicated.

[105]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 187.

sources was not a mere academic issue. Hintze showed that it reflected fundamental differences in outlook. Moreover, Hintze indicated that the great publications of documents, since Droysen's day, have mainly followed his lead rather than Ranke's. They have accepted Droysen's dictum to discover how out of mere affairs history can be made. Droysen set the fashion not only with his History of Prussian Politics, but even more with his Records and Official Documents concerning the History of the Great Elector, which Droysen initiated in conjunction with his friend, Duncker, the adviser to the Crown Prince and later the Director of the Prussian Archives.[106] Hintze could also point to the great undertaking in which he played such a prominent role, the Acta Borussica, as following in Droysen's footsteps by attempting to show how history is constructed out of the totality of affairs of the people and state.

Hintze's discussion of Ranke and Droysen and their respective treatment of sources led him squarely into a further consideration with regard to Droysen's historical methodology. He dealt in this connection with Droysen's lectures on historical method.[107] These lectures were ostensibly treatises on historical method, and in this sense, Hintze saw them as continuations of the old Göttingen historical school.[108] Yet, in Hintze's opinion they were basically

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[106]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 188.

[107]Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 191-192.

[108]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 191.

different from the Göttingen approach, for they incorporated a philosophical outlook, a degree of intellectual self-consciousness that was lacking in the older methodology.

Hintze saw the lectures on historical method as an attempt on Droysen's part to create a specific organon of historical method, based on a philosophical grasp of the principles of historicism. In creating such an organon, Hintze saw Droysen avoiding three dangerous courses. One was to treat historical method as though it were purely a procedural question, a matter of sheer technique. Droysen's philosophical grasp avoided this error. Secondly, he avoided the mistake of speculative philosophy which attempted, as in Hegel, to create a philosophy of history which would metaphysically construct the totality of history. Thirdly, Droysen avoided Buckle's mistake of attempting to reduce history to the status of a natural science with laws based upon statistics, anthropology, and ethnology. Therefore, in Hintze's estimation, Droysen avoided the extravagances of both speculative idealism and positivism and developed a moderate intermediate position which Hintze labeled as epistemic criticism (erkenntnistheoretischen Kritizismus).[109]

Hintze found Aristotelian elements in Droysen's conception of history and a closer affiliation of it to Wilhelm von Humboldt than to Hegel. Its idealistic teleological character was a composite of diverse elements: "a strong ethical accent, an emphasis on individuality, on free will and respon-

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[109]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 192.

sibility; on human freedom and originality."[110] The individual, the free, and the responsible seemed to Droysen more important than the "regular, the typical, and the recurring." And Hintze wisely pointed out that for Droysen, history is not a natural process; hence, Droysen's rejection of both the naturalism of positivism with its belief in natural laws,[111] and the naturalism of the organological romantic school with its belief in the Volksgeist and the natural unfolding of the historical organism. Instead, history for Droysen is an ethical process, and the aim of history is the realization of the Fichtean ideal, "the sovereign full freedom of the moral man."[112]

Hintze did not believe that this position committed Droysen to a form of subjective idealism in Fichte's sense. In his analysis of Droysen's Correspondence, he pointed out that for all of Droysen's emphasis on the idealism of freedom and personality, the latter still retained a firm belief in an objective world order, a cosmos governed by God and subject to His supreme dictates.[113]

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[110] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 192.

[111] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 192.

[112] Hintze, "Droysen," p. 192.

[113] Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," p. 198. Meinecke's remarks are very revealing in this connection. He writes: "Empirisch zu forschen und an Gottes Leitung der Geschichte zu glauben, war und blieb bis zuletzt, wie die Briefe beweisen, der Wille Droysens. Es war bei Ranke nicht anders. Gerade der Gottesglaube in der lutherischen, aber von Orthodoxie befreiten Form, in der ihn beide in sich aufnahmen, stimmte sie enthaltsam und bescheiden gegenüber der abgründigen Unerforschlichkeit des gottliche Willens, befähigte sie dem neuen realistisch induktiven Züge der Geister sich hin-

Hintze's discussion of Droysen's historical methodological views was brief but full of insight. Contemporary scholarship on Droysen and an independent examination of the Historik confirm Hintze's basic views.[114] Droysen's Historik is considered today as the first great attempt to work out an organon of historical thinking based on the ideas of Historismus.[115] In the introduction to the Historik, Droysen contrasted the realm of nature and the realm

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zugeben, nicht mit der überheblichen Meinung des späteren Positivismus, durch Empirie und Methode das Ziel des Wissens zu erreichen, aber mit dem sicheren Troste einer Auflösung all Welt-und Forschungsrätsel in Gott und mit der inneren Berufsfreudigkeit im strengen Forschen, die lutherischer Art entsprach," see F. Meinecke, in Historische Zeitschrift, CXLI (1930), 263. Meinecke's appreciation of the Lutheran element in both Ranke and Droysen was more profound than that of Hintze's.

[114]The recent scholarship on Droysen's Historik is extensive. The most important studies are the following: Bertha Becker, Johann Gustav Droysen's Geschichtsauffassung (Dissertation, Hamburg, 1928); F. Meinecke, "J. G. Droysen, sein Briefwechsel und seine Geschichtschreibung," Historische Zeitschrift, CXLI (1930), 249-288; F. Meinecke, "Droysens Historik," Vom Geschichtlichen Sinn und vom Sinn der Geschichte (Stuttgart, 1951), 40-46; E. Meister, "Die geschichtsphilosophischen Voraussetzungen von J. G. Droysens 'Historik'," Historische Vierteljahrschrift, XXIII (1926), pp. 25-63; 199-221; J. Wach, Das Verstehen, Vol. III, 134-189; Hübner's introduction to J. G. Droysen, Historik, VII-XIX; E. Rothacker, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 169-178; W. Schultz, "Der Einfluss lutherischen Geistes auf Rankes und Droysens Deutung der Geschichte," Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, XXXIX (1942), 108-172; E. Rothacker, "J. G. Droysens 'Historik'," Mensch und Geschichte, pp. 49-59; H. Astholz, Das Problem 'Geschichte' untersucht bei Johann Gustav Droysen.

[115]The reputation of Droysen's Historik has steadily grown in modern German historiography. Alfred Stern's characterization is quite appropriate when he states, that "his (Droysen's) ideas on historiography have received a new vogue in recent times and have been a strong influence on writers like Simmel, Troeltsch, Dilthey, and Rothacker." See Alfred Stern, "Johann Gustav Droysen," Encyclopedia of the Social

of history and what he sought to do was to find a method which was peculiarly applicable to the realm of history. Droysen thus set up a historical world against a natural world, a specifically historical method against a method for studying nature. "The method of historical investigation is determined by the morphological character of its material," said Droysen. "The essence of historical method is understanding by means of investigation."[116]

"Understanding by means of investigation" (forschend zu verstehen) -- Hintze quoted this neat phrase with approval as epitomizing the very kernel of Droysen's approach. The phrase contained two ideas -- Verstehen and Forschen.[117] Perhaps this meant that understanding was to be a special set of grasping and comprehending historical relationships. It differed fundamentally as an approach from the use of causal laws, which were peculiar to the natural sciences.[118] Perhaps one can see Droysen's rejection of Buckle's attempt, in the History of Civilization, to elevate history to the rank of a natural science in a review. For Droysen, Forschen implied a rejection of pure speculation as a key to history. On the other hand, it placed emphasis on historical inquiry,

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Sciences, ed., E. R. A. Seligman, Vol. V (1931), 242. Meinecke shares this view too. See his remark in Historische Zeitschrift, CXLI (1930), 278.

[116] J. G. Droysen, Historik, p. 328.

[117] Hintze, "Droysen," pp. 191-192.

[118] On Droysen's concept of Verstehen, see the following: H. Astholz, Das Problem 'Geschichte' untersucht bei Johann Gustav Droysen, pp. 90-128; J. Wach, Das Verstehen

on a realistic exploration of historical data. Understanding and historical inquiry: these went hand in hand, mutually supplementing each other.[119]

So far, in this chapter, two things have been accomplished. A brief sketch of the problem of historicism together with an indication of its three phases in Germany was placed at the beginning of the chapter. There followed an elaborate analysis of Hintze's interpretation of Droysen as reflecting an important aspect of nineteenth-century German historicism. There remains the task of indicating the importance of Droysen's ideas for Hintze's own interpretation of history.[120]

Droysen's interpretation of history was of the deepest significance for the formation of Hintze's own historical ideas. Hintze not only regarded Droysen as one of the great representatives of nineteenth-century historicism and a symbol of significant trends in the political history of Germany; but in addition, he absorbed elements of Droysen's outlook and interpretation, and molded them to fit his own needs. His close association with Droysen as a student, the position he held as the last librarian of Droysen's Historical Society, and the lively debates with Droy-

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Vol. III, 134-189, and Hans R. G. Guenther, "Zur Geschichte der Verstehenstheorien," Persoenlichkeit und Geschichte (Augsburg: Walther Beyschlag Verlag, 1947), pp. 60-62.

[119] J. G. Droysen, Historik, pp. 386-405.

[120] These influences are merely listed here. They will be carefully developed in the course of the dissertation.

sen over cups of tea during early morning hours, all provided Hintze with innumerable opportunities to come into intimate contact with the old master.[121] They left on Hintze a permanent imprint of Droysen's tremendous gifts and powers.

What were the major influences that Droysen exercised on Hintze? Droysen's grasp of the concept of both individuality and development as an aspect of historicism strongly influenced Hintze. Whereas Meinecke was greatly attracted by Droysen's emphasis on human individuality, personality, and the role of genius, Hintze was more drawn to Droysen's stress on the individuality of great historical movements and forces. The example of the unique roles of Hellenism and the Prussian state in Droysen's approach moved Hintze more than the mysterious genius of Alexander the Great.

In the second place, Hintze was influenced by Droysen's emphasis on the idea of universal development as represented in the latter's History of Alexander, expanded in the History of Hellenism; also as revealed in Droysen's Lectures on the Wars of Liberation. Hintze's preoccupation with universal-historical forces and developments certainly owed its initial interest to Droysen, but it was Ranke's influence through Waitz that really shaped Hintze's main ideas regarding the importance of universal history.

Of the greatest significance on Hintze, was Droy-

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[121]Hintze, "Droysen," p. 181.

sen's concept of the relationship between Geist and Macht. Hintze rejected the notion of separate realms of ideal and real factors. He followed Droysen in his belief that history is the expression of the concrete fusion of ideal and real forces to form a specific dynamic pattern. In this way Hintze completely accepted Droysen's notions regarding the relationship between power and freedom. He insisted that the internal freedom and external power of a state were indissolubly connected, and he accepted the connection that Droysen drew between the internal constitution of a state and its foreign policy. Hintze was in full agreement with Droysen's analysis of power relationships as was discussed in the essay, "Prussia and the System of Great Powers." Here again, however, Hintze's concepts were not only shaped by Droysen, but the influence of Ranke was more than passive.

The "specifisches Preussentum" in Droysen left a deep imprint on Hintze. He not only sympathized with the ideals it represented, but, as if by sympathetic osmosis, he absorbed this quality so thoroughly that it became an integral part of his own personality. Hintze not only stood in the direct line of Borussican historiography from Pufendorf, Droysen, Schmoller, and to Koser, but he embodied in a specific fashion a personality and a powerful energy that exemplified the very dynamics of Prussianism itself.

On the methodological front, Hintze accepted Droysen's concept of the "wide" use of sources but toned down

his "pragmatic" interpretation of them greatly. He fused together Ranke's "objectivity" with Droysen's comprehensive regard for the sources.

Hintze completely accepted Droysen's dictum "forschend zu verstehen." In Hintze's interpretation of history there was a rejection of both speculative idealism, naturalistic positivism, and the belief of the romantic folk spirit (Volksgeist) school concerning the immanent unfolding of historical entities. His description of Droysen's position as an intermediate one, an "epistemic criticism" fitted Hintze perfectly. He accepted the idea of Verstehen, as a distinctive category of historical understanding. Droysen's statement that "historical investigation is determined by the morphological character of its material" met with Hintze's approval. Only in Hintze's case, this led him more and more toward a typological approach, whereas in Droysen, the emphasis on individuality and originality kept him confined inside the cage of pure historicism.

Finally, Droysen's union of science and politics (Wissenschaft und Politik) left its traces on Hintze. In the sense of being an active politician or a party member, Hintze was not political, but he was in a larger meaning of the term, that is, in the realization of the role of power, the dynamics of state policy, the larger demands of a political ethic. And as in Droysen, his fusion of Geist and Macht did not permit the total divorce of science from politics. That is why Hintze's description of Droysen's historicism was necessarily a description of Droysen's

politics -- the two elements fused.

From what has been said, it seems clear that Droysen was not just another determinant on Hintze. Droysen was the first significant influence on Hintze. In Droysen there were present either abortively or maturely, many of the factors that were to constitute the structure of Hintze's conception of history.

CHAPTER III

THE LEGACY OF RANKE: WEIZSÄCKER

Droysen was one of three great representatives of nineteenth-century German historicism who profoundly influenced Hintze. The other two were Ranke and Schmoller. In this chapter we shall deal with Ranke's influence on Hintze while Schmoller's impact upon him will be left for a succeeding chapter.

While Droysen exercised a very direct influence on Hintze through a teacher-student relationship, Hintze came under Ranke's influence indirectly through two of Ranke's followers under whom Hintze studied -- Julius Weizsäcker and Georg Waitz. From Weizsäcker Hintze acquired an appreciation of Ranke's emphasis on the necessity of a philological-critical approach to the examination of sources. Waitz stimulated him to pursue a systematic study of the political and social sciences (Staatswissenschaften) and to apply Ranke's concept of the European state system to the larger understanding of universal history. Ranke's historiographical legacy was thus of genuine importance in shaping the pattern of Hintze's historical thinking.

Before describing Hintze's relationship to Weizsäcker and Waitz, it will be necessary, briefly, to indicate the role that Ranke played in the development of nineteenth-cen-

tury historicism. To do full justice to Ranke's historical achievement and his influence on historiography would require a separate volume. We can only indicate his role in nineteenth-century German historicism in the sketchiest fashion.[1]

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[1]The literature on Ranke is enormous and of uneven merit. Listed below are the more important writings which were consulted in an endeavor to arrive at a just estimate of Ranke's conception of history. Basic are Leopold von Ranke, Sämtliche Werke, ed., Alfred Dove (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1867-1890), 54 volumes; Leopold von Ranke, Das Briefwerk, ed., W. P. Fuchs (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe Verlag, 1949); Leopold von Ranke, Neue Briefe, ed., H. Herzfeld (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe Verlag, 1949). Very useful is Leopold von Ranke, Das politische Gespräch und andere Schriftchen zur Wissenschaftslehre, ed., E. Rothacker (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1925). The following are important secondary studies: Theodor H. von Laue, Leopold Ranke, the Formative Years (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950); Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat, Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates (7th ed., München und Berlin, 1928), pp. 286-328; E. Fueter, Geschichte der neueren Historiographie, pp. 472-485; Ulrich Busse, Das Individuum in Ranke's Papstgeschichte und in seinen Frühwerken, doctoral dissertation (Hamburg: Max Wilrodt-Schroder, 1933); Moritz Ritter, Die Entwicklung der Geschichtswissenschaft, pp. 362-421; George P. Gooch, "Ranke's Interpretation of German History," Studies in German History (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1948), pp. 210-266; R. H. Thomas, "Leopold Ranke and Friedrich Meinecke," Contemporary Review, No. 1037 (May, 1952), 296-300; Karl Rotthaus, "Staatsform und auswärtige Politik," Preussische Jahrbücher, CLXXIX (1920), 1-35; Werner Schultz, "Der Einfluss lutherischen Geistes auf Rankes und Droysens Deutung der Geschichte," Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, XXXIX (1942), 108-172; Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, pp. 614-632; James W. Thompson and Bernard J. Holm, A History of Historical Writing, Vol. II, pp. 149-205; Gerhard Masur, Ranke's Begriff der Weltgeschichte (München und Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1926); Franz Borkenau, Drei Abhandlungen zur deutschen Geschichte, pp. 76-111; Friedrich Meinecke, Ranke und Burckhardt (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1948); Ernst Simon, Ranke und Hegel (München und Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1928); Erich Rothacker, "Savigny, Grimm, Ranke," Menschund Geschichte (Bonn: Athenaum-Verlag, 1950), pp. 20-49; Friedrich Meinecke, "Zur Beurteilung Rankes," Schaffender Spiegel (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler Verlag, 1948), pp. 121-146; Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte (3rd ed.,

Leopold von Ranke achieved success as a historian by exemplifying concretely the two cardinal notions of modern historicism, the ideas of individuality and development. No one can read any of Ranke's writings without being immediately impressed by the fashion in which he relates the specific individuality of detail to a larger conception of historical development. Every one of his works breathes this love of detail -- a receptivity for the individuality of events and personalities -- a capacity by creativity to weave detail into a more general framework.

If one attempts to analyze Ranke's historicism from

München und Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1929), pp. 469-488; Theodor Steinbüchel, "Ranke und Hegel," Grosse Geschichtsdenker, Ein Zyklus Tübinger Vorlesungen, ed., Rudolf Stadelmann (Tübingen und Stuttgart: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, 1949), pp. 173-217; Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Geist und Geschichte, I, 239-293; George P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 76-130; Friedrich Meinecke, "Ranke's politisches Gespräch," Vom geschichtlichen Sinn und vom Sinn der Geschichte (5th ed., Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler Verlag, 1951), pp. 24-40; Franz Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (2nd ed., Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1950), III, 86-102; Karl Brandi, Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft (Bonn: Universitäts-Verlag, 1947), pp. 109, 109-114; Joachim Wach, Das Verstehen, III, 89-134; Julius Kaerst, "Die Geschichtsauffassung Rankes und Droysens in ihrer nationalen Bedeutung," Universalgeschichte (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1930), pp. 231-252; Ludwig Dehio, "Ranke und der deutsche Imperialismus," Historische Zeitschrift, CLXX (1950), pp. 307-328; Friedrich Engel-Janosi, The Growth of German Historicism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1944), pp. 51-63; Carl Hinrichs, "Ranke's Lutherfragment von 1817 und der Ursprung seiner universalhistorischen Anschauung," Festschrift für Gerhard Ritter zu seinem 60. Geburtstag (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1950), pp. 299-322; Hans Herzfeld, "Politik und Geschichte bei Leopold v. Ranke im Zeitraum von 1848-1871," Festschrift für Gerhard Ritter zu seinem 60. Geburtstag, pp. 322-342; Friedrich Baethgen, "Zur geistigen Entwicklungsgeschichte Rankes in seiner Frühzeit," Deutschland und Europa, Historische Studien zur Völker - und Staatenordnung des Abendlandes (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1951), pp. 337-355.

a methodological point of view, it seems clear that five specific factors are tightly interwoven in his approach to history. They are a doctrine of ideas (Ideenlehre), a concept of universal history, an emphasis on the primacy of external politics (Aussenpolitik), a philological-critical method of approaching the sources, and finally, a Protestant religious consciousness. In Ranke's historicism these five factors always supplement each other. All are equally essential for a proper understanding of history. No single factor is an end within itself, but all contribute to a larger grasp of the historical process. Consequently, Ranke would have rejected the pursuit of the philological-critical method as an end within itself. The mere ascertainment of naked, historical facts was important to Ranke only if they were linked to significant ideas. Facts required the spiritual nourishment of ideas in order to enrich them. Ranke saw both the facts and the ideas of any historical age as standing directly before God. The facts, ideas, and patterns of relationship of an age, reflecting the dynamic struggles of states and expressing universal-historical relations, stand before the Divinity, which contemplates in His majesty the march of historical events. Ranke's factors resemble the instruments of a symphonic orchestra led by a supreme conductor, contributing to the performance of a noble and eloquent piece of music.

It is very important to note the close and intimate relationship that these five factors played in Ranke's inter-

pretation of history. The history of Ranke's followers and epigoni is often the history of men who accepted not the total pattern of Ranke's concept of history but portions of it. To some, Ranke came to signify the successful applications of the philological-critical method of analyzing source materials. His religious orientation, so basic to his own approach to history, was either lost sight of or ignored. Ranke's insistence on the close interrelationship of the five factors was frequently forgotten and even more infrequently practiced. Perhaps the leading reason was the rapid secularization of German Protestantism and German scholarship during the second half of the nineteenth century. The outcome was a secularized, historical methodology, which really had no place for a theological interpretation of history, but which was willing to absorb from Ranke valuable insights regarding the study of sources and the structure of the state system. The result was that Ranke's unified approach tended to dissolve during the second half of the nineteenth century into a number of disparate elements which were variously combined by his followers. Ranke's legacy to nineteenth-century historicism was thus considerably different from Ranke's own distinctive approach.

We have stated the above proposition in a somewhat categorical fashion. It is now necessary to dwell on them more carefully and to document them. In practice this is equivalent to showing more specifically the nature of these five factors in Ranke's interpretation of history and how

they relate to each other.

In his personality Ranke reflected the contemplative rather than the activistic nature.[2] Not that Ranke was uninterested in politics, but unlike Droysen, who was charged with a subjective, activistic, voluntaristic dynamism toward the political, Ranke approached politics with a cool detachment. Ranke had always shown an antipathy to the "collectivistic, voluntaristic mass forces of the liberal and national movements, which dominated the nineteenth century."[3] He invariably gave the impression of standing above ideological conflicts, of looking down at them from the heights of an Olympian retreat. Ranke's contemplative mood hearkens back to the Restoration period, the quiescent, aristocratic flavor of which resembled the diplomatic mentality of the pre-revolutionary era more than the liberal political atmosphere of the nineteenth century. In Ranke the fragrance of the earlier classical diplomacy is always present.[4]

An instance of the contemplative disposition in Ranke is shown in his doctrine of ideas (Ideenlehre). In his first lecture to King Maximilian II of Bavaria, which formed part of Ranke's Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte, he dealt with the subject of the "so-called leading ideas in history." Ranke took issue with Hegel and the Hegelian

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[2]Srbik, Geist und Geschichte, Vol. I, 253.

[3]Srbik, Geist und Geschichte, Vol. I, 253.

[4]Srbik, Geist und Geschichte, Vol. I, 253-254.

school for misinterpreting the role of ideas in history.[5] The Hegelians, declared Ranke, have attempted to subsume the role of ideas in history under a logical process -- the dialectical method of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. In so doing, they have confused the real and specifically historical development of mankind with a concept of logical development. They have made ideas all important by insisting that only ideas have an independent life. Thereby they have reduced the role of individuals and events to mere shadows and phantoms -- weak puppets of powerful ideas.[6] The Hegelians, he argued, have destroyed the unique individuality of men and events in their one-sided emphasis on the role of ideas. Ranke, indeed, saw this Hegelianism as ending in a pantheism which sees "humanity as God in process, a process which evolves by means of its own spiritual activity, which lies in its very nature, and gives birth to itself."[7]

Ranke was not objecting to the doctrine that ideas play an important role in history. His doctrine of ideas was premised on that very assumption. What he was objecting to was the misinterpretation this doctrine had undergone with the Hegelians. The difference between Ranke and the

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[5]Leopold von Ranke, Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte, Vorträge dem Könige Maximilian II von Bayern gehalten, appended to Leopold von Ranke, Weltgeschichte (4th ed., Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1921), VIII, 178.

[6]Ranke, Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte, VIII, 178.

[7]Ranke, Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte, VIII, 178.

Hegelians on this score was expressed by Ranke himself when he declared that "by the leading ideas I understand only those leading tendencies which are found in each of the centuries. These tendencies can nevertheless only be described; they cannot in the last instance be subsumed under a concept."[8] For Ranke, accordingly, ideas are not to be looked upon as logical exemplifications of some greater concept -- the absolute spirit. Instead, the ideas of each age have an individuality of its own. Just as personalities and events have a specific individuality -- a uniqueness that is sui generis, so, likewise, do ideas. The ideas and and events of each age stand on their own merit. God looks down at each, at its ideas, personalities, and relations. He allows each epoch to have and retain its own individuality.

Ranke's doctrine of ideas was not original with him. It derived from the teachings of Wilhelm von Humboldt,[9] representing an adaptation of Humboldt's views together with some Hegelian influences. Though Ranke differed basically with Hegel on the meaning of ideas, he was, nevertheless, influenced by Hegelian currents.[10] Thus, in his Weltge-

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[8]Ranke, Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte, VIII, 178.

[9]E. Fueter, Geschichte der neueren Historiographie, p. 474. See the excellent discussion of Ranke's theory of ideas and its relationship to Humboldt in Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel, transl. William H. Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 226-242.

[10]On the whole subject of Ranke and Hegel, the two best studies are Ernst Simon, Ranke und Hegel (München und

schichte, Ranke declared, "This precisely is the secret of history, that not every epoch is capable of accomplishing everything. The life of mankind is composed of all epochs; in no single one alone does it appear complete and finished."[11] Ranke agreed with Hegel in recognizing that every epoch has its role to play in history, and that the meaning of history cannot be derived from an examination of any single epoch. In Ranke, however, there was a much greater respect for the individuality of each epoch than was the case in Hegel. But, on the need of linking up the individual and the general, particular epochs of history with a more universal conception of history, Ranke was much closer to Hegel than he was to Hegel's contemporary, the historian of Rome, Barthold Georg Niebuhr.[12]

According to Ranke, Niebuhr was a brilliant example of the "antiquarian method." Hegel, on the other hand, was an outstanding instance of the "philosophizing method." For Ranke, the great merits of Niebuhr were his "critical" approach to individual facts and his endeavor to dynamise or enliven these events; his main deficiency was that an excessive preoccupation with the ascertainment of critical particulars sometimes led him to lose sight of great uni-

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Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1928) and Theodor Steinbüchel, "Ranke und Hegel," Grosse Geschichtsdenker (Tübingen und Stuttgart: Hermann Leins, 1949).

[11] Ranke, Weltgeschichte, VII, 12.

[12] See in this connection the excellent remarks of Dove in his introduction to Ranke's Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte, VIII, 165.

versal forces. Conversely, the great merit which Ranke found in Hegel's approach was precisely Hegel's awareness of the need for a more universal point of view in history. For Ranke, Hegel's deficiency was an uncritical approach to individual fact, a tendency to neglect specific detail and the uniqueness of the concrete event, and an attempt to strait-jacket the historical process into an abstract philosophy of history which assumed it already knew what the ultimate goal of history was.

How to combine the strong points of Niebuhr and Hegel and avoid their weaknesses was Ranke's aim. How to unite Niebuhr's critical-philological method with Hegel's insight that the individual is always linked with the general and universal was Ranke's problem. On these matters Ranke expressed himself as follows:

> Two methods can be employed to learn about human affairs (menschliche Dinge). One is the knowledge of the individual; the other is the knowledge of abstractions. The former is the way of history; the latter that of philosophy. There is no other way besides these two, and even the Revelation includes both within its fold: abstract propositions and history. It is well to separate these two sources of knowledge. Nevertheless those historians err who view the whole of history merely as a prodigious collection of facts....I am much more of the opinion that the study of history in its more perfected state will be called on and will be capable of proceeding from the exploration and contemplation of the individual to its own path, namely that of attaining a more universal and general view of events, of elevating itself to a knowledge of the objectively available interconnections.
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> In my estimation two attributes are demanded of the true historian. Firstly a participation

> and joy in the individuality of events in and of itself....Nevertheless this is not sufficient. It is necessary that the historian also have his eyes open to the general as a philosopher; rather during his contemplation of the individual, the path will be shown him how to proceed toward understanding the development of the world in terms of the general. This development is never to be understood merely in terms of those general concepts that prevail in this or that epoch....Not as a result of concepts which appear to have had a dominance now and then, but rather in terms of the nations themselves, which have come forward in history to be active, do we direct our attention. We concern ourselves with the influences that nations have had on one another, on the struggles that they have waged, the transformation that nations have undergone as a result of peaceful and warlike relationships. Nothing could be more false than to see in these struggles of great historical powers the effect of mere brute forces....In the notion of power as such, there appears already a spiritual essence, a spontaneous genius, that has its own individual life, fulfills its more or less peculiar conditions, and constitutes a separate domain. The business of history is to perceive this life.[13]

In this significant passage Ranke summarized his whole conception of universal history. Beginning with a knowledge of individual events in history, the historian proceeds to larger levels of understanding until he comes to grasp the operation of universal forces and connections. Ranke never stopped at the historical understanding of a single event or a single nation. The nation for Ranke was not a final unit of historical understanding. Ranke, thus, differed from many of the Romantic historians who saw history as the organic unfolding of the life of a nation. For Ranke the life of no single nation could be understood in isolation. The attempt to explain the development of any single nation

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[13]Ranke, Weltgeschichte, VIII, 163-164.

in terms of an expression of its folk-spirit (Volks-geist) or of the peculiar essence of its nationality (Volkstum) was rejected by him. Ranke's whole concept of universal history rested on the consideration that universal history is the product of the spiritual and power relations obtaining between nations in an international arena. To understand a state means to see it as a dynamic force in relationship to other dynamic forces in the international arena. The life of a nation or a state for Ranke is accordingly subject to a variety of shifts, influences, oscillations, and transformations as a result of the shifting role which that nation exercises in the arena of universal history. Ranke's contribution in breaking the back of the Romantic, organic, folk-spirit conception of history, by showing its inapplicability to a notion of universal history is, thus, as Fueter has emphasized, one of the great achievements of modern historiography.[14]

Ranke saw the role of power in history on a double plane. A state for Ranke was never the mere expression of brute force. A state was always a constellation of power and spiritual forces that were concretely united. The only other contemporary historian who so astutely grasped the role of the state as an amalgam of power and spirit -- (Macht) and (Geist) -- was Droysen. Ranke shared with Droysen another notion regarding power. Ranke directed his at-

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[14]E. Fueter, Geschichte der neueren Historiographie, pp. 475-476.

tention primarily to the role which power exercised in the foreign relations of a state. He was much less concerned with the internal and domestic power relationships of the state. Ranke consequently emphasised the primacy of foreign policy in shaping the destinies of a state.[15] In domestic policy he really did not fully grasp the role that power played. Ranke never dealt adequately with the power relationships involved between different social classes within the state, or the role that different social interest groups, such as political party groups could exercise. Rather, he saw power again and again as expressing itself in the dynamics of foreign policy on the international plane. For Ranke it was precisely these international power factors that shaped the role of the state.

Ranke's concept of universal history was different from the idea of universal history prevalent during the Enlightenment and among the Romantics. Ranke centered his universal history around the history of the Romanic-German peoples and their states. This gave it a certain unity. Ranke was not primarily interested in universal history as the history of an endless series of vital forces or centers, of civilization. Instead, it was the fate of the western community of nations, the Romanic-German nations, that especially attracted him. Within this western community and as the nucleus around which the life of a particular people,

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[15]E. Fueter, Geschichte der neueren Historiographie, p. 475. Ranke's views on this subject are mostly easily available in his studies, Politisches Gespräch and die gros-

he saw, expressed itself, there arose an emergence of a state system and international relations.[16]

If Ranke's conception of history ended in an attempt to write universal history, it began with the more modest aim of establishing the authenticity of individual events. The philological-critical method was a heuristic tool of great significance for Ranke because it enabled him to proceed to the establishment of a body of authentic fact. And for Ranke, unless such a body of fact were first established, the final structure of universal history was nothing more than an illusion written large. On the occasion of his ninetieth birthday, December 21, 1885, Ranke expressed his thoughts on the subject as follows:

> I sense the repugnance against the historical novel to be chiefly the result of its false attempt to approach to the level of authentic description of events, and conclude, that in history, everything must be avoided that deviates in any way from the substantiated tradition of facts. I do not deny that these considerations entrench me within the fold of those who practice the critical method, who see the critical method as a characteristic stamp of my work; that is, the determination not to go beyond that which is literally and authentically established in the tradition.[17]

Ranke's keen sensitivity to the authenticity of fact separated him both from the historiography of the Enlightenment and that of Romanticism, neither of which

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sen Mächte, translated on pages 152-219 of Theodor H. von Laue, Leopold Ranke.

[16]F. Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (2nd ed.; Freiburg, Herder, 1950), III, 95.

[17]Ranke, "Dankrede im 90. Geburtstag 21-12-1885," in Sämtliche Werke, CI/CII, 596.

really accepted Ranke's dictum of naked truth without embellishment. Nor would either school have understood the following plea of Ranke's:

> I desire as it were to extinguish myself, and to let only things speak for themselves, to let the powerful forces appear, which in the course of centuries have sprung forth conjointly and have strengthened each other....[18] It would be impossible to have no opinion regarding all the struggles of power and of ideas which the greatest decisions contain. But the nature of impartiality can be preserved. For this impartiality consists only in this: that one recognize the proper roles of the activating powers and be able to assess them in each one of their particular relationships. One sees these powers appearing in their special roles or selves, confronting and challenging one another.[19]

Ranke's objectivity sprang partly from a desire to apply and extend Niebuhr's critical-philological method.[20] Ranke applied this method to archival materials and to a dissection of previous historians such as Guicciardini. But it would be a mistake to explain Ranke's preoccupation with the need for objectivity as stemming exclusively from methodological considerations.[21] Such was more definitely the case with Ranke's followers. As for Ranke himself -- his desire for objectivity was decisively shaped by his

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[18]Ranke, Englische Geschichte, Sämtliche Werke, XV, 103.

[19]Ranke, "Die deutschen Mächte und der Fürstenbund," Sämtliche Werke, XXXI/XXXII, p. vii.

[20]Ranke, however, had already learned the philological method from Gottfried Hermann and historical source criticism from G. A. H. Stenzel. See the article, "Ranke," in Hellmuth Rossler and Gunther Franz, Biographisches Worterbüch sur deutschen Geschichte (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1952), p. 693.

[21]Established by leading scholars on Ranke, this

whole religious ethos -- a Lutheran theological conception.

While Hegel was a pantheist in religion with a philosophy precluding dualism, it was precisely the opposite with Ranke. He saw God's leadership in history, but this did not mean that God and history were identical. God directs history, but God and history are separate. God is the conscience of history. Every epoch stands directly in the presence of God. It is responsible to God in a direct and immediate fashion. Thus, Ranke created a dualism between the inner conscience of God and His outward order. The world of history is the outward order of God and every period in it is directly faithful to God. The task of the historian must be one of being faithful to God's external order, that is, to the world of history. When Ranke writes that he would like to extinguish himself, he means that he desires to minimize, as far as possible, his personal ego, his inner self, so that he can discover and obey this outward historical order of God's. To be faithful to God, to obey him, is to be faithful to God's order in history. Fac-

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can be supported by the many indications to this effect in Ranke's own writings. Consult: Werner Schultz, "Der Einfluss lutherischen Geistes auf Rankes und Droysens Deutung der Geschichte," Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, XXXIX (1942), 108-172; F. Meinecke in Historische Zeitschrift, CXLI (1930), 263; Carl Hinrichs, "Ranke's Lutherfragment von 1817 und der Ursprung seiner universalhistorischen Anschauung," Festschrift für Gerhard Ritter (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1950), pp. 299-322; for Ranke's own views, see his Sämtliche Werke, LIII/LIV, 89; Vol. I, 24; LIII/LIV, 261; LIII/LIV, 168-169; XXXVII, 22 as examples which could greatly increase upon further investigation. These references support the position taken on Ranke's religiosity, on the following three pages of the dissertation, pp. 97-99.

tuality (Sachlichkeit) for Ranke is not only a scientific desideratum, but it is a mandate from God to the scholar to contemplate, obey, and live by God's external order: the order of history.

And so the great historian for Ranke is a devoutly religious man who, in his infinite respect for God, obligates himself to be faithful to the objective cosmos, which God, with His infinite knowledge, directs. Every objective relationship that the historian discovers is nothing else, in Ranke's estimate, but a further disclosure of God's meaning. Events, ideas, epochs, universal connections: all are equally part of a divine order. Ranke's theological interpretation of history never led him to create a distinctively Christian philosophy of history which gave a partial or speculative meaning and construction to the historical facts. Instead, the Lutheran imperative of obeying the external order led Ranke to what he believed was a direct empirical examination of the facts themselves. Empirical investigation of facts and God's direction in history for Ranke, therefore, went hand in hand.

Attention has already been directed to the proposition that Ranke's legacy was quite different from the unique amalgam of factors which constituted the essence of his own interpretation of history. Ranke's legacy to nineteenth-century German historiography consisted of three distinct strains.[22] His leading older students such as Waitz and

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[22]H. Rössler and G. Franz, "Ranke," Biographisches Wörterbuch zur deutschen Geschichte, 694.

Giesebrecht, trained in Ranke's seminar which emphasized careful, critical methodology and on the Jahrbücher des deutschen Reiches, turned their attention mainly to medieval history. The younger Ranke school represented by historians as Lenz, Dove, Delbrück, and Oncken, sought to be faithful to Ranke's objectivity, but they were equally desirous of maintaining Ranke's conception of universal history. A third strain is represented by Meinecke with his emphasis on the history of ideas (Ideengeschichte) and on a religious outlook.

Hintze, though never exclusively a follower of Ranke, reveals very clearly the influence of two of these strains. Weizsäcker, who was representative of the older Ranke strain, which emphasized a critical-philological approach, shaped Hintze's doctoral dissertation. And Waitz, who was also in this Ranke tradition, turned Hintze's attention to the importance of universal history and systematic, comparative, constitutional history. It is evident that although Hintze's basic historiographical conceptions were shaped as a result of the conjunction of three powerful influences in nineteenth-century historicism -- Droysen, Ranke, and Schmoller -- the particular influence of Ranke upon Hintze was a very strong one.

The remainder of this chapter will examine one aspect of this influence in greater detail. It will show that Hintze's doctoral dissertation, which he wrote under Weizsäcker, is an example of the Rankean emphasis on the philological-critical approach. The following chapter will show

that Hintze's powerful essay on Roscher's theory of political development is an application of Ranke's plea for universal history.

In order to establish a closer relationship between the legacy of Ranke, Weizsäcker and Hintze, it is necessary to sketch the historiographical background of Weizsäcker.[23]

Julius Weizsäcker was born in 1828 in Oehringen. A strong religious atmosphere prevailed in the Weizsäcker household, and this was a determinant in the education of both Julius and his brother, Karl, who eventually became a celebrated professor of theology and chancellor of the University of Tübingen.[24] After a secondary education at Oehringen and Tübingen, Julius entered the theological seminary at Urach. In 1846, he enrolled in the Tübinger Stift, a famous theological seminary at Tübingen.[25] Weizsäcker plunged enthusiastically into his theological studies, but his interests quickly shifted, under the influence of Christian Baur, to history.[26] After passing the theological examination in the fall of 1850, he undertook a one-year educational trip, which brought him to Paris, Vienna, and Berlin. At Berlin, Weizsäcker attended lectures given by Wattenbach and also the lectures of Ranke. By 1859, Weizsäcker had

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[23]The only satisfactory account of Weizsäcker is Ernst Bernheim, "Julius Weizsäcker," Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XLI (1896), pp. 637-645.

[24]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 637.

[25]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 637.

[26]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 637.

definitely decided upon a career in the field of historical studies at the University of Tübingen.[27]

Weizsäcker already had received his doctoral degree in August of 1856. His dissertation, dealing with a problem of Frankish Church history of the ninth century, was entitled Hincimar and Pseudo-Isidorius.[28] In 1860, he published an article on the "Pseudo-Isidorian Question and the Present State of its Research" in the Historische Zeitschrift.[29] Bernheim has characterized the methodology and skill exhibited in these early studies of Weizsäcker:

> Each of these studies was in its own fashion masterly. Weizsäcker was able to achieve complete clarity and understanding in an extremely difficult area that remained confused as a result of insufficient examination of the sources, the complexity of the interrelated canonical legal, and dogmatic problems, and the ambiguity of motives....It is the complete originality of Weizsacker as a source scholar that makes itself manifest in these first writings: To apply the greatest power to the smallest point, and with such power to move forward from the smallest to the greatest -- that was the fundamental principle of his research....[30]

In 1860, three paths lay open to Weizsäcker. He was offered the editorship of the Staatsanzeiger, which he declined. In the same year he was offered an extraordinary professorship of Church and dogma history at Gottingen,

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[27]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 638.

[28]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 638.

[29]Julius Weizsäcker, "Die pseudo-isidorische Frage in ihrem gegenwärtigen Stande," Historische Zeitschrift, III (1860), 42-97.

[30]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 638.

which he likewise refused.[31] Instead, Weizsäcker attached himself to the great project that Ranke and Von Sybel had so long entertained -- to collect and critically edit the documents of the imperial diet for the medieval period.[32] The project was capable of realization as a result of the financial support of King Maximilian of Bavaria, and in 1858, the task was entrusted to the newly established "Commission for Germanic Historical and Source Investigation" by the Academy of Sciences at Munich.[33] Von Sybel, one of Ranke's most brilliant students and the editor of the Historische Zeitschrift, was placed in charge. Georg Voigt, who was to have assisted von Sybel, was given an appointment at Rostock and was unable to work on the project. At von Sybel's suggestion Weizsäcker was approached in 1860 to replace Voigt, and he accepted.[34]

Weizsäcker settled in Munich in 1860, April 1. He was to take a leading role in the editing and publishing of the acts of the imperial diet. He was at once made a lecturer (Privatdozent) in history at Munich. But the most significant result was that by choosing to attach himself to this great project, Weizsäcker was placing himself squarely within the tradition of Ranke. The project was inspired by Ranke; it was directed by Ranke's leading students, and it

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[31]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 638.

[32]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 638.

[33]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 638.

[34]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 639.

was designed to be a master application of Ranke's critical-historical method of examining and editing source materials. As an advocate of this approach to the sources, Weizsäcker was probably unrivalled.

He set to work on the project with powerful energy, remarkable industry, and rare skill. He was not contented merely to examine the material which was currently available -- material based on a few of the leading archives and a limited publication of documentary collections. Instead, he organized a systematic inventory and investigation of the whole literature and of all archival collections. Over 70 archives were systematically searched.[35] Numerous documents hitherto unknown were uncovered. Weizsäcker followed Voigt's suggestions of not restricting himself merely to the decisions and proceedings of the Reichstag proper. Instead, he sought to exhibit the relation of these proceedings and decisions to the political conditions of the time. Consequently, it was necessary to take into account the collections of the electors, the princes, and the cities; also the instructions and reports of envoys.[36]

The result was that under Weizsäcker, the publication of the Reichstagsakten became the "assured documentary foundation for the whole imperial history of that period,[37] which up to then, even in its main outlines, remained dark

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[35]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 639.

[36]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 639.

[37]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 639.

and confused." Moreover, there was still another advance in historical source analysis. Up to this time, rules of procedure had been carefully worked out for analyzing the Latin sources of the middle ages, but no such rules existed for the German acts and documents. It was the achievement of Weizsäcker to work out carefully such rules in the first volume of the Reichstagsakten, which dealt with King Wenceslas from 1376-1387.[38]

Weizsäcker devoted many years of careful attention and detail to the great project. Meanwhile, his academic career was undergoing important changes. In 1863, he was at Erlangen.[39] In 1867, he received a call to Tübingen as a professor in ordinary. Then in 1872, Weizsäcker settled in Strassburg after having received a favorable appointment to the university there.[40] At Strassburg, he refined the techniques of the historical seminar. He introduced the practice of providing a seminar library housed in a separate room of the University and designed to be a counterpart to the natural science laboratory. This practice was of genuine importance in furthering the historical techniques of students. Weizsäcker introduced this measure not only at Strassburg, but at Göttingen and, above all, at the University of Berlin. It gradually spread to most other German

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[38]Julius Weizsäcker (ed.), Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter König Wenzel, 1. Abteilung, 1376-87 (München: Oldenbourg, 1868), pp. LX-LXXXIV.

[39]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 640.

[40]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," pp. 640-641.

universities.[41]

In 1876, when Georg Waitz was called to Berlin, Weizsäcker, who had attained an outstanding reputation as a critical scholar in the Ranke tradition, succeeded Waitz at Göttingen.[42] Finally, later, in 1881, when Nitzsch died, his chair at Berlin was filled by Weizsäcker. At Berlin, Weizsäcker trained a corps of students in careful and methodical scholarship. He checked on his students' work meticulously and controlled their researches carefully. Yet, he did not impose any dictatorial pattern of conformity upon them. What he insisted upon was careful, critical work, and, as long as this was performed, he allowed his students genuine independence of judgment.[43] Many of his students took part in the editing of the acts of the imperial diet, which provided them with abundant opportunity for the exercise of meticulous scholarship.[44]

Hintze had enrolled at the University of Berlin in 1880 -- one year before Weizsäcker came. As indicated earlier, although Hintze was profoundly influenced by Droysen, he chose to write his doctoral dissertation under Weizsäcker. He selected as his subject The Kingdom of William of Holland and received his doctor's degree on March 24, 1884. When

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[41]Lenz, Geschichte der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, II, Part II, 356.

[42]Berheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 642.

[43]Berheim, "Weizsäcker," pp. 642-644.

[44]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," pp. 642-644.

Hintze chose to write his dissertation under Weizsäcker, he was linking himself up with the whole Ranke tradition.[45] It has already been indicated how Weizsäcker was of this tradition, and it now remains to link Hintze up more closely with Weizsäcker.

Weizsäcker's preoccupation with the acts of the imperial diet was not only indicative of Ranke's influence in terms of critical source scholarship, but it reflected a basic interest in the field of medieval history. Already at Strassburg, Weizsäcker had not only concentrated his research -- but his lectures on this period of history.[46] He directed his student's attention to the middle ages and so it was only natural that Hintze should select a topic in medieval history. The choice of the dissertation topic on The Kingdom of William of Holland was, indeed, not accidental on two counts. It was in a realm of history in which Weizsäcker was greatly interested -- medieval history -- and it was on a topic that also attracted his attention. Already in 1879, Weizsäcker had published a monograph on the Rhenish League of 1254.[47] This work exhibited the critical acumen of Weizsäcker and antiquated the earlier studies of Busson and Klupfel.[48] The work sought to apply

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[45]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 638.

[46]Bernheim, "Weizsäcker," p. 641.

[47]Julius Weizsäcker, Der Rheinische Bund, 1254 (Tübingen: H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung, 1879).

[48]A. Busson, Zur Geschichte der grossen Landfriedensbundes deutscher Städte (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1874); A. von

the canons of careful source criticism to the documents of the Rhenish League.[49] Weizsäcker, thus, sought to establish a new and authentic text of the Bundesakten by showing the inaccuracies of previous renderings by Leibnitz, Freyberg, Bohmer, and Pertz.[50] In brilliant fashion he established the original text. Secondly, he sought to correctly establish the purpose of the League. He tried to prove that the Rhenish League of 1254 was not formally a league of cities at all but a league of lords and cities.[51]

In choosing the theme of The Kingdom of William of Holland, which was expanded into a volume in the series entitled Historische Studien.[52] Hintze was working on a topic which was closely related to that of the Rhenish League. And, as Hintse's teacher, Weizsäcker, had applied critical scholarship to render antiquated previous uncritical interpretations of the League, so Hintze now sought to apply this same critical approach to the problem of The Kingdom of William of Holland. Thus, Hintze pointed out that a critical work on The Kingdom of William of Holland was lacking.[53]

Klupfel, "Die Einungen des deutschen Reich im Mittelalter," Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, VI (1846), 289-309.

[49]Weizsäcker, Rheinische Bund, pp. 7-68.

[50]Weizsäcker, Rheinische Bund, pp. 2-3.

[51]Weizsäcker, Rheinische Bund, p. 4.

[52]Otto Hintze, Das Königtum Wilhelm von Holland, (Historische Studien; ed., Arndt, Noorden, Voigt, No. 15; Leipzig: Veit and Company, 1885).

[53]Hintze, Königtum Wilhelm von Holland, p. 1.

He dismissed Meerman's work on the subject as containing much material but it's being out of date.[54]

In 1882, three years before the appearance of Hintze's study, Ulrich had published his book on King William.[55] Weizsäcker defended the publication of Hintze's study precisely on the grounds that Hintze's work was more critical in its scholarship.[56] Hintze confessed that he wrote his account without being aware of Ulrich's study, but he argued that last minute knowledge of Ulrich's work in no way persuaded him that his own study was rendered superfluous. Indeed, Hintze pointed out that on many matters his conclusions differed from those of Ulrich: that Ulrich lacked a grasp of the essential nature of the whole problem, and that Ulrich's uncritical approach ignored a number of important issues such as a detailed treatment of the important election question, a broad view of party conditions in Germany, a survey of the sources of power of the counter kingdom and, finally, a detailed examination of the role of the Rhenish League.[57]

Without such a knowledge of the role of the Rhenish League, Hintze argued that it was impossible to acquire an understanding of the basis of King William's power during

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[54]Meerman, Geschiedenis van graaf Willem van Holland Roomisch Köning ('S Gravenhaage, Muller, 1783-1797), 4 Vols.

[55]Adolf Ulrich, Geschichte des römischen Königs Wilhelm von Holland (Hannover: Hahn, 1882).

[56]Hintze, Königtum Wilhelm von Holland, p. 2.

[57]Hintze, Königtum Wilhelm von Holland, p. 2.

the latter period of his reign. For this reason Ulrich made no distinction between the earlier period of King William's reign and the latter period. Ulrich failed to see the significance of the year 1255 -- not only in terms of death of Conrad IV -- but because that year marked a shift in the support of King William. After 1255, William shifted his alliance from the feudal powers, which had given him insufficient aid and finally betrayed him, to the cities which exhibited interests in the king and Empire.[58] Supported by the cities, the king sought to create, by means of a federative system, a basis for royal authority and the peace. Hintze was, therefore, inclined to view William in a more favorable light than previous historians. In fact, he detected tendencies in William's federative policy that were to emerge anew a hundred years later, and he argued that William's position respecting federalism was a more forceful one than those of Ruprecht or Wenceslas.[59]

In an effort to write a critical study of the kingdom of William of Holland, Hintze made use of the new Regesten edited by Ficker and the papal documents edited by Potthast. Weizsäcker was impressed with the results of Hintze's critical scholarship. He specifically supported Hintze's division of King William's reign into two periods. He recognized the skill with which Hintze dealt with the elections of 1247 and 1252, which threw new light on current research regarding

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[58]Hintze, Königtum Wilhelm von Holland, p. 2.

[59]Hintze, Königtum Wilhelm von Holland, p. 2.

the origins of the electoral college. He admired Hintze's treatment of the territorial struggles of the king. He praised Hintze's partial reconstruction of the treaty of Mons (1250). He commended Hintze's critical approach to the collection of letters which formed the basis of our knowledge concerning the attempt to depose the king. Concerning himself with Hintze's treatment of the Rhenish League, Weizsäcker praised Hintze for not remaining satisfied with conclusions which Weizsäcker himself had established, and for proceeding beyond the master's results. Even where Hintze reached results which deviated from his own Weizsäcker praised Hintze, because he exhibited a penetrating and careful approach.[60]

The subsequent judgment of historical scholarship has vindicated both Weizsäcker's view on this work of Hintze, and the latter's own scholarship.[61] In the last edition of Dahlmann-Waitz, Hintze's study on the kingdom of William of Holland is listed as the definitive work on the subject. In his Bücherkunde zur deutschen Geschichte, Gunther Franz again lists Hintze's study as the basic work on this problem.[62]

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[60]Hintze, Königtums Wilhelm von Holland, Introduction, pp. v-vi.

[61]Kempf, speaking of Ulrich's work, declares that it rests "auf dem altern Regesten von Bohmer und is weit überholt durch die Arbeit von O. Hintze, das Königtums Wilhelm von Holland (1885)," which he regards as "sorgfaltig, eingehend und erschopfend." See J. Kempf, Geschichte des deutschen Reiches wahrend des grossen Interregnums, 1245-1273 (Wurzburg: A Stubers' Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1892-3), p. vii.

[62]Gunther Franz, Bücherkunde zur deutschen Geschichte (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1951), p. 149.

Hintze's study on the kingdom of William reflected the scholarship and interests of Weizsäcker, and in turn, the latter stood on the shoulders of the critical scholarship of Leopold von Ranke. Thus, Hintze's first important work was solidly grounded in the legacy of Ranke: a legacy that in this instance expressed the desire of Ranke's older students to concern themselves with intensive topics in medieval history for critical analysis and intensive examination.

CHAPTER IV

THE LEGACY OF RANKE: WAITZ

We turn our attention in this chapter to another aspect of the legacy of Ranke which reached Hintze via one of Ranke's most celebrated students, Georg Waitz.[1] It is necessary to sketch briefly the historiographical background of Waitz in order to relate Waitz to the legacy of Ranke and show his influence on Hintze.

Georg Waitz was born on October 9, 1813 at Flensburg. He attended the local schools there. His interest in history warmed early in the reading of Niebuhr's Roman History. The attraction of Niebuhr's interest in constitutional history awakened Waitz's desires to emulate the former, who had become his ideal.[2]

In 1832, Waitz entered the University of Kiel, where

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[1]On Waitz, consult Eberhard Waitz, Georg Waitz, ein Lebens und Charakterbild (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1913); A. Kluckhohn, Zur Erinnerung an Georg Waitz (Hamburg: A. G. Verlag, 1887); G. P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 117-122; E. Fueter, Geschichte der neueren Historiographie, pp. 387-389; H. von Srbik, Geist und Geschichte, I, 297-299; 301-305; Herman Grauert, "Georg Waitz," Historisches Jahrbuch, VIII (1887), 48-100; J. W. Thompson and B. J. Holm, A History of Historical Writing, II, 198, 202; F. Frensdorff, "Georg Waitz," Allgemeine deutsche Biographie (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1896), XL, 602-629.

[2]F. Frensdorff, "Georg Waitz," Allgemeine deutsche Biographie (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1896), XL, 602-629. To be cited as F. Frensdorff, "Georg Waitz" in future references.

he was a brilliant student. In 1833, he left Kiel for Berlin. He at once came under the influence of Ranke, Lachmann, Savigny, and Hohmeyer. The center of his interests at Berlin was Ranke. He attended all his lectures. Ranke became, for Waitz, not only a teacher but also a close friend. Moreover, Ranke persuaded Waitz to pursue a professional career in history. Under Ranke's direction, Waitz became an excellent scholar with a critical understanding of the sources.

In 1836, armed with a splendid recommendation from Ranke, Waitz left for Hannover to become a co-worker on the Monumenta Germaniae Historica. The relations between Waitz and the director, Pertz, were excellent, and Waitz did a yeoman's task for the Monumenta. In the archives of the society, there appeared a constant succession of studies under his name -- among them -- an important analysis of the Hersfeld Annals. In 1841, Waitz discovered the famous tenth-century codex of the Merseburger Zaubersprüche. These studies and discoveries brought fame to him, and in 1842, the young scholar was called to a professorship at Kiel.[3]

There, Kiel gave Waitz opportunity to continue his work with the Monumenta. He lectured on the history of Denmark, general German history, medieval history, and introduced a series of lectures on medieval historiography. In 1843, on the occasion of the one-thousandth anniversary of the treaty of Verdun, he envisaged the writing of a com-

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[3]F. Frensdorff, "Georg Waitz," pp. 603-605.

prehensive German constitutional history. The first volume came out in 1844; the second in 1847 and finally, by 1878, the last and eighth volume volume of his life's work appeared.[4]

Waitz became involved in politics during the revolution of 1848. He, being the representative from the University of Kiel, was a member of the provincial diet. In 1848, he was at the Frankfurt Parliament as a representative from Schleswig-Holstein.[5] His political views were pro-German and his pro-Hohenzollern position made him disliked by the Danish government.[6] The result was that in 1849 Waitz accepted a call to Göttingen.[7]

His first lectures at Göttingen concerned German history and politics. Since the departure of Wilhelm Roscher from Göttingen, no one had been lecturing on the subject of politics and Waitz was urged to do so by his colleagues. Waitz also lectured on the history of the middle ages, modern German history since the middle of the eighteenth century, general constitutional history, and German history from 1815 to 1865. The most original and distinctive of these lectures was in the field of general constitutional history. These lectures on general consti-

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[4]Georg Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (Kiel: Schwers'sche Buchhandlung, 1844-1878), 8 volumes.

[5]F. Frensdorff, "Georg Waitz," p. 608.

[6]J. W. Thompson and B. J. Holm, A History of Historical Writing, II, 199.

[7]F. Frensdorff, "Georg Waitz," p. 611.

tutional history followed the development of the constitutional system not only during the medieval period, but throughout the course of modern history.

Along with these lectures, Waitz developed, at Göttingen, a seminar in the field of medieval history that became justly celebrated. As a model of careful, conscientious work in criticism and analysis of source materials pertaining to the medieval period, it set a high standard and produced corps of critical scholars.[8]

Meanwhile, Waitz continued to produce a stream of scholarly studies ranging from a history of Schleswig-Holstein to topics in German and French history, and obviously, not excluding a great wealth of writings in medieval history.

The years at Göttingen served to transform Waitz into one of the acknowledged masters of German history, especially German constitutional and medieval history. He received calls to other universities -- to Munich, for example, but he declined them.

His name almost became synonomous with Göttingen. Finally, in 1876, Waitz left Göttingen for Berlin, where he succeeded Pertz as director of the Monumenta. He declared that his two ambitions in life were the Monumenta and the completion of his German Constitutional History (Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte). Waitz devoted his remaining years to these two gigantic tasks. He gave scarcely any attention

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[8]F. Frensdorff, "Georg Waitz," pp. 611-612.

to teaching. In 1886, this devoted and faithful follower of the legacy of Ranke died.[9]

In examining the historiographical career of Waitz, one is tremendously aware that in many respects it resembles the pattern of Ranke's older students. These students, as we have noted, concentrated on medieval history and meticulous critical source analysis. In this regard, both Weizsäcker and Waitz belong to the older generation of Ranke's students. In other respects Waitz reveals a different orientation. He displayed a genuine interest in general constitutional history, and the problem of politics as an academic discipline also intrigued him.

Waitz's interest in constitutional history was stimulated by Niebuhr, but this interest was nourished by Ranke's approach to the state system. It has been indicated that Waitz succeeded Roscher in regularly giving a series of lectures on politics at Göttingen. These lectures on politics were published.[10]

The lectures which Waitz gave at Göttingen on general constitutional history were of a wider scope and more within the intent of Ranke than the massive Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte which Waitz wrote. Of this last work, Thompson and Holm have well declared, "Actually the work is too erudite, too scrupulous, too weighted with source-facts to

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[9]F. Frensdorff, "Georg Waitz," pp. 614-619.

[10]Georg Waitz, Grundzüge der Politik nebst einzelnen Ausführungen (Kiel: Ernst Homann, 1862).

be a great history. The data are there, and so is the critical treatment, but one will look in vain for any illuminating generalizations, any explanatory interpretations, or any flash of insight."[11] Although the work resembled a number of individual specialised monographs loosely drawn together, this German Constitutional History of Waitz's, nevertheless, marks a milestone in historiography. The reason is that this work was "the first presentation of German constitutional history from a historical viewpoint, and free from subordination to legal history."[12] Waitz, thus, insisted that German constitutional history was a historical discipline -- not a juristic one. He was instrumental in directing the interests of historians, who approached from distinctly historical viewpoints, to this field.

In advocating such an approach to constitutional history and accepting the historian's obligation to deliver a set of lectures on politics, Waitz was broadening the horizon of the older students of Ranke. The influence of Waitz on Hintze in this regard was decisive. In his inaugural address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1914, Hintze sepcifically and gratefully acknowledged the influence that Waitz had exercised upon him in calling Hintze's attention to the importance of constitutional history and systematic

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[11] J. W. Thompson, B. J. Holm, A History of Historical Writing, II, 20.

[12] Fritz Hartung, "Georg Waitz," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed., E. R. A. Seligman, Vol. XV (1935), 322.

analysis in the political and social sciences (Staatswissenschaften).[13]

This influence of Waitz on Hintze came at a crucial moment in the latter's career. Hintze had completed his doctorate under Weizsäcker. He was preparing for the examination, pro facultate docendi, when Waitz suggested that he spend a year in systematic study and reading in political science. Up to this time, Weizsäcker had trained Hintze in the careful approach of a critical scholar. The year of study now opened up to Hintze the realm of general constitutional history, political science, and the role of the general social sciences.[14]

Hintze's newly-awakened interests -- the results of Waitz's proddings -- did not represent a genuine break with the Ranke tradition. Instead, Hintze saw that the problem of the constitutional history of the Western state system and the question of the nature of politics were interrelated. The man whom Hintze considered as realizing that modern European history, its constitutional development, and its political structure were part of a single process, was Ranke. Thus, Ranke's influence on Waitz, which led to Hintze, in turn, led Hintze back to Ranke.

Hintze studied this problem in a memorable essay[15]

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[13]Hintze, "Antrittsrede," p. 746.

[14]Hintze, "Antrittsrede," p. 746.

[15]Otto Hintze, "Roscher's politische Entwicklungstheorie," Schmoller's Jahrbuch für Gesetsgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft, XXI, 1-45. This essay is reprinted in Otto Hintze, Historische und Politische Aufsatze (Berlin:

written in 1897 devoted to Roscher's conception of political development. The essay was ostensibly an elaborate review of Roscher's great work on politics.[16] This essay by Hintze revealed his newly-developed interest in the political and social sciences, his strong opposition to Roscher's organic notion of political development, and support of Ranke's concept of universal history and the Western state system.

Hintze began by discussing the status that politics as a separate discipline had failed to achieve in German universities. He noted that very few men lectured on the subject of politics as a distinct field.[17] The number could almost be counted on one hand: Dahlmann,[18] Roscher, Waitz, and Treitschke[19] were among the leaders. With the deaths of Roscher and Treitschke, the likelihood of any further teaching of politics as a separate discipline had truly decreased.

Hintze found the main reason for this decline of politics as an autonomous field in the changing social-political situation within Germany after 1871. Whereas the

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Deutsche Bücherei, n.d.), IV, 35-86. All further citations to this essay are from this latter book. Henceforth, this essay will be cited as Hintze, "Roscher."

[16]Wilhelm Roscher, Politik: Geschichtliche Naturlehre der Monarchie, Aristokratie und Demokratie (2nd ed.; Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1893).

[17]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 35.

[18]Consult F. Dahlmann, Die Politik, auf den Grund und das Mass der gegebenen Zustände zurückgeführt (2nd ed.; Leipzig: Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung, 1847), Vol. I.

[19]Heinrich Treitschke, Politik (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1897), 2 volumes.

main energies of the nation between 1815-1870 had been absorbed in "political reconstruction in a constitutional and national sense,"[20] with the establishment of the empire after 1871 the great question became the matter of social reform by the state. Socio-political reform programs by the state involving questions of justice were tending to create a vast new area and discipline, social policy (Sozial-politik) which seemed intent on swallowing previously independent areas of inquiry such as politics, economics, and ethics.

Hintze was convinced that this new growth of socio-political interests rendered the cultivation of politics as a separate discipline difficult. The field of politics was considered by him to be a somewhat undeveloped state. Compared to other disciplines, the study of politics was quite unadvanced. Hintze regarded the two leading students of politics in Germany, Treitschke and Bluntschli, as scarce having established politics on a firm basis. From a methodological standpoint, Hintze considered the creation of such a sound study of politics as necessary. It was with an expectation that perhaps Wilhelm Roscher had finally achieved such a goal, that Hintze approached Roscher's significant work on politics.[21]

Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894), a leading German economist, was along with Knies and Hildebrand, the founder of the older historical school of economics. In Roscher's

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[20]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 36.

[21]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 38.

famous work, Principles of Political Economy (System der Volkswirtschaft), he[22] devoted a chapter to the methods of political economy. Roscher dismissed the theological method of the medieval period, the juridical method of the seventeenth century, and also the mathematical method.[23] He then went on to contrast two other methods of approaching political economy -- the idealistic and the historical-physiological method.[24] The idealistic method is based on what should be. It sets up norms and ideal conditions which it regards as desirable. Roscher also rejected this approach. "We refuse entirely," he wrote, "to lend ourselves in theory to the construction of such ideal systems." Roscher then turned to the historical method. He described it in the following words:

> Our aim is simply to describe man's economic nature and economic wants, to investigate the laws

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[22]On Roscher, a key figure in the development of the social sciences in nineteenth-century Germany, consult K. Arnd, Das System Roschers, gegenüber den unwandelbaren Naturgesetzen der Volkswirtschaft (Frankfurt: Winter, 1862); Gustav Schmoller, "Wilhelm Roscher," Zur Literaturgeschichte der Staats - und Sozialwissenschaften (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1888), pp. 147-171; M. Brasch, Wilhelm Roscher und die sozial-politischen Stromungen der Gegenwart (Leipzig: G. Foch, 1895); Max Weber, "Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie," Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (2nd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1951), pp. 1-145; Margaret Huter, Die Methodologie der Wirtschaftswissenschaft bei Roscher und Knies (Jena: G. Fischer, 1928); Ulrich Werner, Der Einfluss der lutherischen Ethik auf die Sozial - und Wirtschaftsauffassung von Roscher und Knies (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1938).

[23]Wilhelm Roscher, Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, Vol. I of System der Volkswirtschaft (5th ed.; Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung, 1864), 38-50.

[24]Roscher, System der Volkswirtschaft, Vol. I, 39; 48-49.

> and the character of the institutions which are adapted to the satisfaction of these wants, and the greater or less amount of these wants, and the greater or less amount of success by which they have been attended. Our task is therefore, so to speak, the anatomy and physiology of social or national economy.[25]

Roscher's use of the expression "anatomy and physiology of social or national economy" was not accidental. For he regarded the economist as performing in his field a task allied to that of the physician. Just as the doctor studies the principles of the maturity, birth, and decay of the human organism, so the economist studies the natural laws of the national economic cycle. "Whoever is acquainted with the laws of the development of the plant, cannot fail to see in the seed the germ of its growth, and in its flower, the herald of decay." And Roscher added:

> The forms of the period of maturity may be considered the most perfect; earlier forms as the immature, and later as those of the age of decline. But it is a matter of the greatest difficulty accurately to determine the culminating point of a people's civilization....It is, however, always a purely empirical question; and in the solution of it, the observer's eye may acquire a singular acuteness by the comparative study of as many nations as possible, especially of those which have already passed away.[26]

Roscher's aim was thus to describe with his historical method the natural unfolding of the social organism in terms of its birth, maturity, and decline. The laws which he discovered he regarded as natural laws of historical development. In his work on politics, Roscher sought to establish the natural laws of political development, to exhibit the principles of the

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[25]Roscher, System der Volkswirtschaft, I, 45.

[26]Roscher, System der Volkswirtschaft, I, 46-47.

rise, maturity, and decline of political organisms. He believed he had already accomplished this for the national economy, and his book on politics was now an application of the historical method to the political realm.

Roscher had been given historical training in Göttingen under Dahlmann, Gervinus, and K. M. Muller. Later, he studied in Gerlin under Ritter, Bockh, and Ranke.[27] He thus had an excellent historical preparation. Here was a distinguished scholar, a leader of the earlier "historical school," trained in the best historical tradition, including that of Ranke, who believed he had discovered the "natural" laws of historical and political development. The issue was a basic one, because it involved a fundamental question of methodology. If Roscher was correct, then he had, indeed, found the natural laws of political development, and his historical method was truly epoch making. If Roscher was wrong, then his whole methodological framework dissolved, although much of his descriptive material was still worth-while. Hintze approached Roscher's work on politics in an endeavor to ascertain whether Roscher's methodology and theory of political development was valid or not.

Hintze began by summarizing Roscher's conception of political development. In attempting a comparative morphology of the development of states, he considered Roscher as going back to Aristotle. Yet, Hintze regarded it as in-

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[27]Carl Brinkman, "Wilhelm Roscher," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed., E. R. A. Seligman, Vol. XIII (1949), 437.

correct to simply label Roscher's attempt as an Aristotelian application. In significant ways it deviated from Aristotle.[28]

According to Hintze, Roscher's picture of political development was as follows. Out of an original tribal state there at first issued a monarchy which held the power of the state in its hands and, yet, did not perceptibly restrict the freedom of the people. This monarchy could thus be designated as a patriarchal, primitive kingdom. Gradually, this monarchy declined, and it was succeeded by a knightly, priestly aristocracy. Slowly there was formed between the class of priests and laity, the lords and the servants, an educated middle class. The role of this middle class was to entrench the monarchy and, thereby, contribute to the formation of a new state -- an absolute monarchy. As democratic elements continue to evolve, the absolute monarchy gradually yield places to a full democracy, which, in turn, degenerates because of the formation of two opposing factions -- extremely wealthy capitalists and an impoverished proletariat. Thus, a plutocracy, a moneyed oligarchy, and a proletariat confront each other. Finally, a new monarchy completes the cycle -- a military tyranny which Roscher named Caesarism.[29]

Hintze was fully aware that Roscher acknowledged exceptions to this cycle of political development. But the

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[28]Hintze, "Roscher," pp. 38-40.

[29]Hintze, "Roscher," pp. 40-41.

point was that Roscher accepted a normal, natural cycle of political development, which ran from a primitive kingdom, aristocracy, absolute monarchy, plutocracy and proletariat, through Caesarism. This was the curve that Roscher contended each of the western nations had experienced, and in the future, barring unforeseen circumstances, this cycle of political development would continue. In fact, Roscher devoted the six sections of his book to separate discussions of each of these political forms.

Hintze showed that Roscher could derive these six political forms from three more basic ones -- aristocracy, monarchy, and democracy. Monarchy appears in three different ways -- as the patriarchal, primitive kingdom, as an absolute monarchy, and as Caesarism. Aristocracy appears in two forms: as a warlike and priestly aristocracy and as a plutocracy of money. Democracy on the other hand appears only once. Moreover, Roscher sought to protect himself from criticism by arguing that these six forms were, to some extent, ideal types. In practice and in empirical reality no one form existed in pure isolation, but each was blended with others -- though at any moment -- one form tended to be dominant.[30]

Hintze turned to a powerful critique of Roscher's conception of political development. He showed in the first place that part of Roscher's confusion rested on the inability to distinguish state (Staat) from society (Gesell-

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[30]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 42.

schaft). Accordingly, Roscher sometimes confused political with social categories. As a result, Hintze held that the plutocratic-proletarian phase of the cycle was not an expression of a particular political form of the constitution but that it designated a social category.[31]

Hintze next subjected Roscher's cycle to a review of ancient and modern constitutional history in order to see whether it would meet the test. For political conditions in the Greek world, Hintze thought Aristotle's classification and description of the political cycle was more appropriate than that of Roscher. Hintze rejected Roscher's patriarchal kingdom, characterized by the freedom of the people. For Hintze regarded it, as Eduard Meyer, as having its prototype in the Oriental kingdoms of the East. Moreover, he rejected as superficial, Roscher's comparison of Greek tyranny with the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He showed that the relations to the rising middle class in both instances rested on different bases. Above all, Hintze demonstrated that the newer absolutisms were striving for power on an international basis, whereas, the older tyranny in Greece was an attempt to eliminate internal party conflicts. The former tyranny was an adaptation peculiarly for a city-state; the latter absolutism was designed for a modern, large state.[32]

Hintze criticized Roscher's attempt to apply the

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[31]Hintze, "Roscher," pp. 49-50.

[32]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 51.

same cycle of development equally to the Roman situation and the development of states during the middle ages. The basis of his criticism of Roscher's treatment of Rome rested on the proposition that the external development of power in Rome influenced remarkably the social structure of Roman society and the formation of the inner constitution, but Roscher ignored this factor.[33]

The crux of Hintze's critique of Roscher's cycle theory of development amounted to the following. Roscher was content to view the state merely from within, in terms of an internal development. This theory said Hintze:

> ....did not take sufficient cognizance of the fundamental fact, which all impartial historiography acknowledges; namely, that the inner life of the individual states is in large part dependent on the relations of states among one another, on the strains and pushes which prevail among them, on the greater and lesser pressures; so to speak, on the total political atmosphere; in short on that which Ranke calls the great world relationships (<u>die grossen Weltverhaltnisse</u>).[34]

With acuteness, Hintze saw that Roscher was isolating states and regarding them as self-contained entities. He realized that Roscher's approach rested on the supposition that every state has a curve of development which it normally follows, and that this curve of development is a self-contained one, "determined" by inner laws of life. Hintze traced Roscher's error as reflecting a false, biological analogy. Indeed, he maintained that the very title of Roscher's book implies that the state is a natural entity. In-

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[33]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 53.

[34]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 55.

stead of regarding the state as a logical classifying concept, Roscher viewed it as a biological one.[35]

Hintze's characterization of Roscher's method was completely just. The truth was, as Max Weber indicated in an essay on Roscher, that the latter's approach went back to Savigny and the historical school of jurisprudence. It rested on the notion that nations were organic entities with a unique folk-spirit (Volks-Geist), which created all aspects of a nation's life -- its laws, language, and other manifestations. It was a romantic conception of the state as organism with its own inner life and laws.[36]

It was against such a romantic conception of the state that Hintze objected. Though Roscher had studied with Ranke, he had not understood Ranke's concept of the state system. Indeed, what Hintze was doing was to go back to Ranke's notions of universal history and the dynamics of the state system in order to show the inadequacy of Roscher's romantic conception of the political development.

Hintze, thus, over against organic life for the individual state, following Ranke, postulated a universal concept of the state system. He demanded a world-historical approach over a national-historical way of looking at the growth of a state. As he put it:

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[35]Hintze, "Roscher," pp. 55-56.

[36]Max Weber, "Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie," Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, p. 9. On this question, see the excellent discussion in Huter, Die Methodologie der Wirtschaftswissenschaften bei Roscher und Knies, pp. 29-56.

> Seen from this standpoint, all formations of states, as all developments of culture generally are part of a great coherent process, involving the many peoples who have produced world history. In the many relations of these peoples affecting each other, having different starting points, contrasting or uniting with one another, and working together for continually more comprehensive and more complicated forms of political life, the course of nations becomes manifest.[37]

On this view, individual states are always involved in wider historical connections and relations that depend on the behavior and actions of other states as well as the past history of these states. The result is that the particular development of an individual state is always being modified by a "universal situation originating out of a general historical development."[38]

Max Weber, who wrote his penetrating essay on Roscher for Schmoller's Jahrbuch in 1903, completely grasped and properly evaluated Hintze's contribution in criticising Roscher's method.[39] Other historians were less successful in assessing Hintze's contribution. Georg von Below, for example, who reviewed Roscher's System der Volkswirtschaft, his Politik, and Hintze's Historische und politische Aufsätze, praised both Roscher and Hintze. He filled his review with minor criticisms of Roscher but never came to fundamental grips with the basic methodological differences between the

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[37]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 57.

[38]Hintze, "Roscher," pp. 57-58.

[39]See the remarks of Weber, "Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie," Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 23-29.

two, Roscher and Hintze.[40]

Hintze's achievement in his critique of Roscher's approach was a very genuine one. Hintze attained the following results. He rejected a purely juristic conception of politics. Instead, he accepted the dictum of Waitz that politics and constitutional development can only be understood from a historical point of view. The real question was this: what is the nature and character of this historical point of view? Roscher had claimed that he had found the proper historical method. But Hintze showed that Roscher's approach was inadequate, since it was based on the isolated organic development of nations and ignored the whole nexus of mutual relationships in which states are involved. The proper historical method of understanding politics was, in Hintze's judgment, dependent upon Ranke's concept of universal history and the Western state system. Thus, Hintze was pleading for a universal-historical approach in Ranke's sense, as against the romantic concept of individual organic nationality.

In emphasizing the importance of Ranke's concept of universal history in this essay written in 1893, he was reflecting a trend in historiographical development. One year after Hintze's essay on Roscher, the art historian, Riegl saw no dichotomy between detailed research and universal history. Both were necessary and were interrelated.

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[40] Georg von Below in Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, VII (1909), 344-348.

Without the support of detailed research, universal-historical judgments tended to be empty. Left to itself, detailed research, without a grasp of universal forces, became mere, busy work.[41]

In 1899, Julius Kaerst published an essay dealing with the topic of the universal-historical conception in its particular application to the history of antiquity.[42] Kaerst, who like Hintze was profoundly influenced by both Droysen and Ranke, sought to show that a universal-historical conception, as Ranke had understood the term, was applicable to the history of the ancient world.[43] In a note Kaerst acknowledged that he had only come upon Hintze's essay on Roscher after a good part of his own essay was already written, but he was glad to see the agreement on major points in the two essays.[44]

This trend toward a universal-historical approach was also revealed in the important work of Eduard Meyer on the history of antiquity, whose five volumes appeared be-

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[41]Alois Riegl, "Kunstgeschichte und Universalgeschichte," Gesammelte Aufsätze (Augsburg-Wien: Dr. Benno Filser Verlag, 1929), pp. 3-9.

[42]Julius Kaerst, "Die universalhistorische Auffassung in ihrer besonderen Anwendung auf die Geschichte des Altertums," Universalgeschichte, Abhandlungen von Julius Kaerst (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1930), pp. 3-32.

[43]See his essay, "Die Geschichtsauffassung Rankes und Droysens in ihrer nationalen Bedentung," Universalgeschichte, pp. 231-252.

[44]Kaerst, "Die universalhistorische Auffassung in ihrer besonderen Anwendung auf die Geschichte des Altertums," p. 3.

tween 1884 and 1902.[45] As Rostovtzeff says, "Meyer's great contribution lies in the fact that he was the first to give a presentation of ancient history as a whole -- as a part of Universalgeschichte -- not as a generalization based on second-hand information, but as an original contribution built upon a solid and lasting foundation."[46] Finally, this universal-historical trend also was revealed among Dove[47] and Lenz,[48] who were in the younger Rankean school along with Delbrück[49] and Oncken.[50] In attaching himself to such an universal-historical approach, Hintze was linking himself with a trend that sought to preserve faithfully Ranke's legacy.

Hintze's interpretation of the role and status of politics was much more profound than any of his German predecessors' with the possible exception of Ranke himself.

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[45]Eduard Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen, 1884-1902), 5 volumes.

[46]M. Rostovtzeff, "Eduard Meyer," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed., E. R. A. Seligman, Vol. X (1933), 402.

[47]See Alfred Dove, Ausgewählte Schriften vornehmlich historischen Inhalts (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1893); Alfred Dove, "Leopold von Ranke," Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXVII, 233-269; also the many remarks of Dove in Leopold von Ranke, Sämtliche Werke, which Dove edited.

[48]Consult F. Grafe, Max Lenz zum Gedächtnis, Verzeichnis seiner Schriften mit Beiträge von Erich Marcks und Karl Alexander von Müller (Berlin: Weidmann, 1935).

[49]Consult F. J. Schmidt, K. Molinski, S. Mette, Hans Delbrück der Historiker und Politiker (Berlin: Deutsche Verlogsgesellschaft, 1928).

[50]Gunther Franz, "Hermann Oncken," Biographisches Wörterbuch zur deutschen Geschichte, p. 640.

Roscher's idea of political development could not compare with it. Nor were the attempts of Dahlmann and Waitz to write works on the nature of politics on the same plane as Hintze's contributions. Dahlmann's work on politics was interesting as the reflections of a typical representative of constitutional liberalism, but his treatment of constitutions revealed no real grasp concerning the relations of internal and external policy in the development of a constitution.[51] The same could be said of Waitz's work on politics. Though Waitz was a disciple of Ranke, he did not logically carry out the total implications of Ranke's point of view regarding constitutional and political development, nor was Treitschke an improvement in this respect. Indeed, in the attempt to work out systematically the implications of Ranke's point of view as a basis for understanding the structure of politics and the nature of constitutional development, Hintze stands virtually in a class by himself among modern historians.

In his inaugural address before the Prussian Academy in 1914, Hintze gave a brief account of his scholarly career. He discussed his various achievements and expressed the main aim of his scholarly life and career in these words:

> The true aim which has always hovered before me in my scholarly endeavors was from the very start to develop a general comparative constitutional and administrative history of the modern state system, that is, of the Romanic and Germanic peoples. To further carry out the intentions of Ranke, whose whole life work was de-

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[51]Dahlmann, Die Politik, pp. 1-237.

> voted to this object, seems to be a task whose supplementation is both necessary and possible. I would like to thank my honored teacher Georg Waitz for pointing out to me in my younger years the importance of systematic juristic and political scientific studies for such an end. Prussian history only served as a paradigm for me of the forms and transformation in the life of a great modern state.[52]

In this most significant passage, Hintze, by his own admission, linked himself to Leopold von Ranke, stating that his whole conception of historical scholarship was devoted to fulfilling Ranke's ideas regarding universal history and the political structure of the Romanic-Germanic nations. Everything else -- Hintze's tremendous labors on Prussian history, his systematic studies in political and social sciences -- were subordinate to this central goal. It is ironic, indeed, that although Hintze spent his whole life preparing for the writing of a vast comparative constitutional history of the Western world, and he published numerous smaller contributions to that end, he never succeeded in writing his great work. In 1911, in the important series entitled Die Kultur der Gegenwart (The Culture of the Present Day), there appeared the first half of a volume, Allgemeine Verfassungs - und Verwaltungsgeschichte.[53] In this work on general constitutional and administrative history, Hintze was listed as one of the authors, but the second

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[52]Hintze, "Antrittsrede," p. 746.

[53]A. Vierkandt, L. Wenger, M. Hartmann, O. Franke, K. Rathgen, A. Ritter Luschin von Ebengreuth, and O. Hintze, Die Kultur der Gegenwart, Part II, Section II, Allgemeine Verfassungs - und Verwaltungsgeschichte (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1911), erster Hälfte.

half of the work never made its appearance. Hintze's contribution was, therefore, never published. Nevertheless, though Hintze's aim remained unfulfilled, it guided all his other endeavors.

We shall make frequent reference to Hintze's attempt to work out the bases for such a universal-historical approach to constitutional development. Already, in his essay on Roscher, he sketched its rough outlines as an alternative to the latter's own views. Hintze's approach rested on working out typological patterns of political development, which were the product of specific, universal-historical processes, conditioned by particular space and time factors.

As examples of such types, Hintze cited the ancient city-state and the modern national large-scale state. Both types of states, argued Hintze, rose as the product of special world-historical circumstances. The ancient city-state, found among the Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans, was regarded by Hintze as a product of the coastal culture of the Mediterranean Sea. In the interior, or along the less-travelled and commercial coasts, one still found the old, loosely-organized form of tribal state preserved. The most important example of such a land state, with a firm, monarchical constitution was Macedonia. By virtue of its military power, it finally became master of both the weak city-states and Persian empire. In place of the city-state, which rested on a local concept of an autarchy, larger territorial formations were grown. But according to Hintze, with the exception of Hellenistic Egypt, these larger formations lacked a real pattern of cen-

tralization. They showed an increasing tendency to dissolve themselves for administrative purposes into words or districts. The result was no genuine attainment of centralized territorial administration.[54]

Hintze regarded the Roman Empire as the completion of the municipal type of administration. Though through a system of alliances of unequal kinds, the city community of Rome was able to extend its power widely, resulting in a great conglomerate of sovereign districts grouped around the capital, the Romans extended the idea of municipal organization to the barbarian hinterland. In matters pertaining to the army and finance, centralization was increasingly pronounced. Matters of inner administration were left to the local cities, decurions being responsible for the collection of taxes.

Hintze argued that the ground was taken from under the municipal type of organization with the disintegration of the Mediterranean Sea culture, paralleled by a return to natural economy within the interior, the rise of a colonnate, and the formation of great estates based on a self-sufficient economy. Cities disappeared and with them the whole administrative apparatus of the empire. The municipal form or type of organization was gradually replaced by a feudal type which, again, was not a natural type in any "organic" sense but simply the result of a new series of universal-historical forces.[55]

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[54]Hintze, "Roscher," pp. 58-59.

[55]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 59.

It is unnecessary to go into a discussion of the modern large-scale state as a second great type. We shall consider it in detail later. What needs to be emphasized again is that Hintze, following Ranke, was projecting concepts of political development based on notions of universal history and the contacts of states with each other.

At the end of his essay on Roscher, Hintze summarized the requisites of a true study of politics. He rejected the notion that a comparative analysis of the social and political development of all times and all peoples would enable one to discover a "law" of political and social development with predictive power. This was Roscher's mistake. On the other hand, Hintze did not reject the comparative approach to the study of politics. Comparative analysis was necessary. It could never lead to general laws of political development, but it was basic for a typological approach such as Hintze advocated -- one founded on the unique emergence of specific types of states in the course of history and the product of special universal-historical situations. Freeman's attempt in his Comparative Politics was cited with approval by Hintze.[56]

Secondly, Hintze rejected both the Aristotelian classification of states and the purely juristic ones. He argued that any systematic study of the forms of the state must be replaced by a general constitutional history. The initiative of Dahlmann, Waitz, and Treitschke, in pursuing

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[56]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 84.

an historical approach to state forms, must be amplified and extended. Hintze also advocated linking constitutional and administrative history with the body of social sciences and economics. He regarded Schmoller as a leader in this regard.[57]

The task then was to bring the whole realm of constitutional and administrative history, in both ancient and modern times, under a more unified outlook. Attention had to be directed to both the external and inner aspects of the formation of states, to their international, legal, and world-historical connections. Research in the field must never lose sight of the relation of constitutional and administrative history to general cultural movements. Otherwise, the basically historical orientation would be lost. But, equally, research must make use of findings in political geography, international law, constitutional law, and the comparative method, which reveals the development of states within the framework of areas of universal-historical relations. By comparing the different areas, Western, Islamic, Far Eastern, etc., differences in the development of state formation and structure within these frames will become apparent. Finally, the study (Wissenschaft) of politics must be illuminated by a philosophical viewpoint based on psychological and ethical foundations, which would not only clarify the theoretical and historical problems but would convert the ethical convictions of the

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[57]Hintze, "Roscher," p. 85.

day into useful, political and social policy.[58]

Hintze's program for the proper study of politics was, thus, a most comprehensive one. Five years after he had published his essay on Roscher, he was already well on his way with the general design. In 1902, Hintze published in the Historische Zeitschrift, a study on state formation and constitutional development, which he described as a historical-political study.[59] It was an attempt to apply, systematically, Ranke's insights regarding the primacy of foreign policy in the formation of the constitutions of states and to link this process to universal-historical developments.[60]

Hintze's general aim, to write a comparative constitutional history of the modern world, placed him solidly within the legacy of Ranke. Yet, the training and historical direction which he received under Droysen were not averse to such a project. Indeed, on this score, Ranke and Droysen supplemented one another. Both historians agreed on the primacy of foreign policy. Both interpreted the state system as a nexus of dynamic centers of interacting power. Both accepted the importance of universal history. In his intention to write comparative, constitutional history,

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[58] Hintze, "Roscher," p. 86.

[59] O. Hintze, "Staatenbildung und Verfassungsentwicklung. Ein historisch-politische Studie," Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXVIII (1902), 1-21. This is reprinted in O. Hintze, Staat und Verfassung, pp. 24-42, and all further citations are taken from this latter work.

[60] We shall deal with this essay below. See pp. 229-242.

Hintze, accordingly, was not only continuing in the legacy of Ranke, but he was pursuing a historical approach that also would have met with the complete approval of Droysen.

CHAPTER V

SCHMOLLER AND THE ACTA BORUSSICA

Gustav von Schmoller (1838-1917), the leader of the younger historical school in Germany and a towering force in the political and intellectual life of Wilhelmian Germany, was the third great influence in Hintze's conception of history.[1]

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[1]The literature by and concerning Schmoller is extensive. We cite below only works actually consulted in the preparation of this dissertation. For work by Schmoller himself, consult Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kleingewerbe im 19. Jahrhundert, Statistische und nationalökonomische Untersuchungen (Halle: Buchhandlung der Wais, 1870); Die Strassburger Tücher - und Weberzunft. Urkunden und Darstellungen nebst Regesten und Glossar. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Weberei und des deutschen Gewerberechts vom 13, bis 17. Jahrhundert (Strassburg: Trübner, 1879); Zur Literaturgeschichte der Staats - und Sozialwissenschaften (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1888); Zur Sozial - und Gewerbepolitik der Gegenwart. Reden und Aufsätze (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1890); Über einige Gründfragen der Sozialpolitik und der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1898); Umrisse und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs - Verwaltungs - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte besonders des preussischen Staates im 17 und 18. Jahrhundert (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1904); Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1900-1904), 2 volumes; Charakterbilder (München und Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1913); Die sozial Frage, Klassenbildung, Arbeiterfrage, Klassenkampf, ed., L. Schmoller (München und Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1918); Zwansig Jahre deutsche politik 1897-1917. Aufsätze und Vorträge (München und Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1920); Deutsches Städtewesen in alterer Zeit (Bonn: K. Schroeder, 1922); Preussische Verfassungs - Verwaltungs - und Finanzgeschichte (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1921); Die Volkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methods (Frankfurt am Main Vittorio Klostermann, 1949). On Schmoller, consult the five studies by Hintze cited below and the following:

If Droysen laid the basis for Hintze's historical outlook and Ranke, and the Rankean legacy inspired Hintze to grasp the significance of a universal conception of political development, the influence of Schmoller was scarcely less important. After Waitz had turned Hintze's attention to the importance of studies in legal and political science, Hintze's interests were quickly directed to the significance of the social sciences (Sozialwissenschaften). It was Schmoller who exercised an enduring influence on Hintze's conception of the social sciences. It was also Schmoller who channelized Hintze's interest into the great project which he directed, the Acta Borussica. And it was Schmoller, again, who kept Hintze from becoming what so many gifted followers of Ranke became -- the narrow, political historian. Hintze's great gifts as an institutional historian, his talents in clarifying complex problems in administrative and social history, owed a good deal to Schmoller. Finally, Hintze was deeply impressed by the sheer personal power and attraction

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Heinrich von Treitschke, Der Sozialismus und seine Gönner, nebst einem Sendschreiben an Gustav Schmoller (Berlin: G. Reimar, 1875); Carl Brinkmann, Gustav Schmoller und die Volkswirtschaftslehre (Stuttgart: W. Kohlmanner, 1937); Albion W. Small, "The Schmoller-Treitschke Controversy," American Journal of Sociology, XXX (1924-1925), 49-86; Bernard Pfister, Die Entwicklung zum Idealtypus (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Joseph Schumpeter, "Gustav von Schmoller und die Probleme von heute," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, L (1926), 337-388. F. Lifschitz, Die historische Schule der Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Berne: Stampfli & Cie, 1914), pp. 199-253; Carl Brinkmann, "Schmoller's Gerechtigkeit," Wirtschaftsformen und Lebenformen (2nd. ed., Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr; 1950), 65-79; Arthur Spiethoff, ed., Gustav von Schmoller und die deutsche geschichtliche Volkswirtschaftslehre, dem Andenken an Gustav von Schmoller, Festgabe zur hundertsten Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages 24. June 1938 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1938).

of Schmoller, by his role as an academic and political beacon in imperial Germany.

In his inaugural address before the Prussian Academy, Hintze gratefully acknowledged Schmoller's role in directing him to the study of the social sciences.[2] But the best way of studying the relationship between Schmoller and Hintze is in terms of five historiographical and biographical studies which Hintze wrote on Schmoller.[3] These studies enable us to study Hintze's interpretation of Schmoller's role in nineteenth-century historicism. They furnish valuable clues regarding Schmoller's impact on Hintze, and when used judiciously alongside Hintze's other writings, they provide an impressive chapter in the development of German scholarship at the end of the nineteenth century.

The five articles which Hintze devoted to Schmoller were not ephemeral writings intended merely for the passing moment. It is true that the first article which Hintze wrote on Schmoller, as a historian, originally appeared in a news-

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[2]Hintze, "Antrittsrede," p. 746.

[3]O. Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller als Historiker," Historische und politische Aufsätze, IV, pp. 183-191; "Gustav von Schmoller," Historische Zeitschrift, CXVIII (1917), 477-483; "Gedächtnisrede auf Gustav Schmoller," Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophische-historische Klasse, 1918, 1-16; "Gustav Schmoller. Ein Gedenkblatt," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, XXXI (1919), 375-399. This article was reprinted in O. Hintze, Zur Theorie der Geschichte, pp. 214-238. All citations to it refer to this latter work and are designated as Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," and "Gustav von Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, II (1928), 124-135.

paper, Täglich Rundschau, for June 23 and 24 of 1908.[4] Nevertheless, it was a perceptive and intelligent account of Schmoller's gifts as a historian. The second article appeared in Germany's most distinguished historical journal, Historische Zeitschrift, and was designed to be a summation of Schmoller's achievement. The third article was a memorial address before the Prussian Academy. The fourth was published in the leading journal of Prussian history, Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, although in an abbreviated form it had been previously read before the Verein für Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg. The last article on Schmoller, in many ways the best of the five, was written for a leading biographical yearbook, which carried authoritative evaluations of important deceased Germans. Hintze's contributions on Schmoller were thus written for some of Germany's leading journals and societies and reflected the respect and esteem in which he was held as an accomplished interpreter of Schmoller.

Hintze and his friend, Meinecke, sought, in their estimates of Schmoller, not only to describe his attainments, but to place him properly within the intellectual, social, and political currents of the nineteenth century. Meinecke, in a penetrating essay, devoted to the topic of three generations of German academic intellectuals in politics, dealt with Friedrich Theodor Vischer as representative of the first generation and Gustav Schmoller and Max Weber as being characteristic of the third. He discussed the problem of the

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[4]See note on p. 183 of "Gustav Schmoller als Historiker," Historische und politische Aufsätze, IV.

role of the academic intellectual in nineteenth and early twentieth-century German politics, and he showed that each generation of academic intellectuals in German politics reflected an individual and distinct aspect of the intellectual life of Germany. The first generation extending from Fichte to Gervinus was influenced by the whole atmosphere of idealistic philosophy together with the speculative and aesthetic spirit which became associated with it. This generation sought to establish the ideal foundations and preliminary expressions of "free and national values." Meinecke regarded the growth of historicism in the cultural sciences as an offshoot of this first period. The second period was one of classical liberalism, extending from Dahlmann to Treitschke, which sought to synthesize German idealism with historical-political experience.[5]

Meinecke studied the idealistic historicism of the generation of Dahlmann and Treitschke, as it was transformed during the 1870's and 1880's. A new generation now converted idealistic historicism into a more empirically-oriented historicism. The change could be measured by comparing Droysen with his student, Erdmansdorffer. Political historians of the third generation such as he converted history into a philological-critical field of knowledge and generally excluded themselves from taking an active role in politics. Their reason was that the political aspirations of the previous gen-

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[5]F. Meinecke, "Drei Gerationen deutscher Gelehrtenpolitik," Staat und Persönlichkeit (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1933), p. 136.

eration of historians had already been attained. Since this task was accomplished, there was no genuinely new activistic role for these political historians. Lacking any adequate knowledge of the existing social and economic problems of the empire, they were unable to participate actively in the new currents of political life.

Meinecke found that the academic leaders of the third generation in politics came from the ranks of the economists. The philosophers and historians of the first and second generation yielded before these new "socialists of the chair" (Kathedersozialisten). Three intellectual forces affected this new generation, symbolized by Schmoller: an older, philosophical idealim, an idealistic-political historicism, and the new ferment of Western European positivism. The generation of Schmoller was oriented around a reform program, a socio-political platform designed to strengthen the Wilhelmian Empire and conciliate and harmonize the diverse currents within it.[6]

Hintze, too, saw very clearly this special role of Schmoller within the German intellectual and social sense. He declared it a mistake to consider Schmoller merely as a prominent specialist in the social sciences. The total scientific and political effectiveness of Schmoller can be understood only in terms of the background and transformations of German national history.[7] Hintze, like Meinecke, traced the

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[6]Meinecke, "Drei Generationen," p. 138.

[7]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," pp. 214-215.

changes in German intellectual life in terms of three periods though Hintze's article was written prior to Meinecke's. The first period, according to Hintze, extended from 1815-1840, and was characterized in its intellectual interests by literary-aesthetic pursuits and a predominantly philological ideal of education -- together with a cosmopolitan and universal outlook. The second period, between 1840-1870, witnessed the dominance of ethical-political national values, particularly in the realm of historiography, political, and constitutional-legal studies. This period was graced by such intellectual lights as Duncker, Droysen, Mommsen, Gneist, Sybel, and Treitschke. The third period saw the triumph of national economic studies, which set in after 1870. It was signalized by the calling of Adolf Wagner to Berlin in 1870. Public life came to center around questions of social policy. Succeeding the epoch of the powerful and effective foreign policy politics of Bismarck and the establishment of the empire, there followed a period of inner-consolidation of political and economic life. Hintze insisted that Schmoller's whole political and scientific endeavor was a direct reflection of this last period in German national and imperial development.[8]

In seeking to understand Schmoller, Hintze traced the development of his life and career without losing sight of the unifying forces that gave a fundamental singleness to Schmoller's life and attainment. What Hintze had accomplished in his earlier study on Droysen, he sought to achieve in his account of Schmoller. He emphasized the role which

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[8]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 215.

Schmoller played as a non-Prussian, magnetically attracted to Prussia as a center of German power, and as one devoted to the enhancement of the Prussian cause. Though he was born in Heilbronn in Württemberg and never lost some of his Swabian characteristics, his social and political outlook was shaped largely by the Prussian state.

In describing Schmoller's childhood and youth, Hintze emphasized a number of significant factors. He referred to the fact that Schmoller's father was a bureaucrat, a finance attorney at Heilbronn, who wanted Schmoller to pursue a similar career.[9] Hintze stressed the importance of Schmoller's weak and sickly condition as a child, when there was fear that he might develop consumption. In order to overcome this weakness, Schmoller needed to learn how to economize in all things -- to avoid every excess -- to blend his diverse efforts to the best advantage, and above all, to lead a balanced and harmonious life. Schmoller became, said Hintze, a virtuoso in the art of living.[10] It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this factor in Schmoller's total personality. The classical motif in Schmoller, his sense of balance and harmony, his desire to unite diverse trends, his feeling that life, culture, and society were an ensemble, was partly conditioned by such life-long efforts to adjust to physical limitations.

Hintze stressed two other factors which early left

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[9] Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 215. See also Hintze, "Gustav von Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, II, 125.

[10] Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 215.

their marks on Schmoller. One was the poor training which he received in grammatical and philological studies. Acquiring early distaste for those studies, he never attained any outstanding proficiency in the philological-critical method, which was considered the sine qua non of historical scholarship. The other factor was Schmoller's brother-in-law, Gustav Rümelin, who married Schmoller's sister while he was still Rector of the Latin school at Nurtingen. He advanced rapidly, becoming minister of education in Württemberg and then a professor and Chancellor of the University of Tübingen. He sat in the Frankfurt Parliament, where he played a prominent role in politics in 1948.[11]

Rümelin's education and culture was very well rounded. Trained in theology and philology, he also had an extensive knowledge of political science, statistics, and the history of philosophy. Hintze insisted that Rümelin's influence on Schmoller can scarcely be exaggerated. Rümelin inspired Schmoller with a desire to acquire a broad education, a general one without the evils of narrow specialization, and he directed Schmoller's attention to philosophy and history as essential backgrounds for any education such as he desired.[12] In the second place, Rümelin also turned Schmoller's political inclinations toward Prussia. In the period of 1848-1849, Rümelin was the only Swabian who stood for Prussia's leadership. One of a deputation who had offered Frederick William IV the crown, and filled with enthusiasm not only for the

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[11]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 216.

[12]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 217.

power and splendor of Prussia but equally for its science, culture, and education, Rümelin, acting as a mentor and friend to young Schmoller, turned the latter's attention to the greatness of Prussia.

Hintze showed how opportunities were present during Schmoller's university days at Tübingen to reinforce his newly-acquired love for Prussia. Though Schmoller was not strongly influenced at Tübingen by either the professors of economics or of jurisprudence, the historian, Max Duncker, made a strong impression on him. Duncker was also pro-Prussian.[13]

Hintze noted, too, the wide range of Schmoller's studies at Tübingen. Not only history and philosophy but physics, chemistry, and technology were pursued by him, and Hintze traced Schmoller's later interests in the importance of technology upon economic life to these university studies.

Hintze observed that, though Schmoller never received a truly methodical schooling in historical method, he, nevertheless, won a prize at Tübingen for a study of the economic views in Germany at the time of the Reformation. This became the basis of his dissertation and led to a doctor's degree in political science.[14]

At the same time, Schmoller passed the examination

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[13]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," pp. 217-218.

[14]See Gustav von Schmoller, "Darstellung der in Deutschland zur Zeit der Reformation herrschenden national-ökonomischen Ansichten," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, XVI (1860), 461-716.

required for students of the science of finance, which included completing this aspect of education by working both in the finance office and on a government board. This provided him with practical, financial, and administrative experience. Hintze indicated how Schmoller used part of this time to make a comprehensive study of the philosophical systems between 1750-1850 which had exercised an influence on economic theories. This served to provide him with a deep and broad background for his later scholarly work.

Schmoller's study of philosophical currents and their influence on economic life led him to make a study of the older historical school of economics as established by Roscher, Hildebrand, and Knies. It raised anew the question which Friedrich List had previously propounded -- whether the doctrines of the English school of economics were applicable to the German situation. Schmoller's answer was in the negative. Upon these two propositions -- the inability of classical economics to account for Germany's situation, and the necessity of grounding economic doctrine on a philosophical basis -- Hintze saw Schmoller establishing the foundation of the younger historical school of economics.[15]

If Schmoller emphasized the need for a philosophical background for economics, he was no less insistent upon its empirical foundations. Hintze regarded it as especially significant that Schmoller spent some time in the statistical office, which was under the direction of Rümelin. There,

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[15]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 219.

he prepared a survey of the industries of Württemberg, which was published, and which helped to secure, for Schmoller, an academic appointment at the University of Halle in 1864. The survey reflected the empirical tenor of Schmoller's work.

Hintze showed how the pro-Prussian attitude of Schmoller was developing very strongly during this period, for even before Schmoller's call to Halle, he was involved in a controversy at Württemberg in which he defended Prussia's stand against Austria during the Zollverein crisis. Since the government of Württemberg was pro-Austrian, Schmoller virtually became persona non grata.[16]

In tracing Schmoller's career at Halle, Hintze again emphasized the importance of Schmoller's Prussianism and his efforts to formulate a policy of social politics (Sozialpolitik). In terms of the former, he revealed how Schmoller was chosen town-councillor in the Prussian town of Halle, and that this provided him with practical experience. But Schmoller also desired to acquire a comprehensive knowledge of Prussian administrative and economic history. His colleague at Halle, Eiselen, was delivering lectures on the Prussian state and institutions, which had been incorporated in a book published in 1862.[17] While useful, the book revealed how much still remained to be accomplished in this field. After 1865, Schmoller succeeded Eiselen at Halle, and

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[16]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 220.

[17]See F. Eiselen, Der preussischen Staat (Berlin: Mittler, 1862).

he was determined to write an administrative and economic history of Prussia, while still pursuing his economic studies.[18]

Schmoller's visits to Berlin strengthened his Prussian convictions. There, he met Ranke, Duncker, Droysen, Gneist, Treitschke, Erdmansdorffer, and others who reinforced his outlook. Schmoller properly understood that a real gap in our knowledge of Prussian history existed for the reign of Frederick William I, and, therefore, he devoted himself to the task of correctly interpreting the regime of this ruler. In Hintze's estimation, Schmoller was ably qualified for this task, since only an administrative historian could do full justice to an place in proper perspective the founder of the Prussian political system (Staatsordnung). Schmoller was the ideal man to reveal Frederick's love of order and justice (Gerechtigkeit). The first fruits of this task of providing a biography and administrative history of King Frederick were several articles, including one on the administration of Frederick.[19]

In concerning himself with Schmoller's social policy while at Halle, Hintze attempted to show that the leading ideas later represented by Schmoller at the Verein für Sozialpolitik were already present during his Halle days. Thus, at Halle, Schmoller approached the worker's question by attacking both the dominant Manchester school of economics and Lassalle and the Marxist International. He

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[18]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 221.

[19]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 221. Consult Gustav Schmoller, "Die innere Verwaltung des preussischen Staates

opposed the Manchester school on the grounds that it was insufficiently grounded in historical and philosophical issues; and he also maintained that the betterment of the workers represented an ethical and political demand of the age. Schmoller leaned toward an approach similar to Schulze-Delitzsch based on cooperative societies (Genossenschaften).[20]

Hintze traced the development of Schmoller's social-political views from the publication of his study on the history of German small industry in the nineteenth century[21] to the formation of the important Verein für Sozial-politik in October of 1872. Hintze argued that Schmoller's monograph on German small industry combined a historiographical approach represented at once by a realistic-historical, psychological, and ethical standpoint. Hintze saw this emphasis on realistic-historical forces, psychological understanding, and ethical aims as constituting the distinctive historiographical outlook of Schmoller.

This book by Schmoller on German small industry also revealed a classical conception in its approach. It did so on two counts. Schmoller's writing attempted to unite a realistic-historical approach with a psychological-ethical one in order to establish an inner harmony. Secondly, Schmoller objected to the principle of free competition in trade

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unter Friedrich Wilhelm I," Preussische Jahrbücher, XXV (1869), 575-591 and XXXI (1870), 1-16.

[20]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 220.

[21]Gustav von Schmoller, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kleingewerbe im 19. Jahrhundert, 1870.

and industry because it was disruptive. Instead, he stressed the interests of the common welfare. Thus, basic considerations for Schmoller were the harmony and justice of opposing and diverse elements. His historiography and his social-politics were equally grounded on the assumption that one must do justice to the various elements in any situation and weld them together into a unified synthesis.[22]

Hintze's description of the address which Schmoller gave before the Verein in 1872, and designed to state the ideals of the new organization, left no doubt concerning the classical quality in Schmoller. A middle road between doctrinaire liberalism and socialist experimentation was advocated. This was to be achieved by a policy of social reform guaranteeing full freedom to the worker, better working conditions, factory legislation, state undertakings, and an acknowledgment that the people as a whole are entitled to share in all the higher goods of culture, education, and welfare.[23]

Hintze saw the establishment of the Verein für Sozialpolitik in 1872 as marking a second epoch in Schmoller's life. Schmoller received a call to the Imperial University of Strassburg where he formed a corps of students around him who pro-

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[22] Consult Schmoller's famous essay, "Die Gerechtigkeit in der Volkswirtschaft," in Schmoller's Jahrbuch, V (1881), 19-54, on this question.

[23] See Gustav Schmoller, "Rede zur Eröffnung der Besprechung über die soziale Frage in Eisenach den 6. Oktober 1872," Zur Sozial - und Gewerbepolitik der Gegenwart (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1890), 1-14. See also Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," pp. 223-224.

duced a monumental series of historical studies based on careful, empirical approaches. These studies in administrative and economic history were published as the important series, Die Staats - und sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungen.[24]

One of the fruits of Schmoller's stay at Strassburg was his interest in the economic politics of the older German cities. In an important study, he investigated the weaving and cloth guild of medieval Strassburg.[25] Hintze found this study to be important in two respects. It rested on a thorough analysis of the documents. Secondly, and of the greatest importance, Schmoller was able to study a typical example of a medieval city's economic and industrial politics. Hintze insisted, therefore, that in no sense was this work merely a specialized monograph on local history. Historiographically, its significance was much greater, since Schmoller was using Strassburg as a paradigm of a pattern repeated again and again in other medieval cities. Strassburg's economic and industrial politics were, thus, typical of a more comprehensive pattern of medieval urban organization. Schmoller's practice of employing an institutional study to illuminate a typical, historical development left

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[24]Consult Franz Boese, Geschichte des Vereins für Sozial-politik (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1939), pp. 1-21; and Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 224.

[25]Gustav von Schmoller, Das strassburger Tücher - und Weberzunft: Urkunden und Darstellung nebst regester und Glossar: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Weberei und des deutschen Gewerberecht vom 13. bis 17. Jahrhundert (Strassburg: Trübner, 1879).

a deep impression on Hintze, who became a master of this kind of historical analysis.[26]

At Strassburg, Schmoller became involved in a famous controversy with Treitschke.[27] Hintze correctly understood the controversy as the product of genuine differences between the two men regarding social policy. Schmoller insisted that the Prussian state and kingdom of the Hohenzollerns had the right and obligation to undertake its traditional role -- to seek the alleviation and balance between the upper and lower classes for the common welfare. Schmoller wanted the two neutral forces in the class warfare -- the king and the bureaucracy -- to reconcile themselves to the ideals of the liberal state and parliamentarism. Together, these forces were then to assume the initiative in carrying out a program of widespread reform legislation.

In Hintze's estimation, Treitschke had no proper understanding of the need for social policy in the new empire. He was fearful of the workers whom he regarded as revolutionary elements. He discounted the whole program of social policy, which he confused with socialist utopian-

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[26]Schmoller's work first contained the documents (pp. 3-353) and then provided a Darstellung (pp. 353-583) based upon them. For further details, see Schmoller, Die strassburger Tücher - und Weberzunft, pp. 353-374; 434-467; 497-528; and 529-553.

[27]See Treitschke, Der Sozialismus und seine Gönner, nebst einen Sendschreiben and Gustav Schmoller (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1875) and Schmoller's later judgment made in 1896 at a memorial address to Sybel and Treitschke. Consult Schmoller, "Heinrich von Sybel und Heinrich von Treitschke, Gedächtnisrede in der Leibnizsitzung der Akademie der Wissenschaften 2 Juli 1896," Charakterbilder, pp. 208-215.

ism or Social Democratic party demands. He promulgated an aristocratic constitution over and against Schmoller's demands for social policy.

Hintze provided a brilliant and informative picture of the third and last phase of Schmoller's career -- the Berlin period (1882-1917). It was characterized by the growing influence of Schmoller in academic and public life, the sharpening of his fundamental views regarding the methodology of the younger historical school and the supervision of the important project -- the Acta Borussica.

Hintze showed how Schmoller's influence after 1881 grew by leaps and bounds. Until then, it had been an undercurrent, but after that date, it became a leading force in imperial Germany. Besides being with the Verein für Sozialpolitik and publishing the Staats - und sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungen, he edited a leading journal, Schmoller's Jahrbuch. Whereas the Forschungen produced a great number of monographs designed to form the empirical foundation for a new theory of the play of political and social sciences, Schmoller's Jahrbuch was intended to provide a practical medium for the discussion of practical experiences, theoretical issues, and public affairs.[28]

Schmoller was the acknowledged head of the younger historical school, but also the exerciser of the leading role in the Verein für Sozial-politik. Hintze considered Schmoller's importance in the Verein to lie not in the

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[28]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," pp. 226-228.

fact that he was the sharpest and most decisive representative of reform ideals but that he was a paragon of moderation. Schmoller understood how to bring together divergent factions in the Verein and unite them for the common good. He always recognized the relative justice of both contending parties and possessed an amazing personal tact and capacity for reconciling them. If this quality of classical harmony stood him in good stead with the Verein, it also endeared him to his colleagues and gave him noteworthy recognition in academic life. Moreover, it proved to be a factor in his relations with leading statesmen and public officials such as Prince von Bulow; the finance minister, Miquel; the trade minister, von Berlepsch; and leading representatives of the government bureaucracy. In 1884, Schmoller was made a member of the Prussian Council of State where he represented the University of Berlin, whose rector he had been for the years 1897-1898. Numerous other titles and honors testify to the dominant role he played in German political, social, and intellectual life.[29]

Hintze provided an illuminating account of the sharpening of Schmoller's methodological position during his Berlin period. Although Schmoller disagreed on some issues with Adolph Wagner, he was able to reconcile himself with Wagner. A great controversy, a so-called Methodenstreit broke out, however, between Schmoller, as leader of the younger historical school, and Carl Menger, an important representative of the Austrian school of economics. Hintze viewed the struggle as partially methodological be-

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[29]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, pp. 132-133.

tween the approach of the historical school and the theoretical position of the Austrian school.[30] Menger began the controversy with his book on the methods of the social sciences (1883).[31] This book was an attack against the whole historical psychological approach to economic phenomena. Schmoller answered with a very dissenting critique of Menger.[32] The latter replied with a new and more powerful criticism of the historical school in a brochure dealing with the "errors" of historicism.[33] Schmoller refused to reply and broke off the controversy. Hintze contended that the controversy reflected not only basic methodological differences between the two men but temperamental ones as well; and there was no point in pursuing the controversy further.[34]

Hintze regarded the controversy as productive of one good result -- it stimulated Schmoller to carry to completion a fundamental idea that he had long cherished -- to provide a historical-realistic foundation for a new system of the political and social sciences. At the request

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[30]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, p. 128.

[31]Karl Menger, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften, und der politischen Oekonomie insbesondere, (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1883).

[32]See Schmoller, "Die Schriften von K. Menger und Wilhelm Dilthey zur Methodologie der Staats - und Sozialwissenschaften," Zur Literaturgeschichte der Staats - und Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 275-304.

[33]Karl Menger, "Die Irrthumer des Historismus in der deutschen Nationalökonomie," (Wien: Alfred Holder, 1884).

[34]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, p. 128.

of Schmoller's publisher, Carl Geibel, he finally agreed to present the results of his researches in a book on the principles of political economy.[35] Hintze considered Schmoller's Principles as a compromise between the demands of the day and the great plan which Schmoller originally had in mind. He maintained that Schmoller considered any fruitful synthesis in the social sciences as resting on a tremendous foundation of monographic, economical-historical, and statistical-descriptive, specialized research. Only when such research was fairly well completed could synthesis be effected. Yet, Schmoller believed he could no longer delay a preliminary synthesis for his generation; otherwise he would pass away without leaving any indication of the main outlines of the task.

In evaluating the Principles, Hintze considered it a "monumental work" -- a magnificent mosaic in which every little stone was the product of specialized research. He regarded the work as furnishing the material for a social-universal history or a universal-historical sociology, though the basic orientation was still within the frame of a sociologically oriented economics. The work was very revealing, said Hintze, in showing how the autonomous discipline of sociology was slowly emerging out of the frame of a sociologically oriented historical economics.[36]

Hintze attempted to penetrate to the heart of

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[35]Gustav Schmoller, Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1900-1904), 2 volumes.

[36]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, p. 130.

Schmoller's methodology. Schmoller never dealt with abstract categories, mere concepts. Rather, he sought to provide empirical (anschauliche) ideas. Schmoller emphasized the role of the hypothetical in his theoretical positions, the problematic in his practical approach to economic politics (Wirtschaftspolitik), the relative correctness of opposing standpoints, and the spatial and temporal limitations of all economic-political measures. But Hintze saw the distinctive aspect of Schmoller's methodology in the fact that he was one of the precursors of the "interpretative sociology" (verstehenden Soziologie). Max Weber and Werner Sombart, the two leading exponents of this type of sociology were students of Schmoller, and Hintze regarded them as continuing in the tradition of Schmoller.[37]

In analyzing Schmoller as a precursor of "interpretative sociology," Hintze came to the conclusion that the kernel of Schmoller's methodology was his inclination toward "empirical thinking" (anschaulichem Denken). Hintze saw this as a central focus of Schmoller's whole approach and, therefore, argued that the methodological controversy between Schmoller and Menger was not primarily a controversy between the deductive and the inductive methods. These were mere catchwords. Rather, the difference lay in the contrast between concept (Begriff) and experience (Anschauung). The opponents of Schmoller's historicism had a whole theoretical framework of concepts in mind. These abstract, theoretical concepts resembled those employed by the natural sciences and jurisprudence. In Hintze's estimation, Schmoller pro-

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[37]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, p. 130.

ceeded on a different level. He set up, it is true, a typology, but this was not satisfactory to define formal and theoretical constructs. It sought, instead, to arrive at empirical abstractions. These empirical abstractions (anschauliche Abstraktionen) did not have reference to substantial things but referred to social actions, social modes of behavior, and social orders, which the empirical abstractions sought to describe. It was a typology directed at social understanding. This typology was clearly oriented, as Hintze so well saw, around a demand for historical-realistic specialized research; for only out of such empirical research could such types be abstracted. Therefore, the preliminary research must be as empirical and detailed as possible in order that the types which are based on it can be faithful instances of empirical forms of abstractions.[38]

Hintze did not consider Schmoller to be empirical in a limiting way -- limiting himself to individual facts and isolated perceptions -- but rather an empirical person who seeks to establish and describe typical social actions which are grounded in sensory evidence. Moreover, Hintze correctly saw that Schmoller was not content with comprehending these typical social actions "from without," as was the case in the natural sciences. Instead, Schmoller sought to understand these social actions "from within," that is, he wanted to understand the structure of social action in terms of human motivation. It was the difference between

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[38] Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, p. 131.

comprehending the chemical composition of a rock in terms of its molecular composition and understanding the social results of an economic policy in terms of the psychological motivation of its participants.[39]

With genuine insight, Hintze saw that Schmoller's theory of historical understanding went back to Droysen and his dictum, "Understanding by means of investigation" (Forschend zu verstehen). Understanding is directly related to experience. Hintze also realized the close affinities this approach had with Dilthey and his cultural-scientific psychology -- (Geistewissenschaftlichen Psychologie). It was for this reason that Schmoller placed so much emphasis on psychology and the necessity for a proper psychological foundation of the social sciences.[40]

Hintze described the weaknesses that Schmoller detected in the older historical school of economics. It lacked a genuine spirit of historical-realism that could only be provided by a great body of detailed research in economic history, along with sufficient statistical-descriptive data. It lacked a proper psychology and an adequate methodological frame. Schmoller consequently was willing to junk traditional-theoretical systems in order to create a new approach founded upon historical-realistic research. This new system would provide a new evaluation, not only for economics, but the entire realm of the political and social sciences. Hintze realized that Schmoller was unable to achieve this aim, and Hintze regarded

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[39]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, p. 131.

[40]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, p. 131.

this task for the newly developed science of sociology.[41]

Finally, in discussing Schmoller's methodology, Hintze once again brought out very effectively the classical quality in Schmoller's personality and thinking. The latter never thought of economics as an autonomous science. As a historical scholar, he linked economics with economic history and the totality of history. Schmoller, indeed, went further than this. He linked economics to politics, the state to its history. But he also linked these to custom, morality, and law; in sum, to the totality of ethical culture and civilization. Civilization and society resembled a magnificently harmonious interplay of diverse elements, all united and integrated to constitute a coherent whole.[42] Consequently, Schmoller never detected any opposition or tension between his historical-realistic and psychological-ethical approach. Facts and values seemed to him united. Science was linked in his opinion to a world view (Weltanschauung). The state was not merely a fact of power but a moral value as well. For Schmoller, the realm of moral values and ideas did not exist in some transcendental realm but was a product of a common spirit and common will, which in the last analysis resulted from the interplay of individual psychological processes.

Hintze traced the great methodological controversy between Schmoller and Max Weber concerning the role of value judgments in the social sciences as having its roots in this outlook of Schmoller. For Schmoller's whole notion of social

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[41]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," Deutsches biographisches Jahrbuch, p. 131.

[42]See above, p. 131.

policy -- his cardinal demand for social justice (Gerechtigkeit) was premissed on the proposition that there was no dichotomy between social science and social policy, between facts and values. Science for Schmoller was never an autonomous activity. It was linked integrally to the rest of culture and to the realm of values.[43] Weber, on the other hand, called for a separation of facts from value judgments in the social sciences. The issue between the two men was clearly drawn.[44]

Hintze's whole discussion of Schmoller's methodology brought forth clearly Schmoller's achievements within the framework of nineteenth-century historicism. We shall deal with this topic further in Chapter VII, when we sketch the development and structure of Hintze's typological interpretation of history. But it is clear that Hintze viewed Schmoller as a great link in the development of historicism from Droysen to Schmoller, and its transformation into the historical-interpretative sociology of Weber (verstehenden Soziologie). Hintze was deeply influenced by these currents.

There remains the task of describing Schmoller's work on Prussian history during the Berlin period as viewed by Hintze -- how it culminated in the Acta Borussica, and how this project brought Hintze into the closest contact with both Schmoller's methodology and his conception of Prussian history.

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[43]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 132.

[44]For Schmoller's position in the Schmoller-Weber controversy, see Gustav Schmoller, Die Volkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode, ed., A. Skalweit

Hintze noted that the roots of Schmoller's interest in social policy and methodological questions extended far back to the beginnings of his early university days. As we have seen, this was equally true of Schmoller's Prussianism and his attachment to Prussian history. Just as the Berlin period now brought forth the full maturing of Schmoller's talents in the areas of social policy and methodology, it likewise witnessed Schmoller's most important achievements in the realm of Prussian history.[45]

Schmoller plunged with renewed energy into researches concerning Prussian administrative and legal history. He completed a series of studies between 1884-1887 on the economic politics of Frederick the Great and Prussia from 1680 to 1786.[46] These studies, said Hintze, provided an informative picture of the growth of trade on the Elbe and Oder, and the administration of the province of Magdeburg. But Hintze found their greatest value in the new evaluation and picture which Schmoller gave of the mercantile system; for Schmoller's celebrated description of the mercantile system was contained in these studies.[47] Hintze argued that Schmoller's treatment of the mercantile system corrected a false judgment

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(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), pp. 80-85.

[45]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 230.

[46]Gustav von Schmoller, "Studien über die wirtschaftliche Politik Friedrichs des Grossen und Preussens überhaupt von 1680-1786," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, VIII (1884), 1-61; 345-421; 999-1091; X (1886), 1-45; 327-373; 675-727; XI (1887), 1-58; 789-883.

[47]In Vol. VIII of the above footnote; see pp. 15-61 for further reference.

ment which had viewed the mercantile system as a colossal error in European history. Schmoller, however, showed the mercantile system as a useful and necessary intermediate stage in the development of the economic politics of modern European states. This discovery by Schmoller, said Hintze, "placed in a new light the whole history of Europe from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century."[48]

At Berlin, Schmoller gave up his plan to write an elaborate biography and history of Frederick William I. Instead, he devoted himself to individual studies such as the one on the Prussian Army of the seventeenth and eighteenth century.[49] But he became increasingly aware of the fragmentary character of the documents that were readily available for a study of Prussian administrative and economic history during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hintze interpreted Schmoller, as wishing to do for administrative and economic history, what the great collections of documents on the history of the Great Elector and the political correspondence of Frederick the Great had accomplished for political history. Schmoller's entrance into the Berlin Academy in 1887 enabled him to carry out such a project which bore the name Acta Borussica and was designed to be an immense source survey of every phase of the Prussian state and economic administration during the

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[48]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," p. 230.

[49]See Gustav von Schmoller, "Die Entstehung des preussischen Heeres von 1640 bis 1740," Umrisse und Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs - verwaltungs - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1898), 247-288.

eighteenth century.

Schmoller's great project -- the Acta Borussica -- can scarcely be understood if it is viewed merely as an endeavor to fill a gap in the source collections. To be sure, it served this purpose, but the motivation, as far as Schmoller was concerned, was larger and deeper. Hintze, in his account of Schmoller has provided us with a clue on this matter. He showed that one of Schmoller's deepest convictions was that the state is the most splendid of all moral institutions of history. Schmoller considered the state in the modern period of history be be, in fact, the true educator of humanity. To the kingdom of the Hohenzollerns, Schmoller ascribed an especial historical calling to perform such a social reform. Schmoller's Prussian historical studies, said Hintze, were profoundly shaped and influenced by this idea. The idea of the "social kingdom" was a central one and shaped his political convictions. He was a convinced monarchist because he saw a strong monarchy supported by an educated bureaucracy as the indispensable means of moderating class differences from a "neutral" standpoint. Monarchy thus appeared to Schmoller not so much as a power political necessity, but rather, as social-political wisdom.[50]

Social policy and Prussian history were, thus, for Schmoller, not two separate fields. This history of Prussia was a concrete instance of the effective application of social policy. The Acta Borussica, by gathering together the

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[50]Hintze, "Gustav Schmoller," pp. 231, 237.

vast body of documents on Prussian administrative and economics, not only filled a gap in the documentary history of Prussia, but cast light on an important chapter in the social-politics of the Hohenzollerns.

In planning the Acta Borussica, Schmoller, who was not trained in the careful historical-critical-philological tradition, looked around for a number of skillful and enterprising young historians as assistants. We have previously described how he chose Hintze as his leading assistant in 1888; how Hintze was assigned the task of collecting and editing the documents pertaining to the Prussian silk industry in the eighteenth century and its establishment by Frederick the Great; and that this led him into intensive archival investigations.[51] It is necessary to examine more closely this influence which Schmoller exercised on Hintze through the Acta.

Schmoller's choice of Hintze as his leading assistant had a number of important consequences. The Acta Borussica dealt not with political history in the traditional manner but rather, with institutional, administrative, and economic history. Up to this time, Hintze had been trained by Weizsacker primarily as a political historian. It is true that

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[51]See above, pp. 12-13. On the whole problem of the origin of the Acta Borussica, see Schmoller's introductory remarks in Vol. I of Die preussische Seidenindustrie, pp. I-V; also consult Georg von Below, Zur Entstehung der Acta Borussica, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, III (1905), 142-146, which is a hostile diatribe against Schmoller. See also Fritz Hartung, "Gustav von Schmoller und die preussische Geschichtsschreibung," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, LXII (1938), 292-295.

Waitz had stimulated Hintze to study systematically political science, constitutional history, and some social science. But Hintze's practical introduction into institutional history in terms of its administrative and economic aspects did not occur until he came under the influence of Schmoller and the Acta Borussica.

The Acta Borussica also served to direct Hintze's attention squarely to the field of Prussian history, where he was to devote so many of his efforts. Previously, Hintze must have been aware of the important role of Prussian history under his teacher, Droysen. But Droysen's Geschichte der preussischen Politik dealt almost exclusively with the foreign affairs of Prussia. And though Droysen gave an occasional course at the University of Berlin on the internal history of Prussia, it was only due to Schmoller's suggestion that Droysen gave the course regularly.[52] The immediate preoccupation by Hintze with the internal history of Prussia was due to Schmoller, not Droysen.

A more specific examination of Hintze's contributions to the Acta Borussica will serve to clarify the influence of Schmoller on Hintze. The first publication of the Acta Borussica was a three-volume account of the Prussian silk industry of the eighteenth century, published in 1892. Schmoller and Hintze jointly edited the two volumes of documents on the Prussian silk industry, while Hintze wrote an

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[52] F. Hartung, "Gustav von Schmoller und die preussische Geschichteschreibung," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, LXII (1938), 280. See Droysen, Briefwechsel, II, 776, 938, 977.

elaborate account of the silk industry as volume three. A few weeks prior to the publication of the first three volumes, Schmoller read a report on the Prussian silk industry in the eighteenth century and its establishment under Frederick the Great. The report was read before the Berlin Academy of Sciences, on April 21, 1892, and afterwards printed on May 19 and 23 as a supplement to the newspaper, Allgemeinen Zeitung. This report, together with the three volumes of the Acta, enables us to form an idea of Hintze's approach and what it owed to Schmoller.[53]

That the two men worked in closest conjunction with each other on this project is clear from the joint editorship of the first two volumes of documents, and from the fact that these were the initial volumes to appear on a leading project and would thus naturally call for the closest supervision. But it is also indicated by the division of the three volumes. Volume three consisted of Hintze's presentation of the development of the silk industry as based on the documents. In his report, Schmoller stated that Hintze's account obviously could not be as objective as the documents themselves. Nevertheless, Schmoller mentioned that he repeatedly read Hintze's account, before allowing it to be published, and that he found everything in it of significance -- correct and objective.[54] He, thus, had ample oppor-

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[53]The report is reprinted in Gustav von Schmoller, "Die preussische Seidenindustrie im 18. Jahrhundert und ihre Begründung durch Friedrich den Grossen," Umrisse und Untersuchungen, pp. 530-561. A footnote on page 530 indicates the previous place of publication and reading before the Academy.

[54]Schmoller, "Die preussische Seidenindustrie im 18. Jahrhundert," p. 531.

tunity to control and cross-check Hintze's work.

The question naturally arises as to why Schmoller and Hintze did not simply edit the documents without providing an additional narrative account as a constituent part of the Acta Borussica. Schmoller's answer is that Hintze's account was not only correct and objective, but it was the commission's opinion that a presentation which rested on such an immense mastery of the documentary material could not easily be repeated by anyone, and probably would never be accomplished by another man. Hence, it seemed worth while to disclose to wider circles the results of the newly published documents.[55]

Schmoller indicated the framework upon which the three-volume publication on the silk industry rested. He referred to his 1879 work on the Strassburg weaving and cloth guilds as the first exact history of a city's industry, supported by documentary materials. It provided, said Schmoller, an account of the Strassburg wool industry from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries in terms of the background of medieval urban economic politics. Schmoller regarded the three-volume work on the Prussian silk industry as being analogous in structure, except that it would be a documentary history of a territorial weaving industry during the eighteenth century, viewed from the wider background of state-economic mercantilist politics. The similarities in historiographical intent between the Strassburg study and

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[55]Schmoller, "Die preussische Seidenindustrie im 18. Jahrhundert," pp. 531-532.

the Acta silk industry study were, thus, very clear in Schmoller's mind. In both instances there was an institutional study -- there, the Strassburg woolen industry, here, the Prussian silk industry. In both instances the understanding of these industries was in terms of the wider historical background; there, Strassburg's industry seen within the larger pattern of medieval, economic politics, and here, Prussia's silk industry viewed as an example of the new mercantilist politics. And in both instances, the development of the two industries was not seen in terms of unique situations, but rather, as typical responses to two different stages of economic politics -- the medieval urban and the mercantilistic.[56]

It seems evident, therefore, that Hintze's historiographic approach in this account of the Prussian silk industry was decisively shaped by Schmoller's outlook. Hintze was now writing economic institutional history, whereas previously, he had dealt mainly with political diplomatic affairs. Under Schmoller's direction, he was interpreting the development of the Prussian silk industry in terms of the larger historical movement of mercantilism and was viewing Prussia's development as a paradigm or type-example of conditions that were similar elsewhere.[57]

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[56]Schmoller, "Die preussische Seidenindustrie im 18. Jahrhundert," p. 533.

[57]See Hintze's remarks in his Antrittsrede, p. 746. He states, "Prussian history only served as a paradigm for me of the forms and transformations in the life of a great modern state." This is similar to Schmoller's view. See his remarks in Umrisse und Untersuchungen, pp. 32, 245.

Hintze's historiographical approach in the Prussian silk industry reflected three influences. Hintze's masterly editing of the first two volumes of the documents on the Prussian silk industry reflected the training he had received under Weizsäcker. It was, thus, an aspect of the legacy of Ranke. The wide use of sources in this work was also a reflection of Droysen's dictum that the historian should show how history is produced out of the affairs of a people. Finally, there was the preponderant influence of Schmoller.[58]

Schmoller pointed out, that in scope and thoroughness, the volumes on the Prussian silk industry far exceeded what he had accomplished in his study on Strassburg. The account of the Prussian silk industry was intended to be "a month by month, and day-to-day documented history of a large and significant German industry of the eighteenth century, performed with greater thoroughness than had previously been accomplished for either a country or industry."[59] Hintze was able to reconstruct in detail the motives of the various participating individuals because the Berlin silk industry rested on the initiative of the government, especially Frederick the Great. The result was that the development of the silk industry was too large an extent of a part and parcel of administrative history and could be tracked down in the govern-

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[58]So painstaking a critic as Below calls Hintze a Meister der Edition and attributes Hintze's skill in this regard to his training under Weizsäcker. See Below, Zur Entstehung der Acta Borussica, p. 143.

[59]Gustav v. Schmoller, Umrisse und Untersuchungen, p. 533.

ment archives.

Hintze's account of the Prussian silk industry was partly chronological and partly systematic, once again showing the historiographical influence of Schmoller. Thus, Hintze began his account by dealing with the rise of the silk industry in modern times. He showed the importance of textile manufactures in industrial development prior the rise of coal and iron industries. He traced the shifting economic supremacy in textiles, particularly silk manufactures from the Byzantine Empire to Italian cities like Venice and Genoa to the larger Italian states such as Milan. He showed the shift from Italy to Spain and France, and from these to Holland and England. He indicated that the silk and wool industry seemed to develop side by side.

Hintze dealt with the early growth of the silk industry in terms of the shifting economic situation and the influences of political forces. He raised the question as to why Berlin in his own day had no silk industry, although a hundred years ago it was, if not the largest, the most promising of the industries of the capital city. Hintze's answer was that the development of the Berlin silk industry in the main was the creation of the mercantilistic industrial politics of Frederick the Great, and the decline of this industry was sealed with the carrying out of the free trade proposals of the Zollverein.[60]

Hintze contended that Frederick's efforts on behalf

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[60]Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie, pp. 1-32.

of the industry constituted a classic example of the industrial political efforts and achievements of mercantilism. Hintze, on the other hand, viewed the development of the Prussian silk industry as a type study in the achievement of mercantilistic protectionism. He contrasted this type of mercantilistic protection of industry with the situation in Krefeld. Although the Krefeld industry also relied on the state, the development of that industry was not conceived as an act of reasons of state but rather a matter of private speculation.[61] The introduction of the silk industry in the Brandenburg lands, therefore, was not the product of personal whim or inclination, but stood in a direct connection with a more powerful and universal-economic political movement. Hintze viewed it as a phase in the great economic process of transformation which was introduced into Brandenburg Prussia by the Great Elector and completed by Frederick the Great -- a process which transformed Prussia from a poor and wasted land to the most productive economic area of Prussia.[62]

Hintze traced with great care the new establishment of the silk industry in Berlin and Potsdam under Frederick the Great.[63] He analyzed the system of regulations built to protect and advance the industry between 1746 and 1756.[64] He dealt with the body of statutory regulations and admin-

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[61]Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie, pp. 81-102.

[62]Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie, p. 2.

[63]Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie, pp. 103-105.

[64]Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie, pp. 136-153.

istrative supervisory authorities.[65] In brilliant fashion he showed the formation of a trade policy based on such mercantilistic regulations as the prohibition of the Rhine-Westphalian factory products inside the provinces on this side of the Weser. He traced the complete growth and transformation of the silk industry, showing at every stage, how it was related to wider historical developments.[66]

Hintze's achievement in editing and narrating the materials on the Prussian silk industry was a significant one by any count. From a historiographical standpoint it looms as especially important, since it marks a shift in the development of Hintze's pure historicism under Droysen and Weizsäcker, to a modified historicism which became concerned with typological questions. In this connection, Schmoller played a great influence on Hintze, and we shall examine this problem systematically in Chapter VII.

Hintze's work with the Acta Borussica began to bear further fruits shortly after he had completed his account of the Prussian silk industry. In 1893, he published a study on a Berlin merchant at the time of Frederick the Great -- Johann Gotzkowsky.[67] The same year saw an article on the Prussian silk industry of the eighteenth century appear in Schmoller's Jahrbuch. In the next two years, Hintze pub-

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[65]Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie, pp. 172-192.

[66]Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie, pp. 207-214.

[67]Hintze, "Ein Berliner Kaubmann aus der Zeit Friedrichs des Grossen, Johann Ernst Gotzkowsky," Schriften des Vereins für Geschichte Berlins, XXX (1893), 1-18.

lished four more articles on related topics.[68]

Hintze's association with Schmoller did not end with his work on the Prussian silk industry. Schmoller was very pleased with Hintze's achievement and promptly enrolled him for further work on the Acta Borussica. The upshot was that for the next twenty years Hintze spent a good part of his time in significant archival work for the Acta Borussica.[69] Volumes six through ten dealt with the administrative organization and general state administration in Prussia during the eighteenth centuries.

The most significant of these volumes was Part I of volume six, which was an Introduction by Hintze of over six-hundred pages, pertaining to the administrative organizational pattern in Prussia during the eighteenth century. Hartung, a leading German historian, noted for his careful, cautious judgments, had called this introduction by Hintze, the great work on administrative history, and exemplary for all further work in the field.[70] Meisner, another authority on constitutional history, has dubbed it the "classic des-

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[68]Hintze, Die preussische Seidenindustrie des 18. Jahrhunderts, Schmoller's Jahrbuch, XVII (1893), pp. 23-60. See also Hintze's "Die Schweizer stickerei Industrie und ihr Organization," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, XVIII (1894), 1251-1307. "Ein Denkschrift über die Berliner Manufakturverhaltnisse aus dem Jahre 1801," Schriften des Vereins für die Geschichte Berlins, XXXI (1894), 101-114. "Zwei Denkschriften aus dem Jahre 1800 über die preussische Seidenindustrie," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, VIII (1895), 103-142.

[69]Preface by G. Schmoller and R. Koser to O. Hintze, Behördenorganisation, Part I, p. 5.

[70]Hartung, "Otto Hintze," p. 206.

cription" in this area.[71]

Hintze's Introduction was intended by the editors, Schmoller and Koser, to provide a picture of the general administration of Prussia around the year 1740. Since the documentary volumes were purely chronological, it was deemed important to give a general view of the Prussian administration and for this purpose Schmoller and Koser regarded the year 1740 as ideal.[72]

This study which accordingly was not primarily developmental but designed, rather, to provide a cross-section of the administration at the time of the accession of Frederick the Great, clearly revealed how far Hintze had moved from a pure historicism, and how strongly Schmoller's emphasis on institutional history had affected Hintze. The problem was not to describe unique situations and events, but to systematically explain the structure and pattern of the Prussian constitution, administration, and bureaucracy.

Hintze began by describing the spirit and system (Geist und System) of the Prussian administration in 1740. He revealed that the Prussian state of 1740 was not yet a completely developed state, though it was more developed than any of the other German states. However, it was not as highly unified as England or France.

Hintze referred to a process which was going on in all of the newer states since the time of the Great Elector, namely, an amalgamation of constitutive parts of the terri-

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[71]Meisner, "Otto Hintze's Lebenswerk," p. 66.

[72]Hintze, Behördenorganisation, Part I, p. vi of Preface.

tories to form a larger organized totality. Frederick William had accomplished an extraordinary amount for the centralization of administration of the Prussian state, but this process was by no means complete in 1740. Hintze showed how Prussia was referred to as a unified state only in the parlance of foreign affairs, but domestically, there was no precedent for this. He described Prussia around 1740 as a composite territorial state and distinct from a type which he designated as the simple territorial state, and another type prevalent in the nineteenth century, which he named the modern unified state. He regarded Prussia, during all of the eighteenth century, as an example of the composite territorial state.[73]

Hintze considered the spirit of the large modern state as already strongly developed in Prussia around 1740. Its new institutions stood predominantly in the foreground. The old territorial institutions were pushed in the background, and they were partly in a process of decay. Yet, these older territorial institutions still exercised enough influence so that Prussia had to be carefully distinguished from the modern unified state. Hintze argued that it was a mistake to view Prussia and its administration in the eighteenth century only from the center. One had also to make due allowances for the administrative standpoints of the provinces, and it was one of the great achievements of Hintze's study, that he analyzed not only the central administration but the

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[73]Hintze, Behördenorganisation, Part I, p. 3.

individual provinces.[74]

In brilliant fashion, Hintze showed that around the year 1740 there existed within Prussia two different views of life and the state. One was rooted in the idea of the Lutheran Reformation and the old feudal-estates order of society. Its palladium was the territorial church and the territorial constitution. It saw the highest aim of the state as the maintenance of pure religion, the exercise of a justice removed from the sovereigns, a territorial police completely in accord with the prescriptions of the words of God and a Godly ordained order of estates. The concept of the state and life was directed toward a peaceful and comfortable life among small circles, an honorable income along traditional lines -- without vast undertakings or widespread ambitions. This ideal never cast its eyes beyond the borders of its territory. Emperor and Empire were regarded by it as the highest worldly authorities. Its dynastic loyalty possessed a feudal or patriarchal rather than political character. In politics this approach assumed a completely defensive character.

Hintze saw the weakness of this position to lie in its passivity, its neglect of power, and all that it implied. The second approach was grounded on the premise of power, and Frederick the Great incorporated it masterfully. In foreign affairs, said Hintze, Frederick's approach led to the conquest of new provinces. Within, it

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[74]Hintze, Behördenorganisation, Part I, p. 4.

led to concentration and an increment of power. Everything in the state was subordinated to the idea of power. "Reasons of state," said Hintze, "dominated in all spheres," and economic measures, the improvement of lower classes, tax and war measures, were all designed with this end in view. Everything had to be subordinated to the task of insuring state power and independence in the great struggle of rival powers. Otherwise, welfare and culture could no longer be maintained and furthered.[75]

Hintze's aim was to describe the Prussian administration and constitution in terms of this mixture, struggle, persistence, and incompatibility of these two outlooks on life and the state. The typological elements in such an approach are clear. Hintze's distinction between the three types of states -- the simple territorial, the composite territorial, and the unified, rested upon a typological construction. Likewise, his contrasts between the two modes of life in eighteenth-century Prussia rested upon a typology; for the two modes of life were different types of life: the old estates and newer absolutistic types.

Hintze, thus, amalgamated in his study systematized analysis, typological approach, and a reverence for the fidelity to the documents. Hintze's work on the Prussian administration, in its complete form, was a monument of industry and effort, and a faithful example of the institutional historical approach of Gustav Schmoller.

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[75]Hintze, Behördenorganisation, Part I, pp. 5-6.

CHAPTER VI

THE LAMPRECHT CONTROVERSY

By the 1890's, three leading strands of nineteenth-century historicism flowing from Droysen, Ranke, and Schmoller, respectively, had profoundly shaped the pattern of Hintze's historical thinking. But the 1890's in Germany also witnessed a leading historical debate which was nothing less than a symptom of the onset of a crisis in German historicism. This was the Lamprecht discovery.

German intellectual life during the second half of the century was distinguished by an extraordinary number of academic controversies. It became customary for scholars to take sides on leading issues which frequently blazed into lengthy, violent polemics. No doubt, it would be revealing if some enterprising student made a historical and sociological analysis of the role of these polemics in German academic life. Of the many such controversies, a good share took place among historians. None evoked such clamor, heat, noise, and attention as the celebrated Lamprecht controversy in which Hintze played an important role. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and interpret his part in the controversy as a stage in the development and transformation of German historicism.

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to en-

ter into a lengthy description of the Lamprecht controversy,[1] which has often been regarded as a methodological one, and also as the expression of differences in political ideology and Weltanschauung.[2] That the controversy involved questions of methodology is undeniable, but that it also reflected questions of values is equally clear. The controversy can be properly understood only if both aspects are taken into consideration.

The controversy centered around the colorful personality of Karl Gotthard Lamprecht, who in 1891 was a professor of history at the University of Leipzig. It is necessary to sketch the historiographical background of Lamprecht briefly in order to clarify the succeeding discussion.

Karl Lamprecht was born in Jessen in the province of Saxony in 1856.[3] He studied at the Gymnasium in Wittenburg and also at Pforta, where he received an excellent humanistic education and Protestant upbringing. His university studies took place at Göttingen, Munich, and Leipzig.[4]

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[1]On this point, consult the studies of Friedrich Seifert, Der Streit um Karl Lamprecht's Geschichtsphilosophie (Augsberg: Dr. B. Filser, 1925); and A. Kuhnert, Der Streit um die geschichtswissenschaftlichen Theorien Karl Lamprechts, dissertation (Gütersloh: Ludwig Flottam, 1906).

[2]This is the case with the important work of Otto Westphal, Feinde Bismarcks, geistige Grundlagen der deutschen Opposition 1848-1918 (München und Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1930), pp. 186-201.

[3]See the Lebensabriss in his dissertation Beiträge zur Geschichte des französischen Wirtschaftslebens im 11. Jahrhundert (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1878).

[4]Annie M. Popper, "Karl Gotthard Lamprecht," Some Historians of Modern Europe, ed., Bernadotte E. Schmitt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 217;

There, leading professors E. Bernheim, J. Weizsäcker, E. V. Noorden, and W. Roscher, all under whom Lamprecht carried studies, left deep impressions on him, especially Bernheim and Roscher, the latter of whom he wrote his dissertation under, which involved the aspects of the history of French economic life during the eleventh century.[5]

In 1885 Lamprecht became a professor extraordinarius at Bonn. There, he produced one of his better works, perhaps the best, a three-volume account of German economic life during the middle ages.[6] In 1891, Lamprecht accepted a call to Marburg, and one year later, he went to Leipzig where he remained until his death in 1915.[7]

Prior to 1890, Lamprecht's university career was not too unconventional. It is true that he deviated from the approach of the ordinary political historian by emphasizing economic history. Though Roscher's impact on Lamprecht was strong in this respect, the latter was regarded as a solid, respectable historian in his own right.[8] In

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Emil J. Spiess, Die Geschichtsphilosophie von Karl Lamprecht, dissertation (Erlangen: Junge und Sohn, 1921), p. 14. See also J. W. Thompson and B. J. Holm, A History of Historical Writing, II, 422.

[5]See the Lebensabriss in his dissertation, Beiträge zur Geschichte des franzosischen Wirtschaftsleben im 11. Jahrhundert, which significantly enough appeared as a volume in Schmoller's Staats - und sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungen, in 1878.

[6]Karl Lamprecht, Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter (Leipzig: A. Durr, 1885-1886), 3 volumes.

[7]Popper, "Karl G. Lamprecht," p. 219.

[8]Thompson and Holm, A History of Historical Writing, II, 423.

1891 he produced the first volume of his history of Germany.[9] This work created a furor among historical circles inside Germany. Lamprecht was bitterly attacked; his methodology criticized; and his status as a competent historian was questioned. For the next fifteen years, a violent controversy raged between the prolific polemicist and a host of opponents.

It is extremely difficult to be clear about many aspects of the controversy; for each side frequently accused the other of misinterpreting and misrepresenting its own position. The issues were fought on many levels -- reflecting numerous differences between the factions. The controversy revealed a struggle between the adherents of an individualistic and a collectivistic interpretation of history, a contest between the partisans of political history and those who favored a cultural-historical approach, and a sharp exchange between the followers of Ranke and the adherents of the historical school of economics. In the controversy there was a division between naturalistic and positivistic currents and those of German idealism, as well as a deep cleavage between those who believed life should be organized around the state and those who regarded society as a more fundamental unit. Furthermore, the controversy involved a struggle between the followers of spirit (Geist) and power (Macht). Finally, it reflected tensions and strains in the optimistic currents that accompanied the

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[9]Karl Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte (Berlin und Freiburg: R. Gaertners Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1891), Vol. I.

rise and growth of nineteenth-century German historicism.

In the forward to the second edition of his Deutsche Geschichte, Lamprecht attempted to explain his approach and meet objections. He indicated that his work was not designed for any particular body of readers but was intended to meet the exacting requirements of historical scholarship. Lamprecht contended, further, that the question of method was basic to the natural sciences. He confessed, however, that history was not a natural science nor could it ever be one, but that it ought to emulate the natural sciences as closely as possible. In answer as to the nature of the characteristics of natural science, Lamprecht indicated that the natural sciences were no longer interested in the sheer description of facts, having long passed this stage. They possessed two characteristics. They were interested in subsuming isolated and discrete facts under general principles, and they revealed that events had a genetic developmental character.[10]

In his forward, Lamprecht stated that history ought to be guided by these two principles. He declared, however, that the political approach to history did not follow them, and that the primary question of the political historian (he had Ranke in mind) was: how did history actually occur (Wie ist es eigentlich gewesen?); when it should have been; and how did it actually develop (Wie ist es eigentlich geworden?)? The age of the political historian, concerned with

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[10]Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, 2nd ed., p. v.

the actual description of events, must give way to a new age with a new method -- a genetic-historical approach designed to exhibit the universal and general principles of historical development.[11]

Lamprecht maintained that a developmental-historical approach naturally would stress the cultural-historical factor, instead of the political. "Is this such a misfortune?" he asked, with an eye on his critics.[12] Quite the contrary, insisted Lamprecht, since the new historical method was nothing but a profound reflection of changes in the whole national life of Germany. Lamprecht asserted a type of sociology of knowledge, by arguing that historiographical methodology always was an expression of a particular age. The present age, in terms of its leading manifestations and interests, demands a historical method which will emphasize the "cultural-historical, economic-historical, legal-historical, and humanistic-historical" factors.[13] Any other approach is unthinkable. Such, in brief, were Lamprecht's views, as he formulated them in the second edition of his Deutsche Geschichte. As the controversy continued, he expressed various aspects of his approach more explicitly.

In 1897, as the controversy reached its climax, Meinecke, editor of the Historische Zeitschrift, invited Hintze to write a brief communication[14] stating his views in

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[11]Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, 2nd ed., p. vi.

[12]Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, 2nd ed., p. vii.

[13]Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte, 2nd ed., p. vi.

[14]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 205.

the Historische Zeitschrift,[15] which Meinecke considered as one of the finest contributions on the controversy.[16] That Meinecke chose Hintze to write the article was, needless to say, fortunate; for Hintze had been trained on the traditions of Ranke and Droysen. Yet, he was also deeply influenced by the younger historical school of economics as represented by Schmoller; and in totality, all three great currents of nineteenth-century historicism were represented in Hintze's approach to history. It was to be expected that he would do justice to both sides of the controversy, since he would reflect diverse approaches in his own conceptions of history.

Hintze's contribution in the Historische Zeitschrift was not intended to be a wholesale critique of Lamprecht.[17]

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[15]O. Hintze, "Über individualistische und kollektivistische Geschichtsauffassung," Historische Zeitschrift, LXXVIII (1897), 60-67. It is reprinted in O. Hintze, Zur Theorie der Geschichte, pp. 12-20, and all further citations are taken from this latter work.

[16]Meinecke, Erlebtes, p. 205. Meinecke's favorable opinion was not an isolated one. See, for example, A. Kuhnert, Die Streit um die geschichtswissenschaftlichen Theorien Karl Lamprechts, p. 47, where Kuhnert states that many regarded Hintze's article as the last work on the controversy. See also O. Westphal, Feinde Bismarcks, pp. 188-189; and E. Spranger, Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft, eine erkenntnistheoretisch-psychologische Untersuchung (Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 1905), pp. 41-44. The historical importance of Hintze's article is also indicated by the inclusion of portions of it in the two important anthologies: F. Wagner, Geschichtswissenschaft (Freiburg: Alber, 1951), pp. 299-302; and Helmut Schoeck, Soziologie (Freiburg: Alber, 1952), 243.

[17]Karl Lamprecht, "Was ist Kulturgeschichte?" Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, N.F.I. (1896), 75-150.

It was designed to be a specific response to Lamprecht's article, "Was ist Kulturgeschichte?" (What is cultural history?). It was not Hintze's primary purpose to concern himself with every aspect of the controversy but only certain, crucial, methodological questions.[18] In general, Hintze adopted a middle-of-the-road stand in this article between the extreme opponents of Lamprecht and the position represented by Lamprecht himself. He, consequently, contended that Lamprecht's article contained much that was instructive even to the latter's opponents. Yet, Hintze pointed out that Lamprecht had carried correct principles to such extreme lengths as to render them unacceptable for the careful investigation of scientific truth.

The fundamental issue involved, in Hintze's estimation, was a question concerning the status of laws in history.

> Are historical events of such a general nature that they can be subsumed under a typical schematism of regular development, or are they mainly in the large of a singular nature? This is the great question which dominates all discussions regarding historical method and seems to me also to be the genuine impulse in Lamprecht's efforts.[19]

Hintze was correct in regarding this as the issue. In 1896, he, Lamprecht, published his book on old and new tendencies in historical study, and in this work, he distinguished be-

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[18]Hintze, "Über individualistische und kollektivistische Geschichtsauffassung," p. 12. Henceforth, this article will be abbreviated to read Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung."

[19]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 12.

tween two schools of historiography,[20] an older school represented by Ranke and the young Rankeans,[21] and a younger one supported by Lamprecht. The older school was interested only in describing singular historical events, while the newer one was searching for a collectivistic interpretation of history based on social-psychological laws. Thus, the issue was clearly drawn.[22]

Hintze regarded the Lamprecht controversy as legitimately reflecting differences between an individualistic and a collectivistic concept of history: the former believing only in singular events and the latter in collective forces. He denied, however, that the Lamprecht controversy was a conflict between materialistic and idealistic approaches to history, and his grounds for doing so were important in that he saw the second half of the nineteenth-century characterized by the decline of metaphysical speculation. Questions previously within the province of metaphysics were taken over by psychology. Philosophical issues tended to become psychological ones, and questions of philosophical method were frequently translated into questions of psychological method. He indicated that the contrast between Lamprecht and his opponents was, therefore, not one between a materialistic metaphysics and an idealistic one -- but a

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[20]Karl Lamprecht, Alte und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft (Berlin: R. Gaertners Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1896).

[21]Lamprecht, Alte und neue Richtungen, pp. 26-79.

[22]Lamprecht, Alte und neue Richtungen, pp. 1-25.

difference between the followers of an individualistic psychology versus those who accepted a collectivistic one.[23]

Hintze further stated that extreme individualists and extreme collectivists were both in error. The followers of an individualistic psychology who denied the existence of social-psychological principles were mistaken and one-sided. Likewise, those who asserted that there were only social-psychological forces were equally wrong and biased. Hintze's position was that an adequate understanding of history rested on a combination and interrelationship between individual-psychological and social-psychological phenomena.[24]

Although Hintze regarded the social-psychological approach inadequate by itself, he considered the rise of a social-psychological standpoint during the nineteenth century as being, perhaps, the greatest achievement of that century in the realm of the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). He traced the roots of the social-psychological standpoint to German idealism and romanticism. Hintze even psychologized Hegel's concept of the objective spirit (objektiv Geist) and Jakob Grimm's notion of the folk-soul (Volkseele), by contending that all they really meant by these terms were "spiritual collective forces, that were a product of mass psychological events."[25] He considered the folk-psychology school, a product of influences stemming from Wilhelm von Humboldt and Herbart, as a reflection of social-psychological approach, though it was exercising more influence in ethnology and linguistic rather than

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[23]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 13.
[24]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 13.
[25]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 13.

in history.

The influence of positivistic currents during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was clearly mirrored in Hintze's view that the social-psychological approach had been developed more realistically by Comte and Spencer than by German idealists. Hintze regarded these two thinkers, Comte and Spencer, along with Taine and Freytag, as holders of the social-psychological viewpoint, and he considered the historical school of economics as also expressing such an approach, but on a more empirical and careful basis than the earlier German idealists.

Therefore, three currents in nineteenth-century thought: idealism, romanticism, and positivism were making use of a social-psychological approach to history, and the gains in each case were significant. Insofar as it employed a social-psychological approach, Hintze regarded Lamprecht's Deutsche Geschichte as also constituting an important advance over previous efforts.[26]

Hintze showed that Lamprecht's social-psychological approach differed from both Marxist theory, which rested on a belief in objective means of production, founded upon material conditions, and the idealistic individualism of historicists like Ranke, and to label Lamprecht a follower of the one-sided Marxist economic interpretation was a serious mistake. While the Marxists explained everything in terms of objective material conditions, Lamprecht proceeded to employ psychological-collective forces -- and so, the Marxists

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[26]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 13.

materialized history while Lamprecht psychologised it.[27]

One of the difficulties that Hintze found in Lamprecht's social-psychological approach to history was his separation of individual from collective psychological forces. Instead of interweaving the roles of individual and the collective-psychological events, he separated them. Lamprecht did this for two reasons. He tended, primarily, to minimize the importance of individual factors and, secondly, to regard collective-psychological phenomena as having an existence apart from individuals.[28]

Hintze criticized this view, claiming that Lamprecht did not recognize that every social-psychological complex in the last analysis originated as a product of the acts of individuals. This did not mean, said Hintze, that there were only individual-psychological events. Beyond these, there were also collective-social forces such as institutions. The point was that at every moment in the development of social-psychological forces, the acts of individuals were operative. Individuals were constantly modifying the greater social-psychological forces in society. Whenever an institution changed or underwent development, it was the result of the actions of individual human beings reacting on that collective institution. The individual factor could, therefore, never be neglected in dealing with collective happenings, since it was the principal source of the spe-

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[27]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," pp. 13-14.

[28]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 15.

cific group individuality and also the leading factor which shaped its further development.[29]

Hintze, thus, refused to see a dichotomy between the great personalities representing individual decisions in history and the march of collective forces. Between the singular and the general in history there was no ultimate bifurcation and both were simply different aspects of a single historical process in which each played an indispensable role. The individual played a role in the development and modification of language, morals, economics, and law, as well as in the establishment of states and the struggles of powers. Yet, the actions of even the greatest historical personalities were limited by the collective conditions and forces in which they found themselves. Collective forces shaped individuals and individuals, in turn, modified collective forces. The two processes went hand in hand.[30]

Hintze proved himself a follower of nineteenth-century historicism to the extent that he regarded the idea of individuality as a cardinal factor in the historical process. When we ask what is meant by individuality, Hintze states that we have a profound mystery before us. The natural and cultural sciences have no solution for the final mystery of life. The problem of individuality is related to the enigma of life. "All causal explanation of historical connections can only proceed ultimately to that point where we arrive at the spontaneously qualitative determination of the individuality of life as the final cause of his-

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[29]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 15.

[30]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 15.

torical connections and happenings."[31] We can never penetrate this mystery of individuality. Hintze did not think that the causal (erklärende) psychology of his day was capable of accounting for human individuality. He accepted Dilthey's critique of this psychology.[32] Nor did he think that Wundt's psychological approach, upon which Lamprecht's theory of history rested, was adequate to account for the phenomenon of individuality. Hintze pressed the point that the historian attains an "understanding" of human individuality only by a "kind of artistic apperception resting upon empirical research."[33]

If Hintze accepted individuality as a fundamental aspect of the historical process, he did not deny the existence of more general kinds of events. Both sorts of events exist, but more important, they always exist in an interrelated fashion -- "there exists in historical life just as few events of an exclusively general nature as of an individual kind."[34]

Therefore, Hintze contended that the whole Lamprecht controversy was couched in terms of dichotomies, that there were not two historical methods -- a collectivistic and an individualistic one, nor were there two disciplines corresponding to these methods -- cultural history and political

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[31]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 15.

[32]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," pp. 15-17.

[33]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 17. In a footnote on page 63 of the original Historische Zeitschrift article, Hintze stated that his views on the role of individuality resembled Meinecke's even though Hintze did not share Meinecke's "pronounced idealistic point of view."

[34]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 17.

history, but that there was really only one method which rested on properly relating the individual and the collective, which was neither political nor cultural history but a universal-historical approach which embraced both collectivistic and individualistic methods.[35]

Hintze concluded his article on Lamprecht by concerning himself once again with the decisive question -- whether there existed historical events of such a general nature that they could be subsumed under a typical schematism of regular development. Hintze's answer followed the approach taken in his article on Roscher. World history, for Hintze, was a singular process and not the manifestation of recurrent general events. All nations, for Hintze, did not go through regular stages of development which followed typical patterns, and on this ground, he rejected Lamprecht's schematism in the Deutsche Geschichte which attempted to show that German history had developed through five main cultural periods each characterized by an "all-prevailing social psychic condition," and a "diapason that diffuses all psychic expressions and hence all historical phenomena."[36] As a result, Lamprecht found that the early period of German history was characterized by the diapason of symbolism, the early middle ages by typism, the late middle ages by conventionalism, modern times by individualism, and the period since the eighteenth century by subjectivism. Lamprecht discovered corresponding economic stages of development for each of these social psychological ages,

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[35]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 17.

[36]Popper, "Karl G. Lamprecht," p. 224.

and that the ages of typism and conventionalism were characterized by a natural economy, the age of symbolism by an economy of occupancy (occupatorische), and the ages of individualism and subjectivism by a gold economy. Lamprecht expressed a view that other nations went through similar stages, and that this process could be described and reduced to laws.[37]

The critique which Hintze directed against Roscher and his conception of political development was based on the former's objection to the idea that there were recurrent stages in the lives of nations, the view which Lamprecht also advocated. Indeed, Spiess showed Lamprecht's notion of an organically unfolding sequence of stages in the lives of nations was derived in good measure from his teacher, Roscher.[38]

In his critique at Lamprecht, Hintze maintained that all we know about the history of nations does not permit us "to construct a normal course of development for a nation."[39] Hintze further conceded that nations did seem to exhibit natural tendencies, which pointed to a kind of regular development, but such tendencies were found mainly during the early history of nations, but as these nations developed and came into contact with other nations, their development invariably changed. Consequently, Hintze maintained that na-

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[37]Lamprecht, "Was ist Kulturgeschichte?" pp. 126-129; 133-135.

[38]E. Spiess, Die Geschichtsphilosophie von Karl Lamprecht, pp. 25-36.

[39]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 18.

tions were essentially the product of historical situations, and not "natural" formations. Because nations were the products and results of world-historical situations, Hintze held that they resemble total individualities rather than uniform generic types. Whenever a paralleled development of nations was discerned, as in the case of the Romano-Germanic group, this was due to a common cultural foundation, "which is not a natural endowment -- but a world-historical achievement."[40] In this connection, Hintze acknowledged Ranke's achievement in creating a concept of universal history which was not a refuse product of national development, but has an independent significance. World history was not only produced by nations but universal historical processes in turn produced nations. Hintze acknowledged the importance that Lamprecht attached to such contacts between nations as renaissances, receptions, and what Lamprecht called "diosmoses." Yet, Hintze regarded the most durable result of universal-historical development as being in the binding of nations into communities of common values. Nations, accordingly, bore a closer resemblance to individuals in a social community than to plants in a forest.[41]

It is clear that Hintze's criticism of Lamprecht's approach to history was an intermediate one which recognized merits in Lamprecht's collectivistic approach and, yet, was unwilling to exclude individual factors as forces in history. It may seem that, in this regard, Hintze was not

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[40]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 18.

[41]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," pp. 18-19.

altogether just to Lamprecht: for in his article on cultural history, the latter specifically stated that his social-psychological approach was always to be accompanied by an individual-psychological one. He declared that collective pehnomena never took place without the conscious activity of individuals, and consequently, the two approaches supplemented one another.[42] Though remarks such as these appeared to indicate that Lamprecht himself was adopting an intermediate position between the individualistic and collectivistic interpretations of history, such was indeed not the case. Lamprecht's theoretical position, expressed in his books and articles, was that the singular individual event was irrational and could be the object of scientific knowledge at no time.[43] But scientific knowledge was the only kind of valid knowledge for Lamprecht, and he insisted that typical phenomena in history were far more fundamental in their effects than individual events.[44] In practice, he was concerned with working out a collectivistic-cultural history which allowed remarkably little room for the expression of historical individuality.

We have given, in this chapter, a description and analysis of Hintze's article on individualistic and collectivistic approaches to history. The remainder of the chap-

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[42]Lamprecht, "Was ist Kulturgeschichte?" pp. 81-86; 120.

[43]Lamprecht, Die historische Methode des Herrn von Below (Berlin: R. Gaertner, 1899), p. 15.

[44]Lamprecht, Zwei Streitschriften, den H. H. Oncken, Delbrück und Lenz zugeeignet (Berlin: R. Gaertner, 1897), p. 37.

ter will be devoted to a brief demonstration showing how this article by Hintze reflects changes in the transformation of German historicism at the end of the nineteenth century.

Hintze's article on the Lamprecht controversy is exceedingly instructive in the regard that it reveals, in the first place, how German historicism toward the close of the nineteenth century was losing both its metaphysical-idealistic orientation and its religious roots. It indicates that the older, idealistic historicism of the early nineteenth century was gradually being transformed after 1870 into an empirical one. In examining the evidences for such a change in historical outlook more closely, we may note that Hintze's attempt to regard the Lamprecht controversy as a struggle between differing psychologies of history, instead of differing philosophies of history, points up the important status that psychology had achieved by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The philosophical tradition of idealistic metaphysics was plainly thinning out and being supplanted by psychology. Instead of searching for philosophical foundations for the cultural sciences, scholars attempted to establish a psychological basis for history and the other cultural sciences. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the most important endeavor in this direction was accomplished by Karl Lamprecht, Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Wundt, and Christoph Sigwart.

These men differed widely in their approach to psychology, and in the way they applied psychological principles to history. There was a world of difference between Wundt's so-called three historical laws -- the laws of resultants, relations, and contrasts -- and Dilthey's theory of historical understanding. Yet, both men agreed that only psychology could furnish an adequate foundation for the cultural sciences. Both were equally anti-metaphysical and denied any eternal validity to metaphysics. Both men sought to establish philosophy, along with the other cultural sciences, on a psychological basis.[45]

These tendencies were reflected in the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey. In the second section of this work on the introduction to the cultural sciences, Dilthey traced the history of the idea of metaphysics as the foundation of the cultural sciences, and he showed how this ideal had crumbled.[46] In his famous study on descriptive and analytical psychology, written in 1894, Dilthey's first chapter dealt with the tasks of a psychological foundation of the cultural sciences.[47] He criticized the basis of ana-

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[45]Wundt, Grundriss der Psychologie, pp. 391-393.

[46]Wilhelm Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte (2nd ed.; Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1923), pp. 123-402.

[47]Wilhelm Dilthey, "Die Aufgabe einer psychologischen Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften," Ideen uber eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie in Die geistige Welt, Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens (Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1924), erster halfte, pp. 139-154.

lytic-causal psychology and substituted a descriptive psychology in its place. This psychology, he was convinced, would provide a proper foundation for the cultural sciences. Dilthey, thus, was an advocate of psychologism -- the belief that only psychological principles can furnish the basis for understanding knowledge and experience.

Both Lamprecht and Hintze reflected a belief in psychologism in the Lamprecht controversy. Psychologism, in fact, was sweeping over large portions of German intellectual life during the closing decades of the nineteenth century. In his essay on cultural history, Lamprecht declared:

> One thing is certainly clear to me -- that psychology must be the foundation of all historical science. As a matter of fact, how could this truth ever have been denied. All historical science can only have direct experiences as its content, as these are determined by the reciprocal actions of knowing and acting subjects. The science of the generally valid forms of these experiences and their connections is however psychology.[48]

Whereas Lamprecht grounded his theory of history upon Wundt's psychology, Hintze definitely was oriented toward Dilthey's psychological approach.[49] But the belief in a psychological approach was shared by both men. Hintze's assertion that the great achievement of the nineteenth century in the realm of the cultural sciences was the de-

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[48] Lamprecht, "Was ist Kulturgeschichte?" p. 77.

[49] Lamprecht, "Was ist Kulturgeschichte?" p. 77. See also E. Spiess, Die Geschichtsphilosophie von Karl Lamprecht, pp. 45-79, where this influence is analyzed in detail; and see Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 17.

velopment of a social-psychological approach, together with his erroneous belief that Hegel's notion of an objective spirit was a psychological, not a metaphysical principle; and his conviction that philosophical principles were at bottom psychological ones all testifying to the triumph of psychology over metaphysics at the close of the nineteenth century.

Late nineteenth-century German historicism was squarely feeling the impact of psychology. The victory of psychology marked a defeat for metaphysics, and it indicated that German historicism was becoming more secularized in its approach. This tendency was also revealed in the loss of religious roots, manifest in late nineteenth-century German empirical historicism. We have seen how Ranke's historicism was firmly anchored in a Protestant religious consciousness. A good deal of idealistic historicism, of which Ranke was an instance, had such religious roots. The empirical historicism of the second half of the nineteenth century, however, increasingly dispensed with such religious foundations and adopted a secular approach. This trend was fully in harmony with the victory of psychology over metaphysics, the growth of an empirical realistic spirit in the social sciences, and the growing influence of positivistic currents, such as those of Mill, Comte, and Spencer.

Hintze's article reveals an empirical temper of mind which refused to regard religion as essential to a theory of history. In discussing Ranke's interpretation of history, Hintze insisted that Ranke's doctrine of ideas was

not actually dependent on any notion of transcendental forces or a divine plan and he regarded the latter's "ideas" merely as a species of psychological influence that could be acceptable to any historian.[50] Hintze, in effect, was stripping Ranke's ideas of any divine originality or intent.

Hintze's article also reflected naturalistic, positivistic, and empirical currents, all of which were confronting the idealistic heritage of German thought. Lamprecht's approach to history was a naturalistic one and symbolized the wave of naturalism that was influencing Germany after the 1880's in many areas including literature.[51]

Positivistic influences were reflected in Hintze's article, in his references to Comte, Spencer, and Taine as important representatives of the social-psychological approach, and empirical influences may be seen in Hintze's remark that in Germany, "the idealistic one-sidedness of the earlier period is now being corrected by a more specialized empirical research into politics and economic life."[52] Hintze, no doubt, was referring to the attempts of Schmoller and others to establish historical economics and the social sciences on a more empirical basis.

If Hintze's article documented the shift from ideal-

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[50]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 16.

[51]On this topic, consult Wilhelm Lutgert, Das Ende des Idealismus im Zeitalter Bismarcks (Gütersloh: Der Rufer Evangelischer Verlag, 1930). See also O. Westphal, Feinde Bismarcks, pp. 174-220.

[52]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," pp. 13-14.

istic to empirical historicism, the change from metaphysics to psychology, and a turn from the religious well-springs of history to more careful empirical description, it likewise mirrored another problem that confronted German historicism. This was the question of political versus cultural history -- the issue whether the state or society was paramount. The Lamprecht controversy disclosed a cleavage between the adherents of political and cultural history, but the beginnings of the split actually antedated the controversy. In 1888, a few years before the outbreak of the issue, Dietrich Schafer published a brochure which was a defense of political history. He asserted that the task of the historian should be restricted to the investigation of political power. The whole realm of culture was excluded as being outside the historian's province.[53]

The reply to Schafer was made by Eberhard Gothein, who had done important work in cultural history. His argument was that the historian cannot limit himself to political history, but must in fact concern himself with all phases of a people's civilization -- art, law, economics, and religion -- in short, with the totality of culture.[54]

During the Lamprecht controversy, the exchanges between the followers of political and cultural history became more pointed. The heat which was generated on this

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[53]Dietrich Schafer, Das eigentliche Arbeitsgebiet des Geschichte (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1888), pp. 1-25.

[54]Eberhard Gothein, Die Aufgabe der Kulturgeschichte (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1889), pp. 2-3.

matter was not merely the expression of a narrow methodological issue, but reflected a larger problem. German historicism had grown up in the nineteenth century during a period when national political values were regarded as basic. Such values were oriented about the state. The problem of national ethics in Germany was, hence, one of achieving a political power status, commensurate with Germany's size, population, and historical importance. German historiography up to the time of Bismarck was preoccupied with this political problem and its solution. But when that political unity had been attained, the social question after 1870, began to loom as the main issue. The problems of the social order threatened to overshadow those of the state.

There were three paths that German historiography could choose in taking a stand on this problem. It could argue that the political power problem of the state was still fundamental, and therefore, that political history represented the most appropriate type of history. A majority of Ranke's followers, advocating an individualistic approach to history, adhered to this position in the Lamprecht controversy. An opposite stand was taken by Lamprecht. Approaching the problem, Lamprecht argued that the new social, economic, and legal questions of the Bismarckian empire demanded a new kind of history -- a cultural history with emphasis on social forces rather than individual ones. An intermediate third position was adopted by historians such as Hintze, who represented an outlook similar to that of Schmoller. These men denied that a polarity

existed between political and cultural history, between the state and society. State and society, for them, were part of a single interrelated process of universal history. Hintze and Schmoller were emphatic in stressing that no real opposition existed between state and society.

German historicism, by the close of the nineteenth century was consequently confronted with a series of problems, that augured the onset of a crisis of historicism. Nineteenth-century German historicism had been brought up on a heritage of metaphysical idealism which was threatened by psychology, empiricism, and positivism and presented the questions: how could and would it adjust to these new currents? German historicism was raised on religious foundations, but found itself secularized beyond all expectations. How would it react to this secular transformation? German historicism had been developed under the imperative of creating a national ethic which could provide the basis of political power, but it was faced by social problems which it was not trained to handle, except for Schmoller's historical school. What ought its attitude to be on the pressing problem of state and society?

Finally, German historicism had arisen as a reaction to the generalizing approach of the Enlightenment, which sought uniform and rational explanations for historical events. Instead, German historicism stressed the ideas of individuality and dynamic development. It believed in the singularity of both events and processes. Lamprecht's historical theory at the end of the century was a great chal-

lenge to this approach. It was a challenge because it tried to combine the idea of development with the idea of law. Instead of the German historicist formula -- history equals individuality plus development -- Lamprecht's formula stated that history equalled development plus law. If Lamprecht's formula were true, then the historicist's notion about the uniqueness of events was false. To make matters worse, within the historicists' fold proper, there had arisen differences between the followers of an individualistic approach and the adherents of the historical school, such as Schmoller, who emphasized collective institutional arrangements. As German historicism turned the century, these problems all confronted it. German historical thought during the twentieth century was to find itself involved in a genuine crisis of historicism.

CHAPTER VII

TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF HISTORY: BEGINNINGS

In the important Lamprecht controversy, Hintze maintained that the basic issue was the methodological question regarding the status of laws in history. If history exhibited a typical and recurrent course of development, it was subject to law. If, on the other hand, historical development was essentially singular in character, then there were no laws in history. The followers of the individualistic approach to history denied that there were historical laws. Adherents of a collectivistic approach to history, such as Lamprecht, asserted the existence of social-psychological historical laws. The division between these two schools of historical thought, during the Lamprecht controversy, seemed sharply drawn.

The methodological problem of the singular and the general in history -- the individual and the collective -- came to a head at the close of the nineteenth century. It did so in terms of such significant developments in German historical thought, as the Lamprecht controversy, the Windelband-Rickert writings on the distinction between the natural and historical sciences, and the emergence of a typological approach to history. All three developments were attempts

to answer the question regarding the status of laws in history. They, consequently, reflected the onset of a crisis in German historicism.

In the previous chapter, Hintze's role in the Lamprecht controversy was expounded and analyzed. Hintze participated in the Windelband-Rickert discussions. He also played a significant role in the development of a typological approach to history. The purpose of this and the following chapter is to trace the emergence in Hintze's writings of a typology of historical development, to show how this approach became increasingly self-conscious and articulate and to relate Hintze's typological approach to larger questions within German historicism.

The problem regarding the role of types and the typical is an old one. The Greeks were already concerned with this question. An outstanding characteristic of the Greek mind and outlook was that it did not restrict itself to the individual but sought constantly to proceed to the typical. For the Greeks, this was equivalent to a renunciation of accidental individual characteristics in any situation, in favor of the common and generally valid elements. As Boll says, "Both Greek art and the Greek Weltanschauung strove after those generally valid principles which were subject to law."[1] Aristotle, accordingly, regarded literature as being more philosophical than history, precisely because it did not concern itself with individual

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[1]Franz Boll, Vita Contemplativa (2nd ed.; Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitatsbuchhandlung, 1922), p. 4.

particulars, but that it sought to disclose the more universal actions of men and women. Plato's and Aristotle's attempts to formulate the main types of states also illustrate this inclination of the Greeks to search for the typical.[2]

If a preoccupation with the typical in human affairs had a long and honorable history, which went back to the Greeks, it is only since the end of the nineteenth century that this problem has received systematic and methodological examination. The rise of typologies and a typological approach to history grew out of a special situation which had arisen in German historicism.

The rise of historicism, which centered in nineteenth-century Germany, was a reaction against the climate of opinion of the Enlightenment, which had stressed uniform and rational principles. Instead, historicism substituted an individualized conception for a generalized conception of historical forces. By not searching basically after general laws and the typical, historicism emphasized the ideas of unique individuality and dynamic development. Nineteenth-century historicism did not, therefore, stress natural rights, pragmatism, or rationalism. It sought rather to disclose a new world of dynamically developing individual expressions.[3]

This idea of the individuality of historical events, their singularity, became a credo of nineteenth-century German historicism; and, indeed, so firmly was this notion

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[2]Boll, Vita Contemplativa, p. 4.

[3]See above, pp. 36-40.

entrenched in German historical thinking that even today it still is regarded as a maxim.

> To this day, there is rooted in the consciousness of German historical study, the idea that the proper object of historical knowledge is the presentation of the individual, the singular, or as Ranke put it, the particular. In his great work on the origins of historicism, which appeared in 1936, Friedrich Meinecke conceived the 'essence of historicism' as lying precisely 'in the substituting for a generalized contemplation of historical human forces, an individualising approach.' 'Individuum est ineffabile' -- this phrase of Goethe to Lavater, stands programmatically at the beginning of the book, and Meinecke reiterated it many times in other places. There is no doubt, that the deep truth contained in this phrase strikes us even today, and in its literal meaning, seems to exclude any tendency to go beyond the apprehension of historical individuality; to generalize to a genus, and intensify to a type.[4]

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a variety of factors contributed to challenge this postulate of historicism regarding the individuality of historical events. These included the influx of positivistic currents such as those of Mill, Comte, and Lamprecht, the spread of socialism and Marxism, and the general emphasis on social-psychological forces in the social and cultural sciences. The result was that the whole relation of the individual to the general now was rendered problematic.

As we have seen, the Lamprecht controversy was one response to this problem. Another was the Windelband-Rickert writings. Wilhelm Windelband, a professor of philosophy at Strassbourg, began the discussion, and his approach was continued and developed by Heinrich Rickert. Their

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[4]Theodor Schieder, "Der Typus in der Geschichtswissenschaft," Studium Generale, V (1952), p. 228.

point of departure involved the distinction between the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) and the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften). They were also concerned with the relation between history and a general theory of values.

Wilhelm Windelband, important both as a historian and systematic philosopher, was influenced by Kuno Fischer and Hermann Lotze as well as the whole movement of Kantian criticism.[5] Though Windelband regarded himself as a follower of Kant, his view was that a genuine understanding of the philosopher meant going a bit beyond him. He saw a deficiency in Kant's approach, in that the latter's epistemology was restricted to the mathematical, natural sciences with a consequent neglect of history.[6] Windelband's interpretation of the relation between history and the natural sciences was expressed in a famous rector's address delivered at Strassbourg in 1894.[7]

In this address, Windelband distinguished between the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). The task of the natural

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[5]On Windelband, consult the article "Wilhelm Windelband," in Werner Ziegenfuss and Gertrude Jung, Philosophen Lexikon (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Col, 1950), II, 892-895. See also Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Windelband (2nd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1929) and E. Lass, "Wilhelm Windelband," Vierteljahrsschrift für Philosophie, VIII (1884), 1-17.

[6]Ziegenfuss and Jung, "Wilhelm Windelband," p. 892.

[7]Wilhelm Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," Präludien, Aufsätze und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte (9th ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924),

sciences is to establish, collect, and exhibit facts in such a way that they are subsumed under general laws. The aim of the natural sciences is thus to establish laws. The cultural sciences, on the other hand, are not concerned with laws, but aim at the description and understanding of individual happenings -- unique events. These unique happenings may include the life of an individual man, or a whole nation, or the development of a language or religion. In each case, what the cultural sciences attempt is a description of singular and unique events.[8]

Windelband, thus, argued that the object of natural science is general laws, while the object of cultural science is specific historical facts. The former is a science of laws; the latter, a science of events. Here, asserted Windelband, was a genuine methodological basis for distinguishing the natural from the cultural sciences. "The principle of division is based upon the formal character of their objects of knowledge." Windelband, moreover, designated that type of ascientific thinking concerned with laws as nomothetic (nomothetisch), while scientific thinking directed at individual unique events was labeled idiographic (idiographisch).

Windelband insisted that the natural sciences always had laws as their goal, but the goal of the cultural

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II, 136-160. To be noted Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," hereafter.

[8]Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," 143.

[9]Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," 145.

sciences was individual forms (Gestalten). In the natural sciences, thinking proceeds from the establishment of the particular to the comprehension of general relations. In the cultural sciences, there is no progression beyond the particular. The natural scientist is interested in individual events only as manifestations of types as special instances subsumed under classificatory concepts. On the other hand, the historian is always confronted with the task of reexperiencing a situation in the past in terms of its wholly individual distinctiveness. It follows, therefore, that natural scientific thought leads more and more to abstractions, while historical thought inclines more toward experience (Anschaulichkeit).[10] Finally, on the question, as to which of these two approaches was more valuable, Windelband took his stand with the cultural sciences, because they led to the development and fulfillment of values.[11]

The fundamental position advocated by Windelband was effectively stated in his 1894 address. It was expanded by Windelband's successor at Heidelberg, Heinrich Rickert, in a further series of writings.[12] But the basic stand taken

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[10]Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," 149-150.

[11]Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," 155-160.

[12]Heinrich Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (1st ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1896). Consult the various editions of this work. See also Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1899); Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1905); Die heidelberger Tradition in der deutschen Philosophie (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1931).

by Windelband was continued by Rickert, whose intent was to bolster Windelband's position by all sorts of refined and elaborate arguments.

The Windelband-Rickert approach was of considerable importance in German historical thought at the turn of the century. Its genuine influence undoubtedly was due to the fact that it represented a theoretical justification of the position actually endorsed by a majority of the advocates of nineteenth-century German historicism. The notions of individuality and unique development, subscribed to by historicists such as Ranke and Droysen, did indeed separate the historical sciences form the natural sciences with regard to methodology. What Windelband was thus doing was not discovering anything new, but he was simply making theoretically explicit a dichotomy between the historical and natural sciences, which was already assumed by many practicing historians.[13]

Now that we have seen how both the Lamprecht controversy and the Windelband-Rickert writings grew partly out of a preoccupation with the question concerning historical laws, it is necessary to turn to a third manifestation of an interest in this problem -- the emergence of typological approaches. Whereas German historicism during most of the nineteenth century was not especially concerned with this question of types and typologies, the situation

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[13]For a present-day critique of the Windelband-Rickert position by an American scholar, see Ernst Nagel, "Some Issues in the Logic of Historical Analysis," Scientific Monthly, LXXIV (1952), 162-169.

changed during the last quarter of that century. The problem of types now appeared as an important issue in the cultural sciences. Typologies were developed in such diverse fields as economics, politics, ethics, esthetics, religion, psychology, and history.[14] In economics, Schmoller dealt with the relationship between types and scientific laws.[15] In politics, Roscher worked out a typological sequence of political forms.[16] Dilthey dealt with the problem of types in the realm of the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften).[17] In history, Lamprecht developed a typology of German national development.[18] These examples could be multiplied. The growing acceptance of typologies within the social sciences in Germany may also be discerned, by observing that Georg Jellinek's Allgemeine Staatslehre, which appeared in its first edition in 1900, and was quickly destined to become the standard work in its field, devoted considerable attention to the problem of types in the social sciences.[19]

These typologies, which arose at the close of the century, differed greatly in their nature, function, valid-

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[14]E. Spranger, Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 94.

[15]G. Schmoller, Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, I, 103-106.

[16]Roscher, Politik, passim.

[17]W. Dilthey, "Über vergleichende Psychologie, Beiträge zum Studium der Individualität," in Die Geistige Welt, Part I, pp. 240-316.

[18]K. Lamprecht, "Was ist Kulturgeschichte?" pp. 126-129.

[19]Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1st ed.; Berlin: Otto Häring), pp. 23-48.

ity, and fruitfulness for the social and cultural sciences. But the fact that a typological approach was currently employed in so many of these disciplines, indicates an unmistakable trend toward the use of typological constructs in the cultural sciences. The task of clarifying the total range and significant material of these typologies is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, we shall approach the problem through Hintze, who did important work in developing his own typology of historical development.

In order to trace the emergence of a typological approach in Hintze's writings, it is once again essential to bear in mind the three strands of nineteenth-century historicism which helped shape his conception of history -- Droysen, Ranke, and Schmoller. Each of these played a share in leading Hintze to a typological approach to history.

In the chapter on Droysen, we traced Hintze's interpretation of Droysen as a representative of nineteenth-century German historicism and the influence that Droysen exercised on Hintze.[20] Although Droysen, as a historical scholar, emphasized the ideas of individuality and dynamic development, he gave certain indications in his leading works on the principles of historical method, that suggested a typological approach. As a historicist, Droysen made a distinction between the realm of nature and the realm of history.[21] He distinguished the regularity of law in nature

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[20] See above, pp. 41-81.

[21] Droysen, Historik, pp. 11-17; 325-328.

from the sphere of individuality in history. He declared that the "method of historical investigation is determined by the morphological character of its material"[22] The realm of history thus discloses certain forms which are peculiarly historical. The task of the historian consists in the understanding of these distinctive historical forms by means of investigation. Droysen devoted much attention to the topic of historical investigation in relation to these forms.[23] He distinguished natural, ideal, and practical forms of association (Gemeinsamkeiten). Examples of natural forms of association were the family tribe, and people (Volk).[24] Ideal forms of association were disclosed in the languages, arts, sciences, and religions. Finally, examples of practical forms of association included society, welfare, law and justice (Recht), and power.[25] Now, what is significant about all this, is the emphasis which Droysen placed on the motion that there are distinctive morphological forms in history and his insistence that the historian ought to study these forms or Gestalts. They were also different from isolated discrete historical events in that they possessed a structure and pattern of organization. Besides, these forms were never found in the realm of nature but were distinctively his-

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[22]Droysen, Historik, pp. 325-328.

[23]Droysen, Historik, pp. 202-258; 348-352.

[24]Droysen, Historik, pp. 202-214; 349-350.

[25]Droysen, Historik, pp. 241-265; 350-353.

torical. Droysen not only was interested in describing the individualised expression of these historical forms as they actually occurred in history, but in his treatises on historical methodology, he concerned himself systematically with the general nature and character of such historical forms. Although Droysen did not employ the term, type, his historical forms, in fact, resembled historical types. Droysen showed how these forms were always the product of larger and more universal situations, and he distinguished them from both the concepts of natural science and the isolated narrative events of history. The forms thus occupied an intermediate status. Hintze's approach to the problem of historical types resembled Droysen's view regarding historical forms. Certainly, when Hintze, later concerned himself greatly with the morphological forms of history and sought, for example, to discover the different historical forms that the modern state had assumed, he was but following a lead already suggested strongly in Droysen's methodological writings.

Ranke's influence in leading Hintze to a typological consideration of historical development was an even more important one. We have described some aspects of it in Chapter V.[26] Two distinct Rankean influences on Hintze were indicated. One was the emphasis on source criticism and a critical-philological approach which reached Hintze via Weizsacker and resulted in Hintze's doctoral disserta-

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[26]See above, pp. 135-137.

tion, which was quickly expanded into a book on the kingdom of William of Holland. From the standpoint of exhibiting evidences of a typological historical approach, this early work by Hintze was disappointing; there were no genuine indications of a typological approach in it. Instead, the book was written in the careful orthodox fashion of a historical monograph, with the full scholarship of the critical-historical school. It emphasized a critical narration and exposition of the particular political situation during the period of King William's reign. It thus was based primarily on a narration of individual events, with the accent placed on the particularity of each historical situation. Nevertheless, Hintze did detect the emergence of a federative system in King William's policy after 1255, and he regarded this as an example of a policy that was to be tried many times after in German history.[27]

The second influence coming to Hintze from Ranke -- the concept of universal history and the emphasis on the primacy of foreign policy--- was of considerable importance in shaping Hintze's notions regarding historical types. Hintze's first theoretical formulation of his position, on this score, took place in 1897 in two articles, which we have already discussed -- on Roscher's concept of political development, and on the individualistic and collectivistic conceptions of history.[28] It will be necessary

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[27]See above, p. 109.

[28]See above, pp. 120-131; 184-212.

to repeat some of the material, which was previously described, in order to focus it specifically on the problem of Hintze's typological approach.[29]

Hintze's critique of both Roscher and Lamprecht was similar. In both instances he attacked their typological approach to historical development by supporting Ranke's notion of universal history. In his book on politics, Roscher had worked out a type sequence of state forms, which he believed was repeated in the "lives" of different nations. In his work on German history, Lamprecht had evolved a typological sequence of development for the German nation, which he also believed was similar for other nations. Now, it is true that Roscher's types and Lamprecht's were in one sense different. Roscher believed that all nations ordinarily went through a natural cycle of political development, extending from the type of primitive kingdom, to aristocracy, absolute monarchy, plutocracy through Caesarism. Lamprecht believed that Germany and other nations went through the following typical stages -- symbolism, typism, conventionalism, individualism, and subjectivism. The specific types utilized in both cases were different.[30]

The important thing to bear in mind, however, is not the differences between these types employed by Roscher and Lamprecht, but the similarity in their approaches. In both instances, there was a belief that historical types

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[29]See above, pp. 120-131; 184-212.

[30]See above, pp. 198-200.

could be discovered. Both Roscher and Lamprecht believed that these types were applicable to the lives of nations. Both argued that nations went through a series of regular typical developments. Both men, therefore, thought that they had discovered a regular recurrent typical sequence of historical development -- in short, historical laws. Roscher's "Caesarism" was a type of political manifestation that was not limited to a particular phase of Roman development, but was repeated regularly at certain stages in the lives of all nations. Lamprecht's "typism" was equally not limited to a particular aspect of German national development, but it could be found in its corresponding stage in other nations. In other words, these types utilized by Roscher and Lamprecht were recurrent types, subject to the laws of the historical development of nations.

We have seen how Hintze denied that there were any such recurrent types, which exhibited a regular law of historical development.[31] He did so, on the basis of Ranke; the burden of Hintze's argument being that Ranke had shown that nations do not exhibit an organic, logical, or historical unfolding of necessary typical stages which are recurrent. Instead, the affairs and policies of states are constantly being transformed and modified as a result of new universal historical changes and developments. The clue to the understanding of a state is, therefore, its foreign affairs, which constantly discloses the impact of

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[31]See above, pp. 199-201.

these outside forces on that state. A new constellation of outside historical forces can at any time in history bring about a different formation of states. States, for Hintze and Ranke, "are not a natural endowment but a world-historical achievement."[32] And Hintze concluded his article on the Lamprecht controversy with this telling sentence: "Because of this intercrossing and interweaving of national and universal development, it is impossible in my estimation to establish world history as a comparative history of nations; instead world history is and remains a great singular process."[33]

If, however, world history is indeed a singular process, then this apparently left Hintze alonside Ranke, as a historicist, who accepted the individuality of events. Nevertheless, Hintze drew consequences from Ranke's approach to world history, which Ranke himself did not draw. In doing so, Hintze still regarded himself as following in Ranke's footsteps. Since this is a very important issue, we need to clarify it carefully.

In order to understand the problem involved, it is necessary to realize, that in the second half of the nineteenth century, three different positions regarding the nature of history were being defended in Germany. The first position was one advocated by the majority of practicing historians in Germany. They were historicists, who believed that history was a singular process, and that it was con-

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[32]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," pp. 18-19.

[33]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," pp. 18-19.

cerned with individual events. They denied that there were any laws to history. Droysen and Ranke were leading practicing advocates of this approach. The Windelband-Rickert position was the most sophisticated theoretical justification of this outlook. At the other extreme was the position advocated by Roscher and Lamprecht. They believed history exhibited laws of recurrent types of national development. They subsumed history under collective recurring types, which were based on a generality far beyond any individual events.

An intermediate third position was supported by men such as Hintze, and it was this very position which led Hintze to develop a historical typology. Hintze's position can be phrased as follows: Roscher and Lamprecht certainly are mistaken in thinking that there are historical laws of national development. Ranke's demonstration that world history is a singular process put the coup de grace to that notion. But does this thereby compel the historian to limit himself only to narrative isolated singular events? Not at all, argued Hintze. It is true that the historian has an obligation to narrate such events as, Caesar crossed the Rubicon. But in addition to narrating such individual events, the historian can also discover certain historical types in history. These types, though, are not recurrent national types, as Roscher and Lamprecht thought -- instead, they are distinctive historical types and, thus, exhibit a historical individuality.

The idea of historical types, that are at the same

time instances of individuality, sounds like a contradiction, but actually it is not. Hintze provided an example of such a type in his essay on Roscher. He showed that specific historical types can emerge as the result of particular universal-historical processes that develop in a particular time and place. He cited the ancient city-state as an example. The ancient city-state was an instance of a historical type which did not emerge everywhere. There were large parts of the world where it never emerged. Indeed, it was an individual type, that emerged around the coastal culture of the Mediterranean.[34] Thus, the city-state type was a peculiar type which developed around a particular geographic nexus at a particular time. It was the product of a special set of universal-historical circumstances restricted to the Mediterranean area. Within this area, the Phoenician, Greek, and Roman city-states were examples of this historical type, because they all shared in this nexus of relations that revolved around the Mediterranean Sea. The Chinese, involved in a different world-historical frame at this time, thus, did not share in the ancient Mediterranean city-state type of organization. Moreover, with the decline of the Roman Empire, the municipal organization that had centered about the Mediterranean Sea slowly disappeared. A new series of universal-historical forces, such as the barbarian migrations and Christianity helped to produce new constellations of forces

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[34]See above, p. 136.

which eventually gave way to new and equally unique constellations of forces. Hintze, thus, maintained that while world history as a whole is a vast singular process, in given areas, and at specified times, there arise historical types that are expressions of particular constellations of universal-historical situations.

It is important to note that historical types, such as the ancient city-state type, possess both a singular and a common character. A type such as the ancient city-state had a common character in the sense that it was a common type, of which the phoenician, Greek, and Roman city-states were specific examples. On the other hand, the ancient city-state type itself was a singular example of a historical type, in as far as it was the product of a unique constellation of forces around the Mediterranean Sea.

Hintze, thus, drew consequences from Ranke's concept of universal history which led him to develop a historical typology, something which Ranke never had attempted. In doing so, Hintze did not think of himself as repudiating Ranke's historicism. Rather, he thought he was fulfilling the implications inherent in Ranke's approach to the states system and universal history. We can study this conjunction of Ranke's approach and the formulation of a historical typology of the state system, and in Hintze's essay, on the formations of states and constitutional development, which he wrote in 1902.[35]

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[35]Hintze, "Staatenbildung und Verfassungsentwicklung. Ein historisch-politische Studie," Historische Zeit-

Hintze stated his purpose in writing this essay as follows:

> I have only the desire to present the form and manner in which a causal connection exists between certain types of state formation and certain constitutional forms. In conclusion I would emphatically point out, that I do not see in the formation of states, the sole cause for the Gestalt of constitutional forms. Instead it is only a general regulative principle, which is very significantly supported or modified by many other causal factors. These morphological thoughts of mine have only the most general contours in mind, within which, mocking its head at any formula, the motley and variegated life of historical reality unfolds.[36]

Hintze's reservations, with respect to the task at hand, are exceedingly important to bear in mind. He did not argue that constitutional forms were exclusively the results of the formations of states. Instead, he adopted a multi-causal approach. The constitutional forms of a state were caused by such factors as internal class and power struggles, social rivalries, national character, as well as external state factors.[37] Nevertheless, he did think the formation of states was a leading factor in shaping inner constitutional forms. It was a general regulative principle in the formation of constitutions. Moreover, Hintze suggested that his typological approach could only apprehend the most general contours of states and

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schrift, LXXXVIII (1902), 1-21. This is reprinted in Hintze, Staat und Verfassung, pp. 24-42. All further citations are taken from this latter work. Henceforth, this article will be cited as Hintze, "Staatenbildung."

[36]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 41.

[37]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," pp. 24-27.

constitutions -- their morphological structure. It could not reproduce the infinite and variegated individuality of historical reality in all of its detail.[38]

Hintze argued that the majority of historians were mainly interested in the foreign policy of states, while political theorists were largely preoccupied with the internal developments of states. The task though was to unite these two approaches, to show that internal constitutional forms were profoundly affected by the external factors of state formation. In this way the internal and external aspects of a state could be brought into dynamic relationship. Ranke, said Hintze, had with his fine political instincts, sensed this relationship without having systematically developed it. Hintze viewed this as his task.[39]

Hintze distinguished the internal from the external life of a state. By the external life of a state, he meant everything which was distinct from its internal social development, and which included anything that affected its "outward configuration, size, and form, firm or loose structure, also its ethnic composition." A little thought, said Hintze, will persuade us that inner constitutional forms of a state bear a close relationship to the general external structure of a state.

> It is not indifferent for the form of a constitution, whether we are dealing with the Roman city-state or the Roman Empire, whether we have before us a national unified state such as France or a compounded structure, made up of

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[38]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 41.

[39]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," pp. 24-25.

> various nationalities such as Austria, whether we are concerned with a medieval feudal state, or a territorial state of the sixteenth century, or a modern large state (Grossstaat).[40]

Hintze stated that the internal social development within a state comes only after the external formation of that state has taken place. The formation of the state thus constitutes the basis for "the life of the state and its constitutional form of government."[41]

Given these assumptions, Hintze, then proceeded to maintain that "definite types of formations of states were historically regularly associated with definite constitutional forms." Thus, all the world empires of ancient history, including those outside the European cultural frame, showed the characteristic constitutional form of oriental despotism. By a world empire Hintze meant "those state formations of antiquity and of the extra-European cultures, that have established a universal dominion (Herrschaft), within a spacial area, which at any given time is regarded as the known and inhabited world."[42] Despite some variations, the ancient and modern type of city-state possessed a similar internal republican constitutional form. The territorial state in France and Germany, as a historical type, had a constitution based on estates (standische Verfassung). Another type, which Hintze labelled the composite territorial state, was associated with an absolutistic constitution. Finally, the thoroughly developed unified national state type of nineteenth-century Europe was associated with

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[40]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 25.

[41]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 25.

[42]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 25.

a representative constitution.[43]

Hintze entered into a closer examination of these historical types of states and their constitutional counterparts. He argued that the ancient city-state type of state was generally associated with a tendency toward a republican type of constitution. The reason for this was that the organization based upon communal fellowship (genossenschaftliches Organisationsprinzip) was preponderant over that founded upon domination (herrschaftlich). Therefore, in the full development of the ancient city-state, monarchical power always was regarded as an abnormal and passing stage by the citizen body.[44]

Hintze regarded the whole constitutional development of antiquity as "moving between the extremes of the city-state and world empire types." The world empires of antiquity and the extra-European world produced despotic constitutions. Hintze observed that "so far as historical experience extends, we find freer constitutions appearing only where a majority of states exist in close proximity and enjoy equal rights with mutual acknowledgment of their separate independence."[45] There has been only one "great" manifestation of such a series of states, standing side-by-side in that kind of relationship -- the Western state system. Hintze regarded the Greek city-states and the Italian states of the Cinquencento as possessing a similar balance of power system, but both functioned with "a relatively narrow national framework." As examples of the world-

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[43]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 25.

[44]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 25.

[45]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 28.

empire type, which lacked any such notion of a balance of power state dynamics, Hintze cited the Egyptian, Assyrian-Babylonian, Persian, Alexandrian, Roman (after Augustus), Inca, Aztec, Turkish, and Chinese empires.[46]

All these empires developed the characteristic constitutional form of oriental despotism. Hintze regarded its essential feature to be the union of mundane and spiritual power united in a single person -- the head of the state. The Egyptian pharaoh was viewed as a god on earth. The emperor of China was regarded as the son of heaven. The Persian emperor was a theocratic despot who finally enjoyed god-like honors. Alexander and the Roman emperors continued this practice. In the late Roman Empire, after the introduction of Christianity as the state religion, a distinctive type of Caesaropapism developed in place of the previous practice of the divine worship of the emperor. These Caesaropapistic aspects were continued in the Byzantine and Russian Czarist empires. Hintze thus saw the two ideas of world empire and theocratic despotism as standing in the closest relationship to each other.

Hintze regarded this imperial state form as the legacy which antiquity bequeathed to the Romano-Germanic peoples. The universal imperial idea continued its function in two ways. It affected the Germanic formation of states and, above all, it had an influence on the organization of the Roman Church. But a split occurred between the

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[46]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 30.

secular and spiritual authority, which Hintze regarded as being of decisive consequence. In place of Caesaropapism, which united church and state, a dualism of state and church occurred. This separation of imperium and sacercotium was due mainly to the moral political power acquired by the Roman Church after the fall of the Roman Empire. The Merovingians had still retained the Caesaropapistic idea, but under the Carolingians, that idea could no longer be asserted. As usurpers, the Caroligians lacked that godly consecration which had been assigned to the Merovingians. Therefore, they sought a substitute by attaching themselves to the Church. This enhanced the prestige of the religion, which progressively expanded its power, while the secular states deteriorated rapidly after the second half of the nineth centuries. The result was that the Church gradually emancipated itself from the power of the state, and for hundreds of years, it appeared as the true representative of the Western imperial idea.[47]

The middle ages, said Hintze, were characterized by this dualism and split between empire and papacy. But this division was of untold significance, because it made possible the emergence of a western European state system. Neither of the two powers -- the papacy or empire was able, in practice, to realize its ideas regarding a universal Christian empire. Each power steadily hindered the other. Therefore, between the emperor and the papacy there slowly emerged a third force -- a group of coordinated independent states.

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[47]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," pp. 31-32.

Hintze, consequently, agreed completely with Jellinek that the idea of sovereignty, as it functioned in France up to the sixteenth century, was dependent on the separation of empire and papacy.[48]

The distinctive Western state system which slowly emerged as an intermediate force between the two other powers of empire and papacy, had left a unique stamp on the political map of Europe. Hintze viewed the formation of the balance of power system, which consisted of a dynamic group of European states, as one of the great singular processes of world history. He regarded the European state system as alternately shifting from a balance of power situation to one of temporary hegemonies of one or another powers. These hegemonies, however, were always temporary and continual rivalries between the states restored the balance once again.[49]

Hintze saw two sorts of conflicts going on in Europe during late medieval times. One was this conflict among the newly evolving states. The other was the struggle between the church and state. Hintze found traces of this latter conflict among the institutions of the imperial states. In Germany the powers of the princes was strengthened as a result of the struggle between the states' regents and papacy. In England, King John's defeat at Bouvines at the hands of the French papal party led to a situation which brought forth the Magna Charta. In France, the political signifi-

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[48]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 32.

[49]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 32.

cance of the estates generally dates from the role it exercised in 1302 in the struggle between Philip the Fair and Boniface. Moreover, Hintze also saw societal forces emerging in the late middle ages as a result of the struggle between Church and state. Following the lead of Gierke, Hintze regarded it as extremely significant that medieval canonists began to evolve a doctrine of juristic corporations.[50] This indicated, said Hintze, that state and society were now separated, whereas in antiquity they had been undifferentiated. The blossoming of a variety of social groupings in the form of guilds, corporations, city, and knightly leagues were further indications of the emergence of independent social forces in the middle ages. On the other hand, Hintze regarded all constitutions which rested either on the idea of estates or the principle of representation, as attempting to unite once again the separated elements of state and society.[51]

Hintze saw three factors which were present during the middle ages as significant prerequisites for the development of constitutions based on the idea either of estates or representation (ständische und reprasentative Verfassungen). They were the dualism between the secular and spiritual authorities, the development of a group of rival states, and the formation of feudalism.[52] By the tenth

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[50]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 33.

[51]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 33.

[52]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 33.

and eleventh centuries, France had begun to establish a territorial type of state with a constitution based on estates. In Germany, a similar process occurred during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Formations of states of an intensive sort now took place, supported by capable administrations. Although these territorial states retained in many places remnants of the feudal system, they overcame the feudal-political organization. They brought forth the beginnings of a permanent bureaucratic constitution (Amtsverfassung).[53]

The typical formation of the territorial type of state was characterized by the presence of a distinctive internal constitution based on associations of privileges to certain groups or estates. The French provincial estates in their origins were the same as the German provincial diets (Landtage). Hintze did not think that the attempt to find precedents for these estates among feudal institutions was too illuminating. In Germany, the ministeriales played the leading role, not the vassals. Accepting the views of Bulow, Hintze argued that the constitutions based on estates were a spontaneous accompaniement of the formation of territorial states. In Hintze's estimation, the dualism revealed in states organized under such constitutions expressed itself in the theoretical and practical contrast of prince and territory. This dualism was peculiarly conditioned by the manner in which these territorial states were formed. It was above all the patrimonial conception of the princely rights of dominion, which drove the territory (Land) to set itself up as a second

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[53]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 36.

kind of authority alongside the princes. There was lacking, said Hintze, the concept of true public power, and this lack was due to the fact that the territorial princes still regarded themselves as subordinate members of a higher state organization embodied in emperor and empire. These territorial states thus lacked the characteristic of sovereignty and as soon as they acquired such sovereignty, they proceeded to overcome the dualism present in a constitution based upon estates.[54]

Hintze regarded the composite territorial absolutistic type of state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the product of the attempt by the princes to repress the power of the estates. The reverse process, where the estates gained in power and thrust off the monarch, occurred in Europe among the United Netherlands, and in the American Colonies as a result of the Revolutionary War. In both cases it led to an incomplete type of unification, which resulted in a federative type of state.[55]

Unlike these federative states, the absolutistic continental states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, no longer were interested in conserving the old constitutions, were determined to forge unified states. In France, this process had taken place sharply since the time of Richelieu. In Prussia it was the Great Elector who chartered this development. Hintze, thus, saw the roots of absolutism as lying in the attempts of the monarchical state power to fuse its constituent parts into a unified

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[54]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," pp. 36-37.

[55]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," pp. 36-37.

military, administrative, and financial totality. Hintze regarded the historical necessity for such larger absolutistic forms of states as resting in the very condition of The European state system. France was forced to pursue such a course as a result of its rivalry with the Habsburgs. Other European states followed suit as matters of self-preservation. The military political power state, constantly prepared for warfare, could only be established on the basis of a unified, governmental and administrative power state. Hintze, therefore, regarded the "system of militarism with all of its political consequences, as proceeding out of the rival struggles of the continental states since the end of the middle ages."[56] England, however, with its relatively insulated and secure geographic position and widespread maritime, commercial interests, was able to avoid the full impact of this absolutism, and it developed a different constitutional form.

Hintze traced the transformation of the European absolutistic type of state to a full-fledged national unified state in the nineteenth century, with a representative constitution. The world-historical significance of the absolutistic state, for Hintze, was its contribution to the formation of larger and more unified states. But forces were released during the development of European absolutism that led to new situations. Hintze argued that absolutism really had not totally eliminated the layer of the intermediate estates; it had only repressed them. This was evident in

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[56]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 38.

the fact that the absolute states sought to make use of the estates order of society in their governments by making the nobility assume a legal-social status, rather than the old political one. The main shift in the development of the absolutistic state, however, occurred on another level.

The idea of a general citizenship accompanied by the franchise became prevalent. A latent "state and national consciousness came forward."[57] These developments, together with the growth of a propertied and educated bourgeoisie, contributed toward the formation of both highly unified nation states and representative constitutions. However, Hintze did not believe that the bourgeoisie alone were responsible for the creation of a representative constitution. There had existed a powerful middle class in the continental European states long before the idea of a representative constitution was conceived. Moreover, the "English representative constitution in the classical period of parliamentarism, did not rest upon a commercial or industrial class, but on an agrarian aristocracy."[58] Hintze, thus, insisted that centralized state politics played a larger role in the formation of the unified state type than did the internal economic and social development of the middle class. Mercantilism was an example.[59]

Hintze's study on the formations of states and constitutional development was nothing less than an attempt.

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[57]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," pp. 39-40.

[58]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 40.

[59]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," pp. 39-40.

to sketch the broad framework of a historical typology of states, which rested on a Rankean concept of universal-historical development. Ranke, thus, provided Hintze with the general frame in which to develop a typology of the state system.

CHAPTER VIII

TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF HISTORY: METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

In the last chapter we examined the role which Droysen and especially Ranke played in leading Hintze to the formation of a historical typology. Another set of factors, which stemmed from Schmoller, Dilthey, Jellinek, and Weber, exercised an important influence on Hintze's historical typology. We shall now investigate this problem.

From the evidence already cited, there can be no doubt that Hintze's interpretation of Ranke's concept of universal history and the state system was one factor which led Hintze in the direction of a historical typology. The interesting question that arises, however, is this -- was Ranke's influence alone sufficient to have led Hintze to formulate a historical typology of states? In other words, if Hintze had been exclusively a devoted follower of Ranke, would he have developed such a typology of history? A definitive answer to this question is impossible, but certain aspects of it require analysis.

For one thing, we know that there were many historians who were devoted followers of Ranke, and yet, who never developed a historical typology of the state system. The vast majority of the Ranke school, indeed, made no use

of typologies. Roscher, who had studied under Ranke, it is true, developed a typological approach to political development. But Roscher was not strictly speaking a professional historian, and moreover, his typology was totally opposed to the basic outlook of Ranke. With the exception of Hintze, virtually all the German historians who were influenced by Ranke refused to develop any typology of history. The reason was (as the previously cited quotation of Schieder indicates) that most German historians insisted "the proper object of historical knowledge is the presentation of the individual, the singular, or as Ranke put it, the particular."[1] Any sort of typology seemed to them to be on too high a level of abstraction; hence, too far removed from the study of concrete particulars. These historians, therefore, refused to make any conscious or articulate use of historical typologies in their writings. Hintze was one of the leading exceptions. It seems quite unlikely to believe, therefore, that Hintze would have evolved such a conscious historical typology, if Ranke had been the "only" significant influence on Hintze.

The evidence seems rather to point in the following direction. We know that Hintze systematically studied the various currents in the social, political, and cultural sciences. He, thus, had ample opportunity to become acquainted with the significance and scope of typologies, which were developed in various fields of the cultural and social sci-

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[1]Schieder, "Der Typus in der Geschichtswissenschaft," p. 228.

ences during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As a result of these studies, Hintze came to apply the notion of types to historical questions, especially Ranke's concept of universal history and the functioning of the state system.

It is worth emphasizing once again that Hintze was by no means alone in applying the idea of types to history. But very few such attempts came from the professional "craft" historians. Most of the attempts were made by followers of other cultural sciences, who under the sway of the broad currents of German historicism, were exhibiting a live interest in historical problems. Philosophers such as Dilthey, economists of the stature of Roscher and Schmoller, gifted political scientists such as Jellinek, sociologists with historical interests such as Max Weber -- these were leading examples of men trying to apply typological notions in the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) in efforts to understand or explain historical development. The result was that a historian, such as Hintze, who became interested in the problems of types, could expect very few fellow historians to exhibit any real methodological concern with this problem. With the exception of Ranke and Droysen, who provided Hintze with an implicit general framework for the application of a typology, Hintze found his methodological support for a historical typology coming from such "outsiders" as Schmoller, Dilthey, Jellinek, and Weber, all of whom were interested in studying the problems of historicism.

We shall begin by examining Schmoller's impact on Hintze with respect to the problem of types. In 1882, Hintze

published his study on the Kingdom of William of Holland. That study, as we have seen, disclosed no use of typological constructs or any interest in typologies.[2] Seven years later, in 1892, Schmoller and Hintze published two volumes of documents, and Hintze wrote an account of the Prussian silk industry. The latter study was in part an application of the problem of types. Between these two dates, there occurred two very important developments in Hintze's career. Under the stimulus of Waitz, Hintze had pursued a systematic analysis of political and constitutional problems. Secondly, as a result of Schmoller's influence, Hintze took a lively interest in the social sciences.[3] This interest was concretely exemplified in the studies and documents which Schmoller and Hintze edited and wrote for the Acta Borussica in the field of economic and administrative institutional history.

In Chapter V, which dealt with Schmoller, we saw how Hintze viewed Schmoller's study of the Strassburg weaving and cloth industry as a type example of a medieval city's economic and industrial politics.[4] Hintze, therefore, regarded Schmoller as utilizing this institutional study, not as an example of local history, having only individualized significance, but as illuminating a typical phenomenon. In Chapter V, Schmoller's report on the Prussian silk industry was discussed, and it was shown that he considered the Acta silk industry volumes as having a historiographical in-

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[2]See above, pp. 108-110.

[3]See above, p. 12.

[4]See above, pp. 156-157.

tent similar to that of his earlier Strassburg study.[5] Both studies were institutional in character. They both related the institutional development of their respective industries to wider historical forces. Finally, both studies were comparative studies, designed to show how their respective industries were typical of two different stages of economic politics -- the medieval urban and the mercantilistic. Indeed, both Schmoller and Hintze conceived the Prussian silk industry study not only as a description and analysis of a single industry, but also as exhibiting a type of response to a larger European economic political phenomenon -- mercantilism.

Schmoller's influence in directing Hintze's attention to the importance of types extended to two interrelated levels -- the practical and the theoretical. On the practical side, it resulted in the brilliant studies, which Hintze published in the Acta Borussica. On the theoretical level, Hintze was well aware of Schmoller's theoretical reflections on the subject of methodology. We have previously shown how Hintze regarded Schmoller as a precursor of interpretative sociology, a discipline which made extensive use of historical types.[6] Hintze contended that Schmoller set up a distinction between the ideas of Begriff or concept, and Anschauung or experience. Schmoller's opponents, who objected to his historicism, were considered by Hintze as

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[5]See above, pp. 172-173.

[6]See above, pp. 162-164.

employing a set of theoretical concepts (Begriffen) similar to those utilized in the natural sciences and jurisprudence. Hintze considered Schmoller's typology, on the other hand, as excluding such "formal" theoretical constructs. Instead, it sought to arrive at empirical abstractions (Anschauliche Abstraktionen).

The theoretical framework with which Schmoller operated will illuminate both his role within German historicism and the problem of a typology of history.[7]

Schmoller was not only the leader of the younger historical school of economics, but he was one of the significant representatives of nineteenth-century historicism. His role in this regard was clarified during the great Methodenstreit or methodological struggle which occurred between Schmoller and Menger during the 1880's.[8] Schmoller replied to Menger's attack in an article devoted to a criticism of Menger's position.[9] Menger's purpose, said Schmoller,

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[7]The study by Gerhard Ritzel, Schmoller versus Menger, eine Analyse des Methodenstreits im Hinblick auf den Historismus in der Nationalöekonomie, doctoral dissertation (Frankfurt am Main, 1950), emphasizes Schmoller's role within German historicism. Bernhard Pfister in his study, Die Entwicklung zum ideal Typus, eine methodologische Untersuchung über das Verhaltnis von Theorie und Geschichte bei Menger, Schmoller und Max Weber (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1928) places the emphasis on Schmoller as a transitional figure in the development of Weber's ideal type. See also F. Lifschitz, Die historische Schule der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, pp. 199-253; 254-288; and Erich Rothacker, "Historismus," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, LXII (1938), 4-16; plus Arthur Spiethoff, "Gustav Schmoller und die anschauliche Theorie der Volkswirtschaft," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, LXII (1938), 16-36.

[8]See above, pp. 159-160.

[9]See Schmoller, "Die Schriften von K. Menger und

was first to save theoretical economics by indicating its proper method and second, to disclose the mistakes of the historical school.[10]

Schmoller summarized Menger's approach as follows. Menger, said Schmoller, had argued that there were two main tendencies in the search for knowledge. One was directed toward concrete phenomena in space and time, and in the relationship of concrete phenomena to one another. The other dealt with regularities and recurrent phenomena. The first approach was directed toward the individual, the second, toward the typical. In economics, the historical and statistical aspects pertain to individual economic phenomena, which also include collective individualities. To theoretical economics, on the other hand, belongs the task of establishing the exact general nature and interconnection between economic phenomena. History is always concerned with an individual process of development. In a theoretical science, however, each concrete event is regarded as a special instance of a larger regularity. According to Menger, the first approach, when applied to economics, should be called the realistic-empirical. The second approach deserves the name of exact. The first approach rests on the inductive determination of empirical reality and can never provide us with laws in the exact sense, but only with rough empirical

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Wilhelm Dilthey zur Methodologie der Staats - und Sozialwissenschaften," Zur Literaturgeschichte der Staats und Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 275-304. Henceforth, this will be cited as Schmoller, "Schriften."

[10]Schmoller, "Schriften," p. 276.

laws. The second approach gives us exact theoretical knowledge, but this knowledge is arrived at by means of another path, a deductive one, which allows us to deduce exact typical relations and precise invariable laws.[11]

Schmoller represented Menger as objecting to the notion that economic development is inseparably associated with social and political development. Instead, Menger maintained that economic phenomena can be isolated from the political and social, since the true aim of the economist is not the discovery of the universal character of economic phenomena, but only the establishment of isolated economic phenomena, which can be only understood in terms of the individual economic strivings of men. Hence, the charge of atomism, with respect to such an individualistic approach is groundless.[12]

After this summary of Menger's position, Schmoller next turned to a criticism of the above views of Menger.[13] Schmoller denied that there was an impassable gulf between the science of the individual and the science of the general. The science of the individual is descriptive science and it provides the indispensable preliminary basis for the establishment of general theory. This preliminary basis must rest on as complete a description of "important characteristics modifications, causes, and consequences as possible."[14]

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[11]Schmoller, "Schriften," pp. 276-277.

[12]Schmoller, "Schriften," pp. 277-278.

[13]Compare Menger, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaft, pp. 1-93.

[14]Schmoller, "Schriften," p. 278.

Complete description, however, again presupposes a completed classification of phenomena, an adequate conceptual apparatus, and a correct subsumption of individual phenomena under observable types. It also presupposes a complete overview (Übersicht) embracing all possible causes.[15] Theory and history, therefore, for Schmoller, were not separated. They were not two totally distinct activities, employing different methodologies. Instead, the historical and the theoretical were interwoven.

In his main work on methodology, Menger had discussed a point of view which resembled Schmoller's.[16] After dwelling upon the two main tendencies of investigating knowledge in general -- the individual or historical, and the general or theoretical -- Menger proceeded to examine the two other approaches -- one pertaining to theoretical knowledge, in general, and the other dealing with economics in particular. One approach was the empirical-realistic, the other was the exact. The empirical-realistic approach, when applied to theoretical matters, could lead to the establishment of what Menger called real types (Realtypen). He defined these real types as "fundamental forms of real phenomena (Grundformen der realen Erscheinungen)."[17] These real types were, therefore, structures which bore a close relationship to empirical reality and allowed great scope to particular events, and the fact that phenomena were subject to change

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[15]Schmoller, "Schriften," p. 278.

[16]Menger, Untersuchungen, pp. 30-48.

[17]Menger, Untersuchungen, p. 36.

and development. The empirical-realistic approach contributed to the formation of what Menger called empirical laws. These were attempts to establish regularities which existed between empirical events. In opposition to this empirical-realistic approach to theoretical matters in economics, Menger postulated his own exact approach, which led to the establishment of exact types instead of real types, and natural exact laws, instead of approximate empirical ones.[18]

Menger's term, real types, was equivalent to what Schmoller called "observable types," and Hintze labelled as empirical abstractions (anschauliche Abstraktionen).[19] Schmoller's real types were developed within the framework of an empirical historicism. The implications of nineteenth-century historicism, however, led Schmoller into directions which were different from the majority of practicing professional historians. Whereas most historians limited themselves to singular individual historical particulars, Schmoller tied history to theory. And theory for him meant establishing observable historical types and empirical laws. Schmoller, thus, represented an intermediate position between those historians concerned only with concrete particulars, and Menger, who wanted to develop a theoretically exact series of type relationships and laws. Both Schmoller and Menger desired to establish types, but the difference between the types they employed was great. Schmoller's types led back to

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[18] Menger, Untersuchungen, pp. 36-48.

[19] Schmoller, "Schriften," p. 278.

empirical concrete historical reality, while Menger's resembled theoretical abstract models. Hintze was correct in realizing that the difference between Schmoller and Menger was based on the distinction between experience (Anschauung) and concept (Begriff).

Hintze was correct in maintaining that Schmoller linked up economic, political, and social phenomena in order to furnish the basis for a universal-historical sociological approach.[20] Consequently, Schmoller's historicism, which was oriented around the notion of types, could not restrict itself to the usual historical approach of nineteenth century historicism, for this latter approach rested on a thorough separation between individual events and general ones. Schmoller, however, united the individual event and the general. In this respect, Hintze was also a disciple of both Schmoller and the historical interpretative sociology of Max Weber, since historical types for Hintze were equally a manifestation of the union of the individual and the general. Insofar as these types were grounded in historical reality, Hintze regarded both his and Schmoller's approach as no repudiation of traditional nineteenth-century historicism, but only as a supplementation of it. As late as 1929, in a review of Horst Jecht's Wirtschaftsgeschichte und Wirtschaftstheorie, Hintze stressed that Schmoller's demand for empirical historical thinking -- his working out of types of social action, instead of abstract concepts --

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[20] See above, p. 161.

made him a precursor of the historical-sociological approach of interpretative sociology, while Menger's abstract conceptual approach led to the "transcendental methodology of the Neokantian movement."[21]

Wilhelm Dilthey, who was Hintze's teacher of philosophy at the University of Berlin, was also instrumental in directing Hintze's attention to the importance of a historical typology. We know that Hintze regarded his own psychological approach to history as resting upon Dilthey.[22] An important aspect of Dilthey's psychology of understanding (verstehende Psychologie) was his emphasis on the need for a historical typology.[23] Dilthey's typology was not merely

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[21]Hintze, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, XXCVII (1929), 417.

[22]Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 17.

[23]On Dilthey's psychology of history, and his typology consult, in addition to his Gesammelte Werke, the following works: Liliane Frey-Rohn, Die Grundbegriffe der Dilthey'schen Philosophie, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften, doctoral dissertation (Zürich: Ferrari-Buchdruck, 1934); Eduard Spranger, Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft, pp. 75-109; H. A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 196-253; Kenzo Katsube, Wilhelm Dilthey's Methode der Lebensphilosophie (Hiroschima: Sartoru Fujirua, 1931), pp. 73-104; Waldemar Oelrich, Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Bildung des Menschen (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1950); Erich Rothacker, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 2nd ed., pp. 253-278; Raymond Aron, La philosophie critique de l'historie, pp. 21-111; Renate Wanstrat, "Das sozialwissenschaftliche Verstehen bei Dilthey und Max Weber," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, LXX (1950), 19-45; Renate Wanstrat, "Die hermeneutische Methode in der soziologischen Forschung," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, LXIX (1949), 1-21; Joachim Wach, Trendelenburg und Dilthey (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1926); Otto Bollnow, Die Methode der Geisteswissenschaften (Mainz: Johannes Gutenberg, 1950); H. A. Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey, an Introduction (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1944), pp. 36-52.

the result of his psychology of the cultural sciences. It also reflected Dilthey's refusal to make any sharp and final distinction between individual and general events. Schmoller's refusal to create such a dichotomy led him to develop an intermediate level of historical types. The situation was similar with Dilthey. He dealt with the problem in his essay on comparative psychology and the problem of individuality.

Dilthey's essay was an attack on the position advocated by Windelband in his 1894 rector's address. It also represented an extension of thought which Dilthey had expressed earlier in his study on descriptive and analytical psychology. He made a distinction between general descriptive psychology and comparative psychology. General psychology emphasized the uniformities of psychological experience, but comparative psychology stressed individual differences in the cultural sciences and among men. Dilthey indicated that his comparative or differential psychology had all of mankind as its object. It sought to establish individualities, similarities, and type relations between men. It was interested in the fundamental forms (Grundformen) of human life.[24]

After launching into an attack against a too sharp distinction between inner subjective and outer objective psychological experiences, Dilthey proceeded to deal with Windelband's distinction between the idiographic singular sciences and the nomothetic general sciences. Dilthey denied that the distinction was a sharp one. Many so-called idio-

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[24]Dilthey, "Über vergleichende Psychologie," pp. 241-242.

graphic sciences such as economics have a nomethetic or general character, insofar as they are partly concerned with the search for economic laws. Many nomothetic sciences such as astronomy and geology, on the other hand, possess a partly idiographic or singular character. Moreover, what would one do with the attempts of men like Polybius, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Taine, and Nietzsche to establish certain uniformities in the historical world?[25] All the evidence points, in fact, to a union of the general and the individual in the systematic cultural sciences.[26] All expressions of the cultural world reveal an individuality which is at once singular, but which also exhibits another side, in terms of revealing uniformities and a level of generality. Cultural expressions, thus, unite the two aspects and are "uniformities associated with individuation."

> In each one of the cultural sciences this union [of the individual and general] is expressed. The relation between the two constitutes one of the most genuine problems of the cultural sciences. This problem is in fact of decisive significance for the formation of any of the cultural sciences. Everywhere in the various cultural sciences, controversy now rages regarding the extent to which uniformity and law determine the individual, and concerning the role of the singular, the positive, the historical, economics, political science, and legal science are especially filled with violent controversy regarding this topic. Everywhere, there also appears a tendency to approach a position which reveals the inner connec-

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[25] Dilthey, "Über vergleichende Psychologie," pp. 241-242; 256-258.

[26] "Es ist so; eben in der verbindung des Generellen und der Individuation besteht die eigenste Natur der systematischen Geisteswissenschaften," "Über vergleichende Psychologie," p. 257.

> tion between the two, in which the general appears as the basis of individuality. This tendency expresses itself in the rise of comparative methods, which render possible the treatment of the positive, the historical and the singular as the object of science. Indeed, the scientific determination of singular historical events can only be achieved as the result of a universal historical comparative method. One event illuminates the other. All together, throw light on individual events.[27]

This quotation from Dilthey is of the first importance in understanding the status of the cultural sciences at the end of the nineteenth century. It reflects the fact that all the cultural sciences were beset by severe controversies regarding the status of the singular and the general. The Schmoller-Menger controversy, the Lamprecht, Windelband-Rickert-Dilthey controversies all disclosed this polemical character regarding the problem of the individual and the general. These controversies thus mirrored the onset of a crisis in historicism. In an attempt to solve the problem, the various cultural sciences began to make use of comparative methods, based on a comparative psychology. These comparative methods, when applied to history, result in what Dilthey labelled as the universal-historical comparative method, which united historical individuality and generality, led in turn to the formulation of historical types.[28]

There were important similarities between Schmoller's and Dilthey's approaches to the problem of types. Both men agreed that psychology ought to form the basis of the cul-

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[27] Dilthey, "Über vergleichende Psychologie," pp. 268-269.

[28] Dilthey, "Über vergleichende Psychologie," p. 270.

tural sciences. Both men advocated a psychology based on the understanding of social action. Both Schmoller and Dilthey supported a comparative method. Both applied this comparative method to evolve a universal comparative historical approach. And Dilthey and Schmoller both realized that a universal-historical comparative method required a historical typology which could unite historical individuality and a degree of generality.

On each of these points, Hintze was in agreement with both Schmoller and Dilthey. We have seen how Hintze accepted Dilthey's psychology as a basis of the cultural sciences. Hintze applied the comparative method not in the fashion of Roscher or Lamprecht, both of whom he considered as mistaken. Instead, in the Prussian silk industry study, Hintze made use of careful comparative analysis. He did so again in his study on the Prussian administration of the eighteenth century. He also applied the comparative method in his essay on Roscher; and in his 1902 essay on the formations of states and constitutional development, he sought to apply Ranke's comparative approach to universal history and the state system. Ranke's approach to universal history was regarded by Hintze as compatible, not only with a comparative method, but with a universal-comparative historical approach, such as that advocated by Schmoller and Dilthey. To achieve such an aim, Hintze believed that Ranke's political approach needed to be supplemented by cultural history on a wide scale. Finally, Hintze's position on the relationship between the individual and the general was similar to that of Schmoller

and Dilthey. This is clearly revealed in the position which Hintze took during the Lamprecht controversy. In adopting an intermediate stand, which linked the individual and the general in history, Schmoller and Dilthey came to evolve a historical typology. This was precisely the situation with Hintze.[29]

In Hintze's 1902 essay on the formations of states and constitutional development, there was already present a clear-cut historical typology.[30] In this essay, Hintze revealed that he was familiar with Jellinek's significant work on the state.[31] Jellinek's book, Allgemeine Staatslehre appeared in its first edition in 1900. Hintze's essay appeared in 1902. In Jellinek's book there was a discussion of the role of types in the social sciences. It is quite likely that Jellinek's discussion influenced Hintze's essay with respect to the problem of types. It would, however, be a mistake to believe that Hintze's historical typology of states was totally derived from Jellinek. That this was not the case, is proved, in that Hintze had already sketched the preliminary basis for such a historical typology of states in his essay on Roscher, written in 1897, three years before the appearance of Jellinek's book. Nevertheless, it is highly probable that Jellinek's discussion of types reinforced his (Hintze's) own ideas and sharpened his typology.

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[29] Hintze, "Geschichtsauffassung," p. 18.

[30] See above, pp. 139-140.

[31] Hintze, "Staatenbildung," pp. 32, 40.

In the second chapter of his book, Jellinek discussed the methodology of studying the state. He distinguished knowledge in the social sciences from that in the natural sciences. The aim of the natural sciences is to transform qualitative relations into quantitative relations, and then to subsume these under laws. The individual event is always regarded as representative of a general law, and hence, not important in its own right. The situation is quite different with historical and social happenings. They possess a distinctive individuality and an unending manifold tendency that is sui generis. Jellinek doubted whether there were or could be any adequate social or historical laws, due to the essentially individual character of social and historical events.[32]

If Jellinek believed that social laws lacked any genuine significance for the study of history and society, he, nevertheless, stressed the importance of types in the social sciences. True, such types could never exhaust the infinite concrete individuality of history. To that extent, Jellinek remained a faithful adherent of orthodox nineteenth-century historicism. "The total course of historical happenings, by the very limitation of our scientific means and methods, can never by attempt be grasped in any final fashion."[33] Nevertheless, it is possible to separate segments of reality and isolate them for comparative purposes. The idea of types is an instrument to this end. Applied to the state, it enables us to view the France of Louis XIV, the Prussia of Frederick William III, and the Russia of Alexander III,

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[32]Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, pp. 25-26.

[33]Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, p. 28.

as three examples of absolute monarchy. But Jellinek insisted that these three were also individual states. From one standpoint, they were examples of a type; from another, they possessed an indestructible individuality.[34]

The task of a science of the state, for Jellinek, consisted then in searching out typical elements in the affairs of states and discovering mutual relations between them. Jellinek distinguished two kinds of types, which he designated respectively as ideal types, and average or empirical types.[35] He first discussed ideal types. These were of two sorts. One was the ideal type which was a free form of speculation. Political utopias were examples. The other kind of ideal type was one which also set up a norm, but was concerned with the practical transformation of existing states or institutions. Political reformers constantly made use of this latter kind of ideal type. Jellinek maintained that the characteristic thing about both kinds of ideal types was their normative character, since they were thoroughly purposive and teleological. They set up a goal or norm which ought to be achieved. Consequently, they were expressions of the "ought," instead of the "is."[36]

In contrast to such ideal types, Jellinek set up average or empirical types. An empirical type is concerned

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[34]Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, p. 30.

[35]Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, p. 33. In the first edition Jellinek used the term average type (Durchschnittstypus). In later editions he employed the term (empirische typus) empirical type instead of average type.

[36]Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, p. 32.

with describing what is rather than what ought to be. Empirical types are created by concentrating on those characteristics of phenomena, which the investigator has decided to study by ordering the manifold character of phenomena, and inductively abstracting their common elements from experience. Empirical types are thus empirical forms of abstraction. The task of a science of the state, insofar, as it does not restrict itself to a single state, is the investigation of empirical types of state relationships by employing inductive and comparative methods.[37]

Jellinek indicated certain limitations that ought to be observed in utilizing the comparative inductive method for setting up empirical types. The comparisons must never be carried too far; otherwise, the individualized aspects of events become neglected. The resulting types become empty platitudes whenever comparisons are sought on too universal a basis. Secondly, comparative inductive procedures should always be limited to those states that derive from a common historical development. Only where there exists common historical, political, and social foundations among states is it possible to reveal widespread similarities in their structure and function. Finally, care must be taken to account for the modifiability of these types. Jellinek, therefore, distinguished between developmental and stationary types.[38]

Jellinek also dealt with the value of using such types. These types satisfy our need to synthesize the infinite diversity of individual events and bring them under some unity. Secondly, the types actually enhance our under-

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[37]Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, p. 34.

[38]Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, pp. 35-36.

standing of individual events. In addition, they provide a practical heuristic instrument for regulating our experience.[39]

Hintze's whole approach to the problem of types was in substantial agreement with Jellinek. Hintze's sketch of a science of Politics, outlined in his essay on Roscher,[40] would have had Jellinek's support. Hintze's demand for a typology of the state system, along Ranke's lines, also would have met with Jellinek's approval, since it conformed to Jellinek's insistence that a comparative typology of states should be restricted to those states, that are the product of a common historical background, such as the Romano-Germanic nations. Finally, Hintze's observation, stated in his essay on the formations of states, that no typology can ever adequately exhaust the concrete individuality of historical events, was also in complete accord with Jellinek.[41]

Hintze employed a typological approach in a number of essays which he wrote during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century. His 1902 essay, on the formation of states and constitutional development, has already been discussed. Two further studies, both written in 1906, also revealed a strong typological approach. One dealt with the different periods of evangelical church government in Prussia.[42] Hintze

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[39]Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, pp. 38-39.

[40]See above, pp. 137-139.

[41]Hintze, "Staatenbildung," p. 41.

[42]Hintze, "Die Epochen des evangelischen Kirchenregiments in Preussen," Historische Zeitschrift, XCVII (1906), pp. 67-118. This is reprinted in Hintze, Geist und Epoche der Preussischen Geschichte, pp. 64-105. All further citations to this essay are taken from this latter work.

distinguished a type of church government called episcopalism (Episkopalismus), characterized by the Lutheran territorial church (Landeskirche) in Brandenburg during the sixteenth century. This type then gave way to another, which Hintze designated as Territorialism. It incorporated the principle of absolutism in church government, and was characterized by the origins of the Prussian state church (Landeskirche). A final type which emerged in the nineteenth century was the presbyterian and synod governmental form. It witnessed the completion of the Landeskirche, and later, saw the introduction of a freer type of church government, characterized by presbyterian synod -- to designate periods. His types were, thus, period types, since each represented a distinct historical period in the development of church government inside Prussia.[43]

The second essay, which Hintze also wrote in 1906, dealt with the connection between the constitutions of states and their military organizations.[44] In this essay, Hintze not only developed a typological approach, but he expressed himself on the correct use of a typological methodology. His observations on the limitations of a typological approach once again brought out the close agreement which existed between Hintze and Jellinek on the question of types.

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[43]Hintze, "Die Epochen des evangelischen Kirchenregiments," pp. 78, 92.

[44]Hintze, "Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung," Staat und Verfassung, pp. 42-74.

Hintze pointed out that there were two ways to treat the topic of the constitution of states and their military organizations. One was to handle the problem in very general and universal historical terms, by borrowing examples indiscriminately from all times and all peoples. This was the procedure employed by Herbert Spencer in his Principles of Sociology. Hintze did not deny that this approach, on occasion, could lead to significant results, but in the main, he was wary of it. This approach, said Hintze, ran against the grain of anyone carefully schooled in historical thinking; for there was something intolerably high-handed in the attempt to tear institutions out of their proper historical context, and to utilize isolated examples as evidence for statements of a most general sort. Even worse, the propositions thus arrived at were frequently so vague and indistinct, so tenuous and remote from concreteness, so incredibly empty of all empirical content, that the final results were nothing but hollow platitudes.[45]

The second approach to the problem was the one advocated by Hintze. It consisted of establishing relations between the constitutions of those state and military organizations, which were related within a given historical matrix. Hintze chose as his example, the Romano-Germanic peoples, after the period of the decline of the Roman Empire. These nations became part of an interrelated historical process of development.[46]

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[45]Hintze, "Staatsverfassung und Heersverfassung," p. 42.

[46]Hintze, "Staatsverfassung und Heersverfassung," p. 42.

Hintze contrasted his own typology with that of Herbert Spencer, who believed in two fundamental types of government -- the warlike and the industrial type. In doing so, Hintze labelled Spencer's two types, ideal types. Hintze's use of the term "ideal types," is interesting; for it marks the first time in his writings that he had employed this specific term.

> These are ideal types, which in the history of peoples are perhaps nowhere realized in their total purity; historical reality in fact shows almost everywhere mixtures, made up of elements of both. The warlike type appears with particular distinctness among many states, ancient and modern, civilized and uncivilized. Spencer referred to the empire of the Dahomey, the Peruvian empire of the Incas, ancient Egypt and Sparta, Prussia, the German empire, and Russia. The industrial type forms itself very slowly, only under especially favorable circumstances, and not as distinctly as the warlike type. England and America, with their militia system, self-government, and principles of freedom of action, contrast with the more constrained life of the continental military states.[47]

Jellinek had employed the term ideal types, in his Allgemeine Staatslehre. However, it is clear that Hintze was not using the term, ideal type, in Jellinek's sense. Instead, he was employing the term in the way in which Max Weber used it. It is impossible to state definitely, in regard to Hintze's use of the term, whether it derived from Weber. Weber first used the term ideal type, in his essay on the objectivity of social scientific and social political knowledge, which was published in 1904. This was two years before the appearance of Hintze's article,

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[47]Hintze, "Staatsverfassung und Heersverfassung," p. 44.

so that it is quite possible that Hintze was acquainted with Weber's article, though this cannot be proved with certainty.[48]

In dealing with the process of development (Entwicklungsprocess) of the Romano-Germanic peoples, Hintze proceeded to distinguish three type periods of state and military organization -- a period of tribal and kinship government, a period of feudalism during the middle ages, and a final period of militarism in modern times. Within the period of militarism, Hintze distinguished three sub-periods, the first from the end of the fifteenth to about the middle of the seventeenth century. During this sub-period, the institution of the mercenary army was not firmly entrenched, nor was the state sufficiently consolidated so as to constitute an absolutistic unified state, though it was on the way to doing so. In the second sub-period, extending from the middle of the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was formed on the continent, the fully-developed absolutistic military state, while England, with its militia, parliament, and self-administration, took a different turn. Finally, in the third sub-period of militarism, which extended through the nineteenth century, the prac-

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[48]Max Weber, "Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XIX (1904), 22-87. This is reprinted in Weber's, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 146-214, and all furthur citations are taken from this latter work. References to ideal types occur on the following pages of Weber's essay: 190-206; 208-212. The main analysis of the meaning of ideal types occurs on pp. 190-206.

tice of general military service was associated with a constitutional type of state.[49]

Although Hintze employed the typological approach in these two studies of 1906, it must not be assumed that he was invariably adopting such an approach in all his writings. Instead, some of the articles which he wrote during the period 1900-1915 did not disclose such a conscious and a carefully articulated typology.[50] Nevertheless, a typological approach was a leading characteristic of a good deal of Hintze's writings, even though it was not generally formulated in such an overt and forceful manner as the 1902 essay on the formation of states, or the two studies published in 1906.

The last significant influence on Hintze's historical typology was Max Weber. Although Weber may have exercised an impact on Hintze, before War I, it was only after the War, that Weber's influence became strongly manifest in Hintze's writings. During the 1920's and the early 1930's, his writings were vigorously affected by a variety of currents -- Germany's defeat in the Great War, the crisis of historicism, developments within German sociology, and the failure of European society to adequately adjust to the post-war situation.

Weber's influence on Hintze arose out of an increas-

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[49] Hintze, "Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung," pp. 48-49.

[50] For example, "Stein und der Preussische Staat," Historische Zeitschrift, XCIV (1905), pp. 412-446; and "Königin Luise, Festrede zur Feier ihres hundersten Todestages," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, XIV (1910) 1-9.

ing preoccupation on Hintze's part with the problems of historical sociology. We shall indicate the crucial importance that this factor played in the crisis of historicism, in succeeding chapters, devoted to Scheler and Oppenheimer.[51] Here, we merely wish to describe the specific role that Weber's ideal types played in the formation of Hintze's typology of history.

In 1922, Hintze wrote a reiew article of Max Weber's significant studies on the sociology of religion.[52] In 1926, he wrote an article on Weber's sociology.[53] These two articles, together with other writings by Hintze, bear testimony to the impact which Weber exerted upon Hintze. They enable us to trace the connection between Hintze's historical typology and Weber's ideal types.

It has already been indicated that Hintze first used the term, ideal types, in his 1906 article on the constitutions of states and military organizations. It was pointed out also that Hintze may have borrowed this term from Weber, who employed it in his 1904 study on objectivity in social sciences and social policy. But it is impossible to prove this with any certainty.[54]

Weber's essay on objectivity in social sciences and

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[51]See below, pp. 333-416.

[52]Hintze, Review of Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, in Schmoller's Jahrbuch, XLVI (1922), 251-258.

[53]O. Hintze, "Max Weber's Soziologie," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, L (1926), 83-95.

[54]See above, pp. 226-267.

social policy remained fundamental for his theoretical formulation of the notion of ideal type. This essay was later re-published as a part of Weber's volume on the methodology of the social sciences.[55] Hintze never reviewed this book, but his reviews of other works by Weber, together with his many references to the ideal type, leave no doubt, that during the 1920's Hintze became thoroughly familiar with the whole corpus of Weber's writings, including the one on methodology.

In order to study the relationship between Weber and Hintze with regard to ideal types, it is first necessary to examine what Weber meant by an ideal type.[56] Then we must

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[55]Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922). I have used the second revised edition of 1951. For the essay, consult pages 146-214 of the latter edition.

[56]On Weber's concept of ideal type, consult the following of his writings: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 146-214 and the many other references in this volume; Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (2nd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1925), 2 volumes, pp. 14-16; 35-37; 62-67; 95-97; 122-176; 194-215; 603-870; Wirtschaftsgeschichte, ed. by S. Hellman and M. Palyi (München: Duncker und Humblot, 1923); Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial - und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924); Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922) 3 volumes; Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924). Among the many secondary works, consult: L. L. Bennion, Max Weber's Methodology, doctoral dissertation (Paris: Les presses modernes, 1933); Werner Bienfait, Max Weber's Lehre vom geschichtlichen Erkennen, ein Beitrag zur Frage der Bedeutung des 'Idealtypus' für die Geschichtswissenschaft (Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1930) Charlotte Engel-Reimers, "Der Methodenstreit in der Soziologie," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, LVI (1932), 87-103. Heinrich Klüver, "Max Weber's Ideal Type in Psychology," Journal of Philosophy, XXIII (1926), 29-35; Albert Salomon, "Max Weber's Methodology," Social Research, I (1934), 147-168; Alexander von Schelting, "Die logische Theorie der historischen Kulturwissenschaften von Max Weber und im besonderen sein Be-

see how Hintze applied and interpreted this concept in his writings.

Weber approached the problem of the ideal type, not in any isolated fashion, but as an essential aspect of a comprehensive methodology of the social sciences. Such a methodology had to take three factors into consideration. It had to recognize the tradition of historicism within German thought during the nineteenth century. It had to confront the distinction which was made between the natural and cultural sciences. Weber's methodology also had to take into consideration the fact that German sociology slowly emerged as an autonomous discipline out of the larger area of historical economics and social policy.[57] Weber's essay on the objectivity of social scientific and social policy

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griff des Idealtypus," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XLIX (1922), 623-752; Alexander Schelting, Max Weber's Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934); Hans Oppenheimer, Die Logik der soziologischen Begriffsbildung, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Max Weber (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1925); Carlo Antoni, "La Logica del 'Tipo Ideale' di Max Weber," Studi Germanici, III (1938), 279-294; Raymond Aron, La sociologie Allemande contemporaine (2nd ed.; Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 97-155; Arnold Bergstraesser, "Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber: An Empirical Approach to Historical Synthesis," Ethics, LVII (1947), 92-107; Hans Freyer, Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1930), p. 145; Heinrich Klüver, "The Problem of Type in Cultural Science Psychology," Journal of Philosophy, XXII (1923), 225-234; Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 601-624; Bernard Pfister, Die Entwicklung zum Idealtypus; Georg Weippert, "Zum Begriffs des Wirtschaftsstils," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, LXVII (1943), pp. 450-455; Georg Weippert, "Die idealtypische Sinn - und Wesenserfassung und die Denkgebilde der formalen Theorie. Zur Logik des 'Idealtypus' und der rationalen 'Schemata,'" Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, C (1940), 257.

[57]Hintze, "Max Weber's Soziologie," p. 83.

reflected these three elements. The essay, written in 1904, was published in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, at a time when the editorship of the Archiv passed to three new editors: Weber, Werner Sombart, and Edgar Jaffe.[58]

The three editors deemed it necessary to state their attitudes toward the whole question of the social sciences and the problem of social policy. What would be their "line" toward the question of value judgments concerning measures of economic state policy? Schmoller's Journal reflected an attitude that value judgments and social policy formation go hand in hand with the methodology of science in the social areas. For Schmoller social science was not value-free, but value-charged. Would the new editors of the Archiv reflect a similar policy?

As spokeman for the editors, Weber stated the attitude of the Archiv. The Archiv, he said, was from its inception a purely scientific journal. It would continue to be so. Weber objected to Schmoller's notion that economics constitutes an ethical science with empirical foundations. He called this a confused opinion. Instead, he regarded social science (Sozialwissenschaft) as a purely empirical specialized discipline, which cannot provide binding norms and ideals for practical social policy.[59] Weber did not

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[58]Max Weber, "Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis," p. 146. Henceforth, this essay will be cited as Weber, 'Objektivität.'

[59]Weber, 'Objektivität,' p. 149.

exclude ethical criticism, but he denied that this was an obligatory, binding, or even essential task of the social sciences. Weber thus restricted the area and range of social science to a much smaller compass than Schmoller.

> The social science that we want to pursue is a science of concrete reality. (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). We seek to understand the distinctive uniqueness of the reality which is around us. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships and cultural significance of individual events in their present day form, and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise.[60]

What characteristics did Weber assign to social science as a science of concrete reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft)? He denied that social science was identifiable with a one-sided monistic materialist theory of history. Indeed, one of Weber's aims was to refute the claims of a materialistic theory of history. It is equally a mistake to believe that because social science is a science of concrete reality, that it is thereby an exact reproduction of reality. Reality is infinite in its extent and thus inexhaustible. Weber argued that every analysis of reality -- every scientific attempt to grapple with the multiplicity of the real world -- was based on our ability to select a slice of it for investigation. In this sense all science, including social science is one-sided.

Weber, next, raised a question regarding the

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[60]Weber, 'Objektivität,' pp. 170-171.

criteria that we choose in selecting a given segment of reality. He denied that the decisive criterion in the social or cultural sciences should be the selection of those events which allow for a regular recurrence of certain causal relationships -- scientific laws. Weber, however, argued that the social sciences have the following characteristics. First of all, the social sciences are cultural sciences. By cultural sciences Weber meant those sciences which strive to apprehend the events of life in terms of their cultural significance.[61] But in order to understand the cultural significance of events, a value- orientation is required. The concept of culture is, thus, a value concept.

Weber insisted that social science, as a cultural science, selects certain aspects of reality which it deems significant or of value. An aspect of reality is significant whenever it reveals relationships that are important to us in regard to our values.[62] It is important to note that Weber was using values in two different senses with respect to the social sciences. He denied that the social sciences could dictate social policy concerning what was good or bad. In that sense, the social sciences could not legislate ethical values. On the other hand, if by values we mean that which has

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[61]Weber, 'Objektivivät,' pp. 168-172.

[62]Weber, 'Objektivität,' pp. 175-176.

meaning to us, then the social sciences do, indeed, select those aspects of reality that have value for us -- which have meaning or cultural significance for human beings.

Weber contended that the social sciences were not merely preoccupied with culture, but they were concerned with the real. By the real, Weber meant the "concrete individually-structured configuration of our cultural life in its universal relationships."[63] Such configurations are not to be understood in terms of their quantitative aspects but, rather, in regard to their qualitative features. Moreover, Weber contended that cultural events pertain to psychological and spiritual (geistige) phenomena and require a type of understanding fundamentally different from the approaches available to the exact natural sciences.

The aim of social science was summarized by Weber in the following fashion:

> We seek knowledge of a historical phenomenon, meaning by the word historical -- significant in its individuality. And the decisive factor in this is, that only through the presupposition that a finite part of the infinite variety of phenomena is significant, does the knowledge of an individual phenomenon become logically meaningful. We stand helpless, even with the widest imaginable knowledge of all laws, before the question -- how is the causal explanation of an individual fact generally possible, since a description of even the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive.[64]

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[63]Weber, 'Objektivität,' pp. 172-173.

[64]Weber, 'Objektivität,' p. 177.

Weber argued that what we are concerned with in the cultural sciences is the historical individuality of events, which alone is significant. Insofar as laws or other generic relationships aid in the ascertainment of such individuality, they are valuable; but the more general the laws are, the less they contribute to the causal imputation of individual events and the understanding of their cultural significance.[65]

Weber's argument led him squarely into the question of the relation between concept formation (theoretische Begriffsbildung) and the realm of cultural reality. This involved him in a discussion of the ideal type. The whole question of the appropriateness of concepts to reality was called, by Weber, a question of the economy (Ökonomie) of scientific work. He gave an example of the use of the ideal type in abstract economic theory. Suppose we set up an ideal type of the commodity market existing in a society having an exchange economy, free competition, and rational conduct. What sort of a conceptual pattern would we then have? Weber argued that the ideal type of the commodity market, first of all, resembled a utopia, arrived at by an accentuation of certain aspects of reality. Empirically, there may not be such an ideal commodity market. But, if in experience, we find a market that resembles our ideal type, we can then enhance our understanding of that empirical example by reference to the ideal type.[66]

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[65]Weber, 'Objektivität,' p. 178.

[66]Weber, 'Objektivität,' p. 178.

Weber, thus, argued that ideal types were not exact descriptions of reality, but heuristic means of attaining a description of historical reality.

How were ideal types formed? Weber's answer was that they were created by a one-sided accentuation of certain features which were present in concrete phenomena, in order to arrive at unified mental constructs. Such constructs, in their full conceptual purity, cannot be found anywhere in reality, and to that extent, they were what Weber called utopias. The task of historical research was to ascertain whether there were indeed specific examples of such ideal types and to discover to what extent these concrete examples approximated or diverged from such ideal types. For instance, having set up an ideal type of a city economy, the historian can ask to what extent the economic structure of a certain city conforms to this type of city economy. Weber was convinced that the ideal type was a heuristic tool of the greatest significance for research in the cultural sciences.[67]

Weber maintained that it was possible to con- a number of ideal types and to juxtapose them. For example, the ideal typical handicraft system can be compared with the ideal typical capitalistic system. Furthermore, there is not necessarily one ideal type of the capitalistic system. There may, indeed, be many, and each can claim significance insofar as it has

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[67]Weber, 'Objektivität,' pp. 190-191.

abstracted certain traits from the empirical content of history and united these into a unified ideal construct.[68]

Weber knew that many historians would object to his notion of the ideal type. For the assumption upon which a good many historians operated was that they were providing, in their histories, a presuppositionless reproduction of objective facts. In brilliant fashion, Weber showed that such historians were mistaken. Indeed, as soon as a historian proceeds beyond the most elementary establishment of concrete events and seeks to characterize and discover the significance of these events, he must make use of a set of concepts which are nothing less than ideal types. What else, asked Weber, do such historians think concepts such as individualism, imperialism, feudalism, mercantilism, and the like represent? The fact is that historians are constantly employing ideal types without realizing precisely what it is that they are doing. They are constantly engaging in theoretical activities without being aware of the theoretical character of these activities.[69]

Weber regarded the ideal type as "an attempt to grasp the character of historically unique configurations or their individual component parts by means of genetic concepts."[70] He warned of various confusions that would arise with respect to the ideal type. Thus,

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[68]Weber, 'Objektivität,' p. 192.

[69]Weber, 'Objektivität,' pp. 193-194.

[70]Weber, 'Objektivität,' p. 194.

the ideal type is not an average. Nor is the ideal type a substitute for historical reality. Consequently, the "essence" of historical reality is not found in such constructs. Ideal types play an important heuristic role for understanding historical reality, but they are not essences. Moreover, it is a mistake to try to use ideal types as a procrustean bed into which all of history is violently forced. Furthermore, ideal types are not generic concepts. Instead, they always bear a particular relationship to unique historical configurations.[71]

Having examined Weber's use of the term, ideal type, let us look at Hintze's interpretation and application of the term. In an essay published in 1929 on Sombart's conception of high capitalism, Hintze briefly discussed the role of ideal types.[72] He commented on Sombart's reference to the "idea" of capitalism. Sombart treated the development of capitalism as though the historical reality of capitalism was slowly approximating that "idea" of capitalism which Sombart had set up. However, Hintze contended that Sombart did not understand the "idea" of capitalism

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[71] Weber, 'Objektivität,' pp. 191, 195.

[72] O. Hintze, "Der moderne Kapitalismus als historisches Individuum. Ein kritischer Bericht uber Sombarts Werk, Das Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus," Historische Zeitschrift, CXXXIX (1929), 457-509. This article is reprinted in Hintze, Zur Theorie der Geschichte, pp. 71-124, and all further citations are taken from this latter work. Henceforth, this article will be cited as Hintze, "Moderne Kapitalismus."

in a wholly nominalistic fashion -- that is, as a specific empirical abstraction, which is taken from a social-historical complex of events. Instead, Sombart gave indications of regarding the "idea" of capitalism as belonging to a realm of transcendental realities. Such a view, said Hintze, would also conform to the new metaphysical approach adopted by Sombart in his other writings.

Hintze rejected Sombart's transcendental view of "ideas." One of his reasons for doing so was that this approach was incompatible with the principles of interpretative sociology (verstehende Soziologie), a discipline of which Sombart was presumably an adherent. Hintze then added the following significant lines:

> According to my views, the "idea" of capitalism is only an 'ideal type' of this economic system, abstracted by the intellect from reality, and constituting, therefore, a theoretical construction, which requires to be verified through the most thorough historical investigation. And the historical 'development' of capitalism is nothing else than an interrelated series of modifications, which the economic life of a previous stage must pass through, in order to become the substratum for such an abstraction. At the same time, it is also the sum of further modifications, which removes it even further from this ideal type and leads it to a new and unknown stage.[73]

Hintze regarded the use of ideal typical constructs as constituting a distinctive and very fruitful union of history and system (Geschichte und Systematik) of empiricism and theory. Hintze believed

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[73]Hintze, "Moderne Kapitalismus," p. 75.

that such an approach finally resolved the methodological controversy (Methodenstreit), which for so long had raged between the theoretical and historical schools of economics. Hintze warned, however, that a union of the two approaches should never be construed to mean a sheer mixture of the two. The proper approach could only be attained by first taking a complex of events and approaching it from a purely rational point of view. This consisted in approaching a complex of events conceptually, analytically, and constructively, so as to find an ideal type. With such a theoretical concept formation, there was then combined an empirical historical approach which showed whether and to what extent the empirical historical events corresponded to the ideal typical construct.

> In this fashion, economic theory and economic history are closely interwoven with one another, without either being either distorted or falsified by the other. It is the method that Sombart learned from Max Weber and which can also profitably be applied to those other disciplines where basic theoretical concepts must be united to the empirical research of historical development. Indeed, this approach has often been applied implicitly, without an express awareness of all that is involved. For example, such a behind-the-scenes approach has frequently been attempted in the realm of political - constitutional history.[74]

Hintze used Weber's ideal type explicitly in his significant 1930 study on the typology of Western European Constitutions based on estates.[75]

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[74] Hintze, "Moderne Kapitalismus," p. 76.

[75] Hintze, Typologie der ständischen Verfassungen des Abendlandes," Historische Zeitschrift, CXLI (1930), 229-248. This is reprinted in Hintze, Staat und Verfassung pp. 110-129. All further citations are taken from this latter work, and will henceforth be cited as Hintze, "Typologie."

Hintze indicated that many historians had concerned themselves with the problem of the development of constitutions based on estates within the various German territories in early modern times, and a body of accepted views had been generally agreed upon. No one, however, had undertaken the task of making a comparative study of these European "estates constitutions" (Ständeverfassung) including those within and outside of Germany. Hintze regarded this as his task in this essay. He was not concerned with the problem as to why the estates constitutions, as the preliminary stage of later forms of constitutional government were unique to the Christian West, and why they did not make an appearance in other areas of world history. Instead, he was only interested in the problem of establishing a typology of the estates constitions of the West by showing that a general type of estates constitution obtained in the West, and that special subtypes existed within this general type. Hintze specifically called his types "ideal types." This applied both to his general type and to his two specialized types.

> These two special types are also ideal types which in their perfect purity have never been realized in history. One can however orient oneself in terms of such ideal types in order to better understand historical reality. We are thus concerned with two different types which separate themselves from each other in terms of their morphological structure, as well as their political function and developmental tendency. I will attempt to describe them and as far as possible relate them to their historical conditions.[76]

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[76]Hintze, "Typologie," p. 114.

Hintze's essay, thus, was a description of his general ideal type of the estates constitution and the two specialized ideal types, which he designated as the "two chambered system (naturally not in the modern sense) and the threefold legislative assembly (Dreikuriensystem)."[77]

Hintze's essay on the typology of estates constitutions was an attempt to apply Weber's ideal types to historical situations. The thoroughness with which Hintze applied Weber's ideal typical constructs in this essay was a little surprising in view of Hintze's remarks about ideal types in his earlier article on Max Weber's sociology.

This 1926 article was a review of Weber's great work on economics and society, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Hintze regarded Weber's work not so much as a treatise on economics and society but, rather, as an attempt to formulate a system of sociology. He regarded Weber's sociology as emerging out of the large discipline of historical economics. After analyzing the contents of the book, Hintze briefly characterized Weber's approach to sociology, as one which did not employ the usual concepts of natural science. Instead, Weber made use of ideal types "in order to grasp the meaningful content of historical social reality."[78] Hintze contended that Weber's definitions were basically nominalistic ('nominalistisch'). By this, Hintze meant that Weber

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[77]Hintze, "Typologie," p. 114.

[78]Hintze, "Max Weber's Soziologie," p. 89.

did not "tell us what a thing is, but rather how it shall be named. He defines names, not things."[79] Hintze, therefore, regarded Weber as operating more with verbal than substantival concepts, since Weber always thought in terms of the categories of function and actuality, rather than substantiality. Community (Gemeinschaft) became for Weber the social action or relationship of being communal (vergemeinschaftung), and society became the action of being associative or social (vergesellschaftung).[80] That which was truly real for Weber, is the social actions of individuals. Sociology for Weber is, therefore, a cultural science pertaining to the social actions of individuals. "It restricts itself to the interpretation of understandable contents of meaning."[81] It is therefore always oriented toward the investigation of intended meanings, in contrast to attempts, such as Simmel's, to discern the objective or "valid" meaning of social relationships. Weber's sociology was, therefore, an interpretative sociology.

Hintze argued that Weber's approach represented a unique amalgam of the systematic and historical approaches. However, the systematic frequently triumphed over the historical in Weber's sociology. In this respect Weber's work resembled that of his teacher, Mommsen, in his Römische Staatsrecht. Weber slighted the factor of historical development with its

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[79]Hintze, "Max Weber's Soziologie," p. 89.

[80]Hintze, "Max Weber's Soziologie," pp 83, 89. Compare Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 21.

[81]Hintze, "Max Weber's Soziologie," p. 89.

implications. Instead, institutions which had developed over many years were treated from the standpoint of their systematic unity.[82]

Hintze saw a weakness in this neglect by Weber of historical development, and a strength in Weber's emphasis on systematic understanding. He argued that Weber's sociology of the state needed to be supplemented by a constitutional historical approach to the state. In this connection Hintze contracted the historian's and sociologist's treatment of the state. The sociologist always employed types for the purpose of arriving at greater generality. The historian on the other hand used types to clarify and intensify the individuality and concreteness of events. Hintze believed there was a genuine danger that the concepts of sociology might become so general as to become "abstractions lacking content" (inhaltleere Abstraktionen). Hintze even regarded Weber as not being wholly immune from this danger. Thus, Hintze considered Weber's discussion of feudalism as lacking in historical precision and being too general. Hintze also thought that Weber's types of authority -- traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic -- suffered from this defect. In substance, Hintze's distinction between the historical and sociological approach amounted to the following comment:

> In the hands of the historian, the comparative method always leads toward a more sharp determination and reciprocal separation of the

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[82]Hintze, "Max Weber's Soziologie," p. 89.

> real typical -- the individual; but the ideal types of sociology are only useful for the analysis of structure and not for the synthetic formation of homogeneous groups of events.[83]

These structures regarding the sociological approach must not be interpreted to mean that Hintze opposed the use of ideal types and his employment of the ideal typical approach in his 1930 essay on the estate type of constitutions show that he was inclined toward the employment of ideal types. What Hintze wanted was the use of ideal types to clarify the individuality of the historical process and not their employment to create a too abstract and general system of sociology.[84]

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[83]Hintze, "Max Weber's Soziologie," p. 93.

[84]This topic will be treated below in the chapter on Oppenheimer. See pp. 408-416.

CHAPTER IX

TROELTSCH AND THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM

The rise and development of historicism was one of the great intellectual revolutions undergone by the Western world.[1] It profoundly altered man's ideas regarding his place in the world of nature and society. Because historicism emphasized the notions of dynamic development and individuality, it gradually replaced the natural law view of society, which had dominated the thinking of Europe for centuries. Historicism created new organons and techniques of historical thought and manifested itself in an unprecedented outpouring of historical writing and literature during the nineteenth century. In that century, the historical outlook not only found itself free and liberated but seemingly triumphant in every realm of human affairs. Politics, law, economics, philosophy, religion were but a few of the areas of knowledge where the historical view was victorious.

The rise and development of historicism was a European phenomenon, but it was also peculiarly a German concern. The most important developments in the rise and growth of historicism centered in Germany. Merely in terms of the quantity and quality of historical writing, Germany easily led the rest of Europe. Germany acted as an active nucleus of historical thinking, radiating and transmitting its influence to

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[1]Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, p. 1.

other countries and areas. The roles performed by the Reformation and historicism were analogous in this respect. Both movements centered in Germany, and yet were European in their extent. In both instances, Germany performed a leading creative role and also acted as a source for the spread of ideas. It is no wonder that historicism has been called Germany's greatest achievement since the Reformation.[2]

The previous chapters of this dissertation represent an attempt to describe important forces in the growth of nineteenth-century German historicism, particularly, as they related to Otto Hintze. By the close of the nineteenth century, German historicism was beginning to suffer certain tensions. The various controversies: the Lamprecht, Windelband-Dilthey, Schmoller-Menger, Schmoller-Weber, etc., were indicative of strains within the solid structure of German historicism. Added to these were such issues as the respective roles which political and cultural history should exercise, the impact of positivistic currents on the idealistic tradition of German historiography, the problem of the secularization of German intellectual life, the relation between historical thought and national life, and the dawn of a certain scepticism regarding the whole value of history for the conduct of life.[3] These problems foreshadowed the coming of a genuine crisis in historical thinking. During the twentieth century, German historical thinking entered a new crisis phase.

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[2]See the article on "Ranke," in H. Rössler and G. Franz, Biographisches Wörterbuch zur deutschen Geschichte, p. 694.

[3]See above, pp. 209-210.

Any attempt to describe and interpret the total significance of this crisis in German historicism is fraught with genuine difficulties. The problem is both exceedingly complex and highly controversial. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to engage in an elaborate analysis of the crisis of German historicism.[4] The writers who have dealt with this topic frequently disagree, but it is important to notice the nature of their disagreement. They do not differ on the question as to whether there exists a crisis in twentieth-century German historical thinking. No one doubts the existence of such a crisis. "For two generations, there has been much talk concerning a crisis of historicism."[5] Instead, the important issue is: what is the meaning and significance of the crisis? Just how is this crisis to be interpreted?

Fortunately, we need not endeavor to embrace the problem from every angle. Such ominibus attempts to swallow the problem whole, can only lead to greater difficulties. Instead, Hintze's writings provide us with a more modest approach. He wrote a number of studies in the post World War I period that shed considerable light on this problem.[6] These

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[4]For a bibliography of some of the leading works on the subject, see above, p. 41. The best brief account, though not wholly satisfactory, remains Karl Heussi, Die Krisis des Historismus.

[5]Franz Borkenau, "Die Krise des Historismus, ein deutsches Problem?" Drei Abhandlungen zur deutschen Geschichte (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1947), p. 76.

[6]The most important of these studies were O. Hintze, "Troeltsch und die Probleme des Historismus," Historische Zeitschrift, CXXV (1927), 188-239. This is reprinted in Hintze, Zur Theorie der Geschichte, pp. 20-71. All further references to this article refer to this work. Henceforth,

writings enable us to see how Hintze interpreted the crisis of German historicism. They throw valuable light on the nature of the crisis and Hintze's role within it. In many respects, they are a valuable commentary on the problems of German historical thought during the twentieth century. In this chapter, we shall show how Hintze's article on Troeltsch focused on some leading issues in the crisis of historicism. In the next chapter, we shall study another aspect of the crisis as disclosed in Hintze's essay on Max Scheler; for Scheler's sociology of knowledge constituted an attempt to overcome the crisis of historicism. Finally, in Chapter XI, we shall analyze Hintze's description of another attempt to overcome the crisis -- Oppenheimer's sociological interpretation of historical development.

Hintze's powerful essay on Troeltsch and the problems of historicism appeared in 1927 in Germany's leading historical journal, the Historische Zeitschrift. Superficially, the article appeared to be an elaborate review of several works by Troeltsch.[7] Actually, this was not the case. Hintze

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this essay will be cited as Hintze, "Troeltsch." The second important article by Hintze on the crisis of historicism was O. Hintze, "Max Scheler's Ansichten über Geist und Gesellschaft," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, XXCI (1926), 40-79. Henceforth, this article will be cited as Hintze, "Scheler," and his third important study was "Soziologische und Geschichtliche Staatsauffassung. Zu Franz Oppenheimer's System der Soziologie," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, XXCVII (1929), 35-106. Henceforth, this article will be cited as Hintze, "Oppenheimer."

[7]Specifically, Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, I. Buch: Das logische Problem der Geschichtsphilosophie (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922); Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa. Gesammelte kulturphilosophische Aufsätze und Reden, ed., H. Baron (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1925); Der Historismus und seine Überwindung (Berlin: Pan-Verlag, 1924).

stated that his purpose in writing the article was to come to personal grips with Troeltsch's thought concerning historiscism and not to review his books.[8] Hintze's approach in the article, thus, consisted of a systematic analysis of Troeltsch's ideas together with continual critical commentary. The article resembled a constant dialectical interplay between Hintze and Troeltsch.

Before we plunge into Hintze's interpretation of Troeltsch's views on historicism and his criticism of them, it may well be that a brief summary of the latter's ideas on the crisis of historicism may facilitate study.[9] We are for-

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[8]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 20.

[9]On Troeltsch, consult his Gesammelte Schriften, 4 volumes. This consists of Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, Vol. I of Gesammelte Schriften (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923); Zur religiosen Lage Religionsphilosophie und Ethik, Vol. II of Gesammelte Schriften (2nd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922); Der Historismus und seine Probleme, Vol. III of Gesammelte Schriften; Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschicte und Religionsoziologie, Vol. IV, Gesammelte Schriften. Also consult the following works by Troeltsch: Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1902); Das Historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie (Berlin: Reuther und Reuther, 1904); Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft (2nd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1929); Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt (3rd ed.; Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1924); Der Historismus und seine Überwindung; Spektatorbriefe (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924); Deutscher Geist und West Europa. On Troeltsch, consult the following secondary works: Walther Kohler, Ernst Troeltsch (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1941); Edmond Vermeil, La pensee religieuse d' Ernest Troeltsch (Strasbourg: Librarie Istra, 1922); Julius Schaaf, Geschichte und Begriff. Eine kritische Studie zur Geschichtsmethodologie von Ernst Troeltsch und Max Weber (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1947); Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge (New York: Liveright, 1938), pp. 155-166; Friedrich Wieneke Die Entwicklung des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs bei Ernst Troeltsch, doctoral dissertation (Soldin, H. Madrisch, 1929), pp. 29-35; E. W. Lyman, "Ernst Troeltsch's Philosophy of History," Philosophical Review, XLI (1932), 443-465; Friedrich

tunate in this regard. In 1922, the very year in which Troeltsch produced the most important work on the whole crisis of Historicism, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, he also wrote a short article on the crisis of historicism.[10] A summary of this article is essential in order to provide some background for understanding the relation of Hintze and Troeltsch to the crisis of historicism.

Troeltsch pointed out that the word, historicism, was often used currently as a term of reproach. In this sense, it amounted to a complaint against historical pedantry, complicated historical thinking, and the inability to make forceful decisions because of a too extensive historical education. According to Troeltsch, such a negative use of the term historicism represented nothing less than one aspect of

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Meinecke, "Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem des Historismus," Staat und Persönlichkeit, 54-65; Carlo Antoni, Vom Historismus zur Soziologie, translated by Walter Goetz (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, n. d.), 57-118; F. J. von Rintelen, "Der Versuch einer Überwindung des Historismus bei Ernst Troeltsch," Deutsch Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, VIII (1930), 324-372; W. Brachmann, Ernst Troeltsch historische Weltanschauung (Halle: Niemeyer, 1940), Friedrich Parpert, Die Aufgabe der geschichtlichen Abstraktion. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Ernst Troeltschs Geschichtsmethodologie, doctoral dissertation (Göttingen: Hubert and Co., 1929); Hans Liebrich, Die historische Wahrheit by Ernst Troeltsch, doctoral dissertation (Giessen: Glasgow, 1937); D. Freisber, Das Problem der historischen Objektivität in der Geschichtsphilosophie von Ernst Troeltsch, doctoral dissertation (Emsdetten: Heinrich und J. Lechte, 1940); Emil Spiess, Die Religionstheorie von Ernst Troeltsch (Paderborn: F. Schönongh, 1927): Walther Hofer, Geschichtsschreibung und Weltanschauung, pp. 319-545; J. Milton Yinger, "The Sociology of Religion of Ernst Troeltsch," An Introduction to the History of Sociology, ed., Harry Elmer Barnes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 309-316.

[10]Ernst Troeltsch, "Die Krisis des Historismus," Die neue Rundschau, I (1922), 572-590.

a widespread anti-intellectual rebellion against science in general. It was part and parcel of the disillusionment of many people with the belief in intellectual progress and the promises it held.[11]

Troeltsch explained that he did not wish to use the term historicism in this sense. Instead, he desired to approach the crisis of historicism from within, that is, "as originating out of the inner course and nature of history itself." The term historicism then assumes a neutral, rather than a negative meaning. It signifies the "historizing of our whole knowledge and perception of the cultural world, a process which took place during the nineteenth century."[12] Historicism means that we see everything in the flux of becoming, "in an endless and perpetually new process of individualization, in the determination through the past and in the direction toward an unknown future."[13] Historicism asserts that the state, law, morality, religion, and art are dissolved in the flux of historical becoming and are only understandable as a constitutive part of historical development. Troeltsch regarded historicism as shattering the belief in eternal truth no matter whether it was of an ecclesiatical supernatural sort or eternal rational truth or merely worldly sanctions of a secular view of rulers. "Historicism, in this sense, is the first total penetration of all corners of the cultural world, with a comparative and developmental historical mode of think-

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[11]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 572. Compare Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 1-11.

[12]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 572.

[13]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 573.

ing; a peculiarly modern form of thinking, fundamentally different from ancient and medieval, as well as that of the rational Enlightenment."[14]

Troeltsch considered historicism, in his meaning of the term as standing in opposition to another great principle, which he called naturalism. He used naturalism in a neutral sense, to mean "the great principle which seeks to explore the corporeal world (Körperwelt), including the life, nerve, and brain processes, according to the general scientific principles of natural causality."[15] Historicism and naturalism, together, exhaust the realm of the empirical sciences. They divide the world of the real sciences (Realwissenschaft) between them. But the precise delimitation between the two realms continues to be a matter of controversy. Troeltsch traced the beginning of this dichotomy between historicism and naturalism to the Cartesian dualism between mind and matter. The principle of naturalism triumphed first in the modern world, but since the end of the eighteenth century, the principle of historicism has effectively been competing against it.[16]

Troeltsch showed how history in the modern world first became an instrument for the criticism and elimination of medieval Christian culture. Under the influence of romanticism, historical thinking then became a counterweight against the revolutionary rationalistic spirit, as for example, with Ranke, Adam Müller, Comte, and Taine. Then history

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[14]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 573.

[15]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 574. See Heussi, Krisis des Historismus, p. 13, footnote 4.

[16]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 574.

was utilized for a new task, namely, the attempts to achieve national unification on the parts of the European peoples. Sybel, Treitschke, Seeley, and Thiers were historians who employed historical thought to this end. Finally, history entered a period of "value free realism" at the close of the nineteenth century and sought merely to arrive at historical truth and objectivity. Ultimately, historical realism also aimed at a picture of the past which would exhibit the development of mankind continuously and in terms of general connections. In practice, however, the extensive growth of monographic research and specialized techniques in historical investigation, rendered this ideal more and more remote. The result was that the task of synthesis devolved more and more upon dilettantes and improvisers -- men outside the historical craft. Troeltsch cited Spengler and H. G. Wells as representing characteristically German and English attempts at such synthesis.[17] To the innate difficulties of creating such a synthesis, one must add World War I. It shattered, said Troeltsch, all existing standards which up to then had been taken for granted. It therefore, broke the back of any historical frame, which sought to provide a picture of human development in a synthetic fashion. "An unending series of puzzles and stabs at the meaning of history, foolhardy, audacious new constructions, pessimistic doubts or sceptical musings, were the result."[18] This was the heyday for new philosophies of history, since the realm of critical historical scholarship retreated before the new confusions of the world and tenaciously adhered to its exacting standards.

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[17]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 575.

[18]Troeltsch, "Krises des Historismus," p. 576.

New and strangely refurbished movements made their appearance -- neo-catholicism, reinnovated rationalism, inspirational cliques, occult theosophies. These movements were free-floating relativistic islands of hope and despair in the sea of post-war intellectual Germany.

These conditions contributed to the growth of a crisis of historicism in Germany. Troeltsch attempted, however, to probe to the very foundation of this crisis. He discussed the crisis in terms of three problems. The first problem was one which Troeltsch called the "epistemic-logical problem of history."[19] Troeltsch stated the problem as follows: what is the relation of the activity of our mind in its search for order and law with the real events of this world? Applied to history, the problem is one of knowing to what extent history can grasp and reproduce the real events of the world.

Troeltsch maintained that all history was both a selection and a transformation from the vast number of available events. Even the largest narrative history is but a tiny detail in comparison with the total body of actually occurring events. No amount of source criticism, or techniques for the ascertainment of historical fact, can get around this situation. The most that source criticism can do is to establish the authenticity of certain historical events, but it cannot evade the fact that, in the end, the historian actually selects only a small number of events. According to Troeltsch, the events thus selected by the historian, therefore, possess a representative significance. The historian does not select individual events for their own sake; other-

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[19]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 577.

wise one event would be as good as another. Instead, he selects certain events because they are representative of some general tendency or situation which the historian wished to illustrate. "And only these larger connections are of general human significance, and invest history with a united influence upon education and life."[20] Therein lies a problem. On the one hand, there is the specialist historian who seeks to establish the authenticity of his facts with more and more refined techniques. Troeltsch called this "seminar history," and he admitted that it was a triumph of science. However, this philological "seminar" type of history only interested the specialist and his few fellow specialists within the same narrow field. But as soon as the results of these specialists were culled by other historians, to create what is, after all, the real task of history -- "the synthesis of larger developmental connections" -- the painful question regarding the objectivity of this larger synthesis arises.[21] Is this larger synthesis more than a penetrating logical arrangement of events; or is it merely a kind of literature? Doubts regarding the objectivity of this larger synthesis of history are, indeed, not dispelled, when it is noted that each age approaches history with novel questions, and, thus, rewrites history from its own standpoint. What, then, is left of the reality and objectivity of history?

Troeltsch argued that the dichotomy between the specialist historian and the synthesis historian could be dispelled only by a careful investigation of the philosophy of history. However, the vast number of specialist his-

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[20]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 578.

[21]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 578.

torians retreat in panic before the thought of studying the relations between philosophy and history; while attempts at historical synthesis fall largely into the hands of dilettantes. The upshot of the matter is that dilettantes, who are outside the historical profession, have taken into their hands the task of pronouncing on the meaning of history, either in terms of "scepticism, literature, or a practical cultural synthesis."[22] Wells and Spengler were examples. Opposed to them were the historical specialists whose retreat has gone so far as to bring from their critics the charge of pedantry, unfruitfulness, and imprisonment within a set of illusions.

The second great problem which Troeltsch regarded as characteristic of the crisis of historicism was "the introduction of sociological elements into historical research, causal explanation, and intuitive synthesis." In Troeltsch's estimation political intellectual and legal history were gradually being investigated from a special angle -- the sociological. Troeltsch showed that there were many precedents in the nineteenth century for such a viewpoint, including the St. Simon School, Comte, Müller, List, Rodbertus, and Marx. But the emergence of sociology as a special discipline immeasurably strengthened the sociological approach, which provided a powerful methodology for viewing history. This situation, consequently, led to a special problem.[24]

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[22]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 579.

[23]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 579.

[24]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 580.

The problem involved the relation between economic-social, political, religious, and intellectual factors. In this respect, Troeltsch argued that the sociological approach immensely complicated the whole problem of understanding historical causation and development. Instead of searching for a unified or monistic explanation of historical causation, it became apparent that there was a complicated network of interrelations between social-economic factors, and political, legal, intellectual, and religious ones. The task of constructing any unified historical synthesis was thereby rendered immensely more difficult, if not impossible. The historian was still obligated to present the peculiarly individual course of historical development, but comparative general sociology made this task extremely difficult. Yet, the historian retreated before the task.

> Above all, any encroachment on the historian's part into the vital questions of the day, depends on his grasping the mutual interrelations between economic-social, intellectual-cultural, and political-legal forces, and his willingness to take a stand on this matter. However, the present day historical profession is frightened to death at the thought of such a gigantic task, and takes flight preferably along old lines, in the pure contemplation of the fullness of historical, patriotic, or cultural construction; in the viewing of the development of European humanity, the modern state, or in art and literary history.[25]

Without such a sociological orientation, historians could neither meet their obligations to present day society, or construct an adequate theory of causation. Yet, as Troeltsch

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[25]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," pp. 581-582.

indicated, the majority of historians retreated before this task. Thereby, they revealed an inner crisis within historicism.

Troeltsch's third great problem, pertaining to the crisis of historicism, was based on the breakdown of the traditional value system of European civilization. Since the break-up of both the Christian theological and the "dynastic absolutistic" frameworks of values, the humanitarian belief in progress and the autonomy of reason had won out in various realms, such as law, religion, science, the state, society, and art. But Troeltsch contended that this optimistic belief in progress and humanity was itself in the process of being shattered. The breakdown of philosophy, the rise of Darwinism, the struggles of imperialism, the new Machiavellianism, have all contributed to engender a scepticism toward the idea of humanity. In addition to these factors, Troeltsch regarded Nietzsche's fight against traditional values, and Schopenhauer's scepticism concerning the possibility of history and progress, as additional ideological factors which were contributing to a breakdown of the traditional value system. Writing in 1922, after World War I, Troeltsch particularly reflected the German situation, when he referred to the breakdown of a unified value system, and the rise of an anarchy of values.

> Everything struggles against everything else: culture and progress, scepticism and aestheticism, struggle against a Christian attitude, above all, against that Protestantism so long identified with culture. The realists, the moderns, the believers in a folk idea, the expressionists, struggle against classicism. The followers of Christianity struggle

> among themselves and against modern culture. Struggles occur against capitalism and the middle class, against imperialism and war, in favor of nation, state, war, and Realpolitik; in favor of independent national or international pacifistic culture, for economics against politics, and politics against economics! Add to this, the split between America and Europe, the irresistible advance of America toward Europe, and the contrast between Russian and Western European values....[26]

Troeltsch considered World War I as constituting the peak of this confusion. It forever destroyed a whole group of values which had been taken for granted, along with a corresponding number of historical approaches which had been erected around these values. Since these values had been well-established historical values, their break-up represented a crisis within history. The historical approach had contributed to the breakdown of values by fostering a historical relativism. But history in turn also suffered from such a breakdown of values, since this breakdown, thus, destroyed the thread of historical continuity.

In terms of these three problem situations, Troeltsch regarded it as perfectly proper to speak of a crisis of historicism. He argued that the crisis was not only grounded in the events of his own day, but that it was the result of various logical tendencies within the development of historicism itself.[27] But the crisis of historicism, for Troeltsch, constitutes "a deep inner crisis of the age in general. It is no mere scientific problem, but a practical problem of life."[28]

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[26]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 583.

[27]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," pp. 583-584.

[28]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 586.

Troeltsch, therefore, turned to a discussion of various ways out of the crisis of historicism. One possible way out was a radical denial and hatred of knowledge and the assertion of fundamental antihistoricism. This represented an irrational and anti-intellectual response to the crisis of historicism. Another possibility was to search for a nationalistic folk (völkisch) interpretation of history, which would repudiate the West and stress the values inherent within the German people (Volk). The result would be the creation of a racial mythology built around the German people. A third possibility consisted in repudiating the total cultural political development of the West, as one gigantic error, and taking hope in the return to church authority and a modernized corporative society. Catholicism was the major sponsor of this solution.[29]

Troeltsch discussed one other possible way out, and he regarded it as the only solution for anyone who was "scientifically" oriented. This called for a new contact between history and philosophy. Troeltsch did not mean that historical scholarship should become completely impregnated with philosophical ideas. History must remain what it is, but in its selection of themes, and its objects of investigation, it must devote more and more attention to larger relationships and significant connections. History must relate itself to the problems of life and the need for a present day cultural synthesis along universal-historical lines.

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[29]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," pp. 586-588.

This was a task which Troeltsch believed historians and philosophers working together could accomplish. "Historicism yearns for ideas, philosophy for life. Both together can be aided by such a union."[30]

After this summary of Troeltsch's position on the problems of historicism, we can profitably turn to Hintze's article on Troeltsch. The first significant issue which Hintze discussed was the question whether historicism represented a total concept of life (Weltanschauung) or whether it was only a structural category (Kategorialstruktur).[31] The question was an exceedingly important one, for it made all the difference in the world, whether historicism was conceived as just a logical category of historical thinking, or whether it represented a total orientation toward life and society. Hintze focused his remarks on Troeltsch's work, Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Hintze argued that although this book was subtitled "the logical problem of the philosophy of history," it actually did not restrict itself to a formal historical logic (formale Geschichtslogik). It also contained ideas for a material philosophy of history and dealt with the relationship between the world of values, culture, and ethics, and history.[32]

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[30] Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 589. On Troeltsch's problem of solving the crisis of historicism, see also the section on ethics and the philosophy of history in his Der Historismus und seine Überwindung, pp. 1-61.

[31] Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 20-31.

[32] Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 21. Compare Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 1-110, 694-772.

Hintze agreed with Troeltsch that the term, historicism, was subject to a variety of interpretations. One meaning, which Hintze detected, went back to Nietzsche's essay on the use and misuse of history. Historicism, in this sense, referred to a one-sided exaggerated historical preoccupation with human affairs "leading to scepticism, relativism, or mere aesthetic contemplation, and thereby, to a weakening of the will and a paralysis of action."[33] In addition to this negative use, the term has come to have a more general meaning. Hintze argued that the general meaning of the term, historicism, fluctuated between regarding it as "the concept of a methodical mode of thinking, in the sense of being a logical structural category of the mind, and regarding it as representing a general life and world view, which could serve as a substitute for metaphysics."[34]

Hintze, thus, detected three fundamentally different meanings for the term, historicism. He contended that Troeltsch had not sufficiently distinguished between historicism as a logical category and historicism as a view of life. The reason for this lack of distinction was that Troeltsch accepted the Windelband-Rickert position regarding the "fundamental in indissoluble union of value relationships with logical categories." Hintze, therefore, regarded Troeltsch as one who constantly fluctuated between a logical category concept of historicism and a Weltanschauung

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[33]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 22.

[34]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 22. On Nietzsche's use of historicism, consult Heussi, Krisis des Historismus, p. 2.

interpretation of historicism. Moreover, Hintze refused to believe that Troeltsch had completely freed himself from even the negative use of the meaning of historicism. The complete historizing of all our ideas concerning man, culture, and values seems to lead one to the edge of an abyss of scepticism and relativism. Hintze, therefore, believed that Troeltsch's use of historicism in the positive sense occasionally called forth the ghost of historicism in the bad sense.[35] In general, Hintze contended that the use of the term historicism, to designate a whole way of life, dominated Troeltsch's approach. The consequence was that "for Troeltsch, emotional thought swallows up cognitive thought."[36] Hintze refused to follow Troeltsch in this regard. In the interests of what Hintze called a clear logic of history (klare Geschichtslogik), he deemed it desirable to view historicism as a logical category of thought.

Hintze also expressed himself on the manner in which Troeltsch included a great variety of movements within the fold of historicism. Troeltsch included such diverse movements and men within historicism, as romanticism, the historical-organological school, Ranke, Hegel, Marx, and positivism. The result was that Troeltsch tended to make the problems of historicism so inclusive, as to render them identical with the problems of the philosophy of history.[37] Hintze's

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[35]Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 22-23.

[36]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 24.

[37]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 24. Compare Troeltsch, Historismus, pp. 221-693.

position on this matter was not altogether clear. On the one hand, he regarded the heart of historicism to be "that great intellectual transformation which began with Vico, Herder, and Rousseau, and reached its culmination point in German romanticism, the historical school of law, Hegel and Ranke."[38] It emphasized the idea of individuality. On the other hand, if the idea of development was stressed as the crucial one in historicism, Hintze thought that one ought to include both Marxism and positivism as expressions of historicism. He considered the "specifically German idealistic interpretation of historicism as altogether too narrow."[39] Apparently then, he regarded idealism as the most characteristic but not the only expression of historicism.

Hintze also found himself unable to assent to Troeltsch's dichotomy between historicism and naturalism. He argued that Troeltsch had erected such a polar concept because he viewed historicism as the expression of a Weltanschauung. However, if one interpreted historicism as a logical category, then the opposite to historicism became not naturalism but pragmatism. Pragmatism, for Hintze, was the historiographical principle which prevailed before the rise of historicism. It was the principle that established meaningful connections between events on the basis of their usefulness to individuals and in terms of the purposeful

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[38]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 24.

[39]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 26.

actions of individual men. Such a pragmatic viewpoint had a certain justification in the realm of political history, but less so within cultural history. In politics, where one can observe the conscious behavior of strong personalities, the pragmatic principle seemed to operate. But with the rise of historicism, one became aware of the role of "anonymous forces, that tied the individual to the community." These forces seemed to operate "partly beneath, and partly above, the individual consciousness of men."[40] Historicism, thus, stressed the notion of an irrational purposeful interrelationship, which we call "development." Historicism created various carriers of the idea of development which operated on a level above and beyond the individual purposeful actions of individuals. Hintze cited, as examples, the "folk-soul" of the romantics, the "objective spirit" of Hegel and the "economic means of production of the Marxists."[41]

Hintze maintained that those historians who favored cultural history naturally stressed the importance of historicism. Old fashioned political historians, however, still employed the principle of pragmatism. Hintze considered Troeltsch as the arch representative of the principle of historicism. For this reason Troeltsch was interested only in those historians who were significant for the development of historicism and cultural history. The ordinary craft historian, who dealt with political affairs and narrative events, scarcely was mentioned in Troeltsch's great work,

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[40]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 27.

[41]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 27.

while numerous pages were devoted to Hegel, Marx, Wells, Nietzsche, Spengler, and the positivists. Even in his approach to Ranke, Hintze regarded Troeltsch as placing more emphasis on Ranke's notion of universal history and the idea of a Romano-Germanic family of nations, than on the concrete, particularistic, infinitely varied pictures, which Ranke drew in his histories of the various states.[41] What Hintze missed in Troeltsch's interpretation of Ranke was a recognition that Ranke was not only a leading representative of historicism but also a historian who combined the older notion of pragmatism with this historicism.

In brilliant fashion, Hintze showed how Troeltsch lacked any genuine appreciation of the role which pragmatism played in history. The result was that Troeltsch rejected any psychological approach to history. Hintze called Troeltsch's method pneumatic, in contrast to a psychological method. A psychological method seeks to relate historical events to psychological processes. A pneumatic method regards historical events as operating on an independent level, above and apart from psychological events. For his part, Hintze accepted a psychological explanation in history together with a limited form of pragmatism in historical explanations.[42]

Hintze considered his own approach in this regard as merely following in the footsteps of Droysen, Weber, and Dilthey's student, Spranger. Each of these men tried to explain

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[41]Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 27-28.

[42]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 31.

historical events in terms of psychological motivation. These men were links in the development of a cultural scientific psychology. This type of psychology (geisteswissenschaftlich Psychologie), contrasted sharply with a positivistic experimental psychology. Each of these men was interested in understanding the intended meaning of individuals, in the realm of social behavior by means of a psychology based on "understanding." But this approach played no important role in Troeltsch's interpretation of history. Hintze noted that Troeltsch believed "that a cultural scientific psychology could learn from history, but not the reverse." Troeltsch's pneumatic method, thus, precluded history from being based on any psychological framework.[43]

Hintze had thus far argued two things. He had sought to show that historicism was "a new, and peculiar category structure of the mind for the comprehension of historical events, which had slowly emerged among the Western peoples since the eighteenth century, and attained decisive validity during the nineteenth century especially in Germany, but not alone in Germany."[44] In the second place, he had argued, given this interpretation, historicism contrasted more with pragmatism than with naturalism.[45]

Hintze next turned to a highly complex analysis of the relationship between historicism and value structures.

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[43]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 30.

[44]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 39.

[45]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 30.

On this question, he differed fundamentally from Troeltsch.[46] Where Hintze regarded Troeltsch as following in the footsteps of Rickert's historical logic, which insisted that historicism was linked to values, he denied any such connection between values and historicism. Hintze summarized Troeltsch's point of view as elaborated in section three of Chapter I of Der Historismus und seine Probleme, a section which dealt with the problem of a formal logic of history.[47] Hintze regarded Troeltsch as maintaining that historicism was characterized by two categories -- individuality and development. The notion of individuality in history referred to both "biographical single individuals" and collective individualities such as "peoples, states, classes, estates; moreover, cultural periods, cultural movements, religious communities, complexes of events of all sorts, such as wars, revolutions, and the like."[48]

Troeltsch designated such collective individualities with the name "individual totalities."[49] Individual totalities with the quality of spontaneity and uniqueness are not psychologically or otherwise causally derived or explainable.[50] These individual totalities are historically

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[46]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 31.

[47]Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 27-67.

[48]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 32. Compare Troeltsch, Historismus, pp. 30-33.

[49]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 32. Compare Troeltsch, Historismus, p. 32.

[50]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 32. Compare Troeltsch, Historismus, pp. 35-42.

concrete objects. However, these individual historical totalities are also experienced in the form of historical concepts, arrived at by means of selection and empirical abstraction. Such abstractions are quite different from both the natural science classificatory concepts and physical laws. These empirical abstractions are related to a unity of meaning or value (Wert-oder Sinneineit).[51]

The second constitutive element of historicism is the category of development. Hintze discussed Troeltsch's use of this term. The value or meaning unity, which one finds associated with the individual historical totalities, manifests itself as a historical tendency or idea. Such tendencies or developments are grasped as an intuitive act. One somehow senses the existence of a historical development, but once having doneso, one must necessarily investigate the specific character of this development by means of causal connections, in order to confirm and control the range of our intuitions.[52] Troeltsch distinguished the idea of historical development from the concept of progress, which represented "a secularization of the Christian eschatology and the belief in a universal goal attainable by all of humanity."[53] The category of historical development for Troeltsch represented merely the notion of dynamic change and transformation. Historical development was also to be distinguished from Spencerian evolution, which presented a "complication

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[51]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 32.

[52]Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 32-33. Compare Troeltsch, Historismus, pp. 54-55.

[53]Troeltsch, Historismus, p. 57.

of the causal series represented by an alternation of aggregation and disaggregation."[54]

Hintze contended that Troeltsch had linked these two constitutive categories of historicism, individuality and development, with values. Thereby "the logical structure of the research seeking subject [the historian] was brought into the most intimate association with the historical object...."[55]

On this score, Hintze parted with Troeltsch, although he agreed with Troeltsch that individuality and development both characterize historicism.[56] Hintze thought that our notion of historical individuality was patterned after the analogy of human individuality. He regarded the concept of historical development as analogous to the idea of life processes within human beings. Hintze was convinced that we first grasp historical individualities as objects of history, as selves or units of life, in an intuitive fashion. The establishment of a logical unity of meaning of meaning comes only as a rational afterthought, and consists in reworking the empirically acquired material within a more consistent framework. But Hintze denied that our knowledge of historical individualities in history is dependent on values.

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[54]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 33. Compare Troeltsch, Historismus, p. 58.

[55]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 33. Compare Troeltsch, Historismus, pp. 200-220, where he deals with the problem of history and values.

[56]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 39.

Hintze insisted that the issue was in part a question of what we mean by values and value dependence. Insofar as all historical objects are products of human culture and belong to this realm they have some relationship to human values. If values are taken in this general sense, to designate that which has cultural meaning or significance, then Hintze agreed that every historical individuality is related to values. But Hintze insisted that Troeltsch was using the word value to mean a specific ethical good that makes for progress or betterment. Troeltsch thus had in mind certain specific ethical values, and not merely the general category of meaning.[57] What Hintze refused to concede was the proposition that our understanding of historical individualities depends on our acceptance of a specific body of ethical values, e.g., those of the European tradition. The consequence was that "The exclusion of a necessary relationship between a logic of history and definite cultural values permits one to comprehend historicism as a category structure that does not present a distinctive Weltanscauung, but is compatible with different Weltanschauungen as idealism and positivism."[58]

Hintze's view that historicism was not a Weltanschauung but only a specific category of the mind and, hence, a method represented one possible approach to the meaning of historicism. An opposite approach was taken by

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[57]Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 36-37.

[58]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 40.

Karl Mannheim in his article on historicism.[59] For Mannheim, historicism was not a fad or a fashion, not an intellectual current or mode of thinking. It was much more than this. "Historicism is indeed itself a Weltanschauung."[60] The approach of Troeltsch's was intermediate to Hintze's and Mannheim's positions, and it fluctuated between historicism as a category and Weltanschauung, thought it leaned heavily in the direction of the latter.

In his article on Troeltsch, Hintze engaged in an extensive discussion regarding the idea of historical development as another aspect of historicism. Hintze was concerned with the various forms in which historical development occurred. His starting point, for a discussion of this topic, was a critique of Troeltsch. According to Hintze, Troeltsch recognized only one form of historical development: namely, that form of development dominated by an idea or cultural value, or a complex of such values. Historical development, for Troeltsch, was a continual process of becoming, in which value unities realized themselves ultimately.[61]

Hintze refused to accept such a completely lofty

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[59]Karl Mannheim, "Historismus," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LII (1924), 1-60.

[60]Mannheim, "Historismus," pp. 1-2.

[61]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 41. Hintze was mistaken about Troeltsch on this point. A leading problem in the Troeltsch book was that of sociologically establishing a relationship between ideas and social forces. Hintze, himself, mentioned this point in a later section of his study. See Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 67. The point is discussed below. See p. 329.

and independent notion of cultural values or ideas. What, then, was the nature of ideas in historical development? According to Hintze, historical ideas were never purely spiritual or intellectual forces. Instead, they were a fusion of real factors and spiritual factors, concretely united to constitute real-spiritual tendencies (real-geistigen Tendenzen). In this respect, Hintze was in agreement with both Droysen and Ranke. Hintze's discussion of this topic was also stimulated by Scheler's sociology of knowledge.[62]

Hintze distinguished two realms of human activity. One is the realm of spirit or Geist. The other is the realm of the natural inclinations and desires (natürlich-tribhaftes Begehren). He maintained that "there was nothing in historical reality which is not formed and penetrated by the human spirit, and yet, which does not also spring from the roots of our natural inclinations."[63] No events in history are, therefore, exclusively the expression of either our spiritual or our natural dispositions. All historical events reflect both the activity of the spiritual and natural character of man.

Hintze distinguished two levels of historical reality -- the historical-social level (die geschichtlich gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit) and the spiritual-cultural level (geistig-kulturellen Wirklichkeit). Both levels of

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[62]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 41. Scheler's influence will be investigated in the next chapter. See below, pp. 333-373.

[63]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 41.

historical reality were expressions of the spiritual and natural character of man. But the historical-social level of reality was dominated by the natural impulses of man, whereas the spiritual-cultural level was dominated by the spiritual dimension of man. The historical-social level of reality was civilization; while the spiritual-cultural level could also be designated as the realm of higher culture.[64]

Civilization, or the historical-social level of reality, was expressed in such phenomena as race, race separations and mixtures, population movements, food problems, economic conditions of production, technological transformations, movements of tribes and peoples, social differentiations, and class conflicts, formations of states and marriage forms. In the realm of civilization, the natural forces prevail, in terms of power, food, and sex drives, with all of their manifold variations and interweavings. These natural forces usually express themselves in an unconscious social pattern of mass actions. But Hintze emphasized that, though the civilizational process was predominantly the expression of these natural drives of men, it was not exclusively so. Spiritual factors were interwoven with the natural factors, but in a means-end relationship. That is, the spiritual factors were not regarded as ends in themselves, but were subordinated to "life needs and life demands."[65]

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[64]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 41.

[65]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 41.

Hintze regarded the civilizational process -- the expression of the historical social level of reality -- as not wholly separate from the level of biological evolutionary development. Consequently, he could not accept Troeltsch's notion that historical development, and also biological evolutionary development, were totally different in kind. Hintze rejected the older romantic notion of development, represented by the German historical school, Adam Müller, and Schelling, who believed in a folk spirit and an organic-historical development, analogous to that of a human organism. But he argued that the modern biological ontogenetic concept of development permitted adequate sociological analysis. This latter concept of development "rests on the rational procedure of empirical causal research, and seeks to explain the totality of a social structure in terms of its elements and their mutual effects upon one another."[66]

Hintze contrasted the spiritual-cultural level of history with the civilizational level. The spiritual-cultural level emerges out of the civilizational level, but its form and character are different. The difference between the two levels, in Hintze's estimation, is the following. Whereas the civilizational level manifests itself in the form of a continual steady process of development; the spiritual-cultural level operates in an abrupt manner, revealing all sorts of contrasts and contradictions. The form

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[66]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 42.

of historical development in the civilizational process, thus, is evolutionary, while the form of historical development in the spiritual-cultural process is dialectical.[67] The civilizational level is largely the product of "unconscious, natural impulsive" forces; the spiritual-cultural level is dominated by conscious intellectual-spiritual factors. Hence, the process of social evolution on the civilizational level and that of cultural creativity on the spiritual level are quite different.

Hintze, therefore, drew a sharp contrast between the realms of nature and spirit. Social evolution, on the civilizational level, was a natural and necessary process. Cultural creativity on the spiritual level was a free deliberate expression of the conscious mind. Hintze, who saw a dialectical opposition between the two realms of nature, also saw opposition within the very realm of higher culture. The realm of culture constantly exhibited internal tensions, contrasts and oppositions, which reflected a dialectical, not an evolutionary development.[68]

A leading manifestation of the relationship between the realms of civilization and culture were the so-called historical ideas or tendencies. Hintze regarded the whole notion of periodicity in history as based on the principle that dominant tendencies or ideas emerged in history. Thus, we speak of such distinct ages as the Renaissance, Enlighten-

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[67]Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 43-45.

[68]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 44.

ment, Reformation, Romanticism, etc., each dominated by certain tendencies or ideas. These ideas belong neither wholly to the realm of spirit or to the realm of nature. Instead, historical ideas are a product of ideal and real factors of spiritual and natural forces. In order for great historical ideas to have any effect, it is necessary that the ideas be constantly accompanied by the cooperation of "real forces" (realer Kräfte), which arose out of the impulsive life of the masses and express social action.

Hintze rejected Hegel's notion that ideas operate completely on an independent and autonomous level. But he also disclaimed Marx, who viewed ideas as nothing but a function of the economic structure of society. Instead, ideas possess an intermediate status between spirit and society, partaking of both elements. Hintze understood clearly that German idealism tended to view ideas as something superhuman. This was the view of both Schelling and Humboldt. In this idealistic tradition, ideas broke through into the realm of historical reality as a sudden revelation of God. Hintze contended that Troeltsch shared such a view.[69]

For his part, Hintze refused to accept this aspect of German idealism. He repudiated the view of ideas as the expression of an objective spirit, or as the products of a divine revelation. History was not Geistesgeschichte, the account of an autonomous realm of spiritually unfolding ideas. The problem, for Hintze, was rather one of showing how ideas

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[69]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 46.

represent the activity of both real and ideal forces. It was a problem in historical sociology, of establishing a relationship between the realms of spirit (Geist) and society (Gesellschaft). The problem was an exceedingly complex one.[70]

> I only want to give expression to the view here that these historical ideas, these real-spiritual tendencies of Ranke, are no derivative revelations of a superhuman sphere but rather quite peculiarly the work of human cultural communities and their individuals, leaders, and carriers. Thereby, I do not deny the mysterious and inexplicable character of creative productivity as an expression of the depths of human individuality. That element will always remain as a residue; in no ways is it denied. The famous X of Droysen's, therefore, remains standing. Only, it is my view that research must always strive to reduce this X to a minimum. Otherwise, one would be better advised to give up altogether scientific research work in history and follow Spengler in poetizing about history. Whereby, such a situation would mean that in the end Schiller and Shakespeare greatly excel the whole crew of modern historians.[71]

After dealing with the concept of historical development in terms of the various forms and rhythm of development, Hintze turned to the question concerning the goal of historical development. Is history heading toward some final end or purpose? Hintze's answer was that from a formal standpoint there were two possibilities. Either history was a linear progressive affair aiming toward an ideal goal or it resembled a closed revolution or cycle without any fixed goal eternally recurring, but each time such occurred on a higher plane. Hintze dealt with both of these concepts.[72]

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[70]Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 46-47.

[71]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 49.

[72]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 53.

He disagreed with Troeltsch's contention that the idea of progress was different and distinct from the idea of development.[73] Instead, Hintze maintained that the idea of historical development ought to include within its fold the idea of progress. How was this possible? Hintze's answer was that the idea of progress could mean two things. It could mean a steady enhancement and intensification of culture in a positive sense. Or progress could mean the ability to preserve the culture of the past and transmit it to ever-wider groups and peoples of mankind. Hintze called the former meaning of progress, the intensive meaning, the latter, the extensive. It was this latter meaning that he had in mind.[74]

Hintze argued that modern civilization was witnessing a large scale application of the extensive meaning of culture. Contacts between the different civilizational areas were constantly being accelerated in the modern world. The whole colonial expansion of European civilization was an example. Consequently, a widespread diffusion of culture was taking place all over the globe. Indeed, Hintze contended, that a unification or globalisation of the world was in process and that the European-American hegemony during modern times represented but one phase in the eventual unification of the world.[75]

Hintze showed that a cyclical theory of historical development already was present in the writings of Spinoza,

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[73]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 53. See Troeltsch, Historismus, p. 57.

[74]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 53.

[75]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 55.

Goethe, and Nietzsche. But since ideas about history and nature were so closely interwoven in the thought of these men, they did not develop a specifically "historical" theory of cycles. This was reserved for Vico. In the nineteenth century age of nationalism, the cyclical theory again was employed by Lamprecht, who carried it to extremes. Hintze maintained that in the twentieth century, nations no longer were the units of a cyclical theory of history. Instead, whole cultural areas or civilizations now were regarded as undergoing cyclical transformations. Spengler's work was an example.[76]

Hintze's acceptance of a cautious application of a cyclical theory of civilizations in combination with a Rankean notion of universal history was in line with the great cultural areas which went through a curve of development in time. These cultural areas were constantly influenced by outside culture contacts and exchanges. But it is wrong to regard such great cultures as a self-contained group of entities. The beginnings of Western civilization created out of ancient classical culture, Germanic factors, and the Christian church is proof enough that cultures are never self-contained entities.[77] Moreover, the gradual unification of the world in modern times, due to the culture contact acceleration between such great areas as Europe, the Far East, Russia, and India, testifies to the falsity of a too narrow cyclical theory of historical development.

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[76]Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 54-55.

[77]Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 55-56.

The last significant issues treated by Hintze in his discussion of Troeltsch and historicism were those involving questions and standards of measuring historical events, together with the problem concerning the nature of a cultural synthesis. Both problems were aspects of what Troeltsch called a material philosophy of history as distinct from a logic of history. A material philosophy of history involved the problem of fusing a concept of universal-historical development with a cultural synthesis and set of values. In dealing with a cultural synthesis and set of values and Troeltsch's conception of a material philosophy of History, Hintze was once again involved in the problem concerning the relationship between historicism and values.

He insisted that a logic of history could arrive at a concept of historicism, which does not depend on a specific set of values. It is, thus, possible to know individual historical totalities and their developmental character without commitment to a given body of values.[78] However, Hintze agreed with Troeltsch that any particular material philosophy of history did depend on values, since its very character was its attempt to formulate a specific philosophy of history in terms of a given body of values. According to Hintze, Troeltsch was not successful in working out a logic of history. But Hintze indicated that Troeltsch's main concern was not so much a formal logic of history as a material philosophy of history. Troeltsch's principal aim was to work out "on the basis of a universal-historical process of development, a great cultural synthesis for the present age, which

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[78]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 56.

at the same time would provide the ethical impulse for a continuation of his culture in the future."[79] Hintze showed how Troeltsch related these three elements -- a universal process of development, a cultural synthesis for the present, and a set of ethical values -- in his material philosophy of history. Thus, any cultural synthesis for the present age could only be conceived as the outcome of a process of universal-historical development. But conversely, any universal-historical development could only be understood by a historian who was sensitive to the value of the present age and, hence, who recognized the need for a cultural synthesis.[80]

Although Troeltsch accepted Rickert's notion that our ideas regarding historical objects depend upon a value relationship, the nature of values was different for Troeltsch and Rickert. Hintze showed how Troeltsch rejected Rickert's notion of a system of absolute formal values. Historical value judgments for Troeltsch did not depend on any absolute values, since no historical values could transcend the flux of the actual world. Rickert could not explain how absolute values were related to the empirical facts of history. Moreover, Hintze regarded Troeltsch as objecting to Rickert's absolute values, because such a notion preclude any genuine acceptance of the two principles of historicism, historical individuality and dynamic development. It also made nonsense

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[79]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 57.

[80]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 57. Compare Troeltsch, Historismus, p. 694.

of the search for a cultural synthesis founded upon a notion of universal-historical development and the ethical values of the present age.[81]

Hintze showed how Troeltsch's historical values were, therefore, not absolute but only immanent values. Troeltsch did not measure historical events by some absolute norm. Instead, he employed the ethical ideals which history had actually arrived at as his norms. Hintze insisted, however, that Troeltsch was not actually searching for standards of measuring historical events in terms of such immanent values. But Troeltsch was engaged in doing three things. These were firstly, understanding individual cultural phenomena; secondly, explaining how cultural attainments are transmitted by historical communities; and finally, the dealing with the need for a cultural synthesis for the present age which would combine and transmit the historical values of the past to the future.[82]

Hintze contrasted his own position with that of Troeltsch on all three points. With respect to the problem of how we come to understand individual cultural phenomena in history, Hintze completely rejected the theological implications of Troeltsch's position, and he sought some solution in a cultural scientific psychology, such as that of Spranger.[83]

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[81] Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 58. Compare Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Überwindung, pp. 21-41; 152-156.

[82] Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 60-61.

[83] Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 61. See E. Spranger, Lebensformen (5th ed.; Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1925).

Hintze's position on the issue of how culture was transmitted from people to people, and group to group, was that not all elements of culture are transmitted but only certain ones -- namely -- those which have a special value for some people or group. Moreover, this process is accomplished by means of a special process of schooling and education, designed to reveal to the new group the value and necessity of such cultural transmission. This task usually is in the hands of a special elite, for example, the clergy in the early Christian and Latin culture. The humanists did the same in the Renaissance, and the neo-humanists accomplished this for the age of Wilhelm von Humboldt.[84]

The third issue, the question of a cultural synthesis, was a crucial one for Troeltsch. If Troeltsch rejected any absolute values, how could he escape from historical relativism? If all history was a ceaseless flux, how could Troeltsch find a fixed point upon which to erect his cultural synthesis and his ethical values?[85] Hintze's views on the dangers of Troeltsch succumbing to a full-blown relativism were highly interesting. Hintze distinguished between a constructive and a destructive historical relativism. A destructive relativism was one which held

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[84]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 62.

[85]Meinecke and Rintelen both view this as the central question in Troeltsch's historicism. Consult Meinecke, "Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem des Historismus," Staat und Persönlichkeit, pp. 55-56. Fritz-Jochim von Rintelen, "Der Versuch einer Überwindung des Historismus bei Ernst Troeltsch," Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, VIII (1930), 324.

that all life and activity was dependent upon and determined by factors which lie outside our own consciousness. This kind of relativism must be combatted, because it denies "the spontaneous activity and the autonomous self-certainty of one's own consciousness."[86] However, once we accept the free activity of our minds as certain, then we need not fear relativism. For we, then, have a constructive relativism, which "acknowledges the unrestricted relativity of all historical life," and yet, "does not sacrifice the freedom of the mind." For freedom is at "bottom nothing but the consciousness of freedom."[87] But Hintze was forced to concede that such a position led to an "antinomy, in the acknowledgment of a general necessity on the one hand, and the consciousness of individual freedom on the other side." Hintze did not deny this antinomy. Indeed, he affirmed it, insisting that "the antinomy between necessity and freedom was the puzzle of human existence generally and the source point of all philosophical dialectic."[88]

In dealing with the problem of what Troeltsch understood by a cultural synthesis, Hintze showed that Troeltsch approached the problem from many angles. Troeltsch not only attempted to link up his cultural synthesis with a set of values and a concept of universal-historical development, but he sought to show that these three factors were the harmonious expression of a divine God.

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[86]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 63.

[87]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 63.

[88]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 63.

Hintze rejected the notion that the historical world represented the harmonious outcome of a God-like order.[88] He regarded the question concerning the relationship between ethical values, present-day cultural synthesis, and historical development as a very significant one.

Hintze showed that, for Troeltsch, the present-day cultural synthesis could only be the outcome of a process of universal-historical development. What was the nature of this universal-historical development? Troeltsch rejected the idea of the Enlightenment, which equated universal-historical development with the history of all of humanity. Instead, Troeltsch restricted the notion to those areas that had contributed directly or were parts of Western civilization. Universal-historical development thus consisted of Western civilization, which was itself the product of the fusion of the ancient Mediterranean culture, the Romano-Germanic peoples and the Christian world.[89]

Hintze criticised such a concept of universal-historical development. Troeltsch had included Russia within the orbit of Western civilization. Yet, he excluded Islam. Likewise, he excluded the Far Eastern and Indian areas. America, on the other hand, was included as an obvious example of Western civilization. Hintze argued that Troeltsch was viewing universal-historical development too exclusively

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[88]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 64.

[89]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 66.

from a Germanic, European, continental, and "specifically Christian" point of view. The emphasis was too narrowly on the West. The cultural synthesis which Troeltsch sought was a Western European one. Hintze did not regard such an approach as representing the height of wisdom. Instead, he entertained the possibility of a future synthesis between East and West. Consequently, Troeltsch's ideas regarding universal-historical development and cultural synthesis, required both revision and wider application.[90]

Hintze, nevertheless, detected real strength in Troeltsch's concept of universal-historical development. This consisted in the application of a sociological approach to that development. Troeltsch had learned the importance of such an approach from Max Weber and Werner Sombart. Hintze argued, that this approach enabled Troeltsch to make genuine concessions toward a historical realistic standpoint, this view "saw that all spiritual, civilizational, and cultural elements rested on the understructure of social-economic-legal relations...."[91] Troeltsch was thus able to investigate the relationship between ideal and real factors in history.[92]

Hintze, recognized, however, that Troeltsch's socio-

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[90]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 67.

[91]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 67. Compare Troeltsch, Historismus, pp. 367-370; 754-756; Troeltsch, Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionsoziologie, pp. 11-12.

[92]Consult, for example, Troeltsch's great work, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, which approaches the development of Christianity from this standpoint.

logical approach to universal-historical development rendered the achievement of any present-day cultural synthesis extremely difficult. Such cultural synthesis, he argued, rested on the ability to harmonize and synthesize contemporary spiritual ideal forces with the real forces. It involved a union of spirit and society, of Geist and Gesellschaft. However, the possibility of uniting ideal and real forces in post-war Germany was no longer present. World War I had destroyed the traditional frame of German society and left the country in confusion. The cultural and social forces of post-war Germany exhibited all sorts of contrasts and tensions. Moreover, Hintze maintained that Post-World-War-I Germany had to choose between a "capitalistic-imperialistic and a federalistic-socialistic world order."[93] Germany, caught between East and the West, had to orient itself one way or the other. Hintze argued that Germany could not orient itself within the "capitalistic-imperialistic frame" of the victorious Western powers. This was a moral impossibility for these powers had rendered Germany defenseless, politically powerless, and severely injured, in terms of national and moral values. Nor could Germany orient itself toward the East, for this was contrary to all past German traditions.[94] Germany, thus, was caught in a genuine dilemma.

Hintze was very pessimistic regarding the actual

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[93]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 69.

[94]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 70.

chances of creating a European cultural synthesis which would prove acceptable to post-war Germany. He could not share Troeltsch's optimism. Yet, he expressed the warmest admiration for Troeltsch's attempts to create such a synthesis. "Such a cultural synthesis is actually the work upon which all of us are more or less consciously, hopefully, and energetically occupied."[95]

Hintze, therefore, accepted the responsibilities for the creation of a material philosophy of history with the utmost seriousness. If he was pessimistic regarding the success of such an attempt, it was not because he denied the necessity of it, but rather, it was because he believed that serious tensions existed between the "mind" and "body" of post-war Germany. This schism between Geist and Gesellschaft in post-war Germany and Europe made the task of any cultural synthesis incredibly difficult. Hintze insisted that any theoretical construction of history, designed to exhibit objectively the universal-historical development of the past was not sufficient. Nor was an aesthetic contemplation of history, which merely sought to enjoy the values of the past for its own sake, the answer. Both these viewpoints needed to be cultivated and maintained, but they required supplementation by means of a third position, which would strive actively toward a present-day cultural synthesis -- toward an "ethical will to culture."[96] This task

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[95]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 70.

[96]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 70. Compare Troeltsch's position regarding the necessity of a Persönlichkeits - und Gewissensmoral in his Der Historismus und seine Überwindung, pp. 1-21.

required a personal commitment, an individual act of resolution, a determination and will to culture. It was an act of personal responsibility toward the cultural demands of the age.[99]

Hintze's study on Troeltsch was, thus, a genuine reflection of the crisis of historicism. Not only did Hintze discuss Troeltsch's views on historicism, but Hintze, himself, came to grips with the chief problems of historicism, on the epistemic problem of historicism, on the question of the sociological relationship between ideal and real factors in history, and on the need for a historical cultural synthesis. Thus, Hintze expressed himself on all three of the central issues within the crisis of historicism.

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[99]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 70. Compare Troeltsch's position regarding the Personlichkeits - und Gewissensmoral situation in his Der Historismus und seine Überwindung, pp. I-21.

CHAPTER X

SCHELER AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

In his article on the crisis of historicism, Troeltsch maintained that one of the three leading problems in the crisis of historicism was "the introduction of sociological elements into historical research, causal explanation, and intuitive synthesis."[1] The sociological approach to history focused attention on the relation between ideal and real factors in history. It concerned itself with the connection between political, religious, intellectual forces and economic-social ones. A whole new discipline arose to handle this problem -- the sociology of knowledge. The development of the sociology of knowledge in post-war Germany was no accident. It grew directly out of the crisis of historicism and was an attempt to solve the crisis.[2]

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[1]Troeltsch, "Krisis des Historismus," p. 579.

[2]On the development of the sociology of knowledge, consult Ernst Grünwald, Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens. Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der wissensoziologischen Theorien (Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1934); Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1938), I, 490-499; II, 824-839; 906-912; 921-926; H. Otto Dahlke, "The Sociology of Knowledge," Contemporary Social Theory, ed., Harry Elmer Barnes, Howard Becker, Frances Bennett Becker (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1940), pp. 72-85; Theodor Buddeberg, "Zur Soziologie des europäischen Denkens," Jahrbuch für Soziologie, III (1927), 157-183; Robert K. Merton, "The Sociology of Knowledge," Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), pp. 217-247;

A leading figure in the development of the sociology of knowledge in post-war Germany was the brilliant thinker, Max Scheler. Scheler was without any doubt one of the most influential forces in the intellectual life of Germany during the nineteen twenties.[3] He faithfully reflected the crisis of historicism and the attempt to overcome it. In 1926, Hintze devoted an elaborate article in one of Germany's most important journals

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Gerald L. De Gre, Society and Ideology, an Inquiry into the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Bookstore, 1943); Hans Speier, "The Social Determination of Ideas," Social Order and the Risks of War (New York: George W. Stewart, 1952), pp. 95-112; Karl Mannheim, Die Gegenwartsaufgaben der Soziologie (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1932); Karl Mannheim, "German Sociology (1918-1933)," Politica, I (1934), 12-33. Karl Mannheim, "Historismus," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LII (1924), 1-60; Karl Mannheim, "Ideologische und soziologische Interpretation der geistigen Gebilde," Jahrbuch für Soziologie, II (1926), 424-440; Karl Mannheim, "Das Problem einer Soziologie des Wissens," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LIII (1925), 557-652; Karl Mannheim, "Wissensoziologie," Handwörterbuch der Soziologie, ed., Alfred Vierkandt (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1931), pp. 659-680; Carl Brinkmann, "Der 'Überbau' und die Wissenschaften von Staat und Gesellschaft," Wirtschafteformen und Lebensformen, Gesammelte Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik (2nd ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1950), pp. 9-33; Karl Dunkmann, "Die soziologische Begründung der Wissenschaft," Archiv für systematische Philosophie und Soziologie, XXX (1927), 145-164; Hans Ehrenberg, "Ideologische und Soziologische Methode, ein Wort zur Socialisierung der Denkart," Archiv für systematische Philosophie und Soziologie," XX (1927), 133-144; Hans Freyer, Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft (Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1930), pp. 79-114; Paul L. Landsberg, "Zur Soziologie der Erkenntnistheorie," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, LV (1931), 769-808; Alexander von Schelting, "Zur Streit um die Wissensoziologie," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LXII (1929), 1-66.

[3]On Scheler, consult the following of his works: Die Transcendentale und die psychologische Methode, Eine grundsätzliche Erörterung zur philosophischen Methodik

on political and social science, to the problem

(2nd ed.; Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1922); Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1912); Das Schamgefühl (Halle: Niemeyer, 1914); Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (3rd ed.; Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1927); Abhandlungen und Aufsätze (Leipzig: Weisse Bucher, 1915), 2 volumes; Vom Ewigen im Menschen (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist, 1921); Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (3rd ed.; Bonn: Cohen, 19260; Moralia (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist, 1923); Nation und Weltanschauung (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist, 1923); Christentum und Gesellschaft (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist, 1924), 2 parts; "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens," Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens, ed., Max Scheler (München und Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1924), 1-151; Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1925); Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist, 1926); Philosophische Weltanschauung (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1929); Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (München: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1947); Bildung und Wissen (3rd ed.; Frankfurt Am Main: G. Schulte-Bulmke, 1947). Consult the following secondary works on Scheler: Paul Arthur Schilpp, "The 'Formal Problems' of Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophical Review, XXXVI (1927), 101-120; Wilhelm Jerusalem, "Soziologie des Erkennens," Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Sozialwissenschaften, III (1921), 28-34; Ernst Grünwald, Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens, pp. 158-171; Erich Fechner, "Der Begriff des kapitalistischen Geistes und das Scheleresche Gesetz vom Zusammenhang der historischen Wirkfaktoren," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LXIII (1930), 93-120; Gerald L. De Gré, Society and Ideology, pp. 10-22; Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, pp. 596-617; H. Otto Dahlke, "The Sociology of Knowledge," Contemporary Social Theory, pp. 72-83; V. J. McGill, "Scheler's Theory of Sympathy and Love, "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II (1942), 273-292; Hanna Hafkesbrink, "The Meaning of Objectivism and Realism in Max Scheler's Philosophy of Religion: A Contribution to the Understanding of Max Scheler's Catholic Period," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II (1942), 293-308; Howard Becker and Helmut Otto Dahlke, "Max Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research II (1942), 310-322; Alfred Schuetz, "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II (1942), 323-347; Richard Hays Williams, "Scheler's Contributions to the Sociology of Affective Action with Special Attention to the Sociology of Shame," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II (1942), 348-358, Hans-Joachim Lieber, "Zur Problematik der Wissensoziologie bei Max Scheler," Philoso-

of Max Scheler's views on spirit (Geist) and society (Gesellschaft).[4] This article enables us to study Hintze's growing preoccupation with the problems of historical sociology and the sociology of knowledge. It is valuable too as an interpretation of Scheler's sociology of knowledge. Above all, it allows us to understand how the sociology of knowledge reflected a crisis in historicism, and the attempt to overcome such a crisis.

Hintze's article on Scheler was from one standpoint, an elaborate review and analysis of a book on the sociology of knowledge which Scheler had edited in 1924.[5] This book marked a turning point in the development of

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phische Studien, I (1949), 82-90; Erich Rothacker, Scheler's Durchbruch in die Wirklichkeit (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1949); Katharina Kanthack, Max Scheler, zur Krisis der Ehrfurcht (Berlin: Minerva, 1948); Heinrich Lützeler, Der Philosoph Max Scheler, ein Einführung (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1947); J. Nota, Max Scheler, Een Worstelen om het Wezen van den Mens (Brussel: Het Spectrum, 1946); Theodor Haecker, "Zum Problem Geist und Leben bei Scheler," Hochland, XXII (1925-1926), 129-155; H. Hugelmann, Max Scheler's Persönlichkeitsidee unter Berücksichtigung der Gemeinschaftsproblem, doctoral dissertation (Leipzig: Helm and Torton, 1927); H. Herzfeld, Begriff und Theorie vom Geist bei Max Scheler, doctoral dissertation (Leipzig: Werkgemeinschaft, 1940); Paul Honigsheim, "Max Scheler als Sozialphilosoph," Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Sozialwissenschaften, III (1929), 94-108.

[4]Otto Hintze, "Max Scheler's Ansichten über Geist und Gesellschaft," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaften, LXXXI (1926), 40-79.

[5]Max Scheler, ed., Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. Herausgegeben im Auftrage des Forschungsinstituts für Sozialwissenschaften in Köln. Mit Beitragen von Justus Hashagen, Paul Honigsheim, Wilhelm Jerusalem, Paul L. Landsberg, Paul Luchtenberg, Kuno Mittenzwey, Hellmuth Plessner, Max Scheler, Lore Spindler, Walter Johannes Stein, H. L. Stoltenberg, Vollrath, L. V. Wiese (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts für Sozialwissenschaften in Köln, II; München und Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1924).

the sociology of knowledge as a distinct discipline. It represented a coordinated attempt on the part of the Research Institute for Social Sciences at Cologne, to formulate the theoretical principles of the sociology of knowledge, and to provide a series of concrete studies which would exhibit "historical types of scientific cooperation."[6] Accordingly, the book was divided into three parts. Part one was entitled "Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge." It was a one hundred and fifty page introduction to the leading issues in the sociology of knowledge, written by Scheler, who was director of the Cologne Institute for Social Sciences.[7] Part two was entitled "Formal Sociology of Knowledge and Epistemology," and dealt with two problems: the general forms and conditions of the formation of knowledge, and special conditions determining the formation of knowledge in the realms of history, law and economics.[8] Part three was entitled the "Material Sociology of Knowledge," and dealt in a series of separate studies with such diverse historical types of "scientific cooperation," as the Indian Brahman caste, the Aristotelian School, the medieval scholastics and mystics, and the modern type of cultural institute.[9] The book thus represented the first

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[6]Scheler, Versuche, p. ix.

[7]Scheler, Versuche, pp. 1-150.

[8]Scheler, Versuche, pp. 151-274.

[9]Scheler, Versuche, pp. 275-450.

systematic and coordinated attempt on the part of a group of scholars to formulate the principles and practice of the sociology of knowledge.

This work, edited by Scheler, did not, however, originate the sociology of knowledge. Grünwald, in his work on the sociology of knowledge, has traced the whole pre-history of the sociology of knowledge, in terms of such movements as the doctrine of ideology of the Enlightenment, irrationalism in the form of Nietzsche, Pareto, and Sorel; Durkheim's sociological views, Hegel, Romanticism, Feuerbach, Marx, and Dilthey.[10] But Scheler's attempt was novel in at least two ways. It marked the first attempt by a group of scholars to formulate a systematic cooperative project regarding the sociology of knowledge. Moreover, it represented the first significant endeavor to free the sociology of knowledge from its positivistic basis.[11]

Hintze recognized the pioneering quality of Scheler's work in this respect. "The sociology of knowledge," said Hintze, "has hitherto been a domain of the positivistic school."[12] It is the distinction of Scheler and his followers to have freed it from such a narrow viewpoint. Hintze argued that the general point

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[10]E. Grünwald, Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens, pp. 1-52.

[11]Grünwald, Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens, p. 158. Scheler, Versuche, p. vi.

[12]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 40.

of view and fundamental outlook of both Scheler and his followers was not positivistic but metaphysical. They recognized metaphysics as an ineradicable need of the human spirit and also maintained that a metaphysical viewpoint was "scientifically possible."[13] In a general way, Scheler's problem of a sociology of knowledge was this: how was it possible to maintain a sociological point of view and still not succumb to either positivism or Marxism? And how was it possible to maintain a historicist position and still leave room for metaphysics? To vindicate metaphysics, to do justice to the legitimate claims of sociology, and to reap the benefits of modern historicism, -- these represented the aims of Scheler's sociology of knowledge. His sociology of knowledge represented the conjunction of philosophical, sociological, and historicist tendencies. The most striking aspect of Scheler's sociology of knowledge was his attempt to maintain both historicism and a metaphysics based on absolute ideal essences.

The one dominant idea which Hintze saw reflected throughout this work of Scheler and his associates was the notion that there are no unchanging uniform categorical forms of thought in history. Instead, human history revealed the presence of many different modalities and forms of thought, each determined by special sociological conditions.[14] Kant's belief that he had discovered the

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[13]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 40.

[14]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 42.

unity and constancy of categorical forms of thought (kategoriale Denkformen) was viewed as an error. His categories were valid only for European man at a certain period of history, and not applicable to all periods and peoples, especially to pre-literates.

Hintze considered that the attack against the Kantian categories had come from two directions. On the one hand, the post-Kantian idealistic philosophy of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel "sought and found new categories, and a dialectical movement in the phenomenology of spirit."[15] On the other, positivism and psychologism sought to discover those principles which regulated changes in the collective thinking of peoples. Wundt's important folk-psychology, Levy-Bruhl's study of primitive mentality, Lamprecht's false attempt to create a national psychology of cultures, were examples of this latter trend.[16] The denial of Kant's position regarding the status of categories, together with the subsequent discovery that there were innumerable different categories, each one subject to particular historical and sociological conditions, left its influence on Hintze. In his study on Troeltsch, written a year after the article on Scheler, this tendency is clearly revealed. Historicism is there viewed by Hintze as a logical category of thought, slowly formed among the Western peoples after the end of the eighteenth

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[15]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 42.

[16]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 42.

century, and developed during the nineteenth century, especially in Germany, but not there alone.[17] Hintze did not, therefore, view historicism as a permanent ineradicable category of the mind. Rather, he regarded it as a category which developed at a certain time and among particular peoples because of special circumstances.

Hintze did not devote his major efforts in the article on Scheler to a comprehensive analysis of all the various contributions made to the sociology of knowledge. Instead, he concentrated his attention on the elaborate introduction by Scheler, which concerned the general problems of the sociology of knowledge.

How did Scheler view sociology? Hintze understood quite properly that Scheler distinguished two realms of sociology -- "Realsoziologie und Kultursoziologie."[18] These terms may be translated as realistic sociology and cultural sociology. Scheler rejected Weber's conception of sociology which limited sociology to subjective and objective meaningful contents. He did so because such a conception of sociology took no adequate account of those objective conditions which frequently were not in the minds of the participating individuals.[19] Instead, Scheler was drawn to Marx's definition that it is

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[17]Hintze, "Troeltsch," p. 39.

[18]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 44. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 6-7.

[19]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 44. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 6.

the social being of man that determines his consciousness.[20] Only Scheler did not limit the expression, social being, to merely the economic material factors.[21]

Realistic sociology dealt with the real factors in the world, while cultural sociology was concerned with the ideal factors. Hintze cited the most important real factors in Scheler's estimation, as race, the state, politics, and economics. The most significant ideal factors were religion, art, and science.[22] The real factors were mainly the expressions of our drives and impulses. The ideal factors were largely the manifestations of our mind and spiritual nature. The real factors were directed toward changes in actuality, toward the modification of historical reality. The ideal factors were oriented mainly toward ideal purposes and goals. Hintze pointed out, that for Scheler, every human activity was never solely the product of either our drives or our spirit; since the drive element and the spiritual element were jointly present in all activities. But the drive element predominated among the real factors, while the spiritual element was ascendant among the ideal factors. Thus,

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[20]The original in Marx reads, "Es ist nicht das Bewusstsein der Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondern ungekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewusstsein bestimmt," see Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (new edition; Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz Nachfolger, 1947), p. 13.

[21]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 44. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 6.

[22]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 44. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 6-8; Scheler, Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft, pp. 1-6.

although economics, the state, politics, the family, and tribal relations, were predominantly the expression of our drives and impulses, these real factors also contained a modicum of the spiritual element. They were largely, but not exclusively, an expression of the sex, power, and food drives. The spiritual element was subsidiary in these real factors but, nevertheless, it was still essential.[23]

Hintze indicated that Scheler regarded an adequate theory of drives as necessary for realistic sociology, while cultural sociology required in its turn, the formulation of an appropriate theory of mind and spirit. Realistic sociology involves an understanding of soul (Seele), in the sense of the vital psychic forces in man, while cultural sociology refers to spirit and mind (Geist). Scheler reserved an elaborate formulation of the nature of human drives and the human spirit for his later book on philosophical anthropology.[24] However, he also dealt with this question in regard to the sociology of knowledge.

If an exploration of the nature of drives was essential for realistic sociology, and an examination of mind and spirit for cultural sociology, there was yet another problem of equal significance. This was the question of the relationship between realistic and cultural sociology. This was really the problem of the relation-

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[23]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 44. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 7.

[24]This was published, posthumously as Philosophische Weltanschauung (Bonn: Cohen, 1929). See also Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.

ship between ideal and real factors in the historical world. However, the distinction between real and ideal factors, for Scheler, was not only methodological, but ultimately it was also ontological.[25] It reflected the bifurcation of the whole of reality into an absolute realm of pure essences and a historical existencial social world of changing events. Scheler's ultimate dualism was thus Platonic in character.

From the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge, the most important question was that of discovering the principles governing the interaction between real and ideal factors in history. Scheler believed that he had discovered a general law governing the real factors.[26] Hintze discussed Scheler's observations on this point.

Hintze regarded Scheler's law as worthy of the most serious attention. Hintze dubbed it a modern substitute for the untenable one-sided theories of Hegel and Marx.[27] Scheler rejected Hegel, for whom the real world was only an emanation of the spirit, and Marx for whom the spiritual world was merely the reflection of the economic means of production. The real factors constituted the substructure (Unterbau) of all culture, but the ideal superstructure (Überbau) was not wholly explainable, as such, out of this substructure. Instead, it had its

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[25]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 45. Scheler, Versuche, p.8.

[26]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 45. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 81.

[27]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 45.

own individual and independent character.

Hintze argued that Scheler regarded the content and nature of culture as a free and autonomous creation of the spirit and mind (Geist). But in order for culture to become effective in reality, in order for culture to objectively realize itself, it required the cooperation of real factors. By itself, culture -- the expression of ideal factors -- is free to create, but helpless to influence, unless it has the assistance of the real factors. Thus, ideal factors by themselves do not possess the power to count in the real world.[28]

Scheler distinguished the intellectual cultural sphere, which was the expression of a liberté modifiable, from the realm of real factors which reflected a fatalité modifiable. These terms were borrowed from Comte.[29] The cultural sphere expressed a modifiable freedom, that is, a form of potential freedom and autonomy of action. However, the realm of real factors was governed by a modifiable fatality, by a realm of blind necessity.

Scheler argued that the real factors, strongly conditioned by the drive structure (Triebstruktur) of man, can act as a negative or positive factor of selection, with respect to the ideal cultural realm. The real factors can, for example, exclude certain ideal

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[28]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 46. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 9.

[29]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 46. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 11.

factors from concretely realizing themselves in the real world. Conversely, they can also promote other ideals, by selecting them for realization in the historical world. What Scheler meant, was that economic factors, power situations, population potentials, geo-political positions -- all of which were examples of real factors -- negatively and positively determine which ideal factors would count in the real world. The role of mind in the real world, convesely, was largely directive. It could only speed up or limit larger trends among the real factors, but it could not destroy such trends.[30]

Hintze showed that Scheler distinguished three kinds of real factors -- race, the state, and economics. However, Scheler avoided the error of attributing all historical change to any single one of these independent variables. Therefore, Scheler rejected a racial theory of history which would make all of history depend only upon race. He also avoided a strict political interpretation of history which rooted all historical development in the soil of political power. And he threw overboard an economic monistic interpretation of history. Instead, Scheler worked out a "law of order" (Ordnungsgesetz), which rejected any single constant independent variable in history. Scheler's law attempted, however, to establish a definite order in history for the dominance of one or another of these real factors. Barring the

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[30]Hintze, "Scheler," pp. 46-47. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 10-13.

presence of external intrusive factors, the following succession occurs in history. A first phase is characterized in history by the domination of blood and kinship ties. This initial phase is distinguished by such institutions as father right, mother right, marriage forms, kinship bands, race mixtures, and race separation. This phase is likewise one which flourished prior to the appearance of the state.[31]

Scheler believed that this first phase of blood and kinship institutions, gave way to a second phase, characterized by the dominance of political power and and the state.[32] In its turn, this second historical phase yielded to a third one in modern times, in which economic factors slowly became the leading determinants.[33] The course of history thus reveals the general dominant succession of three distinct phases of real factors - a blood kinship, a political, and an economic. Scheler regarded this law as having only a tentative hypothetical character. It must not be assumed, that at any time in history, only one of these three real factors was present, but simply that the dominant factors always set a frame and limitation upon the other factors. Thus, whatever political and economic forces existed during

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[31] Hintze, "Scheler," pp. 47-48. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 31-32.

[32] Hintze, "Scheler," p. 48. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 32.

[33] Hintze, "Scheler," p. 48. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 32.

the first phase, were severely limited by the dominance of blood tribal kinship factors. Kinship and tribal factors created a framework within which all of the other real forces operated. It is not sufficient, therefore, to know the dominant real factor during a particular phase. It is equally necessary to know the relationship between that dominant factor and the lesser real factors. Only by understanding the reciprocal relationships between the different factors can the full meaning of any phase of history be explicated.[34]

In his discussion of Scheler's law of dominant real factors, Hintze brought out the strength and weakness of Scheler's position. The strength lay in Scheler's ability to reveal the one-sidedness of Hegel's and Marx's views. Scheler showed that Marx should have limited his dominant economic factor to a very recent portion of history and not extended it to include all of history. Moreover, Marx should have understood that the economic factor was not so much an actual causal factor as a dominant limiting factor.[35] The weakness in Scheler's treatment consisted in frequently miscalculating the concrete roles exercised by the real factors. For example, Scheler followed Gumplowicz in believing that all divisions into estates and castes, in the final analysis, rested upon distinctions of race, and were

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[34]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 50.

[35]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 48.

consequently the result of dominant racial elements imposing their will by conquest over other elements of the population. Hintze regarded this as highly dubious.[36] For his part, Hintze argued that the political power factor was dominant in the formation of society along estates lines among the Romano-Germanic nations. Indeed, he insisted that political factors were the principle ones, not only in the formation of estates, but in the emergence of classes and in the economic development of early capitalism during mercantilism.[37]

Hintze showed that Scheler was not merely content to discern the principles which governed the actions of real factors. He sought also to find the laws regulating ideal factors, and above all he endeavored to understand the connection between real and ideal factors. Hintze maintained, that though Scheler believed there were principles which regulated ideal factors in history, Scheler was remarkably sketchy in this description of such principles.[38] He did not develop a law of the development of ideal factors with the same thoroughness that he formulated a law of the succession and development of real factors.

Hintze understood correctly that Scheler rejected Comte's law of three stages. Mythical thought, for

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[36]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 48.

[37]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 49.

[38]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 54.

Scheler, was not succeeded by metaphysical and positive thought respectively. Instead, mythical thought remained a primitive form of thought (Denkform). As a result of a process of differentiation, religious, metaphysical, and positive thought also developed. But they did not evolve in any regular order, as Comte assumed. Nor did one of these modes of thought completely give way to the other. Instead, each of the three forms developed out of the mythical. Scheler, therefore, rejected Comte's notion (together with that of other anti-metaphysicians such as Dilthey) that metaphysics would one day be replaced by the positive sciences. The metaphysical position, for Scheler, was not an antiquated standpoint; its vigorous reassertion in the present age, indeed, testified to its perennial vitality.[39]

Hintze showed that there were two aspects to Scheler's treatment of ideal factors. Ideal factors played a role in the world of historical social reality; yet they also reflected an ontological realm of eternal and ideal essences. The realm of Geist or spirit was thus linked to both our human minds and to a world beyond our limited minds -- a world of eternal forms. Ideal factors possessed both a relative and an absolute status. Insofar as they were a part of the historical world, ideal factors were relative to our minds and to the shifting historical social world. But insofar as these ideal

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[39]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 52.

factors ultimately referred back to a world of eternal forms and essences, they also bespoke of something absolute. Scheler thus combined a historicism with respect to the social historical world together with a phenomenological metaphysics of pure ideal essences, regarding a transcendental world of reality.[40]

Scheler thus rejected every attempt to explain spirit and mind (Geist) merely in terms of psycho-physical terms. To do so would be to succumb to psychologism. Scheler's phenomenological metaphysics rejected the psychological method in favor of the transcendental.[41] A theory of mind could not restrict itself to the proposition that values are human creations. Values are transcendental essences. We emotively intuit them, but we do not create them. As ideal factors, the values come to participate in the historical social world, where they assume a relative historical social status. Scheler did not believe that sociology could account for the realm of Geist or spirit. The realm of Geist simply is, and it must be accepted as a given datum. Sociology can investigate the manner in which spirit or Geist manifests itself in the social historical world. It can study the relations of one set of ideal factors to another in different societies and historical periods.

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[40]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 54. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 14.

[41]This was of course the burden of Scheler's argument in his book, Die Transcendentale und die psychologische Methode, which first appeared in 1900.

But the ultimate status of spirit, for Scheler, was not a sociological but a religious and metaphysical question.[42]

In brilliant fashion, Hintze thus maintained that Scheler's general position was characterized by a series of dualisms which Scheler sought to overcome. Scheler created a dualism between real and cultural sociology, between soul and spirit, between the accidental world of historical social reality and the eternal realm of ideal essences, between historicism and metaphysics.[43] Scheler was thus caught between a series of polar dualisms and faced the Herculean task of bridging these dualisms. For his part, Hintze could not see that Scheler was genuinely successful in his attempt to overcome them.

On the principle issue -- that between historicism and metaphysics -- Hintze refused to accept Scheler's belief in a world of eternal essences.[44] Nor could Hintze accept a primary dualism between soul and spirit. He argued instead that there was a secondary dualism between soul and spirit.[45] What was the nature of this secondary dualism?

Hintze insisted that man was not originally an expression of a dualism between his vital psychic

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[42]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 54.

[43]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 56.

[44]Hintze, "Scheler," pp. 43, 61-62.

[45]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 62.

qualities -- soul or Seele -- and his spiritual qualities. Instead of being primary, this distinction was secondary, that is, it was the product of man's own development and self reflection. Out of his own self-reflective activity, which was at the same time a "microcosmic mirror of the macrocosm," man shaped the realm of spirit, forming a whole new series of symbols and meaningful patterns in such areas as religion, metaphysics, art and science. "These are not original creations, but transformations of the macrocosm...."[46]

Within the realm of the historical social world, Hintze believed that Scheler had also created too sharp a dualism between the ideal and real factors. Here, Scheler was caught again by two opposing tendencies. On the one hand, his methodological distinction between real and cultural sociology ultimately rested upon an ontological basis. On the other hand, Scheler did not want to completely separate the two realms of sociology. Indeed, he wanted to show how real and ideal factors affected each other. Scheler maintained that many events in the historical world thus represented an amalgam of real and ideal factors. Hintze argued, though, that Scheler's dualism was stronger than his desire to harmonize the two realms. In the end, it was the dualism between real and ideal factors that played the major role in Scheler's

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[46]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 62.

sociology of knowledge.[47]

Hintze was greatly stimulated by Scheler's discussion of real and ideal factors. This is apparent not only in Hintze's article on Scheler, but also in his article on Troeltsch, which we have already discussed.[48] In the article on Scheler, Hintze distinguished three possible relationships between real and ideal forces in history. The first was one in which the ideal factors, as an expression of Geist or spirit, almost completely exist in their own sphere, as for example, in pure art or science. In such cases, the ideal factors generally do not have any significant effect upon society. In the second relationship, the ideal factors work together with the real factors. Examples of this are technology, economics, politics and warfare. This relationship is also present in the church and school, in international scientific congresses, and in propaganda efforts for peace. In the third relationship the ideal factors stand in opposition or contradiction to the dominant real tendencies in society. In that event, the role of these ideal factors, either as guides which hold forth an ideal value or goal, or as directors which restrain the dominant social forces, is at best temporary. The ideal factors cannot in the long run prevent the real forces of society from asserting

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[47]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 62.

[48]See particularly above, pp. 313-318 which directly reflect the influence of Scheler.

themselves.[49]

Hintze maintained that Scheler had not sufficiently distinguished these three relationships. Scheler, however, had discussed the problem of the connection between ideal and real factors. He had maintained, that if his law of the succession of real factors were correct, then the guidance and direction of these real factors by ideal factors would successively decline in importance. In other words, ideal factors had a much greater chance of directing and guiding real factors under a kinship dominated society, then under one in which economic factors gained precedence in the real world. The necessitarian character of these real factors would increasingly manifest itself. But Hintze indicated, that Scheler maintained also, that the restrictive effects exercised by real factors upon ideal factors, would progressively decline in the passage from "a nativistic, to a political, and from this to an economic phase."[50] It is for this reason, that cultural production during the economic phase was so incredibly richer in amount and variety, if not in quality, than was the case in the previous phases.

The most important weakness which Hintze detected in Scheler's treatment of ideal and real factors, was the latter's inability to adequately deal with what Hintze

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[49]Hintze, "Scheler," pp. 59-60.

[50]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 51.

called the real-spiritual tendencies in history (*real-geistige Tendenzen des geschichtlichen Lebens*).[51] These real-spiritual tendencies, or historical ideas, represented to Hintze, the clearest indication that ideal and real factors were not so much dualistic, as concretely united and fused. In his articles on both Scheler and Troeltsch, Hintze stressed an intermediate realm, neither completely spiritual nor completely realistic, but constituting a unique fusion of spirit and society, of ideal and real factors.[52] Hintze, thus, adopted a position which resembled that of Ranke and Droysen, insofar as all three historians regarded the historical tendencies as expressions of real-spiritual forces.

Hintze next turned to a more specific discussion of Scheler's sociology of knowledge.[53] Having treated the general character of Scheler's conception of ideal and real factors, the nature of cultural sociology, and the relationship between real and cultural sociology, Hintze, proceeded to deal with other issues pertaining to the sociology of knowledge. These concerned such matters as the actual development of knowledge and its forms throughout history, the validation of metaphysical

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[51]Hintze, "Scheler," pp. 60-61.

[52]We have already discussed this, in the chapter on Troeltsch. See above. pp. 314-315.

[53]This corresponded in general to the second part of Scheler's introduction, which was entitled, "Die soziologie des Wissens." See Scheler, *Versuche*, p. 39.

thinking, the overcoming of Marxian, Comtean and Hegelian modes of understanding culture and society, and the need for a new cultural synthesis which would unite the technological pragmatic knowledge of the West with the spiritual culture of the East.

Hintze showed that Scheler did not have a narrow view of knowledge when he referred to the sociology of knowledge. Instead, knowledge was to be understood in its broadest meaning. All knowledge is linked to society and expressed itself in group activities. Every group has a group consciousness, and no group can exist without such a consciousness.[54] This group consciousness is equivalent to a common knowledge concerning the same objects. Such knowledge determines the nature and structure of all society. Conversely, society and its structure are co-determinate for all knowledge. Hintze argued, however, that the content of knowledge and its factual validity are not sociologically determined. Scheler rejected that notion. The selection of the objects of knowledge, which is the result of different social interests and perspectives, together with the forms of acquiring and transmitting knowledge, are both sociologically determined.[55] But the content and validity of knowledge are not sociologically conditioned.

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[54]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 64. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 41.

[55]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 65. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 44-45.

Hintze indicated that Scheler regarded all knowledge and education as resting on "individual participation in the spiritual property of society."[56] Without such a participation neither knowledge nor education would be possible. But such participation takes place in terms of groups. It is the arrangement of society into groups, and the determination by these groups of various subjective forms of thinking and categories, that attracts the sociologist. Scheler, accordingly, posited a structural identity between the picture of the world, soul, and God on the one hand, and the structure and dominant forms of different societies on the other.[57] Thus, the particularism and manifold variety of the Greek political world had its counterpart in the conception of polytheism and the pluralism of the Platonic ideas. The development of a universal classical empire was accompanied by stoicism. The hierarchical feudal arrangements of the medieval West were paralleled by scholasticism with its hierarchical order of forms. The absolutism of the separate monarchical sovereign states was accompanied by the doctrine of a godly world order, as in Bossuet. The constitutional government according to laws was paralleled by the idea of a deistic God, who represented not only the idea of a world engineer, but

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[56] Hintze, "Scheler," p. 65.

[57] Hintze, "Scheler," p. 66. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 4

one who governed according to law and was not an arbitrary ruling monarch.[58] Hintze argued that the explanation of such structural identities is not to be found by arguing that they represent a simple carry over of real political forms of authority to an ideal sphere, or conversely, of ideal forms to a real sphere. Instead, the explanation lies in "the predominance of certain normative ideas and impulses of the will, which originate out of the actual conditions of the political life of society, and always claim an absolute validity in the formation of order, both in heaven and on earth."[59]

Scheler distinguished two sets of descriptive terms -- group soul and group spirit.[60] Certain groups of people and their activities are dominated by a group soul, others by a group spirit. The so-called natural view of life and the world (natürliche Weltanschauung) represented by myth, folk-religion, folk-songs and primeval custom represent an organic "natural" expression of the group spirit. Such "natural views of life and the world" vary among different peoples, but they are always an organic, unconscious expression of the particular group soul. Opposed to this is the group spirit, which reveals itself in such artificial self-conscious activities of groups as education, art, philosophy,

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[58]Hintze, "Scheler", p. 56. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 46.

[59]Hintze, "Scheler", p. 66.

[60]Scheler, Versuche, p. 50.

science. These represent high culture, a deliberate and artificial formation by various groups.[61]

Hintze observed that a leading problem for Scheler consisted in not only investigating the different expressions of such "natural views of life and the world (natürliche Weltanschauungen), but in showing how the "higher" forms of knowledge, such as religion, metaphysics, positive and technological knowledge originate out of more natural forms such as myth.[62] Scheler rejected Comte's approach to this problem, because it posited a series of stages in which positive science eventually would replace both metaphysics and religion.[63]

Scheler's own position on the problem of how the knowledge of "higher" culture evolved out of the 'lower" is worthy of mention. Scheler maintained that all forms of knowledge had roots in those vital impulses and drives which originally constitute part of the impulses for power and authority. Out of such impulses, by means of a process of differentiation and development, different modes of knowledge gradually were spiritually transformed. Thus the religious impulse directed itself to supernatural knowledge, intended to provide for the salvation and saving of the group. The metaphysical impulse was more

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[61]Scheler, Versuche, p. 50. Compare Hintze, "Scheler," pp. 66-67.

[62]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 67. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 50-51.

[63]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 67. See above. p. 349.

personal; it grows out of an astonishment at the irrationality of the world and sought to find a general meaning and solution for the puzzles of the world. The positive scientific and technological impulses were more impersonal and universally valid, and arose from a desire for mastery over the realm of nature, man and society. Technology also manifested a playful and constructive impulse. Scheler argued, that both science and art rest on an intensification of predispositions that are already present among the other higher animals, while religion and metaphysics are uniquely human attainments. Hintze insisted that this distinction was one which was ignored by both positivism and German idealism.[64]

Scheler's position on the relationship between diverse forms of knowledge and their motivations in human impulses found a sympathetic response in Hintze.[65] Hintze also entered into a more extended commentary on Scheler's views regarding religion, metaphysics, positive science and technology. He sought to show that Scheler did not establish a relationship between science, technology and economics in Comtean positivist, Hegelian

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[64]Hintze, "Scheler," pp. 67-68. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 52-54. See the critique of this doctrine of "menschlicher Triebimpulse" in relationship to historical factors in Raymond Aron, La sociologie allemande contemporaine, p. 71. Notice that Scheler's remarks pertain to the forms of knowledge and not to the ontological status of that knowledge.

[65]This is clear from Hintze's remarks in his essay on Troeltsch. See Hintze, "Troeltsch," pp. 43-47.

idealistic, or Marxian economic terms.

Religion in its beginnings was rooted in the common ideas and traditions prevalent among kinship groups, tribes, and clans, who developed a salvation knowledge (Heilswissen), in an effort to save and preserve the blood community. Racial mixtures, especially between mother and father right groups, played an important role in the perpetuation of this religion. In the period of the political society, religion experienced a new development with the appearance of personal charismatic leaders who became religious founders. After the deification of the founders, these "religions of the founders" received a more definitive formulation. A relationship between followers and founder was established. The religions gradually assumed various communal forms. In Christianity, church, sect, and mystic community were established, a process brilliantly described by Troeltsch. The distinction between the revealed religions of the West -- Judaism, Christianity, and Islam -- and the metaphysically permeated religions of self-redemption of the East -- Buddhism and Confucianism -- was emphasized by Scheler. This distinction rested on both sociological grounds and racial character. The modern Westerners reveal an impetus (Drang) toward the mastery of nature and society by means of work, calling, economics, technics, and politics. Modern Westerners exemplify a this-worldly activism, made possible by the process of "religious placating of the masses" (Massenkalmierung) which exempted

men from the torments of the problems of life, death, and the salvation of the soul, and from an incessant preoccupation with the philosophical problem of final causes and the ultimate meaning of the world. The orient, on the other hand, reserved its greatest strength for such religious and metaphysical problems.[66] Hintze showed that Scheler did not believe that religion was superseded by the rise of positive sciences. Indeed, Scheler maintained that a religion like Judaic-Christian Monotheism furthered the cause of science because it concerned itself mainly with primary causes and allowed secondary causes to be investigated by scientific means. Scheler's position was that religion and the church are really not enemies of the sciences, but are only opposed to certain metaphysical consequences and extravagances carried out by extreme partisans of the sciences.[67]

Turning to Scheler's discussion of metaphysics, Hintze discussed Scheler's view of metaphysics as the form of knowledge of intellectual elites. Metaphysics as a form of knowledge, therefore, assumed a much more personal character than the positive sciences. Again, in contradistinction to the sciences, metaphysics was much more closely associated with particular cultural areas, nations, estates, and classes. Moreover, metaphysics was

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[66]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 68. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 69.

[67]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 69. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 69-71.

much less developed in the West than in the East. The reason for this was because a precondition for genuinely metaphysical thinking was the lack of hierarchically organized dogmatic church. In Greece where such a church was lacking, metaphysics could flourish, but its true home was among great empires of the Far East. Possessing a personal character, the main expression of metaphysics was the wise man and his school. At times, a certain type of metaphysics could attain a wider diffusion as a result of particular institutional developments. The reception of the Platonic - Aristotelian metaphysics by the medieval church is an example, though the church prohibited free metaphysical speculation. In the period from Nicholas of Cues to Kant, philosophy freed itself from church support, and assumed a free cosmopolitan European outlook. It also revealed concealed national orientations which became clearly apparent in the period from Fichte to Hegel. But only in the present age, is metaphysics freeing itself from its national limitations, and beginning to assume a truly cosmopolitan character. The interest displayed by western metaphysics in the philosophies of the East is an example of this tendency.[68]

Scheler stressed the sociological importance of classes and estates upon the formation of metaphysical thinking and knowledge. Medieval philosophy was dis-

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[68]Hintze, "Scheler," pp. 69-70. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 72-78.

tinctively the product of the priestly estate. French metaphysics up to the time of Rousseau was in the hands of the enlightened nobility. In England, the gentlemen played a leading role not only in philosophy but in political and economic life. In Germany, it was the members of the bourgeoisie, educated in literature, and stemming frequently from the home of Protestant clergymen, who entered philosophy. The result of such sociological influences was that the style, language, and public of philosophers were a reflection of sociological forces, as well as intellectual attitudes and horizons.[69]

In discussing Scheler's description of the positive sciences as another type of knowledge, Hintze brought out the close relationship which Scheler established between positive science and technology. This relationship was the fruit of a marriage between philosophy and practical experience. Sociologically, it was also the product of class mixtures among the western bourgeoisie. Technology was not merely supplemental applied science. Instead, the origins of science were accompanied by a technological development. There thus existed a genuine parallelism between positive science and techniques of production. This parallelism rested on a common structure of drives or impulses (Triebstruktur) in the bourgeoisie, which manifested itself in the direction of a power and dominance drive over nature, man,

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[69] Hintze, "Scheler," p. 70. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 72-78.

and society. This structure of drives was "spiritualised" by means of its connection with philosophy, and it was united with specific forms of ethos - e.g. an economic attitude and an acceptance of work. Scheler agreed with Marx in dismissing the position of intellectualism, which merely regarded technology as applied science. But he differed from Marx who derived religion and metaphysics completely from the means of production. Scheler held that both the means of production and the structure of drives and impulses (Triebstruktur) were conditioned by spiritual moral forces (geistig-sittliche Kräfte). The mean of production must, therefore, be viewed as the result of two independent variables -- the structure of impulses (Triebstruktur) and the spiritual moral forces.[70] Hintze viewed Scheler's position, on this score, as a reintroduction of doctrines of the historical ethical school of economics, represented by Schmoller. Scheler also held that capitalism and positive science never made progress in the cultural area controlled by Buddhism because "in this conception of spirit (the Buddhistic), the dominance of nature and society did not appear as an end...."[71]

After further tracing the development of positive science along Scheler's lines, Hintze argued that the peculiar relationship between science, technology, and

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[70] Hintze, "Scheler," p. 71.

[71] Hintze, "Scheler," p. 71.

economics in the West was explained by Scheler as the result of a new structure and direction of impulses (Triebstruktur und Triebrichtung), which became prevalent among the western bourgeoisis, together with the resulting ethos that grew out of this situation. Thus, there originated a new "categorical logical system" in which "function" replaced the idea of "substance," "natural law" took the place of "form" or "type," and an industrial form of capitalism superseded more primitive forms of economy.[72]

Hintze discussed Scheler's views regarding the consequences of this activistic, technological, pragmatic outlook of the West. The one-sided emphasis on the positive sciences, without the support of a genuine metaphysics, was leading to a rigidity which could result in pure technicism (Technizismus), and finally to a disintegration of Western culture. The only way to avoid such a situation was to create a new cultural synthesis which would combine the wisdom and spiritual techniques of the East with the material pragmatic knowledge of the West. Above all, there must be a revival of metaphysics. Scheler envisaged the East and West as entering into a great syncretistic process which would result in cross fertilization. The East would learn the positive science and techniques of the West. The West would escape ossification by means of the metaphysics of the East.[73]

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[72]Hintze, "Scheler," pp. 73-74. Compare Scheler, Versuche, pp. 79-88.

[73]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 74. Compare Scheler, Versuche, p. 109.

In Hintze's opinion, Scheler's thoughts on the cultural synthesis resembled Count Keyserling's and differed from that of Troeltsch. Whereas Troeltsch's cultural synthesis was basically oriented around Christian Europe as a center, Scheler envisaged the coming of a new culture and a new type of man. Hintze remarked that it was especially noteworthy that such views were expressed by Scheler, who was at this time a Catholic. Hintze argued that Scheler had in mind the creation of a new type of man -- not a superman -- but an all-around man, a human type who would avoid the excesses of western culture by "means of an ascetic sport of the soul, and the metaphysical power of self redemption."[74]

Scheler, therefore, entertained the genuine possibility of the dawn of a new age -- an age of metaphysics. He regarded two significant events as pointing in the direction of the new metaphysics. One event was the rise of relativity physics; the other was the self-overcoming of historicism (Selbstüberwindung des Historismus).[75] Hintze confessed that Scheler spoke vigorously, but not very clearly, on both these issues. Let us take a closer look at Scheler's views on these matters, since they bear out our contention that Scheler's sociology of knowledge was a manifestation of the crisis of historicism.

Scheler regarded his desired cultural synthesis,

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[74]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 74.

[75]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 75. Compare carefully Scheler, Versuche, pp. 114-119.

which would usher in the dawn of a "new" metaphysical age, not as a "pious hope," but as a forseeable historical development -- the outcome of historical trends in the past, and certain historical events of the present. The new metaphysical age, for him, was not to be the product of the self-styled result of a group of professional philosophers, or even of any single branch of philosophy. Instead, it was to be an expression of great universal historical forces that were slowly uniting the world and putting an end to the priority and hegemony of the modern West. The synthesis between East and West was therefore not an intellectual's dream but already in the process of becoming.[76]

In order for the West to be adequately prepared for such a synthesis, two situations needed to be overcome. The absolutism regarding the old notion of matter as extended substance needed to be cleared away by the rise of relativity physics which, far from leading to a complete relativism, allowed for a new kind of objectivity.[77] On the other hand, the self-overcoming of historicism also would prepare the way for the "new" metaphysics. By the overcoming of historicism, Scheler apparently meant, that the sociology of knowledge provided a new means of demonstrating the relativity of "historicism" itself. That is, it has shown that the position of historicism is not

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[76]Scheler, Versuche, p. 114.

[77]Scheler, Versuche, p. 115.

a universal one but rather a relative one. It has shown that historicism represents merely one position among others. Thereby, it has overcome historicism. It has disclosed a historical world made up of many perspectives, but these perspectives can be discovered by means of the sociology of knowledge.[78]

The question remains, however, whether Scheler's notion of the sociology of knowledge really overcame historicism. True, his ultimate hierarchy of values which exists in an absolute realm of essences, forever stands outside the pale of historicism. But according to Scheler, all forms of knowledge are socially conditioned, and if this is the case, it must likewise be true for the sociology of knowledge. It is then, not clear, how Scheler's sociology of knowledge escapes from being an aspect of historicism. Whatever, the actual answer to this problem is, it is evident that the whole problematic situation in which Scheler found himself grew out of an attempt to overcome the crisis of historicism.

Hintze concluded his significant article on Scheler with some significant remarks on the future of civilization. Scheler regarded the transformed intellectual and spiritual situation prevalent in Europe after World War I as conducive toward the development of a future metaphysics. Europe's role as the leading industrial power of the world seemed played out. The effect of this would be to moderate

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[78]Scheler, Versuche, pp. 115-117.

the industrial activism of Europe. The tempo of the progress of technology and the positive sciences was slackening. All this worked favorably against "technicism, positivism, and scientism," and in favor of metaphysics. Scheler also put great stock in the rise of a world university, which would serve to prepare the ideal basis for the revision of European values, and aid in the accomplishment of the cultural synthesis.[79]

Hintze contrasted the diverse views of two of Germany's Post World War I thinkers -- Max Scheler and Oswald Spengler. Whereas, Spengler predicted the inevitable doom of western civilization, Scheler held out bright hopes for the future of Europe as part of a cultural synthesis. Hintze concluded from such contrasting views that prophecy was an uncertain and precarious affair. Caution was called for regarding both these views.

"What the future will bring, no one can predict" -- cautious words indeed![80] Yet these words did not prevent Hintze from making certain predictions. Hintze predicted that the ineradicable metaphysical impulse of human nature would reassert itself, because, the positive sciences and cultural sciences both need philosophical supplementation. This did not mean that philosophy would swallow science or vice versa. Both realms have their legitimate claims. However, Hintze doubted whether

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[79]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 79.

[80]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 79.

metaphysics could exercise that importance in the future, commensurate with the role which Scheler ascribed to it. Metaphysics has assumed a distinctly personal character; to assume that it could exercise a "universal" dominion once again, equivalent to that during the time of Kant of Hegel, was to hope for the impossible.[81]

Hintze predicted the possibility of great new struggles between peoples, possibly in the form of a communist world revolution. "The post war politics of the victorious imperialistic and capitalistic world powers have done little to eliminate these dangers, and the value of European American civilization is no longer beyond all doubt."[82] One thing seemed clear to Hintze -- the harmony between spirit (Geist) and society (Gesellschaft) which seemed to be announced in Wilson's message at the close of World War I, actually has been more fully destroyed than ever, and indications of its restoration are not to be found.[83]

Hintze's article on Scheler was a first rate document on the crisis of historicism. In both his description of Scheler's views, and in his critical comments on them, Hintze discussed those leading aspects which Troeltsch had found so characteristic of the crisis of historicism. The epitemic problem of history, the

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[81]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 79.

[82]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 79.

[83]Hintze, "Scheler," p. 79.

intrusion of sociological elements in explaining historical development, and the need for a cultural synthesis -- these three leading manifestations of the crisis of historicism, occupied the minds of both Scheler and Hintze in post World War I Germany.

CHAPTER XI

SOCIOLOGY OR HISTORY?

Otto Hintze's development as a historian during the period, 1880-1933, mirrors the most fateful transformation in German historical thinking -- the shift from pure historicism to an articulate sociological approach toward historical interpretation.[1] In the past chapters, we have studied Hintze in relationship to the growth and crisis of German historicism. We saw how Hintze was influenced by two of the leading figures in nineteenth-century historicism: Droysen and Ranke. In addition, a third great influence in nineteenth-century historicism helped to shape Hintze's historical outlook. This was Schmoller. But under Schmoller's direction, Hintze's approach gradually began to reveal the impact of sociological currents in German historical thought. This tendency became increasingly dominant in Hintze's writings. The Lamprecht controversy, the gradual formulation of a typological approach, the growing influence of Troeltsch,

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[1]This crucial change in German historical thought is reflected in both the title and contents of Carlo Antoni's book, Dallo Storicismo alla Sociologia (Firenze: Sansoni, 1940). This book is a study devoted to the historical thought of Dilthey, Troeltsch, Meinecke, Max Weber, Huizinga, and Wölfflin. It is unfortunate that Antoni did not include Hintze, who illustrates this shift in German historical thinking more adequately than any of the figures mentioned in Antoni's book. See also Carlo Antoni, Considerazioni su Hegel e Marx (Napoli: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1946), pp. 146-150; and Carlo Antoni, "I Metodi Sociologici," Studium Generale, V (1952), 432-437.

Scheler, and Weber, were further currents which indicated that both Hintze and important elements within German historical thought were feeling the impact of the shift from pure historicism to a sociologically oriented historical approach.

The most obvious measure of the growing importance of sociological elements in Hintze's approach to history, more or less, may be ascertained by a simple comparison of his writings before and after World War I. In the period from 1885-1921, Hintze devoted relatively few articles and book reviews to strict sociological problems of historical interpretation.[2] Hintze's scholarly labors were devoted mainly to various aspects of Prussian history. These included his activity with the Acta Borussica,[3] his editorship of the Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte,[4] a series of articles and independent essays on various aspects of Prussian history,[5] together with a book

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[2]These included "Über individualistische und kollektivistische Geschichtsauffassung," Historische Zeitschrift, LXXVIII (1897), 60-67, "Roscher's politische Entwicklungstheorie," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, XXI (1897), 1-45; "Rasse und Nationalität und ihre Bedeutung für die Geschichte," Historische und politische Aufsätze, IV, 161-182; "Der Beamtenstand," Vorträge der Gehe-Stiftung zu Dresden, III (1911), 1-78.

[3]See above, pp. 12-13, 22-23.

[4]See above, p. 24.

[5]The most important of these articles were "Staat und Gesellschaft unter dem ersten König von Preussen," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, IV (1900), 269-335; "Friedrich des Grossen Absichten, Emden zu verkaufen," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, XIII (1900), 570-571. (This was a report on a lecture by Hintze.) "Die ös-

on the Hohenzollern.[6] In addition, Hintze devoted a number of writings during the war years to a spirited defense of

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terreichische und der preussische Beamtenstaat im 17 und 18. Jahrhundert. Eine verleichende Betrachtung," Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXVI (1901), 401-444; "Geist und Epochen der preussischen Geschichte," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, VII (1903), 76-90; "Das politische Testament Friedrichs des Grossen von 1752," Schmoller's Jahrbuch, XXVIII (1904), 1-22; "Stein und der preussische Staat," Historische Zeitschrift, XCIV (1905), 412-446; and also review of K. Bornhak, Preussischen Staats - und Rechtsgeschichte, in Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, XVIII (1905), 288-306; "Die Epochen des evangelischen Kirchenregiments in Preussen," Historische Zeitschrift, XCVII (1906), 67-118; "Hof und Landesverwaltung in der Mark Brandenburg unter Joachim II," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, X (1906), 138-169; "Ratsstube und Kammergericht in Brandenburg während des 16. Jahrhunderts," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, XXIV (1911), 1-84; "Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung," Preussische Jahrbücher, CXLIV (1911), 381-412; "Friedrich der Grosse, Stein, Bismarck," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, XV (1911), 1-19; "Friedrich der Grosse und die preussischen Justizreform des 18. Jahrhunderts," Recht und Wirtschaft, I (1912), 129-135; "Der Geist der Erhebung von 1813," Neue Jahrbücher für klassische Altertum, XXXII (1913), 229-247; "Machtpolitik und Regierungsverfassung," Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, VII (1913), 1067-1094; 1157-1184; "Festrede zur Feier des 25 jahrigen Regierungsjubiläums Kaiser Wilhelms II. (16 Juni)," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, XVII (1913), 78-95; "Der Staat des Grossen Kurfürsten," Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, VIII (1914), 657-692; "Die Hohenzollern und der Adel," Historische Zeitschrift, CXII (1914), 494-524; "Bismarck, die deutsche Politik und der Krieg," Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, IX (1914), 793-810; "Bismarcks Stellung zur Monarchie und zum Beamtentum," Das Bismarckjahr, eine Würdigung Bismarcks und seiner Politik in Einzelschilderungen, ed., Max Lenz and Erich Marcks, III (1915), 39-62; "Der Ursprung des Landratsamts in der Mark Brandenburg," Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie, phil.-hist. Klasse, XXIII (1915), 352-368; "Der Ursprung des preussischen Landratsamts in der Mark Brandenburg," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, XXVIII (1915), 357-422; "Reinhold Koser, ein Nachruf," Historische Zeitschrift, CXIV (1915), 65-87; "Das Werk der Hohenzollern, eine Jubiläumsbetrachtung," Deutsche Rundschau, XLI (1915), 1-24.

[6]Otto Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk, Fünfhundert Jahre vaterlandischer Geschichte (Berlin: Paul Parey, 1915).

Germany as a military power.[7]

If Hintze's writings during the period 1885-1921 are compared with those written between 1922-1933, some significant differences may be observed. Whereas writings on German and Prussian hostory predominated in the period 1885-1921, they dwindled to a mere trickle in the period 1922-1933.[8] On the other hand, while articles and book reviews

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[7]"Deutschland, der Krieg und die Völkergemeinschaft," Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, IX (1914), 27-40; "Unser Militarismus. Ein Wort an Amerika," Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, IX (1914), 209-220; "Bismarck, die deutsche Politik und der Krieg." Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, IX (1914), 793-810; "Der Krieg 1915," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, XIX (1915), pp. v-xviii; Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, ed., Otto Hintze, Friedrich Meinecke, Herman Oncken, Hermann Schumacher (Leipzig und Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1915). See therein the following essays by Hintze: "Deutschland und das Weltstaatensystem." pp. 3-51; and "Der Sinn des Krieges," pp. 677-686; "Das Phantom des Pangermanismus in Amerika," Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik, IX (1915); 1213-1256; "Der Weltkrieg im Jahre 1916," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, XX (1916), i-xxiv; "Imperialismus und deutsche Weltpolitik," Europäische Staats - und Wirtschaftszeitung, II (1917), 553-559; "Imperialismus und Weltpolitik," Die deutsche Freiheit, ed. by the League of German Scholars and Artists (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1917), pp. 114-169.

[8]The only two articles which dealt with Prussian history during this latter period were "Kalvinismus und Staatsräson in Brandenburg zur Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts," Historische Zeitschrift, CXLIV (1931), 229-286, and Hintze's article on Droysen's Briefwechsel. Besides this Hintze wrote occasional reviews of books dealing with Prussian and German history. Of the very few such reviews, perhaps the most important were the review of Carl Brinkmann, Die preussiche Handelspolitik vor dem Zollverein und der Wiederaufbau vor hundert Jahren in Schmoller's Jahrbuch, XLVI (1922), 330-331; and also the review of Theodor Mayer, Die Verwaltungsorganisation Maximilians I in Schmoller's Jahrbuch, XLVI (1922), 273-275; Review of Aktenstücke und Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Nationalversammlung, ed., R. Hübner, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXIX (1925), 357-359, and also review of Mildred S. Wertheі-

devoted strictly to sociological questions were in a distinct minority between 1885-1921, they dominated Hintze's writings between 1922-1933.[9] This phenomenon is of considerable significance and calls for an explanation. How are we to account for the fact that in the period 1922-1933, Hintze virtually concentrated most of his major efforts on questions that pertained to historical sociology? How are

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mer, The Pan German League, 1890-1914 in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXIX (1925), 547-550.

[9]In addition to the bibliography of writings for 1922-1932 listed above, pp. 33-34, consult the following: Otto Hintze, Review of Karl Jaspers, Max Weber in Schmoller's Jahrbuch, XLV (1921), 292-293; review of R. M. MacIver, The Modern State, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXVI (1929), 378-383; review of Harry Elmer Barnes, Soziologie und Staatstheorie, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXVI (1929), 579-580; review of Jahrbuch für Soziologie, volumes II and III in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXVI (1929) 613-616; review of Alfred Weber, Die Krise des modernen Staatsgedankens in Europe in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXX (1925-1926), 354-360; review of Leopold von Wiese, Allgemeine Soziologie als Lehre von den Beziehungen und Beziehungsgebilden der Menschen in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXX (1925-1926), 541-546; review of Jahrbuch für Soziologie, ed., G. Salomon, Vol. I in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXX (1925-1926), 736-740; review of Leopold von Wiese, Allgemeine Soziologie als Lehre von den Beziehungen und Beziehungsgebilden der Menschen, Teil II: Gebhildelehre in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXVII (1929), 402-406; review of Franz Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, vierter historischer Band: Abriss einer Sozial - und wirtschaftsgeschichte Europas von der Völkerwanderung bis zur Gegenwart. Erste Abteilung: Rom und die Germanen in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXIX (1930), 348-353; review of Schriften der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie; Verhandlungen der deutschen Soziologentage, VII Band, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXIV (1933), 279-284; review of G. Salomon, Allgemeine Staatslehre in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXIV (1933), 509-512.

we to explain the tremendous decline in the number of Hintze's writings in the realm of Prussian and German history during this same period?

One factor in the situation was undoubtedly Hintze's health.[10] An eye condition, together with the continued deterioration of his general health, prevented Hintze from engaging after 1920 in any further archival work. The deterioration of Hintze's health certainly goes a long way toward explaining why he no longer participated in any further archival research work in Prussian history. Hintze simply did not have the health and strength for such arduous activities. But it does not explain why Hintze virtually ceased writing extensively in the field of Prussian history. We know that some of Hintze's pre-war essays and studies on Prussian history were not directly based on archival materials. A number were general interpretation and syntheses of particular aspects of Prussian history. What was to prevent Hintze from continuing his writings on Prussian history along this vein? It cannot be argued that his health was so bad, that it even precluded the writing of such general essays, for we know that Hintze wrote many other comprehensive articles between 1922-1933. Indeed, given Hintze's tremendous knowledge of Prussian history, it would have been relatively easy for him to have continued writing a host of articles in that field. The explanation of Hintze's health, thus, does not satisfactorily account for the decline in the number of articles which Hintze

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[10]See, on this point, Hartung, "Otto Hintze," pp. 220-221.

wrote in the field of Prussian history between 1922-1933.

A more adequate explanation may be found by examining three other factors and the effect of their impact upon Hintze. These were World War I, the increasing importance of sociology and the crisis of historicism. These factors were to some extent interrelated, but for analytical purposes, we can examine each of them separately.

The most obvious dividing line regarding Hintze's writings was World War I and its immediate aftermath. Prior to the War, as we have seen, Hintze's time was largely taken up with writings on Prussian history. But in the period, 1922-1933, this interest almost disappeared. It was replaced by a greatly accelerated and all-consuming absorption with questions pertaining to historical sociology. World War I played a decisive role in orienting Hintze more sharply along sociological lines. It did this by destroying the Prussian-German system and the values it represented.

In his essay on the monarchical principle and the constitutional form of government, Hintze stated that "the monarchical-constitutional system of government -- in contrast to the parliamentary -- can be designated as the uniquely Prussian-German system."[11] Written in 1911, this essay constituted a vigorous defense, as well as explanation of the monarchical constitution form of government. Hintze was not merely content with tracing the Prussian-German

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[11]Hintze, "Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung," Preussische Jahrbücher, CXLIV (1911), 349. This essay is reprinted in Hintze, Staat und Verfas-

system of monarchical constitutionalism and contrasting it with various types of parliamentarism, such as those of England and France.[12] He was equally intent on demonstrating that the monarchical principle was thoroughly interwoven with the ideals of the Prussian state. He insisted that "the monarchical-constitutional form of government underwent its ordeal by fire in the constitutional conflicts of 1862-1866."[13] And he regarded the success of Bismarkian politics and its solidification of the Prussian state as contributing both to the firm establishment of the monarchical-constitutional system of government and to its extension throughout the German empire. But Hintze emphasized the following points:

> This system, however, is not rooted merely in the personality of Bismarck and in the successes of his politics. Instead, it is rooted in the whole tradition of the Prussian state and generally in the historical-political conditions of our political and national existence. And these conditions also continue in the present, although the long period of peace has understandably enough considerably weakened the scope of its influence upon the consciousness of the people. It must be emphasized that the strongest argument for the retention of the monarchical system of government lies in that very fact, which at the same time, has been the historical foundation of its existence, namely, that Prussia is in an eminent sense a military state and that because of the general political situation, Prussia, together with the empire which it established, will be compelled to remain a military power in the fore-

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sung, pp. 349-379. All further citations to this article are taken from this latter work. Henceforth, this article will be cited as Hintze, "Das monarchische Prinzip."

[12]Hintze, "Das monarchische Prinzip," pp. 350-358.

[13]Hintze, "Das monarchische Prinzip," p. 365.

seeable future.[14]

Hintze argued that the monarchical principle was so thoroughly interwoven in the whole structure and fabric of the Prussian state that it could only really be replaced with a parliamentary form of government by means of a revolution.[15] World War I was, indeed, such a revolution. Germany's defeat represented not merely the defeat of an army or a nation. It also marked the defeat of the whole Prussian-German system of monarchical government. It, thus, witnessed the break-up of a framework of values that had centered about the Prussian state and all it represented.

Hintze's attitude with respect to the Prussian state was not altogether free from ambiguity. There was, indeed, a certain dualism with respect to his views on Prussia. In his inaugural address before the Prussian Academy, delivered in 1914, he insisted that he viewed Prussian history only as the paradigm of a continental military state which was part of the European state system. From a methodological standpoint Prussia was, therefore, merely a very significant example of a type of state existing within the larger frame of the European state system.[16] The important thing, methodologically, was this larger frame of the European state system and the comparative constitutional development of states within that system. From this standpoint, the Prussian state merely constituted an interesting case study.

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[14]Hintze, "Das monarchische Prinzip," p. 369.

[15]Hintze, "Das monarchische Prinzip," p. 369.

[16]See above, p. 134.

However, no one can read the large number of essays which Hintze devoted to the Prussian state and the Hohenzollern before the War without realizing that he had a genuine attachment to this state.[17] Hintze was not only a constitutional historian who was interested in the comparative dynamics of the European state system. He was also a Prussian and an ardent monarchist. Prussia, for him, was not only an historical fact but an ethical political power. Germany's defeat in World War I represented the dissolution of this Prussian reality. To a man such as Hintze, whose attachment to the Prussian outlook had been both constant and imbued with a spirit of genuine devotion, the break-up of this Prussian-German system constituted a catastrophic blow.

World War I signified, for Hintze, the complete defeat and collapse of the Prussian monarchical principle. Hintze realized that the Prussian-German system was gone forever with no hope of its restoration. In his 1930 article on Droysen, he stated that the Prussian monarchical system represented a past epoch, no longer adaptable to a people who had experienced the collapse of 1918 and the peace of Versailles.[18] This period after 1870 loomed, however, for Hintze, "as a lost paradise," and constituted the "peak of real

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[17]See in particular "Festrede zur Feier des 25 jahrigen Regierungsjubiläums Kaiser Wilhelms II," Hohenzollern Jahrbuch, XVII (1913), 78-95 and the other articles listed above, p. 387, which Hintze wrote in defense of Germany and Prussia.

[18]Hintze, "Johann Gustav Droysen," p. 213.

political power and greatness" for Germany.[19] Hintze, thus, looked back at it with a genuine feeling of nostalgia.

World War I, for Hintze, was distinguished not only by the collapse of the Prussian-German system but also by the general breakdown of the western state system. In an illuminating review of Alfred Weber's work on the crisis of the modern conception of the state in Europe,[20] Hintze made the following remarks in 1925:

> Weber is correct. We find ourselves at the beginning of a completely new epoch of European, yes indeed, of world history. The old Europe with its polar contrast of democratic and legitismist monarchical powers, with its balance of power and alternately shifting constellations of powers, no longer exists and cannot again be restored in its old form. Not only is the mechanism destroyed which regulated its range of power and which held it together, but its spirit is also gone -- a spirit that has animated this unity since the days of Charles the Great....[21]

World War I was, therefore, a double calamity for Hintze. It not only destroyed the Prussian monarchical system under which he had been brought up, and which had provided him with a partial orientation of values, but the War also dissolved the effective functioning of the Western state system. Recalling Hintze's interest in constitutional history, it will be apparent what a blow World War I must have been to Hintze.[22]

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[19]Hintze, "Johann Gustav Droysen," p. 197.

[20]Alfred Weber, Die Krise des modernen Staatsgedankens in Europa (Berlin und Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1925).

[21]Hintze, Review of Alfred Weber, Die Krise des modernen Staatsgedankens in Europa, in Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXX (1925-26), 355.

[22]See above. p. 134.

Hintze regarded both post-war Germany and Europe as characterized by a great schism between spirit (Geist) and society (Gesellschaft), between the ideal and real factors.[23] The only way this schism and breakdown could be understood was in terms of a comprehensive sociological analysis of historical development. As a living force, the Prussian reality no longer had any meaning for Hintze. It was merely a nostalgic memory. In his eyes the European political power frame had also collapsed. Therefore, comparative constitutional history no longer possessed, for Hintze, that attraction which it had previously held. Instead, the investigation of sociological historical forces loomed as an all important task. Hintze faithfully mirrored this tendency in the body of writings which he produced between 1922-1933.

The second factor which affected Hintze's growing predilection for a sociological analysis of historical development in the post-war period was the increasing importance and role which German sociology was exercising. It is a mistake to think that Hintze had no real sociological interests prior to World War I. The past chapters of this dissertation disprove this, for they show conclusively that Hintze was gradually being influenced by a sociological outlook. World War I merely served to accelerate greatly this interest on Hintze's part. But the war did not create that interest. In this connection, let us take a brief look at the development of German sociology and its relation to historicism.

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[23] See above, pp. 330-331.

German historicism had developed in the nineteenth century under the strong influence of the problem of national political unification. The historicism of Droysen thus showed a close connection with the problem of creating ethical national political values. By 1870 this political problem had been resolved under Bismarck, and it no longer loomed as an all-important issue. Questions of social policy took precedence in imperial Germany. Schmoller's historicism reflected this new trend. His historicism was formed in close relationship to questions of social policy, and it represented the social-economic outlook of the younger historical school. Schmoller's historicism possessed a double aspect. On the one hand it revealed a universal-historical, sociological outlook. But on the other hand, Schmoller was deeply attached to the values of the Prussian state. From one standpoint, Schmoller was a universal-historical sociologist; from the other, he was an ardent Prussian patriot. Schmoller saw nothing fundamentally inconsistent in this dual attitude.[24]

In his articles on Schmoller, Hintze indicated that Schmoller was a precursor of the interpretative sociology of Max Weber and Werner Sombart, both of whom were students of Schmoller.[25] However, Schmoller's notion of sociology and the social sciences was a value charged one. Social science was to be a comprehensive instrument for molding social policy. Schmoller's notion of social science was thus

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[24]These points have all been developed previously. See above, pp. 165-166.

[25]See above, p. 162.

specifically oriented in terms of particular problems of social policy in imperial Germany. Schmoller consequently tried to harmonize his historical sociological synthesis, with ethical economic values, and the political ideals of the Prussian state.[26] From a sociological standpoint, Schmoller's activities in the realm of social policy were directed to the problem of attaching the German middle classes to the ethical political ideals of the Prussian state. The middle classes were unable to achieve a genuine parliamentary form of government in Germany. On the other hand, socialist agitation was constantly increasing. In response to the impossibility of achieving parliamentary government in imperial Germany, and the "dangers" of socialist agitation, Schmoller and the Verein für Sozialpolitik tried to steer a middle course, which was oriented around the ethical-political ideals of the Prussian state.[27]

Schmoller's conception of a science of society was hence value charged. In linking up the values of society with those of the state, Schmoller was uniting the ideas of state and society. An independent science of society exclusive of the state was thereby precluded by Schmoller. However, Schmoller's concept of a value charged sociology, which was oriented around the state, did not go unchallenged. This was

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[26] See above, p. 165.

[27] On the sociological background of Schmoller's views and those of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, see the illuminating study of Reinhard Bendix, The Rise and Acceptance of German Sociology, unpublished master's thesis (University of Chicago, 1943), pp. 230-236.

reflected in the great debates which took place in the convention of the Verein für Sozialpolitik in 1909.[28]

These debates centered around such issues as bureaucracy and the role of value judgments in the social sciences. They revealed a split between men such as Wagner, Conrad, Schmoller, and Phillipovich on the one hand, and Alfred and Max Weber and Werner Sombart on the other. The position of Schmoller and Phillipovich regarding the ethical nature of the state, and the close relationship between a science of society and social policy was challenged by men such as Weber, who insisted that social science must not confuse individual personal values and scientific investigation--in short sociology must be value free.[29]

This approach by Weber was already reflected, as we have seen, in the new editorial policy which Weber, together with Sombart and Jaffe, instituted in 1904, in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik.[30] It was also revealed in the founding of the German Sociological Society.[31] In its first convention held in 1910, Weber declared that the Society was, in fact, non-political. It was a Society without

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[28]See F. Boese, Geschichte des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, pp.103-122, 129-137.

[29]Consult the remarks of Max Weber in the Verhandlungen des Verein für Sozialpolitik in Wien, 1909 ("Schriften des Verein für Sozialpolitik," Vol. CXXXII; Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1910, pp. 583-536.

[30]See above. p. 272.

[31]Weber played a leading role in the establishment of the Society.

party political interests and affiliations.[32] Thus, whereas Droysen's historicism was representative of a whole generation for whom a leading problem was the creation of ethical political national values; and Schmoller's historicism, in turn, typified the activity of a group of historical economists who linked historicism with social-political and ethical interests, Weber's role was a different one. He attempted to free historicism from its ethical-political orientation, by means of a value free concept of sociology. The study of society and the values of the Prussian state were thus separated by Weber, whereas they had been united by Schmoller.

Weber, accordingly, gave a great impetus to the development of sociology as an independent discipline during the early years of the twentieth century. The development of German sociology was also given a tremendous boost as a result of World War I. As we have seen, the War destroyed the Prussian monarchical order of society and it introduced important changes in German society. Any of the earlier views of sociology which had linked up society with the Prussian state, such as that of Schmoller were now dealt a death blow. On the other hand, a conception of a value free sociology, such as that of Weber, was now provided with great scope and opportunity for expansion.

The post World War I years between 1922-1933 saw an amazing blossoming of diverse currents within German

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[32]Max Weber, "Geschäftsbericht," Verhandlungen des ersten Deutschen Soziologentages ("Schriften der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie": Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1911) p. 39.

sociology.[33] These included the sociology of knowledge led by Scheler[34] and Mannheim,[35] Alfred Weber's cultural sociology,[36]

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[33]On this development consult: Theodor Abel, Systematic Sociology in Germany, a Critical Analysis of Some Attempts to Establish Sociology as an Independent Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929); Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science, II, 878-933; "Leading Sociologists in Germanic Countries," in An Introduction to the History of Sociology, ed., Harry Elmer Barnes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 209-418; Hans Freyer, Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft; Karl Mannheim, "German Sociology (1918-1933,)" Politica, I (1934), 12-33; Karl Mannheim, Die Gegenwartsaufgaben der Soziologie, ihre Lehrgestalt (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1932); Helmut Schoeck, Soziologie, pp. 188-350; Louis Wirth, "The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies," American Journal of Sociology, XXVII (1926), 412-422; Franz Oppenheimer, "Tendencies in Recent German Sociology," Sociological Review, XXIV (1932), 1-13; Raymond Aron, La sociologie allemande contemporaine; Leopold von Wiese, Soziologie, Geschichte und Hauptprobleme (2nd ed.; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1931); P. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories (New York and London: Harper Brothers, 1928).

[34]On Scheler, see above, pp. 333-373.

[35]On Mannheim see the bibliography of some of his works, listed above. p. 334. Consult also the following of his writings: "Die Bedeutung der Konkurrenz in Gebiet des Geistigen," ("Verhandlungen des sechsten deutschen Soziologentages vom 17. bis 19. September 1928 in Zürich"; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1929), pp. 35-83, 119-124; Ideology and Utopia, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936); "Das konservative Denken, soziologische Beiträge zum Werden des politisch-historischen Denkens in Deutschland," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LVII (1927), 68-142, 470-495; "Das Problem der Generationen," Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie, VII (1928), 157-185, 309-330; Die Strukturanalyse der Erkenntnistheorie, ("Kant Studien, Ergänzungsheft Nr. 57"; Berlin: Reuther un Reichard, 1922).

[36]Consult the following of Weber's writings; Ideen Zur Staats - und Kultursoziologie (Karlsruhe: G. Braun, 1927); "Kultursoziologie," Handwörterbuch der Soziologie, pp. 284-294; "Principielles zur Kultursoziologie," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XLVII (1920-21), 1-49; "Kultursoziologische Versuche: das alte Ägypten und Babylonien," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LV (1926), 1-59.

the sociology of Tönnies[37] and Vierkandt.[38] It also embraced the conception of sociology as a science of formal relationships represented by von Wiese.[39] It included the universalistic sociology of Othmar Spann[40] and the sociology of historical development of Franz Oppenheimer.[41] This period witnessed the continuation and development of Max Weber's interpre-

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[37] Consult the following of Tönnie's writings: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (6th and 7th ed.; Berlin: K. Curtius, 1926); Die Entwicklung der sozialen Frage (4th ed.; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1926); "Zweck und Mittel im sozialen Leben," Hauptprobleme der Soziologie; Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber, ed. M. Palyi (München und Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1923) I, 235-271; Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1922); "Die Einteilung der Soziologie," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXIX (1925), 1-15; Fortschritt und soziale Entwicklund (Karlsruhe, 1926); Soziologische Studien und Kritiken (Jena; Gustav Fischer, 1928-1929), 3 vols.; Einführung in die Soziologie (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1931).

[38] On Vierkandt, consult the following of his writings: Gesellschaftslehre. Hauptprobleme der Philosophischen Soziologie (Stuttgart: Enke, 1923); Der Dualismus im modernen Weltbild (Berlin: Pan Verlag R. Heise, 1923); "Die Überwindung des Positivismus in der deutschen Soziologie der Gegenwart," Jahrbuch für Soziologie, II (1926), 66-90; "Gesellschaftsphilosophie," Jahrbücher der Philosophie, III (1927), 276-305; "Die Grundeigenschaften der Gruppe," Archiv für angewandte Soziologie, I (1928), 1-7; "Macht in soziologischer Beleuchtung," Der Arbeitgeber, IX (1927), 329-332; "Der neue Geist unseres Soziallebens," Der Arbeitgeber, IX (1928), 587-590; "Theorie der Gruppe, Sozialgestalt und Sozialmoral," Archiv für angewandte Soziologie, II (1929), 1-11.

[39] On von Wiese, consult the most important of his writings; Allgemeine Soziologie ("Teil I: Beziehungslehre;" "Teil II, Gebildelehre"; München: Duncker und Humblot, 1924, 1929).

[40] The most important of Spann's writings during the period 1922-1933, was Gesellschaftsphilosophie (2nd ed.; Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1923).

[41] Oppenheimer's great System der Soziologie appeared between 1922-1935. Consult the bibliography listed below, p. 396.

tative sociology by various of Weber's followers,[42] including Sombart.[43] Other older movements, such as historical materialism, also underwent an elaboration and extension of principles.[44]

The numerous currents within German sociology between the years 1922-1933 showed a bewildering variety of competing outlooks. Since they were no longer attached to a particular national political frame, these many currents of sociological thought were a good mirror of the fluid and competitive character of post-war German society. This state of affairs so

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[42]See for example, Erich Fechner, "Der Begriff des kapitalistichen Geistes bei Werner Sombart und Max Weber und die soziologischen Grundkategorien Geimeinschaft und Gesellschaft," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, XX(1929), 194-211; Bernard Pfister, "Bermerkungen zu dem Thema: Theorie und Geschichte," Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, CXXXI (1929), 481-512; Arthur Salz, Macht und Wirtschaftsgesetz, ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis des Wesens der Kapitalistichen Wirtschaftsverfassung (Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1930); Alexander von Schelting, "Zum Problem des Verstehens in der Sozialerkeantnis. Max Weber und Werner Sombart auf gemeinsamer Linie," Die Volkswirte, XXIX (1930), 212-220; Hauptprobleme der Soziologie. Errinerungsgabe für Max Weber (München und Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1923), 2 volumes; Joachim Wach, Einführung in die Religionssoziologie (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1931); Andreas Walther, "The Present Position of Sociology in Germany," Journal of Applied Sociology, X (1926), 229-238; Andreas Walther, "Max Weber als Soziologe," Jahrbuch fur Soziologie, II, 1-65.

[43]Consult the following of Sombart's writings published between 1922-1933: Nationalökonomie und Soziologie (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1930); Die drei Nationalökonomien,(Duncker und Humblot, 1931); "Prinzipielle Eigenart des modernen Kapitalismus," in Grundriss der Sozialökonomik (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1925), Section IV, Part I, pp. 1-26; "Grundformen des menschlichen Zusammenlebens," Handwörterbuch der Soziologie, pp. 221-239; "Kapitalismus," Handwörterbuch der Soziologie, pp. 258-277.

[44]See, for example, Karl Kautsky, Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung (Berlin: J. H. Dietz, 1927), 2 vols.

well described by Troeltsch in his article on the crisis of historicism,[45] whereby group struggled against group, ideology against ideology, movement against movement, was propitious for the development of a variety of sociological conceptions. Post-World War I German life with its fluidity, tensions, dislocations, and divorce between ideals and social reality, was a fertile ground for the growth of German sociology.

Post-War German sociology was shaped by the crisis of German historicism. Sociology in Germany had arisen during the nineteenth century in the closest relationship to historicism. The organological cultural sociology of the nineteenth century,[46] the formulation of Marxist sociology as a dialectical theory of history, the historizing of the cultural and social sciences generally,[47] and the philosophy of history as sociology,[48] all revealed the tremendous impact of historicism upon German sociology. Whereas, American sociology had never been profoundly influenced by historical currents, the historical outlook exercised a decisive influence upon German sociology.

During the nineteenth century, in the period of the

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[45]See above, p. 300-301.

[46]See Helmut Schoeck, "Zur organologischen Kultursoziologie im 19. Jahrhundert," Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, XXXIX (1951), 386-402.

[47]See Arnold Bergstraesser, "Deutsche und Amerikanische Soziologie," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, I (1953),

[48]See the important work of Paul Barth, Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie (3rd and 4th ed.; Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1922).

growth of German historicism, the main task of the historical attitude of mind was that of infiltrating the various cultural and social sciences.[49] Gradually, all of the cultural and social sciences adopted a historical evolutionary conception of development. The great syntheses of the nineteenth century were, thus, historical syntheses. The resultant historical syntheses -- the organological, Marxist, and Hegelian -- were attempts to work out a total interpretation of the meaning of history. Such monistic interpretations of history, functioning merely on a single level, were subjected to a searching criticism during the period of the crisis of German historicism. The breakdown of values, complications in the epistemic problem of history, and the exploration of the role of sociological factors in historical development, in terms of ideal and real factors, undermined these earlier philosophies of history. More acceptable cultural syntheses were sought. In the chapters on Troeltsch and Scheler, we have described attempts in this direction.[50]

Post-War German sociology not only revealed the influence of historicism, but it disclosed a systematic non-historical outlook as well. While certain sociologists such as Alfred Weber and Karl Mannheim were representative of historical sociology, other sociologists, such as von Wiese and Vierkandt, viewed the main task of sociology as the formulation of a systematic body of formal social relationships.

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[49] Bergstraesser, "Deutsche und amerikanische Soziologie," pp. 222-243.

[50] See above, pp. 327-328, 368-373.

German sociologists methodologically fell into three groups -- those who favored historical sociology, those who leaned toward systematic sociology, and thirdly, a figure such as Max Weber who combined both the historical and the systematic points of view. The problem thus raised was an important one.

It involved the relationship between the formal systematic and the material historical points of view. German historicism had stressed the uniqueness of events and their dynamic development, and German sociology, from the start, had been strongly influenced by this historicism. However, as German sociology assumed a more formal, autonomous, and systematic character, the problem regarding the relationship between sociology and history loomed as a leading one.[51]

Hintze, who reflected this accelerated influence of sociological currents in post-War Germany, faced this problem. Hintze had been brought up on the whole tradition of German historicism. Yet, he also was both impressed and influenced by the systematic social sciences. He was therefore confronted with the problem regarding the relationship between

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[51] The rise of German sociology as an independent discipline helped to sharpen the problem of the relationship between history and sociology. This can be discerned in the writings of the historian, Georg von Below. See the following of his writings. Soziologie als Lehrfach. Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Hochschulreform (München und Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1919); "Was ist 'Soziologie?' eine Frage des Universitätsunterrichts," Hochland, XVI (1919), 550-555; "Soziologie und Hochschulreform, eine Entgegnung," "Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, XVI (1921), 512-527; "Alter und Wesen der Soziologie," Deutschland's Erneuerung, VIII (1924), 748-753; "Zum Streit um das Wesen der Soziologie," Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, CXXIV (1926) 218-242; Die Entstehung der Soziologie (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1928).

sociology and history. He considered this problem in part in his essay on Oppenheimer and the sociological and historical conception of the state.[52]

Hintze's article was in one respect a comprehensive review and analysis of Oppenheimer's important system of sociology.[53] Besides dealing with the relationship between history and sociology, the article was also an important document on the crisis of German historicism. Hintze attempted to deal with Oppenheimer's views in terms of six basic problems -- the sociological idea of the state (die soziologische Staatsidee), Oppenheimer's system of sociology, the notion of the class state and imperialism, the pseudo law of primitive accumulation (Pseudogesetz der ursprünglichen

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[52]"Sociologische und Geschichtliche Staatsauffasung. Zu Franz Oppenheimer's System der Soziologie," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXVI (1929), 35-106.

[53]Franz Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, Vol. I, Allgemeine Soziologie; Vol. II, Der Staat; Vol. III, Theorie der reinen politischen Ökonomie; Vol. IV, Rom und die Germanen: Vol. V, Bauern und Städter (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1923, 1926, 1929, 1933, 1935). On Oppenheimer, consult his autobiography, "Mein wissenschaftlicher Weg," in Die Volkswirtschaftslehre der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1929), 69-116; also consult the following of his writings: Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft (3rd ed.; Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1922); Wege zur Gemeinschaft (München: M. Hueber, 1924); "Gesellschaft und Staat," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LVIII (1927), 179-185. Consult also the following secondary accounts: Kurt Werner, Oppenheimer's System der liberalen Sozialismus (Jena: G. Fischer, 1928); D. Bockenhoff, Wirtschaftsbegriff Oppenheimers (Münster: A. Boader, 1930); Paul Honigsheim, "The sociological Doctrines of Franz Oppenheimer: An Agrarian Philosophy of History and Social Reform," An Introduction to the History of Sociology, ed. Harry Elmer Barnes, pp. 332-352; Raymond Aron, La sociologie allemande contemporaine, pp.54-62; Fritz Sander, "Gesellschaft und Staat. Studie zur Gesellschaftslehre von Franz Oppenheimer," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LVI (1926), 339-416.

Akkumulation), and the problem of the origin of the state.

Hintze pointed out that the phrase, "sociological idea of the state" is a catchword, coined by the Austrian sociologist, Ludwig Gumplowicz, and adopted by Franz Oppenheimer.[54] It refers to a quite definite theory, which regards the state as the product of conquest and the class contrasts which thereby ensue.[55] This theory of the state is in sharp contrast to any idealistic theory of the state. The "sociological ideal of the state" regards the historical state as essentially a class state. This state primitively embraced a ruling and service class. The ruling class governed by means of conquest; the service class served because it was subjugated by the ruling class. The origin of the state is thus identical with the separation of classes. From a formal standpoint, however, the state is a legal arrangement imposed upon the conquered by the conquerors. This legal order of the state is created for the self-seeking interests of the victors, who thereby can freely enjoy the fruits of labor of the conquered. The class struggle which results from the creation of the state, fills the whole inner politics and history of states. However, this class struggle is not rooted in pure economic relationships such as competition. Instead, it is rooted in political power which leads to constant suppression.[56] Against such suppression, and exercise of force, the

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[54]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 35.

[55]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 35.

[56]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 35.

ineradicable idea of justice arises in the interests of the suppressed. In the beginning, therefore, force precedes right, but gradually, this force is "civilized," and then it appears as power. The power state represents the historical reality. The legal state (Rechtsstaat) arises as a gradual result of the demands of certain interests and ideas, that slowly emerge and are able to attain a partial realization.[57]

Hintze observed that the "sociological idea of the state " is opposed to a natural rights concept of the state. It differs also from the position of Hobbes, because it postulates the struggle of group against group, and not individual against individual. It is a group conflict approach to the state. Hintze noted too that the formulation of a group conflict theory of the state by Gumplowicz was no accident, since it was rooted in the unique and highly unfortunate struggles between nationality groups, which Gumplowicz had observed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[58]

Hintze argued that a theory such as Gumplowicz's had little hope of success in the Bismarckian Empire. Only Gustav Ratzenhofer, who stood in the camp of the all Germans (Alldeutschen), and pessimistically combined a philosophy of the state with a philosophy of war, attempted to continue in Gumplowicz's footsteps.[59]

Hintze also regarded Oppenheimer as one who further

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[57]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 36.

[58]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 36.

[59]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 37.

developed the teachings of Gumplowicz. But Oppenheimer did so in a quite different fashion from Ratzenhofer. In place of Ratzenhofer's cross materialism, Oppenheimer represented a purified positivistic conception, which also contained idealistic elements.[60] The kernel of Oppenheimers' sociological idea of the state, was contained in volume two of his System der Soziologie, which represented an expansion of his earlier work on the state.[61]

Hintze argued that Oppenheimer's views deserve careful consideration, and ought not to be quickly dismissed as a mere rehash of Gumplowicz's position. In many respects, Oppenheimer's views constituted a modification and correction of Gumplowicz. Moreover, Oppenheimer's theory of the state reflected the post-war Zeitgeist.[62] Hintze's remarks in this connection were extremely revealing. The catastropic events of World War I and its aftermath, said Hintze, have changed our whole attitude toward the state. The piety and devotion toward the state, which characterized the Bismarckian era is gone. A sober and suspicious critique toward the state has taken its place. This applies not only to the German state, but the criticism extends equally to the whole system of imperialistic power politics which contributed to bring about the debacle of World War I. And Hintze even carried the critique further, and argued that imperialistic power politics

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[60]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 37.

[61]Hintze, "Oppenheimer,"pp. 37-38. Compare Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, II, 15-24

[62]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 38

represent part and parcel of the destiny and fate of all world history. "The Hegelian apotheosis of the state" is gone forever.[63] The conditions in the present age seem to indicate clearly that "all power, or at least all excessive power, as a rule, will be misused," especially when it is clothed with moral and juristic trappings.[64] Moreover, Hintze insisted that World War I had produced conditions which rendered the notion of continued national solidarity as an illusion. Class tensions and disturbances characterize the post war world.[65]

Hintze, thus found a conception of the state, such as that represented by Oppenheimer to be of the highest interest, since it postulated power and injustice as the starting point of all class distinctions, politics, and formations of states. Even if such a notion were finally rejected on "scientific grounds," Hintze maintained that it could nevertheless provide a deeper and more correct understanding of the great comtemporary problem of state and society in the post war era.[66] It is thus clear, that, at least a part of Hintze's interest in Oppenheimer's views, was rooted in the break-up of the Prusian state, the collapse of the Western state system, the imperialistic struggles of powers, the debacle of World War I, and the dislocations in state and society which were accentuated by the War.

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[63]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 38.

[64]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," pp. 38-39.

[65]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 39.

[66]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 39.

Oppenheimer interpreted his "sociological idea of the state" as a part of a larger general system of sociology. Hintze turned to a consideration of the fundamental principles in Oppenheimer's system of sociology. Hintze regarded Oppenheimer as standing in the tradition of Comte, insofar, as Oppenheimer considered sociology to a universal science (Universalwissenschaft).[67] Oppenheimer sought to overcome Dilthey's objections to such a universal science of sociology.[68] A universal science of sociology, in Oppenheimer's use of the term, is no mere summary name for a series of generalizations derived from the individual social sciences. Sociology is not a syntheses of the social sciences. Instead, it represents the application of a universal approach to society from the viewpoint of the social process and the social organism. Such fields as history, political and legal science, and social economics, increasingly reveal such a sociological point of view. "Every historian, jurist, and economist, who discusses the foundations of his science, is engaging in sociology without wishing to do so."[69]

Hintze showed that Oppenheimer did not regard sociology as a science of formal social relationships. Oppenheimer accordingly rejected Simmel's formalism, as well as the formal

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[67]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 39.

[68]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 39. Compare Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, I, 156-166.

[69]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 40.

sociology of Vierkandt and von Wiese.[70] Instead, Oppenheimer returned to Comte's conception of sociology as a "universal contextual synthetic doctrine of society."[71]

Hintze regarded Oppenheimer as viewing sociology as a generalizing cultural science in Rickert's sense. Such a position was in harmony with the basic outlook of Comte, even though Oppenheimer rejected other elements in Comte, such as his religion of the future.[72] What Comte called "statics," Oppenheimer designated as "potential dynamics."[74] According to Oppenheimer, the social process was mainly dynamic. Hintze, therefore, regarded Oppenheimer as rejecting every form of "substantial" interpretation, in favor of a fundamentally new functional approach.[74]

Hintze discussed Oppenheimer's opposition to Spencer. He showed that Oppenheimer rejected Spencer's methodological monism because it was derived from the natural and not the cultural sciences. Oppenheimer also objected to Spencer's individualism, and he attacked Spencer's organicism. Hintze maintained that Oppenheimer was not at all clear in his critique of Spencer's organicism nor in his own use of the concept social organism.[75]

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[70]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 40. Compare Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, I, 111-123.

[71]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 40.

[72]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 40

[73]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," pp. 40-41.

[74]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 41.

[75]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," pp. 41-42.

According to Hintze, Oppenheimer was an outspoken universalist who was opposed to all forms of sociological individualism. The individual psyche, for Oppenheimer, was created by society. Hintze, consequently, saw a certain affinity between Oppenheimer's views on society and those represented by Spann's universalistic sociology, although Hintze conceded that Oppenheimer had criticized Spann's sociology as being too "statically" oriented.[76] Spann did not view the social system sufficiently as a product of dynamic historical development; hence he exhibited no great interest in the origin and modification of the social system.

Oppenheimer's emphasis on sociology as the study of the dynamics of the social process gave his concept of sociology a distinctly historical character and led him squarely into the problem of the relationship between history and sociology. This involved him with the problem of the individual and the social group.

Hintze argued that Oppenheimer's treatment of the relation between the individual and society was not satisfactory.[77] While Oppenheimer was opposed to all forms of sociological individualism, he nevertheless viewed the "collective consciousness" of society as perhaps initially residing in the individual. In discussing the psychological foundations of society, Oppenheimer took cognizance of the

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[76]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 42.

[77]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 45.

[78]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 42.

individual with his drives and needs. Yet he interpreted the isolated individual as a fictious expedient, since such a notion presupposed that the individual could exist prior to society

Hintze showed, that from a social psychological view, Oppenheimer distinguished three levels of development. The first level was that of the anthropological individual (anthropologische Individuum) of the sub-social stage, with his drives. The second level consisted of persons involved in social relations and represented the social stage. The third level consisted of the drives of the free personality on a supra-social state (supra-soziale Stufe).[79] The first stage is primarily the concern of anthropology. The second stage -- the social stage -- is peculiarly the affair of sociology. The third or supra-social level is the concern of history.[80]

Sociology in its essence is thus the theory of social processes. It deals with every dynamic situation which explains how the social system is modified. For Oppenheimer, the nature of the social process consists in the activity of human masses (menschliche Massen). Human masses are to be distinguished from masses of men. Human masses consist of a plurality of people bound together by a certain common interest, and who act in concert.[81] It is the task of sociology

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[79]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 43.

[80]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 43. Compare Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, I, 244-247.

[81]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 43. Compare Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, I, 79-82

to investigate the dynamics of such interest groups.

Hintze raised the questions -- how does a group of people come to be united by a common interest, and how is the common activity of this group to be understood? Hintze argued that neither the individualists who posit a series of isolated individuals, nor the collectivists who see only group totalities are correct. Instead, Hintze advocated a position which he had earlier represented in his Lamprecht article, namely, that the individual and the group co-exist in a dynamic mutual relationship. It is, therefore, impossible to conceive society merely as the product of individuals who were originally independent and isolated. Likewise, the individual cannot be explained as the mere product of society. Instead, a dynamic polar interrelationship exists between individual and society.[82]

It appeared evident to Hintze that Oppenheimer had no real appreciation of the reciprocity and mutual tension which existed between individual and society. Oppenheimer's views were one-sidedly oriented in favor of social groups. Hintze showed that Oppenheimer included all social group activity within the province of sociology. This led Oppenheimer to include the greater portion of social, economic, and constitutional history within the realm of sociology.[83] The borderline between history and sociology was thus blurred.

These considerations led directly to the problem of

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[82]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 44.

[83]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 45.

the relationship between history and sociology, and this in turn involved Oppenheimer's notion of the social process. Oppenheimer had divided the social process into three aspects -- statics, kinetics, and comparative statics.[84] Statics embraced all social movements and resistances to movements which did not vary in size or direction.[85] Kinetics dealt with those social movements that vary in both size and direction.[86] These definitions were derived by Oppenheimer from Giddings.[87]

Hintze showed, that according to Oppenheimer, sociology and history both have the same object, namely, "the investigation of the activities of masses in their kinetic relationships."[88] But in addition sociology has for its object the statics of social movements. Hintze regarded this distinction as incorrect. Hintze maintained that a cross sectional description is of as great significance to the historian as a narrative account of events. Narrative events cannot be grasped without an idea of cross sectional development. Moreover, many epochs such as Periclean Athens or the culture of the Italian Renaissance, from a static contemplative view, appear as high points of historiography.[89]

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[84]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 43.

[85]Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, I, 71.

[86]Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, I, 71.

[87]Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, I, 71.

[88]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 45.

[89]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 46.

Hintze also insisted that there were excellent constitutional historian, such as Maitland, who treated the constitutional history of a country in terms of a sense of comparative cross-sections, each having its own typical characteristics, without, thereby, abandoning history in favor of sociology.

Sociology, for Oppenheimer, dealt with the mass actions of civilization and did not concern itself with individual motivations. Sociology thus provided a 'nomothetic frame' for the historian, who in turn dealt with the supra-social ideographic delineation of personalities'.[90] The realm of personality and creativity -- culture in the narrower sense as distinct from civilization -- was excluded by Oppenheimer from sociology. Culture followed different values from those found in the domain of civilization. Within the realm of civilization, everything pertains to the idea of progress, in terms of a more adequate and efficient energy consumption. The realm of culture, however, follows absolute values that are not social but supra-social.[91]

Hintze argued that such a distinction between civilization and culture, between sociology and history, did not correspond to actual reality. History cannot be restricted to the realm of culture in Oppenheimer's sense, for there is after all pragmatic political history which occupies the main part of historical studies. Is this to be thrown out? And what is to be done with fields such as the sociology of

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[90]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 46.

[91]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 47.

knowledge and the sociology of religion?[92]

In Hintze's estimation, the distinction between history and sociology rested upon the fact that history concerns itself with the research and presentation of concrete meaningful patterns of social action, while sociology seeks more general abstractions which rest upon historical evidence. In actual practice sociology makes extensive use of the results of historical research, since such research provides sociology with raw material for its comparative and abstract work. On the other hand, social history requires in its turn sociological points of view and ideal types as heuristic means of research and frames of orientation.[93]

Hintze insisted that there was no rigid dividing line between history and sociology. The sociologist sometimes engages in historical work from his own particular standpoint. On the other hand, insofar as the historian is attempting to discover the constitution or nature of historical objects, he is engaging in a process of abstraction. All formulation of types constitutes a form of empirical abstraction and rests upon a comparative procedure. But comparative procedures can be variously employed. Hintze, therefore, argued that the comparative method can be used in order to find a general principle which lies at the basis of the comparison. But comparisons can also be made in an effort to grasp more sharply the historical individuality of the

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[92]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 47.

[93]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 47.

objects of comparison. Sociology uses the comparative method in order to find general principles. History uses the comparative method in order to attain to a sharper comprehension of historical individuality.[94] According to Hintze, a German or English economic history is a historical work, but a history of modern capitalism is a sociological work. "Naturally, the historical work is not possible without sociological viewpoints and ideal types; the sociological work also depends on the use of historical viewpoints and source investigation. But the scientific intent and total attitude of the two endeavors is quite different."[95]

Hintze's remarks on the relation between history and sociology throw light on the transformation of German historical thought from historicism to sociology. It reveals the highly problematic and ambiguous character of German historical sociology. Let us dwell briefly on this problem.

Hintze's attitude toward the relationship between history and sociology discloses that on the one hand, he did not believe there was any hard and fast distinction between the two fields. Historical sociologists such as Weber and Sombart made extensive use of Historical materials. On the other hand, Historians constantly make use of "sociological viewpoints and ideal types."[96] But on the other

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[94]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 48.

[95]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 48.

[96]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 48.

hand, we find Hintze asserting that "the scientific intent and total attitude of the two endeavors is quite different."[97] For sociology strives to attain to general principles; history always aims at a greater sharpening of historical individuality.

The truth of the matter is, that Hintze was deeply influenced by both historicism and sociological views. Historicism had always stressed concrete individuality and dynamic development. Although German sociology had emerged out of this historicism, it seemed headed in the direction of greater formalization and systematization. In Hintze's estimation, sociology, therefore, put the attainment of general principles as its first aim, and historical individuality and dynamic development as a subsidiary consideration. History, on the other hand, always had as its first aim the discovery of the specific concrete individuality. Thus, although German historical and sociological interests both originally grew out of the larger movement of modern historicism, Hintze believed that, more and more, as German sociology became an independent autonomous discipline, its "scientific intent and total attitude" diverged from that of history.

German sociology thus revealed an ambiguous character. It had emerged out of historicism and yet in a sense it was an attempt to overcome the crisis of historicism. It was not interested in historical materials for their

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[97]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 48.

own sake. It did not love to dwell only within the province of the singular, the unique, the historically concrete. It was interested in general principles, and in that sense, it was an attempt to go beyond the specific individuality of the historical approach.

Hintze himself was caught by this problem. Attracted to both historicism and sociology, he witnessed a growing divergence of approach between the two disciplines. Hintze's problem was one which involved the attempt to be faithful to the historical approach without being completely seduced by the charms of the newer developments in sociology. Hintze's efforts in this direction resulted in a certain ambivalence. He was at once attracted to many of the viewpoints of sociology, and yet he felt that these were increasingly remote from the concrete richness of pure historicism. Thus, during the twentieth century, Hintze was increasingly attracted to Weber's interpretative sociology and his notion of ideal types; yet he believed that Weber revealed some of the dangers inherent in any attempt to systematize historical materials.[98] Hintze was also drawn to a study of Oppenheimer's system of sociology; neverthless, he believed that the inten of a historical sociologist such as Oppenheimer was different from that of the historian. It must be emphasized that Hintze still regarded himself as essentially the historian.

Hintze was thus tossed between a position which widened

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[98]See above, pp. 285-286.

the differences between history and sociology, and one which showed that these differences were not in fact sharp or permanent. In a discussion of Oppenheimer's distinction between the 'human mass' and the 'free personality,' Hintze attempted to show that Oppenheimer was mistaken in thinking that there was a sharp difference between the two.[99] Hintze maintained that in extreme cases, there was a sharp distinction between the "mass" and the "individual." But in many cases, there were all sorts of intermediate graduations between the collective mass on the one hand, and the free autonomous personality on the other. In both sociology and history we constantly encounter such intermediate situations.[100]

Hintze argued that great historical leaders were not possible without the support of masses who followed them. However, these leaders may be divided into "heroes" in Carlyle's meaning, and "representative men" in Emerson's sense. In the case of heroes, the free personality attains to its highest genius; it draws the mass to it. Such heroes work creatively not only in the realm of spiritual culture but also in the realm of civilization. To this group belong not only Christ and Buddha, but also Caesar and Napoleon.[101]

In the case of the representative men, we have a type of leadership personality which serves as the exponent

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[99]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 48.

[100]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 48.

[101]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 48.

of the feelings and attitudes of the mass. This type of leader is able to focus the feelings and attitudes of the mass to a clear consciousness and active will and action. Hintze believed that this type was embodied "above all in the democratic dictators from Pericles to Lincoln or Mussolini."[102] The type of representative leader is found more frequently in the sphere of civilization rather than culture. Nevertheless, it is not lacking in religion, art, and science. Hintze regarded Confucius as an example of representative leadership in the realm of religion.

Besides these great historical leaders -- heroes or representative men -- Hintze believed that history also revealed the presence of innumerable lesser anonymous sub-leaders. The effect of these lesser leaders on the social and political life, especially of the West, has been enormous. Hintze cited competing merchants and industrial entrepreneurs, party politicians and parliamentarians, journalists and bureaucrats, labor leaders and pioneers in cooperative movements, teachers and priests, as examples. Hintze maintained that the characteristic individuality of our Western civilization -- as compared to that of China and India -- was that it had been permeated by such anonymous leaders who activated the masses through individual activity, initiative and responsibility. These leaders thus provided a direction, a dynamic, and a progressive tempo for the West, which was profoundly different from that shown by other

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[102] Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 49.

civilizational areas, where the preservation of kinship social patterns or a caste system interfered with the development of a personal-individual type of leadership.[103]

Hintze argued that Oppenheimer lacked any appreciation of this fundamental difference between Orient and Occident. Therefore, Oppenheimer was unable to understand that the structure of the 'human mass' varied enormously among different peoples and times. The notion of the human mass is thus not a natural category but a specific historical category -- a product of culture. It must not be construed as a universal, uniform, sociological category, but rather it must be examined historically in an effort to discovered how it concretely functions within different historical contexts.

Although Hintze was attracted and influenced by sociological currents in the great transition from historicism to sociology within German historical thinking, he always considered himself as a historian who represented the distinctively historical approach of Ranke. In rejecting the sociological approach to the state as represented by Oppenheimer, and in opposing the approach of Roscher and the historical school of law of Savigny, Hintze restated his fundamental position.

> As against the historical school of economics as well as that of the historical school of law, I have always represented the viewpoint, that it is not possible to construe constitutional history as a pure immanent process of development, without taking into account powerful external

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[103]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 49.

> interferences. This is the meaning of my critique of Roscher's theory of political development and my essay on the formation of states and constitutional development. On all points, I have made an attack, against the idea that the state develops like a natural product, that it grows 'like a palm tree' (Robert Seeley). I view the state rather as a cultural product, which like all culture rests upon natural foundations, but which in its individuality is the work of human forces. I do not contemplate the state as an organism, either in its individual or collective sense. Instead, I regard the state as an 'institution,' or dynamically speaking, as an 'undertaking,' yes, as an undertaking of a distinct sort alongside the economic undertaking. I allow a wide range to conquest and war in the course of the formation of states, but equally to defense against attempts at conquest and to preventative security against such attempts; in short, to the whole system of militaristic power politics, which has left its mark on the whole formation of states, as well as on the social and political aspects of government. All this separates me widely from the standpoint of the so-called historical school in law and economics, which is oriented altogether too much around the notion of pure immanent organic development. I believe that I represent the true and specifically 'historical' standpoint, and need only refer to the authority of Ranke in proof of that contention. On the distinction between a construction of the state based on pure immanent forces and a method which takes into account various historical political constellations, I would like to refer to the presentation of Jewish history by Wellhausen on the one hand, and that of Eduard Meyer on the other hand; or to the constitutional history of the French Revolution by Taine as compared with that of Aulard. These are classical examples which can best illustrate what I have in mind.[104]

Thus, despite the tremendous impact which sociological elements exercised upon Hintze's concept of history, the influence of historicism as reflected in Droysen and Ranke continued to loom as the leading force in his interpretation of history. To Hintze, the role of sociological

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[104]Hintze, "Oppenheimer," p. 85.

factors was not that of arriving at a comprehensive system, but rather that of understanding more adequately the individuality of historical structures and relationships.

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