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THE RHETORICAL THEORY OF JOHN CARDINAL NEWMAN

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In ancient times theories of rhetoric were generally set forth and developed in terms of the speaking experiences of the more successful Attic orators. The field of rhetoric, however, was invaded by subsequent writers who were often content to translate and restate the doctrines of the Greek and Roman theorists. Quintilian observes that quite frequently writers on rhetorical theory had little experience in practical eloquence. Such writers, moreover, often shaped doctrines which failed to rise above the plateau of subtle reconstruction and cold compilation of "theories."

Contrasted with this group of rhetorical theorists are the functional rhetoricians who have found time to set down their personal doctrines. When the theory of such men is not presented in any systematic order it becomes a profitable enterprise for the student of rhetoric to discover and organize the theory which is hidden and buried in their sundry lectures and treatises. Such a study becomes especially worth-while if the speaker under consideration has developed and refined his own functional rhetoric through such great masters as Aristotle, Cicero,

Quintilian, and St. Augustine.

It is generally recognized that the extraction of an able speaker's theory of rhetoric from the sum of his works is a valuable contribution to the existing rhetorical theory. The worth of Hance's "The Rhetorical Theory of Phillips Brooks" and the reception accorded Crocker's "Henry Beecher's Art of Preaching" are offered in confirmation of this judgment.

Reasons for a Study of Cardinal Newman

I. John Cardinal Newman is among those who have had the dual rhetorical orientation as a speaker and a writer.

II. Cardinal Newman personally considered himself a rhetorician. Writing to R. H. Froude concerning his function in the Oxford Movement, Newman states: "You and Keble are the philosophers, and I the rhetorician."[1]

III. Throughout his life Cardinal Newman made rhetoric the principal vehicle for projecting his ideas and influencing his contemporaries. Some conception of the exalted place that Newman occupies in the field of preaching can be gained from the critical evaluation given by the late Charles Fredrick Harrold. Having devoted his scholarly acumen and his final years to a comprehensive

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[1] John Henry Newman, Letters and Correspondence, ed. Anne Mozley, (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903), II, 139.

study of the famous leader of the Oxford Movement, he concludes:

> Of all the eloquent preachers of Newman's day, only six are regarded by one authority as reaching true greatness: Newman himself, the Fredrick William Robertson of Brighton, Canon Liddon of St. Paul's, Charles Haddon Spurgeon of Exeter Hall and the Metropolitan Tabernacle, William Connor Magee (successively Bishop of Peterborough and Archbishop of York), and William Boyd Carpenter, Bishop of Ripon and Canon of Westminster. . . . The power and eloquence of these men have long been matters of historical record. Yet of the greatest, Newman alone is read widely today as a master of sermon eloquence.[1]

Matthew Arnold, a contemporary, was aware of the persuasive skill of Newman even forty years after the delivery of his famous sermons.

> The name of Cardinal Newman is a great name to the imagination still; his genius and style are still things of power. . . . Forty years ago he was in the prime of his life; he was close at hand to us at Oxford; he was preaching in St. Mary's pulpit every Sunday; he seemed about to transform and renew what was to us the most national and natural institution in the world, the Church of England. Who would resist the charm of that spiritual apparition, gliding in the dim afternoon light through the aisles of St. Mary's, rising into the pulpit, and then, in the most entrancing of voices, breaking the silence with words and thought, which were a religious music,--subtle, sweet and mournful.[2]

IV. Cardinal Newman exerted a strong and pronounced influence on the style of ecclesiastical rhetoric.

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[1]Charles F. Harrold, John Henry Newman (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1945), p. 319.

[2]Matthew Arnold, Discourses in America (London: The Macmillan Co., 1896), pp. 139-140.

From a survey of a few of the more notable works in connection with rhetorical research and criticism, we may gain some idea of the high regard in which Newman's writings have been held in the twentieth century. Hardt[1] has investigated the process of Newman's rhetoric in relation to some of the more prominent theological concepts found in his sermons; Houghton[2] has made a study of the underlying rhetorical principles of the Apologia Pro Vita Sua; Sattler[3] has referred to Newman as an authentic interpreter and authority on the Aristotelian concept of ethos; Ryan[4] has made a study of Newman's conception of literature; Brastow[5] has included a chapter on Newman in his homiletical history, designating him as the "Ecclesiastical Dogmatist"; Clark[6] has referred to Newman's opinion on the essential difference between poetic and rhetoric.

From the above studies we may infer not only that Newman has been considered significant and worthy of

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[1]P. G. Hardt, John Henry Kardinal Newman als Prediger (Munster: University of Munster, 1928).

[2]W. Houghton, The Art of Newman's Apologia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945).

[3]William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1941).

[4]Alvan S. Ryan, Newman's Conception of Literature ("University of Iowa," VI, /Iowa City, Iowa, 1942/), 123-174.

[5]Lewis O. Brastow, Representative Modern Preachers (London: The Macmillan Co., 1904).

[6]Donald L. Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1902).

scholarly research but that his doctrines and personal opinions in rhetorical matters are respected.

Purposes of the Study

The purposes of this investigation are:

I. To restate systematically Newman's theory of rhetoric

II. To relate Newman's rhetorical doctrines to the classical tradition by comparing and contrasting them with the doctrines of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and St. Augustine

III. To determine through this study the contributions made by Newman to the field of rhetorical theory

Sources of the Study

This study will by its nature involve the study and analysis of Newman's numerous works. Because they contain chiefly the rhetorical doctrines, the study primarily is based on the following works of Newman:

1. Apologia Pro Vita Sua. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921.
2. Callista. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891.
3. Essays Critical and Historical. 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919.
4. Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920.
5. Grammar of Assent. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913.

6. Lectures on Justification. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914.

7. Oxford University Sermons. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921.

8. Parochial and Plain Sermons. 8 vols. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1916-1920.

9. Sermons on the Subjects of the Day. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909.

10. Sermon Notes of John Henry Newman. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914.

11. Sermons Preached on Various Occasions. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921.

12. The Idea of a University. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921.

13. The Arians of the Fourth Century. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919.

As suggested in the previous section, the rhetorical writings of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and St. Augustine will also be given consideration in this study. The works of these writers have been selected for purposes of comparison because they represent a systematic and complete statement of classical rhetorical theory. While St. Augustine did not live in what is usually regarded as the classical period, his writings approximate the views expressed by classical writers. His views on rhetoric are especially relevant to this study because he directly applies classical rhetorical theory to Christian preaching.

Plan of Organization

The chapters of this study will be arranged according to the traditional five categories of rhetoric. There will be chapters in the study devoted to each of these five constituent elements of classical rhetoric: Rhetorical Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery. Each of these chapters will be concerned with the following considerations: (1) Newman's theories on rhetoric as expressed in his lectures and writings; (2) comparisons between Newman's theories and those prominent and important in the rhetorical tradition; and (3) statements of conclusions indicative of Newman's position relative to the classical tradition.

The final section of this study will contain two appendices: Appendix I, Biographical Study of Cardinal Newman, and Appendix II, Rhetorical Background of Cardinal Newman. These two appendices are especially directed to those readers who are unacquainted with the life and rhetorical background of Cardinal Newman.

CHAPTER II

NEWMAN'S CONCEPTION OF RHETORIC

The purpose of this chapter is to present Newman's general conception of rhetoric. Fortunately Newman has not limited his discussion to the bare scholastic definition and divisions of rhetoric. Throughout his works he has interspersed many significant comments on the historical development of rhetoric and on the relation of rhetoric to the other liberal arts. The main sections of this chapter are: (1) definition of rhetoric, (2) kinds of rhetoric, (3) media of rhetoric, (4) relation of rhetoric to logic and grammar, and (5) observations on the history of rhetoric.

Definition of Rhetoric

In his remarks concerning the early beginnings of rhetoric, Newman observes that writers emphasized the note of persuasion. Newman's stress on persuasion as the end of rhetoric suggests the nature of his formal definition of rhetoric. We do not, however, discover a strict metaphysical definition of rhetoric in terms of genus and specific difference.

Considering rhetoric in its classical position as

one of the Seven Liberal Arts, Newman affirms that "rhetoric is the art of persuasion."[1] He further amplifies his meaning by saying that "the aim of oratory is to persuade, and its object is the probable."[2] In another of his essays he says, "what, again, is the art of rhetoric, but the reduction of reasoning . . . into the calculus of the tastes, opinions, passions and aims of a particular audience."[3]

These three broad definitions indicate Newman's relation to the classical tradition. His definitions follow strictly neither the definition of Aristotle[4] nor the descriptive definition of Quintilian.[5] The definitions basically follow the opinion of Cicero who states that the office of the orator is to speak in a way adapted to win the assent of his audience.[6]

Newman maintains this same conception of rhetoric throughout his works. He writes, for instance, in his "Essay on Cicero" that the orator aims at "persuasion by

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[1]John Henry Newman, Idea of a University (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1905), p. 259.

[2]John Henry Newman, Essays, Critical and Historical (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919), I, 29.

[3]Ibid., p. 288.

[4]Aristotle Rhetoric tr. Lane Cooper (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1932) 1. 2. 1355[b].

[5]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria tr. H. E. Butler (London: William Heinman, 1933) II. 15.

[6]Cicero De Oratore tr. H. Rackman (London: Harvard University Press, 1942) I. 138.

appeals to the reason or passions."[1] Appeals to reason should not, however, be the sole concern of the orator. He declares that "logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot round corners, and you may despair of converting with a syllogism."[2]

Rhetorical persuasion can only be achieved through challenging the heart as well as the intellect. Newman clearly disapproves of a theory of rhetoric limited to logical appeals. He writes:

> . . . deductions have no power of persuasion. The heart is commonly reached, not through reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by testimony of facts, and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma. No man will be a martyr for a conclusion . . . after all man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal.[3]

Newman proves the utility of appeals to the imagination from his observation of the part the imagination plays in shaping public opinion. He observes its functioning widely in society and in turn influencing not only thinking but also action. In analyzing the function of the imagination, he notes:

> Your neighbour assures you that every one is of one way of thinking; that there is but one opinion on the subject; and while

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[1]John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), I, 50.

[2]Ibid., II, 205.

[3]Ibid.

> he claims not to be answerable for it, he does not hesitate to propound and spread it. In such cases, every one is appealing to every one else; and the constituent members of a community one by one think it their duty to defer and succumb to the voice of the community as a whole.[1]

It is Newman's judgment therefore that public opinion "is the offspring of their [the people's] judgment, but mainly . . . of their imagination."[2] Public opinion especially acts upon and appeals to the imagination; it does not convince, but it impresses. From these observations Newman concludes that public opinion "has the force of authority rather than of reason."[3]

Having noted the force of public opinion upon action, Newman is convinced that the imagination is an important avenue by which persuasion can be achieved. Newman never tires of repeating the dictum "the whole man reasons,"[4] and therefore rhetoric which is concerned with persuasion should use all the avenues by which persuasion can be accomplished. The three avenues he indicates are the imagination, intellect, and will.

Kinds of Rhetoric

Newman shows that rhetoric, like dialectics, has

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[1]John Henry Newman, Essays and Sketches, ed. Charles F. Harrold (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948) II, 277.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, op. cit., p. 169. See also Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 94.

universal extension and comprehension in regard to subject matter. Yet in the practical order the art of rhetoric is restricted by reason of the mechanism proper to it as an art. Following closely the doctrine of Cicero, Newman believes that the subject matter of oratory may be limited by reason of the case, the speaker, and the speech. He likewise states that the case may be considered to be either definite or indefinite.[1]

From the standpoint of the speaker, anticipating the presentation of a definite case, Newman agrees that rhetoric could be judicial, deliberative, and descriptive.[2] Newman is not consistent in using the term "descriptive" for the third kind of rhetoric. Yet his explanations of descriptive rhetoric show that he considers the term largely in the sense of ceremonial or panegyrical rhetoric.

Newman does not give special attention to the consideration of forensic rhetoric. He does this despite the fact that Pitt and Gladstone, two of the most famous forensic English orators, were his contemporaries. In regard to panegyrical rhetoric, he declares that the object of such oratory "is to excite or keep up interest and reverence of the auditors."[3] In this form of rhetoric speakers aim at "nothing beyond their own exhibition and

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 33.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 491.

are content with being eloquent, and with the sensation which eloquence creates."[1] He notes in this connection some of the occasions when laudatory or descriptive rhetoric is in vogue.

> Such are the exhibition days of Colleges; such the annual Commemoration of Benefactors at once of the English Universities, when Doctors put on their gayest gowns, and Public Orators make Latin Speeches. Such, too, are the Terminal Lectures, at which divines of the greatest reputation of intellect and learning have before now poured forth sentences of burning eloquence into the ears of an audience brought together for the sake of display.[2]

In discussing deliberative oratory, Newman is specifically concerned with preaching. He recognizes that desirous as the advocate might be to gain acquittal of his client, or the legislator to sway the senate, the advocate or the legislator would remain content with a temporary effect. But the preacher is anxious to produce a slightly different kind of persuasion from that of the forensic speaker. The preacher should aim at producing a more lasting and permanent persuasion. He strives not only to instruct the intellect and please the imagination but also to move the will of his audience. Newman signifies this fact in a letter to his mother on September 16, 1824.

> Those who make comfort the great object of their preaching seem to mistake the end of

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

> their ministry. Holiness is the great end. There must be a struggle and toil here. Comfort is a cordial, but no one drinks cordials from morning to night.[1]

Newman criticizes his contemporaries for neglecting to attend to the end and purpose of preaching as a form of rhetoric. He directs sharp strictures at them in words which further reflect his own opinion:

> The true preaching of the gospel is to preach Christ. But the fashion of the day has been, instead of this, to preach conversion; to exhort men to undergo a change; to tell them to be sure they look at Christ, instead of simply holding Christ up to them; to tell them to have faith, rather than supply its Object.[2]

Newman declares that the "communication of some spiritual good to his hearers"[3] is the immediate end of the ecclesiastical speaker. On the other hand, the ultimate end of preaching and all sermon writing is the salvation of the hearer.[4] Newman believes that the preacher must have this end before his "mind's eye" just as the marksman must aim at the target and its bull's eye, and at nothing else.[5] Not completely satisfied with the weight of his own experience on this matter,

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[1]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 76.

[2]John Henry Newman, Lectures on Justification (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1892), p. 325.

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 408; p. 410.

[4]John Henry Newman, Discourse to Mixed Congregations (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921), p. 1.

[5]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 406.

Newman enlists the authority of two saints, St. Francis de Sales and St. Charles Borromeo:

> So far is clear at once, that the preacher's object is the spiritual good of his hearers. 'Finis praedicanti sit, says St. Francis de Sales; ut vitam (justitiae) habeant homines, et abundantius habeant.' And St. Charles: 'Considerandum, ad Dei omnipotentis gloriam, ad animarumque salutem, referri omnem concionandi vim ac rationem.'[1]

Newman sees that the preacher has a specifically different aim and object than the teacher or the lecturer whose object is to instruct and teach.[2] The lecturer ordinarily is not interested in changing conduct or moving the will. But the preacher, according to Newman, must not only instruct the intellect, but move the will: "'Necesse est ut doceat et moveat,' says S. Francis."[3] We find that in this instance Newman is echoing the opinion of St. Augustine in regard to the end of ecclesiastical rhetoric as a part of deliberative oratory.[4]

In comparison with the representatives of the traditional rhetoric, Newman's treatment of the kinds and the subject matter of rhetoric is brief and skeletal. He gives little attention to the discussion of forensic rhetoric. In placing stress on the end of the speech and

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 490.

[3] Ibid., p. 411.

[4] St. Augustine De Doctrina Christiana, IV Book, tr. Sister Therese Sullivan (Washington, D. C.: Catholic Educational Press, 1930), iv. 4.

in dividing the whole subject of rhetoric on the basis of purpose, Newman appears to follow the views of the representatives of the rhetorical tradition.[1] His conclusions do not depart in any significant way from those expressed by Aristotle.

Media of Rhetoric

Newman sees reason for using both littera scripta and oral composition as the media for rhetoric. Of these two media he considers oral composition not only more effective and persuasive, but historically the more primitive medium. He thinks that oral communication (mutatis mutandis) is better than littera scripta as a rhetorical device because it allows the speaker to express his personality more effectively.

> This characteristic gift of man belongs to its exhibition by means of the voice, not of handwriting. It addresses itself in its primary idea, to the ear, not to the eye. We call it the power of speech, we call it

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric i. 3. 1358[b]. Aristotle states that the aim of the deliberative speaker concerns advantage and injury; for the one who exhorts recommends a course of action as better. "The aim of judicial pleaders concerns justice and injustice, and they in like manner make the other considerations subsidiary to these. The aim of those who praise and blame concerns honor and dishonor, and such speakers likewise subordinate the other considerations to these."

Quintilian Institutio Oratoria iii. 4. 14. Quintilian says the end of the deliberative speech is to move an audience with respect to future action, the demonstrative, which amplifies and embellishes a subject, and the forensic, which attempts to move an audience regarding past action.

St. Augustine De Doctrina Christiana iv. 4 ff. St. Augustine states that the aim of preaching is to direct man's welfare not to temporal but to eternal welfare.

language, that is the use of the tongue.[1]

Negatively he argues further:

> . . . no book can convey the special spirit and delicate peculiarities of its subject with the rapidity and certainty which attend on the sympathy of mind with mind, through the eyes, the look, the accent and the manner of casual expressions thrown off at the moment.[2]

To support his own opinion he points to the world of science where this same principle is recognized:

> We find a remarkable instance of the principle which I am illustrating, in the periodical meetings for its advance, which have arisen in the course of the last twenty years, such as the British Association. . . . Yet on closer examination of the subject, it is found that not even scientific thought can dispense with the suggestions, the instruction, the stimulus, the sympathy, the intercourse of mankind. . . . They [these scientific meetings] issue in the promotion of ideas, and a comparison and adjustment of science with science, of an enlargement of mind, intellectual and social, of an ardent love of particular study, which may be chosen by each individual, and a noble devotion to its interests.[3]

In the field of religion he points to the "oral tradition" which was used almost exclusively in the early days of the Christian Church. He cites the case of St. Irenaeus whose skill as a rhetorician was appreciated even by the pagans. He refers also to St. Anthony who was a match in disputation for the learned philosophers

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 273.

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., II, 282.

[3]Ibid., p. 285.

who came to him.[1] Newman states that the "oral tradition" was effectively persuasive because it was

> . . . the living voice, the breathing form, the expressive countenance, which preaches, which catechises. Truth, subtle, invisible, manifold, it poured into the mind of the scholar by his eyes and ears, and through his affections, imagination, and reason; it is poured into his mind and is sealed up there in perpetuity, by propounding and repeating it, by questioning and requestioning, by correcting and explaining.[2]

Littera scripta came into use and began to supplant oral composition because of the limitations of time and space which are the natural accidents of oral composition. "What is spoken cannot outrun the range of the speaker's voice, and perishes in the uttering."[3] It is in order to overcome time and space that littera scripta is used. "When words are in demand to express a long course of thought, when they have to be conveyed to the ends of the earth . . . they are written down."[4] Yet in lieu of this latter expedient, the best speakers are conscious that they are adapting the oral medium.

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[1] Ibid., p. 282.

[2] Ibid., p. 287.

[3] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 273.

[4] Ibid. ". . . and, even when we write, we still keep in mind what was its original instrument, for we use freely such terms in our books as 'saying,' 'speaking,' 'telling,' 'talking,' 'calling;' we use the terms 'phraseology' and 'diction;' as if we were still addressing ourselves to the ear."

Relation of Rhetoric to Logic and Grammar

Newman in his works considers the relation of rhetoric to the arts of grammar and logic. In general he perceived that some writers have confused these arts. Although recognizing the points of contact which these two arts have to rhetoric and the common matter in which they participate, Newman separates these arts according to the traditional distinctions.

Relation of Rhetoric to Logic

Concerning the relation of rhetoric to logic, the doctrine of Newman is arranged under the following heads: (1) the relation of reason to logic, (2) the necessity of logic, (3) the function of logic, and (4) the distinction between logic and rhetoric.

Reason for Newman is any act of the mind by which from knowing one thing the person advances to know another. The reasoning faculty considered in its natural state functions as "a simple act, not as a process or series of acts."[1] Through the faculty of reason the antecedent is apprehended and then the consequent without any explicit recognition of the medium connecting the two. This comes about as if by a sort of association of the first thought with the second.[2] Newman adds that this knowledge of

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[1]John Henry Newman, Grammar of Assent (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903), p. 259.

[2]Ibid., p. 260.

antecedent and consequent proceeds by a sort of instinctive perception. It is natural because most men reason from antecedent to conclusion without any formal training.

> We perceive external objects, and we remember past events without knowing how we do so; and in like manner we reason without effort and intention, or any necessary consciousness of the path which the mind takes in passing from antecedent to consequent.[1]

Newman distinguishes between ratiocination in the "state of nature" and logic which he calls an artificial system of reasoning. "Ratiocination, . . . put into grooves, is what I have called inference, and the science, which is its regulating principle, is logic."[2] Logic thus looks back explicitly on the reasoning process and analyzes the natural functioning of reason.

The necessity of logic arises because the natural processes of reasoning are not always adequate and satisfactory in establishing a common ground in discussion. Logic also assists the speaker in his interpretation of the concrete world:

> There is another reason for attempting to discover an instrument of reasoning (that is, of gaining new truths by means of old), which may be less vague and arbitrary than the talent and experience of the few or the common-sense of the many. As memory is not always accurate, and has on that account led to the adoption of writing, as being a memoria technica, unaffected by the failure of mental impressions,--as our senses at times deceive us, and have to be corrected by each other; so is it also with

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 263.

> our reasoning faculty. The conclusions of one man are not the conclusions of another; those of the same man do not always agree together; those of ever so many who agree together may differ from the facts themselves, which those conclusions are intended to ascertain. In consequence it becomes a necessity, if it be possible, to analyze the process of reasoning, and to invent a method which may act as a common measure between mind and mind, as a means of joint investigation, and as a recognized intellectual standard,--a standard such as to secure us against hopeless mistakes, and to emancipate us from the capricious *ipse dixit* of authority.[1]

Logic provides the speaker with a key which when revolved through the intricate processes of reasoning can unlock the treasure-house of objective truth. It serves as a faithful rule for interpreting phenomena. For Newman it is indeed a more ambitious art than the science of geometry because it is a more "comprehensive contrivance." It also supersedes personal gifts by a far reaching and infallible rule.[2] Newman, however, recognizes the disadvantages and limitations of logic. Although he says it is proposed as both a test and a common measure of reasoning, it does not go really so far as to prove:

> Logic then does not really prove; it enables us to join issue with others; it suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the lines of thought; it verifies negatively; it determines when differences of opinion are hopeless; and when and how far conclusions are probable; but for genuine proof in concrete matter we require an organon more delicate,

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 262.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation.[1]

Newman feels that the "chain of logical conclusions hangs loose at both ends."[2] Both the point from which proof should start and the points at which it should arrive are beyond its province. It reaches neither first principles nor concrete issues. However, in spite of its limitations, Newman declares that its proper value should not be disparaged. Logic can serve rhetoric because it is the great principle of order in thinking.

Newman writes that analysis of reasoning "is called logic, which is a sort of rhetoric."[3] This hardly means that for Newman logic is the proper tool for gaining new truth, but rather the instrument for the expression of truths gained through other methods and from first principles. It certainly implies that logic properly may be employed in the process of persuasion. If conceived as a method of analysis of thought and persuasion, logic does have a role in the art of rhetoric. For, as Newman notes, besides being the great principle of order in thinking,

> It reduces a chaos into harmony; it catalogues the accumulation of knowledge; it maps out for us the relations of its separate departments; it puts us in the way to correct its own mistakes. . . . If language is the inestimable gift

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[1] Ibid., p. 271.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

to man the logical faculty prepares it for our use.[1]

While it can be clearly inferred that Newman recognized the relationship between logic and rhetoric, and the manner in which logic can participate in the rhetorical process, he follows Aristotle in distinguishing between these two complementary arts. Rhetoric is as Aristotle says an offshoot of logic and, like logic, has no circumscribed subject matter. Newman further follows the thinking of Aristotle by distinguishing between the respective aims of these two disciplines. Logic is indifferent to truth inasmuch as it serves and is concerned with teaching the right use of reason; it is not concerned with the concrete conditions of time nor the ethical status of a particular group of people. Rhetoric, on the other hand, is intrinsically concerned with subjective truth and with finding reasoning processes which will be convincing and persuasive--not to *homines in commune* but to a specific group of men.[2]

Relation of Grammar to Rhetoric

Newman states that grammar in the nineteenth century was often considered the art of using words

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

[2] Newman, *Idea*, *op. cit.*, p. 415. "It [rhetoric] is a relative art, and in that respect differs from logic, which simply teaches the right use of reason; whereas Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, which implies a person who is to be persuaded."

properly, and it embraced orthography, etymology, syntax, and prosody.[1] This was the Johnsonian conception of grammar. Thus defined, it "is the systematic analysis of language, and to be conversant with it, as regards a particular language, is to be able to understand the meaning and force of that language when thrown into sentences and paragraphs."[2] The old grammar,[3] on the other hand, Newman regards as the preparatory study of all literature; it was the bed rock for the upper structure of knowledge. He observes that Grammar in the Middle Ages was synonymous with literature.[4] Cassidorius, Newman remarks, defined grammar as the "skill in speaking elegantly, gained from the best poets and orators; St. Isidore, the science of speaking well"; Raban, "the science of interpreting the

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 334.

[2]Ibid.

[3]L. J. Paetow, The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Studies, 1910), III, No. 7, p. 34. "With the twelfth century there came such a marked change that thenceforward we may with justice distinguish between the 'old' and 'new grammar.' It was natural that grammar should have its share in the general uplift of this century. In some respects it profited from the changes coming about. Donatus and Priscian had been written for students whose native tongue was Latin. They therefore treated many things in a manner ill-adapted for boys who learned it as a foreign language. Thus little had been done to supply the necessary general rules of syntax. One of the best contributions of the 'new grammar' was a system of syntax so well constructed that its principles were adopted by the humanists and are still in vogue even today. More latitude was given to the practice of explaining the Latin rules in the 'vulgar tongue.'"

[4]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., III, 316.

poets and historians, and the rule of speaking and writing well."[1] Newman says that grammar was the function of scholarship. It was "such an acquaintance with the literature of language as is implied in the power and viva voce use of it."[2]

Newman notes that the study of the "old grammar" began soon after the child had memorized the Psalter. It was following the mastering of the psalms that the child usually went to the secular schoolroom, and was there introduced to the study of grammar.[3] According to Newman the average age when the child began the study of grammar was about fourteen. Grammar was considered the introductory study for the boys in the Monastic Schools just as it was considered the preliminary step for the boys in the first century pagan schools. Newman firmly insists that despite its humble position in the hierarchy of the Seven Liberal Arts, it should not be assumed that it was a "superficial study, or insignificant instrument of mental cultivation." Actually the scholar never outgrew his need

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[1] Ibid., p. 320. It is significant to observe that Newman actually gained his definition ultimately from Quintilian, because Raban was merely repeating the definition of the author of the Institutes. See also Institutio Oratoria op. cit., i. 4. Quintilian states: "recte loquendi scientiam et poetarum enarrationem."

[2] Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., III, 316.

[3] Ibid., See also Quintilian i. 4. He states that the boy went to the school of the grammarian "as soon as he is able to read and write without difficulty."

for further and continual contact with grammar. The school task of the boy became, Newman reports, the life-long recreation of the man.[1]

Grammar, Newman states, embraced a study of the full complement of the Latin Poets. He notes that the language was Latin. In Latin Literature the study of Virgil came first; next Lucan and Statius; Terence, Sallust, Cicero; Horace, Perius, Juvenal; and of the Christian Poets, Prudentius, Sedulius, Juvencus, Artus. This was the standard curriculum in the Monastery Schools. Newman also notes that in some places there were special lectures which supplemented the regular curriculum. The monks of St. Albans, near Mayence, had standing lectures on Cicero and Virgil; at the school of Paderborne there were lectures on Horace, Virgil, Statius and Sallust.[2]

Following the termination of his formal study of Grammar, Newman indicates the boy was ready to begin his study of rhetoric. The study of grammar, and particularly the association with the writings of the poets, was supposed to produce a refinement of the boy's imagination. But what facility in composition does Newman expect to accrue from the study of grammar when the boy is ready

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., III, 230. In respecting the worth and importance of the "old grammar," Newman is in agreement with Quintilian. See Institutio Oratoria i. 4.

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., III, 230.

for his introduction to rhetoric? Like Quintilian,[1] Newman recognizes that grounding in grammar is indispensable, and that the young boy should not be introduced to the study of rhetoric until he has facility in composition.

As a result of his training and study of grammar the boy should be able to determine the force of words and phrases; he should be able to master the structure of sentences and the composition of paragraphs; he should be able to compare one language with another, so as to ascertain the common ideas expressed under different idiomatic forms; he should be able to achieve the difficult work of re-casting "the mind of the original author into the mould of his translation."[2]

Relation of poetry to rhetoric.--The purpose of this section is to demonstrate Newman's doctrine concerning the relation of rhetoric to poetry and to determine to what extent he followed the classical tradition.

Aristotle and other representatives of the classical tradition maintained a formal distinction between poetry and rhetoric.[3] Turning to one of the more proximate

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria ii. 1, 4.

[2]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 17.

[3]Donald L. Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance, op. cit., p. 31. "Implicit in Aristotle and throughout classical literary criticism there is a clear-cut distinction between poetic and rhetoric. Aside from the metrical form of poetic, accepted by all but Aristotle as a distinguishing characteristic, and non-metrical form of rhetoric, the essentially practical nature of rhetoric marked it off to the Greeks and Romans as something quite

sources of Newman's rhetorical theory, Clark reports that "the Seven Liberal Arts of the Mediaeval education carried the blending almost to the absorption of poetic by rhetoric."[1] Such confusion of these two forms of expression later led to the debasement of rhetoric itself.[2]

In the nineteenth century the confusion of rhetoric and poetic had progressed so thoroughly that in some instances the traditional techniques of the poetic were incorporated into the text-books of rhetoric. Thus some of the treatises on rhetoric deal not only with what the Greeks recognized as rhetoric, but also with what they classified as poetic.[3]

Newman considers poetry not as a separate art, but as a part of the function of grammar. He strictly follows the classical tradition in maintaining that there is a distinction between rhetoric and poetic. In one of the important notes to his essay on "Poetry with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics," he writes that one of the essential conditions of the idea of poetry is its relation to the affections.[4] He implies that some writers might easily

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different from poetic and infinitely more important in education and public life."

[1] Ibid., p. 42.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[4] Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 81. Newman writes that "poetry may be considered to be the gift of moving the affections through the imagination."

confuse the function of poetry with its object.

Having declared that poetry, according to Aristotle, is a representation of the ideal, Newman notes that it therefore differs from biography and history.[1] Both biography and history represent individual characters and actual facts. Poetry, on the other hand, generalizing from the phenomenon of nature and life, supplies the reader with impressions and images drawn, not according to the pattern of nature, but according to a created image in the mind of the poet. Extending the comparison, Newman points out that the essential merit of biography and history is fidelity, whereas the "essence of poetry is fiction."[2] On this point he refers to the dictum of Bacon: Poesis nihil aliud est, quam historias imitatio ad placitum.

The imagination is the subtle and indispensable faculty of the poet. Because the poet's imagination is so full and rich with images he can re-create the imaginations of others. He does this by "the superhuman loveliness of his own views." Thus he provides a solace for other minds "broken by disappointments and suffering of actual life."[3]

Newman does not discuss the skill necessary for production of a poem. He disagrees with Aristotle as to

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 64.

[3] Ibid.

the importance of technique in the composition of poetry. For Newman, the poem exists apart from the process of writing it down.[1]

Does Newman imply that poetic should be directed toward persuasion? On the contrary, he states that although poetry through a pathetic appeal may persuade indirectly and influence action, such is not its purpose. He criticizes those writers who use poetry in order to produce a moral improvement in their readers:

> If we attempt to effect moral improvement by means of poetry, we shall mature into mawkish frivolous sentimentalism. . . . You must go to a higher source for renovation of the heart and the will.[2]

In direct opposition to the conciseness and the simplicity of the poet, the talent of the orator consists in making much of a single idea. Sic dicet ille ut verset saepe multis modis eandem et unam rem, ut haeret in eadem commerturque sententia.[3] Newman points to the distinct art of Cicero, the orator. In contrast to the simplicity which Newman expects of the poet, whether engaged in statement, argument or raillery, Cicero never ceases his

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 279. Newman cannot participate in Aristotle's delight in the plot of AEdipus Tyrannus; to him the plot is too patently produced by a conscious "workmanship." He states: "Poeta nascitur, non fit, says the proverb; and this is in numerous instances true of his poems, as well as himself. They are born, not framed; and their perfection is of the moment, not so much of his skill as of his power."

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., II, 190.

[3]Ibid., I, 70.

speaking until he had exhausted the subject. Although the poet has some concern with expressing meaning, his verses "are especially intended to charm the ear."[1]

Like Cicero, Newman recognizes that both the poet and the orator often use the same materials and methods.[2] Poet and orator use style, for instance, for projecting their ideas. Yet they do not use style in the same manner. The poet uses it, not as the orator voluntarily for the sake of clearness or ornament, "but almost by constraint, as the sole outlet and expression of intense inward feelings."[3]

Both the poet and the orator make use of the passions, but Newman considers that each should be concerned with a different group of passions. The poet should be concerned with the virtues which are peculiarly Christian. Newman mentions explicitly meekness, gentleness, compassion, contentment, and modesty. The orator, on the other hand, will use the more rude and ordinary feelings, such as anger, indignation, emulation, martial spirit, and

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[1] Ibid., p. 71.

[2] Cicero, op. cit., i. 16. "The truth is that the poet is a very near kinsman of the orator, rather more heavily fettered as regards rhythm, but with ampler freedom in his choice of words, while in the use of many sort of ornament he is the ally and almost the counterpart; in one respect at all events like identity exist, since he sets no boundaries or limits to his claims, such as would prevent him from ranging whether he will with the same freedom and license as the other."

[3] Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 77.

love of independence.[1]

The poet should have "a right moral state of heart."[2] This right moral state is the formal and scientific disposition for a poetical mind. It is an essential disposition because "good feelings commonly produce or result from good practice." In Newman's opinion, the poet is essentially contemplative. The fact that the poet communicates his feelings to others is quite extrinsic to his poetry. Because of the poet's habit of mind leading to contemplation rather than to communication with others, Newman believes that the poet should not strive for clarity like the orator, and is justified in being obscure in his expression. The degree of obscurity will depend on several conditions, for instance, on the kind of poem he is writing, ("less [/obscure/] in epic or narrative and dramatic representation--, more so in odes and choruses") and on the depth of his feelings and their acuteness.[3]

Observations on the History of Rhetoric

Greek Rhetoric

Newman in his Idea of a University refers to Homer as the great apostle of civilization and the true precursor of rhetoric. He points out also how Hesiod and the

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 74; see also ibid., p. 64.

[3] Ibid., p. 77.

Tragedians were associated with Homer in developing education. He believes that the majestic lessons of AEschylus and Sophocles belong to a higher school than Homer or his associates because of what the former wrote concerning duty and religion, justice and providence. He observes, further, that the verses of Euripides were so familiar to Athenian lips and so charming to foreign ears that they were put to use as instruments of persuasion.[1]

Newman infers that these early poetical forms may be considered as oratory or quasi-rhetoric since they were impregnated with so great a power of persuasion. From the beginning, Newman notes there was not always a clear distinction between rhetoric and poetic; in fact "an alliance between these two gifts has existed from the time that the verses of Orpheus had, according to the fable, made woods and streams and wild animals follow him about."[2] Without mentioning the precise date, Newman reports that oratory became the subject of a separate art which was called rhetoric. The Sophists became the first instructors in rhetoric. Their students learned the art from observing and imitating the master rhetor. Newman identifies Lysias and Andocides as two of the principal teachers of rhetoric in Greece during the first

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 258.

[2]Ibid.

Sophistic.[1] Since the first forms of rhetoric concerned law suits primarily, and were therefore political in nature, the study of history was a necessary prescience for the successful rhetor. The writings of Thucydides became one of the most important preliminary studies of the orators. It was through the writings of Thucydides that Demosthenes rose to be the most famous orator of Greece.[2]

Of the great school at Athens, Newman mentions that a student could be taught by such authorities as Plato, Theophrastus, Gorgias from Sicily, Protagoras from Thrace, Anaxagoras from Ionia, or Carneadas from Africa. Most of these teachers had contributed to shaping the ancient rhetorical theory principally from the deductions they had made from their personal experiences. Plato, however, did not agree with the prevailing theory of the Sophists. He conceived of rhetoric as concerned with the exposition of truth.

Newman recognizes that the art of rhetoric owes much to Aristotle. In fact, he sees in Aristotle a reaction against the eristic and sophistic theories maintained by the Sophists and as the first theorist who attempted to put rhetoric on a scientific basis. Through his Rhetoric Aristotle wrested the art from amoral hands,

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[1]John Henry Newman, Historical Studies (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913), III, 43.

[2]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 258.

for the Sophists trafficked in, and taught their students deceit, balanced rhythm, and forced metaphors. The fact that Aristotle wrote treatises on both rhetoric and poetic is historically significant to Newman.

Roman Rhetoric

Newman says that Roman Rhetoric was founded upon the rhetorical doctrines of Aristotle, Isocrates, and Hermagoras. He reports that the eloquence of Carneades and his associates later caused "great sensations among the Roman Orators, who soon split into two parties."[1] The one party adhered to the rough unpolished manners of their forefathers; the other preferred the artificial graces which they learned from the Greek rhetoricians.

Newman makes a specific study of some of the Roman Orators. He places Cato and Laelius among those who followed the coarser Roman style. Cato fundamentally was a cultured man. But purely for political reasons, he showed unreasonable resistance to adopting the more delicate refinements of Grecian literature. Newman singles out Carbo and the two Gracchi as three of the more prominent exponents of the Athenian style of rhetoric. In the first century, Roman oratory was superior to the Greek form of rhetoric. Newman concludes that the Greek school was unable to match such an assemblage of orators as Rome

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 51.

then produced: Caesar, Brutus, Caelicum, Callidus, and Clavus. However, of all the great names in the history of Roman Rhetoric, Newman believes that Cicero was the greatest. He came closest to his own definition of the perfect orator. He was the master even though others excelled him in some particular phase of rhetoric. Newman indicates that Caelius surpassed Cicero in loftiness of sentiment and politeness of attack. Brutus excelled him in philosophical gravity, and Callidus in delicate and harmonious style.

Clavus and Brutus were the chief advocates of the dry, sententious, rhetorical style which is often referred to, Newman says, as the Attic Style. Newman reports that one reason for the extensive popularity of the Attic Style was its comparatively easy cultivation.[1]

The Roman Rhetoric of the first century was predominantly dignified and graceful. This grace and dignity was influenced in large measure by the "popular nature of the government which gave opportunities for effective appeals to the passions; and Greek literature being as yet a novelty, a philosophical sentiment was introduced with corresponding success."[2]

A definite reaction to the Ciceronian style, copia dicendi, is found in Macaena and Gallio. Its influence is

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[1] Ibid., p. 299.

[2] Ibid., p. 52.

seen in the latter part of the first century when critics began to consider "Cicero as inflated, languid, tame and even deficient in ornament."[1]

Newman reports that the bold and virile rhetoric of Free Rome was gradually supplanted by the apostles of the Second Sophistic who stressed "flippancy of attack, prettiness of expression and glitter of decoration."[2]

Rhetoric of the Second Sophistic

Newman accurately describes and sharply satirizes the essential elements of the theory and practice of the Second Sophistic in his detailed description of Polemo of Rhodes.[3] He notes the personal virtuosity, the flamboyant

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[1] Ibid., p. 53

[2] Ibid.

[3] John Henry Newman, Callista (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919), p. 86.
"What! not know the great Polemo of Rhodes, the friend of Plotinus, the pupil of Theagenes, the disciple of Thrasyllus, the hearer of Nicomachus, who was of the school of Secundus, the doctor of the New Pythagoreans? Not feel the presence of Polemo, the most celebrated, the most intolerable of men? That, however, is not his title, but the 'godlike', or the 'oracular', or the 'portentius', or something else as impressive. Everyone goes to him. He is the rage. I should not have a chance of success, if I could not say that I attended his lectures; though I'd be bound our little Firmius, (a novice in rhetoric) here would deliver as good. He's the very cariophylus of human nature. He comes to the schools in a litter of cedar, ornamented with silver and covered with a lion's skin, slaves carrying him, and a crowd of friends attending, with the state or proconsul. He is dressed in the most exact style; his pallium is of finest wool, white, picked out with purple; his tresses flow with ungent, his fingers glitter with rings, and he smells like Idalium. As soon as he puts his foot on earth, a great hubbub of congratulations and homage break forth. He takes no

language, and the preoccupation with subjects divorced from reality. On the other hand, he clearly notes the existence of the Christian functional rhetoric which retained the essential doctrines of the traditional rhetoric. He mentions Saints Cyprian, Basil, Augustine, John Chrysostom, and the two Gregorys. These Fathers of the Church, trained in the classical rhetorical tradition, used the principles of pagan rhetoric to present and preach the Word of God with obvious de-emphasis on personal virtuosity and inane disputations.

Newman not only perceived the internal sterility of the declamatio rhetoric but also penetrated the sorrowful dehumanization this pernicious system had on the

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notice; his favorite pupils form a circle round him, and conduct him into one of the excedrae, till the dial shows the time for lecture. Here he sits in silence, looking at nothing, a hum of admiration filling the room. Presently one of his pupils, as if he were praeco to the duumvir, cries out 'hush, gentlemen, hush', 'the godlike'--no, it is not that I've not got it. What is his title? 'the bottomless', that's it--the bottomless speaks. A dead silence ensues; a clear voice and a measured elocution are the sure token that it is the outpourings of the oracle. 'Pray' says the little man, 'pray, which existed first the egg or the chick? Did the chick lay the egg, or the egg hatch the chick. At the end of a quarter of an hour or so, our praeco speaks again, and this time to the oracle. 'Bottomless man', he says, 'I have to represent to you that no one of the present company finds himself equal to answer the question which your condescension has proposed to our consideration." On this there is a fresh silence, and at length a fresh effatum for the hiersphant. 'Which comes first, the egg or the chick? The egg comes first in relation to the causativity of the chick, and the chick comes first in relation to the causativity of the egg', on which there is a burst of applause; the ring of adorers is broken through, and the shrinking professor is carried in the arms or on the shoulders of the literary crowd to his chair in the lecture room."

rhetors. Newman judges these men worthy of his pity because of their habit of rationalization. Being under constant government supervision and influenced by the sophistic philosophy, these speakers neither "knew what they held, nor what they did not."[1] Usually, they lacked the courage to communicate ideas that ran counter to the established policies of the Empire. Most of them stood upon the order of things, on the traditions of Rome, and the laws of the Empire.[2] Even in his private conversation the rhetor expressed himself in the same spirit of fiction and artificial manners which he habitually adopted when speaking before the senate. Newman tells of Polemo's going into "the magnificient commonplaces, out of his last panegyrical oration, with which he had primed himself before he set out from home."[3]

The rhetoric of the Second Sophistic was not only inimical to the traditional rhetoric of Aristotle and Cicero, but later was antagonistic to the Christian Church. Newman gives an interesting report on one of the important schools of the Sophists at Antioch in the second half of the fourth century. He notes that the startling success of Arius and Paulus Samosata was largely attributable to their thorough training in the sophistic devices

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[1] Ibid., p. 80.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

of disputation. Newman comments at length upon the Sophistic system of education and the genius of their procedure.[1]

Besides emphasizing disputation, the Sophistic schools specialized particularly in composition and debate. Newman believes that in some degree these latter phases of their training were influenced by the works of Aristotle:

> . . . we have actually reason in the circumstances of its history for considering it (Arianism) as the offshoot of those schools of composition and debate, which acknowledge Aristotle as their principal authority, and were conducted by teachers who went by the name of sophists.[2]

Because the leaders of the heretical body were educated in these sophistic schools, the oratory of Paulus

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[1]John Henry Newman, The Arians of the Fourth Century (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919), p. 26. "Other causes will hereafter appear in the secular history of the day; but here I am to speak of their talent for disputation, to which after all they were principally indebted for their success. It is obvious that in every contest, the assailant, as such has the advantage of the party assailed; and that not merely from the recommendation which the novelty gives to the cause in the eyes of the bystanders, but also from the great facility in the nature of things, of finding, then of solving objections, whatever be the question in dispute. Accordingly, the skill of a disputant mainly consists in securing an offensive position, fastening on the weaker points of his adversary's case, and then not relaxing his hold till the latter sinks under his impetuosity, without having the opportunity to display the strength of his own cause, and to bring it to bear upon his opponent; or, to make use of a familiar illustration, in causing a sudden run upon his resources, which the circumstances of time and place do not allow him to meet."

[2]Ibid., p. 29.

Samosata is characterized by the distinguishing traits of scholastic eloquence. Strong emphasis was put on definition of terms and distinctions.

The criticisms of the Second Sophistic by Newman are almost an exact echo of the strictures which Plato had directed against the Sophistic rhetoricians and philosophers of the third century before Christ. Newman, however, was objective enough in his criticisms to perceive that the whole system as an educational instrument for training in rhetoric should not be condemned, for in the Eastern Church a similar system had been used and approved.[1]

Abuses crept into these exercises in rhetoric and disputation because many of the men engaged in the exercises "were destitute of religious seriousness and earnestness."[2] Newman states that both teachers and students grew unable to aim at or to realize the original

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[1] Ibid., p. 31. "And while the science of argumentation provided the means, their practice of disputing for the sake of exercise or amusement, supplied the temptation of assailing the received opinions. The practice (ἐριστική) which had long prevailed in the schools, was introduced into the Eastern Church. It was there employed as a means of preparing the Christian Teacher for controversy with unbelievers. The discussion (γυμνασία) sometimes proceeded in the form of a lecture delivered by the master of the school to his pupils; sometimes by way of dialogue, in which opposite sides were taken for argument sake. In some cases, it was taken down in notes by the bystanders, at the time; in others, committed to writing by parties engaged in it. Necessary as these exercises would be for the purpose designed, yet they were obviously open to abuse."

[2] Ibid., p. 32.

objectives, and as a result came to look on the exercises as a mere trial or skill, or even as a literary recreation. Their error "consisted," writes Newman, "in their indulging without restraint or discrimination in the discussion of practical topics, whether religious or political, instead of selecting such as might exercise, without demoralizing their minds."[1] His extensive study of the Second Sophistic in relation to the Arian heresy leads him to state: "the rhetoricians of Christian time introduced the same error in their treatment of the highest and most sacred subjects of theology."[2] Newman, always aware of the importance of a complete liberal education, perceived that while the assiduous study of "logic and rhetoric made them expert in proof and refutation,"[3] their absolute rejection of the authority of Sacred Scripture made many of the speakers of the Second Sophistic nothing more than sounding brass and tinkling symbols.

Transmission of Classical Rhetoric

Newman reports that the art of rhetoric was passed from the pagans to the Christian Era through the Seven Liberal Arts. It was the Fathers of the Church who formed the connection by which the pagan rhetoric, along with the other arts, became integrated into the Christian Educational

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[1] Ibid.

[2] cf. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[3] Ibid., p. 33.

system. He specifically alludes to the function of St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory, St. Augustine, and Clement.[1] Having received their training in pagan rhetoric, these Fathers kept the spirit and the genius of the Seven Liberal Arts alive through their speaking and writings.[2]

The next link between the Fathers and the Middle Ages is identified as the Benedictine Monastery Schools. Particularly in his essay called "The Benedictine Schools" Newman notes the transmission and the progress of the Liberal Arts Tradition during the Middle Ages. He states that even in the lowest and the darkest moments of the Western Church this tradition was kept alive:

> S. Gregory the Great, whose era, not to say whose influence is often considered especially unfavourable to the old literature, was himself well versed in it, encouraged purity of Latinity in his court, and is said figuratively by the contemporary historian of his life to have supported the hall of the Apostolic See upon the columns of the Seven Liberal Arts. In the ninth century, when the dark age was close at hand, we still hear of the cultivation, with whatever success (according to the opportunities of the times, but I am speaking of the nature of the studies, not the proficiency of the students), the cultivation of Music, Dialectics, Rhetoric, Grammar, Mathematics, Physics, and Geometry.[3]

The Liberal Arts Tradition was preserved and passed on by the Fathers to the Benedictine Schools, but

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[1]John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1917), III, 232; II, 52; II, 461.

[2]Ibid., p. 461.

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., pp. 259-260.

Newman notes there were variations in the content of this tradition. He cites the opinions of St. Augustine and the Alexandrian Fathers of the Eastern Church:

> Augustine, in his enumeration of them (the Seven Liberal Arts) begins with arithmetic and grammar, including under the latter history; then he speaks of logic and rhetoric; then of music, under which comes poetry, as equally addressing the ear; lastly geometry and astronomy, which addresses the eyes. The Alexandrians . . . arranged differently; grammar, rhetoric, and logic or philosophy, which branches off into the four mathematical sciences of arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy.[1]

Newman states that the more universal practice was to follow the Alexandrian order in the Monastery Schools, that is, to have instruction in rhetoric follow instruction in grammar. In the Alexandrian tradition the first three disciplines were called the trivium; the latter four the quadrivium. Although theoretically grammar was the first step in the young student's education, Newman remarks that this procedure was not always strictly followed. Often the distinction between grammar and rhetoric was obscured, and therefore became a verbal fiction:

> To pass from Grammar to Rhetoric, and then in course to the Liberal Sciences, says Lupus, speaking of France, is fabula tantum. It has been the custom in Italy, says Galber Radupphus, writing in the year 1000, "to neglect all the arts but Grammar."[2]

Newman finally perceives a striking resemblance

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[1]Newman, Historical Studies, op. cit., II, 461.

[2]Ibid., p. 464.

between the Monastery Schools and the English Universities. Like the monks of the schools of the Middle Ages, some of his contemporaries at Oxford were aware of their duty to keep the stream of the classical tradition alive by scholarship and teaching.[1]

Conclusions

(1) In all his definitions of rhetoric Newman stresses particularly the element of persuasion. He indicates that the materiale quod of rhetoric is the probable.

(2) Newman recognizes the three traditional types of oratory: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric. He includes preaching as a form of deliberative oratory.

(3) For Newman both oral expression and littera scripta are legitimate media for the rhetorical process.

(4) Newman upholds the traditional relationships and distinctions between the arts of grammar and rhetoric: grammar in its classical position is necessarily

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., III, 321-322. Newman writes: "Not only the memory of their own youth, but the necessity of transmitting to the next generation what during it they had learned themselves, kept them loyal to their classical acquirements. They were in this respect of their history, not unlike the fellows of our modern English universities, who first learn and then teach. It is impossible, indeed, to overlook their resemblance generally to the elegant scholar of a day which is now waning. . . ."

preliminary to that of rhetoric. In the writings of Newman there is no evident confusion of the functions either of grammar or of rhetoric. In no place in his works does he indicate that grammar is a mere speculative study, an opinion often held in the thirteenth century.

(5) Newman maintains that there is a formal distinction between rhetoric and poetic: the aim of the orator is to persuade, and his object is the probable. The aim of the poet is to move the emotions, and his object is the beautiful. Newman follows closely the classical tradition in separating these two arts. In making fiction the essence of poetic he differs from Aristotle. He identifies three points of coincidence between rhetoric and poetic: pathos, ethos, and style. He seems to be acutely aware of the confusion wrought by some of his contemporaries who, by fusing poetry and eloquence, attempted to eliminate the distance between their respective provinces.

(6) Newman distinguishes rhetoric from logic. He indicates that logic is indifferent to the concrete situation and to effective persuasion. He reports that logic is not an instrument for discovery of new truth, but a directive discipline for right thinking and for orderly arrangement.

(7) Observations of Newman on the history of rhetoric show clearly that he knew the genesis of rhetoric, the classical Greek and Roman theory of rhetoric, and something about the influence of the Second Sophistic upon ecclesiastical rhetoric. He recognized that rhetoric was transmitted to the Middle Ages through the tradition of the Seven Liberal Arts. The Fathers of the East and of the West were the nexus between the pagan writers and the Schools of the Middle Ages. Although they were concerned principally with teaching grammar, Newman indicates that the Benedictine Monastery Schools helped maintain the tradition of the Seven Liberal Arts during the Middle Ages.

CHAPTER III

RHETORICAL INVENTION

Invention is that constituent of rhetoric concerned with the finding, the selecting, and the analyzing of material for the speech. In De Oratore Cicero expresses an interpretation of invention when he says the speaker "first ought to find out what he should say."[1] Professor Seibel Canby in a book on writing states: "It is worse than useless to spend time in learning to write unless one is willing to search for and capture thought."[2] This idea is similarly restated by C. S. Baldwin when he says "writing should be taught . . . as to stimulate and train thinking."[3] Presently it will be discovered that Newman is in agreement with this conception of invention.

Traditionally, invention has been taken to include the following elements: topics, preparation, and modes

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[1]Cicero De Oratore i. 31. 142.

[2]Quoted in H. H. Hudson, "Can We Modernize the Theory of Invention," The Quarterly Journal of Speech Education VII (November, 1921) 325.

[3]C. S. Baldwin, "Rhetoric," Cyclopedia of Education, ed. Paul Monroe, V (1909) 178.

of proof. Turning to the classical rhetoricians, we find that the question of invention was extensively treated by them. Invention was the subject of extended and important sections of their rhetorical treatises, and lists of topics which were aids or devices of invention were copied and compiled.

Topics

Topics are essential to the Aristotelian concept of invention, for "the proper subject of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are those with which the so-called Topoi are concerned."[1] For modern writers, topics are referred to as "common-places," "lines of argument," and "heads of reasoning." The late Hoyt Hudson has shown that a painter uses topics, such as fundamental forms of triangle, circle, and square, just as a writer or speaker uses the topics of "justice, expediency, patriotism, liberty, and other specific or general ideas."[2]

Aristotle states that topics should be distinguished. He divides them into general and special topics:

> In Rhetoric as in Topica, we should distinguish between special and general topoi from which enthymemes are to be derived. [See Aristotle, Topics (Sophistic Elenchi) 9. 9, and compare Topics i. 10, 14 and 3. 5] By special topics I mean the propositions peculiar to any given

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric i. 2. 1358.

[2]Hudson, "Can We Modernize...," op. cit., p. 325.

> discipline, by general topics those that are common to all.[1]

While admitting speculatively the distinction and classification of Aristotle, we note that Newman finds there is little value or practical utility to the general topic in comparison to the special topic. In fact, Newman's criticisms of the use of general topics agree substantially with the words of Aristotle:

> The universal topoi, since they are not restricted to any special subject, will not give a man intelligence in any science. . . . However, enthymemes are mostly formed from these particular and special topoi; not so much from the universal topoi.[2]

"To say nothing else," writes Newman, "common-places are but blunt weapons; whereas it is the particular topics that penetrate and reach their mark."[3] He says this despite the fact that in most important aspects he considers all audiences to be the same; so what is suitable for one audience is suitable also for another. He states that in the "important respects" the university audience, for example, was not different from any other audience. All the persons who comprised the audience at the University of Dublin were children of Christian adoption. Therefore,

> the great topics which suit the multitude, which attract the poor, which sway the unlearned,

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric i. 2. 1358.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 418.

> which warn, arrest, recall the wayward and wandering, are in place within the precincts of a University as elsewhere.[1]

Newman does not include in his discussion the more refined phases of Aristotle's doctrine on topics. Newman, for instance, does not explain the topic of degree or the topic depending upon a consideration of time.[2]

Preparation

General Preparation

Like almost every representative of the classical rhetorical tradition,[3] Newman specifies the necessity for

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Aristotle Rhetoric i. 2. 1358[a]

[3] Aristotle asks for knowledge of types of government, Rhetoric i. 8. 1365[a]; expedient and inexpedient things, i. 4. 1359; "the good," i. 6, 7. 1364; virtue and vice and the noble and the base, i. 9. 1366[a]; wrong doing, i. 10. 1369.

Cicero requires that the orator have universal knowledge and the habit of philosophy. "And indeed in my opinion, no man can be an orator complete in all points of merit, who has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts." cf. De Oratore i. 5. 19; i. 12. 54; i. 13. 56. He also requires knowledge of history, law, rhetoric, the excellence of a worthy model (ii); for insight into mankind, passions of humanity, and causes by which the mind of man is impelled or restrained (i); and for knowledge of how language can be accomodated to the feelings and understanding of man (i); for extensive practice in writing (i. 32. 150).

Quintilian agrees with the basic requirements of Cicero. "In my opinion no one can be an absolutely perfect orator unless he has acquired a knowledge of all important subjects and arts." Institutio Oratoria ii. 21. 15. He also demands a thorough education from the nursery through the school and study with the rhetorician and grammarian, for acquaintance with Latin and Greek Literature, and practice.

St. Augustine indicates that the youth should have

general speech preparation. He mentions explicitly that "talent, logic, learning, words, manner, voice, action, all are required for the perfection of a preacher."[1]

The doctrine of Newman dealing with general preparation can be arranged under the three following headings: (1) intellectual cultivation, (2) study of literature, (3) study of theology.

(1) Intellectual cultivation.--Newman admits that this requirement is difficult to delimit precisely. He refers to this requirement as philosophy, or philosophical knowledge.[2] Such intellectual training educates the intellect to reason well in all matters. It aids the person "to reach out towards truth and to grasp it."[3] Intellectual cultivation is not mere acquisition of factual knowledge. It involves also mental discipline, extending to the ordering of the imagination and the training of the memory. Newman makes it consist "in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relation of science to science, of their interrelations and their respective values."[4] Intellectual cultivation is

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studied rhetoric (De Doctrina Christiana iv. 3) and have studied and imitated good models (Ibid., iv. 3, 4). The preacher should have Wisdom which accrues from the study and contemplation of the Scriptures (Ibid., iv. 5, 8).

[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 408.

[2]Ibid., p. 125; Ibid., p. 102.

[3]Ibid., p. 126.

[4]Ibid., p. 113.

indirectly related to the process of invention. When preachers fail to have such preparation, their sermons often "are mere repertoires of miscellaneous and efficious learning."[1]

In demanding intellectual cultivation, Newman realizes that he is repeating one of the requirements of the foremost Greek and Roman rhetoricians.[2] The importance of this element in general preparation for preaching can be estimated by the fact that Newman is not content merely to mention it, but points out one of the means by which it can be acquired. Specifically, he mentions that it will give the future orator,

> a clear, conscious view of his own opinions and judgements and a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant. It prepares him...to master any subject with facility. It shows him how to accomodate himself to others, how to throw himself into their state of mind, how to bring before them his own, how to influence them.[3]

Where will the youth find the educational instrument to develop his intellectual cultivation? Newman is certain that intellectual cultivation is the natural result of a liberal education. He points to St. Paul and St. Luke as two great preachers prepared for their future

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[1] Ibid., p. 140.

[2] Ibid., (Aristotle) p. 106; p. 109. (Cicero) p. 104.

[3] Ibid., p. 178.

oratory through a liberal education.

> St. Luke . . . received the advantages of (what is called) a liberal education. In this respect he resembled St. Paul, who, with equal accomplishments appears to have possessed even more learning. He is said to have been a native of Antioch, a city celebrated for the refined habits and cultivated intellect of its inhabitants.[1]

Newman adduces a further reason for the intellectual cultivation of St. Luke. In this respect, he points to "the character of his writings, which are superior in composition to any part of the New Testament, excepting some of St. Paul's Epistles."[2]

Newman perceives that some critics will object to his strong emphasis on intellectual cultivation. They will contend that such cultivation will produce "a trifling, or a proud man." Such critics "suppose that learning must make a man proud. This is a great mistake," Newman says.[3] Although learning might produce a proud man, Newman states that this is no argument against the cultivation of knowledge: "the abuse of good things is no argument against the things themselves; mental cultivation like health, strength and power can be put to bad purposes, yet they are not evil in themselves. They, like all God's gifts [/can be/] perverted by man."

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[1]John Henry Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918), II, 368.

[2]Ibid., p. 369.

[3]Ibid.

Having acquired this intellectual cultivation, the young orator will express himself habitually not in a mere enunciation, but by an enthymeme.[1]

(2) Study of literature.--Newman reports that the study of literature should embrace more than "a smattering of the classical writers in general." It should extend even to an analysis of "the structure and the characteristics of the Latin and Greek languages."[2] Such a study will bring the future orator into contact with some of the best examples of rhetoric. Translation of these classics into his own language will help the student develop the habit of accuracy. As a result of such study, the student will gradually become increasingly dissatisfied merely to throw off some rounded sentences, to make some pointless remarks on a general subject, or to introduce spectacular figures of speech into his compositions. On the contrary, he will learn the importance of clarity of expression.[3] Speaking to the native sons of England, Newman recommends the study of English literature.[4]

(3) Study of theology.--Newman, of course, indicates that theology is another study necessary for the preacher.[5]

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 133.

[2]Ibid., pp. 335-336.

[3]Ibid., p. 497.

[4]Vincent J. Flynn, Prose Reader (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1942), pp. 110-113.

[5]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 419.

This would include both moral and dogmatic theology. Since the Church at the time required the young ecclesiastic to have four years study of both phases of Sacred Doctrine, it can be inferred that Newman would have asked for at least this minimum preparation in theology. In addition, Newman required more extensive study of theology for the preacher who has to speak habitually before the university audience.

Proximate Preparation

Newman states that proximate preparation is necessary for most speakers. He admits, however, that there are some speakers who apparently need no immediate preparation: "there are indeed a few persons in a generation, such as Pitt, who are able to converse like a book, and to speak a pamphlet."[1]

Newman not only contends that proximate preparation is necessary, but he treats this phase of preparation in some detail. The doctrine of Newman on this element of invention falls reasonably into the four following categories: (1) psychological factors, (2) method of choosing a topic, (3) study and meditation, (4) stimulation of further thought through writing.

(1) Psychological factors.--Newman believes that the preacher's attitude towards his function as a preacher, and his attitude towards his subject matter is of prime

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[1] Ibid., p. 423.

importance. He counsels the priest, therefore, to consider the dignity and the gravity of his responsibility. He points to the dictum of St. Charles, that the preacher is the minister of God, through whom the Word of God pours forth as from a spiritual font to freshen the souls of the faithful.[1] Although the priest is the usual instrument of God, he is not indispensable.[2] Newman directs the priest to keep before his mental eye the Four Last Things.[3] Finally, he warns the priest not to aim at being eloquent: "to sit down to compose for the pulpit with a resolution to be eloquent is one impediment to persuasion."[4] The priest who aims at being eloquent turns his attention from his audience.

(2) Method of choosing a topic.--The two fundamental precepts which Newman gives the preacher in choosing a topic are: to consider the nature of the audience and to preach on something that is definite and pertinent.

The first directive, to make an analysis of the audience, is ordered logically to the second directive: to preach on something that is definite and pertinent to the audience. The preacher who follows honestly the

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[1] Ibid., p. 406. "Praedictorem esse ministrum Dei, per quem verbum Dei a spiritus fonte dicitur ad fidelium animas irrigandas."

[2] John Henry Newman, Lectures on Justification (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914), p. 321 ff.

[3] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 409. Last things: Hell, Judgment, Heaven and Purgatory.

[4] Ibid.

conclusions of his analysis of the audience will be disposed to prepare a definite subject and produce a sermon that is pertinent to the needs of the audience. This second directive will also help the preacher exclude from his preparation such extraneous impedimenta which otherwise would consume valuable time and ultimately dissipate his effectiveness. Concerning the efficiency and practicality of this method, Newman remarks:

> ...the more exact and precise is the subject which he is to treat the more impressive and practical will he be; whereas no one will carry much from a discourse which is on the general subject of virtue, or vaguely and feebly entertains the question of the desirableness of attaining heaven, or the rashness of incurring eternal ruin. As a distinct image before the mind makes a preacher earnest, so will it give him something which is worth while to communicate to others....He must aim at imprinting on the heart what will never leave it, and this he cannot do unless he employs himself in some definite subject, which he has to handle and weigh....[1]

Newman declares that he learned the importance of this second directive from the rhetorical doctrines of St. Francis de Sales and St. Charles. From contemplating the dicta of these two preachers, he concludes:

> that the preacher should set out with the intention of conveying to others some spiritual benefit; that, with view to this, and as the only ordinary way to it, he should select some distinct fact, or scene, some passage of history, some truth, simple or profound, some doctrine, or some sentiment.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 411.

[2] Ibid., p. 412.

By projecting himself into the position of the priest who has to preach to a university audience, Newman illuminates his abstract theory on the method of choosing a subject. His audience analysis has given him two important insights: (1) the audience is composed of young men, and (2) all the auditors will be persons either highly educated or under education. In spite of the superior scholastic character of the audience, Newman warns, "let no one suppose that anything recondite is essential to the idea of a University sermon."[1] He mentions that sermons on the following dogmatic topics are pertinent to the university audience: Divine Omnipresence, Future Judgment, The Satisfaction of Christ, and the Intercession of the Saints.

Why should Newman consider these dogmatic topics pertinent? Although he does not set down his personal reasons, it seems that these subjects are particularly pertinent, first, because an educated audience would be anxious to know more concerning such subjects; secondly, because contact with the rationalism of the nineteenth century might have been the occasion for sowing the seeds of doubt concerning these dogmatic teachings of Faith. Newman admits also that while "the most simple subjects" might be justly apposite before a University audience, they would require a more thorough preparation than would be used for

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[1] Ibid., p. 416.

a less specialized audience.

> It is not asking much to demand for academical discourses a more careful study beforehand, a more accurate conception of the idea which they are to enforce, a more cautious use of words, a more anxious consultation of writers, and somewhat more of philosophical and theological knowledge.[1]

Although Newman admits that sermons on dogmatic subjects and on the "most simple subjects are apposite" in the university pulpit, he adds that if the preacher would choose a "subject which has especial significancy" he should select one which bears upon one or other of two classes of sin. He mentions specifically sins of sensuality and sins against faith, such as rash speculation, doubt, and infidelity. He reasons to these two classes of sin from his study of the temptations which ordinarily assail the young and the intellectual. The general types of temptations which attack the students are: those which are directed against their virtue, and those which are directed against their faith.[2] That these two types of sin are in fact the peculiar evils to which large academical bodies are liable is shown, Newman thinks, from an examination of the history of universities. While he judges that such subjects have a similar appropriateness before the university audience, as would discourses on almsgiving when addressing the rich, or on patience,

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[1] Ibid., p. 419.

[2] Ibid., p. 417.

resignation, and industry when the priest must address the poor, or on forgiveness of injuries, when he must speak to the oppressed or persecuted, Newman appends two cautions:

(a) "A preacher should be quite sure that he understands the persons he is addressing before he ventures to aim at what he considers to be their ethical condition; for, if he mistakes, he will probably be doing harm rather than good."[1]

(b) Even if the preacher "should set out to address himself to some special danger, some probably deficiency or particular need of his hearers, he should do so covertly, not showing on the surface of his discourse what he is aiming at."[2] There is "no advantage in a preacher professing to treat of infidelity, orthodoxy, or virtue, or the pride of reason, or riot, or sensual indulgence."[3]

(3) Study and meditation.--Cardinal Newman requires study as another aspect of proximate preparation. He finds authority for this requirement in the writing of St. Charles Borremeo. On the necessity of study, the saint writes: Id omnino studebit, ut quod in concione dicturus est, antea bene cognitum habeat.[4] Newman demands more than a superficial study of the matter pertinent to the

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[1] Ibid., p. 418.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 412, 421.

topic of the sermon. He indicates that the fruit of the study will be "a distinct categorical proposition . . . such as he can write down in a form of words, and guide and limit his preparation by it."[1]

Newman's reference to the necessity of prayer as part of proximate preparation recalls the fact that St. Augustine makes the same demand of the preacher. There is a point of contrast, however, between the recommendation of Newman and St. Augustine. The great bishop of Hippo directs the ecclesiastical orator to use the prayer of petition,[2] whereas Newman does not limit his directive to the prayer of petition but speaks also of the necessity of meditation. Although Newman admits that the priest will expect special help from God through prayer, this should be no reason for him not to exert his own talent under the

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[1] Ibid., p. 411.

[2] St. Augustine De Doctrina Christiana iv. 15. 32. ". . . that orator of ours, in speaking of justice, holiness, and a good life, the subjects on which alone he should speak, strives insofar as possible, when speaking on such subjects, to make his words understood, enjoyed and persuasive; and this he should not doubt but that he can do if it is possible, and insofar as it is possible, more through piety of his prayers than through his orator's skill, so that he is a petitioner before a speaker. At the very time, then, when he is going to preach, before he loosens his tongue to speak, he should lift up his thirsting soul to God, in order to give forth what he will drink in, and to pour out what he will be filled with . . . at the time of the sermon itself he should consider the admonition rather befitting a good disposition, which the Lord utters: Take no thought how or what to speak: for it shall be given you in that hour what to speak."

pretext that Divine Aid will even succour human unwillingness and indolence.[1]

(4) Stimulation of further thought through writing.--Newman believes that writing will stimulate new thought on the chosen subject. This device will also help the preacher clarify and check his understanding of the subject. It is evident that Newman personally practiced this directive himself:

> . . . can it be denied that one of the most effectual means by which we are able to ascertain our understanding of a subject, to bring our thought upon it related to other subjects and to develop it generally, is to write down carefully all we have to say about it? People indeed differ in matter of this kind, but I think that writing is a stimulation to the mental faculties, to the logical talent, to originality, to the power of illustration, to arrangement of topics second to none.[2]

Until a man begins to put down his thought about a subject on paper, he will not be certain of "what he knows and what he does not know; and still less will he be able to express what he does not know."[3]

Newman's views on proximate preparation are strict

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., pp. 5-6. "It is otherwise with us; funes ceciderunt mihi in praeclaris. We have a goodly inheritance. This is apt to cause us--I do not mean to rely too much on prayer and the Divine Blessing, for that is impossible, but we sometimes forget that we shall please Him best, and get most from Him, when according to the Fable, we 'put our shoulder to the wheel,' when we use what we have by nature to the utmost, at the same time that we look out for what is beyond nature in the confidence of faith and hope. However, we are sometimes tempted to let things take their course."

[2]Ibid., p. 422.

[3]Ibid.

and comprehensive. Yet does he require such preparation for every preaching engagement? He states under a distinction that it is "generally necessary." He, however, hastens to acknowledge that there will be "exceptional cases, in which such a mode of preparation does not answer, whether from some mistake in carrying it out, or from some special gifts superseding it."[1] Newman notes that the parish priest often w ill not be able to carry out every phase of this method of preparation.

Modes of Proof

The three generic modes of proof Newman recognizes are: the proper logical argument, ethos, and pathos.[2] In admitting these three traditional modes of proof, Newman agrees with the representatives of the classical rhetoric.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 33.

[3] Aristotle Rhetoric i. 2. 1356[a].
Cicero De Oratore ii. 17. 114; ii. 27. 253; ii. 43.
See E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (London: Macmillan Co., 1868), pp. 108-109. Cope considers that the logical argument is a direct proof, and the suasion of ethos and pathos is indirect. "The term ἤθη in Rhetoric, when applied in its ordinary sense, is employed to denote one of the three kinds of arguments or modes of persuading into which all rhetorical proofs are divided, namely (1) πίστεις direct logical proofs which appeal to the reason, and indirect moral proofs of two kinds, those namely (2) which appeal to the moral sense and (3) to the feelings." See also A. E. Chaignet, La Rhetorique et Son Histoire (Paris: E. Bouillon et Vieweg, 1888), p. 110. Chaignet explains the three specifications required for forging proof: (1) "to have talent and the art of reasoning" (logical proof). (2) "To have the ability to see all that is related to

Logical Proof

Newman's advice to the speaker is that in preparation he invent a categorical proposition before proceeding to the proof he can use to support it. Consideration of how propositions are held and apprehended and of the speaker's state of mind in relation to the proposition is fundamental to its invention.

Propositions.--For Newman, a proposition consists of a subject and predicate united by a copula. There are three kinds of propositions: interrogative, conditional, and categorical.

(1) The interrogative asks a Question (e.g. Does Free-trade benefit the poorer classes?) and implies the possibility of an affirmative or negative resolution.

(2) The conditional expresses a Conclusion (e.g. Free-trade therefore benefits the poorer classes) and at once implies and states dependence on other propositions.

(3) The categorical is simply an Assertion (e.g. Free-trade does benefit) which implies the absence of any condition or reservation of any kind.[1]

These three forms of propositions, although distinct

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habit and custom, including morals," (ethos)., (3) "And to know how the emotions are related to oratory; what they consist of, what the distinctive character of each is, and how each can be excited," (pathos).

[1]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 2.

from each other, follow in a natural psychological sequence in the process of inventing and forming a proposition. A proposition, for instance, which starts as a question, may become a conclusion, and then be transformed into an assertion; but in the process, the proposition of course, ceases to be a question, insofar as it has become a conclusion.[1]

In insisting on the intrinsic distinctness of these three forms of propositions, Newman is not maintaining that they may not co-exist as regards one and the same subject in the mind of the speaker. For what has been concluded may be made into a question; and what is being asserted may again become a conclusion. The speaker may assert to one person, and conclude to another, and ask of a third. Still when he asserts, he does not conclude, and when he asserts or concludes, he does not question.

Newman believes that the psychological process "of holding propositions is for the most part analogous to the external act of enunciating them."[2] As there are three ways of expressing, so there are three ways of holding propositions. These three mental acts are doubt, inference, and assent. A question is the enunciation of a doubt; a conclusion is the expression of an act of inference; an assertion is the expression of an act of

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[1] Ibid., p. 4.

[2] Ibid., p. 5.

assent. For a speaker to doubt, for instance, is for him to see his way to hold that Free-trade is or is not a benefit; to infer is to hold on adequate grounds that Free-trade may, must, or should be a benefit; to assent to the proposition is to hold that Free-trade is a benefit.

These three modes of entertaining propositions become the principles of three distinct conditions or characteristic states of the speaker's mind. In regard to Revealed Religion, most speakers will have a skeptical, philosophical, or believing attitude. One of these three attitudes or states of mind will be prominent. If a speaker disbelieves, or dissents absolutely, then he is assenting to the contradictory aspect of the doctrine, viz. to the proposition that there is no Revelation.[1]

Each of these attitudes or acts is natural to the mind of the speaker. Yet it is possible for the speaker to err in the exercise of doubt, of inference, and of assent. He may withhold his judgment about a proposition on which he has the means of coming to some definite conclusion. He may assent to a proposition which he ought to accept only on the strength of its premises, and therefore keep his mind in the state of doubt. Such circumstances and error in judgment according to Newman should be attributed to the person, and not to his nature.[2]

As to the apprehension necessary for holding a

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[1] Ibid., p. 6.

[2] Ibid., p. 7.

proposition, Newman says that a speaker cannot assent to a proposition without some intelligent apprehension of it. On the other hand, the speaker need not understand the proposition at all in order to infer it. He cannot give his assent to the proposition that "x is y," until he knows something about one or the other of the terms; but he can infer, if "x is y, and y is z, that x is z," whether he knows the meaning of x and z or not.

Apprehension of propositions.--Newman insists on the speaker's apprehension of the terms of his proposition. He notes what confusion results when this directive is overlooked. He points to how frequently this simple rule is neglected in arguments and debates.[1]

Apprehension of a proposition is the interpretation

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 498. "Reflect, Gentlemen, how many disputes you must have listened to, which were interminable, because neither party understood either his opponent or himself. Consider the fortunes of an argument in a debating society, and the need there so frequently is, not simply of some clear thinker to disentangle the perplexities of thought, but of the capacity of the combatants to do justice to the clearest explanations which are set before them,.... The ideas ought, I do not say, to be as perfectly defined and located in the minds of the speakers as objects of sight in a landscape, but to be sufficiently even though incompletely apprehended, before they have a right to speak.... On the other hand, let him never have tried to throw things together, or to discriminate between them, or to denote their peculiarities, in that case he has not hesitation in undertaking any subject, and perhaps has most to say upon those questions which are most new to him. This is why so many men are one-sided, narrow-minded, prejudiced, crotchety. This is why able men have to change their minds,...because they have followed their party, instead of having secured that faculty of true perception as regards intellectual objects which has accrued to them, without their knowing how, as regards the objects of sight.

of the terms of the proposition. "I mean," Newman says, "our imposition of a sense of the terms of which it is composed."[1] The terms of the proposition, the subject and predicate, represent ideas. The terms of the proposition as well as the proposition itself may be apprehended by the speaker either notionally or really. Such propositions as "Man is an animal," "some men are learned," "an apostle is a creation of Christianity," Newman names as examples of notional propositions; "Philip was the father of Alexander," "the Apostles first preached to the Jews," are examples of real propositions.

Newman makes three significant remarks concerning the use of notional and real apprehension:

(1) The same proposition may have a notional sense as used by one speaker and a real sense as used by another. A school boy may notionally apprehend and construe the meaning of the words of the poet "Dum Captolium scandet cum tacita Virgine Pontifex," but the poet's apprehension may be real.

(2) Most common nouns have originally been singular, and so they remain in the apprehension of particular individuals. To the nurse, the proposition "sugar is sweet" is a notional proposition; but to the child tasting sugar for the first time the word has a very real sense, meaning: "this sugar is this sweet thing."

(3) In the same speaker's mind and at the same

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[1]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 9.

time, the same proposition may express both what is notional and what is real. When a lecturer in chemistry shows his class by experiment some physical phenomenon, he and his audience at once recognize it as an individual thing before their eyes, and also as generalized by their minds into a law of nature. When Virgil says, "Varium et mutabile semper Femina," he both sets before his readers what he means to be a general truth, and at the same time applies it individually to the instances of Dido. Newman says he expresses at once a notion and a fact.

Of the two modes of apprehending propositions, notional and real, Newman notes that real apprehension is stronger. Real apprehension is stronger because it is more vivid and forcible. "It is so to be accounted for the very reason that it is concerned with what is either real or is taken for real; for intellectual ideas cannot compete in effectiveness with the experience of concrete facts."[1] Newman declares that various proverbs and maxims also sanction his opinion, such as, "Facts are stubborn things," Experientia docet, "Seeing is believing;" and the generally accepted popular contrast between theory and practice, reason and sight, philosophy and faith. He does not contend that real apprehension, as such, impels to action any more than notional apprehension. But "it [/real apprehension/] excites and stimulates the affections

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[1]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

and passions, by bringing facts home to them as motive causes."[1]

Newman marks two contrasting examples of how assent affects the preacher. First, he points to the preaching of the first century apostles implying that their success stemmed from their real assent to the propositions they enunciated.[2] By contrast, he argues that some of the contemporary popular preachers give a notional assent to even the more solemn parts of the sacred volume. He concludes that such an attitude of the popular preacher is recognized by his auditors.[3]

Newman next asks what degree of apprehension is sufficient for the speaker. He acknowledges that it is the predicate of the proposition which the speaker must apprehend. In a proposition one term is predicated of another; the subject is referred to the predicate, and the predicate gives information about the subject. Therefore to apprehend the proposition is to have this information, and to assent to it is to acquiesce to it as true. The speaker thus apprehends his proposition when he apprehends its predicate. The subject need not be apprehended *per se* in order to have a genuine assent, for it is the very thing which the predicate has to elucidate.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 463.

[3] *Ibid.*

By its formal place in the proposition, so far as it is the subject, it is something unknown, something which the predicate makes known. Yet the predicate cannot make the subject known unless itself is known. For instance, Newman says, the answer that must be known to "What is trade?" is "Trade is the interchange of goods." The subject need not be apprehended further than by what the predicate tells about it.

Having specified that real assent to a proposition will be more suitable and effective in the process of invention than notional assent, Newman proceeds next to explain the logical difficulty of how the psychology of real assent can function when the object of assent is physically absent. Real assent is an experience about the concrete. There is no difficulty in seeing how the preacher may have genuinely real apprehension when a fact is presented to his bodily sense or indirectly presented by a picture. But supposing that these objects are no longer physically present, then the speaker is capable of re-creating the original apprehension through the memory and the inventive faculty. The inventive faculty can, he says:

> Follow the descriptions of things which have never come before us, and to form, out of such passive impressions as experience has heretofore left on our minds, new images, which though mental creations, are in no sense abstractions, and though ideal, are not notional. They are concrete units in the minds both of the party describing and the

party informed of them.[1]

Newman declares that the inventive faculty in its operation is a step beyond the speaker's experience. It is the instrument also often used by the poet and the historian. The historian is able to gaze on Tiberius, as Tacitus draws him, or to figure to himself "our James the First, as he is painted in Scott's Romance. The assassination of Caesar, his 'Et tu, Brute?' his collecting his robes about him, and his fall even under Pompey's statue."[2] All these events become fact to him and an object of real apprehension.

That Newman meticulously examined and studied the psychology of assent and his emphasis on the ultimate effectiveness of real assent destroys all suggestion of the possibility of sophistry creeping into his ex professo doctrine on invention.

Newman notes that the process of reasoning to personal assent is different psychologically from the process of finding and drawing up arguments to convince others:

> We may denote, then, these two exercises of mind, reasoning and arguing... that these two exercises are not to be confounded together would seem too plain for remark, except that they have been confounded. Clearness in argument certainly is not indispensable to reasoning well. Accuracy in stating doctrines or principles is not essential to feeling and acting upon them. Now

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[1] Ibid., p. 27.

[2] Ibid.

> a good arguer or clear speaker is but one who excels in analyzing or expressing a process of reason, taken as his subject matter. He traces out the connection of facts, detects principles, applies them, supplies deficiencies till he has reduced the whole to order. But his talent of reasoning, or gift of reason as possessed by him, may be confined to such an exercise, and he may be as little expert in other exercises as a mathematician need be an experimentalist; as little creative of reasoning which he analyzes, as a critic need possess the gift of writing poems.[1]

Newman points out that men who wish to effect assent in others, to shorten a dispute, or to silence an opponent, often look for some strong and manifest argument which may be "stated tersely, handled conveniently, and urged rhetorically."[2] In such cases they look for one reason, which to them bears a show of vigor and plausibility, or originality, and may be easily reduced to mood and figure. Newman believes that such men err in their

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[1]John Henry Newman, Oxford University Sermons (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1900), pp. 259-260.

[2]Ibid., p. 276. While Newman admits that logical proof is one of the proper rhetorical means whereby the speaker can obtain persuasion through conviction of the intellect, he goes to great pains to emphasize that the preacher in drawing up his arguments should not rely on a single momentous or decisive proof. Conviction and assent follow for the most part not upon one great or decisive argument or token of the point in debate, "but upon a number of very minute circumstances together, which the mind is quite unable to count up and methodize." See also ibid., p. 274. He contends that it is almost impossible to enumerate the elements which bring about conviction and assent. He would remind the speaker when considering the force of logical proof that "much depends in such [instances] on manner, voice, accent, words uttered, silence instead of words, and all the many subtle symptoms which are felt by the mind, but cannot be contemplated."

judgment, because the ordinary auditor is not disposed to follow such a neatly constructed argument.

But granted the practical wisdom of Newman concerning the indisposition of the average auditor to follow a closely reasoned argument, what modes of proof does he make available to the speaker in order to gain assent and demonstrate his propositions? Since the art of rhetoric is concerned with the contingent, Newman states that the same kind of demonstrations should not be used or looked for in this art as would be expected in mathematics. In this connection he cites the well known maxim of Aristotle: "it is much the same to admit the probabilities of a mathematician, and to look for demonstrations from an orator."[1]

The doctrine of Newman concerning logical proof may be conveniently arranged under the dual divisional headings of artistic and non-artistic proofs, the generic division of proofs as set down by the representatives of the classical tradition. Non-artistic proofs are those the speaker adopts which lie outside the art of speaking. These latter are sometimes referred to as extrinsic means of persuasion, and include evidence.[2]

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[1]John Henry Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903), p. 113. See also Aristotle Rhetoric i. 1. 1345[a].

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric i. 1. 1356[a]. "Proofs are of two kinds, artistic and non-artistic. By 'non-artistic' proofs are meant all such as are not supplied by our own effort, but existed beforehand. . . . By 'artistic' proofs are meant

Evidence.--Newman begins his discussion with physical facts, the grossest form of evidence available to the speaker to support his proposition. He says that physical facts are submitted to the senses, and the senses may be satisfactorily tested, corrected, and verified. For the speaker to trust anything but sense in a matter of sense is irrational; why are the senses given to the speaker, argues Newman, but to supersede less certain, less immediate informants? The speaker may have recourse to reason or authority to determine facts when the senses fail him, but he begins with the senses. He deduces, he forms inductions, he abstracts from facts. He should not begin with surmise and conjecture, much less should he look first to the tradition of past ages or the decree of foreign teachers to determine matters which are in his hands and before his eyes.[1]

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those that may be furnished by the method Rhetoric through our own efforts. The first sort have only to be used; the second have to be found."

Quintilian Institutio Oratoria v. 1. 1. "To begin with it may be noted that the division laid down by Aristotle has met with almost universal approval. It is to the effect that there are some proofs adopted by the orator which lie outside the art of speaking, and others which he himself deduces or, if I may use the term begets out of his case. The former therefore have been styled inartificial proofs, the latter artificial."

C. S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: Macmillan Co., 1924), pp. 10-11.

Glen Mills, "Elements of Webster's Rhetorical Theory," (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Dept. of Speech, University of Michigan, 1942), p. 47.

[1]Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, op. cit., p. 111.

In such sciences as history the speaker cannot rest upon mere facts, because they are not available to him. He must do his best with what is at hand and look about to any quarter which might serve his purpose. Newman suggests that the evidence and the interpretation of others such as "the traditions of the ages, the prescriptions of authority, antecedent auguries, analogies, parallel cases"[1] may be used to throw light on historical facts. But he warns that these types of evidence, like even the evidence grasped by the senses, must be sifted and scrutinized.

In regard to subjects which need moral proof, such as history, antiquities, political science, ethics, metaphysics, and theology, Newman declares that "antecedent probability may have a real weight and cogency which it cannot have in experimental science."[2] He thinks that an experienced politician may have a power of reaching matters of fact in consequence of his peculiar habit of mind which is seldom given to a person looking for such data in the physical sciences.

Newman does not agree with Lord Bacon who condemned presumption and prescription in inquiries into facts. He adds that it would be a great mistake to suppose

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 112.

that authority, tradition, verisimilitude, analogy, and the like are mere "idols of the den," or "of the theatre" in history or in ethics.[1]

In the use of all forms of evidence, Newman contends that antecedent probability often overcomes contrary evidence. He believes that "if the antecedent probability is great, it almost supersedes instances."[2] He admits that error may occur in the use of antecedent probability; it is not the instrument itself that is imperfect, but the initially assumed premise that may be fallacious.

Newman discusses some specific uses of antecedent probability. He says that antecedent probability will naturally help sustain what agrees with it. If there is a question of fact, it is plain that the speaker should consider chiefly the character of the witness, his accuracy, and his sources of information. Even when the question relates to what is "strictly a matter of fact," the character of the witness should not be overlooked. A man strongly influenced by prejudice may fancy he sees what he does not. And some degree of suspicion may be attached to the testimony of prejudiced though honest men when their prejudices are on the same side as their testimony. Not a few of those who are put on trial in criminal courts are not legally guilty of the particular crime of which they

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[1] Ibid., p. 113.

[2] Ibid., p. 114.

are convicted. Newman says that such men are "being convicted not so much upon the particular evidence, as on the presumption arising from their want of character and the memory of their former offences."[1]

Newman next considers how the speaker or writer should manage the problem of silence or omission concerning certain strata of evidence, and of the problem of too much evidence. Relative to the problem of silence or omission, he states:

> It is not a paradox to say that there is a certain scantiness nay an absence of evidence, which may even tell in favor of statements which require to be made good. There are indeed cases in which we cannot discover the law of silence or deficiency, which are then simply unaccountable.[2]

He mentions such examples in history as Lucian, who hardly notices Roman authors or affairs; Maximus Tyrius, who wrote some of his works at Rome, yet makes no references to the history of Rome; Seneca, Pliny the elder, and Plutarch are altogether silent about Christianity. In Holy Scripture he points to some unexplained omissions which present real problems: obscurity and silence hang over the characters of Nathannael and Mary Magdalen.

Newman presents certain explanations which can

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

aid the speaker in interpreting these gulfs of silence and omission. He states that omissions when they occur in the evidence of facts and doctrine are naturally difficulties, but not infrequently admit of explanation. Silence, he says, may arise from the very notoriety of the facts in questions, "as in the case of the seasons of the year, the weather, or natural phenomena; or from their sacredness, as the Athenians would not mention the mythologies."[1] Other causes for gaps in evidence may be:

> . . . from external constraint, as the omission of the statues of Brutus and Cassius in the procession. Or it may proceed, from fear and disgust, as on the arrival of unwelcome news; or from indignation, or hatred, or contempt, or perplexity, as Josephus is silent about Christianity, and Eusebius passes over the death of Crispus in his life of Constantine; or from other strong feelings, as implied in the poet's sentiment, "Give sorrow words;" or from policy or other prudential motives, or propriety. . . . Or, again, from the natural and gradual course which the fact took, as in the instance of inventions and discoveries, the history of which is on this account often obscure; or from loss of documents or other direct testimonies, as we should not look for theological information in a treatise on geology.[2]

In addition to these causes, Newman says that "omissions proceed on some law, as the varying influence of an external cause."[3] In such a case, the omission, while being a perplexity, may even confirm such evidence as occurs, by becoming its correlative.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., pp. 116-117.

[3] Ibid.

It is possible to have too much evidence; that is, evidence so full or exact as to throw suspicion over the conclusion which is adduced. For instance, the genuine Epistles of St. Ignatius contain none of those ecclesiastical terms, such as "Priest" or "See," which are so frequent afterwards; on the other hand the interpolated Epistles quote the Epistles at great length; that is, they are too Scriptural to be Apostolic.

Finally, in the chapter "Method of Proof" Newman lays down three directive principles which will guide the speaker when he is faced with the necessity of using evidence drawn from sources extraneous to the art of rhetoric:

(1) In using evidence the speaker should not accept it with suspicion and criticism, but with frank, spontaneous confidence. He can prove the evidence by using it in application to his subject matter. Only when the evidence fails in illustrating phenomena or harmonizing facts should he reject the received doctrines of statement. He should accept the evidence as a whole, "as forming a combined proof; and should interpret what is obscure in separate portions by such portions as are clear."[1]

(2) Particularly in matters of doctrine, a group or collection of weak evidence may make up a strong structure of evidence.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 101.

[2] Ibid., p. 107.

(3) Probable proofs by being added, not only increase evidence, but multiply it. He confesses that he learned this doctrine concerning probable proof from his study of Butler's Analogy.

Reasoning.--The doctrine of Newman on reasoning is contained especially in his Oxford University Sermons. In the famous lecture of this series, "Implicit and Explicit Reason," he mentions that fashioning artificial proof and argumentation depends essentially upon the mind's looking back on its own natural function. This function is achieved, says Newman, by "the reflective power of the human mind, contemplating and scrutinizing its own acts."[1] He contends that the psychological process of reasoning to a conclusion and the artificial and reflective process of logic are different and distinct operations. The logical analysis and artificial re-structuring may be a collation whereas the original, natural psychological process is flowing and irreducible to exact form and figure. Although through the process of logic the speaker might be able to dissect many pieces of the whole original pattern of thought and reconstruct it from the parts, he can no more divide absolutely and demonstrate exactly every fiber of the subjective reasoning than he can divide and unscramble a cooked egg.

Newman considers the native process of reasoning,

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[1]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 258.

natural inference, in most cases to be unconscious and implicit:

> Our natural mode of reasoning is, not from proposition to proposition, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes. Whether the consequents, at which we arrive from the antecedents with which we start, lead us to assent or only towards assent, those antecedents commonly are not recognized by us as subject for analysis; nay often are only indirectly recognized as antecedents at all. Not only is the inference with its process ignored, but the antecedents also.[1]

This is the mode of reasoning the speaker uses when he is not anticipating an audience. In this type of reasoning the speaker deals with things directly, "and as they stand, one by one, in the concrete, with an intrinsic and personal power, not a conscious adoption of an artificial instrument or expedient."[2] Newman observes that natural inference is often found in ordinary minds. When it is characterized by precision, subtlety, promptitude, and truth, it is a gift and a rarity. In other minds it is biased and degraded by prejudice, passion, and self-interest. The woman who perceives the deep personal defects in an individual whom she meets for the first time may be unable to produce convincing demonstrative proofs for her conclusion, but her judgments will often be correct. Newman adds, however, that natural inference, as it is actually in persons, operates in definite subject matters.[3]

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[1]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 330.

[2]Ibid., p. 331.

[3]Ibid., p. 328. "I will assert, as far as it is

In addition to natural inference Newman recognizes and discusses two kinds of artificial reasoning: informal and formal inference.

Newman's discussion of the exact nature and function of informal inference is not easy to determine or describe. His phrase "converging probabilities" seems to imply a series of mounting inductions.[1] In his discussion he harkens back frequently to the statement of Butler: "probable proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence, but multiply it."[2] Sometimes he

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manifested in ratiocination, it is not equal to all undertakings, but has its own peculiar subject-matter, and is circumscribed in its range. No one would for a moment expect that because Newton and Napoleon both had a genius for ratiocination, that, in consequence, Napoleon could have generalized the principle of gravitation, or Newton have seen how to concentrate a hundred thousand men at Austerlitz. The ratiocination faculty, then, as found in individuals, is not a general instrument of knowledge, but has its province, or is what may be called departmental. It is not so much one faculty, as a collection of similar or analogous faculties under one name, there being really as many faculties as there are distinct subject-matters, though in the same person some of them may, if it so happen, be united,--nay, though some men have a sort of literary power of arguing in all subject matters, de omni scibili, a power extensive, but not deep or real. It is almost proverbial that a hard-headed mathematician may have no head at all for what is called historical evidence. Successful experimentalists need not have talent for legal research or pleading. A shrewd man of business may be a bad arguer in philosophical questions.... Cromwell, whose actions savoured of the boldest logic was a confused speaker."

[1] Ibid., p. 288. "It is the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible."

[2] Ibid., p. 319.

refers to this kind of reasoning as reductio ad absurdum.

Under formal inference Newman includes such logical modes as the syllogism, the enthymeme,[1] analogy, a priori and a posteriori reasoning.[2] He considers the syllogism to be the traditionally Aristotelian expression of deduction from two premises.[3] As he declared that a proposition is composed of two terms, so a syllogism is composed of two propositions called premises from which a third proposition called the conclusion or consequent follows.

Newman limits his treatment to a discussion of the categorical syllogism, and indicates that this type of artificial reasoning is more adapted to demonstrations than to investigation. Although he exposed the mechanism of the conditional proposition, he does not treat of its deductive counterpart, the hypothetical syllogism.

Newman seems to have understood the enthymeme as did Whately, as being a syllogism with one of the premises suppressed. He failed to perceive the Aristotelian import of the rhetorical enthymeme. He did not describe it in light of its strict rhetorical formality: that it must deal with things which are contingent. But this is not to be wondered at because De Quincy notes in a review of

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[1]Ibid., p. 263. See also Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 258.

[2]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 263.

[3]Ibid.

Whately's Elements of Rhetoric in 1828 that not at Oxford only but among scholars generally the enthymeme was regarded as a syllogism with one premise suppressed. Recalling his own study of the Rhetoric at Oxford, De Quincy exclaims: "What then was an enthymeme? Oxford thou wilt think me mad to ask." Certainly Whately held, and probably influenced Newman in saying that the enthymeme was merely a syllogism with one term suppressed.[1] But De Quincy, following the considered opinion of Facciolati, states that:

> an enthymeme differs from a syllogism, not in the accident of suppressing one of its propositions; either may do this, or neither the difference is essential and in the nature of the matter; that of the syllogism being certain and apodeictic; that of the enthymeme probable, and drawn from the province of opinion.[2]

Having described briefly the function of the syllogism and the enthymeme, Newman next offers an evaluation of formal inference. In the first place formal inference, being conditional, is hampered with other propositions besides those immediately used in the specific proof:

> It views its own proper propositions in the medium of prior propositions, and measures it by them. It does not hold a proposition for its own sake, but as dependent upon others, and those others it entertains for the sake of the conclusion. Thus it is practically

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[1]Wayland M. Parrish, "Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric," (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University), cf. II, 19 ff.

[2]Thomas De Quincy, "Elements of Rhetoric," Blackwood's Magazine, XXIV (December, 1828), pp. 887-888.

> far more concerned with the comparison of propositions, than with the propositions themselves. It is obliged to regard all propositions, with which it has to do, not so much for their own sake, as for the sake of each other, as regards the identity or likeness, independence or dissimilarity, which has to be mutually predicated to them.[1]

Newman concludes that formal inference succeeds insofar as words can in fact be found to represent the countless varieties and subtleties of human thought. Such reasoning often fails because of the fallacy of the original assumption "that whatever can be thought can be adequately expressed in words."[2]

Ethical Proof

In Newman's opinion, the priest and his preaching are intimately related: the personality of the speaker is the primary element in the speech situation. This idea is paramount in Newman's theory of preaching: "Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us."[3] In developing the philosophy of ethos with special reference to ecclesiastical rhetoric, Newman turns to a consideration of the two fundamental powers conferred upon the priest at ordination: to preach the Word of God and to dispense the Sacraments. Newman recognizes in both functions that the personality of the priest is instrumental to the Divine Operation. Although the ethos of the

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[1]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 264.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., II, 204.

priest is "suppressed" and overshadowed in dispensing the Sacraments, in the function of preaching it becomes the paramount point of focus.

> There is something more than composition in a sermon; there is something personal in preaching; people are drawn and moved not simply by what is said, but by . . . who says it. The same things said by one man are not the same as when said by another. . . . In this respect the preacher differs from the minister of the sacraments, that he comes to his hearers, in some sense or other with antecedents. Clad in his sacerdotal vestments, he sinks what is individual in himself altogether, and is but the representative of Him from whom he derives his commission. His words, his tones, his actions, his presence, lose their personality; one bishop, one priest, is like another; they all chant the same notes, and observe the same genuflexions, as they give one peace and one blessing, as they offer one and the same sacrifice. The Mass must not be said without a Missal under the priest's eyes; nor in any language but that in which it has come down to us from the early hierarchs of the Western Church. But, when it is over, and the celebrant has resigned the vestments proper to it, then he resumes himself, and comes to us in the gifts and associations which attach to his person. He knows his sheep, and they know him; and it is this direct bearing of the teacher on the taught, of his mind upon their minds, and the mutual sympathy which exists between them, which is his strength and influence when he addresses them. They hang upon his lips as they hang upon the pages of his book. Definiteness is the life of preaching. A definite hearer, not the whole world; a definite topic, not the whole evangelical tradition; and in like manner, a definite speaker. Nothing that is anonymous will preach; nothing that is dead and gone; nothing even which is of yesterday, however religious in itself and useful. Thought and word are one in the Eternal Logos, and must not be separate in those who are His shadows on earth. They must issue fresh and fresh, as from the preacher's mouth, so from his breast, if they are to be "spirit and life" to the hearts of his hearers. And what is true of a parish priest, mutatis mutandis, to a University preacher; who,

> even more, perhaps, than the ordinary parochus, comes to his audience with a name and a history...[1]

Newman represents this same doctrine in his fifth Oxford University Sermon, "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth." In this sermon he states that the preacher is the instrument of God to form "all men after One Exemplar; making them like himself, or rather like One above himself, who is the beginning of a new creation."[2] If the preacher lacks eloquence or the facile flow of language, he is always able to use his personality and sincerity to attract and move his audience.

Newman places himself prominently with the classical tradition in stating that the speaker "persuades by what he is" and that "nothing that is anonymous will preach."[3] Such a philosophy of ethos reminds us of the insistence which the ancient rhetoricians gave to this topic and the extensive treatment they gave to ethos as a medium of persuasion. Newman's concept is similar to the belief of Aristotle concerning ethos, but, as we shall see presently, the English Cardinal went far beyond the Aristotelian analysis, and contributes Christian philosophical and theological concepts which are not found in the rhetoric of Aristotle. We may say in general that Newman is not only logical in including ethos in his

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., pp. 425-426.

[2]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 87.

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 426.

philosophy of preaching but is well within the tradition of the classical rhetoricians.

To comprehend Newman's concept of ethos, we must consider the three following phases: (1) basic observations upon ethos; (2) relation of decorum and propriety to ethos; and (3) qualities the speaker should possess.

Basic observation upon ethos.--Newman distinguishes between persuasion effected through the personality of the speaker and persuasion realized through arousing the emotions of the hearers. The first, ethical proof, resides in the character of the speaker. It proceeds from "what the speaker is"; the second consists in producing a certain attitude in the hearers. The basis for ethical proof is the feeling and judgment the audience has toward the personal worth and the resources of the speaker. Obviously, it is a subjective evaluation. The elements upon which the audience makes this evaluation are the intellectual and moral probity of the speaker as well as his manifested good will or sympathy. Newman, like Aristotle, sees that ethos is founded on the personality of the speaker. He acknowledges his indebtedness to Aristotle in the "Lecture on University Preaching."

> Hence it is that the great philosopher of antiquity in speaking, in his Treatise on Rhetoric, of the various kinds of persuasives, which are available in the Art, considers the most authoritative of these to be that which is drawn from personal traits of an ethical

nature evident in the orator...[1]

To Newman it is clear that if any one of the three modes of persuasion should have to be sacrificed in the rhetorical process, the ethical character should never be sacrificed. Ethos plays so important a function in persuasion because the speaker is not supposed or expected to present apodictic demonstrations to his audience. Newman, it will be recalled, says the proper matter of rhetoric is the probable and the contingent. Therefore, the authority, the probity, and the trustworthiness of the speaker are important factors which the audience will take into consideration before assenting to any proposed course of action. If a question is open to two or more solutions, the audience will be inclined to follow the judgment of a speaker who is believed to be honest and trustworthy. Newman states that this opinion is universally accepted:

> ... for such matters are cognizable by all men, and the common sense of the world decides that it is safer, where it is possible, to commit oneself to the judgment of men of character than any considerations addressed merely to the feelings or to reason.[2]

Ethical proof should have a place in every form of rhetoric. Newman points to the function of ethical proof in many of his works. In analyzing the reason for the sudden and far-reaching influence of Protagoras and the

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[1] Ibid., p. 408.

[2] Ibid.

other sophists at Athens, he concludes that the youth of the city flocked to these speakers because of their superior personal resources and talents, and not because they promised entertainment and novelty of display available at the theatre.

The influence of this ancient school operated by the Sophists, Newman notes, was exerted not by method or system so much as by "the action of personality, the intercourse of soul with soul, the play of mind upon mind." He accepts the judgment of Plato that the sophists held their audiences because of their "superior knowledge and intellectual fame, combined with an imposing personality, making itself felt in their lectures and conversations."[1]

Although Newman recognizes that ethos should function in all rhetoric, like Aristotle, he believes that it has a special significance in deliberative oratory. He reports that "in deliberative oratory, indeed, a great

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[1]John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1906), III, 55. The house of Protagoras he describes imaginatively as filled with avid auditors. "A party followed, chiefly foreigners whom Protagoras had 'bewitched like Orpheus, by his voice.' On the opposite side of the portico sat Hippias with a bench of youths before him, who were asking him questions on physics and astronomy, Prodicus was still in bed, with some listeners on sofas round him. Such is the sketch given us of this school of Athens, as there represented. I do not enter on the question, as I have already said, whether the doctrine of these Sophists, as they are called, was true or false; more than partially true it could be, whether in moral or physics, from the circumstances of the age; it is sufficient that it powerfully interested the hearers."

part of the effect of the composition depends on its creating a high opinion of the speaker."[1]

Newman observes that there will be a strong temptation for the speaker to give the impression of being more virtuous than he actually is. Nevertheless, Newman clearly indicates that the speaker should never affect being more virtuous than he is. Here he is more exacting than Aristotle who allows the speaker to give the impression of character and virtue to his audience when he says: "give an impression of yourself as a good and just man, for good character always commands more attention."[2]

Newman admits that the simulation of virtue is an effective means of persuasion, but such action is tantamount to deceit. Often through the simulation of virtue "people are led into false religions and false philosophies."[3] In this connection he cites the example of Balaam the prophet, who despite the fact that he was the enemy of God, gave the impression to his audience of a most religious and conscientious man: "a man . . . speaking so religiously that at first sight you might have thought he was to be followed in whatever he said, and that your soul would have been safe with him."[4] Although the first

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 44.

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric iii. 14. 1415[b].

[3]Newman, Discourses to Mixed Congregations, op. cit., p. 158.

[4]Ibid.

appearance of the speaker might make the audience believe that he is "amiable and good, and so trustworthy," his later speeches portray his "true self." He is found to be:

> rude, perhaps, and unfeeling; he is selfish, he is dictatorial, he is sensual, he is empty-minded and frivolous; while we in our simplicity had antecedantly thought him the very embodiment of purity and tenderness, or an oracle of heavenly truth.[1]

Newman, therefore, cautions the preacher who may feel inclined to exaggerate his virtue. Actually the priest who aims at appearing to be earnest and virtuous impedes his ultimate persuasiveness. In concentrating on himself and falsely producing symptoms of earnestness, the speaker turns his attention from the message of his sermon and breaks the psychological contact with his audience.[2]

Newman further differs from Aristotle concerning the question of whether the ethos of the speaker is operative only through and during the speech. Aristotle holds that the ethos of the speaker should be judged only within the limits of the speaking situation. Newman, on the other hand, contends that the popular reputation established through daily conversation and other social relations with his people contributes to the persuasiveness of his ethos. Newman even suggests that the speaker should attend to improving his ethos in the community by

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[1] Ibid., p. 159.

[2] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 409.

letting himself be known and seen. Speaking to priests, Newman states:

> I said your victory was to lie in forcing upon others a personal knowledge of you . . . face to face. . . . The great instrument of propagating moral truth is personal knowledge. A man finds himself in a definite place; he grows up in it and into it; he draws persons around him; they know him, he knows them, thus it is that ideas are born which are to live, that works begin which are to last.[1]

Newman does not discuss ex professo the relation of ethos to arrangement. He, however, mentions that Cicero was wont to establish ethos particularly in the proem of his speech.[2] Yet he does not present specific directions concerning ethos as a factor in arrangement.

He differs, therefore, from Quintilian and Cicero who give particular directions concerning the use of ethos in the arrangement of the speech. Quintilian, although he states that the speaker should gain the good will of his audience throughout his speech by the impression of his good character and friendliness, declares that he should strive to use the persuasive force of his ethos in the exordium.[3] Cicero says that

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[1]John Henry Newman, Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England (Dublin: James Duffy, 1857), p. 351.

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 45.

[3]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria iv. 1. 9. "As regards good will, we secure that either from the persons connected with the case or from the case itself. Most writers have divided these persons into three classes, the plaintiff, the defendant, and the judge. This

the speaker should aim to conciliate the audience by means of his ethos in the peroration. Both Quintilian and Cicero state that the ethos of the speaker should be impressed on the audience in the exordium in order to prepare the auditors properly for the logical arguments.[1]

While these basic observations point to the conclusion that Newman is in general agreement with the representatives of the classical tradition, there is additional confirmation in the fact that he used and relied upon ethical proof almost exclusively in his Apologia Pro Vita Sua. In this work he recounts the perplexity of his mind. How should he defend himself and what kind of argumentation should he use? This perplexity may be understood by a consideration of the circumstances leading up to the defense of himself.[2]

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classification is wrong, for the exordium may sometimes derive its conciliatory force from the character of the pleader. For although he may be modest and say little about himself, yet if he is believed to be a good man, this consideration will exercise the strongest influence at every point of the case. For thus he will have the good fortune to give the impression not so much that he is a zealous advocate as that he is an absolutely reliable witness."

[1]Cicero De Oratore ii. 79. 317.
Quintilian Institutio Oratoria iv. 1. 9.

[2]Newman, Apologia, op. cit., Preface, xxii-xxiii. "When first I read the Pamphlet of Accusation, I almost despaired of meeting effectively such a heap of misrepresentation and such a vehemence of animosity. . . . He called me a liar--a simple, a broad, an intelligible, to the English public a plausible arraignment; but for me, to answer in detail charge one by reason one, and charge two by reason two, and charge three by reason three, and so to proceed through the whole string both of accusations

Newman had been charged by Charles Kingsley with teaching "lying by system." Newman protested strongly and received from the detractor a half-hearted apology. Later, the initial charge was made more formally and repeated in sharper language, with the added barb that Newman advocated and practiced systematic dissimulation. How was Newman to persuade the English public that Kingsley was wrong? Kingsley's words had fallen on the ears of an audience conditioned by British prejudice against the Catholic Church and personal prejudice against Newman, since he had attempted to make the Anglican Church more Catholic. Newman realized that the force of logical proof was useless in the face of such strong prejudice and distrust. The problem which stood before him was to vanquish this mood of prejudice. But he would first have to dislodge the presumption against him. He chose the device of ethical proof. He would put the facts of his life vitally and dramatically before his reading audience; he would represent himself so realistically to

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and replies, each of which was to be independent of the rest, this would be certain labor lost as regards an effective result. What I needed was a corresponding antagonist unity in my defence, and where was that to be found? I reflected, and saw a way out of my perplexity. My perplexity did not last half an hour. I recognized what I had to do, though I shrank from both the task and the exposure which it would entail. I must, I said, give the true key to the whole life; I must show what I am, that it may be seen what I am not, and that the phantom may be extinguished which gibbers instead of me.... I will indeed answer his charges and criticisms on me one by one (in the Appendix) lest any one should say that they are unanswerable, but such a work shall not be the scope nor the substance of my reply."

his readers that they at times would think they were listening to his honest voice; and he would make them see the principles which directed and pervaded his whole life. He would let his readers follow him through his student and tutorial days at Oxford so intimately that they would believe they knew him on terms of friendship. He then would ask them if they should believe such a person. That this choice of ethical proof was suitable for the occasion and ultimately successful is a fact of history.

In this defense of his life, there is evident a tremendous disproportion between the proem and the actual demonstrations. Of the two hundred eighty-nine pages of the Apologia, only the last fifteen are concerned with a direct refutation of Kingsley's attack. The preceding two hundred seventy-four pages are ethical proof and indirectly persuasive. They simply prepare for the logical argument and refutation. In appraising this great proportion of ethical proof Gates, the able critic of the last century, concludes: "Probably in no other piece of writing is the actual demonstration so curiously small in proportion to the means that are taken to make the logic effective."[1]

Relation of decorum and propriety to ethos.--Cicero and Quintilian recognize decorum as a regulating principle

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[1]Lewis Gates, Selections from the Prose Writings of John Henry Cardinal Newman (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1895), p. xix.

of becoming and virtuous conduct. Cicero maintains that the Roman concept of decorum is similar to the older concept of propriety:

> For as in life, so in a speech, nothing is more difficult than to see what is becoming. The Greeks call this "propriety," we call it "decorum." But concerning this point many admirable rules are laid down, and the matter is well worth being understood. And it is owing to ignorance respecting it that men make blunders not only in life, but very often in poems and in speeches.[1]

Newman prefers to consider the Greek concept of propriety. He notes that propriety was one of the principles of conduct followed by the pagans. The other two principles he mentions are law and expediency. The Greeks practiced virtue, he says, "simply because it was so praiseworthy, so noble, and so fair."[2] They chose propriety as the regulating principle of conduct just as the Romans had chosen decorum. In adopting the principle of propriety the Greeks did not totally discard the directive force of law. As a regulating principle of conduct, propriety was supposed to govern, influence, and cultivate a fine and delicate taste, a sense of honor, and an elevated, aspiring spirit. The Athenian ideal was the gentleman (καλοκἀγαθός).[3] This word, Newman remarks, has hardly an equivalent in the sterner language

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[1]Cicero Orator tr. C. D. Yonge (London: George Bell and Sons, 1888) Vol. IV. xxi. 401.

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., II, 318.

[3]Ibid., p. 317. Origin of propriety. See Mary A.

of Rome, where, on the contrary, the ideal was the bonus vir.

Vir bonus est quis?
Qui consulta patrum, qui leges juraque servat.[1]

He believes that the Greeks laid more emphasis on the cultivation of the beautiful, with propriety as an aesthetic principle by extension.

The influence of the Greek concept of propriety can be observed in several places in Newman's works. His frequent references to the gentleman, the product of a liberal arts education, seem to have an affinity to the ancient principle of becoming conduct and the beautiful. Describing this beau ideal in one of his sketches, he writes:

> For instance, the polished manners and high-bred bearing which was so difficult to attain, and so strictly personal when attained, which are so much admired in society, from society are acquired. All that goes to constitute a gentleman,--carriage, gait, address, gestures, voice; the ease, the self possession, the

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Grant, "Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable," University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, No. 21 (1924) p. 76. "This doctrine of propriety which influenced so profoundly ideas of morality and conduct, as well as matters of style and rhetoric in the Ciceronian and Augustan ages, may have, as Kroll suggests, one of two origins, either in the development of the art of music, or in that of rhetoric. (Randbemerkugen, Rh. Mus. LCIII, 1907, p. 99). He is inclined to favor its connection with music and quotes passages of Plato Republic iii. 399A . . . and Laws ii. 699c, where it is said that the Muses would never make the mistake of attributing the songs and gestures of women to men, or the rhythms and melodies of slaves to freemen."

[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., II, 318.

> courtesy, the power of conversation, the talent of not offending; the lofty principle, the delicacy of thought, the happiness of expression, the taste and propriety, the generosity and forbearance, the candour and consideration, the openness.[1]

Newman's idea of propriety also seems to be in harmony with Cicero's concept of decorum. The Roman Orator appears to couple the concept of conduct with the principle of the beautiful.[2] Cicero states that decorum denotes orderliness of behaviour, freedom from excess and seemliness. In the De Officis he implies that the aesthetic principle operates in union with ethical judgment. Like Newman, Cicero states that courtesy, consideration of others, dignity, and good taste are shown through one's speech.

With reference to the appearance and conduct of the speaker, Newman speaks of the virum pietate gravem whose words rule the spirits and soothe the breasts of the multitude.[3] Grace of diction, a certain attention to

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., II, 318.

[2]Cicero De Officis tr. Walter Miller (New York: Macmillan Co., 1913), 1. 28. 101. "For, as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry of limbs, engages the attention and delights the eye, for the very reason that all parts combine in grace and harmony, so this propriety which shines out in our conduct engages the approbation of our fellowmen by the order, consistency, and self-control it imposes upon every word and deed." See also Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., II, 283. "One's life must show the balance, harmony, and temperance of 'mean state.'"

[3]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., II, 314.

dress, and an unaffected neatness manifest the propriety of the speaker to the audience. Thus his action, charm, and bearing generate admiration and praise in the audience, disposing them to assent.

Propriety is not easily acquired. The full assemblage of attributes and becoming conduct Newman maintains cannot be expected to be learned only from books. Propriety and decorum, the attributes of the gentleman, are learned and can be acquired at the "shrines of refinement and good taste." In speaking of these traits, Newman reports

> ... are they not necessarily acquired, where they are found, in high society? The very nature of the case leads us to say so; you cannot fence without an antagonist, nor challenge all comers in disputation before you have supported a thesis; and in like manner, it stands to reason, you cannot learn to converse till you have the world to converse with; you cannot unlearn your natural bashfulness, or awkwardness, or stiffness, or other besetting deformity, till you serve your time in some school of manners. Well, and is it not so in matter of fact? The metropolis, the court, the great houses of the land, are the centers of which at stated times the country comes up, as to shrines of refinement and good taste; and then in due time the country goes back again home, enriched with the portion of the social accomplishments, which those very visits serve to call out and heighten in the gracious dispensers of them. We are unable to conceive how the 'gentlemanlike' can otherwise be maintained; and maintained in this way it is.[1]

The person who wishes to acquire the special manners and decorum of the forum orator should become a

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[1] Ibid., pp. 283-284.

member or have some experience in the legislature. It does not seem presumption, Newman observes, that "Parliament put a clever man au courant."[1] Through participation in public speeches and his private conversation with the members a person will learn quickly. He will gain forensic propriety and decorum from his observation of the "bearing of measures and events, the action of parties, and the persons of friends and enemies."[2]

But Newman regards what might be considered effective and within the limits of propriety for the speaker in Parliament as unbecoming for the preacher. If a preacher descends to "the coarse rhetoric of hard names and sweeping imputations in advance of proof,"[3] Newman believes that such action is not only inappropriate, but that it also detracts from the speaker's ethos. There is a difference between what an audience considers fitting for an advocate, and what is inappropriate for the theologian. Newman remarks:

> In controversy one has no right to complain of strong conclusions, but to assume them on starting is the act of a pleader or advocate, not of a theologian. I will not indeed say that this arm of polemical attack is altogether inadmissable, but at least it is not logical and may without scruple be ignored and passed

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[1] Ibid., p. 284.

[2] Ibid.

[3] John H. Newman, Via Media (London: Basil M. Pickering, 1877), I, xxvii.

> over by a respondent. It is at times, and in a measure pardonable, when it stands for a token or symbol of earnestness in an assailant, and of confidence in the goodness of his cause. From the freshness and originality of thought which give life to such rhetoric--or from the authority of the speaker or writer which gives it weight--or from the congeniality of strong words in the matter in dispute with the sentiments of the audience or the hearer--or their terseness and keenness as dicta, appeals, denunciations, defiances--or again as the vehicle of humorous images, satirical nick-names, epigrammatic hits--or as watchwords in a great conflict--they may be serviceable, nay indispensable in exciting attention and interest, and in encouraging the wavering or timid, and in diffusing light over subjects obscure or abstruse; but after all, and for the most part, their place is Parliament, public meetings, or the Courts of Law, they are unworthy of ecclesiatics as they are easy and seductive.[1]

Newman implies that the speaker should decide what is acceptable to his audience and becoming to his position before he begins his speech. Newman's position in this regard reminds us of Cicero, who considered what was fitting as conditioned by the time and the speaker:

> . . . to say a thing is becoming, is to say that it is fit, as it were, and suitable to the time and person; which is very often important both in action and in words, and in a person's countenance and gestures and gait.[2]

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[1] Ibid., I, xxvii-xxviii.

[2] Cicero Orator xxii. 402, 403. See also James Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson (Bath: George Boynton, 1925), II. 49. 932. "Johnson's profound reverence for the Hierarchy made him expect from Bishops the highest degree of decorum; he was offended even at their going to taverns. 'A bishop (said he) had nothing to do at a tippling house. It is not indeed immoral in him to whip a top in Grosvenor-square; but if he did, I hope the boys will fall upon him and apply the whip to him. There are gradations of conduct, there is morality--decency--propriety. None of these should be violated by a bishop.'"

Character

Qualities the speaker should possess.--In naming specific virtues and qualities which the speaker should possess, Newman is in harmony with the classical tradition. Aristotle cites character, intelligence, and good will; Cicero mentions knowledge, deep feeling, good character, good will, and good physical qualities; Quintilian specifies character; St. Augustine requires wisdom and character.[1]

In organizing the qualities which contribute to the ethos of the speaker, we have arranged the doctrine of Newman under the following heads: (1) character, (2) intelligence, (3) sympathy.

Newman declares that the character of the speaker is the primary requisite for ethos. With his insistence on good character in the speaker, Newman reminds us in particular of Quintilian and Cicero. Both demand character, but Quintilian goes further and is more explicit. He states:

> My aim, then, is the education of the perfect orator. The first essential for such a one is that he should be a good man, and consequently we demand of him not merely the possession of exceptional gifts of speech, but of all the excellencies of character as well.[2]

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric ii. 1. 1378[a].
Cicero De Oratore ii. 84. 323; i. 13. 157. Orator 26. 406, 407.
Quintilian Institutio Oratoria i. 6. 5.
St. Augustine De Doctrina Christiana iv. 5. 7, 8.

[2]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria i. proem. 9.

Quintilian notes that some preceptors of rhetoric fail to teach ethics, and that the study of moral philosophy is necessary to form the character of the speaker. He remarks that the ideal speaker is the good man. Says he: "the orator then, whom I am concerned to form shall be the orator defined by Marcus Cato, a good man skilled in speaking."[1] Quintilian denies the name orator to anyone lacking in moral rectitude. For him the fact that a man possesses intellectual qualification does not necessarily mean that he will be a successful orator.

Newman believes that the character of the speaker is sometimes so powerful a persuasive force that when recognized by the audience it becomes an antecedent probability in favor of the proposal of the speaker. It can often overcome a plausible argument brought forth by an opponent. Says Newman:

> . . . a good character goes far in destroying the force of even plausible charges. There is indeed a degree of evidence in support of an allegation, against which reputation is no defence; but it must be singularly strong to overcome an antecedent probability which stands opposed to it.[2]

He reminds us of Aristotle who states that the character of the speaker can even overcome strong feelings of prejudice and help change these latter adverse feelings of the audience into good will toward the speaker.[3]

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[1] Ibid. xii. 1. 355.

[2] Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 381.

[3] Aristotle Rhetoric iii. 14. 1415[a].

While there are general points of contact between Newman and the representatives of the classical tradition, we should not fail to point out that he has depended upon and refined to some extent the opinions of Quintilian and Aristotle concerning his personal doctrine on character. From the Nichomachean Ethics he seems to have adopted the doctrine that character is the sum of many habits and virtues, and involves training of the will:

> It is as if a law of the human mind, ever to do things in one and the same way. It does not vary in its modes of action, except by an effort; but, if left to itself, it becomes almost mechanical, as a matter of course. Its doing a thing in a certain way to-day, is the cause of its doing it in the same way to-morrow. The order of the day perpetuates itself. This is, in fact, only saying that habits arise out of acts, and that character is inseparable from our moral nature. Not only do our features and face remain the same day after day, but we speak in the same tone, adopt the same expressions of countenance, and walk with the same gait as yesterday.[1]

That character is inseparable from our moral nature, which Newman describes, seems to have precedent in the Institutio Oratoria. Quintilian states:

> The ethos, of which we form a conception, and which we desire to find in speakers, is recommended above all by goodness, being not only mild and placid, but for the most part pleasing and polite, and amiable and attractive to the hearers; and the greatest merit in the expression of it is that it should seem to flow from the nature of the things and persons with which we are concerned so that moral character of the speaker may clearly appear, and be

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[1]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 296. See also Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics ii. 1103.

recognized, as it were, in his discourse.[1]

Newman, however, has a very personal opinion concerning the principles related to the formation of character. While he holds with the pagan rhetoricians that the formation of character results from education of habits and virtues, he also contends that character formation can proceed either from natural or supernatural principles. Newman believes that the speaker whose character is formed under the influence of the supernatural principle of grace will have better ethos than the one who has had his character formed through natural virtues and habits. He notes some of the attributes of the speaker whose character has been formed by natural principles:

> At best he is such as this. He has a number of good points in his character; but some of these he has by nature, and if outward circumstances compelled him to acquire them, or that he has from nature some active principle within him, of one kind or another, which has exerted itself, and brought other principles under and rules him. He has acquired a certain self-command, because no one is respected without it. He has been forced into habits of diligence, punctuality, precision, and honesty. He is courteous and obliging; and has learned to say all he thinks and feels, or to do all he wishes to do, on all occasions. The great mass of men of course are far from having in them so much that is really praise-worthy as this; but I am supposing the best. I am supposing then, that a man's character and station are such, that only now and then he will have his inclinations or his interests to run counter to his duty.[2]

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria 1. 5. 6.

[2] Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, op. cit., 1900 ed., IV, 6.

Newman mentions explicitly three virtues or qualities which contribute to the character of the speaker: earnestness, humility, and fortitude.

In beginning his discussion of earnestness, Newman cites certain examples of studied or false earnestness. In each instance he is also indirectly condemning the principle of natural virtue.

I. Appearing more religious externally than one really is because of[1]
   a) passive imitation
   b) a love of respectability or reputation
   c) imitation of the conduct of the Pharisees, who did their works to be seen by and praised by men.

II. Deceiving others in and through speech[2]
   a) the speaking about religious feeling which the speaker should have, but actually does not have
   b) using "unreal words" to impress an audience.

True earnestness arises from the inner man. Newman states that certain convictions involve external manifestations. This quality of earnestness in the supernatural order is a quality of "the eloquence of the saints, not of

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[1]Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), I, 72-76.

[2]Ibid.

the saints only, but of all Christian preachers."[1] The causes of Christian earnestness are the theological virtues of faith and love.

In naming the virtue of faith and love as the causes of earnestness, Newman agrees with the traditional teaching of the Church on the theological virtues.[2] He states that the virtue of faith is a divine help and grace which enables the speaker to believe revealed truth upon the authority of God. He realizes, therefore, that the speaker operating under the influence of faith has a quality far surpassing the potential of the speaker who acts from the natural principle of unaided reason. The virtue of faith, Newman notes, dispels doubt, and the certitude it generates will be evident in the earnestness of the speaker. This certitude effects earnestness in the speaker because it does not depend upon nor proceed from "argument, discussion, investigation, philosophy, nay, from reason altogether in the popular sense of the

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 410.

[2]Newman agrees with Aristotle in regard to the psychology of habit and the relation of the virtues to character. But in stating that the theological virtues are the source of the earnestness of the Christian preacher, he names virtues and qualities never discussed by Aristotle. Aristotle's division of the soul into two parts, rational and irrational, allows for only two kinds of virtue: intellectual and moral. He precluded from his system the possibility of the theological virtues. Aristotle considered that the highest kind of human activity is the exercise of philosophical wisdom. For Newman the Aristotelian wisdom gives way to knowing and loving God through the theological virtues.

word."[1] The theological virtue of faith is infused by grace, yet leaves the speaker free to exercise his free will.[2] Newman alludes to the operation of faith in the effective preaching of St. Gregory Nazianzen, who although he was "an old man, a timid man, a retiring man, fond of solitude and books, and unpracticed in the struggles of the world, suddenly appears in the Arian city of Constantinople; and despite a fanatical populace, and an heretical clergy, preaches the truth and prevailed."[3] Faith produces earnestness in preachers because:

> . . . they are not developing principles or evolving systems; that their ultimate end is not . . . popularity or success; that they are but doing God's will and desiring His glory. They profess a sincere belief that certain views which engage their minds come from God; that . . . a divine blessing alone can carry them forward; that they look for that blessing; that they feel God will maintain His own cause; that that belongs to Him, not to them, that if their cause is God's cause, it will be blessed, in his time and way; that if it be not, it will come to nought; that they securely wait the issue; that they leave it to the generation to come; that they can bear to seem to fail but cannot bear to be 'disobedient to a heavenly vision;' that they think that God has taught them and put a word in their mouths; that they speak to acquit their own souls; that they protest in order to be on the side of God's host, of the glorious company of the Apostles, the goodly fellowship of the Prophets, the noble army of Martyrs.[4]

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[1]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 295.

[2]Newman, Discourses to Mixed Congregations, op. cit., p. 224.

[3]Ibid., p. 242.

[4]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 301.

Love is the other source of earnestness. For Newman love is the complimentary virtue to faith. Whereas faith has for its proper object Divine Truth, love has for its object the Supreme Goodness of God. Newman, as would be expected, identifies orthodoxly love with charity. Love thus considered is explained by the process of amor benevolentiae mentioned by Aristotle.[1] Newman points to love as motivating and enhancing the ethos of such preachers as St. Peter and St. Augustine.[2]

Newman enlarges on this quality of earnestness in the characters of Savonarola and St. Philip Neri. They were two of the most effective preachers in the sixteenth century. Contemporaries of one another, Savonarola, a Dominican and the older man, preached principally in Florence, while St. Philip Neri preached at Rome. Both aimed at the spiritual improvement of their audiences. Newman recognizes Savonarola as "a man certainly of commanding eloquence and extraordinary influence,"[3] but contrasts the zeal and earnestness of Savonarola to that of St. Philip Neri in whom such traits were tempered by the virtue of humility. Newman comments ironically of Savonarola: "At length, his innocence,

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[1]Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics viii. 3. 1156.

[2]Newman, Discourses to Mixed Congregations, op. cit., pp. 74-78.

[3]John Henry Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions (London: Burns, Oates, Company, 1870), p. 210.

sincerity and zeal were too much for his humility."[1] Newman argues, however, that the immediate successes of Savonarola were greater and more spectacular than even those of St. Paul:

> . . . he burst forth into a whirlwind of indignation and invective against all that he found in Florence, and condemned the whole established system, and all who took part of it, high, low, prince or prelate, ecclesiastic or layman, with a pitiless vigour--which for the moment certainly did a great deal more than St. Paul was able to do at the Areopagus; for St. Paul made only one or two converts there and departed, whereas Savonarola had great immediate success, frightened and abashed the offenders, rallied round him the better disposed, and elicited and developed whatever was of piety, whether in the multitude or in the upper class.[2]

It was not his logical arguments but the ethos of the preacher that attracted huge crowds to his sermons.

> It was the truth of his cause, the earnestness of his convictions, the singleness of his aims, the impartiality of his censures, the intrepidity of his menaces, which constituted the secret of his success.[3]

Newman, while acknowledging the immediate effectiveness of Savonarola, points out that St. Philip Neri, following a slower and more quiet approach, was ultimately more effective. For character formed according to the principles of the natural law alone or upon the code of decorum of Cicero is not the ideal character Newman

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[1] Ibid., p. 216.

[2] Ibid., pp. 211-212.

[3] Ibid., p. 232.

has in mind. Rather, it is the character formed according to the principle of grace. Grace, Newman feels, does not destroy character but perfects it. Grace combines with natural character. Instead of superseding the natural character, grace invigorates, elevates, and ennobles it.[1]

A person directed and informed by the supernatural principle of grace effects good far surpassing that effected by a speaker who relies upon the ethics of "duty for duty's sake." Newman believes that "we shall find it difficult to estimate the moral power which a single individual trained to practise what he teaches will exert."[2] Whereas many men held in popular esteem appear great from a distance, Newman observes that, seen at close range, the moral stature of these men often appear small in comparison with their reputations. The attraction exerted by the positive moral virtues, that is, by unconscious holiness, is urgent and irresistible. It persuades the weak, the timid, the wavering, and the inquiring. It draws the affection and loyalty of all who are, in some measure, like-minded.[3]

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[1]Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, op. cit., p. 92. Newman points to St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Athanasius, and St. Paul the Apostle as men "versed in human knowledge and had the talent to throw themselves into the minds of other men."

[2]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 94. See also St. Augustine De Doctrina Christiana op. cit., iv. 27. 60. St. Augustine remarks: "Far more would they [preachers] do good by practicing what they preach."

[3]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 95.

In his "Lecture on University Preaching," Newman introduces the idea of earnestness as the all-pervading quality of the character of the preacher. He states categorically that "the very presence of simple earnestness even in itself is a powerful natural instrument to effect that toward which it is directed."[1] Then he makes an extensive philosophical analysis. Newman was perhaps induced to give such strong emphasis to earnestness because many of his contemporaries were neglecting or falsifying this quality. In analyzing the psychological effect of earnestness, he declares that "earnestness creates earnestness in others by sympathy; and the more the preacher loses and is lost to himself the more does he gain his brethren."[2] This quality, he notes, also has a certain logical force. What is powerful enough to absorb and possess the preacher has at least a *prima facie* claim to attention by the audience. He argues further that the inability to externalize earnestness might lead the audience to suspect that it is absent from the moral character of the speaker. This neglect or lack of earnestness is certain to weaken the force of arguments, both logical and eloquent in their presentation. To lend the most cogent authority to this emphasis upon true earnestness as the adjunct of good character in the

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[1] Newman, *Idea*, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

[2] *Ibid.*

speaker, Newman makes allusion to the earnestness of Christ, the Preacher *par excellence*, and the Exemplar for all Christian speakers. He asks:

> Who would wish to be more eloquent, more powerful, more successful, than the Teacher of Nations? Yet who more earnest, who more natural, who more unstudied, who more self-forgetting than He?[1]

We have already noted that as Newman did not sanction the speaker's giving the impression merely of being a virtuous man, neither would he allow that earnestness must be simulated by the speaker. Rather, he expresses a strong feeling of opposition to the speaker who would attempt to increase the effectiveness of his ethos by simulating signs of earnestness:

> I do not mean that a preacher must aim at *earnestness*, but that he must aim at his object, which is to do some spiritual good to his hearers, and which will at once *make* him earnest. It is said that, when men cross an abyss by a narrow plank thrown over it, it is wisdom not to look at the plank, along which lies his path, but to fix his eyes steadily on the point in the opposite precipice at which the plank ends. It is by gazing at the object which he must reach, and ruling himself by it, that he secures to himself the power of walking straight and steadily. The case is the same in moral matters; no one will become really earnest by aiming directly at earnestness; any one may become earnest by meditating on the motives, and by drinking at the sources of earnestness. We may of course work ourselves up into a pretence, nay, into a paroxysm, of earnestness; as we may chafe our cold hands till they are warm. But when we cease chafing, we lose the warmth again; on the contrary, let the sun come out and strike us with his beams, and we need no artificial chafing

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 409.

> to be warm. The hot words, then, and energetic gestures of a preacher as rubbing the hands or flapping the arms together are signs of warmth; though they are natural where earnestness already exists, and pleasing as being the spontaneous concomitants.[1]

From the practical consideration, therefore, Newman believes that studied earnestness will not help the character of the speaker. A speaker is making a fatal mistake when he is determined to be earnest. "To sit down to compose for the pulpit with a resolution to be eloquent is one impediment to persuasion; but to be determined to be earnest is absolutely fatal to it."[2]

In addition to earnestness, Newman states that humility is a virtue necessary for the ethos of the preacher.[3] In requiring humility, Newman specifies a quality neither demanded nor even discussed by any of the representatives of the classical tradition. Humility is not one of the virtues listed by Aristotle in the Ethics, unless it is the unnamed mean between inordinate ambition (fumositas) and lack of ambition (pusillanimitas).[4] Newman observes that Aristotle failed to include the virtue of humility when he attempted to delineate the ideal virtuous man. Newman declares that not only the Stoics but also

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[1] Ibid., pp. 408-9.

[2] Ibid., p. 409.

[3] Newman, "Notes on Sermon Writing" (dated 1868), quoted in Wilfrid Ward, Life of Cardinal Newman (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912), II, 335.

[4] Aristotle Ethics iv. 4. 1125[b].

the Pythagoreans erred because they had not the genuine understanding of this virtue:

> In proportion as they drank in the spirit of eternal purity, they became divine in their own estimation; they contrasted themselves with those who were below them, knowing no being above them by whom they could measure their proficiency. Thus they began by being humble, and, as they advanced, humility and faith wore away from their character.[1]

He notes that Aristotle has recognized this deficiency by declaring:

> This is strikingly illustrated in Aristotle's description of a perfectly virtuous man. An incidental and unstudied greatness of mind is said by him to mark the highest moral excellence, and truly; but the genuine nobleness of the virtuous mind, as shown in a superiority to common temptations, forbearance, generosity, self-respect, calm high-minded composure, is deformed by an arrogant contempt of others, a disregard of their feelings, and a harshness and repulsiveness of external manner. That is, the philosopher saw clearly the tendencies of the moral system, the constitution of the human soul, and the ways leading to the perfection of our nature.[2]

Although Aristotle seemed to realize the necessity for a quality like humility, Newman notes that he could not have been expected to formulate the operation of this virtue, because he never heard about nor had he ever seen the Son of God, the exemplar of humility, manifested in the flesh.[3]

The virtue of humility serves as a brake upon the

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[1]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 28.

[2]Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[3]Ibid., p. 29.

pride of the preacher. It helps him regulate and control two basic drives of his nature: an inordinate self-respect and an inordinate desire for praise from his audiences. Humility keeps these drives reasonable, strengthening them on the one hand against the obstacles which block the spiritual growth and progress of the preacher, and keeping him from accepting speaking situations and honors out of proportion to his talents. The virtue of humility can protect the preacher from being carried away by his successes. His very position and his talents, learning and attractive eloquence, are temptations to him. "There are in his path such enemies as the pride of intellect, the aberrations of reasoning and the intoxication of applause."[1] Newman cites an interesting example of a popular teacher who was intoxicated by his own ability and applause of his audience.[2]

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[1]Newman, Historical Sketches, op. cit., p. 185.

[2]Ibid., p. 187. Newman says: "I quote it, because it forcibly suggests to the mind how fitting the talent is, first to exalt the possessor in his own eyes, and then through him to mislead his hearers. I will cap it, if I may use the expression, with the following histories or legends of the thirteenth century;--Simon Tournay, a famous Parisian doctor, one day proved in a lecture by such powerful arguments the divinity of Christianity, that his school burst out into admiration of his ability. On this he cried, 'Ha, good Jesus: I could, if I chose, refute Thee as well!' The story goes on to say that he was instantly struck dumb. A disciple of Silo, a professor of theology, died; after a while he returned to his master from the grave, invested in a cope of fire, inscribed all over with philosophical theses. A drop of his sweat fell upon the professor's hand, and burned it through. This cope lay on him as punishment for intellectual pride." See also Father Dalagairn's article in the British Critic, January, 1843.

Lest the element in humility of ultimate subjection to God appear as a stumbling block; lest it seem akin to hypocrisy or the enemy of magnanimity, Newman points to its presence in St. Paul, the great preacher to the Gentiles and the student of the liberal arts.[1]

In naming fortitude as a virtue contributing to the ethical character of the preacher, Newman considers this virtue not only in its Aristotelian context as being concerned specifically with regulating fear in man over bodily perils and the mean between rashness and cowardliness, but also as a Christian virtue supported by the principle of grace. He states that the first Christian preachers had this virtue, because the religion of Christ was constantly beset with dangers and persecutions. Many of these first preachers daily faced the possibility of death because of their outspoken speeches. Some of them finally had to suffer martyrdom because of their unwillingness to compromise:

> Look back at the early Martyrs, my brethren, what were they? why, they were commonly youths...--a set of hot-headed young men, who would have lived to be wise, had they not been obstinately set on dying first; who tore down imperial manifestoes, broke the peace, challenged judges to dispute, would not rest till they got into the same den with a lion, and who, if chased out of one city, began preaching in another.[2]

Because he often has to speak the unpleasant truth,

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[1]Newman, Sermons on Various Occasions, op. cit., p. 95.

[2]Newman, Sermons to Mixed Congregations, op. cit., p. 180.

even when loss of reputation and death seem to be inevitable consequences, the need for fortitude in the priest is obvious. Despite the consequences, Newman declares the zealous preacher "offends not individuals merely, but classes of men, and much more when he is pastor and ruler, too, and has to punish as well as denounce."[1] In this connection Newman singles out St. Athanasius, the famous bishop of Constantinople. Because he denounced the civil government, Athanasius was sent into exile. Newman also notes St. Chrysostom's fortitude who, despite the prospects of fierce reprisals and death, spoke out boldly against social evils, denounced injustice and defied the civil authority. "He [through his speeches and sermons] made an Empress his enemy, more powerful than Antipater, as passionate, if not so vindicative."[2]

Newman also mentions the qualities of perseverance and patience. Some speakers become depressed and impatient because their first speeches are poorly attended. In such cases these qualities will fortify the speaker against impatience. Newman remarks:

> I have seen in my time various instances of the way in which Lectures really gain upon the public; and I must express my opinion that, even were it the sole object of our great undertaking to make a general impression upon public opinion, instead of that of doing

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., III, 170.

[2]Ibid.

> definite good to definite persons, I should reject that method . . . which young and ardent minds may have thought the more promising. Even did I wish merely to get the intellect of all Dublin into our rooms, I should not dream of doing it all at once, but at length. I should not rely on sudden, startling effects, but on the slow, silent, penetrating, overpowering effects of patience, steadiness, routine, and perseverance. I have known individuals set themselves down in a neighbourhood where they had no advantages, and in a place which has no pretensions, and upon a work which had little encouragement, but much resolution. For months they were ill-attended, and overlooked in the bustle of the world around them. But there was a secret gradual movement going on, and a specific force of attraction, and a drifting and accumulation of hearers, which at length made itself felt, and could not be mistaken. In this stage of things, a friend said in conversation to me, when at the moment, I knew nothing of the parties: 'Bye-the-bye, if you are interested in such and such a subject, go by all means, and hear such a one. So and so does, and says there is no one like him. I looked in myself the other night, and was very much struck. Do go, you can't mistake; he lectures every Tuesday night, or Wednesday, or Thursday', as it might be. An influence thus gradually acquired endures; sudden popularity dies away as suddenly.[1]

Intelligence

Intelligence is the second element contributing to the ethos of the speaker.[2] This requirement is consistent with the whole pattern of Newman's theory of rhetoric. He directed strong strictures against the

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., pp. 493-494.

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric ii. 1. 1378. Intelligence is required, Aristotle says, for all types of speakers, the deliberative, demonstrative, and forensic. See also Cicero De Oratore ii. 84. 323.

anti-intellectual preaching of the Evangelicals of his day. He emphasizes the importance of a thorough liberal education as essential propaedeutica for the speaker. That intelligence contributes to the ethos of the speaker, Newman clearly notes in one of his Oxford University Sermons:

> ... in the way of influence Reputation for talent, learning, scientific knowledge, has a natural and just claim on our respect, and recommends a cause to our notice. So does power; and in this way power, as well as intellectual endowments, is necessary.., in order to secure from mankind a hearing.[1]

In addition to this general observation Newman mentions in the "Lecture on University Preaching" that "talent as well as learning are required for the perfection of the preacher."[2] In the Grammar of Assent he states that the forensic speaker attracts the attention and gains the admiration of his hearers by his intelligence.[3]

In the Grammar of Assent Newman analyses briefly the dynamics or psychology of ethos leading to persuasion with reference to the element of intelligence. In this book, as well as throughout his works, he emphasizes the prominent influence that intelligence has on the actions of men. He notes that most men rely on the learning and

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[1]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 63.

[2]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 408.

[3]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 372.

intelligence of others.[1] He points out, however, that trust in the intelligence of others is not peculiar to rhetoric. He instances how frequently the opinion of a person who has the reputation for talent and intelligence in a specialized field is sought out and accepted. He states that "we betake ourselves to Newton for physical, not theological conclusions, and to Wellington, for military experience, not for statesmanship."[2] Aristotle, Newman says, has expressed this idea in grand words in his Ethics:

> We are bound to give heed to undemonstrated sayings and opinions of the experienced and aged, no less than to demonstrations; because, from their having the eyes of experience, they behold the principles of things. Instead of trusting logical science, we trust persons.[3]

Why does the lawyer win admiration and respect from his audiences? How does the advocate influence belief in his side of the case even before he begins to argue in favor of his client? Newman answers both questions. The ethos of the speaker is established because the audience has heard about his reputation. In previous cases the speaker has manifested and established his intellectual prowess.[4] Newman remarks:

So again, to refer to a very different subject

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[1] Ibid., p. 341.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid. See also Aristotle Ethics iv. 11. 1143[b].

[4] Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 341.

> matter, we often hear of the exploits of some great lawyer, judge or advocate, who is able in perplexed cases when common minds see nothing but a hopeless heap of facts, foreign or contrary to each other to detect the principle which rightly interprets the riddle, and, to the admiration of all hearers, converts chaos into an orderly and luminous whole.[1]

The attribute of intelligence in the speaker should spring, Newman indicates, from the virtues of philosophical and practical wisdom.[2]

Philosophical wisdom is the virtue which perfects the intellect of the speaker in his understanding of ultimate causes. Considered in itself, philosophical wisdom is a kind of science; it demonstrates conclusions from principles.

In two ways, however, philosophical wisdom is distinct from other sciences: it is above all other sciences by reason of its certainty and also by reason of its authority. It judges all sciences in regard to their principles and conclusions. The supreme authority attributed to philosophical wisdom is because of the dignity of its proper object. Its proper object is immaterial being in general, and ultimately, God Himself

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[1] Ibid., p. 372.

[2] From the doctrine of Aristotle, found chiefly in the Sixth Book of the Ethics, Newman has drawn his fundamental doctrine concerning philosophical and practical wisdom. See also Rhetoric i. 9. 1366[a]. Aristotle in the Rhetoric declares that his selection of virtues follows the principle that the highest virtues are those which are most useful to society. Probably because he does not judge philosophical wisdom to have immediate usefulness to society, Aristotle does not define it in the Rhetoric.

as the Cause of all being.

Newman's conception of philosophical wisdom is in accord with that of Aristotle who states that wisdom "must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge of the highest object."[1] Its place, he also maintains, is higher than statesmanship, since its objects are or may be higher than man. Newman adds that Christian Wisdom may participate in the principle of grace, and is concerned with supernatural as well as natural objects:

> . . . in like manner St. Paul speaking of the Wisdom of the perfect, calls it a revelation, a knowledge of the things of God, such as the natural man 'discerneth' not. And in another Epistle, evidently speaking of the same Wisdom, he prays that his brethren may be given to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and depth and height, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that they might be filled with all the fullness of God.[2]

In the acquisition of this virtue, Newman observes that "knowledge itself,"[3] though a condition for wisdom, is not the very thing which produces the enlargement of mind. Rather, wisdom is concerned with ordering and comparing subjects of knowledge one with another. He states that its acquisition consists "not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown, but in the mind's energetic and

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[1]Aristotle Ethics vi. 7. 1141[a].

[2]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., pp. 286-287.

[3]Ibid., p. 287.

simultaneous action upon and among new ideas, which are rushing in upon it."[1] In the speaker possessing this virtue, there is a continual formative process at work reducing to order and meaning the new ideas which are being constantly acquired. This involves, naturally, a comparison of the old ideas with the new:

> wisdom . . . implies a connected view of the old with the new; an insight into the bearing and influence of each part upon every other; without which there is no whole, and could be no centre. It is the knowledge, not only of things, but of their mutual relations. It is organized, and therefore living knowledge.[2]

Newman further expands this idea that wisdom is the knowledge not only of things in general, but of things in their relation to one another:

> It is the power of referring everything to its true place in the universal system,--of understanding the various aspects of each of its parts,--of comprehending the exact value of each,--of tracing each backwards to its beginning, and forward to its end,--of anticipating the separate tendencies of each. . . . It never views any part of the extended subject-matter of knowledge without recollecting that it is but a part, or without associations which spring from this recollection. It makes everything lead to everything else.[3]

Wisdom puts the mind of the speaker above the influence of chance and necessity, above anxiety, suspense, unsettlement, and superstition, states of mind which are

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 134.

[2]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 287.

[3]Ibid., p. 291.

often those of a speaker who lacks this virtue. Speakers whose minds are unfortified by this virtue have no supreme principle to direct them. Often they lose their way in a mass of details. "They do not know what to think or say of new phenomena which meet them, of whatever kind; they have no view, as it may be called, concerning persons or occurrences."[1] They hang on to the opinions of others for want of internal resources. But the speaker, who has the virtue of wisdom, has, says Newman, "a clear calm, accurate vision and comprehension of the whole course, the whole work of God."[2]

Since wisdom becomes plainly manifested to an audience, Newman implies that it contributes to the ethos of the speaker. Its strength, illumination, and ability to order things become more obvious and brilliant when the speaker is opposed in argument by an adversary. Possessing this wisdom, Newman states:

> . . . men, when in difficulties, originate at the moment vast ideas or dazzling projects; who, under the influence of excitement are able to cast a light, almost as if from inspiration, on a subject or course of action which comes before them; who have a sudden presence of mind equal to any emergency, rising with the occasion, and an undaunted magnanimous bearing, and energy and keenness which is but made intense by opposition.[3]

Although he notes that philosophical wisdom is

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[1] Ibid., p. 291.

[2] Ibid., p. 293.

[3] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 138.

the beau ideal of both the Peripatetic and the Stoic, Newman concludes that "it belongs more especially to preachers of the gospel."[1] Preachers of the gospel need this virtue because the "material" of their sermons is about the Final Cause.

In addition to philosophical wisdom, the preacher also needs practical wisdom. In his discussion of practical wisdom Newman conforms more closely to the mind of Aristotle than he does when speaking about philosophical wisdom. At the outset he states that this virtue is "fully considered in the well-known treatise of Aristotle."[2] Having certainly studied and contemplated the sixth book of the Ethics, Newman declares that the faculty which guides the mind in matters of conduct is named phronesis or judgment. Newman emphasizes strongly the function of judgment in the virtue of practical wisdom:

> Judgment does not stand here for a certain homely, useful quality of intellect, that guards a person from committing mistakes to the injury of his fortunes or common reputation; but for the master-principle of business, literature and talent, which gives him strength in any subject he chooses to grapple with, and enables him to seize the strong point of it.[3]

In contrast to philosophical wisdom, practical

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[1]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 279. See also Idea, op. cit., p. 138.

[2]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 352.

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 174.

wisdom is concerned with judgments in the concrete order.[1] Practical wisdom, therefore, is concerned with the reasonable way of doing things, or the reasonable way of acting. It directs and commands the speaker in personal matters, and it will also be the determining and controlling principle of action in social matters. Practical wisdom does not discover the first principles but applies them in the actual situation. Being concerned with acting and doing, it proceeds from the practical intellect.

Practical wisdom, formally and essentially, is an intellectual virtue, because it perfects the intellect; but materially it is a moral virtue inasmuch as it deals with human acts. It directs one as to how to gain the right idea and standard of virtue; how to apply in practice one's own standard of conduct; and it determines for one what is right and wrong in a particular case.[2]

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[1]Aristotle Ethics vi. 1. 1139[a]. Aristotle makes clear the distinction between philosophical and practical wisdom. Philosophical wisdom or scientific wisdom is concerned with the invariable; practical wisdom, with the contingent: "Let one of these parts be called scientific and let the other the calculative; for to deliberate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about the invariable."

[2]Ibid., vi. 12. 1144. Aristotle notes that moral virtue is not equivalent knowledge, as Socrates infers; but practical wisdom is required for moral virtue: "Again the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means." See also E. M. Cope, Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, op. cit., p. 97. Cope infers that the relationship between practical wisdom and moral virtue is not emphasized in the Rhetoric. And if the relationship between practical wisdom and moral virtue

In such situations the virtue of practical wisdom will come to the aid of the speaker. Newman contends that an ethical system may apply laws, general rules, guiding principles, a number of examples, distinctions, solutions of critical or anxious difficulties; but who is to apply them to a particular case? Whither can one go, except to the living intellect, one's own, or another's? What is written is vague and abstract. Men are counseled to avoid extremes and seek the mean, but no general law or principle can ascertain for an individual, according to personal needs, the golden mean. Practical wisdom, according to Newman, is

> the authoritative oracle, which is to decide our path [/it/] is something more searching and manifold than such jejune generalizations as treatises can give, which are distinct and clear when we least need them. It is in the mind of the individual, who is thus his own law, his own teacher, and his own judge in those special cases of duty which are personal to him. It comes of an acquired habit, though it has its first origin in nature itself, and it is formed and matured by practice and experience; and it manifests itself, not in any breadth of view, any philosophical comprehension of the mutual relations of duty towards duty, or any consistency in its teachings, but is a capacity sufficient for the occasion, deciding what ought to be done here and now, by this given person, under these given circumstances.[1]

The importance of practical wisdom, as contributing

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is drawn out prominently, Cope believes that one ascribes too much ethical philosophy to the Rhetoric.

[1]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., pp. 354-355.

to the ethos of the speaker, is evident in the rhetorical theory of Cardinal Newman. He implies that the exercise of this virtue is essential to the art of rhetoric.[1] Since the matter of rhetoric is contingent, the speaker will have to be continually relying upon this virtue. His practical judgment will either be aided or impeded by the presence or absence of practical wisdom. The judgments made by the speaker will be revealed to his audience through his speeches. And these judgments will reveal to the audience what he is.

Newman notes the need for practical wisdom in two functions of the preparation of the speech. Practical wisdom is needed in the choice of suitable arguments for a specific audience. Although Proof is the same the whole world over, the speaker must choose an argument which is effective in a particular situation.[2] Practical wisdom is also required in the selection of a topic. If the speaker is without practical wisdom, he will be prone to misjudge the ethical condition of his audience. He, therefore, might speak upon a subject which is not pertinent, or treat some special danger or probable deficiency or need of his hearers in a rude and unbecoming manner. Because of his lack of practical wisdom, he will

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 415.

[2]Ibid., p. 418. See also Ibid., p. 176. Newman notes that the most characteristic attribute of Edmund Burke's ethos was his practical wisdom.

probably do them more harm than good; he will probably make them even hostile and indisposed to accept his proposals.

For the permanent functioning of wisdom, Newman presupposes rectitude of the speaker's will and emotions. "Wisdom", he writes, "is _desursum_, is _pudica_, is _pacifica_, from above, chaste, peaceful."[1] Without moral rectitude of the will and the emotions, Newman perceives that a speaker becomes ambitious and contentious. Even though some have considered that mere wisdom would produce moral virtuousness, Newman states that they were in error.[2] He argues: "did wisdom support Cicero under the disfavor of the fickle populace, or nerve Seneca to oppose an imperial tyrant? It abandoned Brutus, as he sorrowfully boasts, into the false position of defying the heavens."[3] Newman also notes that "the philosopher in Rasselas taught a superhuman doctrine and then succumbed without an effort to a trial of human affection."[4]

Newman singles out Abelard as the supreme example of the speaker who had wisdom without rectitude of the will and the emotions. He indicates that this worthy opponent of his former teacher, William of Champeaux, demonstrated

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[1]Newman, _Essays and Sketches_, _op. cit._, II, 356.

[2]Newman, _Idea_, _op. cit._, p. 115.

[3]_Ibid._, p. 116.

[4]_Ibid._

to audiences not only a superior intellect but also a mastery of the art of rhetoric. His genius and subtlety of knowledge were manifest in his personality. He attracted and dazzled his audiences by his wisdom. The element of wisdom in his ethos was so magnetic that

> . . . people came to him from all quarters;-- from Rome, in spite of mountains and robbers; from England, in spite of the sea; from Flanders and Germany; from Normandy, and the remote districts of France; from Angers and Poitiers; from Navarre by the Pyrenees, and from Spain, besides the students of Paris itself; and among those, who sought his instructions now or afterwards, were the great luminaries of the schools.[1]

He was endowed by nature and art with the sweetness of eloquence, and with a ready flow of language. Yet Abelard "illustrates the strength and the weakness of the principle of advertising and communicating knowledge for its own sake."[2]

Abelard, as well as other speakers, has erred in cultivating wisdom without also developing the moral virtues. Newman recognizes that there is no necessary connection between the intellectual virtue of wisdom and the moral virtues. Yet he insists that wisdom must have the support of the moral virtues. Without the support of the moral virtues, Newman declares that the applause of the audiences will be "too much for a weak head and heart, weak in spite of intellectual power;

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., II, 356.

[2]Ibid.

for vanity will possess the head, and worldliness the heart, of the man."[1]

Especially for the preacher, Newman believes that the intellectual element in his ethos should be subordinated to his moral character and holiness. Even from the standpoint of persuasion, he contends that the preacher of holiness will influence his audience more by the goodness of his moral character than another speaker who has only the attribute of learning and wisdom:

> Science is a sort of disciplina arcani, whether we will it or no; and the presence of a learned man has no tendency to make others learned with whom he is in habits of familiarity. It is otherwise with sanctity; a saint will influence by his conversation, and preacher by his life.[2]

Christ, Newman argues, gave little attention to intellectual display:

> ... we find the Almighty Teacher rejecting with apparent disdain all intellectual display, and confined himself to the enunciation of deep truths, intelligible to the children of wisdom, but conveyed in language altogether destitute of argumentative skill and what is commonly considered eloquence.[3]

Sympathy

If a preacher comes to his audience with the reputation for possessing the moral and intellectual virtues, and with the reported desire to communicate

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[1] Ibid., p. 357.

[2] Newman, Historical Essays, op. cit., I, 170.

[3] Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 56.

some apiritual good,[1] his good will is usually anticipated by his auditors. Aristotle names good will as the third constituent element which contributes to the ethos of the speaker. Newman does not use the term good will, but mentions the need and effectiveness of the quality of sympathy.

In explaining good will, Aristotle refers the reader to his discussion of friendship in the second book of the Rhetoric. He states:

> Let loving [liking, being friendly] be defined as wishing for a person those things which you consider to be good--wishing them for his sake, not for your own--and tending so far as you can to effect them. And a friend is one who loves [likes], and is beloved [liked] in return; men deem themselves friends when they think that they stand in this mutual relation. From these assumptions it follows that a friend is one who shares another's pleasure in good fortune, and his pain in what is painful, not for any ulterior motive, but simply for that other's sake. All men take pleasure in the realization of their own wishes, and are pained at the reverse; so it follows that our pains and pleasures are a sign of what we wish.[2]

In addition to this definition of good will, Aristotle mentions certain traits of character in the speaker which manifest to the audience feelings of good

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 411. See also for discussion of the habit of sympathy Sermons on Various Occasions, op. cit., p. 91 ff.

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric ii. 4. 1381[a]. See A. E. Chaignet, La Rhetorique et Son Histoire, op. cit., p. 166. In regard to good will as a virtue, Chaignet states: "Although it basically concerns the emotional part of man and Aristotle discusses it in connection with the emotions, good will is also a virtue, or at least is neither able to be conceived nor practiced without virtue."

will. Significant to Newman's concept of sympathy is one of these traits. He states:

> Further, men love [/like/] anyone who has done good to them or to those for whom they are concerned--whether the service was great, or zealously done, or done at such and such a juncture--something done on purpose for the recipient; or [/they love (like)/] anyone who, as they think, wishes to act in this way.[1]

Newman considers that sympathy includes not only the love of friendship, but includes also "a special apprehension of human nature as a fact, and an intimate familiarity with it as an object of continual contemplation and affection."[2]

The source and basis for the sympathy described by Newman is not the natural amor benevolentiae mentioned by Aristotle. He points out that sympathy is a virtue closely allied to supernatural charity, and is informed by this great theological virtue:

> Charity, we know, is a theological virtue, and the love of man is, properly speaking, included in the love of God. "Everyone", says S. John, "that loveth Him that begat, loveth him also who is born of Him." Again, "This commandment we have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother." But there is another virtue distinct from charity, though closely connected with it. As Almighty God Himself has the compassion of a father on his children, "for He knoweth our frame, He remembereth that we are dust;" so, after His

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric ii. 4. 1358[a].

[2]Newman, Sermons on Various Occasions, op. cit., p. 102.

> pattern, we are called upon to cherish the virtue of humanity, as it may be called, a virtue which comes of His supernatural grace, and is cultivated for His sake, though its object is human nature, viewed in itself, in its intellect, its affections, and its history.[1]

As conceived by Newman it will be noted that he understands sympathy as a habit existing in the preacher at all times. He notes its presence and effectiveness in St. John Chrysostom. He states:

> . . . nor is his eloquence of a kind to carry any one away who has ever so little knowledge of the oratory of Greece and Rome. It is not the force of words, nor cogency of argument, nor harmony of composition, nor depth or richness of thought, which constitutes his power--whence, then, has he this <u>influence</u>, so mysterious, yet so strong?
>
> I consider St. Chrysostom's charm to lie in his intimate sympathy and compassionateness for the world, not only in its strength, but in its weakness; in the lively regard with which he views everything. . . . Not that any religious man--above all, not that any Saint--could possibly contrive to abstract the love of the world from the love of its Maker, or could feel a tenderness for earth which did not spring from devotion to heaven. . . . But this is the characteristic of all Saints; and I am speaking, not of what St. Chrysostom had in common with others, but what he had special to himself.[2]

In a later section of this chapter, it will be shown that this habit of sympathy participates in the speaker's analysis of and adaptation to the audience.

Pathetic Proof

Newman affirms that the speaker must not merely

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[1] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 108-109.

[2] Newman, <u>Essays and Sketches</u>, <u>op. cit</u>., III, 217.

convince the intellects of his auditors but move and persuade their wills.[1] Because the emotions have a participation in the movement of the will, Newman indicates that pathos has a legitimate function in the art of rhetoric. He finds the use of pathos necessary, not from the fact that a study of pathos has been traditionally included in the texts of rhetoric, but from his personal observation of the nature of man: *operari sequitur esse*. In defending the necessity of the inclusion of pathos, he concludes:

> The heart is commonly reached, not through reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of fact and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. . . . After all, man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal.[2]

By assigning pathetic proof a place in the rhetorical process it is clear that Newman is in agreement with the majority of the representatives of the classical tradition.[3]

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[1]Newman, *Idea*, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

[2]Newman, *Essays and Sketches*, *op. cit.*, II, 204-205.

[3]Aristotle *Rhetoric* i. 2. 1356[a]. Aristotle holds that pathetic proof is one of the three modes of artificial proof. The speaker persuades by means of pathos when he arouses certain emotions in his audience which contribute to the total speech process. The object of pathos is to put the hearers in a certain frame of mind. Aristotle condemns the use of appeals to the emotions as treated by his predecessors. He contends that his study will be scientific, in contrast to the Sophists' unscientific treatment, which advocated the introduction of direct appeals to the emotions of the audience by the admittance

Newman indicates that certain forms of proof are especially applicable to forensic oratory. He advises the preacher to avoid using some of the common rhetorical methods ordained to provoke pathos. Such devices, he avers, belong in "Parliament, public meetings or Courts of Law."[1] In contending that pathos belongs more properly to forensic oratory than to deliberative and therefore ecclesiastical oratory, we find that Newman is in significant agreement with Aristotle and Quintilian.[2]

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of the widow and orphans, or friends of the deceased person in order to excite sympathy and blind the reason of the judge to the real merits of the case.

Cicero De Oratore ii. 44. 185, 187. Cicero advocates the use of pathos, the stirring of the emotions of the audience, but he cautions that the speaker should himself feel the emotions he wishes to excite.

Quintilian Institutio Oratoria vi. 1. 7. Quintilian notes that appeals to the emotions were forbidden to the Athenian orators by proclamation. It was considered immoral to distract the judge's attention by appeals to his emotion. And it was regarded unbecoming for a good man to make use of appeals to the emotions to serve his ends. In spite of this historical background, Quintilian admits that appeals to the emotions are necessary if there is no other means for securing the victory of persuasion.

[1] cf. Newman, Via Media, op. cit., I, xviii.

[2] Aristotle Rhetoric i. 1. 1354[b]. The deliberative branch (of rhetoric) . . . affords less room for trickery [/that is, for biasing the judges' audience by playing upon their emotions/]. In a debate upon communal interests, the judges decide questions which touch them as individuals, so that nothing more is needed than to prove that affairs are as the advocate of a given policy states [/since each can see what is advantageous to him, there is no need of arousing their passions/]; but in forensic speaking this is not enough, [/the judges have not the same interest in the outcome of a given case/] and it pays to win the audience over [/by working on their emotions/]. Ibid. ii. 1. 1378[a]. Evincing the right character is more important in deliberative speeches, and producing the right attitude in the hearer is more important in forensic.

In order to clarify the scope and the function of emotional proof, it is expedient at this point to understand in what way it differs from the persuasive effect of ethical proof.

In the Orator Cicero distinguishes ethos and pathos by declaring:

> The former one is courteous, agreeable, suited to conciliate good-will; the latter is violent, energetic, impetuous, by which causes are snatched out of the fire; and when it is hurried on rapidly it cannot by any means be withstood.[1]

Cicero in the De Oratore indicates that pathos is related to the strong and vehement emotions, whereas ethos is related to the milder emotions.[2]

Institutio Oratoria. The main discussion of pathos by Quintilian centers around the advocate in the court room. vi. 1. 9. Both parties as a general rule may likewise employ the appeal to the emotions, but they will appeal to different emotions and the defender will employ such appeals with greater frequency and fullness. For the accuser has to rouse the judge, while the defender has to soften him.

[1]Cicero Orator 37. 419. See also M. A. Grant and G. C. Fiske, "Cicero's Orator and Horace's Ars Poetica," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, XXXV (1924) 35. "Cicero, contrasting the function of ethos and pathos in his treatment of actio, describes ethical delivery as 'ad naturas et ad mores et ad omnem vitae consuetudinem accommodatum.' The tone is come, iucundum ad benevolentiam conciliandam paratum." Ibid., pp. 35-36. "The essential nature of pathos is characterized by vehemens, incensum incitatum."

[2]Cicero De Oratore ii. 44. 271. "To this mode of speaking, ethos, we may subjoin the opposite method, which moves the mind of the judges by very different means, and impels them to hate, or love, or envy, or benevolence, or fear, or hope or desire, or abhorrence, or joy, or grief, or pity or severity; or leads them to whatever feelings resemble and are allied to these and similar emotions."

Quintilian follows this conception of Cicero. In the Sixth book of the Institutio Oratoria, he states:

> .... They therefore explain pathos as describing the more violent emotion and ethos as designating those which are calm and gentle; in the one case the passions are violent, in the other subdued; the former command and disturb, the latter persuade and induce a feeling of good will. Some add that ethos is continuous, while pathos is momentary. While admitting that this is usually the case, I still hold there are some subjects which demand that more violent emotions should be continuous.[1]

However, he adds that, although ethos is difficult to translate into Latin, the Latin equivalent of pathos is rightly expressed by the word adfectus. He states that pathos and ethos are sometimes of the same nature, differing only in degree.[2]

The theory of Newman shows affinity to the doctrines of Cicero and Quintilian. Although he does not categorize the milder emotions as proper to ethos and the more vehement emotions as proper to pathos, he recognizes obliquely this distinction in his analysis of Cicero's orations. In his essay on "Poetry, with Reference to Aristotle's Poetry," he allocates to poetry the gentler virtues and to rhetoric the ruder and more ordinary feelings:

> ... the virtues peculiarly Christian are especially poetical--meekness, gentleness,

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria vi. 2. 9, 10.

[2]Ibid., vi. 2. 8.

> compassion, contentment, modesty, not to mention the devotional virtues; whereas the ruder and more ordinary feelings are the instruments of rhetoric.[1]

In contrast to ethical proof, which has its foundation in the character of the speaker, pathetical proof results from the speaker's moving the emotions of the audience. The persuasiveness of ethos results from the audience's beholding moral goodness, intelligence, and sympathy in the speaker. The persuasiveness of pathos follows when the speaker moves or changes the mental and emotional state of the audience through pity, anger, and the other emotions, so that judgment under the influence of emotion is affected in a way different than in the absence of emotion. In the theory of Newman ethos takes on the form of a habit. It is constant and inseparable from the speaker, whereas pathos is a transient and temporary condition produced in the audience by the words and actions of the speaker. In the de facto speech situation, pathos will exist in the speaker and in the audience. It is this latter condition that is the ideal.

Newman mentions that Cicero was wont to rely upon emotional appeals at the beginning and at the end of the speech. Quintilian contends "that although some hold that they [emotional appeals] should be confined to the exordium and the peroration...where they are most often used, [they] may be employed in other parts of the speech

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 46.

as well."[1] Newman, although recognizing the practice of Cicero, follows the final direction of Quintilian.[2] It is the opinion of Newman that pathos should not be deliberately inserted in specific places in the speech, but it should arise and grow out of the sense of the words and the action of the speaker.

The remainder of Newman's treatment of pathetic proof has been organized into two sections: (1) the emotions, and (2) audience analysis.

Emotions.--In including study of the emotions in his rhetorical theory, Cardinal Newman is in conformity with the representatives of the classical rhetoric.[3]

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria vi. 1. 51.

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 47.

[3]Each member of the classical tradition has varied in the extent of his treatment of this phase of pathos. Paradoxically, it is Aristotle who has presented the most comprehensive study of the emotions. (Aristotle criticized his predecessors for giving so much space to instruments of rhetoric which would serve speakers for playing upon the feelings of the audience. In spite of this stricture, he dwells at length upon methods of producing certain impressions, and exciting certain feelings in the audience. [The major part of the second book of the Rhetoric (Chapters 2-11) is concerned with the emotions, and their relation to pathetic proof. He analyses fourteen types of appeals to the emotions.] The defense he offers for his own treatment is that he will discuss the emotions scientifically.) See E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, op. cit., p. 4.

Aristotle Rhetoric ii. 2, 11. Aristotle's treatment of each of the fourteen emotions begins with a definition. He then proceeds to point out the implications of the definition which he has enunciated and describe the circumstances under which the emotions often arise and the types of people in whom they are likely to be aroused and against whom they may be directed. Throughout these chapters

Newman's theory conforms more to the doctrine of Aristotle than it does to the theories of Cicero or Quintilian.

Having studied the preachers of his day and the methods they used, Newman thoroughly pondered the problem of the emotions in ecclesiastical rhetoric. It is not merely a choice of either using the emotions without any restraints upon them or of absolutely disregarding them in speaking. The emotions have an irreplaceable presence and function in religious preaching. Newman defends this point:

> No one (it is plain) can be religious without having his heart in his religion; the affections must be actively engaged in it; and it is the aim of all Christian instruction

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Aristotle keeps closely to the definitions he sets down and does not let the discussion wander from a scientific study.

Cicero De Oratore ii. 48, 51. Cicero, while he does not discuss the emotions as extensively as Aristotle does, follows somewhat the same general procedure: with a general inquiry into the nature of the emotions and the conditions under which they are stimulated. He does not give precise definitions of the individual emotions, nor does he name the circumstances under which they arise.

Quintilian Institutio Oratoria iv. 1. 6ss; vi. 1. 7ss; vi. 1. 51; vi. 2. 25. Quintilian discusses the emotions in a characteristic manner. In the chapter on the exordium, he treats benevolentia; in speaking of the epilogue, he presents a number of directions concerning miseratio and inflammatio. He also remarks that there is place for the application of these directions in other parts of the speech. Having finished his discussion of the epilogue, he deals with the emotions in themselves. In saying that the correct handling of the emotions may be more important to the speech than a logical demonstration, he does little more than show his appreciation of the part the emotions have in the rhetorical process. He points out that there are two kinds of fear [/quem patimur et quem facimus/]; that there is a distinction between invidus and invidiosus.

to promote it.[1]

Newman is in fundamental agreement with the Aristotelian doctrine of the psychosomatic nature of man wherein the emotions participate in the process of persuasion. In contrast to the fourteen kinds of appeals to the emotions discussed by Aristotle, Newman names only the four following ordinary, rude feelings as proper to rhetoric: anger, indignation, martial spirit, and the love of independence.[2]

In developing his theory on the emotions, Newman points out a similarity between the emotions (or passions) of the animal and the emotions in man. Thus anger and fear seem to have counterparts in the brutes, but the emotions are formally different in man because of his superior rational nature. Emotions, feelings of pleasure or pain, are experienced differently by man, and intensified because man reacts to the object of pleasure or pain according to his rational nature. Considering that this point deserves special emphasis, Newman writes:

> This is much to the purpose to insist upon; I say it is not the body that suffered, but the soul in the body.... A tree, for instance, has life, organs, growth, decay; it does not suffer, because it has no mind or sensible principle in it. But wherever this gift of an immaterial principle is found, there pain is possible, and greater according to the quality of the gift. Had we no spirit of any kind, we should not feel pain more acutely than a brute

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[1]Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, op. cit., I, 179.

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 76.

> feels it; but being men, we feel pain in a way in which none but those who have souls can feel it.... Living beings, I say, feel more or less according to the spirit which is in them; brutes feel far less than man, because they cannot think what they feel; they have no advertance or direct conscience of their suffering. This is what makes pain so trying, viz., that we cannot help thinking of it, while we suffer it. It is before us, it possesses the mind, it keeps our thought fixed upon it.[1]

The feelings attendant upon emotional experiences in man are influenced by his sensitive and spiritual faculties. Thus, the memory is able to form images of experiences which have been previously impressed on the senses. The memory has also the power of recalling past experiences, not only of re-living them, as it were, but of identifying them also in their posterior context. Through the memory, therefore, the speaker can recall to the audience not only the first, third, and nineteenth moment, but can accumulate and concentrate all these moments in the twentieth moment of pleasure or of pain.[2] Newman notes that, although some people have their feelings "glossed over and deadened," the speaker can

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[1] Newman, Discourses to Mixed Congregations, op. cit., p. 325.

[2] Ibid., p. 328. Newman points out, for instance, how the mind dwells on the chance of what is barely possible, and quite unreasonable, or on what is wrong and dangerous. The emotion of fear is often awakened by hearing of a fire, a murder, or some horrible accident. Newman also makes allusion to the influence of the imagination and how it plays upon a received report and magnifies it. The memory then compares this received report with others and brings to bear its influence on the judgment of the person.

usually move such auditors by recalling to their minds the memories of their childhood.[1]

There are other spiritual faculties of the soul which do not use the body organs directly: the spiritual faculties of intellect and will. The intellect is the faculty having the power of receiving an object in an intentional form. The will is the intellectual appetitive faculty which is drawn to an object as an end, as a good. The will is distinguished from sense appetitive powers in that it is an inclination toward, or away from, the object that is apprehended by the intellect.

Although the intellect is the only faculty of the soul that can move the will directly, the emotions can have a mediate and indirect influence upon the movement of the will. The emotions can influence the will in three ways: (1) by causing an inordinate activity of the sensory faculties which results in a weakening of the intellect's power of attention; (2) by "coloring" the practical judgment through the imagination; (3) by stimulating the emotions so as to cause a change in the dispositions of a person. Thus a proposal of a speaker which seems good to an angry man does not seem so to a peaceful man.[2]

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[1]Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, op. cit., VI, 70.

[2]In regard to this phase of his theory, Newman is in harmony with the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. See Aristotle Rhetoric ii. 1. 1378[a]. See also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II. q. 9. a. 2. cf. Ibid., q. 43. a. 1.

The application of this doctrine to the practical order is obvious. Since the will is the principle of action, it must be moved through persuasion. Yet a proposal of a speaker may fail to be persuasive to a person in the audience, not because he might not be convinced, but because the speaker has so affected the emotions of the auditor that the proposal appears different than if he were not under the influence of an emotion. Newman points out the indirect and mediate influence of the emotions:

> Strictly speaking, it is not the imagination that causes action; but hope and fear, likes and dislikes, appetite, passion, affection, the stirring of selfishness and self love. What imagination does for us is to find a means of stimulating those motive powers; and it does so by providing a supply of objects strong enough to stimulate them. The thought of honour, glory, duty, self-aggrandisement, gain...lead us along a course of action corresponding to itself, but only in case there be that in our minds which is congenial to it. However, when there is that preparation of mind, the thought does lead to act. Hence it is that the fact of a proposition being accepted... to practice indirectly by the action of its object upon the affections.[1]

The emotions are therefore the natural prelude to action. Newman notes that the universal experience of men proves how easy it is to open the mind through the influence of some feeling or emotion, and how difficult it is to avoid or thwart an emotion once it has been set in action--how difficult it is to restrain anger, fear, or any other strong emotion. Men often have feelings within them that are disproportionate to the sound judgment of reason, and by the

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[1]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

very influence of such emotions men are led to unreasonable action.

Newman recognizes that speakers often influence and are responsible for such unreasonable action through appeals to the emotions of their audiences. He believes the temptation to exploit the emotions is especially strong for speakers dealing with religious subjects:

> As for talking on the appropriate subject of religious meditation, and trying to show piety, and to excite corresponding feelings in another, far from doing this, we shall account it a snare and a mischief. Yet this is what people consider the highest part of religion, and call it spiritual conversation, the test of a spiritual mind; whereas putting aside the incipient and occasional hypocrisy, and again the immodesty of it, I call all formal and intentional expression of religious emotions, all studied passionate discourses, dissipation.[1]

Thus, he proceeds to defining the speaker's ethical use of the emotions. He observes that "nothing is more common...than to say that reason goes one way, and our emotions another."[2] It is immoral for a speaker to exploit this common weakness by indiscriminate appeals to the emotions. The speaker should intend to communicate a "spiritual good," and this only through reasonable means. Newman never allows that "the end justifies the means." He is opposed to the sophistic practice of attempting to make the worse better by any means conducive

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[1]Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, op. cit., II, 377.

[2]Ibid., VI, 278.

to that end. In fact, Newman warns the preacher against using some of the more common and accepted mechanisms. He specifically objects to the use of "denunciations, hard names, sweeping imputations, and satirical nicknames."[1] He opposes both a speaker's directly appealing to the emotions, and to the falsification of his own feelings in order to provoke an emotional response in the audience. His mind is clear and certain of this latter point, as he states:

> Men begin by feeling as they should feel; they think it is a very hard thing that men should not feel as they feel, and in course of time they learn to speak without feeling. Thus they learn to love the praise of men.[2]

Finally in view of the aim of the preacher, such use of emotional appeals is not only unethical, but is unsatisfactory. The end of the sermon is not merely emotional excitation but the movement of the will:

> Mere sympathy, it is true, is able, as I have said, to transfer emotion or sentiment from mind to mind, but it is not able to fix it there. He [the preacher] must aim at imprinting on the heart what will never leave it.[3]

Newman admits that it is difficult for the speaker to decide what is the mean in using and appealing to the emotions. It is, he declares, "often impossible, for various reasons, to avoid being agitated and excited; but the question before us is whether we should encourage

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[1]Newman, Via Media, op. cit., I, xiii.

[2]Ibid., VI, 278.

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 411.

it."[1] The temperament of the audience, as well as the temperament of the speaker has to be taken into consideration. "The natural temperaments of men vary exceedingly. Some men have ardent imaginations and strong feelings, and adopt...a vehement mode of expressing themselves."[2]

Newman recognizes two facts in solving this problem: (1) the emotions are not directly under the control of the will; (2) men often act and are under the influence of mixed emotions.

The first fact--that the emotions are not under the direct control of the will--is essential to understanding Newman's position concerning the use of emotions by the speaker. Just as a man cannot elevate or suppress his blood pressure by his will, so neither can he arouse or suppress his emotions by sheer will power minus the cooperation of his other faculties. The emotions are not, as is the intellect, under the immediate domination of the will. The will moves the intellect to contemplate representations and objects which, in turn, influence the emotions. For instance, if a person attends to a consideration of the Passion of Christ, he may provoke and indirectly create the emotion of sorrow or pity. On the other hand, if the same person wishes to suppress the feeling of hatred or anger arising in controversy or in

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[1] Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, op. cit., I, 179.

[2] Ibid., p. 181.

reaction to an act of obvious injustice committed against him, he may, through the command of his will, dwell intellectually on the forgiveness and mercy of God, or on the many acts of injustice heaped upon Christ. Recognizing the psychology of the emotions and the indirect influence the will has upon them, Newman contends that the speaker or writer should therefore appeal indirectly to the emotions of his audience. He explicitly directs the speaker to refrain from any attempt to move or to influence the emotions of the auditors by mere hortatory methods: "We do not affect people by telling them to weep or to laugh."[1] The speaker, he says, should hold up to the audience a represented object which will awaken the desired state of mind and indirectly affect the emotions.

When the intellect grasps the represented object, the emotions are moved as a consequence. Men are acted upon, he says, by the reception of good or bad news, or by the apprehension of beautiful or fearful sights. The nature of the object will move them to admiration, to joy, to tears, or to pain. Just so, men in battle grow sorrowful and grieving when they apprehend the imminence of death. The emotions are moved by a representation of the object through the words and description of the speaker just as by the actual object. Through this mechanism of representation, the speaker leads the audience

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[1]Newman, Lectures on Justification, op. cit., p. 327.

to a contemplation of some past experience, which, when it was seen or experienced, was attended by pain or pleasure. Newman directs the preacher to use this mechanism to indirectly move the emotions. When the preacher judges he should move his audience to newness of life, Newman suggests that "the true Object be put before them.... 'Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, today, and forever.'"[1] Since a preacher cannot represent adequately all Christology in one sermon, Newman advises the preacher to present in this same manner related aspects and the attributes of Christ. He remarks

> ... the true Gospel preaching is to enlarge, as they (the auditors) can bear it, on the Person, natures, attributes, offices and work of Him Who once regenerated them, and is now ready to pardon; to declare reverently and adoringly His mysterious greatness as the Only-begotten Son, one with the Father, yet distinct from Him; of Him, yet not apart from Him; eternal, yet begotten; a Son, yet as if a servant; and to combine and to contrast His attributes and relations to us as God and man, as our Mediator, Saviour, Sanctifier, and Judge.[2]

This intellectual and indirect approach to the emotions, Newman reminds, was the approach used and advocated by the great preachers in the Church. He declares the authority of the Saints on this matter:

> Hence it is that the Saints insist so expressly on the necessity of his (the preacher) addressing himself to the intellect of men, and of convincing as

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[1] Ibid., p. 325.

[2] Ibid., p. 327.

> well as persuading. "Necesse est ut *doceat et moveat*," says St. Francis; and St. Antoninus still more distinctly: "Debet praedictor clare loqui, ut *instruat* intellectum auditoris, et *doceat*." Hence, moreover, in St. Ignatius' *Exercises*, the *act of the intellect precedes that of the affection*.[1]

Newman considered that "the fashion of (his) day has been instead of this, to preach conversion... to exhort men to undergo a change; to tell them to be sure they look at Christ, instead of simply holding up Christ to them; to tell them to have faith, rather than to supply its Object."[2] Such preaching, aimed at stirring up and working up the minds of the audiences, relies upon "words, vehemence, eloquence, and the like."[3]

Audience analysis.--Audience analysis is one of the most basic concepts in Newman's whole rhetorical theory. Newman did not come to this conclusion late in life. In his first literary attempt, the "Essay on Cicero," he states clearly the relation of persuasion to a specific audience:

> If, however, eloquence be the mere power of persuading, it is but a relative term, limited to time and place, connected with a particular audience, and leaving to posterity no test of its merits but the report of those whom it has been successful in influencing.[4]

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[1]Newman, *Idea*, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

[2]Newman, *Lectures on Justification*, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

[3]*Ibid*.

[4]Newman, *Essays and Sketches*, *op. cit.*, I, 51.

Following the theory of Aristotle in the second book of the Rhetoric, Newman bids the speaker adapt himself to the specific audience he is to address.[1] In the Idea of a University he summarizes:

> Aristotle, then, in his celebrated treatise on rhetoric makes the very essence of the Art lie in the precise recognition of a hearer. It is a relative art, and in that respect differs from Logic, which simply teaches the right use of reason, whereas Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, which implies a person who is to be persuaded.[2]

Regarding preaching, Newman takes the same point of view. For although the priest will be addressing persons who are alike in belief, there will be certain characteristics unique to specific audiences:

> ... all preaching is directed towards a hearer, such as is the hearer will be the preaching.... A hearer, then, is included in the very idea of preaching; and we cannot determine how in detail we ought to preach till we know whom we are to address.[3]

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric ii. 18. 1391. Aristotle states that "the function of all utterance is realized in some decision--.... Such is the function of speaking, even to a single listener, when you urge him on, or try to turn him--as you do it you tax an individual about his conduct--or seek to alter his views. The individual man is as truly a judge or decider as an entire audience; so, in the wider sense, whoever it is you have to persuade is 'judge'...you compose your speech for an audience, and the audience is the 'judge.'"

[2]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 415. See also Newman, Essays Critical and Historical, op. cit., I, 288. "What, again, is the art of rhetoric, but the reduction of reasoning...into the calculus, of tastes, opinions, passions and aims of a particular audience."

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., pp. 414-415.

Newman next deduces a significant directive principle: "For, if all preaching is directed towards a hearer, such as is the hearer will be the preaching."[1] He found this maxim, he says, in the works of holy men on the subject of preaching:

> Thus, St. Gregory Theologus, as quoted by the Pope his namesake, says: "The self-same exhortation is not suitable for all hearers; for all have not the same disposition of mind, and what profits these is hurtful to those." The holy Pope himself throws the maxim into another form, still more precise: "Debet praedicator," he says, "perspicere, ne plus praedicet quam ab audiente capi posset." And St. Charles expounds it referring to Pope St. Gregory: "Pro audientibus genere locos doctrinarum, ex quibus concionem conficiat, non modo distinctos, sed optime explicatos habebit. Atque in hoc quidem multiplici genere concionator videbit, ne quicumque, ut S. Gregorius scite monet, legerit, aut scientia comprehenderit, omnia enunciet atque effundat; sed delectum habebit, ita ut documenta alia exponat, alia tacite relinquat, prout locus, ordo, conditioque auditorum deposcat."[2]

Lest his ecclesiastical hearers should think that considering the interests and characteristics of the audience is inconsistent with the simplicity of the gospel, Newman notes that St. Charles Borromeo has anticipated this objection:

> And, by way of obviating the chance of such a rule being considered a human artifice inconsistent with the simplicity of the gospel, he has said shortly before: "Ad Dei gloriam, ad coelestis regni propagationem, et ad animarum salutem, plurimum interest, non solum

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[1] Ibid., p. 414.

[2] Ibid.

> quales sint praedicatores, sed qua via, qua ratione praedicent."[1]

It is true, Newman adds, that study of the audience is also one of the elementary principles of the Rhetoric:

> ... but it is no scandal that a saintly Bishop should in this matter borrow a maxim from secular, nay, from pagan schools. For divine grace does not overpower nor supersede the action of the human mind according to its nature; and if heathen writers have analyzed that nature well, so far let them be used to the greater glory of the Author and Source of all Truth.[2]

St. Charles, Newman concludes, has even expounded and gone beyond the ancient maxim of St. Gregory--that the preacher should take care not to preach over the heads of his audience.

Showing his insight into the practical problem involved and the organic relation of audience adaptation to the whole speech process, Newman handles the factors of audience analysis realistically. Both the general and specific characteristics have to be assessed and analyzed by the speaker. Newman notes that in general there are some attributes common to all Christian audiences:

> In all the most important respects, indeed, all hearers are the same, and what is suitable for one audience is suitable for another. All hearers are children of Adam; all, too, are children of Christian adoption and of the Catholic Church.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 415.

Considering merely the attributes and characteristics found in every Christian audience is only the beginning of audience analysis. Newman reminds that the speaker will never be called upon to speak to homines in commune. Rather the preacher addresses a definite group of people, having the same religious tenets, but with moral and psychological difference, as unique and personal to this audience as the wrinkles on an old man's face:

> As, then, the Christian Preacher aims at the Divine Glory, not in any vague and general way, but definitely by the enunciation of some article or passage of the Revealed Word, so further, he enunciates it, not for the instruction of the whole world, but directly for the sake of those very persons who are before him.[1]

Newman directs the speaker to study the character of the audience in order to fashion arguments suitable not only to intellectual background, but also attractive to this audience on the basis of age and social standing. An audience in which young men predominate requires different language, tone, and subject matter than one composed principally of old men. Rich men are not interested in the same way as poor men. Certain ages and classes of men are identified with different and peculiar characteristics. There are times when the speaker will have an audience in which one or other of these conditions is the predominating element. To gain immediate approval and good will, the speaker must adapt his language and

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[1] Ibid.

the tone of his speech to the sentiments and mental attitudes of his listeners. His approach to the audience is conditioned further by affections and motives through which they can be most readily appealed to and influenced. It is imperative that the speaker acquaint himself with the ordinary motives, feelings, and opinions of an audience--to analyze his listeners on the bases of (1) rank, (2) profession, (3) states, (4) age, and (5) character.[1]

By states, Newman probably means the two states: lay and religious. Since the religious by profession are bound to strive in a more formal way for perfection by reason of their vows and constitutions, the sermons directed to them should be different from those to a parish congregation of the faithful. The preacher, moreover, should expect a religious auditory to anticipate a different type of sermon or conference.

By character of the audience, Newman probably includes both its intellectual and moral condition, since he seldom distinguishes the intellectual from the moral nature.

These five categories or aspects--rank, profession, states, age, and character should be before the speaker's mind to help form the most suitable arguments and emotional appeals, as well as in wording of the speech, but more so,

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[1]Ibid.

when he selects a topic which is apposite to his audience. Newman reminds the speaker:

> He is, when in the pulpit, instructing, enlightening, informing, advancing, sanctifying, not all nations, nor all classes, nor all callings but those particular ranks, states, ages, characters, which are gathered around him.[1]

We here observe that Newman faithfully reflects the traditional doctrine of audience analysis found in the Rhetoric. In counselling audience study, Aristotle employs eighteen chapters of the second book of the Rhetoric. He directs the speaker to study the emotions, virtues, vices, the times of life, and the states of fortune of his audience.[2]

Considering the case of a priest who analyzes a university audience Newman makes an application of his theory. The students attending the University of Dublin are in general similar to other students elsewhere. Yet they also have a stamp and a personality of their own which mark them off from any other university audience. In contrast to other Irish Universities Dublin is a Catholic university; and, mutatis mutandis, the speaker who would have knowledge of the accidental characteristics of the Dublin university auditory would have an advantage over the speaker who knew only the characteristics of university students in general. Writing of the University of Dublin audience, he says:

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 415.

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric ii. 2, 18.

> A university has a character of its own; it has some traits of human nature more prominently developed than others, and its members are brought together under circumstances which impart to the auditory a peculiar color and expression even where it is not substantially different from another.[1]

Newman remarks that the speaker should be especially conscious of the sex, age, and educational development of the university auditors.

Respecting the relation of audience to pathos, Newman gives prudent advice to the preacher. A faulty or inadequate analysis in some instances can prove worse than no analysis at all. It is particularly important for the preacher to appraise the ethical condition of the congregation:

> I append two cautions. First, I need hardly say that a preacher should be quite sure that he understands the persons he is addressing before he ventures to aim at what he considers to be their ethical condition; for, if he mistakes, he will probably be doing harm rather than good. I have known consequences to occur very far from edifying, when strangers have fancied they knew an auditory when they did not, and have by implication imputed to them habits or motives which were not theirs.[2]

The normal consequence of a false or precipitous judgment of the ethical condition of an audience will be to stir up adverse emotions in them against the speaker's proposition. If the speaker has not had sufficient time

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 416. "It [the University audience] is composed of men, not women; of the young rather than the old; of persons either highly educated or under education."

[2]Ibid., p. 418.

or opportunity to study his audience, Newman counsels that "it would be much safer to select one of the more general subjects which are safe, than to risk what is evidently ambitious, if it is not successful."[1]

The speaker will never be able to adapt himself to his audience unless he is able to project, or as Newman says, "throw himself into the minds of other men."[2] In discussing this ability, Newman singles out St. Paul, whose ability to project himself was his especial *forte* and characteristic gift:

> A heathen poet has said, *Homo sum, humani nil mihi alienum puto*. "I am a man; nothing human is without interest to me": and the sentiment has been widely and deservedly praised. Now this, in a fulness of meaning which a heathen could not understand, is, I conceive the characteristic of this great Apostle. He is ever speaking, to use his own words, "human things," and "as a man," and "according to man," and "foolishly":--that is, human nature the common nature of the whole race of Adam, spoke in him, with an energetical presence, with a sort of bodily fulness, always under the sovereign command of divine grace, but losing none of its real freedom and power because of its subordination. And the consequence is that, having the nature of man so strong within him, he is able to enter into human nature.[3]

The identification of St. Paul with his audiences became so refined, says Newman, that he felt all his neighbors, all the whole race of Adam, to be existing in himself. Viewing the potentialities of his own nature, he saw that he was "capable of running into all the

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Newman, *Sermons on Various Occasions*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

multiplicity of emotions, of devices, of purposes, and of sins," which his audiences had experienced.[1] He could so project himself, because he viewed vicariously in himself "the natures of those, who had not accepted the Grace of God, the tendencies and the results of being deprived of grace."[2]

But how can a preacher develop this keen awareness of his audience which St. Paul achieved. Memory and imagination are the faculties the preacher should use to "throw himself" into the minds of his audience. There are other times when the preacher merely by reading his own heart can learn the dispositions of his audience. St. Paul, Newman says, attained this insight through his memory and imagination:

> Though he had never been a heathen, though he was no longer a Jew, yet he was a heathen in capability, as I may say, and a Jew in the history of the past. His vivid imagination enabled him to throw himself into the state of heathenism, with all those tendencies which lay dormant in his human nature carried out, and its infirmities developed into sin. His wakeful memory enabled him to recall those feelings and ideas of a Jew, which in the case of others a miraculous conversion might have obliterated; and thus, while he was a Saint inferior to none, he was emphatically still a man, and to his own apprehension still a sinner.[3]

Although Newman implies that the preacher should speak only to and about God, he signifies that the preacher must

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[1] Ibid., p. 96.

[2] Ibid., p. 97.

[3] Ibid., pp. 102-103.

also establish a common ground between himself and his audience. He must not only endeavor to understand the hearts and dispositions of his audience, but he must have knowledge of the world. In this connection, Newman points to St. Paul's superlative knowledge and experience in the world prior to his preaching:

> To him [St. Paul] especially was it given to preach to the world, who knew the world; he subdued the heart, who understood the heart... it was his affectionateness which was his title and instrument to empire. 'I became to the Jews a Jew,' he says, 'that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the Law, as if I were under the Law. To the weak, I became weak, that I might gain the weak. I became all things to all men, that I might save all.'[1]

Memory, imagination, reading one's own heart, and knowledge of the world, will aid the preacher in entering into the minds of his audience. But, Newman insists, this whole function must be informed by supernatural love for the people of his audience. Under the influence of love, the preacher cultivates the habit of looking beyond himself into the misery and weakness of others. Newman notes this habit in St. Paul:

> It is the habit, then, of this great Apostle to have such full consciousness that he is a man, and such love of others as his kinsmen, that in his own inward conception... he almost loses sight of his own gifts and privileges, his station and dignity, except he is called by duty to remember them, and he is to himself merely a frail man speaking to frail men, and he is tender toward the weak from a sense of his own weakness.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 104.

[2] Ibid., p. 109.

St. Paul acted upon this principle of love. He had an impatience, Newman observes, "lest he should not appear to his converts partaker of the same earth and ashes as themselves."[1] He spoke "to them as an equal rather than as an Apostle, and calls them to witness that he has ever so treated them."[2]

Newman concludes that, although St. Paul was an inspired teacher and a scholar in theological and secular knowledge, he did not depend on the arguments of logic and science, but "addresses himself chiefly to the hearts of his hearers."[3] Much of the success of his preaching therefore must be attributed to his ability to analyze his audiences and adapt himself to their dispositions and characteristics.

States of mind.--Aristotle, in the second book of the Rhetoric, devotes considerable space to the analysis of habits of mind, times of life, and accidents of fortune.[4] In exposing his theory Newman agrees that age is a significant consideration for the speaker in audience analysis, but passes over in silence the consideration of fortune. Newman treats states of mind extensively, but in contrast to the pagan rhetoricians he considers states of mind not

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[1] Ibid., p. 113.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 119.

[4] Aristotle Rhetoric ii. 12. 1389[a]; ii. 16. 1391[a].

only from a natural point of view, but also from the supernatural and religious point of view. He discusses three states of mind which are pertinent to the speaker: sincerity, hypocrisy, and prejudice. Since these first two states may be regarded as opposites, they are treated as a single unit.

Sincerity and hypocrisy.--Men may be divided into two great classes: those who profess religious obedience, and those who do not. Of those who profess to be religious there is another subdivision of those who profess as well as perform their religious observances and those who profess but do not perform. From another aspect, Newman signifies that there are three classes of men in the world: open sinners, consistent Christians, and a class between the two extremes of professing Christians, or as they are sometimes called, nominal Christians. Open sinners and consistent Christians agree in nothing. "They neither profess the same things nor practise the same."[1]

The real difference between the true and the merely professing Christian is the difference between hypocrisy and sincerity. They represent different states of mind. The sincere mind has an honest, unaffected desire of doing right; on the other hand, the mind of the hypocrite is a "double mind, pursuing other ends besides

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[1]Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, op. cit., IV, 252.

truth, and in consequence an inconsistency in conduct, and a half consciousness (to say the least) of inconsistency, and a feeling of the necessity of defending oneself to oneself, and to God and to the world."[1]

The hypocrite tries to seek two goals, religion and the world. He professes to be in agreement with his fellowmen; he almost displays his agreement; he protests that he pursues the same objects as his fellows; but still he never seems to be known; no one seems actually to make progress with him; he is really little known by his fellows; seldom does he cause his fellows to have confidence in him; he is never known better than he was upon the first meeting. When confronted with some difficulty or problem, Newman observes that the hypocrite follows a typical pattern:

> Perhaps their [hypocrites'] difficulty may be a real one; but in this they differ from the sincere; the latter seek God in their difficulty, feeling that He only who imposes it can remove it; but insincere men do not like to go to God; and to them the difficulty is only so much gain, for it gives them an apparent reason, a sort of excuse, for not going by God's rule, but for deciding for their own way.[2]

The speaker may be easily deceived by the outward profession of the hypocrite but Newman offers no practical suggestions by which the preacher can appeal to the mind of the hypocrite.

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[1] Ibid., p. 256.

[2] Ibid., p. 265.

Prejudice.--Newman presents a logical study of prejudice. He explains (1) what it is, (2) how it is produced, and (3) its operation.[1] Prejudice, he says, properly means a pre-judgment, or judgment by anticipation. Thus, a man is accused of theft, and his judge already believes him to be an habitual thief; the judge is led to think the man guilty before considering the evidence. In this manner Newman thinks, a previous good or bad name has much to do with influencing the courts of justice. Slight evidence will be enough to convict a reputed thief. Newman believes that prejudice does not evolve from a single act of the mind. "Prejudice ... is more than an act of judgment; it is not a mere act; it is a habit or state of mind."[2]

How is prejudice produced in the mind? Newman states that it is produced through repetition. The repeated statement is not merely held in the mind as opinion or belief, but it also acts upon the mind. After prejudice has stained the mind, the person is no longer disposed as before, to keep it or throw it away. In Newman's words prejudice becomes "one of our habitual and inva riable modes of judging and believing, something like ideas we have of good and evil."[3] The first

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[1]Newman, Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics, op. cit., p. 210.

[2]Ibid., p. 212.

[3]Ibid.

impressions become more deeply engrained through time and repetition. A fact or argument is in itself no stronger because it is repeated, but the effect upon a mind which is passive under it, is stronger and stronger every time it is repeated to that mind. Suggestion also helps generate deep prejudice. Repetition by itself does not increase the logical cogency:

> ... a lie is a lie just as much the tenth time it is told as the first, or rather more; it is ten lies instead of one; but it gains in rhetorical influence. Let it be repeated again and again; it matters not; the utterer has only to go on steadily proclaiming it, and first one, then another will begin to believe it, and at length it will assume the shape of a very respectable fact or opinion, which is held by a considerable number of well informed persons.[1]

The peculiarity of these mental impressions is that they do not depend afterwards upon the facts or reasoning by which they were initially produced, any more than a blow, when once given, has any continued connection with the stone or the stick that inflicted it. To burn the stick will not salve the sore; and to demolish the argument does not obliterate the prejudice. The reason for the deep impressions which stain the mind, is that it

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[1] Ibid., p. 213. Newman notes that true ideas are congenial to our nature, and false ideas are uncongenial to our nature. "These latter are characterized first, in not being common to all; next in not being found in the mind from the first (if it may be so stated), in not coming there, no one knows how, that is, from heaven itself, but formed in the subject by accidental occurrence of things which we have seen or heard, and another has not."

is not the mind only which is affected, where there is prejudice, but also the will and the emotions. It was a saying of the greatest of the Romans that "Caesar's wife should not be suspected." The slanderer has, as it were, stained the mind of his hearers, and only time can wipe it out. Prejudice, properly understood, then, is "not an opinion which is at our disposal, and dependent for its presence or its dismissal upon our will, but an impression, which reason indeed can act upon, and the will subdue, but only by degrees and with great effort and trouble."[1] Prejudice penetrates and sinks into the hearer's mind by repetition of untrue representation; it must be effaced by an opposite process, by a succession of thoughts and deeds antagonistic to it.

In receiving an impression of prejudice, the will acts; there is no compulsion of necessity; those who have prejudices are unwilling to give them up. There is no prejudice without an action of the will, and since the will is involved prejudice is culpable. In contrast, jealousy, suspicion, dislike, thinking ill, are feelings so painful to the rightly disposed person, that there is a constant reclamation going on within them, an uneasiness that they should be obliged to entertain such ideas, and an effort to get rid of them. But one who has allowed his mind to become stained by prejudice, closes his ears to

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[1] Ibid., p. 214.

explanation, and shows a desire that the worse may be true.[1]

Newman indicates that prejudice is often used as a rhetorical device. It belongs under pathetic proof, because it addresses itself to the will and the passions more than to the intellect. It serves best those who would attempt to influence and to arrest the attention of the multitude:

> The multitude, if it is to be arrested and moved, requires altogether a different polemic from that which is at the command of the man of letters, of thought, of feeling and of honor. His proofs...though he considers them sufficient himself, and considers that they ought to be sufficient for the multitude, have a sobriety, a delicacy, and exactness, a nice adjustment of parts, a width and breadth, a philosophical cumulativeness and indirectness and circuitousness, which will be lost on the multitude. The problem is, how to make an impression on those who have never learned to exercise their mind, to compare thought with thought, to analyse an argument, or to balance probabilities.[2]

Tame facts, elaborate inductions, subtle presumptions, will not avail with, will not persuade the multitude. Something which will cut a dash, something gaudy and

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[1] Ibid., p. 219. Newman states that the prejudiced man puts aside any proffered proof. He pays not the slightest attention to it. "This, if he can; if he cannot, if it is urged upon him by some friend or brought up against him by some opponent, he draws himself up, looks sternly at the objector, and goes on saying the very same thing as before, with a louder voice and more confident manner. He becomes more intensely and enthusiastically positive, by way of making up for the interruption of braving the refutation."

[2] Ibid., pp. 205-206.

startling, something inflammatory is the rhetoric required.[1] Staining the mind of the multitude with prejudice is the most obvious means.

How will a speaker cope with an audience that has been stained deeply by prejudice? Newman states that when a speaker is confronted by such an audience, "there, indeed, is no use to argue; prejudice thinks its first principles self-evident."[2] Little immediate impression can be made on such an audience. If a prejudiced audience condescends to listen to the logic of the speaker for a moment, it is only in order to pick holes in the argumentation not to estimate the weight of evidence.[3] The problem of overcoming such stern obstinacy of will is difficult, Newman admits. But "it is a great thing to know your aim, to be saved from wasting your energies in wrong quarters, to be able to concentrate them on a point. You have but to aim at making men look steadily at you."[4]

The only possible help against prejudice is the ethos of the speaker. (Newman is obviously thinking of priests who will live in a community and will be known outside their preaching engagements.) His reputation prior to his speech is contributory to the speaker's ethos. To

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[1] Ibid., p. 208.

[2] Ibid., p. 288.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 344.

move and overcome the obdurate will of a prejudiced audience, Newman cautions:

> I am not advocating... anything rude in your bearing, or turbulent, or offensive; but first I would impress upon you the end you have to aim at. Your one and almost sole object, I say, must be, to make yourselves known.[1]

Relation of the audience to the speaker.--Reflecting again the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, Newman says that if the audience is to gain knowledge from the speech or the written page it too must make an effort to "throw itself" into the mind of the speaker. Ideally, the audience should be not a passive entity but a group of minds who have come prepared to learn. Their minds must be active throughout the whole lecture or speech.[2] Newman considers the speaker practically handcuffed by an audience that is unwilling to hear and enter into the mind of the speaker. Recalling to his readers the high ideal of his philosophy of rhetoric he distinguishes types of audiences on the bases of their relation to the speaker: some come for diversion and entertainment; some come to gain knowledge and discover new relationships between the things they know and the subject which the speaker will represent.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 114.

[3] Ibid., p. 488. Newman gives the example of a person who might be tempted to go into some society which will do him harm; and supposing, instead, he falls asleep

Usually new knowledge and insight are acquired by the audience from a speech. Yet people may hear a thousand lectures or sermons, and be at the end of the experience very much the same as they were when they attended the first sermon. If the message of the speaker is to be effective, the audience must go half way to meet it. Newman remarks:

> Something more than merely admitting it in a negative way into the mind is necessary, if it is to remain there. It must not be passively received, but actually and actively entered into, embraced, mastered. The mind must go half-way to meet what comes to it from without.[1]

There are "narrow minds who have no power of throwing themselves into the minds of others,"[2] Newman points out. This state of mind results not from

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in a chair, and so lets the time pass. In this case certainly he escapes the danger, but it is by accident, and his going to sleep has not had any real positive effect on him, or made him more able to resist temptation on some future occasion. When he awakens, he is no different from what he was before he came into the company of the new society; the opportune sleep has but removed the temptation. The sleep has not made him better intellectually; for he was not shielded from the temptation by his own action, but he was passive under an accident. In like manner if a person listens to a speech or lecture 'indolently or passively,' he cannot be elsewhere while he is physically present hearing the speech, but the speech produces no positive effect or influence on his mind, nor does it tend to create any power within him capable of resisting temptation, because from the outset he has shut down his mind to the meaning of the speaker's words. See also Wilfrid Ward, Life, op. cit., II, 249. In a letter to Wilberforce Newman says: "..... None are so deaf as those who won't hear."

[1] Ibid., p. 489.

[2] Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 21.

ignorance, but because of the emotional dispositions.[1]

Writing about such minds, Newman says:

> They have stiffened in one position, as limbs of the body subjected to confinement, or as our organs of speech, which after a while learn new tones and inflections. They have already parcelled out to their own satisfaction the whole world of knowledge; they have drawn their lines, and formed, and given to each opinion, argument, principle, and party, its own locality; they profess to know where to find everything; and they cannot learn any other disposition. They are vexed at new principles of arrangement, and grow giddy mid cross divisions; and, even if they make the effort, cannot master them. They think that any one truth excludes another which is distinct from it, and that every opinion is contrary to their own opinions which is not included in them. They cannot separate words from their own ideas, and ideas from their own associations; and if they attain any new views of a subject, it is but for a moment. They catch it one moment, and let it go the next; and then impute to subtlety in it, or obscurity in its expression, what really arises from their own want of elasticity or vigour.[2]

Such minds reporting the thought of a speaker often do not accurately represent what has been said. "Their

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[1]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 307. Newman says that students who are lazy and indolent might be inclined to say that the lecturer in psychology is obscure. But Newman wisely comments that no power of the lecturer can make such a subject understood, if the students are not disposed: "No power of words in a lecturer would be sufficient to make psychology easy to his hearers; if they are to profit... they must throw their minds into the matters in discussion, must accompany his treatment of them with an active, personal concurrence, and interpret for themselves, as he proceeds the dim suggestions and adumbrations of objects which he has a right to presuppose, while he uses them, as images existing in their apprehension as well as his own."

[2]Ibid., pp. 307-308.

nearest approximation to it is a mistake."[1]

Respecting the evidence for belief or persuasion that the speaker offers, it is ridiculous to assume that the evidence appears the same to each member of the audience. Newman remarks "that evidence is something, but not everything."[2] Each person in the audience "processes" the evidence, and all the speaker says or does, according to the disposition of his heart.[3]

This does not mean that great evidence might not influence a person to accept the argument or proposal. But since the average members of an audience live amid the confusion and hurry of the world, few of them are trained or take the time to judge dispassionately. They, like "most men must and do decide by principles of thought and conduct which are habitual to them." Newman

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[1] Ibid., p. 308.

[2] Ibid., p. 277.

[3] Ibid. Newman asks: "But then follows the question, what is to come of the evidence, being what it is, and this he decides according to (what is called) the state of his heart." See also ibid., p. 226. In this place Newman asks: "Now, what does this really mean, but that it shows what he thinks likely to be?--and what he thinks likely, depends surely on nothing else than the general state of his mind, that state of his convictions, feelings, tastes and wishes. A fact asserted, and is therefore proposed to the acceptance or rejection of those who hear it. Each hearer will have his own view concerning it, prior to the evidence; this view will result from the character of his mind; nor commonly will it be reversed by any ordinary variation in the evidence. If he is indisposed to believe, he will explain away very strong evidence; if he is disposed, he will accept very weak evidence."

points to this almost universal phenomenon. The condition of the heart, the feelings, tastes, and wishes influence people in their thinking, acting and in their reactions to the proposals of the speaker:

> Act we must, yet seldom indeed is it that we have means of examining into the evidence of statements.... Hence statements are often hazarded by persons interested for the very purpose of bringing out the public mind in some certain point ascertaining what it thinks, and feeling how their way lies, and what courses are feasible and safe. And, in like manner, startling or unexpected reports are believed or disbelieved, and acted on in this way or that, according as the hearer is or is not easy of belief, or desirous of the event, or furnished with precedents, or previously informed.... We decide one or another, according to the position of the alleged fact, relative to our existing state of... knowledge and feeling.[1]

If persons in the audience do not agree with the speaker, it is to be assumed that they consider their own reasoning and belief substantial, and the proposal of the speaker untenable or poorly established. Nothing is more common among men than to consider that no one is right but themselves. People find fault with the reasoning of others, including a speaker who is advocating a new course of action, since no one proposes to form his judgments without reasons of some kind. If an individual, for instance, would attempt to study why the person sitting next to him in an audience is on one side of a political question, not on the other; why for or against certain

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[1] Ibid., p. 228.

measures of social, economical, or civil reform; why one belongs to this party or faction, not to that; why he has certain tastes and preferences in literature and music; it would be discovered that the force of prejudgment, feelings, and wishes have an important influence on the person's acceptance or rejection of a proposal of the speaker.

Conclusions

(1) The theory of rhetorical invention advanced by Cardinal Newman includes three primary divisions: topics, preparation, and modes of proof. While he names and discusses special and general topics, his doctrine is of little significance. Newman discusses topics less extensively and gives them considerably less emphasis than is the case with the classical writers.

(2) Newman discusses the subject of preparation extensively. He is distinctive in his treatment of this phase of invention. Whereas Cicero and Quintilian discuss the need for long general preparation designed to produce the philosopher-speaker, Newman indicates that the speaker should have a liberal arts education. He states that special preparation is necessary for each speech situation, and gives definite directions for the speaker. The paramount characteristic of the

doctrine of Newman on preparation is not its harmony with the classical rhetoric, for logically there should be little disagreement. The important features are his practical point of view and his unique demands for the preacher: knowledge of theology and prayer and meditation.

(3) We observe that the philosophy of preparation of Newman suggests five conclusions: (a) the speaker should have a broad and liberal education; (b) he should make an accurate analysis of his audience; (c) he should select a topic which is based upon the audience analysis; (d) he should phrase his topic in terms of a specific purpose; (e) he should stimulate further thought on the topic through writing.

(4) In regard to rhetorical proof, Newman is in essential harmony with the three pagan representatives of the classical tradition. He states that there are three modes of proof proper to the art of rhetoric: logical, ethical, and pathetical. In emphasizing that rhetoric deals with probabilities rather than demonstrations, Newman follows closely the position of Aristotle.

(5) Newman points out that when the speaker personally reasons to a conclusion, he performs a different

function than when he constructs proofs or presents arguments to an audience.

(6) Since one of the principal directives he gives for the preparation of the sermon is the invention of a categorical proposition, Newman discusses extensively the constituent elements of the proposition, the psychological states of assent, doubt and assertion, and the manner of apprehending and holding propositions. He infers that the speaker who gives real assent to the proposition is better psychologically prepared to approach and influence an audience than another speaker who merely asserts a proposition.

(7) Newman advises the speaker not to rely upon a single logical argument. He believes that conviction and persuasion are more effectively realized through "converging probabilities" than through a single logical argument.

(8) Newman recognizes and treats ex professo two kinds of reasoning: formal and informal inference. Under formal inference he includes such logical modes as the syllogism and the enthymeme. He considers the syllogism to be the traditional expression of deduction from two premises. He limits his discussion solely to the categorical syllogism. In regard to the enthymeme, he fails to

note the Aristotelian import of the rhetorical enthymeme. Like Whately, he considers the enthymeme as a syllogism with one of the premises suppressed.

(9) In naming ethos as one of the three modes of persuasion proper to the art of rhetoric, we conclude that Newman is in substantial agreement with the representatives of the classical tradition. Declaring the primacy of ethical proof over the persuasive force of logical and pathetical proof, he echoes the views of Aristotle. Newman likewise holds that ethos is the most important persuasive factor in deliberative speaking. Since rhetoric is concerned with the probable and the contingent, Newman observes that most people trust the speaker who has the reputation for intellectual acumen and moral probity. He infers that ethos pertains to the character of the speaker, whereas pathos pertains to the audience.

(10) Like Cicero, Quintilian, and St. Augustine, Newman admits that a man of bad character can be persuasive. He does not advocate, however, that a man of bad character preach what he does not practice. When the audience learns that the preacher does not practice what he preaches, the influence and the persuasiveness of the preacher will depreciate.

(11) Comparing the observations of Newman on the qualities of the speaker with those given by the classical rhetorical theorists, we conclude that there are significant parallels as well as points of difference. In emphasizing the need for character, intelligence, and sympathy, Newman holds with the classical rhetoricians. In making the speaker the keystone of the speech situation, he is similar to Quintilian and St. Augustine. In demanding the actual presence of good character, intelligence, and sympathy in the speaker, Newman differs distinctly from Aristotle and Cicero who permit the speaker to give the impression to the audience that he is a man of intellectual competence and moral uprightness. In naming the theological virtues of faith and love as the sources of the qualities of a speaker, Newman adds to the rhetorical philosophy of the pagan writers.

(12) Newman believes that the ethos of the speaker depends not only on his conduct at the time of the speech, but also on his previous reputation and on his daily conversation. In this regard he differs from Aristotle.

(13) The ethos of the speaker is manifested through the practical judgments of the speaker. The speaker has a wide range in which to show his audience his

practical judgment. It is through his practical judgments that the speaker manifests particularly to his audience his intellectual acumen and Christian sympathy.

(14) By including materials on pathos, we conclude that Newman is in general agreement with the representatives of the traditional rhetoric. He admits that pathos contributes to persuasion, but maintains that this mode of proof belongs especially to forensic oratory. In this latter opinion we find that he is in significant agreement with Aristotle and Quintilian. He requires that the preacher refrain from the use of some of the methods commonly employed by speakers in the law courts.

(15) The great merit of Newman's treatment of pathetic proof is his penetrating study of the audience. Like Aristotle, he considers that the speech is to be judged by the effect it has upon the audience. Since the speech has its end in persuasion, Newman states that the speaker will not know how to speak until he has first assessed the character of the audience. He infers that the speaker must know human nature, the age, the social and educational background, and the emotional and mental habits of the audience.

(16) Newman adheres to the persuasion-conviction duality and to the Aristotelian-Thomistic interpretation of how the emotions influence the will. He says that the ruder and more ordinary feelings should be considered the proper instrument for rhetorical persuasion. He names anger, indignation, emulation, martial spirit, and the love of independence as proper to rhetoric.

(17) Newman reports that Cicero was wont to rely upon emotional appeals at the beginning and at the end of his speeches. Newman himself, although recognizing this practice of Cicero, follows the final judgment of Quintilian. He indicates that pathos should not be deliberately inserted in specific places in the speech, but should arise out of the sense and the meaning of the speaker's words and action.

(18) Newman's formal treatment of the emotions falls far short in comparison to the extensive and thorough discussion of Aristotle. It is evident that he has drawn his theory on the pathos from Aristotle, St. Gregory, and St. Charles.

CHAPTER IV

ARRANGEMENT

Concerning arrangement, the second element in the rhetorical theory of Cardinal Newman, we ask two questions: Should attention be given to this element of rhetoric? What are the forms of arrangement which should be included in this chapter? Newman presents answers to both of these questions. He therefore affords us with justification for including this element of rhetoric in this study.

Since order and balance are inherent to all rhetorical forms, Newman perceives that in a speech the absence of arrangement can render ineffectual the most compelling arguments. In noting that arrangement is necessary to rhetoric, he follows the opinion of Quintilian.[1]

In forwarding this suggestion, Newman cites two chief defects which pertain to the topic of arrangement: (1) He contends that dearrangement in writing or speaking

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria vii. 1. Preface. Quintilian says that invention is useless without arrangement. He remarks that just as in erecting a building it is not sufficient merely to collect stone and timber, so in constructing a speech, it is not sufficient for the speaker merely to find arguments. He adds: "... however abundant the matter may be, it will merely form a confused heap unless arrangement be employed to reduce it to order and give it connection and firmness of structure."

is often caused when the speaker or writer loses control over the sequence of ideas:

> The mind, once set in motion, is henceforth deprived of the power of initiation, and becomes the victim of a train of associations, one thought suggesting another, in the way of cause and effect, as if by a mechanical process, or some physical necessity.[1]

(2) On the other hand, he believes that some writers err by excess. These latter are inordinately concerned with divisions and incidental details. They divide and arrange the speech so meticulously that they "destroy its life and defraud us of the whole by their anxiety about the parts."[2]

At the outset there is a generic agreement between Newman and the representatives of the classical tradition. Newman recognizes the traditional divisions of the speech discussed by the ancient writers. He states that "the speech itself consists of six parts: introduction, statement of the case, division of the subject, proof, refutation and conclusion."[3]

Quintilian mentions "that arrangement is generally dependent on expediency."[4] Yet like Cicero, he also basically adheres to the traditional six-part arrangement for the speech.[5]

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 141.

[2]Ibid., p. 142.

[3]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 33.

[4]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria vii. 1. 2.

[5]Ibid., iii. 9.

Aristotle declares that fundamentally a speech has only two parts. He says that necessarily the speaker has to state his case and to prove it. Thus it would be absurd for a speaker to state a case and omit the proof, or prove a cause without first stating it. He contends that the current type of arrangement is ridiculous:

> ... surely 'Narration' of the facts is a part of forensic speech alone. In an epideictic speech, or in a political, how can there be a 'Narration' like the one so called? How a 'Refutation' of our opponent, 'Epilogue to the Argument'? In political speaking, again, there can be a 'Proem,' a 'Comparison' of arguments, and a 'Recapitulation,' only when there are two conflicting policies; in that case, you often have accusation and defence, too, but not insofar as the speech is deliberative. Nor is the 'Epilogue' always a part of the forensic speech; it is needless, for example, when the speech is short, or if the facts are easy to keep in mind; an epilogue serves to reduce the apparent length of your speech.[1]

Later in the Rhetoric Aristotle revises his initial statement that the speech is composed of two parts. While statement and proof are the two indispensable parts of a speech, he admits that two other parts can be considered essential, the proem and epilogue. The proem, he says, corresponds to the prologue in poetry.[2]

Newman recognizes four types of arrangement: traditional arrangement, the dialogue, Patristic arrangement, and arrangement of the sermon. Although his discussion of these four types of arrangement is scattered throughout

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric iii. 14. 1414[b].

[2]Ibid., iii. 14. 1415[a].

his works, we will present our study of them in the chronological order of their appearance in the history of rhetorical theory.

Traditional Arrangement

The traditional method of arrangement consists in dividing the proposed speech into either five or six parts. Newman, in all places in which he discusses this type of arrangement , represents the six-part division of Cicero. He mentions the following divisions of the speech which the Roman orators of the first century used: introduction, statement of the case, division of the subject, proof, refutation, and conclusion.[1] Passing immediately to the three principal parts of the speech he says that the introduction contains the ethical proof, the body of the speech the argument, and the conclusion an appeal to the passions of the judges.[2]

To illustrate this traditional type of arrangement, Newman draws examples from the orations of Cicero. He indicates that the great Roman orator "laid out [/his orations/] according to the plan proposed in rhetorical works; the introduction, containing the ethical proof; the body of the speech, the argument, and the peroration addressing itself to the passions of the judges."[3]

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 33.

[2]Ibid., p. 45.

[3]Ibid. See also Quintilian Institutio Oratoria

In opening a case with a view to conciliating and winning the favor of the judges, Newman shows that Cicero commonly makes a profession of timidity and diffidence, and cites incidents where he exhibits timidity and diffidence: because the eloquence of Hortenius is so powerful (Pro Quinct. I, and In Verr. Act. 1, 13); or so much prejudice has been stirred up against his client (Pro Deiotor. 2). He next proceeds to entreat the patience of the judges; he drops out generous or popular sentiment, or contrives to excite prejudice against his opponent. Having gained the good will of the judges, he states the circumstances of the case, and the intended plan of the oration. Cicero is particularly clear and exact in announcing his proposed plan.[1]

The real genius of Cicero's mastery of arrangement is manifested in the presentation of logical proof. In this part he is the supreme model for the student. Newman says that Cicero leaves nothing to be desired:

> He accounts for everything so naturally, makes trivial circumstances tell so happily, so adroitly converts apparent objections into confirmations of his arguments, connects independent facts with such ease and plausibility, that it becomes impossible to entertain a question on the truth of his statement.[2]

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iv. 2. ff. In taking examples from Cicero's oration, Newman follows the precedent of Quintilian. The Roman rhetorician demonstrates most of his ex professo doctrine on arrangement with references to the Orations of Cicero.

[1] Ibid., p. 45.

[2] Ibid., p. 46.

Newman notes that the skillful arrangement of arguments is especially shown "in his defense of Cluentius, where prejudices, suspicions, and difficulties are encountered with the most triumphant ingenuity; in the antecedent probabilities of his Pro Milone; in his apology for Muraena's public and Caelius's private life and his disparagement of Verre's military services in Sicily."[1]

Following the presentation of his arguments, either immediately, or towards the conclusion of the speech, Cicero then proceeds to heighten the effect of his argument by amplification:

> Here he goes (as it were) round and round his object; surveys it in every light; examines it in all its parts; retires and then advances; turns, and re-turns it; compares and contrasts it; illustrates, confirms, enforces his view of the question, till at last the hearer feels ashamed of doubting a position which seems built on a foundation so strictly argumentative.[2]

Cicero uses lavish and effective amplification in pleading the justification of Rabirius in taking up arms against Saturnius; (Pro Rabir. 8) in his account of the imprisonment of the Roman citizen by Verres, and of the crucifixion of Gavius; (In Verr. v. 56) in his comparison of Anthony with Tarquin; (Philipp. iii. 4); in the contrast he draws of Verres with Favius, Scipio, and Marius. (Post Redit. in Senat. i. 4-8; pro Dom. 9, 93; in Pis. 10, 11; Philipp. ii. 18).

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., pp. 46-47.

The case established positively by argument and amplification, Cicero next opens upon his opponents a discharge of raillery "so delicate and so good natured, that it is impossible for the latter to maintain his ground against it. Or where the subject is too grave to admit this, he colours his exaggeration with all the bitterness or irony or vehemence of passion."[1] Cicero illustrates this raillery and irony in the delineations of Gabinus, Piso, Clodius, and Antony.

Cicero often reserves for the close of his orations appeals to the gentler emotions. Newman points to Cicero using such appeals in the defense of Cluentius, Muraena, Caelius, Milo, Sylla, Flaccus, and Rabirium Postumus. He, however, declares there are some speeches in which Cicero planned to use more heroic and elevated sentiments in the peroration. He states that such was the case in the following:

> ... in his invocation of the Alban groves and altars in the peroration of the Pro Milone, the panegryic on patriotism, and the love of glory in his defence of Sextus, and that on liberty at the close of the third and tenth Phillipics.[2]

Newman infers that Cicero was a master in the use of this traditional type of arrangement. He implies that it was most effective in forensic rhetoric. Although his analysis is both thorough and extensive in no place in his

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[1] Ibid., p. 47.

[2] Ibid.

works does he recommend it to his contemporaries.

Dialogue

The second form of arrangment discussed by Newman is the dialogue. He notes that this form of arrangement was utilized effectively and dramatically by Xenophon and Plato. He considers it peculiarly conducive to philosophical exposition and discussion. Although his discussion of the dialogue seems to imply that he understood the distinction between the Platonic method and the Ciceronian method, as modeled on that form of dialogue found in the exoteric works of Aristotle, he does not concern himself explicitly with the differences. He remarks simply that the Platonic is fashioned after the Socratic method. It is characterized by "interrogative and inductive conversation."[1] Cicero, on the other hand, describes the Aristotelian form of dialogue as one in which "the conversation is put forward as to leave him [/Aristotle/] the principal part." (Ad Atticum xiii. 19)[2] Newman appears best informed on the Aristotelian form of dialogue. He observes that it not only excites interest when it is used by skillful hands, but provides the writer or speaker with a medium which gives life, variety, ease, perspicuity, and vigor to his discussion.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 30.

[2] Ibid., p. 31.

[3] John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1908), I, 276.

As a special mode of arrangement the dialogue is especially useful when a subject is beyond or under controversy.[1] In the first situation the dialogue may assume the shape of a continued treatise, or a free disputation; it can provide relief to what is clear, and impart clearness to an obscure subject. Newman notes Cicero's use of the dialogue for projecting his ideas:

> His practical and systematic treatises on rhetoric and moral duty, when not written in his own person, are merely divided between several speakers who are the mere organs of his own sentiments; while in questions of a more speculative cast, on the nature of the gods, on the greatest good, he uses his academic liberty, and brings forward the theories of contending schools under the character of their respective advocates.[2]

Newman states that the advantages of the use of the dialogue are certain. If the writer or speaker is obliged to discuss some controvertible subject, he does not have to represent his own opinion as proceeding from himself; he can create a character in the dialogue who will be his mouthpiece; he can create another character to oppose contrary arguments. The dialogue allows the writer the "use of those oratorical powers in which, after all, is his great strength."[3] If the writer must present subjects which are uninteresting because they are so familiar, the dialogue will help him to pause or digress before the minds

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 31.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

of his readers. "The reader is carried on by easy journeys and short stages, and novelty in the speaker supplies the want of novelty in the matter."[1]

Newman believes that Cicero is just as effective and displays just as much skill in presenting a case through the dialogue as when he chooses to use the direct speaker-audience method. He singles out Cicero, again, as a model for those who would consider the dialogue as a subtle and manageable method for arranging certain subject matters. He considers it idle to enlarge upon the success, beauty, richness, and taste exemplified in the Ciceronian Dialogues. They have been the admiration of every age and country. He states:

> In the dignity of his speakers, their high tone of mutual courtesy, the harmony of his groups, and the delicate relief of his contrasts, he is inimitable. The majesty and splendour of his introductions, which generally address themselves to the passions or the imagination, the eloquence with which both sides of a question are successively displayed, the clearness and terseness of his statements on abstract points, the grace of his illustrations, his exquisite allusions to the scene or time of the supposed conversation, his digressions in praise of philosophy or great men, his quotation from Grecian and Roman poetry; lastly, the melody and fulness of his style, unite to throw charm round his writings peculiar to themselves.[2]

Patristic Arrangement

The third method of rhetorical disposition Newman

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., pp. 31-32.

discusses is a simple form of arrangement used by the Fathers. Without any formal introduction or any effort to establish precise divisional heads the patristic form follows a familiar pattern. The writer or speaker proceeds to explicate important words of a passage of Sacred Scripture.

From the Apostolic Age of the Christian Church down until the twelfth century this primitive device of arrangement formed the structure for most of the preaching. In fact it was often the method the Fathers used, in a modified manner, in writing their homilies. Simplicity is its outstanding characteristic. Some authors have indicated that this inorganic form of arrangement is the genetic parent of the Middle Age sermon.[1]

The example of this form of arrangement Newman cites and analyzes is taken from the famous tract of Vincent of Lerins on Heresy.[2] This work of Vincent was written in 434, immediately after the third Ecumenical Council held against Nestorius. Since this form of arrangement in itself is so obvious and simple, Newman more or less allows the tract to speak for itself. He states that the writer merely

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[1]See E. C. Dargan, A History of Preaching (New York: A. C. Armstrong and Co., 1905). See also J. S. Maury, Essai sur l'Eloquence de la Chaire (Paris: Firmin Didot freres, 1877).

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 123. Newman reports that Vincent was originally a layman, and by profession a soldier. In after life he became a monk and took orders. Lerins, the site of the monastery he entered, is one of the small islands off the southwest coast of France.

headed the arrangement with a quotation from St. Paul's First Letter to Timothy: "he takes a text, and handles it as a modern preacher might do. His text is this:--"

> O Timothy, keep the depositum, avoiding the profane novelties of words, and oppositions of falsely-called knowledge, which certain professing have erred about the faith.[1]

Newman indicates that Vincent dwells successively upon an interpolation of the following key words of the text: Timothy, on the deposit, on avoiding, on profane, and on novelties.

First, Timothy and the "deposit:"--

> Who at this day is Timothy, but either generally the whole Church, or especially the whole body of prelates, who ought either themselves to have a sound knowledge of diwine religion, or who ought to infuse it into others? What is meant by keep the deposit? Keep it (quoth he) for fear of thieves, for danger of enemies, lest when men be asleep, they oversow cockle among that good seed of wheat, which the Son of man hath sowed in His field. "Keep (quoth he) the deposit." What is meant by this deposit? that is, that which is committed to thee, not that which is invented of thee; that which thou hast received, not that which is thou hast devised...

Next, "avoiding:"--

> "O Timothy (quoth he), keep the deposit, avoid profane novelties of words." Avoid (quoth he) as a viper, as a scorpion, as a basilisk, lest they infect thee not only by touching, but also with their eyes and breath. What is meant by avoid? that is, not so much as to eat with any such. What importeth this avoid? "If any man (quoth he) come unto you, and bring not this doctrine," what doctrine but the Catholic and universal, and that which, with incorrupt tradition of the

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[1] Ibid., p. 129.

> truth, had continued one and the self same, through all successions of times, and that which shall continue for ever and ever?

Then, "profane:"--

> "Profane novelties of words" (quoth he); what is profane? Those which have no holiness in them, nought of religion, wholly external to the sanctuary of the Church, which is the temple of God. "Profane novelties of words," (quoth he), of words, that is, novelties of doctrines, novelties of things, novelties of opinions, contrary to old usage, contrary to antiquity, which if we receive, of necessity the faith of our blessed ancestors, either all, or a great part of it, must be overthrown;...

Lastly, "novelties:"--

> "Avoid (quoth he) profane novelties of words," to receive and follow which was never the custom of Catholics, but always of heretics. And, to say truth, what heresy hath ever burst forth, but under the name of some certain man, in some certain place, and at some certain time? Who ever set up any heresy, but first divided himself from the consent of the universality and antiquity of the Catholic Church? Which to be true, examples do plainly prove....[1]

In contrast to the determined and exact divisions of the traditional arrangement, the basis of division in the Patristic form are the words of the text which the speaker or writer has selected. The latter form is fluid and less determined than the former.

Arrangement of the Sermon

The specific directions of Newman for the arrangement of the sermon remind us of the initial remarks of

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[1] Ibid., pp. 129-131.

Aristotle pertaining to the indispensable parts of the speech. Aristotle states:

> A speech has two parts. Necessarily, you state your case, and you prove it. Thus we cannot state a case and omit to prove it, or prove a case without first stating it; one who proves must have something to prove, and one who advances a statement does so for the sake of proving it.[1]

Almost in equivalent terms Newman implies practically the same essential parts of arrangement for the sermon: (1) The preacher must have a distinct categorical proposition such as can be written down;[2] (2) He should prove the proposition. By a proposition Newman means a conclusion which has been produced through study and meditation. The proposition is a single judgment of the speaker. The proof of the proposition is drawn from examples and inductions, from "converging probabilities."

Newman gives many examples of his theory on arrangement for the sermon in his volume Sermon Notes. This book contains no less than one hundred sermon outlines. The first sermon outline in the volume is named "Purity and Love." It is significant not only because it is an outline of a sermon which Newman preached but also because it shows conclusively the theoretical doctrine of Newman on sermon arrangement.

The proposition for this first sermon in the book is: "There are two kinds of saints, the saints of purity,

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric iii. 13. 1414[b].

[2]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 411.

the saints of love."[1] The second part of the arrangement process, amounting to a number of inductions, is shown in the following outline:

1. Saints of Purity
   a. S. John the Baptist, sanctified from his mother's womb.
   b. S. John the Evangelist, the virgin-saint, he who perhaps never voluntarily yielded to venial sin.
   c. Above all these, the Virgin Mother.

2. Saints of Love
   a. Love is the great instrument of conversion.
   b. As love of the pure is tranquil, so love of the penitent is energetic.
   c. Examples of the love of the penitent saints, the saints of love.
      (1) David the great character who wrote the psalms.
      (2) Mary Magdalen--her energy, thrusting herself into the room.
      (3) S. Peter--loving more than the rest--walking on the sea--John xxi (contrast S. John's tranquil 'it is the Lord' rushed forward--weeping for his denial--

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[1]Newman, Discourses to Mixed Congregations, op. cit., p. 62 ff.

crucified downward.

(4) S. Paul, "the life I now live in the flesh," "The love of Christ constraineth us."

(5) S. Augustine represented in pictures loving.

(6) Thus in the Confiteor

i. The Innocent, Our Lady, S. Michael, S. John the Baptist.

ii. The Penitents, SS. Peter and Paul.[1]

There is a definite philosophy underlying Newman's theory of arrangement. In contrast to Quintilian, who formulated strict divisions for the arrangement of the speech, Newman emphasizes action, movement, and development of thought. Whereas Quintilian viewed arrangement from the architectonic or architectural aspect, Newman conceives arrangement from a biological point of view. Newman holds that the sermon should be a living organism moving towards a definite resolution.[3] This idea of development and movement towards an end forms the key to his interesting volume, Development of Christian Doctrine. Therein he states:

> When an idea, whether real or not, is of a nature to arrest and possess the mind, it may be said to have life, that is, to live in the mind which is its recipient. Thus mathematical ideas, real

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[1]John Henry Newman, Sermon Notes (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914), pp. 1-2.

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 57-59.

[3]Aristotle Poetics xxiii. 1. 1459[a]

> as they are, can hardly properly be called living, at least ordinarily.... There will be a general agitation of thought, and an action of mind.... There will be a time of confusion, when conceptions and misconceptions are in conflict, and it is uncertain whether anything is to come of the idea at all, or which view of it is to get the start of the others. New lights will be brought to bear upon the original statement of the doctrine put forward; judgement and aspect will accumulate. After a while some definite teaching emerges; and, as time proceeds, one view will be modified or expanded by another, and then combined with a third.[1]

He says further:

> This process, whether it be longer or shorter in point of view, by which the aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form, I call its development, being the germination and maturation of some truth or apparent truth on a large mental field.[2]

Newman contends that this process of development does not resemble an investigation worked out on paper in which each advance is a pure evolution from a foregoing, but depends upon prevailing conditions and influences:

> ... an idea not only modifies, but is modified, or at least influenced, by the state of things in which it is carried out, and is dependent in various ways on the circumstances which surround it. Its development proceeds quickly or slowly, as it may be; the order of succession in its separate stages is variable; it may be interrupted, retarded, mutilated, distorted, by external violence; it may be enfeebled by the effort of ridding itself of domestic foes; it may be impeded and swayed or even absorbed by counter energetic;...
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> But whatever be the risk of corruption from intercourse with the world around, such a risk must be encountered if a great idea is duly to

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[1]Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, op. cit., p. 37.

[2]Ibid., p. 38.

> be understood, and much more if it is to be fully exhibited.... It necessarily rises out of an existing state of things, and for a time savours of the soil. Its vital element needs disengaging from what is foreign and temporary, and is employed in efforts after freedom which become more vigorous and hopeful as its years increase. Its beginnings are no measure of its capabilities, nor of its scope. At first no one knows what it is, or what it is worth. It remains perhaps for a time quiescent; it tries, as it were, its limbs, and proves the ground under it, and feels its way.[1]

Since this conception of arrangement presupposes genuine reflection and development, Newman anticipates that it will not be universally accepted. In large measure non-acceptance will result from the condition of the writers' minds. He implies that the person with the slovenly mind will shrink from embracing it. If it were practiced by the slovenly or inaccurate mind, the writer could not compose his speech on a "thousand things."[2]

In exposing this theory of arrangement, Newman admits that he is going beyond and opposing "the practice of great Catholic preachers."[3] His theory of arrangement is strictly different from the practice of the great school of French Oratory, as represented by such speakers as Bossuet and Bourdaloue. Whether their sermons are concerned with a moral or dogmatic subject, they work upon a wide canvas. They first take a rapid survey of a whole

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[1] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[2] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 358.

[3] Ibid., p. 412.

subject, and then fix it into divisions or points: they follow more or less the architectonic device of arrangement.

Nothing is so fatal to the ultimate effect of a sermon as the habit of preaching on three or four subjects at once, states Newman. He, of course, implies that the effect is related to the cause. Preachers deliver sermons on several subjects because they fail to limit their topic and develop a single idea.[1] He contends that even though the preacher plans and arranges to preach on one point at a time, finishing and dismissing the first before he goes on to the second, and the second before he goes to the third, still, after all, "a practice like this, though not open to the inconvenience which the confusing of one subject with another might involve, is in matter of fact nothing short of the delivery of three sermons in a succession without break between them."[2]

Conclusions

(1) Newman notes two causes of faulty arrangement: (a) the speaker's loss of control of the sequence of ideas; and (b) the writer's or speaker's inordinate concern with the parts, and loss of sight of the whole plan of the speech.

(2) He represents three types of arrangement: the

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 412.

traditional six part division of the speech, (introduction, statement of the case, division of the subject, proof, refutation, and conclusion), Patristic arrangement, and the dialogue. Although his discussion of the ancient six part division of the speech is brief, his theories substantially parallel the doctrines of Cicero and Quintilian. He illustrates this ancient form of arrangement with examples taken from the orations of Cicero.

(3) In regard to the dialogue as a form of arrangement, he follows the doctrine of Cicero. He says there are two distinct advantages to the use of the dialogue: (a) the author can invent a character who will be his anonymous mouthpiece; and (b) the author, if he is obliged to present a subject which is uninteresting because it is so familiar, may pause or digress in order that the minds of his readers will not become weary and inattentive.

(4) In his theory of arrangement for the sermon, Newman admits that he is going beyond the practice of the great Catholic preachers. He considers nothing more fatal than the habit of preaching on three or four subjects in the same sermon. He states that he is opposed to a sermon ordered according to points. Newman conceives of the arrangement of the sermon from a biological point of view. In this he reflects

the conception of Aristotle found in the Poetics, and is significantly different from Quintilian who viewed arrangement architectonically.

CHAPTER V

STYLE

Relation of Thought to Style

Cardinal Newman begins his treatment of style with an accurate discussion of the relationship between thought and style. He states that thought and oral expression are intimately related. All literature, Newman believes, has an immediate affinity not to things but to thought. "For, after all," Newman observes, "matter and expression are parts of one: style is a thinking out into language."[1] To confirm his contention he alludes to the fact that the meaning of the Greek *logos* represents both the internal word of the intellect and the externalization of the idea in language:

> Call to mind, Gentlemen, the meaning of the Greek word which expresses this special prerogative of man over the feeble intelligence of the inferior animals. It is called Logos: what does Logos mean? it stands for *reason* and for *speech*, and it is difficult to say which it means more properly. It means both at once: why? because really they cannot be divided,--because they are in a true sense one.[2]

So genetic is this interpenetration of thought and

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[1]Newman, *Idea*, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

[2]*Ibid.*

language that Newman considers them inseparable. He says that it would be just as difficult to separate light and illumination, life and action, the convex and the concave of a curve as to make a cleavage between thought and style He speaks of language as the double of thought.

Cicero and Quintilian manifest practically the same philosophy of language as Newman. In the proem to the section on style Quintilian states:

> ... the verb eloqui means the production and communication to the audience of all the speaker has conceived in his mind, and without this power all the preliminary accomplishments of oratory are useless as a sword that is kept permanently concealed within its sheath.[1]

Crassus says that some speakers have attempted to separate the thought from the expression. This is a mistake he declares:

> Every speech consists of matter and words, and the words cannot fall into place if you remove the matter, nor can the matter have clarity if you withdraw the words.[2]

To illustrate the importance which the speaker or writer should give to the relation of thought to style, Newman contrasts the scientist's use of symbols and the orator's use of language. The orator, he says, uses language to express subjective truth and to communicate thought; whereas, the scientist uses a system of symbols to communicate objective truth, or the symbols in

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria viii. proem. 15.

[2]Cicero De Oratore iii. 5. 19.

themselves represent specific things. Newman gives the following as an example of the scientist's use of symbols:

> Such, for instance, would be Euclid's Elements; they relate to truths universal and eternal; they are not mere thoughts, but things: they exist in themselves, not by virtue of our understanding them, not in dependence upon our will, but in what is called the nature of things, or at least on conditions external to us.[1]

Newman perceives that language, expression--either in the oral or written word--has a relation to thought. But, is not the language of the speaker also related to things? In fact, is not the relation between the thing signified and the word more fundamental than the relation between the word and the thought? Newman seems to be unable satisfactorily to reconcile the relationship between the word and the thing. This gap in his philosophy of language and style seems to be the result of his inability to solve satisfactorily the problem of universals.

Students of Newman have accused him of being not only a Conceptualist but also a Nominalist.[2] From his own statements, it is clear that he had a tendency toward Nominalism. In writing concerning the concept of

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 274.

[2]cf. M. C. D'Arcy, The Nature of Belief (London: Sheed and Ward, 1931), pp. 148-149. See also J. F. Cronin, Cardinal Newman: His Theory of Knowledge (Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America, 1935), p. 82. Philip Flanagan, Faith and the Believer (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Bookshop, 1946), p. 113.

man, as represented by a word, he manifests himself as a Nominalist:

> "Man" is no longer what he really is, an individual presented to us by the senses, but as we read him in the light of those comparisons and contrasts which we have made him suggest to us.... If I might use a hard metaphor, I should say he is made the logarithm of his true self, and in that shape is worked with the ease and the satisfaction of logarithms.[1]

In an attempt to resolve the problem of the universal character of our concepts and the individual nature of concrete things represented through words, Newman, like all Nominalists, denies the possibility of genuine universal concepts. For Newman there are no universal realities in nature, nor are there universal representations in our intellects. What are considered abstract and universal concepts are nothing else to the Nominalist than a label for the collective designation of diverse individuals. Our representations, our words are as individual as the realities that we observe. Newman denies clearly that we can have universal concepts which have a foundation in reality. In the end he holds that words are no stronger nor more valuable than labels:

> John, Richard, and Robert are individual things, independent, incommunicable. We find some kind of common measure between them, and we may give it the name man, man as such, the typical man, the <u>auto-anthropos</u>. We are justified in so doing, and in investing it with general attributes,

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[1]Newman, <u>Grammar of Assent</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 31.

> and bestowing on it what we consider a definition of the whole race, and to every member of the whole race, and to every member of it, to the thousand Johns, Richards, and Roberts, who are found in it. No; each of them is what he is, in spite of it. Not anyone is a man as such, or coincides with the auto-anthropos.... There is no such thing as stereotyped humanity; it must ever be vague, bodiless idea, because the concrete units from which it is formed are independent realities.[1]

This passage indicates that Newman did not understand the nature of a universal idea; he therefore was not able to discuss accurately the relation of the word to the signified. This is not to say that the problem did not interest him, nor that he did not attempt to solve it for himself.

The Moderate Realists have a more felicitous solution to the problem of universals. For them, the universal representation which exists in the mind has also a real foundation outside the mind. The universal concept as such (formaliter) is in the intellect only; but has its foundation in the individuals outside itself.

The Orator is Responsible for his Words

Following the discussion of the relation of thought to language, Newman has a basis for saying that the speaker is responsible for his words. If the speaker should protest, Newman reminds him that his words are supposed to represent his thought. If there is

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[1] Ibid., p. 279.

incongruity between his words and his thought, if he speaks against the truth in his mind, the speaker is guilty of deceit. Newman declares that "words have a meaning, whether we mean them or not; and they are imputed to us in the real meaning."[1] Language, however, being an artificial system of signs, imposes on the speaker the responsibility for what he says. Men living in society have to conform to the recognized meanings which have been accepted and established at least through usage. If a man takes God's name in vain, Newman notes, he is guilty even though he says he means nothing by it; for being a social animal, man is not permitted the unsocial prerogative of framing a language for himself, nor is he allowed, in view of the commonweal, to re-define words privately. There are some words which are *ad placitum* signs. These words have a definite political or social meaning in a locale. But language cannot be considered by a given speaker wholly arbitrary; *ad placitum* is not *ad libitum*.

On the other hand, although words have a certain aspect of arbitrariness about them, Newman implies that they are not natural signs. He is not like Plato, who supposed that there is a natural correctness about a word, or a natural significance.[2]

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[1]Newman, *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, *op. cit.*, V, 33.

[2]Plato *Cratylus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891), i, 324 ff.

Cicero notes that some of the speakers of his day used words whose meaning they did not grasp:

> But as nowadays we are deluged not only with the notions of the vulgar but also with the opinions of the half educated, who find it easier to deal with matters that they cannot grasp in their entirety if they split them up and take them piecemeal, and who separate words from thought... [/the/] process [/cannot/] take place without disaster...it is impossible to achieve an ornate style without procuring ideas...[1]

Newman agrees with Cicero and refers to this practice as the unreal use of words. The usual reason for speaking in this manner is that the speaker is not familiar with his subject or he has not digested it in his mind. Newman remarks that such speaking can only provoke ridicule and impede persuasion:

> If you were to hear a person who knew nothing about military matters, giving directions how soldiers in service should conduct themselves, or how their food and lodging, or their marching, was to be duly arranged, you would be sure that his mistakes would be such as to excite ridicule and contempt of men experienced in warfare. If a foreigner were to come to one of our cities, and without hesitation offer plans for the supply of our markets, or the management of our police, it is so certain that he would expose himself, that the very attempt would argue a want of good sense and modesty. We should feel that he did not understand us, and that when he spoke about us he would be using words without meaning.[2]

Some speakers of his day were expected, Newman

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[1]Cicero De Oratore iii. 6. 24.

[2]Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, op. cit., V, 34-35.

writes, to have opinions on "all questions, political, social and religious." Not prepared to speak authoritatively and reasonably on such varied questions, these speakers hide their ignorance under their style and high sounding language. Such speakers, Newman notes, do not present the subject in its real and true substance. On the contrary they adroitly color their speech, or select out of a general subject some particular point which may be exaggerated and dressed up. They make the speech the means and the occasion for working on popular feelings.[1]

Some men, being set on becoming "eloquent" speakers, "use great words and imitate the sentences and constructions of others."[2] Their use of great words and imitation becomes so distorted that, anxious to impress and appear eloquent, they fancy that those whom they imitate had "as little meaning as themselves."[3] In practice such men betray themselves. Unthinkingly, they speak spontaneously of the shortness and vanity of life, of the certainty of death, and of the joys of heaven. "They have commonplaces in their mouths, which they bring forth upon occasions for the good of others, or to console them, or as a proper and becoming mark of attention."[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 37.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 39.

Newman does not condemn all language which overreaches the feelings of the speaker. For him persons are only unreal in their language, not when their words express more than they feel, but when they say things different from what they feel or believe.

Newman recognizes that the scientist has a different background and point of view from the literary man. The scientist is interested primarily in things, whereas the literary man is interested in the expression of thought. Although the scientist will be unable to exclude from his statements his own reactions and feelings, he should strive to suppress his feelings more than the literary man, who is expected to express what he feels, and to state his subjective reaction to things as well as his thoughts about other people.

Relation of Personality to Style

Aristotle refers obliquely to the relationship between personality and style. He agrees with Gorgias, who said, "we must ruin our opponent's earnestness with our jocularity, and his jocularity with our earnestness.... Some of the forms [/of the laughable/] befit a gentleman, and some do not; irony befits him more than does buffoonery."[1] In regard to the last ethical impression which the speaker achieves through style, Aristotle remarks, "you must reveal yourself as a good

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric iii. 18. 1419[b].

man, and him, your opponent, as a bad one in this particular case, or yourself as a good man, and him as a bad man, absolutely."[1]

Crassus, having launched his discussion on style by criticizing those "who separate words from thought as one might sever the body from the soul,"[2] next points out the influence the personality of the famous orators had on their style:

> Now turn your attention to consider the people whose department we are investigating the differences between the interest and the natures of orators. Isocrates had grace of style, Lysias precision, Hyperides penetration, Aeschines sonorousness, Demosthenes force: which of them is not eminent: and yet which resembles anyone but himself? Africanus had weight, Laelius smoothness, Galba harshness, Carbo a kind of flow and melody: which of these in the old days was not eminent? and yet each eminent in his own particular style.... Again, has not our friend Caesar here contributed a... style that is most unique?.... In the present company, consider Sulpius and Cotta... what great difference could there be between two orators, and yet what greater eminence in their respective styles?[3]

Newman follows not only Cicero's order but also his doctrine in discussing the influence of personality upon the relationship between thought and style.

Newman believes that the personality of the speaker has at least an indirect influence upon his style. Every form of expression of thought or feeling involves a

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[1] Ibid., 19. 1421[a].

[2] Cicero De Oratore iii. 6. 24.

[3] Ibid., iii. 6. 28, 31.

personal use of language. This observation is further confirmed, Newman contends, from the fact that some persons use language less discriminately than others. Even particular phrases and idioms can be traced to individuals. The origin of language, he believes, would seem to be traceable to individuals. There is a connection between the force of words in a particular language and the habits and sentiments of the multitude of the nation using them. Thus the able and intelligent speaker uses the common language of the nation, but achieves individuality according to his use of the language and his own style. The rough ore of the national language is refined and transmuted as it passes through his lips.

Originality in expression is another fact which reflects the influence of the personality of the speaker on his style. Newman maintains that originality is the power by which the speaker abstracts from his own self. "[It] is in thought what strength of mind is in action."[1] The opinions of the average person, and his style, are derived from his educational training and social milieu. Common minds transmit thought and its expression as they receive it, whether it is good or bad, true or false. On the other hand, minds of original talent feel that they must investigate and confirm what they receive from others. They strike off new expressions. Thus the

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 74.

old truths do not escape transformation or at least accidental changes when subjected to the mental digestion and skillful refinement of original minds. Their genius and personality are manifested in their style. Yet the original mind is not without its peculiar defects. Newman observes that "when originality is found separated from the direction of good sense, which is often the case, it shows itself in paradox and rashness of sentiment."[1] Such a mind often causes the person to be eccentric in his conduct.

The two principal ethical sources that influence style according to Newman are intellectual wisdom and moral character:

> The throng and succession of ideas, thoughts, feelings, imaginations, aspirations, which pass within him, the abstractions, the juxta positions, the comparisons, the discriminations, the conceptions, which are so original in him, his views of external things, his judgements upon life, manners, and history, the exercise of his wit, of his humour, of his depth, of his sagacity, all these innumerable and incessant creations, the very pulsations and throbbing of his intellect, does he image forth, to all he gives utterance, in a corresponding language, which is multiform as this inward mental action itself and analogous to it, the faithful expression of his in-personality, attending on his inward world of thought as its very shadow.[2]

The intellectual acumen and the emotional character of the person manifest themselves. Newman does not say

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 276.

that we should expect to find in a person's style his moral character completely denuded. Nevertheless, his artifact will be a revelation of his moral and emotional condition. He writes:

> 'Quo fit, ut omnis
> Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella
> Vita sensis'
>
> He writes passionately, because he feels keenly; forcibly, because he conceives vividly; he sees too clearly to be vague; he is too serious to be otiose; he can analyse his subjects, and therefore he is rich.... When his imagination wells up, it overflows in ornament; when his heart is touched, it thrills along his verse.[1]

Even the unique and personal experiences of an individual speaker leave their mark upon what he says and how he says it. These experiences reflect and convey, on the one hand, his own suffering and labor, on the other a sense of triumph in conviction laboriously achieved. The outcome of such experiences possesses the whole man, gradually making a deeper and wider impression on his emotions, imparting a deeper refinement and elegance to his language. Newman believes that the ethical conditions and the personal experiences of the truly great writer are seldom distant from his style:

> ... so we might as well say that one man's shadow is another's as that the style of a really gifted mind can belong to any but himself. It follows him about as a shadow. His thought and feeling are personal, and so his language is personal.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 292.

[2] Ibid., p. 276.

There are some speakers and writers who overlook the influence their personalities should have on their style. On the contrary, they consider that fine writing, or a good style can be achieved by "an addition from without to the matter treated of--a sort of ornament superinduced, or luxury indulged in, by those who have time and inclination for such vanities."[1] They speak as if one man could do the thought and another the style. Personal thought and style to them are two distinct functions. Thus they act as though there should be a division of labor:

> The man of thought comes to the man of words; and the man of words, duly instructed in the thought, dips the pen of desire into the ink of devotedness, and proceeds to spread it over the page of desolation. Then the nightingale of affection is heard to warble to the rose of loveliness, while the breeze of anxiety plays around the brow of expectation.[2]

Although Easterns are often said to have one person conceive the thought and another execute the style,[3] the same has been practiced in England: "We have

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., pp. 277-278.

[3] Ibid. Newman states: "We read in Persian travels of the way in which young gentlemen... cannot write one sentence themselves... betake themselves to the professional letter-writer.... The professional man manufactures words for them, as they are wanted, as a stationer sells them paper, or a schoolmaster might cut pens.... This is what Easterns are said to consider fine writing." See also Charles S. Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), p. 190 ff.

an instance in literary history of this very proceeding nearer home in a great University, in the latter years of the last century."[1] A learned Arabic scholar had to deliver a series of lectures on an historical subject before a distinguished group of doctors and professors. The scholar reflected that a linguist might be conversant with science rather than with words expressing his thought in fine style; but he felt that his lectures must not be without "style." In accord with the opinion of the professional Oriental stylists with whose writing he was familiar, he determined to buy a style. He employed another person to turn out and mould his thoughts "into ornamental English." The job was carried out with one man conceiving the thought and the other executing the style. "These lectures," Newman remarks, "remain to this day in their own place in the protracted series of annual Discourses to which they belong, distinguished amid a number of heavyish compositions by the rhetorical and ambitious diction for which he went into the market."[2] The scholar did not desire to project his thought through his personality in Grammatical English, but through an elaborate, pretentious style. Such people look on style as remote from the personality of the speaker and as "a trick and a trade." They put style on a par with "the gold plate and the flowers and the music at a

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[1] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 278.

[2] Ibid.

banquet, which do not make the viands better, but the entertainment more pleasurable."[1] They consider, erroneously, that "style is the hired servant, the mere mistress of thought and reason, and not the lawful wife of her own house."[2]

Newman states that students of writing often begin by aiming at swelling phrases and copious verbiage. In truth these elements are mere by-products of the style of the great speakers and writers.

> A great author, Gentlemen, is not one who merely has a copia verborum, whether in prose or verse, and can, as it were, turn on at his will any number of splendid phrases and swelling sentences; but he is one who has something to say and knows how to say it.[3]

Felicitousness of style is not aimed at for its own sake. "Rather it is the fire within the author's breast which overflows in the torrent of his burning, irresistible eloquence; it is the poetry of his inner soul...his mental attitude and...his moral countenance are imaged in the tenderness, or energy, or richness of his language."[4]

The personality of the speaker expressed in his style often explains the normal variations of expression

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[1] Ibid., pp. 278-279.

[2] Ibid., p. 279.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

and language. Newman finds that Aristotle verifies this view in his description of the magnanimous man. The style of the speaker is the image not only of the subject, but of his mind and reaction to the subject according to his nature:

> That pomp of language, that full and tuneful diction, that felicitousness in the choice and exquisiteness in the collocation of words, which to prosaic writers seem artificial is nothing else but the mere habit and way of a lofty intellect. Aristotle, in his sketch of the magnanimous man, tells us that his voice is deep, his motions slow, and his stature commanding. In like manner, the elocution of a great intellect is great. His language expresses, not only his great thoughts, but his great self. Certainly he might use fewer words than he uses; but he fertilizes his simplest ideas, and germinates into a multitude of details, and prolongs the march of sentences, and sweeps around the full diapason of his harmony, as if rejoicing in his own vigour and richness of resource. I say, a narrow critic will call it verbiage, when really it is a sort of fullness of heart, parallel to that which makes the merry boy whistle as he walks, or the strong man, like the smith in the novel, flourish his club when there is no one to fight with.[1]

Newman contends therefore that a truly great speaker projects his personality into his words to the extent that he stamps his style with himself; such a speaker is able to take a simple idea and expand it into a many-membered period through the instrumentality of the sheer vigor of

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[1] Ibid., p. 280. See also Longinus, On the Sublime tr. W. H. Fyfe (London: William Heinemann, 1927). Negatively Longinus argues: "It is impossible that those whose thoughts and habits all their lives are petty and servile should flash anything wonderful, worthy of immortal life. No, a great style is the natural outcome of weighty thoughts, and sublime sayings naturally fall to men of spirit."

his rhetorical genius. If this ability to expand a simple idea is allowable in the poet whose genius is far removed from pompousness or pretense, "much more is it allowable in an orator, whose province is to put forth words to the best advantage he can."[1] Cicero has been criticized for his redundancy, his gorgeousness of phraseology and his diffuseness; Newman notes that these symptoms can be discerned also in the writings of Shakespeare, and feels that such criticism is unwarranted. He argues that just as a certain attention to dress is expected of every gentleman, so a certain unaffected neatness and propriety and grace of diction may be required and expected of the great speaker or writer. In this connection, he concedes to Cicero the privilege of the "os magna sonatuarum," of which the ancient critic speaks.

In studying and justifying the Ciceronian style with its copious, majestic and musical flow of language, Newman observes that though it sometimes overreaches what the subject matter requires, yet it is never inappropriate to the represented ethos of the speaker. Cicero gives voice to lofty sentiments in lofty sentences. He is the genuine mens magna in corpore magno. His style is but the expression of the inner man, the product of his experiences and his environment. A weaker soul might have been drowned beneath the heavy tides which swept over him.

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[1] Ibid., p. 281.

> Cicero vividly realised the status of a Roman senator and statesman, and the "pride of place" of Rome, in all the grace and grandeur which attached to her; and he imbibed, and became what he admired. As the exploits of Scipio or Pompey are the expression of his greatness in deed, so the language of Cicero is the expression of it in word.[1]

By insisting on the influence which the personality of the speaker should have on his style, is Newman implying that style is achieved naturally and without effort? Does he believe that the speaker should not work over his manuscript and perfect his speech as an artist does his masterpiece? If on the one hand Newman condemns speakers who aim only at diction and look on style as a trick, he, on the other hand, admits frankly that the best speeches are produced at the cost of a "great deal of time, care and trouble. Many rough copies have to be made."[2] He criticizes only such writers, ancient and modern, who make "fine sentences" the very end of their labor. In this connection he alludes to Isocrates and the sophists, who were set on words to the neglect of thought. The sophists often strove to conceal their personality through their style. Newman claims that he cannot defend such practice.

Newman's Principle of Economy

Newman also observes that the speaker should adapt his style to the specific audience he intends to address.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 281-282.

[2] Ibid., p. 282.

Newman thus places himself in significant agreement with Cicero. The Roman Orator states:

> It is necessary to choose the style of oratory best calculated to hold the attention of the audience, and not merely to give them pleasure but also to do so without giving them too much of it--for I do not imagine that you look to me at this point for the warning to avoid an impoverished and uncultivated style, and expressions that are vulgar or out of date.[1]

Newman feels that the need for this practice is practically self-evident. To follow any other course in a deliberative speech would be fantastic. Newman argues that children, who are made the type in Scripture for people, are taught by an accommodation. To speak to children in language which is ordinarily used with grown men would be simply useless because of their inability to understand it. The problem is not so much that children are incapable of understanding meaning, but ideas must be divided and dispensed to them according to their limited training and experience with words. In this same connection to speak to a blind man of light and colors would only mock and confuse him; according to the well-known instance in which a person speaking to a blind man likens the color of scarlet to the sound of a trumpet. If a speaker is called on to speak to savages, or the ignorant, or weak, or narrow-minded people, Newman says the style must take on a definite and modified form if the ideas are "to gain admission into their minds at all,

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[1]Cicero De Oratore iii. 25. 97.

and to reach them."[1]

In addition to these cases in which adaptation of style is imperative, Newman also mentions how difficult it is to communicate to certain people because of their habits of thought and emotional dispositions. He observes that there are speaking situations where, because of absences of a common medium of communication through a suitable style, the speaker and the audience "seem to be dodging each other."[2] In such cases this lack of a common ground arises from a different principle on which the speaker and the audience have divided and sub-divided the world of ideas.[3]

And even though Newman conceded that Cicero was distinguished for his ability to invent "a style, which adapts itself with singular felicity to every class of subjects, whether lofty or familiar, philosophical or forensic,"[4] it is not from Cicero nor from any of the great pagan rhetoricians that he has developed his ex professo doctrine on adaptation of style to the audience. It is rather from the Fathers, and particularly from the Fathers of the great school of Alexandria, that he drew

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[1]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 341.

[2]Ibid., p. 342.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 48.

his doctrine on the necessity of adaptation of style to the audience.

In writing his Arians of the Fourth Century Newman came into contact with the School of Alexandria. And the School of Alexandria, he states, like the Church of the same name, may be called the Missionary and Polemical School of Christian Antiquity. The School of Alexandria was ideally situated at the cross-roads of pagan and Jewish philosophy; it was supplied in especial abundance not only with philosophy but also with the methods of the traditional rhetoric; it was admirably ordered to promote its special function. The school became famous for examining the doctrines revealed in Sacred Scripture, and for promoting and cultivating the skills of argumentation and disputation in her students. Athenagoras, who was the first master of the school, is renowned for his celebrated rhetorical defense of the Christians addressed to the Emperor Marcus. Pantaenus, who succeeded him, was sent by Demetrius as missionary to the Indians and Arabians. Origen, perhaps the most famous member of the school, was known far and wide in his day for his indefatigable zeal and practical skill in the confutation of heretics. He was also known for his numerous and varied controversial and critical writings.

Because teaching truth and conversion was the peculiar function of the Alexandrian Church, it was to be expected that the school should emphasize in all phases of

its educational system apologetic and polemic training and the exoteric presentation.

It was from the study and investigation of the theory behind the practice of this great school at Alexandria that Newman states he learned not only the necessity of adaptation of style to the audience, but his doctrine of economy.

Newman's understanding of economy is different from Herbert Spencer's use of the term in the Philosophy of Style.[1] By economy Newman means the speaker's fitting the style of the speech to the exigencies of the audience and the subject.[2] The deep and spiritual mysteries of the Faith present a normal problem to the speaker. How can he teach these mysteries? These truths are so far above the immediate comprehension of an uninstructed and ignorant audience that some accommodation in language is necessary if the speaker hopes to reach their minds. Economy, Newman adds, also helps to safeguard the speaker from developing doctrines which would surpass the comprehension of his hearers. He states that economy was sanctioned and used by St. Paul in his preaching. Instead of uttering invectives against the religious practices of his hearers, which he certainly aimed at

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[1]cf. Herbert Spencer, "The Philosophy of Style," Westminister Review, new series, October, 1852, pp. 436-437.

[2]Newman, Arians of the Fourth Century, op. cit., p. 66.

condemning, St. Paul begins his discourse on the Unity of the Divine Nature; he then proceeds to claim the altar, consecrated in the neighborhood to the unknown God, as the possession of Him Whom he preaches to them; he enforces his arguments by words and style founded on the works of a heathen poet.

Although economy is essential to the art of rhetoric, Newman recognizes certain instances of a kind of economy in other disciplines and sciences. Economy is demanded for communication of ideas. It is because the cogitative method of one man is notoriously very different from that of another; of the lawyer's from that of the soldier, of the rich from that of the poor, of the educated from that of the ignorant. And since ideas are presented in a hundred different ways and according to sets of symbols proper to certain professions and sciences, the speaker to communicate to these specific groups must follow along lines of the initial mode of education and indoctrination: the abstractions, generalizations, definitions, propositions are all represented by distinct symbols and standards. Therefore Newman states:

> ... between man and man, then, constituted as men are, alike, various distinct instruments, keys or calculi of thought obtain, on which their ideas and arguments shape themselves respectively, and which we must use, if we would reach them.[1]

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[1]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., pp. 343-344.

The science of mathematics, Newman observes, affords an instance in which various symbols or calculi have been adopted to embody and represent those immutable principles and dispositions of which the science treats:

> These methods are very distinct from each other, at least from each other, at least the geometrical and differential; yet they are, one and all, analyses, more or less perfect, of those same necessary truths, for which we have no name, of which we have no idea, except in the terms of such economical representations.... They stand for real things, and we can reason with them, though they be but symbols, as if they were the things themselves, for which they stand. Yet none of them carries out the lines of truth to their limits.... While they answer, we can use them just as if they were the realities which they represent, and without thinking of those realities.[1]

In music Newman finds another instance of economy. Concerning musical sounds, Newman declares:

> There are seven notes in the scale; make them fourteen; yet what a slender outfit for so vast an enterprise! What science brings so much out of so little? Out of what poor elements does some great master in it create his new world! Shall we say that all this exuberant inventiveness is a mere ingenuity, or trick of art, like some game or fashion of the day, without reality, without meaning? We may do so; and then, perhaps, we shall also account the science of theology to be a matter of words; yet, as there is a divinity in the theology of the Church, which those who feel cannot communicate, so there is also in the wonderful creation of sublimity and beauty of which I am speaking. To many men the very names which the science employs are utterly incomprehensible. To speak of an

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[1] Ibid., p. 345.

> idea or a subject seems to be fanciful or trifling, to speak of the views which it opens to us to be childish extravagance; yet is it possible that that inexhaustible evolution and disposition of notes, so rich yet so simple, so intricate yet so regulated, so various yet so majestic, should be a mere sound, which is gone and perishes. Can it be that those mysterious stirrings of heart, and keen emotions, and strange yearning after we know not what, and awful impressions from know not whence, should be wrought in us by what is unsubstantial, and comes and goes, and begins and ends in itself? It is not so; it cannot be.[1]

Newman does not comment on the desired ethical condition of the mathematician or the musician. But, as to the speaker who has to use rhetorical method of economy to accommodate his language to the audience, Newman indicates that he should be motivated by charity. If the speaker is to lead his audience to accept a novel doctrine, he signifies that charity and the method of economy must go hand in hand. Charity is needed, he thinks, because the speaker will often be confronted with hostile feelings against him and deep prejudice. He does not allow the speaker to make his judgments by the amoral casuistry of expediency, but according to what the virtue of practical wisdom judges to be the actual necessity of the case. Practical wisdom is necessary he says:

> because those who are strangers to the tone of thought and principles of the speaker, cannot at once be initiated into his system, and because they must begin with imperfect views; and therefore, if he is to teach them at all,

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[1] Ibid., p. 347.

> he must put before them large propositions, which he has afterwards to modify, or make assertions, which are but parallel or analogous to the truth, rather than coincident with it.[1]

Because of the ignorance, prejudice and eccentricity of certain minds, Newman believes that those speakers who attempt to speak at all times without any attention to economy of style are certain to convey wrong meanings and impressions to their audiences.

On the other hand, the possibility of unscrupulous speakers' abusing the principle of accommodation to the audience in general, as well as the abuse of the method of economy in particular is obvious, as Newman infers. But in arguing that there is no reason for disregarding a good method because of a possibility of abuse, Newman reminds us of Aristotle's defense of the art of rhetoric:

> If it is urged that an abuse of the rhetorical faculty can work great mischief, the same charge can be brought against the most useful of things (save virtue itself), and especially against the most useful things such as strength, health, wealth, and military skill. Rightly employed, they work the greatest blessings; and wrongly employed, they work the utmost harm.[2]

Usus sed non abusus, is the rule Newman follows. He indicates, however, that even the speaker with the highest appreciation and knowledge for ethical values and

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[1] Ibid., p. 72.

[2] Aristotle Rhetoric i. 1. 1355b.

with a good intention will find it difficult at times "to represent without misrepresenting"[1] what he deems is his duty to present to his audience with caution and reserve. In regard to the practical use of economy Newman states: "The obvious rule to guide our practice is to be careful to maintain truth even in our use of the economical method."[2] He cautions that it is most difficult for the speaker "to hit the mark in these perplexing cases."[3] But in spite of the possibilities of abuse and the difficulties involved in fashioning the style to fit the audience, Newman maintains that economy is necessary.

Allegory

Considering the forms of economy, the most extensive practical application Newman discusses is allegory. He states that he understands allegory in the "wide signification" of the term. Newman's conception of allegory includes not only the representation of ideas and truths under a foreign, though analogous exterior, according to the practice of Christ in constructing the parable, but the practice of generalizing facts into principles and of showing greater truths under the image of lesser truths. He says the hieroglyphics of the ancient

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[1]Newman, Arians of the Fourth Century, op. cit., p. 72.

[2]Ibid., p. 72.

[3]Ibid.

Egyptians mark the antiquity of this method, which, in a later day, enriched and modified by Greek culture, was applied as a key both to mythological legends and to the Scriptures. He adds that this method of adaptation to the minds of the audience has above all Divine Sanction. Divine Wisdom used allegory "on the sublimest of subject media which we spontaneously select for the expression of solemn thoughts and elevated emotions."[1] He points to another factor which should recommend the use of allegory to the speaker: literal words often seem inadequate to convey meaning. He remarks:

> When the mind is occupied by some vast and awful subject of contemplation, it is prompted to give utterance to its feelings in a figurative style; for ordinary words will not convey the admiration, nor literal words the reverence which possesses it; and when, dazzled at length with the great sight, it turns away for relief it still catches in every new object which it encounters, glimpses of its former vision, and colours its whole range of thought with the one abiding association. If, however, others have preceded it in the privilege of such contemplations, a well-disciplined piety will lead it to adopt the images which they have invented, both from affection for what is familiar to it, and from a fear of using unsanctioned language on a sacred subject.[2]

And just as he recognizes that the use of economy is open to abuse, Newman warns the preacher in particular about the careful use of allegory lest he abuse this method of adaptation of style. Since the

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[1] Ibid., p. 57.

[2] Ibid., pp. 57-58.

preacher will probably use allegory in regard to the Scripture, and since the abuse of Sacred Scripture would involve a graver abuse, Newman directs the following advice to the preacher:

> Such a safeguard we shall find in bearing cautiously in mind this consideration: viz: that (as a general rule), every passage of Scripture has some one definite and sufficient sense, which was prominently before the mind of the writer, or in the intention of the Blessed Spirit, and to which all other ideas, though they might arise, or be implied, still were subordinate. It is this true meaning of the text, which it is the business of the expositor to unfold. That it is, which every diligent student will think it a great gain to discover; and, though he will not shut his eyes to the indirect and instructive applications of which the text is capable, he never will so reason as to forget that there is one sense peculiarly its own. Sometimes it is easily ascertained, sometimes it is contained in the literal sense of the words employed, as in the historical parts; or sometimes it is the allegorical, as in our Lord's parables; or sometimes the secondary sense may be more important in after ages than the original, as in the instance of the Jewish ritual; still in all cases (to speak generally) there is but one main primary sense, whether literal or figurative; a regard for which must ever keep us sober and reverent in the employment of those allegorisms, which, nevertheless, our Christian liberty does not altogether forbid.[1]

Abuses in allegorizing Sacred Scripture do not result from the mere adoption of an instrument which Philo or the Egyptian hierophant had employed, but from preachers or writers assuming meanings and the explaining of them beyond the spirit of the canon. By extending the meaning of Sacred Scripture too far, a preacher obscures the

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[1] Ibid., p. 60.

primary meaning and weakens the solid force of the historical facts and the doctrinal implications. Newman accuses those writers of irreverence who use the language of the Bible "as the mere instrument of a cultivated fancy to make their style attractive or impressive."[1]

Fable

The fable is the second species of adaptation which Newman includes under the general discussion of economy.

> Fables, again, are economies or accommodation, being truths and principles cast into the form in which they will be most vividly recognized; as in the well known instances attributed to Menenius Agrippa.[2]

Although fables, at least in their better form depend upon mythical representation, they can like the truth be used "to bring out the action of some principle, point of character, and the like."[3] Newman suggests that the fable might well be used in speaking to those who have an "imperfect knowledge."

The fable presents the same temptations and pitfalls for the speaker as all forms of accommodation and adaptation. In closing his brief remarks on the fable Newman notes:

> I do not meddle with the question of casuitry, viz. which of such artifices, as

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[1] Ibid., p. 63.

[2] Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 342.

[3] Ibid.

> they may be called are innocent, or where the line is to be drawn. That some are immoral, common sense tells us.[1]

Common sense, practical wisdom, Newman concludes, will not only decide whether the use of the fable is necessary in a particular speaking situation, but will also dictate how far the deductions from the fiction can be drawn out.

Qualities of Style

Most of the classical rhetoricians have devoted part of their study of style to a discussion of the qualities of good style. Cicero, for instance, writes of Theophrastus' attempt to establish four such qualities: correctness, clearness, ornateness, and propriety. Newman emphasizes two qualities: perspicuity and accuracy.

Perspicuity

In agreement with other representatives of classical tradition, Newman states that perspicuity is the prime requisite for a good oratorical style. He declares that, while the primary duty of the literary man is to have clear conceptions and to be exact and intelligible in expressing them, the first prerequisite for the orator is to possess clearness of style. He notes that "it is the least pardonable fault in an Orator to fail in clearness of style, and the most pardonable fault of a

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[1] Ibid.

Poet."[1] Perspicuity involves the ability of the speaker to bring out and convey meaning commensurate to the concept in his mind. This quality of perspicuity, Newman indicates, is aided by the speaker's "power of arrangement," "power of illustration," and "the spontaneous power of comparison."[2]

Accuracy

Related to the evolution of oratorical style is the quality of accuracy. Newman notes that the absence of accuracy is almost the universal symptom of the writing of youths. In fact, he discusses the problem of inaccuracy in one of the "Elementary Studies."[3] He identifies the lack of clarity in writing with the inability of the speaker to bring out meaning, and cites that inaccuracy results from the person's failure either to know the rules of Grammar or to apply them to the composition when known. Inaccuracy develops from the writer's failure to understand how separate parts of a sentence should hang together, how they should form a whole, or how each element in the sentence should have a relative function over the whole sentence.[4]

In addition to the qualities of perspicuity and

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[1]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 21.

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 77-78.

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., cf. p. 349 ff.

[4]Ibid., p. 341.

accuracy, Newman notes the value of strength and brevity. When these two latter qualities are accompanied with perspicuity they contribute a certain finesse to the style of the speaker.[1]

In naming clearness as the primary requisite of the style of the orator Newman is in harmony with the majority of the classical rhetoricians.[2] However, the four representatives name other qualities not found in the writings of Newman: Aristotle mentions appropriateness; (Rhetoric iii. 7. 1408) Cicero names correctness, lucidity, ornateness, and appropriateness; (De Oratore iii. 10. 37) Quintilian discusses the necessity for the quality of propriety; (Institutio Oratoria viii. 2. 10) and St. Augustine says that "charm" is needed (De Doctrina Christiana iv. 11. 26) but that style is not pleasing when slight and unimportant truths are adorned with a "foamy redundancy of expression," and therefore excessive profuseness renders the style weak. (Ibid. iv. 14. 31)

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 49.

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric iii. 2. 1404b. Aristotle states: "We may therefore assume the general observations of the Poetics, and regard it as settled that a good style is, first of all, clear. The proof is that language which does not convey a clear meaning fails to perform the very function of language." See also Institutio Oratoria viii. 2. 22. Quintilian notes: "For my own part, I regard clearness as the first essential of a good style."

Sources of Style

In the works of the Roman rhetoricians particularly we observe that they not only name the qualities of good style but state also the sources from which it can be developed. We note that Cicero and Quintilian as well as St. Augustine discuss the sources of style.

Concerning discipline of mind which is the primary requisite, Quintilian states:

> We must search for what is best and refuse to give a joyful welcome to every thought the moment that it presents itself; we must first criticise the fruits of our imagination, and then, once approved, arrange them with care. For we must select both thoughts and words and weigh them one by one.[1]

Although a disciplined mind is basic to good style, Cicero, Quintilian, and St. Augustine emphasize that the young speaker should be given good models for imitation. Quintilian, with characteristic caution, suggests that discrimination in the study of models is necessary: "For even great authors have their blemishes, for which they have been censured by competent critics and have even reproached each other."[2] Cicero implies that the teacher should select the models worthy of the students' study.[3] St. Augustine directs that the ecclesiastical orator who would speak with wisdom and

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria x. 3. 5.

[2]Ibid., x. 2. 15.

[3]Cicero De Oratore ii. 22. 90.

eloquence, should read and listen to the speeches of eloquent men, rather than spend time with the teachers of rhetoric.[1]

A practical imitation of the great orators is another great help in developing style. Quintilian states:

> It is from... authors worthy of our study that we must draw our stock of words, the variety of our figures and our methods of composition, while we must form our minds on the models of every excellence. For there can be no doubt that in art no small portion of our task lies in imitation, since although invention came first and is all-important, it is expedient to imitate whatever has been invented with success. And it is the universal rule of life that we should wish to copy what we approve in others.[2]

After a thorough study of the selected author has been made, Cicero indicates that the teacher should guide the student in the practical imitation of the style of the model.

> Next, let practice be added, whereby in copying he may reproduce the pattern of his choice and not portray him as time and again I have known many copyists to do, who in copying hunt after such characteristics as are easily copied or even abnormal and possibly faulty. For nothing is easier than to imitate a man's style of dress, pose or gait.[3]

Commenting favorably on the doctrine of imitation as

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[1]St. Augustine De Doctrina Christiana iv. 5. 8.

[2]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria x. 2. 1, 2.

[3]Cicero De Oratore 11. 22. 90.

suggested by Cicero, St. Augustine declares that just as infants learn to speak by imitating the speech of those they hear, so by imitating a great speaker will the ecclesiastical orator develop an eloquent style.[1]

Cicero and St. Augustine mention that the young speaker should practice writing. With reference to writing Cicero states:

> Let him... carry out his purposes by frequent and large practice, and if possible, by written composition: if our friend Sulpicius here were to do so, his diction would be far more condensed.[2]

Augustine suggests not only the practice of writing (_scribendi_) but also dictating (_dictandi_).

Agreeing with Cicero and St. Augustine concerning the need and utility of practice, Quintilian states that revision and correction are necessary:

> ... the correction of our work... is by far the most useful portion of our study.... Correction takes the form of addition, excision and alteration. But it is a comparatively simple and easy task to decide what is to be added or excised. On the other hand, to prune what is turgid, to elevate what is mean, to repress exuberance, arrange what is disorderly, introduce rhythm where it is lacking, and modify it where it is too emphatic, involves a two-fold labour. For we have to condemn what had previously satisfied us and discover what had escaped our notice. There can be no doubt that the best method of correction is to put aside what we have written for a certain time,

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[1]St. Augustine _De Doctrina Christiana_ iv. 3. 5.

[2]Cicero _De Oratore_ ii. 23. 96.

> so that when we return to it after an interval it will have the air of novelty and of being another's handwork; for thus we may prevent ourselves from regarding our writings with all the affection that we lavish on a newborn child.[1]

Think Before You Write

Like Quintilian, Newman states: "The rule is, first think, and then write: don't write when you have nothing to say; or, if you do, you will make a mess of it."[2] This principle is fundamental in Newman's philosophy of style. However, he notes that this primary directive is not observed by youth. By describing how "Robert" handles the proposition "Fortune favors the bold," Newman represents his point of view:

> "Now look here," he says, "the subject is '*Fortes fortuna adjuvat*'; now this is a *proposition*; it states a certain general principle, and this is just what an ordinary boy would be sure to miss, and Robert does miss it.[3]

Newman notes that without thought or discipline of mind Robert, and so the average boy, will "refuse to be put into leading-strings; he breaks loose, and runs off in his own fashion on the broad field and in wild chase of 'fortune,' instead of closing with a subject, which as being definite, would have supported him."[4] The proposition

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[1] Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* x. 4. 1, 3.

[2] Newman, *Idea*, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

[4] *Ibid.*

Newman states, was meant to steady and guide the boy. But he notes that in his experience "not one boy in a hundred does avail himself of this assistance."[1] On the contrary boys refuse to think:

> They do not rouse up their attention and reflect; they do not like the trouble of it: they cannot look at anything steadily; and, when they attempt to write, off they go in a rigmarole of words, which does them no good, and never would, though they scribbled... till they wrote their fingers off.[2]

If the boy continues to resist the rule "to think first and then write," Newman predicts:

> When he grows up, and has to make a speech, or write a letter for the papers, he will look out for flowers, full blown flowers, figures, smart expressions, trite quotations, hackneyed beginnings and endings, pompous circumlocutions, and so on; but the meaning, the sense, the solid sense, the foundation, you may hunt the slipper long before you catch it.[3]

On the other hand, one who has begun to cultivate the habit of thinking before he writes, although he may set down little at first and may deliver himself clumsily, will write soon so skillfully, Newman concludes, that "his half sentences will be worth more than the folio sheet of another."[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 358.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 361.

[4] Ibid.

Study and Imitation of Models

Newman agrees that study and imitation of models are other sources of style. He hastens to add that it is the excellencies in the models that he recommends for study and imitation. The style of the great authors should, Newman states, "forcibly arrest the reader and draw him to imitate it, by virtue of what is excellent in it, in spite of such defects, as in common with all human works, it may contain."[1] Newman admits that he followed this rule himself:

> For myself when I was fourteen or fifteen, I imitated Addison; when I was seventeen, I wrote in the style of Johnson; about the same time I fell in with the twelfth volume of Gibbon, and my ears rang with the cadence of his sentences, and I dreamed of it for a night or two. Then I began to make an analysis of Thucydides in Gibbon's style.[2]

He believes that familiarity and study of the style of an author will move the student to generous emulation. He notes some of the classical examples:

> We read of Thucydides, on hearing Herodotus read his history of Olympia, being incited to attempt a similar work, though of an entirely different and of an original structure. Gibbon, in like manner, writing of Hume and Robertson, says: "The perfect composition, the nervous language, the well-turned periods of Dr. Robertson, inflamed me to the ambitious hope that I might one day tread in his footsteps."[3]

In addition to the study and imitation of the

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[1] Ibid., p. 322.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 325.

"great authors," Newman indicates that the student should also familiarize himself with conversational methods. In a letter to J. B. Mozley he wrote:

> In what you write do not be too essayish: i.e., do not begin, "Of all the virtues which adorn the human breast"... be somewhat conversational, and take a jump into your subject. But on the other hand avoid abruptness, or pertness. Be easy and take the mean--now you have full direction how to write.[1]

He also praises the style of his friend Froude's because "his letters approach to conversation."[2] The type of conversational style which Newman had in mind was that of the educated gentleman who had been trained at the University; and for Newman the specific place might well have been the Oriel Common Room, where conversation was considered a fine art. This latter opinion certainly seems to be the understanding of Gerard Manley Hopkins: "Newman," he wrote to Patmore, "does not follow the common tradition--of writing. His tradition is that of cultured, the most highly educated, conversation; it is the flower of the best Oxford Life."[3]

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[1]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., II, 237.

[2]Ibid., 256. See also De Oratore i. 3. 12. Cicero declares that "in oratory the very cardinal sin is to depart from language of everyday life and the usage approved by the sense of the community."

[3]Gerard Manley Hopkins, Further Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. C. C. Abbott (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 232. See also S. T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. J. Shawcross (Oxford: The

As models of the conversational style Newman recommends the letters of the saints.[1] These letters are especially significant because they maintain the speaker-audience relation. They also illustrate to the student how the author impresses his personality on his style.

> A speaker and an audience are prominent throughout them; and we gain an insight into their own character.... Instead of writing formal doctrinal treatises, they write controversy; and their controversy, again, is correspondence. They mix up their own persons, natural and supernatural, with the didactic and polemical works which engaged them.[2]

Such models give the student insight into the methods by which writers adapt their style to various subjects and accommodate their style to the character of their readers:

> ... a large portion of them were intended simply for the parties to whom they were addressed; a large portion consists of brief counsel or spiritual exhortation, disclosing his character either by the topic selected, or his mode of dealing with it. Many are doctrinal; great numbers, again, are strictly ecclesiastical and ex cathedra. Many are

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Clarendon Press, 1907), I, 13-14; II, 23. Coleridge had practically the same idea. He recommends the style be "neither bookish, nor vulgar, neither redolent of the lamp, nor of the kennel," rather, the style of a gentleman in dignified conversation.

[1] Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., III, 160. "Now the ancient saints have left behind them just the kind of literature which more than any other represents the abundance of the heart, which more than any other approaches conversation; I mean correspondence."

[2] Ibid., p. 162.

> historical and biographical; some might be called state-papers; some narrate public transactions, and how the writer felt towards them, or why he took part in them. Pope Gregory's epistles give us the same insight into the holy solicitude for the universal Christian people which possessed him, that minute vigilance, yet comprehensive superintendence of the chief pastor, which in a very different field of labour is seen in the Duke of Wellington's dispatches on campaign, which tell us so much more about him than any panegyrical sketch.[1]

In recommending these two classes of models for study and imitation, Newman reveals his prudence and judgment. He claims that study and imitation of the great authors will benefit the student because:

> Whatever be his subject, high or low, he treats it suitable and for its own sake. If he is a poet, 'nil molitur inepte.' If he is an orator, then too he speaks, not only distincte and splendide, but also apte. His page is the lucid mirror of his mind and life....He always has the right word for the right idea, and never a word too much.[2]

Speaking directly to the preacher, he says that one great difficulty "in recommending particular authors as models of good English arises from the literature of England being Protestant, and sometimes worse."[3] He believes that:

> Hume is a writer of good English, but he was an unbeliever. Swift and Dryden write English with great force, but you never can be sure when you will come upon coarse passages. South is a vigorous writer but he was a Protestant clergyman and his writings are sermons.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 161.

[2] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 292.

[3] Flynn, Prose Reader, op. cit., p. 112.

[4] Ibid.

On the other hand, the letters of the saints, while they are models of the conversational style, are the expression of the personality of the writer and an index of his inner life:

> ...when a Saint is himself the speaker, he interprets his own action; and that is what I find done in such fullness in the case of those early luminaries of the church to whom I am referring. I want to hear a Saint converse; I am not content to look at him as a statue; his words are the index of his hidden life, as far as that life can be known to man, for "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh."[1]

Revision and Correction

Newman indicates that the conception of the thought in the mind of the writer might be finished in a few seconds, but the adequate and felicitous expression of the thought follows the pattern of the other arts. He remarks:

> Take the instance of the painter or the sculptor; he has a conception in his mind which he wishes to represent in the medium of his art;--the Madonna and Child, or Innocence, or Fortitude, or some historical character or event. Do you mean to say he does not study his subject? does he not make sketches? does he not even call them "studies"? does he not call his workroom a studio? is he not ever designing, rejecting, adopting, correcting, perfecting? Are not the first attempts of Michael Angelo and Rafaelle extant, in the case of some of their most celebrated compositions?[2]

Should not the process of developing a style be looked on as being in some measure like the process of perfecting skill in painting or sculpturing? Words, which are the matter for the speaker, should they not be looked on as

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., III, 160.

[2]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 283.

having a similar function as the clay of the modeler? Should not words be worked up as well as colors? Newman believes that the writer should perfect his skill in the use of words in order that his diction will become instrumental to the prototypical ideas in his mind. Newman, in fact, draws out the analogy further. Is it to be wondered at that the pen should sometimes be at fault--"that it should pause, write, erase, re-write, amend, complete, before...[/the writer/] satisfied himself that his language has done justice to the conceptions which his mind's eye contemplated?"[1]

Newman indicates that the student should follow the example of the great writers. Some of the greatest have had to revise and correct their writings. Writers and speakers whose "style is furtherest removed from ornamental, being simple and natural, or vehement, or severely business-like and practical,"[2] often have had to revise and correct.

> Who is so energetic and manly as Demosthenes? Yet he is said to have transcribed Thucydides many times over in the formation of his style. Who so gracefully natural as Herodotus? yet his very dialect is not his own, but chosen for the sake of the perfection of his narrative. Who exhibits such happy negligence as our own Addison? yet artistic fastidiousness was so notorious in his instance that the report has got aboard, truly or not, that he was too late in his issue of an important state-paper, from his habit of

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[1] Ibid., p. 284. See also Quintilian and Cicero. Both use the analogies to painting and sculpturing. Institutio Oratoria xii. 10. 3, 8; De Oratore iii. 7. 26.

[2] Ibid., p. 284.

revision and recomposition.[1]

If these great writers and speakers worked by a model or image which was before the eyes of their intellects, and if they labored to express what they had to say in a style as would most exactly and suitably represent it, should not their style in part be attributed to the fact that they made rough drafts and made revisions? Newman therefore concludes:

> ... that the mere dealer in words cares little or nothing for the subject which he is embellishing, but can paint and gild anything whatever to order; whereas the artist, whom I am acknowledging, has his great or rich vision before him, and his only aim is to bring out what he thinks or what he feels in a way adequate to the thing spoken of, and appropriate to the speaker.[2]

Newman stresses that especially in the first years the speaker should exercise critical judgment about his first drafts and be willing to re-write and re-frame sentences. Speaking about the preacher in his "Notes on Writing," the Cardinal states that "the priest should keep his idea in view, and should write sentences over and over again till he has expressed his meaning."[3] Of the necessity for revision and correction, he writes:

> ... my one and single desire and aim has been to do what is so difficult--viz. to express clearly and exactly meaning; this has been the motive principle of all my corrections

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 285.

[3] Flynn, Prose Reader, op. cit., p. 113.

> and rewriting. When I have read over a passage which I have written a few days before, I have found it so obscure to myself that I have either put it altogether aside or fiercely corrected it.[1]

The habit of revision and correction serves two purposes: it helps the speaker to express his meaning clearly, and it helps him to become more accurate. Newman admits that he was never able to free himself of the necessity of revision and correction:

> ... it is simply the fact that I have been obliged to take great pains with everything I have written, and I often write chapters over and over again, besides innumerable corrections and interlinear additions.[2]

Although revision and correction were always necessary for himself, he implies that after a speaker has developed an ability to bring out his meaning clearly and express his thoughts accurately, he should not have to spend long hours in correcting and revising his manuscript. "Those who are good speakers may be supposed to be able to write off what they want to say,"[3] he states, and points out that the habit of revision can become an obsession with a speaker. The latter condition would impede persuasion. He recalls the case of a certain Archbishop, who, while he was an elegant writer, betrayed the labor which had been involved in developing his speeches: "by his mode of

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[1]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 477.

[2]Ibid., II, 426.

[3]Ibid.

speaking, which was most painful to hear from his hesitation and alteration--that is, he was correcting his composition as he want along."[1]

Conclusions

(1) In founding his ideas of style on the fundamental relation between thought and language, Newman reflects the doctrine of Cicero and Quintilian. He understands style to be a thinking out into language.

(2) Newman states that the speaker is responsible for his words. He deprecates those speakers who use unreal words. He is opposed to those speakers who express themselves in language different from what they feel, or contrary to their beliefs.

(3) The personality of the speaker has a direct influence upon his style. Even the personal experiences and sufferings of an individual writer are revealed through his style. The personality of speakers accounts for the variations in style. Newman notes that Aristotle verifies this opinion in his description of the magnanimous man.

(4) Newman observes that style is not a "trick or a trade," nor an addition from without, but the normal expression of the personality of the speaker. He does not countenance the division of labor: one person's conceiving the ideas, another's manufacturing the style.

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[1] Ibid., II, 426-427.

A truly great speaker, Newman says, projects his personality into his words to the extent that he stamps his style with himself.

(5) Newman's discussion of adaptation of style to the audience centers around a discussion of economy. Economy is the means by which the speaker adapts his style to the exigencies of the audience and the subject. Newman states that he learned the method of economy from the Fathers. He names and discusses allegory and the fable as two types of economy. In saying that adaptation of style to the audience as well as the particular method of economy is open to abuse, he reflects the opinion of Aristotle.

(6) In comparison with the extensive treatments of Cicero, Quintilian and St. Augustine, Newman discusses the problem of classification of style briefly. In a rather limited section he exposes the traditional differences between the Asiatic and Attic styles.

(7) Perspicuity and accuracy are the two requisites of style mentioned by Newman. He states that is it the least pardonable fault in an orator to fail in clearness of style.

(8) Like Cicero, Quintilian and St. Augustine, Newman discusses extensively the sources of style. He lays down three directives: think before you write; study and imitate good models; revise and correct.

CHAPTER VI

MEMORY

Thonssen and Baird state that in the major works of the eighteenth century the consideration of memory has been dropped.[1] Newman does not follow this innovation. He clearly states that memory is the fourth element in the rhetorical process.[2] Moreover, probably cognizant of the fact that Aristotle did not treat formally the element of memory in the Rhetoric, Newman cites Cicero as his authority for including the element of memory. He states "that Cicero specifies memory in his enumeration of the distinct talents necessary for a great orator."[3]

In naming memory as the fourth element in the rhetorical process Newman is in agreement with both of the famous Roman authorities on rhetorical theory: Cicero states:

> But what business is it of mind to specify the value of a speaker and the usefulness and effectiveness of memory?... only people with a powerful memory know what they are going to say and how long they are going to speak and in what style, what points they

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[1]Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1948), p. 80.

[2]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 33.

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 421.

have already answered and what still remain.[1]

Quintilian says that the memory is a veritable treasure-house for the speaker:

> Indeed it is not without good reason that memory has been called the treasure of eloquence. But pleaders need not only be able to retain a number of facts in their minds, but also be quick to take them in; it is not enough to learn what you have written by dint of repeated reading; it is just as necessary to follow the order both of matter and words when you have merely thought out what you are going to say.[2]

The doctrine of Newman on memory can be organized under three heads: (1) definition, (2) function, (3) development and training.

Definition

Newman considers memory as an inner faculty related to the intellect. Memory presents to the intellect as present the imagination of things that are past. It has the ability to retain impressions and likenesses of experiences as received originally by the senses. Newman states that the memory is under the control and dominance of the will and intellect:

> Hence the poet calls memory "the mind's eye." I am in a foreign country among unfamiliar sights; at will I am able to conjure up before me the vision of my home, and all that belongs to it, its rooms and their furniture, its books, its inmates, their countenances, looks and movements. I see

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[1]Cicero *De Oratore* ii. 87. 355.

[2]Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* xi. 2. 1, 2.

> those who once were there and are no more; past scenes, and the very expression of the features, and the tones of their voices, of those who took part in them, in a time of trial or difficulty.[1]

Although some writers signify that the operation of the memory is analogous to the process of logic, Newman believes that it can be called only a reasoning process by participation or analogy. He holds that the memory creates nothing itself, and is essentially passive. What appears to be the reasoning process is but the mechanism of association at work, an aid to and a part of the faculty of memory. The memory has two parts: first, simple recall, when the speaker is able to bring back independently and spontaneously without the help of some technique or device; second, association, wherein one experience or item suggests another event or experience. Newman points out how a word or phrase calls up or suggests through recollection a past impression:

> I may have seen a celebrated painting, or some great pageant, or some public man; and I have on my memory stored up and ready at hand, but latent, an impress more or less distinct of that experience. The words "the Madonna di S. Sisto," or "the last Coronation," or "the Duke of Wellington," have power to revive that impress of it.[2]

Newman declares that the memory is not concerned with the universal, but is limited to the singular and to the individual impressions and experiences: "Memory has to

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[1] Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

[2] Ibid., p. 24.

do with individual things and nothing that is not individual. And my apprehension of its notices is conveyed in a collection of singular and real propositions."[1]

Memory therefore is not really a discursive faculty. Important as the memory is to the function of the intellect, teleologically it is inferior to the intellect. "For instance a great memory is never synonymous with wisdom, any more than a dictionary would be called a treatise."[2] And although there is in some respect an analogy between ratiocination and memory, especially in the process of association, Newman states that there are obvious differences. Although the memory may be exercised without antecedents, or media, ratiocination requires them in its very idea. "At the same time association has so much to do with memory that we may not unfairly consider memory, as well as reasoning, as depending on certain previous conditions."[3] Writing, he states, is a memoria technica, or logic of memory.

Function

Memory is essentially a passive power, acted on by the will and informed by the intellect. But what are the senses which can act on and impress their images on the memory?

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[1] Ibid., p. 24.

[2] Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 288.

[3] Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 337.

Like Cicero,[1] Newman holds that all the senses can impress images on the memory. He also agrees with the Roman Orator in saying that, whereas all the sense experiences can be recalled by the memory, the impressions received by the sense of sight are preserved more vividly than the objects received by the other senses. Newman states:

> I have hitherto been adducing instances from (for the most part) objects of sight; but the memory preserves the impress, though not so vivid, of the experiences which come to us through our other senses also.[2]

Newman notes that the memory can re-present even the experience of a beautiful air, or the scent of a particular flower. In a degree which approaches the vividness of the first experience, and by the power of the will, an impression can be held in continued presence before the mind. Newman gives examples:

> I can bring before me the music of the Adeste Fideles as if I were actually hearing it; and the scent of a clematis as if I were in the garden; and the flavour of a peach as if it were in season; and the thought I have of all these is something individual and from without, as much as the things themselves, the tune, the scent, and the flavour are from

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[1]Cicero De Oratore ii. 87. 357. "It has been sagaciously discerned by Simonides or else discovered by some other person, that the most complete pictures are formed in our minds of the things that have been conveyed to them and imprinted on them by the senses, but the keenest of all our senses is the sense of sight, and that consequently perceptions received by our ears or by reflexion can be most easily retained in the mind if they are also conveyed to our minds by the mediation of the eyes..."

[2]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 24.

> without--though, compared with the things themselves, these images (as they may be called) are faint and intermitting.[1]

There is an unique difference between the perfection of recall of the imagination and of the memory. The imagination is able to recall an image, but it is not able to set the image in its temporal context. Newman recognizes this superior perfection of the memory over the imagination. He states:

> ... though I may have eaten a hundred peaches in times past, the impression, which remains on my memory of flavour, may not be of any of them, of the twenty, thirty units, as the case may be, not a general notion.[2]

In truth, Newman avers that the memory can not only place the event or experience in its temporal context, but can also fix it into its framework of definite events. In fact, the memory is able to date the experience and provide the speaker with a frame of reference. In addition the memory can recall our past mental acts, Newman declares:

> And so again the apprehension which we have of our past mental acts of any kind, of hope, inquiry, effort, triumph, disappointment, suspicion, hatred, and a hundred others, is an apprehension of the memory of those definite acts, and therefore an apprehension of things;.... Such an apprehension again is elicited by propositions embodying the notices of our history, of our pursuits, and their results, of our friends, of our bereavement, of our illnesses, of our fortunes, which remain imprinted upon our memory

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[1] Ibid., p. 24.

[2] Ibid., p. 25.

> as sharply and deeply as is a recollection of sight.[1]

Newman also believes that personal experiences and impressions which were accompanied with great emotional content, such as the vivid image of certain anxieties or deliverances, never will leave the memory, because of the vividness of the initial experiences.

Because of the vivid impressions some experiences make upon the memory of a person, Newman states that these past impressions will often influence the person in the future. In this regard he considers that it is difficult to decide where the function of memory ends and where abstraction intervenes.

> If I am told "there is a raging fire in London," or "London is on fire," "fire" need not be a common noun in my apprehension more than "London." The word may recall to my memory the experience of a fire which I have known elsewhere, or of some vivid description which I have read. It is of course difficult to draw the line and to say where the office of memory ends, and where abstraction takes its place.[2]

Memory has an important function in the whole rhetorical process. Newman indicates that memory has an indispensable function in invention. It helps the speaker in his preparation "to form, out of [/the/] passive impressions as experience has heretofore left on [/the/] mind, new images."[3] Besides serving the speaker in the preparation

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 26.

[3] Ibid., p. 27.

of his speech, memory also functions when the speaker has to recall the arrangement of his speech. Although Newman does not make the specific application to rhetoric, the speaker can use either the device of simple recall or association to recapture the plan of the speech or some figure of speech.

As will be shown more extensively in the chapter on delivery, Newman was opposed to the complete memorization of the speech. He implies that "to get it [/a discourse/] by heart"[1] causes the speaker to be indirect with his audience. The speaker becomes more occupied with the recall of fine images than with the communication of thought.

Development and Training

Newman indicates that memory can be developed early in life. The rapid development of the memory of a boy at school tends to prove this assumption:

> A boy's business when he goes to school is to learn, that is, to store up things in his memory. For some years his intellect is little more than an instrument for taking in facts, or a receptacle for storing them: he welcomes them as fast as they come to him.[2]

The reason for the quick maturation and development of the memory at the early stage of the boy's life is due to the predominantly sensuous activity, Newman infers:

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[1] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 424.

[2] Ibid., p.127.

> ... he lives on what is without; he has his eyes ever about him; he has a lively susceptibility of impression; he imbibes information of every kind; and little does he make his own in a true sense of the word, living rather upon the neighbours around him.[1]

Although recognizing the hierarchy between reason and memory, Newman observes that a strong memory can become an impediment to the proper function of reason. "Memory can tyrannize, as well as the Imagination," Newman states.[2] Such persons, who suffer from this tyranny of the memory, manifest little or no emotional response to the words they utter. This lack of emotion in their speech results from the fact that they have not thought through, and thought out their speeches. And while they seem to manifest to their audience that they possess knowledge, they appear not to be possessed by it. In such speakers one association fires off the memory into effecting a whole chain reaction of associations. This phenomenon often happens in the case of speakers of studious habits of mind. Newman states:

> No one, who has had experience of men of studious habits, but must recognize the existence... of those who have over-stimulated the Memory. In such persons Reason acts almost as feebly and as impotently as in the madman; once fairly started on any subject whatever, they have no power of self-control; they passively endure the succession of impulses which are evolved out of the original exciting cause; they are passed on from one idea to another and go steadily forward,

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[1] Ibid., p. 128.

[2] Ibid., p. 141.

plodding along one line of thought.[1]

Newman accepts the fact that reason must depend on the memory. He does not deny that a strong and ready memory is in itself a real treasure; he does not disparage a well-stored and strongly disciplined memory. But he believes that an overstimulated memory, although good in itself, can impede the development of reason, the higher faculty.

Both Cicero and Quintilian discuss and advocate the development and training of memory by artificial means. Cicero recommends the memoria technica attributed to Simonides. Concerning this method he states:

> ... persons desiring to train this faculty must select localities and form mental images of the fact they wish to remember and store those images in the localities, with the result that the arrangement of the localities will preserve the order of the facts, and the images of the facts will designate the facts themselves, and we shall employ the localities and images respectively as a wax writing tablet and the letters written on it.[2]

Having described extensively the memoria technica recommended by Cicero, Quintilian rejects it as too complicated:

> For how can our words be expected to flow in connected speech, if we have to look back at separate symbols for each individual word? Therefore the experts mentioned by Cicero as having trained their memory by methods of this kind, namely Charmadas, and Metrodorus of Scepsis, to whom I have just referred, may keep their systems for their own use. My precepts

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Cicero De Oratore ii. 86. 354.

on the subject shall be of a simpler kind.[1]

Two of the simpler kinds of methods recommended by Quintilian are a system of mnemonics and writing. Of the two latter methods he states that writing "is at once more expeditious and more effective":

> Both learning by heart and writing have this feature in common: namely, that good health, sound digestion, and freedom from other pre-occupations of mind contribute largely to the success of both.... Thus it results that after writing for several days with a view to acquiring by heart what we have written, we find that our mental effort has of itself imprinted it on our memory.[2]

Newman does not completely agree with Cicero and Quintilian. While agreeing with them to the extent that a memoria technica is indispensable to learning letters, he holds with Plato[3] that habitually committing to writing things we desire to remember weakens the memory:

> ... association has so much to do with memory that we may not unfairly consider memory... depending on certain previous conditions. Writing, as I have already observed, is a memoria technica, or logic of memory. Now it will be found, I think, that indispensable as is the use of letters, still, in fact, we weaken our memory in proportion as we habituate ourselves to commit all that we wish to remember to memorandums.[4]

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria xi. 2. 26.

[2]Ibid., xi. 2. 35; xi. 2. 10.

[3]Plato Phaedrus 275A. Plato asserts that the use of written characters is a hindrance to memory, on the ground that once we have committed a thing to writing we cease to guard it in memory, and lose it because of carelessness.

[4]Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 337.

Therefore, mutatis mutandis, Newman holds that a person who has a good natural memory should not rely upon artificial methods or techniques. For those who do not have a strong memory he reserves the expedient of writing: "Of course in proportion as our memory is weak or overburdened, and thereby treacherous, we cannot act otherwise."[1] The person with a strong memory Newman counsels to have no traffic with expedients or techniques:

> ... in the case of men of strong memory in any particular subject-matter, as in that of dates, all artificial expedients, from the "Thirty days has September," etc., to the more formidable formulas which are offered for their use, are as difficult and repulsive as the natural exercise of memory is healthy and easy to them; just as the clear-headed and practical reasoner, who sees conclusions at a glance, is uncomfortable under the drill of a logician, being oppressed and hampered, as David in Saul's armour, by what is intended to be a benefit.[2]

In spite of the fact that sometimes it will be in error, a well developed natural memory usually should be trusted. Since we trust our reason continually, even though it often deceives us, so should we trust our memory, even though it deceives us. To refuse to trust "a strong and ready memory" is to cut oneself off from a real treasure.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Newman, Parochial and Plain Sermons, op. cit., I, 191-192.

Conclusions

(1) Newman names memory as the fourth constituent element of the art of rhetoric. In naming memory as the fourth element, we observe that he is in agreement with Cicero and Quintilian.

(2) Like Cicero, Newman holds that all the senses can impress their images on the faculty of memory. In addition to this fundamental agreement with Cicero, he manifests another significant affinity to the doctrine of the Roman Orator in remarking that, whereas the past experiences can be recalled through the faculty of memory, the impressions received by the sense of sight are retained more vividly than those received through the other senses.

(3) Memory has an important function in the whole rhetorical process. Newman indicates that memory has an indispensable function in invention. It helps the speaker in his preparation. Besides serving the speaker in the preparation of his speech, memory also functions when the speaker has to recall the arrangement of the speech at the time of delivery. Although Newman does not make the specific application to rhetoric, the speaker can use either the device of simple recall or association to recapture the plan of the speech or some figure of speech.

(4) Newman does not agree completely with the opinions of Cicero and Quintilian as to the development of the artificial memory. Newman believes that a speaker who has a good natural memory should not rely upon artificial methods and techniques.

CHAPTER VII

DELIVERY

Newman recognizes that delivery is intimately connected with the processes of ethical and pathetical proof. Besides the casual observations already mentioned in this study, there is more definite and explicit doctrine on delivery in the works of Newman which still needs consideration and organization.

Newman's treatment of the topic of delivery does not follow the trends of some of his contemporaries. He gives little space in his works as to how the voice may be developed and the body managed.

Modes of Delivery

In general Newman discusses four modes of delivery: (1) the verbatim memorized sermon, (2) a sermon memorized as far as the main facts, (3) the completely ex-tempore sermon, (4) the sermon delivered from a manuscript.[1]

While admitting these four modes of delivery, the main burden of the discussion centers around the problem

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[1] Newman, Idea, op. cit., pp. 420-425. See also Institutio Oratoria. Quintilian discusses the ex-tempore method of delivery in the tenth book of the Institutio Oratoria and the memorized speech in the eleventh book.

of whether the priest should have a manuscript in the pulpit.

In approaching the discussion as to whether or not the preacher should use a manuscript, Newman recognizes that he is entering upon a "delicate question":

> ... considering that Irish practice of preaching without a book, which is in accordance with that of foreign countries, and, as it would appear, with the tradition of the Church from the first, (it) is not universally adopted in England, nor, as I believe, in Scotland; and it might seem unreasonable or presumptuous to abridge a liberty at present granted to a preacher.[1]

That his personal feelings and judgment will influence his conclusion on this matter, he admits frankly.

First of all, considering the question from the standpoint of usage, Newman states that it has been the universal rule in Catholic countries, both contemporaneously and in the past, to deliver a sermon without that aid of a book or manuscript. He asserts, although this is his honest opinion, he has not come to this conclusion from thorough and extensive research. He states:

> I do not speak as if I had consulted a library, and made my ground sure; but at first sight it would appear impossible, even from the number of homilies and commentaries which are assigned to certain Fathers, as to St. Augustine,... that they could have delivered them from formally-written compositions.[2]

On the other hand, he notes that some of the

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 420.

[2]Ibid.

sermons of the saints appear to have been delivered from a manuscript, or at least written out before the actual presentation. Newman judges that "St. Leo's sermons certainly are in the strict sense of the word, compositions."[1] Concerning the sermons of St. John Chrysostom, he states:

> ... though I do not profess to be well read in the works of St. Chrysostom, there is generally in such portions of them as are known to those of us who are in Holy Orders, a peculiarity, an identity of style, which enables one to recognize the author at a glance, even in the latin version of the Breviary, and which would seem to be quite beyond the mere fidelity of the reporters. It would seem, then, he must after all have written them; and if he did write at all, it is most likely that he wrote with the stimulus of preaching before him...[2]

Newman questions whether a sermon which involves so delicate and complicated an organization of thought and language as to force the speaker to use a manuscript should be considered a sermon. He states his opinion categorically: "a discourse which, from its fineness and precision of ideas, is too difficult for a preacher to deliver without such extraneous assistance [/a book or manuscript/] is too difficult for a hearer to follow."[3] If the preacher decides it is advisable for him to put into writing an important discourse, Newman believes that

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 421.

[3] Ibid., p. 424.

"he will find it equally a point of propriety and expediency not to read it in the pulpit."[1]

Passing from the arguments of custom and propriety, Newman next considers a psychological reason for not using a manuscript in the pulpit. What is the instinctive feeling of most preachers when they decide to carry a manuscript sermon into the pulpit? Preachers have an impulse to conceal the manuscript from their audience. Newman points out, therefore, that the preacher's attempt to conceal the manuscript manifests that the sermon needs an apology:

> To conceal it, indeed, in one way or other, will be his natural impulse; and this very circumstance seems to show us that to read a sermon needs an apology. For, why should he commit it to memory, or conceal his use of it, unless he felt it was more natural, and more decorous, to do without it.[2]

Another disadvantage of using a manuscript in the delivery of a sermon is that the eye contact between the speaker and the audience is frequently disturbed. The manuscript at intervals in the sermon becomes an obstacle between the priest and the people whom he is addressing. The manuscript tends to make the priest indirect. Newman mentions that when the preacher reads his sermon from a manuscript the tone of his voice sometimes becomes distorted and unnatural:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 424.

> And so again, if he employs a manuscript, the more he appears to dispense with it, the more he looks off from it, and directly addresses his audience, the more will he be considered to preach; and on the other hand, the more will he be judged to come short of preaching the more sedulous he is in following his manuscript line after line, and by the tone of his voice make it clear that he had got it safely before him.[1]

Newman comments further by saying people usually object to the preacher reading his sermon. People ask why should they go to Church;" they can read their book at home quite as well." Newman remarks that "It is quite true that they can read their book at home, and it is difficult to know what to rejoin."[2] The manuscript sermon, Newman infers, keeps people from going to church. Why should they go; what is got by going to public service, he asks:

> The prayers are from a printed book, the sermon is from a manuscript. The printed prayers they have already; and, as to the manuscript sermon, why should it be in any respects better than the volume of sermons which they have at home? Why should not an approved author be as good as one who had not yet submitted himself to criticism? And again, if it is to be read in the church, why may not one person read it quite as well as another? Good advice is good advice, all the world over.[3]

The strongest disadvantage and objection Newman has to the manuscript sermon is that it tends to obscure the ethos of the preacher.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 425.

[3] Ibid.

If he does without a manuscript, the audience expects more from the preacher, and thinks more of him. Preachers err who think the most important element in delivery is a "good manuscript." Newman states: "there is something more, then, than composition in a sermon; there is something personal in preaching; people are drawn and moved, not simply by what is said, but how it is said, and who says it."[1] Newman believes therefore that it is no extravagance to say that "a very inferior sermon, delivered without a manuscript, answers more perfectly and effectively the purpose for which all sermons are delivered than one of great merit, first written then read to an audience."[2]

Newman holds that the traditional concept of the sermon implies that it be delivered without manuscript. But he admits that because of individual differences and deficiencies this general principle can be modified to advantage. He notes that all men will not speak equally well without a manuscript, "just as their voices are not equally clear and loud, or their manner equally impressive."[3]

Again in the case of a particular preacher, Newman infers that "circumstances may constantly arise which render the use of a manuscript the more advisable

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[1] Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 425.

[2] Ibid., p. 427.

[3] Ibid.

course."[1] He instances the university preacher, who must discourse before the university audience. Such a speaker might justly carry a manuscript into the pulpit.

Relation of Newman's Theory to the Classical Writers

As an element of rhetorical theory, delivery has received an uneven treatment at the hands of the classical writers; sometimes it is regarded as worthy of separate discussion; or, as incorporated with the discussion of ethos; again, as the natural expression of the feelings.

Although regarding the art of delivery as of the utmost importance and a subject previously neglected, Aristotle discusses the topic only briefly;[2] on the other hand, Quintilian devotes practically a whole book to delivery;[3] Cicero not only discusses it thoroughly, but states that the style of delivery is the dominant factor in oratory; considering only the content of the De Doctrina Christiana, St. Augustine has written little concerning the theory of delivery.

If a quantitative measure were used to judge and evaluate the theory of Cardinal Newman in relation to the problems of delivery, the obvious conclusion would be that he had little interest in it. In volume, the doctrine of Newman on delivery is compressed and concise. Thus Newman

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Aristotle Rhetoric iii. 1. 1404[a].

[3] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria xi. 3 ff.

is like Aristotle. The small volume of material, however, does not preclude Newman from enunciating a definite philosophy of delivery.

Because he directs his remarks to maturer audiences, and also because he seems to presume that his audiences already have some facility and skill in the control of the voice and the management of the body, Newman does not discuss techniques either of voice or of gesture. The author of the Institutio Oratoria treats extensively, not only the nature of the voice, but also the manner in which it should be used.[1] In regard to gestures, Quintilian treats methods of gesturing which pertain to the head, movement of the eyes, neck and the hands.[2] Addressing an educated audience, Newman establishes a philosophical viewpoint at the very beginning. He states that there is a genetic relationship between thought and expression, and that delivery must be subordinate to the matter or the thought of the speaker:

> Thought and word are one in the Eternal Logos, and must not be separate in those who are His shadows on earth. They must issue fresh and fresh, as from the preacher's mouth, so from his breast, if they are to be 'spirit and life' to the hearts of his hearers.[3]

Whereas Newman relates delivery to the intellectual content

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria xi. 3. 14 ff.

[2]Ibid., xi. 3. 69 ff.

[3]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 426.

of the speech, Aristotle and Cicero discussed delivery in special relation to the feelings of the speaker. Aristotle states:

> The art of delivery has to do with the voice: with the right management of it to express each several emotion... as when to use a loud voice, when a soft, when the intermediate; with the mode of using pitch--high, low, and intermediate; and with the rhythms to be used in each particular case.[1]

Cicero takes the same viewpoint in the De Oratore:

> ... there can be no doubt that reality beats imitation in everything; and if reality unaided were sufficiently effective in presentation, we should have no need at all for art. But because emotion, which mostly has to be displayed or else counterfeited by action, is often so confused as to be obscured and almost smothered out of sight, we have to dispel the things that obscure it and take up its prominent and striking points. For nature has assigned to every emotion a particular look and tone of voice and bearing of its own; and the whole of a person's frame and every look on his face and utterance of his voice are like the strings of a harp, and sound accordingly as they are struck by each successive emotion.[2]

Newman implies that "words, tones and the actions of the preacher," regardless of the skill he might have acquired in the control or management of the voice and body, should not obscure the ethos of the preacher or cause him to lose sight of his aim:

> I am far from forgetting that every one has his own talent, and that one has not what another has. Eloquence is a divine gift, which to a certain point supersedes rules,

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric iii. 1. 1404[a].

[2]Cicero De Oratore iii. 57. 215, 216.

> and is to be used, like other gifts, to the glory of the Giver, and then only to be discountenanced when it forgets its place, when it throws into the shade and embarrasses the essential functions of the Christian preacher, and claims to be cultivated for its own sake instead of being made subordinate and subservient to a higher work and to sacred objects.[1]

With St. Augustine and Quintilian, Newman maintains that delivery can be improved through practice and training.[2] On this point Quintilian declares:

> The good qualities of voice, like everything else are improved by training.... But the training required by the orator is not the same as that practiced by the singing-master, although the two methods have many points in common.[3]

Whereas Quintilian discusses explicitly particular phases of training and exercises for the voice, throat and lungs, Newman, in an expression reflective of the philosophy of training of St. Augustine, briefly states:

> ... most men, unless they have passed the age for learning, may with practice attain such fluency in expressing their thoughts as will enable them to convey and manifest to their audience that earnestness and devotion to their object, which is the life of preaching.[4]

Although he mentions the qualities which constitute good style, Newman does not, as Quintilian does, name qualities of good delivery.

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., pp. 426-427.

[2]Ibid., p. 427. See also De Doctrina Christiana iv. 3. 4.

[3]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria xi. 3. 19.

[4]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 427. See also De Doctrina Christiana iv. 3. 4.

Conclusions

(1) Newman discusses four modes of delivery:

a. the verbatim memorized sermon
b. the sermons memorized as far as the main facts
c. the completely ex-tempore sermon
d. the sermon delivered from a manuscript.

(2) Newman concludes that the priest should deliver his sermon without a manuscript.

(3) In contrast to Quintilian and Cicero, Newman does not mention the nature of voice and gestures, nor the methods by which the voice can be exercised or improved. This gap in his rhetorical theory is a definite deficiency. He does, however, suggest that the delivery of the speaker can be improved by practice and training.

(4) Newman states that there is a genetic kinship between thought and expression, and that delivery of a speech must be subordinated to the thought-content of the speech.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize the conclusions of each of the preceding chapters in order to present: (1) a perspective of Newman's rhetorical theory, and (2) a perspective of his place in the rhetorical tradition.

I. Newman Had a Thorough Education and Background in Classical Rhetoric.

Through his education and personal acquaintances at Oxford, Newman came into contact with the best rhetorical tradition. The formal course of studies at Oxford introduced him to the classical writings of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. His writings show that he extended his knowledge of Aristotle and Cicero by additional personal study. The works of Newman, while indicating his admiration of Cicero, also signify that he knew the Nichomachean Ethics and the Organon. Being a member of the Oriel Common Room, he frequently conversed with Richard Whately and Edward Copleston, two of the outstanding authorities on classical rhetoric in the middle years of the nineteenth century.

II. Newman's Conception of Rhetoric Is Consistent with the Classical Tradition as Represented by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and St. Augustine.

In all his definitions and divisions of the art of rhetoric, Newman represents essentially the classical rhetorical doctrines. He states that rhetoric is concerned with the probable and its end is persuasion. In principle his definitions of rhetoric are in agreement with the opinion of Cicero.

According to the classical tradition, Newman places rhetoric in its ancient locus as one of the seven liberal arts. He traces the transmission of the art of rhetoric through the tradition of the seven liberal arts. He names the Fathers of the Church as the nexus between the pagan rhetoricians and the Middle Ages.

Newman distinguishes rhetoric from logic, poetry, and grammar. He perceives that while logic, poetry, and grammar have some common points of contact with rhetoric, they should be distinguished from rhetoric according to the formal objects of these respective arts.

III. Newman's Doctrine Concerning Invention Includes Theory on Preparation, Topics, and Modes of Proof.

When compared to the extensive treatment of this subject by the pagan rhetoricians, Newman's discussion of topics is brief. He gives specific directions to the preacher for the selection of a topic for a sermon.

Newman develops the element of preparation with special reference to the preacher. His treatment is more thorough and more extensive than that of all the representatives of the classical tradition except Quintilian. Newman states that not only general preparation of the speaker is necessary, but also special preparation for each speech situation.

Newman's theory on preparation involves three directives: (1) the speaker should have a broad and liberal education; (2) he should include in his special preparation an accurate analysis of the audience; (3) he should select a topic which is based on the audience analysis and one which is definite and pertinent to the needs of the audience.

In agreement with the representatives of the classical tradition, Newman signifies that there are three modes of artificial proof: logical, ethical, and pathetical. Since the materiale quod of rhetoric is the contingent, Newman notes that strict demonstrations should not be expected or required of the orator.

Although his ex professo doctrine embraces an exposition of formal and informal reasoning, Newman states that logic makes a sorry rhetoric with the multitude. He indicates that the most satisfactory and effective means of logical proof is the process of converging probabilities.

Like Aristotle, Newman considers the speaker the keystone of the actual rhetorical situation. He believes

that the ethos of the speaker is the most powerful means of persuasion in deliberative oratory. He specifically mentions that the speaker persuades not only by what he says but by what he is.

With Aristotle, Quintilian, and St. Augustine, Newman admits that a man of bad character may be persuasive. He does not approve, however, that a man of bad character preach what he does not practice. When the audience learns that a preacher does not practice what he preaches, Newman indicates that his subsequent influence and persuasiveness will be weakened.

The three qualities which comprise Newman's conception of ethos are character, intelligence, and sympathy. Newman is distinctive inasmuch as he requires that the speaker should actually possess these qualities. He differs, therefore, from Aristotle and Cicero who allow the speaker merely to give the impression of intelligence, moral probity, and good will. In naming the theological virtues of faith and love as the sources of the qualities of the preacher, Newman goes further than the pagan writers in his analysis of ethos. He also believes that the ethos of the speaker depends not only on his appearance and conduct at the time of the speech, but also on his previous conduct and reputation. With his emphasis on the part judgment plays in practical wisdom, Newman implies the doctrine of choice.

Like Aristotle and Quintilian, Newman avers that

pathos belongs especially to forensic oratory. He cautions the preacher about his use of some of the methods commonly employed by speakers in the law courts.

Newman adheres to the persuasion-conviction duality and to the Aristotelian-Thomistic interpretation of how the feelings indirectly influence the movement of the will. He signifies that the ruder and more ordinary feelings are proper to rhetoric. In this connection he names anger, indignation, emulation, martial spirit, and the love of independence as pertinent to rhetoric. He firmly opposes the indiscriminate excitation of the emotions of an audience.

Pathos, he says, should arise out of the sense and meaning of the speaker's words and actions. While it is evident that Newman follows Aristotle's doctrine on pathos and the emotions, his treatment is briefer and less explicit than Aristotle's extensive study of the emotions.

IV. Newman Conceives of the Arrangement of the Sermon from a Biological Point of View.

Newman's theory reflects the doctrine of Aristotle found in the Poetics, and is significantly different from the theory of some classical writers who viewed arrangement architectonically. He admits that he is even going beyond "the practice of the great Catholic preachers." He states that nothing is so fatal to persuasion than the habit of preaching on three or four

subjects at once. His directive to form a categorical proposition is proposed in order to preclude the possibility of preaching a sermon on three or four subjects or arranging the sermon according to points.

He notes two causes of faulty arrangement: (1) the speaker's loss of control of the sequence of ideas; (2) the writer's or speaker's inordinate concern with the parts of the speech, and loss of sight of the whole plan of the speech.

V. Newman Founds his Doctrine on Style on the Fundamental Relation between Thought and Language.

In establishing the relation between thought and language, Newman reflects clearly the opinion of Cicero and Quintilian. He says that style is a thinking out into language. It is not an end in itself, but the means of conveying thought. He declares that he cannot defend the practice of Isocrates and the Sophists, who were set on words to the neglect of thought.

Since language is based on thought, Newman holds the speaker strictly responsible for his words. To express in language ideas which are different from the truth in the speaker's mind is to lie and deceive. Newman deprecates expressly those speakers who use unreal words. He does not condemn, however, all language which over-reaches the feelings of the speaker. He is opposed rather to language which represents things different from what

the speaker feels, or contrary to his actual opinions or beliefs.

Style, Newman says, is not a "trick or a trade," neither an addition from without, but the expression of the personality of the speaker. A truly great speaker, he contends, projects his personality and thought into his words to the extent that his style is himself. The personality of the speaker actually impressed on his style explains the variations and differences by which speakers express their thoughts in language.

VI. Newman Names Memory as the Fourth Constituent Element of the Art of Rhetoric.

Memory has an important function in the whole rhetorical process. Newman indicates that memory has an indispensable function in invention. It helps the speaker in his preparation "to form out of [/the/] passive impressions as experiences has heretofore left on [/the/] mind new images." Besides serving the speaker in the preparation of the speech, memory also functions when the speaker has to recall the arrangement of his speech at the time of delivery.

Like Cicero, he holds that all the senses impress their images on the faculty of memory. In addition to this fundamental agreement with Cicero, he manifests a significant affinity to the doctrine of the Roman Orator in remarking that, whereas past experiences can be recalled

through the faculty of memory, the impressions received by the sense of sight are retained more vividly than those received through the other senses.

Newman does not agree completely with the opinions of Cicero and Quintilian as to the education of the memory. He believes that a speaker with a good natural memory should not use or rely upon artificial methods and techniques.

VII. Newman Holds that Delivery Should be Subordinated to the Matter or Thought of the Speech.

Whereas Aristotle and Quintilian consider delivery in relation to the feelings, Newman relates delivery to the intellectual content of the speech. In contrast to Quintilian and Cicero, Newman does not discuss in extenso the nature of the voice and gestures, nor the methods by which the voice can be exercised or improved.

In regard to the delivery of the sermon, Newman contends that the matter should not be so involved as to demand the preacher's use of a manuscript in the pulpit. Even a very inferior sermon, he says, delivered without a manuscript answers more perfectly and effectively the purpose for which all sermons are delivered than one of great merit which is read from a manuscript.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF CARDINAL NEWMAN

In this appendix a brief sketch of the life of Cardinal Newman is presented in order to provide a proper perspective for the Cardinal's rhetorical theory. No attempt will be made to present material not already exposed or implied in reputable biographies of Newman, nor will attention be given to any interpretations or relationships which have been found through contemplating the facts of his life.[1]

Childhood and Early Education

John Henry Newman was born in London on Old Broad Street, February 21, 1801. His father was a London banker whose family had come from Cambridgeshire. His mother, the former Miss Fourdinier, was of French descent. There were six children in the Newman household, three brothers and three sisters. John was the eldest.

Newman spent his childhood at Grey's Court, Ham. At the age of seven he entered the boarding school at

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[1]In addition to biographies of Newman, the material in this chapter is drawn from Newman's Apologia Pro Vita Sua and his Letters and Correspondence, the latter edited by Anne Mozley.

Ealing where he remained until 1816. The rapid progress of his young mind is shown in a modest entry in an old diary:

> 1810, May 25.--Got into Ovid and Greek.
> 1811, February 11.--Began verses.
> 1812, March.--Got into Deatessaron.
> May 25.--Began Homer.
> 1813, May.--Herodotus.[1]

In 1813 Newman participated in one of the school's annual Latin plays, and delivered a reconstruction of a House of Commons debate of 1743, assuming the role of Sir William Wyndham. He declaimed Ajax in 1816. A contemporary of Newman's at Ealing remarks:

> Ealing at that date had a great name. It was conducted on Eton lines; everybody sent his sons there; they got on. Once a year the school had a great day--a speech day--and the Duke of Kent used to come to it. One year Newman had to make a speech before him. Unfortunately his voice had just begun to break, yet for all that he went through his speech. He must have done it very well so far as his voice would let him; for, on Dr. Nicholas apologizing to the Duke, "His voice is breaking," the Duke immediately replied "But the action was so good."[2]

At fourteen, the passion for writing seems already to have possessed him. He notes some of his first literary productions in the following report:

> In 1815 I wrote two periodicals--that is, papers called the "Spy" and the "Anti-Spy." They were written against each other. The former ran to thirty numbers from May 8 to October 27, the

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[1]John Henry Newman, Letters and Correspondence, ed. Anne Mozley (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1920), I, 15.

[2]Ibid., p. 16.

latter ran to twenty seven numbers from August 8 to October 31.[1]

As regards his early religious impressions, Newman gives a rather searching and honest account in his Apologia. Speaking of his earliest recollections, he writes: "I was brought up from a child to take a great delight in reading the Bible, but I had no formed religious convictions till I was fifteen. Of course I had a perfect knowledge of the Catechism."[2] His reading seems to have influenced his young imagination, preparing him for his acceptance of Evangelicalism. "I used to wish the Arabian Tales were true; my imagination ran on unknown influences, on magical powers and talismans."[3]

Two tremendous events occurred when Newman was fifteen. Both of them are linked together and give insight into the young boy's mental and religious struggles. In March, 1816, in the midst of the economic uncertainty following the close of the Napoleonic war, his father's bank stopped payment, and he experienced a conversion to which he refers in his Apologia:

> I received it at once, and believe that the inward conversion of which I was conscious, (and of which I still am more certain than I have hands and feet) would last into the next life, and that I was elected to eternal glory. I have no consciousness that this

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 1.

[3] Ibid., p. 4.

> belief had any tendency whatever to lead me to be careless about pleasing God. I retained it till the age of twenty-one, when it gradually faded away.[1]

Education and Tutorship at Oxford

Newman went to Oxford as a commoner and matriculated at Trinity College on December 14, 1816. The following year he was elected scholar at Trinity, and in June, 1819, he entered Lincoln's Inn as a student. In 1820, principally because of overwork and sheer exhaustion, he failed to obtain an honors degree. Nevertheless, his industry and intellectual talent were recognized widely and acclaimed openly by the tutors. His failure to gain high honors in these latter examinations, however, caused a direct change in Newman's career. It seems that his father had intended him to study for the bar. But in 1821, Newman, partially influenced by his failure in the honors examinations, expressed a desire to take orders. Undaunted by his previous unhappy experience in the honors examinations, he began to prepare himself for the coveted Oriel Fellowship Examinations. The Oriel Fellowship was the natural ambition of the most capable students at Oxford, for Oriel in Newman's time was the reforming college. Less than two months after coming of age, in April, 1822, he was elected.

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[1]John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), p. 2.

Newman's subsequent career at Oriel may be conveniently divided into three periods. During the first period, between 1822 and 1827, he was under the influence of Whately and the Noetics.[1] The second period between 1828 and 1832 was signalized by the end of Newman's incipient liberalism,[2] his appointment to the vicarage of

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[1] J. H. Overton, The English Church of the 19th Century (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1894), p. 117. The most distinguished men of Oriel, Whately, Keble, Davidson, Froude, Arnold and Hawkins, were called Noetics. The exact meaning is not clear. Canon Overton derives the term from the writings of Aristotle and said that a Noetic is "a man who exercised his highest faculties, as opposed to those who let them lie dormant."

[2] Newman, Apologia, op. cit., p. 293. See also Newman's poem on "Liberalism" in Verses on Various Occasions (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1903), p. 140, and Harrold, John Henry Newman, op. cit., pp. 163-164. "... the Liberalism against which Newman was a lifelong foe was not at all the political and economic Liberalism of Gladstone, John Bright, or John Stuart Mill.... [It] was virtually a continuation of the deistic spirit of the seventeenth century. He had been horrified by the possible return of that spirit when he observed the tendencies of the Noetics of Oxford, who, after the manner of the Deists (Toland, Collins, Tindal), wished to banish the mysterious and the irrational from religion. This kind of Liberalism, said Newman, consisted in a 'pride of reason,' a 'false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters, in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore it is out of place.'" For Newman, such matters are first principles of whatever kind. When thought is applied to these principles then contradictions and paradoxes spring up; the mind is dazzled with its own powers, and takes delight in doubting.... Thus Liberalism, as Newman understands it, is 'the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and values of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the "anti-dogmatic spirit, which fails to sense the life and objective reality and authority inherent in dogma."

St. Mary's and his personal difference with Hawkins, the provost of Oriel, over the spiritual direction of students under his tutelage. This same period was marked by his gradual moving away from Whately, and his new and lasting friendship with Hurrell Froude. Climactically, there was the third and momentous period of the Tractarian Movement, 1833 to 1845.

Years later, looking back over his career at Oxford, Newman considered that 1826 was a focal point. He speaks of some of the events and changes that took place:

> Things changed in 1826. At that time I became one of the tutors of my college, and this gave me position; besides I had written one or two essays which had been well received. I began to be known. Next year I was one of the public examiners for the B. A. degree. It was to me like the feeling of Spring after Winter; and if I may so speak, I came out of my shell.[1]

At this time Newman began to have an influence on his associates. Whately, whom Newman had assisted, began to observe the first storm warnings of a new party gathering around Newman. Newman was to form strong ties of friendship with two of the most promising Oriel men, Robert Wilberforce and Hurrell Froude, both of whom were elected to fellowships in 1826. A shrewd observer, Mr. Richards, who knew Newman during this period said: "There is a fellow, who, when he is silent, will never begin to speak; and when he once begins to speak will never

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[1]Newman, Apologia, op. cit., p. 16. See also Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op.cit., I, 131-133.

stop."[1] Newman's appointment as College tutor was to give him greater opportunity in influencing the undergraduate students. He at first accepted the appointment as tutor with misgivings and hesitation. Like others before him, Newman considered the position of tutor incompatible with the vow of ordination. There was another reason for his hesitation. He had always had a personal desire to undertake missionary work in some heathen country.[2]

In addition to his tutorial duties, Newman extended his activity and influence into other areas. He had been ordained a deacon in 1824, the year of his father's death; he was appointed to the Curacy of St. Clement's in May of that year; he accepted more responsibility when Whately selected him as his vice-principal at St. Albans Hall in 1825, and it was in May of this year that he received the sacerdotal order. In 1828 when Hawkins was made Provost of Oriel, Newman was presented by his college to the Vicarage of St. Mary's, the University Church. To this church, through the strength of his sermons, he was soon to attract most of the important people of Oxford. He became the University preacher in 1831.

Following his appointment to the Vicarage of St. Mary's, and despite the demands of his new administrative duties, Newman was also busy in writing and preaching.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 7.

Besides composing sermons, he found time to write an essay on Aristotle for the London Review;[1] he also contributed essays on Cicero and Appolonius of Tyna to the Encyclopedia Metropolitana,[2] and composed a portion of Whately's Elements of Logic.[3] By 1829, he was considered one of the most promising men at Oxford. He preached at the evening service at St. Mary's. And it was through this series of Sunday sermons that his enviable reputation as a preacher was first established. One writer calls him the most remarkable preacher who ever stepped into an Anglican pulpit.[4] Flood, one of his audience, spoke of his sermons:

> Month by month, year by year, they went on each continuing and deepening the impression the last one made. The wonderful effect of his preaching on the most distinguished of his contemporaries, at a time when Oxford was especially rich in able men, had been recorded by many who heard him long after the impressionable period of youth had passed, and their testimony is more than sufficient to establish the last fame of Newman as a great preacher.[5]

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[1]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 169.

[2]John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), I, 245.

[3]Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (New York: W. Jackson, 1832), p. viii.

[4]J. M. Flood, Cardinal Newman and Oxford (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1933), p. 157.

[5]Ibid. See also Harrold, John Henry Newman, op. cit., p. 333 ff. "Newman's twelve volumes of sermons fall into three divisions. The first group, the

It is said that Newman's Parochial Sermons, circulating in the early nineteenth century when it was customary to have sermons published, "beat all other sermons out of the market as Scott's tales beat all other stories."[1]

In 1830 Newman began to write a history of the Arians of the fourth century.[2] His study of the Fathers two years earlier prepared him ideally for the project. Personally, he seemed to welcome the opportunity. He soon began to discover a close resemblance between the period of the Arian heresy and the position held by the Church of England. Within two years, by June of 1832, he had finished the book.

Parochial and Plain Sermons, eight volumes, published individually between 1834 and 1843, contain sermons written or preached between January 23, 1825, and April 30, 1843.... They are exquisitely simple in the literary art with which they give body to abstract argument without seeming to do so... [/and/] are marked with Newman's literal application of scriptural imagery, with the technique of fear and pity, and with his sacramental view of visible phenomena as a veil hiding the glories of the spiritual world. There are remnants of Calvinistic teaching and the tone is generally one of mystery and awe.... The second group of sermons comprises the Oxford University Sermons and Sermons on Subjects of the Day, both volumes published in 1843.... Their central theme is the interrelation of faith and reason.... Newman's third and last group of sermons appears in Discourses to Mixed Congregations (1849) and Sermons Preached on Various Occasions (1857).... [/These/] sermons now have a new character; they are passionate, boldly imaginative, colorful, at times consciously rhetorical."

[1]William Barry, "Newman," Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X (1911) 797.

[2]Newman, Apologia, op. cit., p. 25.

Newman's capacity for work was always tremendous. He could push himself through sixteen to twenty hours a day, leaving practically no time for recreation. But he had extended himself so far in writing the Arians that he was almost at the point of physical exhaustion when the book was ready for publication. Rest was imperative.[1] With his friend Hurrell Froude, who himself was weakened by an organic disease, he planned to tour the Mediterranean.

Following his return to England, Newman set down clearly his feelings and reactions to Romanism: "As to the Roman Catholic System, I have ever detested it so much that I cannot detest it more by seeing it."[2] He adds that Rome is the most wonderful place in the world. But it was a city still under a curse.

Later Newman was to realize that none of the sights nor the external splendors of the Religion of Rome were to be the providential signs directing him into the Catholic Church. Rather, it was his life-long love and respect for dogma that was to be the guidepost.[3] Upon returning to England, Newman, however, did not consider immediately the resolution of his own religious problem.

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[1] Ibid., p. 32.

[2] Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 378.

[3] Ibid., p. 49. "I have changed in many things: in this I have not. From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion; I know no other religion; religion as a mere sentiment is to me a dream and a mockery."

His first action was to turn his attention away from himself to the national crisis which was facing him on all sides.

Oxford Movement

On his return to England in July, 1833, Newman heard the cry for disestablishment. He saw a multitude of dangers which could rend the Church of England from within as well as from without.[1] Forced to face up to these conditions, Newman gathered around him such prominent men as Froude, Keble, and Palmer. At their first meetings (some of them held in the Oriel Common Room) those present determined to unite and associate themselves in the common defense of the Church. Newman from the beginning was opposed to any formal organization.[2]

All agreed that something must be done; some action must be taken. But what was to be the specific goal; what, the *modus procedendi*? Although the mechanical device of organization had been advocated by a few, Newman thought that, while organizations, addresses, and

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 30. Newman notes that "the Whigs had come into power; Lord Grey had told the Bishops to 'set their house in order' and some of the Prelates had been insulted and threatened in the streets of London. The vital question was, how were we to keep the Church from being Liberalized?"

[2] Newman, *Apologia*, *op. cit.*, p. 40. Newman said of the group: "I would not have called it a party." See also Newman, *Letters and Correspondence*, *op. cit.*, I, 395.

resolutions might be useful, what the Church, the clergy, and the country really needed was plain speaking; that after delicate revision and meticulous censorship, plain speaking would not be had; nor could it be put forth through joint manifestoes and committee reports. Out of these first discussions came eventually the famous Tracts for the Times, and ultimately what others called the activity of the group, the Oxford Movement.[1]

Despite increasing opposition, the Movement began to gain stature almost immediately. For Newman it was the happiest time of his life. He was in the exultation of health restored and home regained. He experienced, he said, an exuberant and joyous energy which he never had before or since. He realized that he was the recognized leader and director of the great effort, and he personally had supreme confidence in the project:

> I had the consciousness that I was employed in that work which I had been dreaming about, and which I felt to be momentous and inspiring. I had a supreme confidence in our cause; we were upholding the primitive Christianity which was delivered for all times by the early teachers of the Church.... It would be, in fact, a

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[1]R. W. Church, The Oxford Movement (London: Macmillan and Co., 1892), p. 2. Dean Church indicates that the Oxford Movement was a reform movement within the Church. It began in 1833 over the occasion of the suppression of the Irish Bishoprics in Ireland and extended to 1845. Under the leadership of Newman, Richard Hurrell Froude, Isaac Williams and Charles Marriott, it "began, without doubt, in a vigorous effort for the immediate defence of the Church against serious dangers arising from the violent and threatening temper of the days of the Reform Bill."

> second Reformation--a better Reformation, for it would return not to the sixteenth century, but to the seventeenth.[1]

Some of the greatest names at Oxford comprised this group: Perceva l, Froude, the Kebles, and J. Bowden. All worked together; some worked behind the scenes; others were engaged in translating the Fathers; but, Newman wrote the most important, forcible, and pointed Tracts.

Along with the new activities of the Movement, Newman continued his four o'clock sermons at St. Mary's. The Tracts contributed to the effectiveness of the Movement, "but without the sermons of Newman the Movement might never have gone on, certainly would never have been what it was."[2] While the masses read and talked about the Tracts, a small but influential and intelligent group at St. Mary's saw for themselves in the sermons of the leader, Newman the incarnation of ethical righteousness and moral earnestness. Even the other members of the group clearly recognized and sincerely attested to his leadership, and to his intellectual and moral superiority. "He was never condescending... never didactic or authoritative,"[3] says his friend, Froude. The potentiality of

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[1] Newman, Apologia, op. cit., p. 43.

[2] Church, The Oxford Movement, op. cit., p. 130.

[3] J. A. Froude, Short Studies (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1883), pp. 282-283.

his whole personality coming to life at the time, and the power of his preaching equipped him ideally for influence and leadership in the Movement. Considering specifically his influence upon the young men at Oxford, Froude remarks that "among hundreds of young men, Credo in Newmanum was the genuine symbol of Faith."[1] From the beginning of the Movement, Newman stood out and remained the central figure. Compared to the others, "he was the first with no second.... The rest were all but ciphers, and he the indicating number."[2] Yet, despite the first external successes of the Movement, Newman began to experience interior unrest. In the Apologia he writes of his disquietude as "a stage of moral sickness, neither able to acquiese in Anglicanism, nor able to go to Rome."[3]

It was while he was undergoing this soreness of soul that Newman took up again the study of the early heresies. In studying closely the Monophysite controversy, he saw that he was supporting an analogous position, and grew alarmed at his discovery; he had seen a ghost; "... the shadow of the fifth century was on the sixteenth." His conviction was shaken so severely that he felt it necessary to clarify his ideas and justify his position. He enunciated his position in his renowned Tract 90 which

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[1] Ibid., p. 283.

[2] Ibid., p. 270.

[3] Newman, Apologia, op. cit., p. 166.

was published in 1841. The Hebdomadal Board of the Heads of the Houses soon censured this famous tract. In reaction to these outcries the Bishop of Oxford grew alarmed, and advised Newman to discontinue his series of Tracts.

Without entertaining any conscious idea of leaving the Anglican Church, Newman retired to Littlemore. But looking back on his experience with the Hebdomadal Board and the hasty decision of his bishop, Newman later admitted that those two events "put him on his deathbed as regards his membership in the Anglican Church."[1] His final passage from Anglicanism to Catholicism is marked out by his last appearance in the University pulpit on September 2, 1843; on September 18th he resigned at St. Mary's; on the 25th he preached his last sermon as an Anglican at Littlemore, the memorable "The Parting of Friends"; on October 3rd, he resigned his fellowship at Oriel. Following his resignation at St. Mary's, he considered himself as being in lay communion. On October 8th at Littlemore, he was received into the Catholic Church by Father Dominic, a member of the Passionist Congregation.

After he had become a Catholic, Newman stated he had "no further history of his religious opinions to narrate." He had arrived in "port after a rough storm."[2] But, although his own soul was at peace upon his conversion

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[1] Ibid., p. 147.

[2] Ibid., p. 238.

to Catholicism, a violent storm of pugnacious feelings and opinions was erupting around him. The heart of Anglicanism manifested a noticeable increase in pulse rate. Disraeli said that Newman's going to Rome gave the Anglican Church a shock from which it is still reeling and will never recover. The going of Newman, says Dean Church, was more than a defeat; it was a rout.

Following additional theological training at Rome, Newman was ordained a priest in 1846. For some time he had considered what course his future life should take. Finally, in 1847, he returned to England in order to establish an Oratory of St. Philip Neri near Birmingham. In 1850, he presented a course of twelve lectures on the Difficulties of Anglicans.

In 1852, Newman was appointed rector-elect of the projected Catholic University of Ireland. However, because of the lack of Ecclesiastical support from the Irish Episcopasy, he was forced to resign. This project produced four years of frustration for Newman. He had little more to show for his personal efforts than the immortal The Idea of a University which presented a pattern for the contemplated university. In the next year, Cardinal Wiseman asked Newman to undertake a new translation of the Bible into English. At about the same time a similar work had been planned under the direction of the Hierarchy in the United States. Bishop Kendrick of Baltimore was to be the chief mover of the American translation. Feeling

that he could not collaborate with the American Bishop, Newman completely withdrew from the scriptural project. In 1851 he presented a singularly successful series of lectures entitled The Present Position of Catholics in England. The outcome of these lectures was a libel suit with Giovanni G. Achilli, which resulted in Newman's being fined. His feeling of distrust and of misunderstanding deepened, and for the first time in his life he became aware of his age. In July, 1859, he wrote to Henry Wilberforce: "All through my life I have been plucked."[1]

Newman suddenly and dramatically saw his opportunity to explain and vindicate his position as a Catholic when Charles Kingsley attacked his character and honesty in the Macmillan's Magazine of January, 1864. From the general acceptance and reaction to his Apologia, Newman felt that the cloud of distrust and calumny which had enveloped him since his conversion had been lifted, He gained further reassurance when, in 1879, close upon the election of Leo XIII, the new Pontiff conferred on him the Cardinalate. Ward accurately observes:

> This mark of ecclesiastical confidence from the Holy See, after prolonged, aching sense of distrust in high quarters, was so unexpected and so signal, as to be the greatest event as well as the crowning reward of Newman's life.[2]

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[1]Wilfrid Ward, Life of Cardinal Newman (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912), I, 573.

[2]Ibid., II, 21.

In words of unmixed sentiments of joy and relief, their meaning unmistakable, Newman spoke his heart to his Oratorical Brethren over the significant gesture of the Holy Father: "The cloud is lifted from me forever."[1]

Newman spent the remaining years of his life in the relative obscurity of the Birmingham Oratory. One event during this period is permeated with nostalgia and brilliance. He returned to Trinity College, Oxford, on Trinity Sunday, 1880. There, before a tremendous audience, he preached at the Jesuit Church. On August 11, 1890, Newman died of a congestion of the lungs. At his own request, he was buried in the humble cemetery of the Oratorian Fathers. Above his grave is set a simple Latin cross inscribed with his own epitaph: Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem.

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[1] Ibid., p. 438.

APPENDIX II

RHETORICAL BACKGROUND

The purpose of this chapter is to examine and expose the educational forces which influenced and helped to shape the rhetorical theory of Cardinal Newman: (1) the Oxford Curriculum, (2) his associates in the Oriel Common Room, (3) study of the classical rhetorical theorists, and (4) study of the Fathers.

Oxford Curriculum

The twenty colleges of Oxford in Newman's times were by statute required to teach the elements of religion, mathematics, and the Greek and Roman classics.[1] In addition the student was required to select other courses under the direction of his tutor. It was the responsibility of the tutor to determine the needs of students reading for degrees and honors.[2]

In going to Oxford in 1816 Newman found himself in the tide of an intellectual awakening. The Edinburgh

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[1]William Knickerbocker, Creative Oxford (Syracuse, New York: University Press, 1925), p. 32.

[2]Louis Dyer, Oxford As It Is (London: Macmillan and Co., 1902), p. 10. See also C. E. Mallet, A History of the University of Oxford (London: Metuchen and Co.,) III, 59.

Review was partly responsible for this awakening. This recently founded review had from 1801 to 1810 directed a series of attacks on both Cambridge and Oxford. As a result a reform of the curriculum at Oxford was begun from which Newman was to benefit. He found himself subjected to a rigid system of courses and studies of the classics, together with some mathematics and history. Concerning his classical training at Oxford, Newman writes in an early letter to his parents:

> I had a declamation to do last week, a Latin one. I took a great deal of pains with it. As I was going to lecture today, I was stopped by the Fellow who looks over the declamations (the Dean, Mr. Kinsey), and to whom we recite them and was told by him that mine did me credit.[1]

In another letter home he remarks:

> In the interim between studying the beauties of the Rhetoric of Aristotle and enjoying the more substantial sweets of the College cook, allow me to give you proof of my proficiency in the lessons of the former man indicating to you a letter replete with rhetorical graces...[2]

Encouraged by his tutor Mr. Short and inspired by his own success and interest, Newman undertook and successfully passed the scholarship examination in 1818. In a letter to his mother on May 25th, he notes the contents of the examination:

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[1]Maisie Ward, Young Mr. Newman (London: Sheed and Ward, 1948), p. 43.

[2]Previously unpublished letter, quoted in Maisie Ward, Young Mr. Newman, op. cit., p. 49.

> They made me first do some verses; then Latin translation; then Latin theme; then chorus of Euripides; then an English theme; then some Plato; then some Lucretius; then some Xenophon; then some Livy.[1]

The Examination Statute of 1800 declares that all candidates must show "complete proficiency" in the Greek and Latin languages, in Rhetoric and Moral Philosophy as expressed in the Roman and Greek writers, in Logic and in Latin Composition. They must also present at least three books for a detailed examination. These were the ordinary demands for gaining a degree. A higher standard of scholarship was required for honors. When Newman stood for the honors degree he offered the following array of classical authors: Aristotle, Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Thucydides, Herodotus, Polybius, and Virgil.

The next important preparation which Newman set for himself was to read for the Oriel Fellowship Examination in 1812. Dean Church, an Oriel fellow himself and hence an examiner says of the Fellowship examination:

> It was not altogether a trial of how much men knew, but of how they knew, and what they could do.... The Oriel Common Room was rather proud of its seemingly easy and commonplace and unpretending tests of a man's skill in languages and habits and powers of thinking for himself. They did not care if he had read much, so that he came up to their standard of good Latin, good Greek, good English and good sense.... It created a prejudice against a man if he should seem to be trying to be a flash, or to show off his reading.... The two papers which were almost

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[1]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 31.

> invariably the guide to the first decisions were the English into Latin and the English Essay. And no man who failed in these had much chance of retrieving himself. Next to these papers the Latin Essay and the translation into English held.
>
> A good test was attached to viva voce.... It was thought to be a good test of the way in which a man met difficulties and whether he faced them fairly or tried to evade them.[1]

In a letter written to Bowden following his success in the Fellowship Examination, Newman reviews some of the details of the test. In addition to the usual Latin and English compositions, a passage from the Spectator had to be translated into Latin; there were twelve philosophical and mathematical questions; there were ten questions in logic and nine books for viva voce.

In addition to studies of the two classical rhetoricians, Aristotle and Cicero, Newman also came directly under the influence of two of the most famous contemporary English authorities of rhetorical theory, Richard Whately and Edward Copleston.

Associates in the Oriel Common Room

In being elected a Fellow of Oriel in 1822, Newman had gained the most coveted prize that Oxford had to offer any of her sons. To be elected a Fellow of any college was an honor, but to be admitted into the Oriel Common room as a member was to gain a singular distinction. At

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[1] "Occasional Papers," quoted in Maisie Ward, Young Mr. Newman, op. cit., p. 71.

the time when Newman was elected, Oriel was not only a reforming college but the stronghold of the Oxford intelligentia. Liddon in his Life of Pusey gives an accurate description of the famous Common Room.

> It was a common room, to belong to which was in itself an education. Unfriendly critics described this by saying that the Oriel Common Room "stank of logic": but logic, if liable to misuse, is not without its value. The distinctive characteristic of the Oriel mind was exactness in thought, as basis of exactness of expression. This was exhibited, although in different ways, by Newman and Keble, not less than by Hawkins and Whately. Everybody practised more or less the Socratic method of improving thought by constant cross-questioning; but Whately and Hawkins especially excelled in this. The result was to discourage fine words, when homely expressions would suffice; to expose inaccurate and partial knowledge; to resolve imposing theories into their constituent ingredients; to force men back upon principles which really governed their convictions.... The prose of Cardinal Newman unrivalled as it is in this century, owes some of its best elements to those early years of contact with Whately and Hawkins.[1]

The distinguished colleagues of Newman in the Oriel Common Room were called Noetics. Keble, Whately, Davison, Froude, Hawkins, Arnold, and Copleston were among the most famous Noetics. The exact meaning of what a Noetic was is not clear. Canon Overton derives the term from the works of Aristotle and says that a Noetic is "a man who exercised his highest faculties, as opposed to those who let them lie dormant."[2]

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[1]Henry Parry Liddon, Life of Bouverie Pusey (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1893), I, 58. See also Thomas Mozley, Reminiscences, op. cit., I, 18.

[2]C. H. Overton, The English Church in the 19th

In a personal observation of the Oriel Common Room, Samuel Wilberforce supplies a description indicating how Newman fitted into the company of the Noetics. In a letter to R. I. Wilberforce on November 10, 1835, he writes:

> I have passed a very pleasant week here with G. D. Ryder. He is a very good fellow, I have not heard him preach. He has read me one of his sermons, which is very sensible, but too "whole duty man-ish," I think. I fear that Newman makes such preacher contented out of all mind--who have less internal heat and volcanic heat always boiling in his mind. By the way, Newman is publishing a 3rd volume of sermons. I spent a day very pleasantly at Oxford. Newman was very kind indeed--staying in our inn till 11 o'clock with us. I dined in the common room where sights and sounds were curious: the cantankerous conceit of _____, _____'s pettiness, the vulgar priggishness of _____, _____, and the silence of Newman were all surpreant, nay epouvantable.[1]

Among the distinguished members of the Oriel Common Room, Richard Whately and Edward Copleston had the strongest influence upon the rhetorical theory of Cardinal Newman.

Whately

Among Newman's associates in the Common Room, Whately had the reputation of being the loudest and the most argumentative of them all. He had an almost equal appetite for argument and for food. A more incongruous

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Century (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1894) p. 117.

[1]A. R. Ashwell, The Life of Bishop Samuel Wilberforce (London: J. Murray Co., 1880), I, 86.

couple could hardly be imagined: Whately, the brittle and burly philosopher and showman who never tired of hearing the sound of his own voice, and Newman, the sensitive, shy and self-absorbed fellow, suffering lest some solecism appear in his conversation. Nevertheless a friendship was cemented between these two men.[1] It was Whately, so the Apologia tells us, who first opened the mind of Newman and taught him to think for himself and use his reason.[2]

From the outset Whately recognized the first-rate intellect of Newman hidden beneath his shyness and silent self-consciousness. Once in the Oriel Common Room the conversation turned to the game of making three wishes, and Whately fondly remarked: "If I had three wishes, they

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[1]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 92-93. Newman in his "Memoir" tells of his first reactions to Whately. "Mr. Whately afterwards Protestant Archbishop of Dublin, who had lately relinquished his fellowship by marriage, was just at that time residing in lodging in Oxford... and they [the men of the Oriel Common Room] determined on putting their unformed probationer into his hands. If there was a man for a raw bashful youth to get on with it was Whately--a great talker, who endured very readily the silence of his companion, original in his views, lively, forcible, witty in expressing them, brimful of information on a variety of subjects--free and easy in manners, rough indeed and dogmatic in his enunciation of opinion, but singularly gracious to undergraduates and young masters, who, if they were worth anything, were only too happy to be knocked about in argument by such a man. And he on his part professed to be pleased at having cubs in hand whom he might lick into shape, and who, he said, like dogs of King Charles breed, could be held up by one leg without yelling."

[2]Newman, Apologia, op. cit., p. 11.

would all be for a mind like Newman's."[1] It was not long before Whately succeeded in drawing out his new protege, and in a short time he was to re-assure the Oriel men that they had made no mistake in their election of Newman.[2]

Whately did more than help Newman adjust himself to the new environment of the Common Room. Almost immediately, Whately recognized not only that Newman "was the clearest-headed man he knew,"[3] but that he had latent ability for writing. Thus in 1824 Whately strongly urged Newman to write his first public piece, an essay on Cicero.[4]

Whately in the preface to the Elements of Logic signified that Newman served as the anvil upon which he

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[1]Recollections of Dean Boyle. As quoted by Maisie Ward, Young Mr. Newman, op. cit., p. 90.

[2]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 93.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Cf. Newman, Historical Sketches (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), I, 245. In a prefatory notice to the 1872 edition of this essay on Cicero, Newman explains the circumstances under which he wrote the essay at the request of Whately. See also Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 75. "In the spring of 1824 when his hands were so full of work, Dr. Whately paid him the compliment of asking him to write for the Encyclopedia Metropolitana, to which he was at the time contributing himself. Dr. Whately explained to him that the editor had suddenly been disappointed in the article on Cicero which was to have appeared in the Encyclopedia and that in consequence he could not allow more than two months for the composition of the paper which was to take its place; also that it must contain such and such subjects."

hammered out the book.[1] In the preface to the original text Whately says that Newman is the original author of several pages and helped to put together a portion of other sections of the book.[2] Newman in his "Memoir" recounts Whately's method of composition and his function in the composition of the Elements of Logic.[3]

In his study of Whately's rhetoric, Parrish alludes to the cooperation of Whately and Newman. Although he recognizes Newman's cooperation with Whately in writing

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[1]W. J. Fitzpatrick, Memoirs of Richard Whately (London: R. Bentley, 1864), I, 47. Fitzpatrick states that: "It was one of his (Whately's) peculiarities at that time to hammer out his thoughts (if I may so speak) by means of other minds, and he conversed so well and so profitably that it was a pleasure to be employed by him." See also E. Jane Whately, Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1866), I, 10-11.

[2]Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (New York: William Jackson, 1832) p. viii.

[3]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 94. "...Whately was full of the subject of logic; which, in spite of the Aldrich read for his B. A. examination, was quite a novelty to Mr. Newman. He lent him the MS of his 'Analytical Dialogues,' never printed and now very scarce, and allowed him (Newman) to make copies of it, which are to be found among his (Mr. Newman's) papers. At length he went so far as to propose to him to cast these dialogues into the shape of a synthetical treatise. It was a peculiarity of Whately's to compose his books by the medium of other brains. This did not detract at all from the originality of what he wrote.... He called his hearers anvils. He expounded his views as he walked with them;... and it was in some such way that he began to write his well-known Treatise upon Logic through Mr. Newman--that is under the start he gained by revising and recomposing the rude essays of a probationer Fellow of twenty-one."
This work, however, namely his 'Elements of Logic'--was not actually published till four years later.

the Elements of Logic, it is regrettable, he says, that "there is no direct testimony available as to the composition of the Rhetoric." He infers that it was "hammered out in much the same way as the Logic, the anonymous young friends mentioned in the Preface serving as the anvils."[1]

Is there basis for supporting the probability that Newman cooperated with Whately in writing the Elements of Rhetoric? At the time of the composition of the Rhetoric Whately regarded Newman as a close friend and as a young scholar of proven ability. The great logician also personally testified to the highly satisfactory manner in which Newman had cooperated with him in the composition of the Elements of Logic. These two facts suggest that Newman possibly played an ancillary role to Whately in composing the Elements of Rhetoric.

Two letters of Thomas Mozley (during the time when Newman was his tutor) to his mother show not only that Newman recommended to his students the Rhetoric of Whately, but that in 1826 he had the first drafts of Whately's Elements of Rhetoric in his possession.[2] This latter fact together with the conservative opinion of Parrish

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[1]Wayland M. Parrish, "Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1929), I, 21.

[2]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 116. In 1826 Mozley wrote to his mother:...."I have at last had an interview with my new tutor, Mr. Newman,

that the date of the composition of the Elements of Rhetoric was 1828 tend to corroborate the probable conclusion regarding Newman's cooperation with Whately in hammering out the second work.

Besides sharing the work of composing the Elements of Logic with Newman, Whately continued to give Newman direction and advice about his own writing. In a letter to his sister Harriet, dated 1825, Newman speaks of writing articles for the Theological Review at the bidding of Whately. In this same letter, Newman tells his sister that he has become persuaded, as Whately suggested to him, "that sermon writing by itself has a tendency to produce a loose rambling kind of composition."[1]

Whately and Newman were intimate friends until 1831 when Whately was elected Archbishop of Dublin. Once the great honor of the Archbishop came to Whately, he never sought further contact or cooperation from Newman. Both Whately and Newman began to realize that there had been a gradual diminution of intimacy and sympathy between them.

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who gave so much good advice on the subject of themes, and gave me a manuscript treatise on Composition written by Whately, who is a famous man here. This I have copied, and have all the week been furiously engaged in causes and effect and antecedent probabilities and plausibilities, which, as I have never read a line of logic, have been very abstruse. Again in December of the same year he wrote,... I have received very great attention this term, both from my tutor (Newman) and the Dean.... I shall stay at Oxford a week to read Dr. Whately's Rhetoric preparatory to making a careful study of Aristotle's 'Rhetoric' at home, which Newman my tutor strongly recommends."

[1] Ibid., p. 94.

Although the occasion for the formal break between Whately and Newman came over the issue of Peel's reelection,[1] the actual cause was deeper. Whately's absolute and unalterable support of Liberalism was the actual cause of the rupture. Newman said that he would have been ready to love and admire Whately to the end but for the conditions demanded by Whately..."absolute and implicit agreement in thought, word, and deed."[2] Newman surrendered his heart in friendship to Whately, but he could not bring himself to finally submit his mind.

Copleston

Edward Copleston, one of the most famous of Newman's associates in the Oriel Common Room, held the office of Provost at Oriel during part of Newman's residence at the College. Under Copleston's regime at Oriel, election to fellowships was based on ability and scholarship. Prior to his time, elections in many colleges were often solely determined on a personal and social basis.[3] He fathered and maintained a system which not only banished from the elections all claims of nepotism and patronage, but refused cognizance to academical achievement already gained, or even to technical attainments as manifested in serious examination papers. A man was admitted to

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[1]Newman, Apologia, op. cit., p. 14.

[2]Thomas Mozley, Reminiscenses, op. cit., I, 29.

[3]Cf. W. Tuckwell, Pre-Tractarian Oxford (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1909), p. 21.

Fellowship only on *prima facie* evidence of his power and originality. Outside of Oxford, Copleston was known as a writer of genuine and functional rhetoric, a competent controversialist, and able dialectician. During the years when Oxford was under attack from the *Edinburgh Review* he rose to defend the classical educational system of his *alma mater* by his refined rhetorical methods.

Newman's relations with Copleston were of an entirely different nature from those he held with Whately; so also was the influence each of these two men had upon him. With Copleston there was never the personal friendship nor direct and frequent intercourse there had been with Whately. Whately's influence was primarily personal and direct, whereas Copleston's influence was impersonal and indirect. This is not to say that Copleston did not know Newman personally; to the contrary, Copleston not only knew Newman, but he had a deep appreciation for his native ability and his peculiar type of scholarship. In a letter to Hawkins, his successor as Provost at Oriel, Copleston notes how closely Newman measured up to the ideal fellow:

> Every election to a fellowship which tends to discourage the narrow and almost technical routine of public examinations, I consider an important triumph. You remember Newman himself was an example. He was not even a good classical scholar, yet in mind and power of composition, and in taste and knowledge, he was decidedly superior to some competitors

who were a class above him in the schools.[1]

Although Copleston saw Newman less frequently and was on less familiar terms with him than Whately had been, Copleston's letter to Hawkins reveals that Copleston, the rhetorician, was not reluctant to admit Newman's special power for composition and representations of ideas.

Copleston exerted his strongest influence on Newman through his writings. Thomas Mozley, who was a student at Oriel at the time, states that no man in Oxford studied and admired the works of Copleston more than Newman. Mozley says that Newman "read [/the works of Copleston/] with his favorite pupils, pointing out their originality, and their felicity of expression."[2]

The direct references to the writings of Copleston in the Idea of a University show Newman's thorough acquaintance with most of the former's works. It seems that Newman had more than a superficial reading knowledge of the Specimen of Art, a satire on the pretensions of the young Edinburgh Reviewers, and of the Examiner Examined, Copleston's principal logical work. According to Professor Knickerbocker, Newman had before him, as he composed his lectures (the Idea of a University), the

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[1]Personal letter, quoted in Maisie Ward, Young Mr. Newman, op. cit., p. 70.

[2]Mozley, Reminiscenses, op. cit., I, 29.

outline of defense of the Oxford scheme which Copleston and Davison had written in reply to the first Edinburgh criticisms."[1]

Thomas Mozley considers, that of all the writings of Copleston, Newman was most appreciative of the Praelections.[2] Concerning the Latin style of the Praelections, Mozley states that "Newman used to say, (it) was very good, but Coplestonian, not Ciceronian."[3]

Classical Rhetorical Theorists

Of the classical rhetoricians, Newman's favorites are Aristotle and Cicero.

Aristotle

If Newman had gone to Oxford ten years earlier he would have enjoyed little contact with the actual study of Aristotle. In this connection Knickerbocker states that from the middle of the eighteenth century until the turn of the nineteenth, Henry Alrich's emasculated edition of Aristotle's logic was the accepted text at Oxford. He also notes that this condition was modified in 1809 when an examination upon the Greek text of Aristotle was made compulsory in the Final Schools for all candidates for the

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[1]W. S. Knickerbocker, Creative Oxford, op. cit., p. 47.

[2]Mozley, Reminiscenses, op. cit., I, 30.

[3]Ibid., II, 410.

B. A. degree.[1]

Oriel was the leading college in initiating the Aristotelian revival at Oxford. The few but influential Noetics were principally responsible for this revival. They regarded Aristotle as the surest and safest thinker in the history of philosophy. Knickerbocker specifically attributes the revival of the earnest study of Aristotle's ethics and logic to the Noetics. Copleston, the spearhead of the Aristotelian revival, the contemporary and therefore the more able observer and authority, does not limit the study of Aristotle to the Ethics and the Organon; he adds the Rhetoric. Writing of the system of examinations at Oxford, he says:

> He is examined again in Logic, the object being chiefly to see that he has just and firm conceptions of its leading principles; and, on this occasion, selections from the Organon are often introduced. The Examination then Proceeds to Rhetoric and Ethics. Upon these subjects the celebrated treatises of Aristotle are chiefly used; and whoever is master of them knows what an exercise of the mind it is to acquire a thorough insight into the argument, and what a serious discipline the student must have undergone, who has accomplished this point... To these is often added, at the option of the student, the treatise on Politics, which is in fact a continuation and completion of the Ethical System.[2]

At Oxford in the years following 1810, first as a student, and later as Noetic, Newman was surrounded on

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[1]Knickerbocker, Creative Oxford, op. cit., p. 52.

[2]Edward Copleston, A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review Against Oxford (London: J. Parker and J. Mackinlay, 1810), pp. 140-141.

all sides by Aristotelian influences. He had to pursue the formal study of Aristotle in his general course work; he had to contact the works of Aristotle in preparing for his examinations; and he was in close contact with the chief leaders and teachers of the Aristotelian revival in his daily conversations.

The works of Newman reveal that he was much at home with Aristotle's logical, poetical, ethical, and rhetorical doctrines. Aristotle was nothing less than the world's greatest philosopher:

> While we are men, we cannot help being to a great extent Aristotelians; for the great master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, opinions of the human mind. In many subject matters to think correctly is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples, whether we will or no, though we may not know it.[1]

Newman never foreswore Aristotle. In a forthright statement in his Oxford University Sermons he has no doubt about his unwavering loyalty and appreciation of Aristotle in regard to reasoning:

> The boldest, simplest, and most comprehensive theory which has been invented for the analysis of the reasoning process, is the well-known science for which we are indebted to Aristotle, and which is framed upon the principle that every act of reason is exercised upon neither more nor less than three terms.[2]

Ethics.--From the Nichomachean Ethics, Newman

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 109.

[2]Newman, Oxford University Sermons, op. cit., p. 258.

derived his doctrine that reason and logic are not always the same realities. He declared as well that his Illative Sense is a fusion of the Aristotelian concept of intelligence and prudence. Like Aristotle, Newman deemed the relation of truth to conduct important, and not to be considered outside the realm of the observation and study of the philosopher. Aristotle writes that logic does not comprehend first principles; this is the function of intelligence. On the other hand, logic does not extend to concrete circumstances and facts. This matter is grasped and processed by the queenly virtue of prudence, or practical wisdom:

> Prudence then stands opposite to intelligence, for intelligence apprehends definitions which cannot be proved by reasoning, while prudence deals with the ultimate particular things, which cannot be apprehended by scientific knowledge, but only by perception.[1]

Another passage in the sixth book of the Nichomachean Ethics seems to have been the basis for Newman's conception of the Illative Sense.

> ...ultimates as well as primary definitions are grasped by the Intelligence and not reached by reasoning; in demonstrations Intelligence apprehends the immutable and primary definitions; in practical inference it apprehends the ultimate and contingent.[2]

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[1]Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics, op. cit., vi. 8. 9. cf. also Ibid., vi. 6. 1.

[2]Ibid., vi. 9. 4; see also Wilfrid Ward, Life, op. cit., II, 507-508, where Newman is quoted as saying

Newman seems to have drawn from the Nichomachean Ethics the conception of the intuitive and personal elements in thought. Like Aristotle, he considers that experience is the important and indispensable attribute of the prudent man. A boy is not usually considered prudent because he has not lived long enough to have observed the effects and causes in concrete situations. Following the principles of the Stagirite, therefore, he declares that although the boy can be a mathematician, he can in no sense be a philosopher. Newman further follows Aristotle in saying that the virtue of prudence deals with action and with particular facts which are connected with action.[1]

Poetics.--The essay on "Poetry with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics" is an important document for understanding the influence which the works of Aristotle had upon Newman. In 1828 Newman wrote the essay on poetry for

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"Great faculty as reasoning certainly is, it is from its very nature in all subjects dependent upon other faculties. It received from them the antecedent from which its actions start; and when this antecedent is true, there is no longer in religious matters room for any accusation against it of scepticism. In such matters the independent faculty which is mainly necessary for its healthy working and the ultimate warrant of the reasoning act, I have hitherto spoken of as the moral sense; but as I have already said, it has a wider subject matter than religion, and a larger name than moral, as including intuitions, and this is what Aristotle calls νοῦς."

[1]Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics, op. cit., vi. 9. 6; Newman quotes Ibid., vi. 8. 6, 7. Ibid., vi. 2. 5. v. 6; vii, 7.

the London Review at the request of Blanco White.[1] Perhaps anticipating a refusal because of a short dead-line, and the heavy pressure of work under which Newman was laboring, White offered the following suggestion: "I should strongly advise you to venture upon the strength of your household stuff--on the reading and reflection of many years."[2]

Immediate extensive preparation for writing on the Poetics did not seem necessary, for as early as 1818 Newman wrote a critique of the plays of Aeschylus on the principles of Aristotle's Poetics.[3] Throughout the essay, Newman contrasts the proper function and skill of the poet and the orator. In one place he writes:

> ... dexterity in composition, or eloquence as it may be called in a contracted sense of the word, is manifestly a more or less necessary branch of literature, though its elements may be different in each. Poetical eloquence consists first, in the power of illustration; which the poet uses, not as the orator, voluntarily for the sake of clarity or ornament, but almost by constraint as the sole outlet and expression of intense inward feeling.[4]

Although the essay reflects knowledge of the Poetics, it also manifests that Newman did not agree completely with all the doctrine of Aristotle. Newman

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[1]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 169.

[2]Ibid., p. 69.

[3]Ibid., p. 34.

[4]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 77.

questions, Ryan notes, the basic idea of the Poetics: that poetry is the imitation of human action.[1] On the other hand, Newman seems to emphasize in his essay more of the ideal of Plato: an aiming at portraying perfection, and not the imitation of those elements in human character and conduct which are typical and universal. Newman's statement that "the poetical mind is one full of the eternal forms of beauty and perfection," reminds the writer again of the Platonic doctrine of unfused ideas, although the earlier Greek writer endows only the philosopher with this perfection. These two observations which seem to have Platonic overtones, appear to lend some relevance to the fact that Blanco White called Newman's essay Platonic and that Whately was displeased with it.[2] Ryan, attempting to understand the departure of Newman from the present interpretation of the Poetics, assumes that Newman might have been introduced to the Poetics by some unsympathetic interpreter.[3] This being the case Ryan thinks that Newman was unable to read the Poetics with the proper perspective. If the essay reveals that Newman did not penetrate the delicate meanings of the Poetics, as did Bywater, Bernays, and Butcher, it nevertheless shows

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[1]Alvin S. Ryan, Newman's Conception of Literature, VI, University of Iowa Humanistic Studies, ed. J. E. Baker (Iowa City, Iowa. University of Iowa, 1942), 129.

[2]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., I, 172.

[3]Ryan, Newman's Conception of Literature, op. cit., p. 133.

distinctly not only Newman's knowledge of the general doctrine of the Poetics but also manifests his dissatisfaction with some of his contemporaries who were clinging to the less emotional and less imaginative conceptions of poetry.

The Rhetoric.--In examining his published works there is prima facie evidence of Newman's knowledge of the Rhetoric. In the Idea of a University Newman states frankly that he has drawn out and formulated his definition of Liberal Education from the first book of the Rhetoric. He introduces Aristotle as his source for distinguishing between the liberal and the useful arts. Summing up a long discussion of the distinction between liberal knowledge and the servile arts, Newman writes:

> All that I have been now saying is summed up in a few characteristic words of the great philosopher. "Of possessions," he says, "those rather are useful, which bear fruit; those liberal, which tend to enjoyment. By fruitful, I mean, which yield revenue; by enjoyable, where nothing accrues of consequence beyond the using." Aristot. Rheto. i. 5. Do not suppose, that in thus appealing to the ancients, I am throwing back the world two thousand years, and fettering Philosophy with the reasonings of paganism. While the world lasts will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and truth.[1]

Newman's knowledge of the Rhetoric of Aristotle is clearly seen in his lecture on "University Preaching." At the outset of this famous lecture, he writes:

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[1]Newman, Idea, op. cit., p. 109.

> ... hence it is that the great philosopher of antiquity in speaking in his Treatise on Rhetoric of the various kinds of persuasives which are available in the Art, considers that the most authoritative of these to be that which is drawn from the personal traits of an ethical nature evident in the orator; for such matters are cognizable by all men, and the common sense of the world decides that it is safer, where it is possible to commit oneself to the judgment of men of character than to any considerations addressed merely to the feelings or to the reason.[1]

In another section of this same lecture, Newman uses the authority and the reasoning of Aristotle as found in the Rhetoric:

> Aristotle, then, in his celebrated Treatise on Rhetoric, makes the very essence of the Art lie in the precise recognition of a hearer. It is a relative art, and in that respect differs from Logic, which simply teaches the right use of reason, whereas Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, which implies a person who is to be persuaded.[2]

From an extensive and thorough study of the Oxford University Sermons, Sister Mariella has deduced that the magical success of these sermons of Newman can be attributed basically to "his knowledge and use of Aristotle's Rhetoric." It is her contention that:

> Newman was a disciple of Aristotle and he knew it. In the art of using the spoken word he was a very special disciple. In fact it is only by taking the Rhetoric of Aristotle as a guide to the study of the famous sermons preached at St. Mary's that one sees how much of their beauty is traceable to a meticulous application of the truth laid down by the 'oracle of nature

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[1] Ibid., p. 408.

[2] Ibid.

and truth.'[1]

Cicero

The curriculum at Oxford and the examinations at Oxford, embracing the philosophical and historical works of Cicero, suggest that Newman had a considerable knowledge of the doctrines of the famous Roman Orator. Copleston memtions that the student began to study Cicero in his third year of undergraduate work and that knowledge of the works of Cicero was a constant requirement of the higher examinations.[2]

Newman's "Essay on Cicero" written in his early twenties reveals a mature knowledge of and appreciation for Tullius. He shows himself not only a scholarly historian of the great Roman, but a discerning critic as well. He goes so far as to substantiate and interpret his criticisms with quotations from original Greek and Roman sources. Newman's knowledge of the period and of the whole history of Roman rhetoric and philosophy is shown in the faithful account he gives of the rise of the New Academy, of the teaching of Carneadas, and of the propagation of Pyrrhonism. In this same essay, Newman comments specifically and accurately on the rise of Cicero to power:

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[1]Sister Mariella, "Newman's Anglican Sermons," Catholic World CXLIII (January, 1939), 43.

[2]Copleston, Reply, op. cit., pp. 139-141.

> The integrity of his public life was only equalled by the correctness of his private morals; and it may at first sight excite our wonder that a course so splendidly begun should afterwards so little fulfill its early promise.[1]

In the section pertaining to the rhetorical writings of Cicero, he reveals not only the fruits of his personal study of these works, but his keen insight into the circumstances which occasioned their appearance. Newman gives the historical background and a discerning discussion of the contents of each of the following rhetorical books: De Inventione, De Oratore, Brutus, Orator, De Partitione Oratoria, Topica, and De Optimo Genere Oratorum.

The influence of Cicero on the writings of Newman appears in the Idea of a University. In this book there is a significant similarity between the admitted rhetorical strategy of Cicero and the arrangement used by Newman. He, as Tullius, opens his case for Liberal Education with marked modesty, attempting to mollify and conciliate his audience; he pleads for the indulgence of his audience; he appeals to their sense of generosity and human kindness; he outlines the plan of his discourse and then proceeds to sweep the ground clear of objections, presenting his own arguments so cogently "that it becomes impossible to entertain a question of the

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 44.

truth of his statement."[1]

Newman's admiration for Cicero is superlatively expressed near the end of his essay on the great Roman stylist:

> Latin, in short, is not a philosophical language, not a language in which a deep thinker is likely to express himself with purity and neatness. Cicero found it barren and dissonant, and as such he had to deal with it. His good sense enabled him to perceive what could be done, and what is in vain to attempt; and happily his talents answered precisely to the purpose required. He may be compared to a clever landscape gardener, who gives depth and richness to narrow and confined premises by ingenuity and skill in the disposition of his trees and walks. Terence and Lucretius had cultivated simplicity; Cotta, Brutus and Calvus had attempted strength; but Cicero rather made a language than a style; yet not so much by the invention as by the combination of words. Some terms, indeed, by his philosophical subjects obliged him to coin, but his great art lies in the application of existing materials, in converting the very disadvantages of the language into beauties, in enriching it with circumlocutions and metaphors, in pruning it of harsh and uncouth expressions, in systematizing the structure of a sentence. This is the copia dicendi which gained Cicero the high testimony of Caesar to his inventive powers, and which, we may add, constitutes him the greatest master of composition that the world has seen.[2]

Nor did the influence of Cicero on Newman fade after his years of study at Oxford. Several critics have noted the obvious influence of the Roman orator on his style. Two of them, Saralea and Bertram Newman, emphasize the Ciceronian influence. Saralea writes:

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[1]Newman, Essays and Sketches, op. cit., I, 46.

[2]Ibid., p. 50.

> As a matter of fact, if Newman became one of the classics of English Literature, it is largely because from his adolesence he served his apprenticeship as an artist of words. He tells himself that from a very early date he would imitate in turn the style and phraseology of one particular writer. And if he had felt the same scruples about studying some pagan writers of Rome and Greece, which were so painfully felt by the early Fathers, Newman might well have applied to himself the self-reproach of St. Jerome. Thou art not a Christian, thou art a Ciceronian. It was mainly on pagans like Cicero...that Newman formed and moulded his style.[1]

But Newman had more of an affinity to Cicero than the mere fact that the latter was his chief model for stylistic imitation. He states in his "Lecture on Literature," for instance, that the language of Cicero is the honest expression of the inner man. He considers Cicero a mens magna in corpore magno. Harrold conjectures that the fondness and respect of Newman for Tullius is reflected in the fact that he seldom let a day pass without translating at least a single sentence from the great Latin master.[2]

Newman acknowledges his indebtedness to Cicero and his awareness of the influence of Cicero on his writings in a letter sent to Rev. John Hayes on April 13, 1869. He writes:

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[1]Charles Saralea, Cardinal Newman and His Influence on Religious Life and Thought (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1908), p. 41.

[2]Fernande Tardivel, La personnalite litteraire de Newman (Paris: G. Beauchesne et fils, 1937), p. 203. See also Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., II, 477.

> As to pattern of imitation, the only master of style I have had (which is strange considering the differences of the languages) is Cicero. I think I owe a great deal to him, and as far as I know to no one else. His mastery of Latin is shown especially in his clearness.[1]

Study of the Fathers

Newman's first contact with the writings of the Fathers came through his reading of Milner's Church History. He states in the Apologia that he took up this book in the Autumn of 1816 when he was fifteen, and remarks that he was "nothing short of enamoured of the long extracts from St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, and the other Fathers which I found there."[2] His next formal study of the Fathers came about through some private lectures he took from Charles Lloyd, the Regius Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church.[3]

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[1]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., II, 427.

[2]Newman, Apologia, op. cit., p. 7.

[3]Newman, Letters and Correspondence, op. cit., II, 96-97. "This eminent man [Lloyd], who had been the tutor, and was the intimate friend of Mr. Peel, was in an intellectual and academical point of view diametrically opposite to Dr. Whately. At the time there was a not unnatural rivalry between Christ Church and Oriel; Lloyd and Whately were the respective representatives of the two societies, and of their antagonism. Sharp words passed between them; they spoke scornfully of each other, and stories about them and the relation in which they stood towards each other were circulated in the Common Rooms. Lloyd was a scholar, and Whately was not. Whately had the reputation specially of being an original thinker, of which Lloyd was not at all ambitious. Lloyd was one of the high-and-dry school, though with far larger views than were then common; while Whately looked

In the Apologia he states that he perceived that in proportion as he moved out of the shadow of Liberalism which hung over his course, his early devotion to the Fathers returned. In the Long Vacation of 1828, he began a fresh study. Beginning with St. Ignatius and St. Justin, he read systematically and in chronological order the doctrinal works of the Fathers of the Nicene and ante-Nicene eras.

Newman's knowledge must surely have been recognized, because in 1830 Hugh Rose used him to write a history of the principal Councils. Regarding this invitation Newman writes:

> I accepted it, and at once set to work on the Council of Nicaea. It was to launch myself on an ocean with currents innumerable; and I was drifted back first to the ante-Nicene history, and then to the Church of Alexandria.[1]

The result of this fresh study of the Fathers was the publication of The Arians of the Fourth Century. The original book consisted of approximately four hundred twenty-two pages, the first one hundred seventeen consisting of matter introductory to understanding the history and theological controversy which grew out of Arianism.

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down on both High and Low Church, calling the two parties respectively Sadducees and Pharisees. Lloyd professed to hold to theology, and laid great stress on a doctrinal standard, on authoritative and traditional teaching, and on ecclesiastical history; Whately called the Fathers certain old divines."

[1]Newman, Apologia, op. cit., p. 26.

Newman appraises the effect this new study of the Fathers had on his mind and personality. He remarks that such an intensive study could not have failed to strain his mind. But it was principally the doctrines and personal philosophy of Origen and Clement which influenced him most. He admits that the broad philosophy of Clement and Origen carried him away. Some portions of their teaching, he writes, while

> magnificent in themselves came like music to my inward ear, as if the response to ideas, which, with little external to encourage them, I had cherished so long. These were based on the mystical or sacramental principle.[1]

The Alexandrian school, Newman mentions, was explicitly responsible for giving him an understanding of the theology of the angels. But the Fathers, he admits, were implicitly the medium through which he gained new knowledge of the function and use of allegory. In his Apologia, he speaks of this new insight into the function of allegory:

> I understood these passages to mean that the external world, physical and historical, was but the manifestation to our sense of realities greater than itself. Nature was a parable: Scripture was an allegory: pagan literature, philosophy, and mythology, properly understood, were but a preparation for the gospel.[2]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 27.

Besides positive theology and the function of allegory, Newman also learned from his contact with the writings of the Fathers the meaning and the function of economy. For Newman, the concept of economy seemed to have two significances: a method for arranging knowledge and for communicating it in a mode and form compatible to the exigencies of the auditors, and

> those dispensations, which display [God's] character in action...condesensions to the infirmity and peculiarity of our minds, shadowy representations of realities which are incomprehensible to creatures such as ourselves, who estimate everything by rule of association and arrangement.[1]

Both Clement and Origen are explicit concerning the necessity for using economy in communicating religious doctrine to the ignorant, or when speaking before hostile and indisposed pagans. Clement wrote in detail concerning the "reasons for veiling the truth in symbols," and pointed to the fact that "divine things have been wrapped up in figures both in the sacred and in the heathen writers."[2]

The reason for the favorable reaction of Newman to the doctrines of the Fathers and his use of their rhetorical devices and methods in his own writings seems

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[1]Newman, Arians of the Fourth Century, op. cit., p. 15. See also Apologia, p. 269 ss; also Note of p. 343 for a complete discussion of the attack of Kingsley upon Newman's use of the term economy.

[2]Clement, Stromatum, IV (Migne Patrologia Graeca ix) 351.

to be the psychological affinity which he had to them. Father Frederic William Faber, one of the youngest and afterwards one of the most distinguished disciples of Newman in the Tractarian period, observed in 1835 that the temperament and habits of Newman had disposed him to "that mystical allegorizing spirit of Origen and the school of Alexandria."[1] Alexandria Fernande Tardivel points to the significant intellectual attraction Newman had to the Cappadocian Fathers.[2] Newman perceived that he had a community with the Alexandrian Fathers because they emphasized and preferred the personal and the concrete to the abstract.

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[1]J. E. Bowden, The Life and Letters of Frederic William Faber (London: 1869), p. 20.

[2]Tardivel, La Personnalite Litteraire, op. cit., p. 169. "de affinites pre-etables de pensee, de sensibilite religieuse, semblaient avoir prepare depuis longtemps la concordance parfaite que Newman constata entre la large philosophie de Clement d'Origene, et les besoins de son temperament intellectual."

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