RELIGIOUS FEELINGS AND RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of Michigan
1961

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INTRODUCTION

The claim has often been made that one must possess religious feelings to understand religious truth. If we are to take this claim seriously, this must mean that religious feelings are essentially involved in the religious language-verification situation, for it is only in this area that questions of truth and falsity arise.

Since Schleiermacher's The Christian Faith (second edition published in 1830) and Otto's The Idea of the Holy (published in 1923) present different versions of the claim that religious feelings are of central importance in understanding religion, I shall use these two books to set up the problem which is involved in that claim. Two things must be noted. First, I have selected these two books as the most important versions of the religious feeling claim. Other choices are, however, possible. Secondly, it is to be noted that my purpose in discussing Schleiermacher and Otto is to set up a problem, not to enter into a detailed and careful discussion of their views in a way which would be most properly classified as an exercise in the history of ideas. The fact that my purpose is so restricted has two consequences. I will not examine the general position of Schleiermacher and Otto, but simply the views presented in the two books mentioned above. Other books will be referred

to only in so far as they throw light upon The Christian Faith and The Idea of the Holy. The views presented in these two books seem complete in their own right, and are all we need to set up the problem. The second consequence is that I will feel free from time to time to reconstruct the positions of Otto and Schleiermacher either in the interest of clarity or for the purpose of reformulating the position in more contemporary terms.

I would now like to indicate briefly the plan on the basis of which the thesis is constructed.

Both Schleiermacher and Otto conceive the dictum that religious feelings are central to the understanding of religious truths, in terms which involve an investigation of the relation of these feelings to God. Schleiermacher conceives the relation to be a causal one (with some qualifications) while Otto conceives the relation to be a cognitive one. Now to understand these claims we must know what Schleiermacher and Otto mean by 'God'. This will in turn involve us in a discussion of the meaning of religious predicates. Therefore, in the case of both Otto and Schleiermacher, we will begin with a discussion of the nature of religious feeling, move to a discussion of the meaning of religious predicates, and conclude with a discussion of the relation of those feelings to a God defined in terms of the predicates already explained.

I think, however, that we will find these views unsatisfactory. More particularly, we will find (a) that the puta-

tive cognitive relation is so vague as to be useless in an attempt to present a fairly precise picture of the religious language-verification situation, (b) that the putative causal connection is unimportant in this connection and (c) that religious feelings are of little value in the attempt to elucidate the meaning of religious statements.

In Part III, I will attempt to present a view which, while making religious feelings central, avoids the difficulties encountered in the preceding two parts. We will argue that the 'cash value' of the claim that religious feelings are central to the understanding of religious truth is that they play a crucial role in the verification (not the meaning) of religious statements. To claim that these feelings are involved in the verification of religious statements is uninteresting, however, if we do not know how these statements are to be construed. For it is only if we know how these statements are construed that we can know precisely what is being verified. We will therefore be forced to begin Part III with an account of the meaning of religious statements.

PART I

SCHLEIERMACHER

CHAPTER I

A BRIEF SURVEY OF SCHLEIERMACHER'S POSITION

In the first part of The Christian Faith Schleiermacher presents us with the following account of the religious language-verification situation.

The most important feature of this account is the centrality of the feeling of absolute dependence. In relation to an object which can be given to us as a member of the world, we can be both passive and active, i.e., we can act on it, and it can act on us, but since the possibility of acting upon it always remains open we are free with respect to it, i.e., we are not absolutely dependent. But though we are not absolutely dependent on anything in the world, "the self-consciousness which accompanies all our activity...is itself precisely a consciousness of absolute dependence; for it is the consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us in just the same sense in which anything towards which we should have a feeling of absolute freedom must proceed entirely from ourselves."[1] The "whence of our receptive and active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, is to be designated by the word 'God'."[2] "So that in the first

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[1]Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), p. 16.

[2]Ibid., p. 16.

instance God signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant in this feeling and to which we trace our being in such a state; and any further content of the idea must be evolved out of this fundamental import assigned to it."[1]

This special feeling coexists with other feelings (its dominance is the measure of a man's religion) while particular religious emotions spring from the relation of the feeling of absolute dependence to various coexisting feelings.

Religious discourse is tied to, or arises from, religious feeling and is made up of three different forms: the poetic, the rhetorical, and the descriptively didactic. The poetic "is always based originally upon a moment of exaltation which has come purely from within, a moment of enthusiasm or inspiration...is purely descriptive (darstellend), and sets up in general outlines images and forms which each hearer completes for himself in his own peculiar way. The rhetorical is purely stimulative..."[2] The third form is a combination of the other two, "an appropriation of what is given in a direct way in these two forms."[3] "It becomes, less as preaching than as confession, precisely that third form..."[4] "Dogmatic propositions are doctrines

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[1] Ibid., p. 17.

[2] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

[3] Ibid., p. 19.

[4] Ibid., p. 19.

of the descriptively didactic type, in which the highest possible degree of definiteness is aimed at."[1] Here a figurative expression is "exchanged for a literal one or transformed into such by being explained."[2] But "dogmatic propositions never make their original appearance except in trains of thought which have received their impulse from religious moods of mind..."[3] No matter how similar they may seem to be to scientific or philosophical propositions, "a difference must always be assumed."[4]

What is the relation of dogmatic religious statements to religious feelings? "All propositions which the system of Christian doctrine has to establish can be regarded either as descriptions of human states, or as conceptions of divine attributes and modes of action, or as utterances regarding the constitution of the world; and all three forms have always subsisted alongside of each other."[5] The first is "the fundamental dogmatic form"[6] and the other two dogmatic forms are "developed out of propositions of the first form...[and can]...be reduced to propositions of the first form."[7] On the other hand, since dogmatic propositions are the precise

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[1] Ibid., p. 78.

[2] Ibid., p. 81.

[3] Ibid., p. 82.

[4] Ibid., p. 83.

[5] Ibid., p. 125.

[6] Ibid., p. 126.

[7] Ibid., p. 126.

form of didactic propositions, which are in turn a combination of the rhetorical and poetic forms, and since the latter are direct expressions of religious emotion, it would seem that dogmatic propositions must be expressive. And in fact it is claimed that "there is only one type of doctrine, for...it all arises out of the religious consciousness itself and its direct expression."[1]

We must now attempt to deal with this account.

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[1] Ibid., p. 92.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE FEELING OF ABSOLUTE DEPENDENCE

Since Schleiermacher maintains that the religious enterprise is somehow founded on a feeling of absolute dependence, we must ask what he means by the feeling of absolute dependence. But our first task must be the examination of his use of the word 'feeling' itself.

He begins by saying that feeling is equivalent to self-consciousness but quickly adds that these terms are not synonymous (they delimit one another) and that he does not mean 'self-reflection'--the contemplation of ones own states--by 'self-consciousness.[1] Joy and sorrow are paradigm cases of feeling. What does this come to? He apparently wishes to exclude anything which we might describe as a sensation. Thus, 'I feel pain in my right foot' or 'It feels hot' or 'It feels as if I were floating' can be translated into the following statements without any obvious loss of meaning: 'I have a painful sensation in my right foot','This gives me a sensation of heat' or 'I have a floating sensation'. (The fact that he excludes sensations is important in view of the fact that floating sensations, sensations of light and warmth, peculiar tactual sensations, etc., often accompany those experiences in which the mystic claims to have a direct experience of God. If sensations

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[1] Ibid., p. 6.

are not feelings, then the sensations involved in some mystical experiences are not involved in the feeling of absolute dependence.) What Schleiermacher does want to refer to by the use of 'feeling' is perhaps better described as an emotion or attitude--affective states without a definite location, such as joy or sorrow. It is certainly the case that emotions and attitudes may be referred to as 'feelings'--'I feel so happy', 'He feels that he ought to help the poor'--and in dealing with Schleiermacher I shall use 'feeling' in this sense so as to include emotions, attitudes and moods and to exclude sensations.

Why is 'feeling' delimited by 'self-consciousness'? We must first notice that 'self-consciousness' is always opposed to the objective consciousness and to spontaneous activity, and seems properly to be the domain of the affective life. It is not clear to me that Schleiermacher means anything more than that we are aware of these states, i.e., are conscious of them.

What are the characteristics of feeling? (a) Feeling is passive. As such it is opposed to cognition in which we are active.[1] (Since Schleiermacher maintains that the mind supplies the forms which structure experience a la Kant.) (b) More important, "feeling sometimes comes to rest in a thinking which fixes it."[2] But the 'other' which is

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[1] Ibid., p. 8.

[2] Ibid., p. 10.

the cause of feeling is not presented as an object in the immediate self-consciousness, i.e., in feeling. The search for the 'other' is the search for a cause and this is a separate activity. Thus, feeling differs from perception where the object is directly presented to us.[1]

Now what in particular is the feeling of absolute dependence? In the first place, it is a feeling which we can only take up in relation to an object on which we are unable to act. It is to be contrasted with a feeling of absolute freedom which we have in relation to an object which proceeds entirely from ourselves, i.e., which is entirely dependent on ourselves. With respect to most objects, however, we feel both dependent and free--that is they can act on us and we can act on them. Now no particular content of consciousness involves a feeling of absolute dependence since the object presented is always an object in the world, and it is at least possible to act on any finite object, i.e., on any member of the world regarded as a whole made up of finite objects.[2] The feeling of dependence then cannot be absolute in relation to any specific object in the world. That on which we feel absolutely dependent must then be somehow outside the world.

In the second place, the feeling in question involves opposing all of finite being, ourselves included, to something outside of finite being on which it is depen-

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[1] Ibid., pp. 13, 19.

[2] Ibid., p. 16.

dent. The manner in which feeling accomplishes this is rather mysterious, but what Schleiermacher seems to have in mind is this: the feeling of absolute dependence is a consequence of my own nature and circumstances and the nature and circumstances of that on which I am dependent. But the only thing in my nature and circumstances which is relevant to this feeling is the fact that I am finite. Now why do I include the world along with myself in opposing myself to God? Because the system is within ourselves precisely because there is a system.[1] Schleiermacher apparently means something like this: we structure or order experience with our concepts and judgments. As such nature is, in part at least, of our own making. The world, considered as a system of nature, would therefore be included in the self which is set in the relation of dependence to God.

In the third place, the feeling of absolute dependence is common to all receptivity, to all affective life. The feeling always accompanies sensible consciousness,[2] i.e., the feeling of absolute dependence always accompanies some other feelings. Is this connection adventitious or is it essential? There are two senses in which the connection between the feeling of absolute dependence and other feelings might be necessary. (a) Since the feeling of absolute

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[1] Ibid., p. 138.

[2] Ibid., p. 21.

dependence in some way involves an awareness of God, it might be that this awareness, whatever it might be, is impossible without those other feelings in the way in which the perception of a chair involves certain color sensations. In this case the various feelings would make up or constitute--in part at least--the feeling of absolute dependence. (b) It seems more likely, however, that while Schleiermacher thinks the connection is necessary, it is necessary simply in the sense that various tactual sensations, visual sensations, feelings of pain and pleasure, etc., must accompany us in so far as we are sensing and feeling members of the world. That is, we always have sensations and feelings of this sort if we are conscious at all and therefore if the feeling of absolute dependence always accompanies us it will always be accompanied by these sensations and feelings.

Finally, the feeling of absolute dependence is a non-sensuous feeling.[1] What is a non-sensuous feeling? Perhaps Schleiermacher means only that the feeling in question is not an appetite or hunger, not like the pleasure derived from sex or food. But this would mean that the feeling of absolute dependence was non-sensual not non-sensuous. Perhaps he simply means to reject the view that the feeling of absolute dependence is in any sense a sensation like pain or a warm tactual impression. If so, then,

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[1] Ibid., p. 488.

as we have already seen, the feeling of absolute dependence is more like sorrow than pain--a mood, emotion or attitude rather than a sensation.

This account of the feeling of absolute dependence raises certain difficulties which I would now like to consider. In the first place, Schleiermacher claims that the feeling always accompanies our sensible self-consciousness. It is not at all clear that we are constantly aware of any given affective state. Perhaps the best candidate would be those states which constitute our somatic field, but Schleiermacher obviously does not have this in mind. Furthermore, the states which constitute our somatic field are sensations, not feelings in the required sense. Again, it is not clear that we are always aware of these states. We are certainly not always conscious of them if consciousness involves a direction of the attention to members of the somatic field. (Though since Schleiermacher does not mean self-reflection by self-consciousness, this is no objection.) But if the somatic field is not intended, and it pretty obviously is not, are there, as a matter of fact, any other sensations or feelings which always accompany us? If we take 'feeling' as referring to a mood or emotion, it would seem unlikely that there is a feeling which always accompanies us. Perhaps then, what is in question is not a mood or emotion but a constant attitude which we in fact have and which is common to all mankind. Whether there is any such attitude (let alone one called 'the feeling of ab-

solute dependence') seems doubtful. Presumably the question is a factual one and to be decided on empirical grounds. I suggest, however, that Schleiermacher has reached this position, not on the basis of an empirical investigation, however sketchy, but as the conclusion of the following argument: We are finite at every stage of our existence and recognize ourselves to be so. Since the feeling of absolute dependence is the feeling of finiteness and therefore the result of such a recognition, it must always accompany us. However, the conclusion would not seem to have a high degree of antecedent probability and until a factual investigation is made, we might prefer to deny the conclusion and one of the premises. We may, for example, admit that we are always finite yet deny that we always feel finite, and, therefore, feel absolutely dependent.

However, we encounter our major difficulty when we attempt to discover the criteria by which the presence of the feeling of absolute dependence may be recognized in ourselves and others. Now it may be thought that since the feeling always accompanies us, we are unable in principle to discover criteria which would distinguish those situations in which the feeling of absolute dependence is present from those situations in which it is not present. However, Schleiermacher recognizes that the feeling is dominant (in the foreground of consciousness) only in certain people at certain times. In the majority of men, the feeling is present but only as a potentiality for, or dis-

position towards, the feeling of absolute dependence in its full-blown form where it dominates consciousness. We will then ask, what are the criteria for the presence of the feeling, when the feeling is dominant, for it is in cases in which Schleiermacher would say that the feeling is dominant that we would say that a man is experiencing religious feelings. (And if to say that everyone has the God-consciousness is to say that everyone has it at least potentially, then to ask under what circumstances the God-consciousness is dominant is to ask under what circumstances it actually occurs.)

Now the feeling of absolute dependence (as we shall see) is somehow supposed to precede statements about God and serve as their foundation. But how can we feel dependent without having previously identified that on which we feel dependent? I might say, 'I feel dependent on my family.' But this presupposes that I can identify my family either by gestures or by a description. Speaking materially it seems impossible to know that I have a feeling of dependence without being aware of that on which I feel dependent. But absolute dependence is a dependence on God. If so, I must be able to identify God. I cannot point to Him, so I must be able to describe Him. But I can only describe Him if I know that certain God-statements are true, and these statements somehow rest on the feeling of absolute dependence. Schleiermacher might reply that he can identify the feeling of absolute dependence indepen-

dently of its object by a description of the following sort: 'I feel as I do when I am dependent on some object or other, say my family'. That is, I describe one feeling by comparing it with another feeling which is like it in some respects and which I can identify. But how am I to distinguish between a feeling of dependence on my family, a possible feeling of dependence on, say Jupiter regarded as a phenomenon among phenomena though a supremely powerful one, and the feeling of absolute dependence which is caused by God--an object which is supernatural? Schleiermacher would certainly want to maintain that there is a difference, but is the difference simply one of degree or is it a qualitative difference? If the former is the case, then it would seem that it might be very difficult to distinguish the dependence-feeling caused by Jupiter and that caused by God. The strength of a feeling will only admit of very rough measurements. But suppose the difference is qualitative. Can we describe the difference in feeling without using synonyms? It would seem not. How, then, can I distinguish a feeling of dependence on some specific object from a feeling of absolute dependence except by saying that one is caused by a finite object and that the other is caused by an infinite object? This seems to be what Schleiermacher does. But now I can identify the feeling in question only by saying that it is caused by God. But this supposes that I know to some extent what God is, that I know certain statements about God to be true. But

the feeling of absolute dependence is supposed to establish these statements. We are back where we started. I can identify the presence of the feeling of absolute dependence only by means of true statements which are established with the help of the feeling which is to be identified by means of them.

Perhaps it would be better to say that the feeling of absolute dependence is the sort of feeling which follows upon the realization that we are absolutely dependent upon some object. But this makes the realization prior to the feeling, and Schleiermacher seems to want to make the feeling itself fundamental. He must then say that the feeling leads to the realization rather than the other way around. Now I suppose we do speak of vague feelings followed by a flash of insight. But is this to say anything more than that we have certain vague ideas, hunches, etc., accompanied by feelings of uneasiness which are the result of a desire for the solution of some problem? And that often a solution will then present itself which puts an end to our uneasiness. But Schleiermacher cannot accept this. In religion the feeling of absolute dependence is self-sufficient. He does not say that religious statements offer a balm to a previous uneasiness which is a component of religious feeling. On the contrary, religious statements express the feeling and may fail to do it justice. It is the statements (solutions) which are suspect and the source of uneasiness, not the feeling on which they are

based. Uneasiness is not a constituent of the feeling of absolute dependence except incidentally (it may convict us of sin) and is therefore not analogous to the feeling states which precede a sudden realization or flash of insight. (It should be noted that the feelings of uneasiness need not immediately precede the flash of insight but may be separated from it by a longer or shorter temporal interval.)

Perhaps the feeling does somehow precede realization but the case is analogous to that in which we have vague feelings of joy or sorrow and are unable to put our finger on any adequate cause at the time, though we later hit upon an adequate explanation. But the analogy is not sufficiently close. In many moments of depression it may be difficult to pick out more than a few elements in the situation which have caused the mood in question. A person might say, 'I simply feel sad, that's all' or 'I don't know why, but I am so happy'. But it would perhaps be odd for him to say, 'I just feel dependent, that's all' or 'I don't know why, but I feel so dependent' without some indication from previous remarks or context of that on which he is dependent.

It seems then in practice to be quite difficult to identify the feeling of absolute dependence without mentioning God. But Schleiermacher has set out "to oppose the view that this feeling of dependence is itself condi-

tioned by some previous knowledge about God."[1]

Our principal difficulty, then, has been the attempt to find adequate criteria for identifying the feeling of absolute dependence. The only ones which seem acceptable are those which characterize the feeling by reference to its object--God. This attempt can only be successful, however, if we can characterize God, i.e., determine the nature of that on which we are dependent. The difficulty with this is that the feeling of absolute dependence is used by Schleiermacher to both explain the source of religious statements and to determine their truth. Hence an adequate characterization of God, while necessary to identify the feeling, presupposes that we know and can use the feeling.

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[1] Ibid., p. 17.

CHAPTER III

SCHLEIERMACHER'S VIEW OF THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS

A. We must ask how, for Schleiermacher, God is related to the feeling of absolute dependence and will explore the possibility that the relation is a causal one. But before we can ask about the relation of God to the feeling of absolute dependence, it would seem that an analysis of the meaning of religious statements, i.e., statements about God, is necessary. How, then, does Schleiermacher construe religious statements?

Religious statements are of three sorts according to Schleiermacher: (a) poetical statements which are based on an enthusiasm which expresses itself in pictures and figures of speech, (b) rhetorical statements which are presumably commendatory and directive and (c) the descriptively didactic statements of which dogmatic statements are a sub-class.[1]

Poetical and rhetorical statements are in some sense the foundation of didactic statements. I shall consider them together. Enthusiasm naturally expresses itself in poetry and thus in images, metaphors and broad panoramic pictures. Preaching uses rhetorical language to stimulate and direct. As such both are characterized by the use of emotively charged terms which are direct expressions of re-

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[1] Ibid., p. 78.

ligious feelings. Now I will suggest that Schleiermacher conceives the relation of dogmatic statements to poetical religious statements to be something like that of a literal paraphrase to the poem of which it is a paraphrase. Such a relation, at least at first glance, is an intelligible one. But the other transition from religious feelings and the feeling of absolute dependence in particular to poetical statements is by no means clear. There seems to be no question but that a verbal picture or figure of speech may carry a great deal of emotive significance and in fact may cause certain appropriate emotional responses. But Schleiermacher wants to make religious feelings somehow prior to the pictures and figures of speech which express them. It is possible that all Schleiermacher means by this is that the feelings in question are more important to the religious life than the pictures which express them. But I believe he means more than this--that in some sense the feelings are logically prior to the pictures, and are their justification. Nor is he, I think, simply saying that emotions are causal antecedents of the pictures --simply some sort of necessary condition for the presentation of these verbal pictures in poetic language. Rather the transition is a peculiarly appropriate one. The feelings are to <u>justify</u> the pictures in some sense. But how do feelings justify a particular verbal picture? The relation would seem to be the other way around. I may justify certain feelings and aesthetic responses by indicating

the verbal pictures which inspire them, i.e., my feelings may be appropriate or the reverse in respect to a certain picture. But does this ever work in reverse? It might seem that there are such cases. I might choose one figure of speech in preference to another. If asked why, I might reply, 'I just like it--I get a warm glow in the one case which is absent in the other'. But notice here that what I am justifying is my choice of the picture or figure of speech, not the picture or figure of speech itself. So the relation does not run both ways. Features of the verbal picture may make a response appropriate, i.e., may justify it. But my feelings of preference, etc., at best justify the choice rather than the picture itself. Nor is the distinction simply a verbal one. What would it be like to justify a picture? I can certainly justify an evaluation of a picture, but my evaluation is a statement about the picture or figure of speech and not the picture or figure of speech itself. I can think of one way in which religious feelings might be said to justify certain pictures. They would do so if they were cognitive, if they grasped an object in the way in which our senses grasp objects. This sort of claim will be discussed in Part II.

There is still another possibility which I shall only mention here but will elaborate in Part III. This is that the object of religious feelings may be a person judged to be holy and consequently an authority. The ob-

ject of the feeling (the authority) then furnishes us with verbal pictures, figures of speech, etc., which, since they are as intimately bound up with the authority as his actions, must be considered appropriate in so far as the authority remains the object of religious feeling.

Let us now turn to dogmatic statements. As we have seen, dogmatic propositions are a species of didactic language in which "the highest possible degree of definiteness is aimed at".[1] What, then, is didactic language? It is a "derivative and secondary form" which combines the two preceding ones. It is not clear to me precisely what Schleiermacher means by didactic language. But since dogmatics is where didactic language is most precise, it is possible that the difference is simply one of degree, i.e., dogmatic language is more precise and employs fewer emotive terms than other sorts of didactic language, but is otherwise the same. I shall then proceed to an examination of Schleiermacher's account of dogmatic propositions.

The first question we must ask is whether dogmatic propositions express feelings, describe them, state their causes or are related to them in some other way.

Now if religious statements are about the causes of religious feelings, they will presumably take the form 'God causes...' But this cannot explain the meaning of religious statements since it is itself a religious statement, and

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[1] Ibid., p. 78.

stands in need of clarification.

Do dogmatic statements simply express religious feelings? If so, how are we to distinguish them from poetic religious statements? It is precisely the difference which we are interested in establishing. Again, though there is some sense in which Schleiermacher wants to maintain that dogmatic statements express feelings, it is by no means clear that the relation he has in mind is the sort of relation which holds between 'Hurrah' and my feeling of enthusiasm, i.e. where the expression gives vent to and communicates enthusiasm. (I shall call this 'the narrow sense of expression.') He may simply mean that dogmatic propositions are caused by feeling, or perhaps they are related to feeling in some other way--perhaps the feeling is described by religious statements, etc. When Schleiermacher says that dogmatic propositions express feelings, we are not justified in concluding any more than that the propositions in question and feelings are related. Furthermore, it seems to be one of the tasks of dogmatics to eliminate or tone down the emotive and figurative terms used in other sorts of religious language. Furthermore, poetic expressions are those which express (in the narrow sense) religious feelings. I conclude, then, that the relation of dogmatic statements to religious feelings is not that of expression (in the narrow sense).

Do dogmatic statements describe religious feeling? Schleiermacher says that they do, but it is not clear what

he means. A description would seem to involve some sort of phenomenological approach. A pure description of the feeling would be inadequate since presumably the person who uses dogmatic language is interested in the object towards which the feeling is directed and not simply in the feeling itself. Perhaps Schleiermacher is misled by an analogy with visual perception. If asked to describe a certain visual sensation I might reply, e.g., 'It is as if I saw a tree' or 'It is as if I saw a red object' or 'I seemed to see such and such a color and such and such a shape'. That is, visual sensations are sensations of something and so a description of them will involve a description of a (possible) object. The connection between feeling and objects of feeling seems much more tenuous however. Does happiness have an object in the sense that sight or hearing does? If not, a description of happiness or pain would not involve the mentioning of any object of the feeling or emotion, in any intimate way. (I might have to describe happiness as 'the sort of emotion which is caused by certain kinds of occasions' but these occasions are not objects of happiness in the way in which a table is the object of certain visual sensations, though they may cause it.) This is simply to say that feeling is not perception. I suggest that by overlooking this Schleiermacher may have thought that an adequate description of the feeling of absolute dependence would involve mentioning its object and was therefore content to say that dog-

matic propositions are descriptions of religious feelings.

I shall now attempt to clarify Schleiermacher's implicit theory of dogmatic statements by examining the use of dogmatic statements according to Schleiermacher and by examining his analysis of statements which ascribe some quality or activity to God.

1. The Use of Dogmatic Statements: Dogmatic statements do three jobs. They render the images of poetic langauge precise, they justify some of them and exclude others.

We have seen that dogmatic statements stand in an indeterminate relation to religious feelings and that they constitute a "derivative and secondary form" of religious language[1] which combines poetic and rhetorical language. I suggest that the primary relation is a precising one, connected with religious feelings only via poetic and rhetorical religious statements. That is, the images which result from feeling are subjected to a certain precising operation in order to make them more distinct and self-consistent. This would give us "the high degree of definiteness"[2] we want in a dogmatic proposition. The relation of dogmatic propositions to rhetorical statements seems less clear but perhaps consists in the fact that they can both be used for the same purpose--to stimulate and direct (among other things dogmatic propositions direct us how to use poetic religious language). What seems to

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[1] Ibid., p. 79.

[2] Ibid., p. 78.

happen is this: Dogmatic statements state the quintessence of the poetic statements or are a literal paraphrase of them. More is required than this however. "Scientific form" is essential. Language must be dialectical in that it is to be "formed in a technically correct manner,"[1] that is, the presentation must be systematic and logically coherent. It must be in accord with the rules of logic, and it must be free from contradictions. Contradictions in poetic language are to be resolved by an appeal either to the utterances of Christ or to other dogmatic propositions. Furthermore, "scientific form" seems to involve a certain factual plausibility as well as freedom from contradiction. (Thus miracles, for example, are suspect if regarded as special manifestations of the deity, since it has so often turned out to be the case that what was once regarded as a miracle has been found capable of being explained wholly in terms of natural causes.)

Dogmatic statements, then, are derived from poetic statements, but these dogmatic statements in turn seem to serve as checks on the poetic statements. The precising of poetic statements seems to involve judgments of relative importance. Certain pictures are selected as the primary ones. When these are presented in a reasonably precise way, they will help to keep peripheral figures and images in line with the essential ones.

But dogmatic statements not only control poetic

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[1] Ibid., p. 118.

statements, they also seem to me to serve as justifications of the feeling expressed in various figures and pictures of poetic language. Suppose someone shouts, 'Hurrah for Reilly'. We may take issue by saying, 'Why do you shout? Reilly is no good since he beats his wife, never gives money to beggars, etc.' We deny that his enthusiasm is well founded. Now by dragging in these criteria we are not simply trying to change the person's attitude, though this is probably involved. We believe there are certain conditions under which the emotions or feelings in question are justifiable. There are 'things worth shedding tears over.' We can say that a person is 'not worth a curse.' I am suggesting, then, that dogmatic statements might be regarded as the criteria for saying that a particular feeling was justified in the circumstances. But the difficulty is this, if religious emotions are the (logical) foundation of dogmatic statements, how can the latter be used to justify the former? Furthermore, dogmatic propositions would justify an emotion only in so far as the putative justifying statements were true. We must then discuss the question of the truth and falsity of religious statements and will do so in the next section.

There are other dogmatic statements the purpose of which seems only to exclude certain possible poetic statements. Thus consider Schleiermacher's discussion of the Trinity.[1] 'God is three persons in one' is not logically

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[1] Ibid., pp. 742-51.

coherent as it stands. It can best be regarded as a rule which would exclude certain propositions such as 'Christ is more (less) important than the Father' or 'There are three gods' or 'Christ and the Father are manifestations of some one entity'.

I suggest, then, that Schleiermacher is implicitly presenting us with a hierarchy of religious statements. On the first level are poetic statements and rhetorical statements. Then come positive dogmatic statements which are clarifications of the poetic statements. These also serve to keep the riot of possible pictures and figures of speech in line. (Both poetic and dogmatic statements may be used to justify religious feelings.) On the highest level would stand certain rules such as the Trinity-statement which would exclude both certain poetic statements and certain dogmatic statements.

2. Analysis of Dogmatic Statements: I have suggested that dogmatic statements may profitably be regarded as literal paraphrases of poetic religious statements. But if this is the case we must ask ourselves what terms are available for such a paraphrase. What kind of statement do we get--a scientific one, a metaphysical one, an ordinary language statement? I suggest that the sort of literal paraphrase Schleiermacher has in mind is one which will employ philosophical terminology. Philosophical concepts are employed in dogmatics.[1] Apparently, however, they

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[1] Ibid., p. 93.

change their meaning.[1] 'God created the world' means one thing in metaphysics and another in dogmatics. What, then, is involved in the shift of meaning? There seem to be several possibilities. (a) Different methods of verification may be relevant in the two contexts. (b) The statement may be used for different purposes in the two contexts. (c) The change may be like that from 'she has a garden in her face' as used in ordinary language and as used in poetry. In ordinary language such a statement would be obviously false, though the fact that we can understand it in an ordinary language sense is shown by the absurd pictures which come to mind. In poetry the same sentence may be quite in order however. Now which of these alternatives is tenable? Or is there some fourth alternative?

If Schleiermacher has the first alternative in mind, the difference would seem to be that while metaphysical statements are supported by certain arguments and general principles--perhaps an appeal to certain very general facts --, dogmatic statements are ultimately based on religious feeling and their adequacy or inadequacy to religious feelings is in some sense the ground of their truth or falsity. But if this is what Schleiermacher means, the account of dogmatic propositions is incomplete until he has given us an analysis of metaphysical assertions themselves, i.e., if they differ in method of verification and yet have some-

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[1] Ibid., p. 83.

thing else in common, we must determine this common element, and to determine what dogmatic statements have in common with metaphysical statements, we must understand the logic of metaphysical statements.

Or perhaps the same statement is simply used for different purposes. The statement, e.g., 'God created the world' is used in religion to buttress religious feelings and in fact is a clarification of their more poetic expressions--the interest is in maintaining and expressing religious feelings while in metaphysics the statement is intended simply to give us true information about the structure of the world. (That the purpose in view changes a metaphysical statement into a religious statement is suggested by Schleiermacher's discussion of angels.[1] --Take a statement about angels. Such a statement is not essential to the maintenance of religious attitudes. Consequently we may regard it as a metaphysical or empirical claim about the world, and turn the question as to its truth or falsity over to metaphysics or science.)

Now both the above possibilities presuppose an adequate account of the meaning of metaphysical statements and perhaps this could be supplied. But until it is supplied we do not have an account of the meaning of religious statements (since they mean the same).

The third alternative presents us with a greater difficulty however. It makes some sense to say that dogmatic

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[1] Ibid., pp. 156-60.

statements are literal paraphrases of poetic statements, where a translation of poetic statements into metaphysical statements is intended. But suppose the dogmatic statement stands to the metaphysical statement in the sort of relation that a poetic statement stands to a statement in ordinary language. If so, religious poetic statements are not being translated into metaphysical statements but into something which seems to mean in a quite different way even though the same terms are employed in both. Our problem is doubled. For notice what we must do. To understand poetry one must understand ordinary language. But this is not sufficient. That it is not sufficient is shown by the fact that we can imagine someone who takes all poetic statements literally. He understands ordinary language but not poetry. He needs something else. Now if religious statements stand in this sort of relation to metaphysical statements we have a double problem. We must first understand metaphysical statements as before, plus a 'something else'. But perhaps the relation runs the other way and religious statements are prior to metaphysical ones. If so, then it will not help us understand religious statements to understand metaphysical ones. But if not, we are back where we started. What is the meaning of religious statements?

Perhaps, though, Schleiermacher has something else in mind. Dogmatic propositions can take three forms. They can be (a) descriptions of human affective states or (b)

statements about the constitution of the world or (c) statements about divine attributes and modes of action.[1] That is, dogmatics can be set up in its entirety using any one of these three sorts of statements. But this seems to suggest that given any one of these sorts of statements, we can find an equivalent statement, or set of statements, for each of the other two sorts, i.e., a proposition of one sort can be translated into a proposition of another sort. This would certainly base dogmatics squarely on religious feelings, for if the various sorts of statement are interchangable, then dogmatic statements about the world or God can be reduced to statements which describe or present (darstellen) religious feelings. How this is to be effected, however, is unclear. In the first place (a) would seem to be a phenomenological description, (b) an empirical statement, and (c) a metaphysical statement. Schleiermacher's program would then suggest that metaphysical assertions can be reduced to empirical assertions and phenomenological descriptions, and this seems unobvious to say the least.

Presumably statements about the world would include statements about the causes and conditions of the presence of the feeling of absolute dependence, i.e., psychological statements. But how such a statement could be reduced to a mere description of that feeling seems very unclear. That is, how can 'x causes y' be reduced to 'y has features a, b,

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[1] Ibid., p. 125.

c' unless of course we include the cause as one of its features. But then, to say that x causes y of such and such a description would be analytic since x's causal efficacy is one of those features. Again, the cause of a phenomenon would seem to be part of its explanation, not part of its description.

The greatest difficulty seems to be the dissipation of statements about God--statements which predicate attributes of the deity or which assert relations to hold between God and the world. Suppose we take the statement 'The feeling of absolute dependence is the being of God in the individual'.[1] This statement should be capable of being replaced by one which is simply a description of the feeling of absolute dependence. That is, one in which 'God' does not occur. But if statements about feelings are considered by Schleiermacher to be the fundamental ones (and they are) then statements about God are simply disguised statements about religious feelings, and Schleiermacher surely does not want to maintain this.

I suggest, then, that what Schleiermacher may have had in mind is that there are three sorts of dogmatic assertions, no one of which can be reduced to the others, but that statements about feeling are somehow more important than the others, or establish the others in some way.

But this would suggest that religious statements are of three types: phenomenological statements, psychological

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[1] Ibid., p. 387.

statements, and metaphysical statements (the three types mentioned above). But since religion is neither phenomenology, nor psychology nor metaphysics, nor a combination of them, he must mean that there are three sorts of religious statements like these three sorts of statements (perhaps they employ the same terms). But if this is the case, we are again presented with all the difficulties which we found in Schleiermacher's assimilation of dogmatic statements to metaphysical statements. He must tell us how they are like and how they differ.

Finally we must notice that Schleiermacher's presentation also requires an analogy theory of meaning. To show that this is the case, we need only examine his analysis of two predicates 'wise' and 'loves us'. The most important statement in Christianity is 'God is love and God is wise'.[1] If Schleiermacher is driven to an analogical treatment of these two most important predicates, it will be fair to conclude that his theory is essentially incomplete without an analogy theory of the meaning of (at least some) religious predicates.

In the first place there should (on such a view) be a corresponding statement about the feeling of absolute dependence and its modifications. Perhaps 'God's causality is undivided' could, for example, be paired with 'The feeling of absolute dependence is a simple feeling'. But though our feeling is undivided or simple, it can be modified in

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[1] Ibid., pp. 726, 730-31.

various ways, so presumably a statement about God's love corresponds to a statement about some modification of our feeling of absolute dependence while a statement about God's wisdom corresponds to a statement about some other modification of our feeling. Since the feeling-statement is the fundamental one, it would presumably help us to understand the God-statement. But what precisely is the modification of feeling which corresponds to God's wisdom? This view will not be very helpful until it has been worked out in detail.

The explanation which we are offered, however, is slightly different.[1] God's love for us is the dominance of the God-consciousness in us. God's wisdom is the adaptation of means to this end. So far we might take these explanations literally. But Schleiermacher maintains that strictly speaking God's attributes are indistinguishable. Thus the wisdom=His love. But this implies that the dominance of the God-consciousness=the adaptation of means to this end. Surely it is fair to say at this point that words are being used in stretched or analogous senses. We may note too that at one place in The Christian Faith Schleiermacher admits that we draw God's attributes from an analogy with human attributes.[2] Schleiermacher is then actually working with some form of an analogy theory. But this presupposes a theory of analogy which Schleiermacher fails to

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[1] Ibid., pp. 732-33.

[2] Ibid., pp. 411-12.

offer.[1]

I conclude, therefore, that what Schleiermacher's account requires is an analogy theory of the meaning of religious statements. This is not presented in The Christian Faith, and so the account of religious statements contained therein is inadequate.

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[1]He cannot maintain that all statements are analogous, since if so he would be placed in the following situation--a situation in which Auguste Sabatier finds himself. Thus Sabatier maintains in Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), that all religious statements are symbols which always remain partially inadequate. There are two objections to this. One is that the statement that all statements about God are inadequate to His nature is itself about God. Unless it includes itself within its scope (and I do not think that it does) at least one statement about God is non-symbolic. The second objection is this: Why even accept the claim that all statements about God are inadequate symbolic ones? The only reason I can see is that God is of such and such a nature. But the statement that God is of such and such a nature is literal or not. If not, the same question arises again. If it is literal, then it is false that all statements about God are symbolic. On the other hand, if only some statements are analogous or symbolic and are to be explained in terms of certain statements which are neither symbolic nor analogous, then it is precisely the latter which interest us since they are more fundamental.

B. What methods of verification are appropriate for dogmatic propositions? Under precisely what conditions is a dogmatic proposition true? Schleiermacher seems to suggest several possibilities. However, it does not seem to be the case that any one of those criteria proposed is the criterion of the truth of a dogmatic statement. There is rather a series of criteria all more or less relevant to the truth claim.

Since dogmatic propositions seem to be literal paraphrases of rhetorical and poetic statements which express religious feeling, one criterion would seem to be the adequacy of dogmatic statements to the feeling from which they are ultimately derived. Now in what sense can one dogmatic statement be more adequate to religious feeling than another? It could be more adequate if it expressed the feeling more adequately. A dogmatic proposition is true, then, if it expresses a certain religious feeling which it was designed to express. The criterion of truth is then one of success--success in communicating or expressing the feeling we want to express or communicate. Perhaps, say, a novel combination of words expresses an emotion better than some common worn out formula, because it is more striking or something of the sort. But though adequacy in this sense (i.e., adequacy in communicating and expressing feeling) would certainly furnish some sort of ground for preferring one formulation of a feeling to another, it seems unlikely that Schleiermacher would be content with

this. For one thing, the adequacy criterion as above stated would apply to poetic statements as well as dogmatic statements. However, it might be the case that both sorts of statements have the same kind of truth conditions.

Furthermore, there is another sense in which a dogmatic proposition may be said to be adequate to a religious feeling. A dogmatic statement is adequate to a religious feeling in this sense if it presents us with a picture upon the acceptance of which we maintain the religious feeling intact, or upon the acceptance of which the feeling in question is intensified. But this would seem to make adequacy something other than truth. (As opposed to our suggestion that adequacy=truth). It would seem that our attitudes can be maintained and intensified by a picture or claim if and only if we consider the picture to apply to the world or the claim to be true. If we suspect that the picture does not apply or that the claim is false, then it would seem that it will not affect our attitude or may even weaken it. But since a picture is adequate only if it is thought to apply and a claim is adequate only if thought true, we must know what it is for something to be thought true to know what it is for something to be adequate. To know what it is for something to be thought true, we must know what it would be like for it to <u>be</u> true. (To understand 'John thinks p' I must understand 'p'.) But if so, we must understand truth to understand adequacy. Adequacy will not,

then, help us in understanding truth.

Let us then replace our question with another. We must ask under what circumstances a dogmatic proposition is true where we mean by a dogmatic proposition being true that it presents us with a picture which actually applies to the world, where, e.g., 'God created the world' in some sense presents a fact about the world, or a fact which involves the world.

A new criterion may be proposed. Schleiermacher has maintained that religious feeling may be more or less pure, more or less mixed with extraneous elements. A religion in which the feeling of absolute dependence is less pure is not as valuable as a religion in which it is pure.[1] (Thus Christianity is purer than the Islamic religion since in the latter sensuous elements are combined with the feeling of absolute dependence.) Now does this determine the truth of religious statements so that those which are related to the purer feeling are truer? (Schleiermacher would want to maintain that the statements in the Koran are partially true, but that Christianity presents this truth more adequately.) If so, then we can presumably test religious statements by determining the relative purity of the religious feelings on which they are based, since it happens to be the case that pure feelings are related to true statements about the world. But how do we determine the relative purity of the feeling of absolute dependence? We look to

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[1] Ibid., p. 33 ff.

see if it is mixed with extraneous elements. But how do we know that an element is extraneous? Not all accompanying feelings are extraneous. The need for redemption and the feelings which accompany redemption itself are essential to Christianity and do not adulterate the purity of the feeling of absolute dependence. Why is the feeling of absolute dependence, when qualified by feelings of redemption, pure and when qualified in other ways impure? What is the criterion of purity? I suggest that we can only exclude an element as extraneous on the ground that the feeling of absolute dependence so qualified, is inadequate to God. But how do we know it is inadequate? Because God is of such and such a character, i.e., we know certain true propositions about Him. But then the truth of these propositions must be based on some criteria other than that of the purity of the religious feeling to which they are related.

Schleiermacher says in one place that faith is certainty in a fact--the fact that Christ can put an end to our uneasiness and need for redemption.[1] The certainty is a result of the impression which Christ makes upon an individual. Perhaps we can generalize this and say that the criterion of the truth of a dogmatic proposition is simply a feeling of certainty which comes over us when we entertain the proposition. But is this sufficient? I suggest that it is not. There are two ways in which we may justify

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[1] Ibid., p. 68.

the claim to be certain about a proposition. (a) We may offer a proof. Thus we may believe a proposition in logic because we can demonstrate it. Or we may be convinced of an empirical proposition because there is a certain amount of evidence for it. (b) Consider the following: 'There is a tree outside my window.' 'How do you know?' 'Because I see it.' Now this case differs from the preceding one. If I say 'There is a tree outside my window' and offer 'Because I can see it' as backing, the latter is not a demonstration, either deductive or inductive. A <u>reason</u> for the belief that the tree is outside my window, and evidence from which it might be inferred, might be that a seed was planted there, that it had sufficient water and light, that nothing interfered with it, etc., etc. To say 'I see it' simply puts forward the claim that I am in a position to know the truth of the statement. Now either sort of statement can be used to back up another statement which I put forward as true. That is, I can offer a deductive or inductive proof or I can attempt to show that I am in a position to know the truth of the statement in question. But one thing which is not accepted is simply a feeling of certainty per se, or a hunch or guess, without any further backing. A hunch might turn out to be correct. But even then I do not think we would want to say that the person who had the hunch knew it to be true--as opposed to 'thought it would turn out to be true'. Now Schleiermacher cannot accept the feel-

ing of certainty as any sort of proof of dogmatic statements (if this makes any sense) since proofs are irrelevant as we shall see. He must then be claiming that the religious man, by virtue of his feelings, is somehow in a position to know the truth of religious statements. If religious feeling or some special feeling of conviction can do this job however, it is difficult to see how it could be adequate unless it were some sort of intuitive faculty. But then we must ask how we know that our intuitions are adequate. Presumably because the feeling of absolute dependence or some special feeling of certainty is implanted by God, or, as Sabatier says, in the Holy Spirit dwelling within us. But then we must know that the proposition 'God implants the feeling of absolute dependence in us' is true. But this is itself an assertion about God and what is its justification?

It seems rather uncertain, however, that Schleiermacher actually claimed that we can intuit religious truths. Let us then turn to other remarks of his in the hope that we can clarify his position. Proofs are clearly irrelevant to the truth of dogmatic propositions. They cannot be the source of faith but are in fact only designed to dispute objections.[1] It may be remarked that a proposition like 'God created the world' can occur both in a metaphysical and in a religious context. In a metaphysical context a proof might be possible. But there is at least some sense in which the

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[1] Ibid., p. 70.

same proposition is unproved in the religious context.

At the same time, "Whatever opposes the movements of the Divine Spirit is the same as what conflicts with human reason'.[1] Since demonstrative proofs of the truth of religious statements are inadmissable, then perhaps a sufficient though not necessary condition of a religious statement's being false is that it contains a contradiction or otherwise conflicts with reason. However, 'reason' seems to be construed quite broadly so as to include at least the moral sense. Exactly how much is included? Does 'accordance with human reason' simply mean 'accordance with human capacities'? If so, then Schleiermacher's point is a trivial one. Any religious system which might actually be proposed to us, is proposed by human beings, is believed by them, and so in accord with human capacities. Or does he mean 'accordance with worthy human capacities'?

Schleiermacher does maintain that there is an element of irrationality in religion but this does not affect our account of religious statements directly. Though the Christian self-consciousness is irrational in the sense that it cannot be produced by reason, its expression is rational. In a similar way, Schleiermacher maintains that nature is not rational (i.e., not produced by reason) though what we say about nature is rational (subject to rational tests). It seems, then, that the Christian communication is not a solution to an intellectual problem but a new datum,

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[1] Ibid., p.65.

one different in kind from that which can be produced by nature per se--in short, the feeling of absolute dependence as qualified by the sense of redemption. As it is a given, a fact, not a proposition, it is not rational. Nevertheless, as we have said, its formulation in statements is rational.

What does 'rationality' include beyond an injunction not to violate certain logical rules? I suggest it includes something which I shall call 'empirical possibility', i.e., religious statements must in some sense square with empirical statements which occur in science and our everyday knowledge of the world. Discussing angels, Schleiermacher says that we may admit propositions about angels into religious language without deciding on their truth or falsity since they neither conflict with religious feeling nor are essential to it, and since angels are intrinsically possible,[1] i.e., there might be beings of this sort. What does he mean by 'intrinsically possible'? I suggest that he means more than mere logical possibility, that there might actually be beings of this sort since the existence of such beings would not conflict with our actual knowledge, i.e., they are empirically possible. Whether they exist or not is a question for science or metaphysics. This suggests that if a claim that angels existed did conflict with scientific and metaphysical knowledge, we would have to reject any propositions about angels as false. More generally,

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[1] Ibid., p. 156.

any dogmatic proposition which conflicts with well-established empirical and metaphysical knowledge is false.

Factual questions are relevant to dogmatics, though they are not a part of it. Consider the (putative) report of the disciples about the Resurrection. If we assume that the Apostles were deceived, then we cast doubt on their ability as reporters and thus on the rest of the narrative in which Christ's person is presented to us.[1] But notice that the criterion is again presented in a negative form. If certain facts are the case (the Apostles were deceived about the Resurrection) then it is possible that certain other dogmatic propositions about Christ are false. Schleiermacher does not go on to say that if we can show they were not deceived in this, a certain plausibility is given to dogmatic propositions based on the rest of the narrative. Nor can we do so. Since religion, and therefore dogmatics, is based on the feeling of absolute dependence, any proffered proof is irrelevant. How, then, can empirical arguments show that a dogmatic proposition is false? Schleiermacher assumes that they can show a dogmatic proposition to be false because he thinks that dogmatics, if correct, cannot conflict with science or with metaphysics, though neither science nor metaphysics can establish a dogmatic proposition.

Thus all possible empirical confirmation of dogma is

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[1] Ibid., p. 420.

rejected and thus 'miracle' is an internal concept.[1] Far from establishing dogmatic propositions or stimulating religious feelings, an event would not be recognized as a miracle unless we had the feeling in question and employed the dogmatic concepts. The religious man can accept an empirical explanation of a putative miracle since 'miracle' is properly speaking the religious name for an event (see above)--it is the result of a certain way of looking at an event.

There is, however, an apparent way of establishing certain dogmatic propositions which, while not 'merely' empirical, must take account of certain facts. Schleiermacher asks how we can discover the distinctive essence of, say, Protestantism. We cannot deduce it from the concept of religion or of Christianity, nor can we discover it by a "merely empirical method".[2] Perhaps he means by this that we must not simply view certain facts about the Reformation but must 'enter into the spirit of the movement', 'put ourselves in the other person's shoes', i.e., sympathetically share his emotions and feelings to some extent. There would (ideally) be tests governing this procedure. By putting ourselves in the other person's shoes we may discover hypotheses or make predictions which will in fact be verified by, e.g., new documents which turn up.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[2] Ibid., p. 105.

Now our hypothesis concerns the essential spirit of Protestantism and is presumably in dogmatic terms. But assuming that the connection between the spirit (essential feelings) and the dogmatic propositions has been made clear, the only proposition whose truth has been established is that if anyone was essentially Protestant, he would entertain certain propositions. It does not establish the truth of those propositions themselves.

There is some sense in which Schleiermacher thinks that Christ's utterances are authoritative.[1] Certain of his utterances are distinguished from poetic and rhetorical statements and also from dogmatic statements. They presumably have this special status because they are expressions of an absolutely authoritative religious experience. But as to just what sort of religious statements these might be, we are left in the dark.

In a note added to the second edition of the Discourses, Schleiermacher suggests a new criterion.[2] One religion is truer than another if it expresses a superior state of mind. How is this to be decided? What standards are we to use? There are two possibilities. (a) A dogmatic proposition may express a superior state of mind in so far as it is based on a relatively pure feeling of absolute dependence. This has already been discussed. (b) It

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[1] Ibid., pp. 79-80.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, tr. John Oman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 108.

might simply involve a value judgment as to the relative worth of, say, the Christian states of mind and Buddhist states of mind and secular states of mind. But if this is the case, then the truth of dogmatic propositions becomes a value question, a matter of ethics, and Schleiermacher is as interested in separating religious questions from ethical questions as he is in separating religious questions from empirical and metaphysical ones. Furthermore, it is by no means clear how a value judgment can furnish the foundation for the claim that a certain proposition about the world is true. Is it simply as a matter of fact the case that there is an absolute system of ethical judgments such that the dogmatic propositions connected with a state of mind judged superior by that system are true? But the connection involved is inexplicable. If the connection is contingent, just happens to be the case, then in order to determine that the connection holds we must generalize from certain observed instances in which the connection does hold. But this presupposes that we can identify true dogmatic propositions by some criterion which is independent of that which we are trying to establish. But if this is the case, even if the connection between superior states of mind and true dogmatic propositions did hold, it would be unnecessary as a criterion of truth. But the last is our main reason for attempting to establish the connection. The connection is not obviously a logical one. But perhaps the connection does not just happen.

Rather God establishes it. But to know this we would have to know the truth of certain statements about God. But how we can know certain God-statements to be true is the point at issue.

I conclude, then, that Schleiermacher gives us two negative tests. Dogmatic propositions are false if they contain contradictions or are empirically or metaphysically impossible. With the possible exception of an appeal to certain utterances of Christ as authoritative (and this is not developed) there is no positive test except that of adequacy to religious feeling. But this at best shows that certain dogmatic propositions are necessary to justify or maintain the feeling of absolute dependence; it does not establish the truth of these dogmatic propositions, regarded as making claims about the world.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELATION OF THE FEELING OF ABSOLUTE DEPENDENCE TO GOD

Assuming that we have succeeded in isolating criteria for the identification of the feeling of absolute dependence which do not depend on the truth of any statement about God (and this seems necessary if this feeling is to be the basis of any possible theory about God) how do we get from the feeling of absolute dependence to the conviction that there is a God? It is possible that Schleiermacher thinks we are somehow given God in feeling, as tables appear in sense perception. But though he does seem to suggest this at times, it seems unlikely that he would seriously want to maintain it since he carefully distinguishes perception, in which an object is presented to us, from feeling, in which no object is presented (see above). I shall therefore postpone a consideration of the difficulties which this sort of view involves. (cf. Part II)

Schleiermacher attempts to move from the feeling of absolute dependence to the existence of a God in the following way: (1) He begins by stating that in every state of consciousness two elements are to be found--a self-caused element (a being) and a non-self-caused element (a being-by-some-means-come-to-be--ein Irgendweigewordensein). Now this non-self-caused element presupposes an Other which is the

source of the particular determination. That is, for every x, if x is a state of consciousness, then there is a y such that y is not the Self, and y determines x.[1] (We must notice here that this Other is not 'objectively presented', i.e., is not an object of perception.)

(2) Secondly, Schleiermacher explains the feeling of absolute dependence as follows: There is both an active relation of the Self to the Other and a receptive relation of the Self to the Other. In so far as the Self is active in relation to the Other, the Self experiences a feeling of freedom. In so far as the Self is receptive in relation to the Other, there is a feeling of dependence. Now the conditions under which we can experience a feeling of absolute freedom may be characterized as follows: We experience a feeling of absolute freedom if and only if there is an object upon which we act and this object proceeds entirely from ourselves. But in fact such a feeling is impossible, since, (a) any object in relation to which we can feel free must be an object on which we can act, (b) any object on which we can act is <u>given</u> to us and (c) therefore we are receptive in relation to such an object. From this it follows (d) that we feel dependent in relation to such an object and (e) therefore cannot feel absolute freedom in relation to such an object.

A feeling of absolute dependence may be defined as follows: A feeling of absolute dependence =df. a state in

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[1] Schleiermacher, <u>The Christian Faith</u>, p. 12.

which we feel that our spontaneous activity itself comes from an outside source. As a matter of fact we have this feeling.

(3) We may now state two definitions of God. God =df. "the co-determinant in this feeling"[1] and, God =df. "the whence of our...existence".[2]

(4) The conclusion presumably is that there is a God and that this follows from our examination of the feeling of absolute dependence.

Now we are in fact faced here with two arguments which attempt to derive the existence of God from the feeling of absolute dependence. They go as follows:

A

(i) For every state of consciousness there is an Other which determines it.
(ii) There is a feeling of absolute dependence.
(iii) Therefore, there is an Other which determines it.
(iv) This Other =df. God (cf. our first definition above). Therefore, God exists.

B

(i) There is a feeling of absolute dependence.
(ii) A feeling of absolute dependence is a feeling that our spontaneous activity comes from an outside source.
(iii) The whence of our existence (and therefore our spontaneity) =df. God (cf. second definition above). Therefore, God exists.

This second argument will work only if we supply another premiss, viz., 'Our feeling that there is a source of our existence is veridical'. For it is only on the basis of this premiss that we can move from the fact that we feel

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[1] Ibid., p. 17.

[2] Ibid., p. 16.

that there is a source of our existence to the fact of such an existence.

These two arguments are quite dissimilar. In the first, we are moving from the feeling of absolute dependence given as a phenomenon to be explained, to a cause of that feeling. The second argument, however, treats feeling as cognitive, as apprehending a proposition (there is a source of our existence) and concludes that the proposition in question is true. Secondly, we must note that the arguments employ two different definitions of God. It does not follow that the source of our existence is identical with the source of the feeling of absolute dependence. We are using 'God' in two different senses, and we have at best proved that God (sense 1) and God (sense 2) exists. Finally I would like to suggest that it is the constant shift between the above two relations between God and the feeling of absolute dependence which gives Schleiermacher's account whatever attractiveness it may possess. These two relations are (a) a causal relation between religious feelings and God and (b) a cognitive relation between religious feelings and God. We shall examine the latter relation in some detail in Part II. Difficulties in the putative causal connection will be discussed now.

Let us return to the two arguments under consideration and examine them in some detail. In argument A the first premiss is metaphysical, the second factual and the third analytic. Now since the first premiss is metaphysical, the

conclusion can be accepted if and only if we accept the metaphysics on which it is based. The premiss is that every state of consciousness presupposes an Other. Now there is an unclarity about the statement itself. It might simply mean that for every state of consciousness there is a cause of that state of consciousness which is external to the mind. How would we show this? We might examine all cases of mental phenomena. Not until then can we reach a certain conclusion (and Schleiermacher certainly talks as if this were intended to be certain, not simply probable). But if we treat our proposition in this manner we are treating it as an ordinary empirical assertion, and Schleiermacher does not intend it as such. Perhaps then, it means that for every cognizing act there must be a datum of which it is aware, and that this is necessarily implied by the notion of a cognizing act. This cannot be meant however, for the Other is not a datum. Schleiermacher denies that the Other can be objectively presented as an object of perception.

There is a more general difficulty however, and this consists simply in the fact that the premiss is a metaphysical one, and as such can be justified only in terms of a metaphysics. Why is this a difficulty? Well first, it seems unlikely that many would want to burden themselves with Schleiermacher's metaphysics. But secondly, Schleiermacher maintains that dogmatics is independent of metaphysics. Now dogmatics consists of religious statements. Some

of these have God as their subject. As such they imply or presuppose that God, their subject term, exists. But this presupposition (there is a God) rests upon the feeling of absolute dependence. If it does so only in the way in which Schleiermacher outlines in this argument, then dogmatics is not independent of metaphysics, for the presupposition of dogmatics is itself established by metaphysics. This argument cannot then pretend to explain the connection of the feeling of absolute dependence to God. If we are to avoid the difficulty, there must be some other possible explanation of the relation in question which is independent of metaphysics. Otherwise dogmatics cannot be completely present apart from metaphysics. Now it is precisely this other relation we are interested in, for if feeling is essential to the religious situation and to the assertion of religious statements, it would seem that this relation ought to be intelligible apart from the presupposition of some particular brand of metaphysics. This may be simply a pious hope (it is not an argument), yet we will attempt in Part III to present just such a view.

Finally, even if we accept the argument and accept the definition of God as the cause of the feeling of absolute dependence, we can deny that the God whose existence has been proved is the God of Christian theology since it remains possible that the cause is not the Christian God. But if so, then Schleiermacher has not proved what he set out to prove--that a being like the God of Christian theo-

logy exists.

Argument B calls for little comment. For we can accept it only if we assume that the feeling that a being has created us is veridical. But to say that the feeling that there is a being who has created us is veridical is to say that there is such a being. And since God =df. a being who has created us, we have presupposed our conclusion.

Let us now turn to a more general examination of a putative causal connection between the feeling of absolute dependence and God. Schleiermacher without question maintains that there is such a connection. In the following remarks, however, I will follow up certain hints which Schleiermacher gives us as to the nature of such a connection in order to examine some of the general difficulties involved in the attempt to establish the connection in question, without being overly concerned with the faithfulness of the presentation to Schleiermacher's own view. (The essence of the view has, I think, already been presented in the preceding paragraphs.) What distortion there may be will be the result of applying a more matter of fact conception of causality than that employed by Schleiermacher.[1]

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[1]I will use 'cause' as roughly meaning a condition without which the phenomenon in question could not occur, and such that a statement that this x causes this y will imply a conditional to the effect that if x, then y. The paradigm situation will be one where we are capable of checking the conditional by empirical means. I am inclined to

Suppose God is the cause of the feeling of absolute dependence. If so, there ought to be some way to proceed from the feeling to its cause, the assertion 'there is a God' being established by means of a causal inference. Perhaps when Schleiermacher says that the idea of God expresses the feeling of absolute dependence, he has this sort of transition in mind:[1] I have a feeling of absolute dependence. There must be a cause of this feeling, let us call it 'x', sufficient to produce the effect. Then God =df. x. Whether Schleiermacher maintained this or not (and I believe that at least at times he did) the causal relation of feelings to God is well worth investigating.

Now, as we have seen, the feeling of absolute dependence is the feeling of finiteness. But what would be involved in such a feeling? Presumably, I would feel impotent, limited, perhaps frustrated. It is difficult to see what else would be included in a feeling of finiteness as such. Now it would initially seem possible to list the causes of my various frustrations, limitations, etc. If so, it is by no means obvious why I would be forced to go beyond phenomena and their connections. Schleiermacher might reply that he

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think that Schleiermacher's use of 'cause' differs from my own, though I am unclear as to exactly where the difference lies. I suspect, however, that it consists in maintaining that there is some sort of queer necessary connection between events themselves--a metaphysical necessity (whatever this might be) and secondly an emergence theory of the production of substances. I may, however, be imagining the difference in question. If so, then the remarks which follow will apply directly to Schleiermacher.

[1] Ibid., p. 17.

is not talking about any particular limitation or frustration but rather about a general human condition of which these particular limitations, etc., are the consequences. But it is not clear what this general human condition would involve over and above the particular frustrations and limitations. Perhaps, however, we somehow lump together the objects which limit us, infer that they are one in the sense that they are all caused by God, and conclude that it is therefore God who limits us. God, as the cause of the sum of what limits us, is then a being towards Whom we can only feel absolutely dependent. At first glance, then, a causal transition from a feeling of finiteness to God as its ultimate cause appears to be possible. It should be noted, however, that the crucial step is that from the objects which limit us to God as their cause. This, however, will have all the merits and defects to which the cosmological proof of the existence of God is subject.

Moreover, the situation is complicated by the fact that secondary causes are at work. God is not the cause of the feeling of absolute dependence in the sense that he directly and miraculously produces it. For the religious feeling is awakened by contact with ones fellows. It is expressed and communicated by gestures, tone of voice and the use of emotive language.[1] These may be regarded either as a contributing cause, or as a condition upon the presence of which God produces the feeling of absolute dependence. I

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[1] Ibid., p. 27.

am not sure which is meant (nor am I sure there is any difference between a contributing cause and a condition). If, however, communication by gestures and emotive language is not a contributing cause it seems useless, the connection appearing completely fortuitous. But Schleiermacher would certainly want to maintain that such communication is in fact one of the effective means by which the feeling is aroused.

Now if we are asked for an explanation which is sufficient to explain the awakening of the religious emotions, it is not clear but that the use of emotive language, facial expressions, etc., together with the appropriate verbal pictures, is sufficient without any reference to God. That is, I suppose Schleiermacher to be proceeding in this fashion: He has a peculiar experience--the feeling of absolute dependence--and starts investigating its cause. He concludes that the only possible cause would be a being outside the world--God. Now I ask why the pictures and beliefs with their emotional impact would not be sufficient to produce this feeling. The question is a factual one, and is to be decided on empirical grounds.[1]

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[1]I suspect, however, that Schleiermacher has argued like this: The feeling of absolute dependence is the religious feeling. The religious feeling is the feeling produced by God. Thus, God is its cause. That is, he defines the feeling as the feeling of dependence produced by our relation to God, from which it analytically follows that God is its cause or part of its cause. (cf. The Christian Faith, pp. 16-17, 125.)

What Schleiermacher seems to want to say is that psychical conditions, events in the world, etc., explain the presence of the religious feeling--but not entirely. For example, he says that the influence of Christ on the redeemed (an affective influence) is not rationally explicable.[1] He might mean that the impression made is not an act of reason, and this is certainly true. He might mean that the feeling produced is of a qualitatively different kind than our other feelings, that is, belongs in a different category altogether. (We shall investigate this sort of claim in Part II.) Or he might mean, and I think this is what is primarily intended, that the feeling or impression is irrational in the sense that its causes are undiscoverable by science, and this for the reason that the divine is at work. But though this seems to be what Schleiermacher intends, it would only be plausible if the nature of the religious feeling were such that a complete scientific explanation is possible. And Schleiermacher has not shown this.

Let us look at the problem another way. God is supposed to be the cause of the feeling of absolute dependence. Now if we accept certain theories, any object or event in a world created by God, is ultimately caused by Him. Thus it would be trivially true that the feeling of absolute dependence as a phenomenon in the world, is caused by God. But Schleiermacher surely means more than this. Suppose that to

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[1] Ibid., pp. 64-65.

produce an event A, three conditions are together necessary and sufficient, e, m and x. Now e may have...b, c, d, etc. as causal antecedents, while m has l, k, etc. as antecedents and x has u, v, etc. as antecedents. Each series goes back to God as first cause. There is one sense in which I have completely explained A if and only if I have traced all three series back to God. Let us call this 'explanation$_1$'. But there is another perfectly good sense in which to give e, m and x is a sufficient explanation of A. Let us call this 'explanation$_2$'. Now I suggest that what Schleiermacher wants to say is that to give an explanation$_2$ of the appearance of the feeling of absolute dependence, we must always include God as one factor in such an explanation. Antecedent natural phenomena cannot completely explain$_2$ it. With the feeling of absolute dependence something new appears on the scene which could not have been predicted by anyone who simply took account of the natural sequence of events. Now God is obviously not a natural cause because if He were, we could lump Him together with the natural antecedents and the new totality <u>would</u> be a complete <u>natural</u> cause of the phenomenon. But now we must ask what could be meant by a causal relation which is supposed to hold between a natural and a non-natural object. To answer this question we must have a theory about God. This presupposes that we can understand statements about God, that we know how they function. We have already seen some of the difficulties involved in the attempt to answer this question.

Let us ask a more general question. How do we usually pass from feelings to a consideration of their causes? The consideration is important since Schleiermacher seems to claim that if the feeling of absolute dependence is strong enough we will be aware of its cause, i.e., God, just as we are usually aware of the causes of our happiness when we feel happy. But in the first place we must distinguish between justifying and causal explanations. Take the following case: 'Why are you happy?' 'Because I just inherited a million dollars!' The fact which justifies his happiness--which makes it reasonable to feel happy as opposed to the situation where we call a feeling 'groundless'--is the fact that he has inherited a million dollars. The fact which causes his happiness however, is his belief that he has inherited a million dollars. If he is mistaken and does not know it he will still be happy because the cause is at work, but his happiness will be unjustified or groundless.

God may be related to the feeling in three ways. We could claim that belief in God causes the feeling. Secondly, we could claim that since God exists the feeling is justified. Thirdly, we could claim that God causes the feeling. That the first connection holds seems obvious to me. Schleiermacher thinks that the last two claims are equally obvious. But Schleiermacher has not shown that our feeling is justified, for to do so we would have to be in a position to assert that there is a God, and he has rejected proofs for the

existence og God. On the other hand, to show that we need God to explain the feeling he must show that natural antecedents are insufficient and he has not done this. What I suggest has happened is this: It is obvious that the first connection holds. If religious feelings exist one can infer that the subject of these feelings believes in God. But to show that religious feelings and belief in the existence of God are inseparably connected, does not tend to show that religious feelings and an existing God are inseparably connected. Schleiermacher has traded on the obviousness of the first connection to establish the other. Belief in the statement 'God is the cause of the world in general and the feeling of absolute dependence in particular' is a necessary condition of the feeling, and this claim has been confused with the claim that God Himself is a necessary condition of the feeling, and the claim that the feeling is justified since God exists.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

What conclusions can we draw from our examination of certain aspects of Schleiermacher's philosophy? First, we have seen some of the difficulties involved in attempting to provide adequate criteria for the presence of religious feelings (for a more extended discussion of this see Appendix II). Those which Schleiermacher provides seem to employ religious sentences (e.g., 'the feeling which God causes') and are thus acceptable only if we stand within the religious context. One of our tasks, then, in Part III will be the attempt to furnish criteria for the presence of religious feelings which can be accepted by anyone whether or not he accepts any particular religious proposition.

Secondly, we have been forced to reject Schleiermacher's theory of the meaning of religious propositions for the various reasons which have been developed in the second section. I would like to suggest at this point that the difficulties arose from two sources. The first source of difficulty was the attempt to base a theory of the meaning of religious sentences on the feeling associated with these sentences. (In the case of Schleiermacher this is the feeling of absolute dependence.) In Part III, when we propose a model in terms of which to construe the logic of the religious situation, we shall in fact find only one sentence which can be understood only by positing a relation to re-

ligious feeling, viz., 'X is holy'.[1] The second source of difficulty was the attempt to assimilate religious statements to metaphysical statements. This might suggest either that no such assimilation is in order (i.e., religious statements are unlike every other sort of statement) or the assimilation has been misplaced. We will in fact follow up the latter suggestion in Part III and propose that religious statements be assimilated to sentences (for the most part) in ordinary language.

The most important result of our examination of Schleiermacher's theory of the verification of religious propositions has been the suggestion that any attempt to verify these propositions directly by an appeal to religious feeling, is misplaced. That to appeal directly to feeling of any sort in this manner is simply to appeal to caprice, to hunches, to prejudice. We are not, however, suggesting that religious feelings are completely irrelevant to the verification situation which obtains in religious contexts. We are simply rejecting the claim that such an appeal is directly relevant.

Finally, we have examined some of the difficulties involved in asserting that the relation of religious feelings to a religious object is a causal one. This causal relation may be established in two ways. (a) Suppose we

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[1]This is not to suggest that religious sentences cannot be construed as, say, simply expressions of emotion, but that to do so is not sufficiently close to the use of these sentences in religious contexts to be illuminating.

have not independently established the existence of God but feel that given the nature of religious feelings, we must posit such a being as its cause. But we can presumably do this only if we show that natural causes are insufficient to explain the feeling. And how can this be shown? Simply that the phenomenon is too marvelous to be produced by nature? This may cause us to say that the cause of the feeling is supernatural. It would hardly seem to justify the assertion. (b) On the other hand, we may be observing a correlation between two events or entities which have been independently identified. This presupposes that both of the entities in question exist, i.e., in our case, we presuppose that God exists. Now to determine the truth of the latter, we must know certain true propositions about God, for otherwise we would not know what we are asserting to exist. If, then, we must know that God exists, that He has such and such properties before we attempt to establish the connection, and if the connection between God and the religious feelings is essentially causal and not cognitive, then it would seem that religious feelings will play a minor role in any attempt to understand the logic of the religious situation. The essential work has already been done. In our attempt to understand that logic, we must not, then, pin our hopes on some sort of causal connection between religious feelings on the one hand and a supernatural entity on the other.

PART II

OTTO

CHAPTER VI

A BRIEF SURVEY OF OTTO'S POSITION

In The Idea of the Holy Rudolf Otto draws our attention to the fact that 'holy' cannot be rendered simply as 'good'. It "includes in addition...a clear overplus of meaning and this it is now our task to isolate".[1] This extra element is to be designated by 'numinous'. We can speak "of a unique 'numinous' category of value and of a definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever the category is applied".[2] It is upon this state of mind or feeling which is "perfectly sui generis...and... cannot be strictly defined"[3] that we are to concentrate our attention. (Though it cannot be defined we must note that it can be evoked and hinted at by analogous feelings. "It is a content of feeling that is qualitatively sui generis, yet at the same time one that has numerous analogies with others, and therefore it and they may reciprocally excite or stimulate one another and cause one another to appear in the mind."[4])

This feeling is cognitive, i.e., "has immediate and

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[1] Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, tr. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 5.

[2] Ibid., p. 7.

[3] Ibid., p. 7.

[4] Ibid., p. 44.

primary reference to an object outside the self[1] in that it grasps a special numinous object which cannot be directly characterized but "can only be suggested indirectly through the tone and content of a man's feeling-response to it".[2] More specifically, we can characterize the numen by means of ideograms or "illustrative substitutes for a concept",[3] i.e., by designating properties which would appropriately call for a feeling-response analogous to that evoked in the encounter with the numen. Thus anger and other "natural attributes...can only be admitted as figurative indications of something essentially non-rational by means of symbols drawn from feelings that have analogy to it".[4] And thus wrath is an ideogram derived from the daunting and awe inspiring character of the numinous experience. The numen remains, however, "properly beyond utterance",[5] something "whose real nature we can neither proclaim in speech, nor conceive in thought".[6]

The non-rational aspect of the Holy, the numinous, however, can and should be schematized by means of rational concepts such as 'good', 'complete', 'absolute', 'just', etc. Thus the "daunting and repelling moment of the numi-

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[1] Ibid., p. 10.

[2] Ibid., p. 10.

[3] Ibid., p. 9.

[4] Ibid., p. 77.

[5] Ibid., p. 24.

[6] Ibid., p. 33.

nous, is schematized by means of the rational ideals of justice, moral will, and the exclusion of what is opposed to morality".[1] "The attracting and alluring moment of the numinous, is schematized by means of the ideas of goodness, mercy, love..."[2]

"God's rational attributes can be distinguished from like attributes applied to the created spirit by being not relative, as those are, but absolute. Human love is relative, admitting of degrees, and it is the same with human knowledge and human goodness. God's love and knowledge and goodness, on the other hand, and all else that can be asserted of Him in conceptual terms, are formally absolute. The content of the attributes is the same; it is an element of form which marks them apart as attributes of God."[3] These attributes, absolutely taken, can be thought, but "cannot be thought home, thought out".[4]

The rational and the non-rational elements taken together (i.e., the numinous as schematized) yield the "complex category of 'holy' itself".[5]

The category of the holy is an a priori one. This general claim can be separated into three special claims. (a) Schematizing concepts such as "absoluteness, completion,

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[1] Ibid., p. 140.

[2] Ibid., p. 140.

[3] Ibid., p. 141

[4] Ibid., p. 141.

[5] Ibid., p. 45.

necessity, and substantiality, and no less so those of the good as an objective value...are not to be evolved from any sort of sense-perception"[1] but are a priori. (b) The non-rational elements are also a priori. The numinous "issues from the deepest foundation of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses, and, though it of course comes into being in and amid the sensory data and empirical material of the natural world...yet it does not arise out of them, but only by their means."[2] "Religious ideas and feelings are formed...[in]...a 'pure reason' in the profoundest sense..."[3] "This has to be presupposed; it cannot itself be explained."[4] The feeling emerges when certain conditions are fulfilled, but is not caused by these conditions.[5] (c) Finally, "the same a priori character belongs...to the connection of the rational and the non-rational elements in religion, their inward and necessary union".[6]

We have thus the a priori category of the holy.

There is a further twist however. "Religion is convinced not only that the holy and sacred reality is attested by the inward voice of conscience and the religious consciousness...by feeling presentiment, and longing, but also that

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[1] Ibid., p. 112.

[2] Ibid., p. 113.

[3] Ibid., p. 114.

[4] Ibid., p. 114.

[5] Ibid., p. 124.

[6] Ibid., p. 137.

it may be directly encountered in particular occurrences and events..."[1] Here the events are not occasions, the feeling reaction to which excites the analogous numinous feelings. Rather the events are themselves perceived as holy. "Let us call the faculty...of genuinely cognizing and recognizing the holy in its appearances the faculty of divination."[2]

We must now attempt to deal with this account.

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[1] Ibid., p. 143.

[2] Ibid., p. 144.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATURE OF NUMINOUS FEELINGS

Rudolf Otto has presented us with a view of the religious situation which makes certain feelings central to that situation--numinous feelings. These feelings are central in the sense that (a) they apprehend or cognize a special non-natural object called 'the numen', (b) they are the root of the evaluation of objects as holy and (c) they assure us of the truth of various religious propositions.

We will examine (in this order) (a) the nature of the numinous experience, (b) the nature of the predicates which are used to describe the numen, (c) the claim that numinous feelings cognize the numen characterized in terms of those predicates and (d) finally the evaluative nature of numinous feelings.

Rudolf Otto maintains that a certain kind of feeling--numinous feeling--is essential to religion in the sense that it discloses, or puts one in contact with, a special kind of object--a numinous object, the name for which is the proper subject of religious predicates. We will discuss the cognitive claim involved later. I would like to begin, however, with a consideration of the nature of the numinous feeling itself, considered apart from any such cognitive function. This should be possible, since whatever else a numinous feeling may be, it <u>is</u> a feeling, i.e., it is somehow like sadness

or anger, etc., and as such should be capable of being described in the same sort of way in which sadness or anger may be described. What, then, is this feeling like?

Its closest analogue (and perhaps even a rudimentary form of the numinous feeling itself--though Otto seems to disclaim this) is the feeling of uncanniness which makes the hairs on the back of ones neck rise, the shudder of terror on hearing a ghost story, the dread of haunted places. Otto points out (correctly I think) that this differs from simple fear. One form of numinous feeling is, then, religious dread or awe, 'the fear of the Lord', which is not simply fear as such.

An equally important aspect of numinous feeling is the element of fascination by, or attraction to, the object which arouses the feeling in question--a desire 'to come near' so to speak. This again is to be distinguished from ordinary fascination or curiosity. This element of fascination can, however, be further broken down into two aspects, (a) a desire to approach the object which arouses the feeling and (b) a repelling factor which consists in a feeling of uncleanness or sinfulness, a feeling which is triggered by a recognition of the object's holiness.

Though the numinous feeling is analogous to various non-numinous feelings, we must note that the numinous feeling must not be confused or identified with these non-numinous feelings. For the numinous feeling is sui generis. It is absolutely unique. At the same time, however, a capacity

for experiencing this feeling is to be found in each and every one of us, since such a capacity is part of our original make-up (such that any adequate definition of man must mention this feeling as a defining property? Perhaps.) As such these feelings are (according to Otto) a priori, i.e., they are not something we acquire but rather something which we bring into the world.

Having roughly indicated the sort of feeling which Otto wishes to make central to the understanding of the religious situation, I would like to examine more closely some of the features of the feeling so characterized.

This attempt to indicate the nature of the feeling must be distinguished from Otto's theory <u>about</u> the feeling. The latter contains, as we have seen, three main elements. (a) The feeling is cognitive, i.e., puts us in contact with some real object in the way in which sight puts us in contact with tables, trees, etc. Because of its importance, a whole section will be devoted to this claim. (b) The feeling is sui generis, absolutely unique, and (c) the feeling is a priori. We will discuss these last questions in a moment. I first wish, however, to comment on Otto's attempt to describe the numinous feeling by referring to analogous feelings.

The numinous feeling is supposed to be analogous to certain other feelings. We arouse the latter in the hopes that the corresponding numinous feeling will be incidentally excited. But suppose the attempt is successful. How do we know that we have the numinous feeling rather than some other

feelings. The numinous feeling has not been described. As such, we have no criteria for its presence other than the fact that it is analogous to other feelings. Can we make a mistake or does the numinous feeling come labelled 'I am a numinous feeling'? It would seem, then, that we must not only have the feeling but know that it is the feeling in question, i.e., we must be able to recognize the feeling, not simply have it, must have criteria for its presence. But since its association with behavior is tenuous (as we shall see), it is not clear how we can be sure.

Perhaps we can try this criterion: If people act in the same way and express the same doctrines, we can expect the same feeling. We must then distinguish religious from non-religious behavior and will presumably do this in terms of beliefs and conduct. But Otto maintains that it is perfectly possible for a man to accept the doctrines of his church, act in accordance with its precepts and yet never have numinous feelings. This will happen, according to Otto, if he neglects the non-rational aspect of the holy object for its rational aspect. He cannot then use this as a criterion.

How do analogous feelings arouse the numinous feeling? One idea will excite another if it resembles it. "An entirely similar law holds good with regard to feelings."[1] "I can pass from one feeling to another by an imperceptibly gradual transition, the one feeling, x, dying away...while the other,

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[1] Ibid., 42.

y, excited together with it, increases and strengthens in a corresponding degree"[1] but (and this seems to be the point) the feeling does not evolve or transmute itself. It is I who pass over from feeling x to feeling y which is qualitatively different from x. Three things might be meant, depending on how we conceive the series of feelings. (a) There might be a series of feelings, a_1, a_2, a_3.....b_1, b_2,..., such that between any two points in the series, x and y, there will be another point which resembles both x and y. Now it may be clearly appropriate to label the lower end of the series 'feeling a' and to label the upper end of the series 'feeling b' while it will be unclear with respect to some of the intermediate points whether we should call them 'a's' or 'b's'. If this is the case, then the dispute between those who want to speak of a transition from a to b and those who wish to speak of a qualitatively new feeling, seems a verbal one. A person who wishes to maintain a transition or transformation of the feeling itself simply refuses to call the intermediate states 'a' or 'b' but points out their resemblances to both a and b. Furthermore, since there is no break in the series, he may simply decide to regard it as one feeling which has changed in quality. His criteria for distinguishing feelings is then a break in the series. Otto's criterion would be a marked qualitative difference. If there is such a difference there is a difference in feelings. (b) Or we may have two coextensive series:

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[1] Ibid., p. 42.

$b_1, b_2, b_3 \ldots\ldots b_n$

$a_1, a_2, a_3 \ldots\ldots a_n$

But now, in what sense can we say that feeling a excites feeling b? Is there any less reason for saying that feeling b excites feeling a? If one series remains constant in intensity while the other varies in intensity, if the variations in intensity in both series is correlated only in a random fashion, we may conclude that the two series are not related at all. There seem to be three circumstances under which we might suppose a relation between them. (i) a increases as b decreases, (ii) b increases as a decreases, (iii) both series are equal in intensity at any given instant. But suppose one of these conditions is fulfilled. Are we justified in concluding that the dependence runs from a to b rather than vice versa? If they come into being simultaneously as they must, since by our assumption the series are coextensive, then it would seem initially more plausible to maintain that both feelings were excited together by some third factor, and that they are only connected in virtue of this third factor. (c) Or perhaps the series are not quite coextensive:

$b_1, b_2 \ldots\ldots b_n$

$a_1, a_2 \ldots\ldots a_n$

One is increasing as the other decreases, or both remain constant in intensity. In this case perhaps we would speak of two feelings, the one (b) being excited by the other, since series a is in existence before series b, and series b con-

tinues in existence after series a. But if this is the case, then what temptation is there to say that one feeling is transformed into another? On this interpretation (which would seem to be closest to Otto's intention) his fear that we may confuse the process in which one feeling is replaced by another with a transformation of a single feeling, is misplaced.

Let us assume, however, that the difficulties involved in the attempt to describe numinous feelings can be successfully met and turn to a discussion of the general characteristics which Otto wishes to ascribe to those feelings.

A. Religious feelings are sui generis. Often in identifying a religious feeling we find a non-religious feeling which resembles it in some respects. Thus the feeling of being rapt in worship and the feeling of being morally uplifted by the contemplation of a good deed resemble one another. There is one obvious difference. The feelings are different in so far as they are directed towards different objects--in the one case a good action, in the other a supernatural person or numen. Yet the feelings are not differentiated simply by their objects. There is a qualitative difference--the numinous feeling (being rapt in worship) is sui generis. What is it for a feeling to be sui generis? Is it simply to say that it is unique, not like other feelings? If so, it would seem that sadness or any other feeling is sui generis. To say that a numinous feeling is sui generis in

this sense is simply to say that it is not another sort of feeling like sadness, joy or chagrin, nor a complex of these. Perhaps this is all that Otto intends. To say that numinous feeling is sui generis is then to say that it is qualitatively different from other feeling with which we might tend to confuse it. This can be made more precise by specifying analogous but different feelings with which it might be confused, and Otto does in fact proceed to distinguish numinous feelings from feelings of dependence, love, fear, horror, a feeling of sublimity, etc., etc. But to say that one feeling differs qualitatively from another feeling or feelings presupposes that we have some method of determining just where one feeling is qualitatively different from another. How do we distinguish, say, sadness over a death, weariness, discomfort, embarrassment, etc.? Embarrassment may pass into sadness over ones failings. Discomfort may be followed by weariness. Where does one feeling stop and the other begin? There appears to be no sharp break, and yet it would seem that Otto wants to maintain that there is such a (sharp) break between numinous and non-numinous feelings.

Perhaps a feeling is sui generis if we can be truly said to know it only if we have experienced it and if, though we may attempt to describe it by mentioning feelings which are similar, etc., the description does not purport to be adequate but is rather an attempt to arouse the feeling itself by referring to those which are similar to it. C. B. Martin imagines

a Utopian society whose members have never been sad and proceeds to ask how I could teach them what it would be like to be sad. I might draw pictures of sad faces, mention the sorts of situations which normally make a person sad. Finally I might compare sadness with other feelings such as weariness. Yet I would be unsuccessful unless I was able to arouse or evoke a feeling of sadness in the members of this Utopia.[1] Now I am not sure that this is completely accurate. There is perhaps a sense in which a person cannot be said to know what sadness is unless he has at some time or other felt sad. But it is not so clear that attempts to teach the members of our Utopia the use of 'sad' would completely fail, even if we fail to arouse the feeling itself. Let us examine the instruments we have used to teach the use of 'sad'. These fall, I believe, into two groups. (a) I mentioned related feelings. I think I did this simply (or primarily) in order to evoke the feeling in question. That is, I attempted to acquaint our Utopian with the feeling, the 'inner' event--that which a man may conceal by deceptively gay behavior, etc. (b) I drew pictures of sad faces and/or described the sorts of situations which usually give rise to feelings of sadness. Now here also I was perhaps attempting to evoke the feeling of sadness. But I was also doing something else. It would seem that 'sadness' is

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[1] C. B. Martin, "A Religious Way of Knowing," New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1955), pp. 76-95.

not simply the name of a feeling. It is a term which I apply to a person when he acts in certain ways, has a dejected look, sighs, etc. That is, the feeling and the behavior which expresses it constitute a complex which justifies the application of 'sad'. But suppose I do fail to evoke the feeling of sadness. Nevertheless I am getting across to the member of our Utopia that the predicate is applied to people who look a certain way, act in certain ways in situations which I have described, and that this is the expression of a feeling which is somehow like, e.g., weariness. Have I failed? It would seem incorrect to say that I have, for if I bring the person back to our society, he may be able to pick out those persons who are sad from those who are not without difficulty. Of course he may make mistakes, but then so may I. Furthermore, he is perhaps even in a position to apply the predicate to himself if the occasion ever arises. Since, if he begins to act or look in certain ways which he knows would lead others to say 'he is sad', then he will judge that he must in fact be sad and that the feelings he is having are appropriate to the expression of sadness. He might say, 'So this is sadness.'

Now the numinous feeling and the word 'numinous' may be unteachable in the same sense in which 'sadness' is unteachable, i.e., a person cannot be said to know what 'numinous' means unless he has had numinous feelings, yet it would seem that there ought still to be a perfectly good sense in which we could teach the use of 'numinous' so that a person

who has not had these feelings could appropriately apply the predicate. There are some differences, however. A person is not said to be numinous, as we might say a person is sad, but to have numinous feelings. (Except in the sense that Christ is numinous, i.e., He arouses numinous feelings.) This, however, seems to be simply a verbal difference. What we must be able to do if we are to teach the word is to specify situations which arouse the numinous feeling and specify numinous behavior. This presents difficulties, however. (a) Situations which arouse numinous behavior are those in which the numen is present. But under what conditions is the numen present? We cannot simply answer 'where we have numinous feelings' since it is this sentence which we are trying to explicate. We must, then, specify further criteria, but it is not clear that Otto does this. (b) What is numinous behavior? Perhaps a look of ecstacy, a trembling of the limbs, a descent into the trance state, a state followed by a pattern of morally good behavior which was absent before? But perhaps there is a mental disorder, or perhaps a person has embarked on a career of morally good behavior without a numinous experience. How do we distinguish between the different sorts of cases? Is it that in the one case a set of religious beliefs is adhered to which is absent in the other case? Then the behavior which distinguishes the two cases is verbal--an answer to the question 'Do you believe that...?' But if so it would seem that we are applying 'numinous' wherever what might be called religious be-

liefs occurs, i.e., wherever action is bound up with certain religious beliefs. Now Otto wants to use the term more strictly than this since he would maintain that a man who holds his religious beliefs simply as intellectual assertions about the world and then acts on them, has perhaps had no numinous experiences. Yet how are we to distinguish his behavior from that of a man who has had such an experience? There may be a difference but it would seem that we are unable to specify it adequately. Our conclusion, however, must be that until this has been accomplished, Otto cannot teach us how to use 'numinous' even in the sense in which 'sad' is teachable to someone who has never felt sad. All the meaning that 'numinous feeling' has for us is that it is applied to certain feelings, that these are involved in the religious situation, that they are like certain other feelings, and that they are somehow considered supremely valuable by anyone who has had them. But this does not enable us to pick out those who are experiencing numinous feelings, as we can pick out those who are sad.

The root of Otto's inability to furnish behavioral criteria for the presence of numinous feeling is to be found in his belief that numinous feelings are only loosely tied to behavior and beliefs, that identical behavior and beliefs are sometimes accompanied by numinous feelings and sometimes not. Though I am prepared to admit the possibility of deceptive behavior, this sundering of feeling and behavior seems to me to be false.

What are Otto's own reasons for considering the numinous feeling to be sui generis? It is somehow a universal constituent of human nature which cannot be explained in terms of anything else. Now we have not all had numinous feelings. It must therefore be present in human nature as a capacity. Otto says that we cannot explain this, nor is it reasonable to expect an explanation. Nature is explained by certain fundamental laws, but these laws cannot be explained for it is in terms of these laws that all explanations must proceed. "But in the domain of the spirit, the corresponding principle from which explanation is derived is just the spirit itself...This has to be presupposed; it cannot itself be explained."[1] We have to accept the disposition towards numinous experiences as an (in principle) unexplainable fact about spirit.

Now it may be the case that some ultimate principles must remain unexplained, for since they are ultimate, they are the source of all explanation and cannot themselves be explained. This is simply to say that the chain of reasons must have an end. A principle which is used to explain everything else cannot itself be explained, for nothing remains by which to explain it if a circle is to be avoided. But to say that there is a principle or rule or law which cannot be explained is to say something quite different from the claim that there is a faculty or fact or entity, e.g., the spirit of man, the depth of his soul, or what have you, which cannot

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[1]Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 114.

be explained. In the one case we are saying that there is an unexplained principle, in this case that there is an unexplained disposition.

What Otto does is to follow Kant. The soul or self or pure ego is the source of the rules by means of which experience is structured and as such is the ultimate source of all explanation. Hence the soul and its essential properties, dispositions among them, cannot be explained, since the soul is itself the ground of explanation. What are we to say of this? The pure ego of Kant could be interpreted as simply a set of rules, i.e., the body of those rules which structure experience. Now Otto is conceiving the soul more concretely than this. The human soul has appeared at a certain time in the history of the earth. It has capacities --is a <u>human</u> soul. Nothing in Otto seems to justify the claim that the soul is simply considered as a body of rules. It is the source of these rules, but not in the sense of a more fundamental principle since it is not a principle but an entity.

We find that:

> It [religious experience] <u>emerges</u> in due course in the developing life of human <u>mind and</u> spirit and is thenceforward simply present. Of course it can only emerge if and when certain conditions are fulfilled...But such conditions are no more than conditions; they are not its causes or constituent elements...That they...[emerge]... in conformity to laws and under definite conditions is indisputable, but each is none the less a new, original, underivable fact and they are only to be 'explained' on the assumption of a rich potentiality of spirit or mind, which underlies the course of their development and realizes itself more and more...in them in proportion as the con-

ditions of organic and cerebral evolution are more fully realized.[1]

Thus the emergence of the numinous feeling is unexplained. It is something entirely new which 'just happens' on the scene. If it is unexplained we must ask what sense of 'explanation' is being used. I presume that the sort of explanation intended is a causal explanation. But this raises several difficulties. (a) Might not the numen be the cause of the experience? This presents two difficulties. If we accept certain theistic beliefs, then the numen is present everywhere. As such it is present both where the experience occurs and where it does not occur. It is, then, not a sufficient condition of the experience though perhaps a necessary one. Otto maintains, however, that the numen is present in some places and not in others. 'Omnipresent' is only to be taken in the sense that the numen can be present where it pleases. If this is the case, then it is logically possible that the presence of the numen is both a sufficient and necessary condition for the presence of the experience. However we are interested in a causal explanation and the concept of cause can only be applied to the numen schematically, hence the numen is not a cause in the sense in which 'cause' is used in science. If, then, by a 'causal explanation' we mean 'scientific explanation', the claim that the numen is a sufficient and necessary condition of the experience is not a causal explanation. (b) What about the factors which Otto

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[1] Ibid., pp. 124-25.

calls 'circumstances'? Is it not perhaps possible that these circumstances by themselves are sufficient to produce the feeling? But these "are often quite slight, indeed so scanty that hardly any account can be given of them".[1] This suggests that the numinous experience cannot be explained in the sense that we cannot predict the occurrence of the experience on the basis of its antecedents. Otto himself admits that our knowledge of these antecedents and the mode of their operation is scanty. If so, how can we conclude that even if we had an adequate knowledge of these antecedents we would not be able to predict the occurrence of the experience? (c) Notice too that Otto maintains that the experience occurs "in conformity to laws and under definite conditions".[2] Suppose there were such a law. It would either be discoverable or not. If not, we must show why not. Otto fails to do this. If it is discoverable then it must be such that given the circumstances and given the law we can predict the occurrence of the experience. (d) What form would such a law take? Presumably 'If conditions x, y...are fulfilled, then the numinous experience occurs.' This would presumably be established inductively, perhaps induction by simple enumeration. Now perhaps Otto is suggesting the following: This law is simply a summary of, or generalization from, past instances where conditions x, y...and the numinous experience are conjoined. There is

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[1] Ibid., p. 125.

[2] Ibid., p. 124.

no necessary connection between the two, i.e., the connection is contingent. As such the appearance of numinous experience remains unexplained. Now we may ask under what circumstances the condition would appear as necessary. It would appear as necessary if the law which subsumes them is not simply a report of, or generalization from, past conjunctions but is itself deduced from a higher law or is incorporated in a general theory. In this sense, I suggest that Otto would say the experience is 'explained' only if the law under which it falls can be explained (and I do not know how this could be explained except in the sense that the law is incorporated in a scientific theory or is deducible from other true propositions). But if this is the case, then, though it may be true that 'if x, y...then the numinous experience occurs' is now unexplained, Otto has given us no reason to believe that it can never be explained. But this is what he must show.

B. Otto maintains that religious or numinous feelings are a priori. Now in what sense might a feeling be said to be a priori? (a) We might call every event which is 'inner' or subjective, a priori, except those which appear to depend on our sense organs. But in this sense all feelings would be a priori and Otto surely does not want to maintain this. (b) An a priori concept is a concept which is not derived from sense experience but is imposed on sense experience. An a priori feeling might then be (i) a feeling which is aroused by an a priori concept such as the feelings aroused

by the moral law, (e.g., Kant's Achtung) the feelings aroused by the concept of the beautiful or by the concept of God. But for Otto the feeling is the result of an encounter with the numen and is the warrant for the application of the God-concept to the numen. The feeling is not, then, aroused by the God-concept but is the ground of its applicability. (ii) To say that the feeling is a priori would suggest that it is not derived from experience but is imposed on it. But surely, if the numinous experience is properly a feeling at all, it is itself experienced, a given. As such, how can it be said to be imposed on experience? Perhaps in the sense that it shapes or molds the rest of the experience. But hatred may do this.--It may, e.g., affect our judgments as to the motives of a certain person. If so, hatred has as much right to be regarded as a priori as the numinous experience. Otto cannot mean this. (iii) Or perhaps a numinous feeling is a priori simply in the sense that it is not derived from sense experience. Since numinous feeling arises from an encounter with the numinous object, and since the numen is presumably supersensory, the feeling might be said to be a priori. To say that the numinous feeling is a priori is then simply to say that it is not occasioned by sense experience. But if there is such a thing as numinous experience, this point is obvious.

Let me briefly summarize what I have attempted to do in this section. (a) Otto attempts to describe numinous

feelings by pointing out various non-numinous feelings which are analogous to them yet qualitatively different. We find two difficulties here. (i) It is unclear as to precisely how we are to describe the situation which is described as 'exciting a qualitatively different feeling'. This will depend upon how we construe the feeling series. (ii) Unless we are given independent criteria for identifying the numinous feeling (i.e., independent of analogous feelings) it is unclear how we are to distinguish the numinous feeling from those analogous feelings. (b) We have discovered several difficulties with the notion of sui generis feelings. I have argued that any feeling is unique if we mean that there is a sense in which we cannot be said to know the feeling unless we have experienced it. There is another perfectly good sense of 'know' however, where we may be said to know the feeling in question if we can distinguish those who are experiencing the feeling from those who are not. I have argued that we cannot see how this is to be done in the case of religious feelings. If this is the case, then the numinous feeling may be unique in a sense, but it is also unintelligible to anyone who has not experienced the feeling in question. This seems to be an undesirable result, and a result which is not obviously correct. Secondly, I have argued that Otto has no reason for maintaining that the occurrence of the feeling is inexplicable apart from religious considerations and so unique in this sense. (c) Finally I have argued that the notion of

an a priori feeling is unintelligible except in the sense that it is not aroused by an object accessible to the five senses. But this can only mean that it is either aroused by no object or that it is aroused by a non-sensuous object, i.e., an object not accessible to our senses. Otto could of course accept only the latter alternative. We cannot continue the discussion of this point, however, until we see exactly what sort of an object the numinous object is supposed to be, and it is to this problem we must now address ourselves.[1]

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[1]I have concerned myself primarily with the general difficulties which Otto's position presents. It may not be out of place, however, to suggest the difficulties which are presented by Otto's more detailed examination of particular religious feelings, or aspects of these feelings. (a) Thus take the element of awfulness. Suppose someone says that this supposed numinous feeling is simply a combination of fear and wonder, i.e., we encounter something which is not understood, we cannot classify it and are surprised at it. This is coupled with fear or dread. Now such a combination of surprise and fear could be aroused by a natural object, i.e., it is perfectly conceivable that we could encounter a natural object which we are for the moment unable to classify, and which frightens us. But is it so clear that we can distinguish this case in which no special numinous object is present from the case in which a feeling of awfulness is aroused by such an object? Do we merely have to take Otto's word that there is such a difference? He can certainly specify no difference except that the feeling of awfulness is aroused by the numen while the other is not. Is, then, a numinous feeling simply one which is aroused by a numinous object? But this will not do, since we would then be attempting to grasp the feeling by means of the numinous object rather than the other way around.--And it is surely the possibility of the latter which is the point of Otto's discussion. (b) There is a special feeling of otherness which differs from surprise, astonishment, etc. on the natural plane. (But might not the difference simply be that other emotions such as fear, admiration, etc., are involved in the religious context which are not usually coupled with surprise and astonishment in non-religious contexts?) Perhaps the crucial difference between the religious context and the non-religious

context is that in the former case we worship, bend our knee, etc. The claim would not then be, a la Otto, that we cannot worship a natural object but that worship is characteristic of the complex of feelings and behavior that we call religious. This would distinguish religious 'astonishment' from non-religious 'astonishment'. Now why might we think that the object which arouses this attitude must be super-rational? I suggest that it is not because of an intrinsic impossibility of worshipping a natural object but simply because increasing sophistication makes it more difficult for us to maintain this attitude towards anything limited or towards anything which is within our control or which we can understand. Otto seems to maintain, however, that it is intrinsically impossible to have the feeling in question unless it is aroused by a numinous object. That is, the existence of a numinous feeling logically commits us to supposing the existence of a numinous object. But if so, the numinous feeling cannot be fully explained without reference to such an object. We will find, however, that there are many difficulties in our attempt to discover the nature of such an object. As such the notion of the feeling of otherness (and other aspects of numinous feeling) will be correspondingly unclear.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS PREDICATES

Before we turn to an examination of the cognitive function of numinous feelings, we must determine what exactly it is which is being cognized, i.e., we must be able to present certain true statements about the numinous object. But these statements in turn cannot be understood unless we can understand the predicates contained in them. It is, then, to Otto's theory of religious predicates we must now turn.

There are two versions of the theory of religious predicates which we must consider. The first is found in The Philosophy of Religion according to Kant and Fries, the second in The Idea of the Holy.

A. In the former Otto attempts to show the bearing of theoretical reason and the faculty of aesthetic judgment upon religion. I propose to briefly state what I conceive the first of these relations to be and then to examine it in some detail.

We have vague feelings of truth which are articulated in the categories (of causality, quality, etc.) When these categories are schematized by time and applied to sense experience, they yield knowledge of the phenomenal world. But when schematized by the Principle of Completeness (a demand for unity and necessity) these categories may be applied to

Reality and not mere appearance. Apparently (though this is not clear to me) a category schematized by the Principle of Completeness is an Idea, i.e., "the conception of something which absolutely transcends all experience which moreover cannot be applied to experience...and at the same time a concept which we must make necessary for ourselves from pure reason".[1] The categories so schematized, however, yield only negative knowledge, i.e., they only determine what Reality is not. Since the categories are taken as characterizing Reality, as giving us knowledge about it, as being in some sense properties of Reality, we have in embryo an account of religious predicates functioning as logical predicates of Reality. This account is supplemented but not seriously extended by Otto's consideration of practical reason and aesthetic judgment. Let us examine it in more detail.

Otto (following Fries) apparently wants to understand the categories in a very general way, as the fundamental conditions of all being. "We know beforehand that all that exists must correspond to them. In this sense we are prescribing laws for being."[2] (i.e., the numen.) (It would seem, then, that the categories are not an answer to the question, 'What must be the case, what conceptions must we employ, for scientific knowledge to be possible', but are

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[1]Rudolf Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, tr. E. B. Dicker (London: Williams and Norgate Ltd., 1931), p. 66.

[2]Ibid., p. 52.

somehow the source of true propositions about Being per se, i.e., about numena. Now if this is to be the case, and if we are not to depart too far from Kant,[1] it would seem that Reality must somehow be given to us in intuition if the categories are to be applied to it. Otto does not specifically raise this question but I suggest that such an intuition is furnished by the various types of aesthetic judgment and/or numinous feeling. If this is not the case, then it would seem that Otto would have to maintain that we 'just know' certain true propositions about Reality, because of 'demands of our reason' or something of the sort. And it is unclear to me exactly what this would involve beyond a bare conviction that things are such and such. Furthermore, if this were the case, Otto must then answer the question as to how these propositions can be known to apply to being when there is no access to being, i.e., no means of acquaintance with being.)

But if a category can be applied to the noumenal sphere then it must be conceived as "far more general and comprehensive than in its restricted and schematized form".[2] For example, the category of causality when schematized by time, excludes freedom for if a change is to be understood

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[1] I feel justified in criticizing Otto from the Kantian standpoint (or rather raising questions on the basis of Kant's philosophy) because (a) the philosophy which Otto sketches for us is supposed to be based on Kant and (b) he uses Kantian terminology.

[2] Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 57.

as the effect of a cause, that cause must also be an effect. If not, we could ask why the effect had not appeared sooner or later than it in fact did. That is, presumably the answer to the question, 'Why did the effect appear just when it did' is that it was only at such and such a time that the causal conditions of its cause could come into being, and so on. Now let us consider the category apart from its temporal schemata. We now have only "that a thing is the reason for the existence of another thing and its conditions; there is nothing as to the necessity of its being an effect, if it is to be a cause".[1]

Generally speaking, a concept by which we cognize Reality is called an 'Idea'. The Idea or conception of something which transcends all possible experience and yet which reason must form--originate in us in "'the immediate knowledge' of reason itself".[2] On the basis of this we "construct ideas...through which we cognize the essence of things as opposed to our knowledge of them in space and time".[3] --though only by way of negation. I suggest, then, that an Idea seems to be a category considered apart from its temporal schematization and applied to Reality[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 57.

[2] Ibid., p. 66.

[3] Ibid., p. 66.

[4] We are apparently forced to apply the categories to Reality per se, the numena, because of the antimonies to which they lead. Now Otto, following Fries, maintains that the antimonies arise when the categories are considered to

The categories yield knowledge (though not theoretical knowledge) of Reality, if they are schematized by the Principle of Completeness rather than by time. How do

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be temporally schematized. When applied to Reality per se, we escape our difficulty. This suggests two conclusions. (a) We judge that that to which we apply the temporally schematized categories (i.e., the world) is mere appearance and (b) all the antimonies can be resolved by the numena-phenomena distinction. How are the antimonies construed?
(a) On the one hand we must maintain that the world is infinite in space and time since we can conceive of no limit to space and time. On the other hand we must maintain that this is impossible. The nth number in a series can occur if and only if the series up to n is complete. But if the series is infinite, it is never complete. Therefore the nth member could not occur. Otto concludes that for the essence of things, we must close the series. "What really is, is as it is, and not with something continually added." (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 70.) It is complete. We can then construct arguments which show the world to be infinite in space and time and we can construct arguments which show the world to finite in space and time. Hence the antimony. Otto then concludes that the former argument applies only to the world of appearance while the reality which lies behind appearance is complete.

It is perhaps unclear as to how Otto reaches this result. If his second argument is successful, then it would seem to show that for an event to occur in the world of appearances, the succession of events which precedes it must be complete. It would seem, then, that we must entertain these two contradictory propositions--'The chain of appearances is complete' and 'The chain of appearances is infinite in space and time', i.e., the opposed propositions are both about the world of appearances and as such I cannot see how the antimony is resolved by asserting that the reality which underlies appearances (and therefore is not appearance) is complete. Or his conclusion may be this: Since the antimony (that appearances are both complete and infinite) arises with respect to the world of appearance, it is somehow illusory. I think Otto does maintain this. But how can we conclude from this that Reality is complete? Why not infinite? Why anything at all?
(b) On the one hand we must maintain that phenomena are infinitely divisible, since anything conceivable can be conceived as divided. On the other hand this is impossible, for then the world would be nothing but a complex of complexes. Nothing could be properly said to be at all. But with respect to what really is, the incomplex must exist--there must be completeness. Again, we must ask how, assuming that

we arrive at this principle? We must note "the fact of Reason's confidence that it possesses real knowledge...[of] the objective reality of Being and Existence in general".[1] Reason's "most profound knowledge" is of the unity and necessity of things. By unity Otto means that things constitute a whole, are coherent--not that everything is one--a syn-

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the antimony applies to the world of appearance, I can conclude from this the nature of Reality.
(c) On the one hand we must maintain that everything is necessary. On the other hand, in order to conceive any particular action as taking place, we must assume the existence of free causes. There must be a last member of the series "for it is clear that only when all the causes of a phenomenon have worked perfectly...can the phenomenon itself occur". (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 73.) A free cause then =df. a first cause. There must be such a cause for otherwise our explanation of any given phenomenon would be incomplete, i.e., for any given cause which is supposed to explain the phenomenon in question, we can always ask, 'Why'. If we can always raise the question our explanation will never be complete.

Two remarks seem in order. (i) Provisionally assuming that any explanation is incomplete unless we posit a first cause, in what sense is the explanation unsatisfactory? Is a scientific explanation, for example, unsatisfactory unless it mentions a first cause in the course of its explanation? If not, the criteria of a satisfactory explanation are not those of science. (ii) Or does Pure Reason demand such completeness? Does it perhaps furnish, then, criteria--not for a satisfactory explanation in religion, science, ethics, etc.--but the criteria of a satisfactory explanation in general? But is there such a thing as a good explanation per se, apart from a good scientific explanation, a good religious explanation, etc.? This at least does not seem to me to be obvious.

The antimony is resolved by assigning free being to the noumenal world and assigning caused beings to the phenomenal world.
(d) On the one hand it would seem that everything is conditioned. On the other hand, a world in which everything is conditioned would be "a monstrosity of the accidental". (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 74.) Therefore there must be a necessary being.

[1]Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 77.

thetic unity, not "a mere rhapsody of perceptions".[1] We must posit necessity since "chance signifies nothing more than a lack on our part".[2] From this perception we derive the Principle of Completion which is designed to exclude an infinite regress. Real existence is complete, made up of simple elements, involves a totality of causes and these are free causes. This principle furnishes a schema by which we can apply the categories to Reality.[3]

When the categories are schematized by the completeness principle, the following Ideas arise. (a) The category of quantity yields the Idea of absolute or complete being. (b) The category of quality yields the Idea of simple reality. (c) The category of modality yields the Idea of eternity. (d) (i) We apply the category of substance to the spiritual, after we have stripped it of its temporal form. "Here the datum is really an Incomplex...In the individual (personal) mind with its inner qualities, do we alone know with certitude and clearness what Substances are. By way of analogy to it - we interpret that which Is, then, as a world of spiritual Being..."[4] (my italics) What appears in time is apparently

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[1] Ibid., p. 78.

[2] Ibid., p. 79.

[3] Now since an Idea is "the conception of something which absolutely transcends all experience" (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 66.), since Otto presumably means sense experience and since Reality is what transcends experience, the categories schematized by the completeness principle which apply to Reality must be Ideas. I am not clear whether Otto wants to include anything else under the term 'Idea' or not.

[4] Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 84.

being thought of as an appearance of the Self (transcendental ego?) to which we apply the category of substance. We then extend the category by analogy to Reality. This is curious. The category of substance when temporally schematized is meant to apply to phenomena in space and time, such as my empirical self. Now Self (i.e., presumably the transcendental ego) is not a phenomenon which appears in space and time. So if we are to apply the category of substance to it we must have a schemata. (We will ignore the further difficulty that it must somehow be given in intuition.) The only other available schemata is (for all Otto has said) the Completeness principle. But suppose this is used to apply the category of substance to the Self. Then, since a category so schematized applies to Reality, Self must be Reality or a part of it. But Otto has said that the category of substance is applied to Self and then extended by <u>analogy</u> to Reality. So presumably Reality is something different from the Self. (And Reality is presumably not simply a collection of Selves. For if it were a collection of Selves, then the analogy would be between Self and a collection of Selves. But this would be like making an analogy between a tree and a collection of trees, and it seems unclear to me as to exactly how, or with what point, this could be done. Unless perhaps, Reality is an 'organic' whole--a Self composed of Selves, where the will of each is the will of the whole or something of this sort. However, even supposing we are quite clear as to exactly what this

means, I am not aware that Otto seriously suggests this possibility.) But if so, the schematized category actually applies to the Self and applies to Reality only by analogy. Now if an Idea = a category schematized by the completeness principle, it is not the case that all Ideas directly apply to Being. And we can determine how they apply if and only if we are given a theory of analogy which specifically states the difference in sense when the Idea is applied to Self and to Reality.

But perhaps when the category of substance is applied to Self, it is not schematized by the completeness principle. If not, it is apparently the only category which is not schematized before application. If the categories must be schematized before they can be applied (and Otto talks as if this were the case) then he must furnish such a schemata or conclude that the category of substance cannot be applied to the Self. He does neither.

(ii) The category of causality when schematized by our principle yields the Idea of Will and Freedom. Presumably Otto reasons as follows. If any chain of causes is to be complete, there must be a first cause, i.e., something uncaused, i.e., something free. Now this category is applied to 'spiritual activity', i.e., the activity of the Will, and extended by analogy to Reality. As such it is open to the same objections as the foregoing.

(iii) We must now consider the category of community. We already have the Idea of a necessary being, but Otto thinks

we may ask why this being should not lie within the world. He concludes that the world, under the category of community, is an organic whole of its parts. But the reason for such a whole cannot be found in the individuals it comprises but must be found outside it. The category of community when schematized by the completeness principle thus also applies to something other than Reality, i.e., the world as a whole --though here there appears to be no relation of analogy between the category of community as applied to the world as a whole and as applied to Reality. Rather the application of the category of community to the world raises a question as to the 'why' of the world. The category applies, then, to the world and prompts the question as to the cause of the world as a whole. But I must confess I cannot see in what sense the category itself applies to Reality. Surely to prompt a question about Reality is not the same thing as to apply to Reality.

In the light of the foregoing it would seem that we must revise our account of the Ideas. The Ideas of Simple Reality, Completeness and Eternity are derived from the categories of quality, quantity and modality when these are schematized by the completeness principle. These Ideas are presumably meant to apply directly to Reality. But when we come to the categories of relation, something different occurs. In no case does the schematized category apply directly to Reality. The category of substance applies to Self. The category of causality to the activity of the Self and the cate-

gory of community to the world as a whole. (And I suppose that this is the phenomenal world as a whole.) These are then (except possibly for the category of community) applied analogously to Reality. So we must revise our definition of an Idea as follows. An Idea =df. a category schematized by the Principle of Completeness and applied to Reality, or a category schematized by the completeness principle, applied to Self, spirit or world and then applied analogously to Reality.

We must now notice that the predicates in question function negatively. This perhaps furnishes some insight into the way in which the Principle of Completeness schematizes the categories.--It denies or abrogates everything in, e.g., the category of causality, which would seem to suggest incompleteness. This, however, presents us with a new difficulty. The incompleteness in question apparently arises when the category is applied to anything other than Reality. That is, the category of causality, for example, yields the notion of an infinite, i.e., incomplete chain of events only when it is applied to phenomena or the totality of phenomena, and it can be so applied only if it is temporally schematized. To deny anything in the category suggesting incompleteness, is then to deny that the temporally schematized category applies to Reality. But since the incompleteness is not found in the category per se, but in the temporally schematized category, to say that the category applies negatively to Reality would seem to suggest that the feature which is the

source of the incompleteness must be removed before it can be applied. But if so, then all that is involved in schematizing the category by the completeness principle, is to remove the temporal schemata and then apply the category. But this is equivalent to having no schemata at all.

At this stage in the argument it would seem that the Principle of Completeness is performing three functions. (a) We have seen that the categories such as those of substance apply to the Self, although the Self is not in space and time and therefore is not temporally schematized. I have suggested that if it is schematized, the only thing available is the Principle of Completeness. (b) It seems to warrant the extension of, e.g., the category of substance to Reality by analogy--since it is presumably the completeness principle which provides the warrant for the application of <u>any</u> category to Reality, and the category of substance can be applied to Reality only by analogy. (c) We have just seen that the completeness principle seems to be (in part at least) a denial that Reality is in any sense incomplete.

In view of the foregoing, I believe we are justified in rejecting the account of religious predicates contained in <u>The Philosophy of Religion</u> because of the internal difficulties involved in making such a position coherent.

B. We must next consider the account of religious predicates offered in The Idea of the Holy. It consists in essentially four points. (a) Certain predicates, called 'ideograms' can be applied to the numen on the basis of certain affective states created in us by the numen. That is, the numen in virtue of some property P causes in us a numinous feeling f. This is analogous to a non-numinous feeling g, which is normally caused by an object with property Q. We then say that the numen is Q, where 'Q' is an ideogram of the otherwise inaccessible property P.

More than this seems to be intended however, i.e., it would seem that Q is supposed to resemble P in some way over and above the bare fact that they excite analogous feelings. When this happens, I will say that Q may be regarded as a metaphor for P, as metaphorically telling us something about the nature of the numen.

(b) There are other predicates called 'schematizing concepts'. These can be applied to the numen in a more literal fashion than can ideograms. The content of a schematizing concept when applied to numen and when applied to an ordinary object is the same. However, when applied to the numen the concept is applied absolutely. We thus have an essential difference.

(c) The relation between the schematizing concepts and the numen is a priori.

(d) Finally, the numen, the subject of these predicates, is never capable of being completely conceptualized. It is non-

rational and can only be given to us in religious feelings. We will consider each of thses points in turn.

Before proceeding, however, I would like to add that it is not clear to me whether Otto wants to use 'ideogram' to cover all religious predicates or only some of them. It would seem that concepts like 'wrath', 'anger', 'pity', etc. are singled out as ideograms while concepts like 'love', 'just', etc. are schematizing ideas. This distinction is by no means clear since (a) Otto sometimes suggests that all religious predicates are ideograms. Thus in Mysticism East and West, Eckhart's and Sankara's speculations about being are regarded as ideograms "of the 'Wholly Other', of the 'Anyad', alienum, the dissimile of which we spoke in The Idea of the Holy".[1] This would suggest that 'being' and 'wrath' are equally to be regarded as ideograms. (b) Otto at times talks as if all predicates schematize or 'fill in' the numinous.

Be this as it may, it would seem that there is a marked contrast between two sorts of predicates. The distinction seems to be recognized by Otto in practice, though I shall not argue the point. (a) Thus 'wrath' etc. are more obviously metaphorical and anthropomorphical while (b) concepts like those of wisdom and justice, infinity, otherness are meant to apply to the numinous in some more literal fashion. I shall thus speak on the one hand of ideograms and on the

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[1] Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West, tr. Bertha L. Bracey and Richenda C. Payne (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 24.

other of schematizing ideas and concepts. I realize that there is some danger of misrepresenting Otto by doing this, but since my primary purpose is not to present Otto's position, but to examine the problem of the relation of religious feelings to religious statements, and since there does seem to be a distinction in religious literature between those predicates which are metaphorical and those which are not so intended, I feel justified in making this distinction. However, though there will be some departure from Otto, I think that what I say is consistent with his general position.

1. Let us first examine the notion of an ideogram. We find the clue for our presentation in the following remarks. "'Wrath' is here the 'ideogram' of a unique emotional moment in religious experience."[1] It is not "a genuine intellectual concept (but) a sort of illustrative substitute for a concept".[2] I suggest that Otto thinks that we arrive at ideograms in the following way--We derive these symbols by considering what condition or factors would cause--not the numinous feeling itself--but the natural feeling which is analogous to it. Thus fear is the analogue of numinous dread. Fear might be caused by anger or wrath. Therefore 'wrath' becomes an ideogram for that feature of the numen which excites 'numinous dread'.

But at this point we must ask, can this be all that is involved in the use of an ideogram? It would seem not.

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[1]Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 19.

[2]Ibid., p. 19.

Those predicates which we have classified as ideograms are supposed to stand for properties which are somehow like the numen, they function in short as metaphors. For example, 'wrath' is meant to indicate some feature in the numen which is like human anger, over and above the bare fact that they both inspire fear, i.e., 'wrath' tells us something about the numen, not only how it affects us. I will accordingly (though rather arbitrarily) use 'metaphor' here to invoke some point of resemblance over and above the bare fact that the resembling properties excite analogous feelings. I do this partly on the grounds that we seem ready enough to say in the religious situation, 'similar effects, similar causes' and on the basis of this to conclude that the numen must betray characteristics displayed in human anger. At the same time--in this religious situation--we want to say that the numen is not angry in the way a human being is angry. This seems too anthropocentric for our tastes. We regard 'wrath', then, as vaguely indicating points of resemblance, without spelling them out. In short, 'wrath' is regarded as a revealing metaphor.

What does a metaphor do? Presumably there is an implied comparison between one thing and another (e.g., from Crashaw's "Saint Mary Magdalene", 'Heavens thy fair eyes be,/ Heavens of ever-falling stars...') in certain respects, the comparison serving to call attention to certain aspects of Mary Magdalene's eyes. Furthermore, the comparison works backwards. We notice certain aspects of the heavens which

are like those of the eyes. At least two conditions ought to be fulfilled. (a) The juxtaposition must be strange enough to focus our attention on aspects of the heavens and eyes which would otherwise be overlooked, i.e., it must arrest our attention. (b) It must not be strange to the point of being ludicrous. This by no means pretends to be an adequate account of metaphor. But if these brief remarks are correct, they suggest certain respects in which the notion of, e.g., 'wrath' as a metaphorical attribute of the numen, is unclear.

The strangeness which partially accounts for a metaphor's effectiveness is achieved by the surprising yoking of dissimilar and normally unconnected things. But though an ideogram seems to be some sort of a metaphor, it would seem that the surprising yoking of disparate terms is not supposed to be one of their features. 'Wrath', for example, is surely not supposed to call attention to some feature of the deity through the surprising connection of some feature of the numen with human anger. If these remarks are correct, it is by no means clear in what sense we can say that 'wrath' is metaphorically applied to the numen. Presumably the case is this. It is simply claimed that the numen has a property like (in some relatively vague way) love for example.

We are, I think, unable to understand metaphors (in my sense) without either (a) direct access to the vehicle and tenor of the metaphor (the terms are I. A. Richards') or (b) translation into other metaphors or (c) a non-metaphorical

translation. Now the second alternative is inadequate since the same questions arise again. The only non-metaphorical translation will be in terms of schematizing concepts which we will see to be themselves unintelligible. The only remaining alternative is that we have direct access to the numen. But the numen is inaccessible to us unless we have numinous feelings. But this means (since schematizing concepts are unintelligible) that we can understand these metaphors (the only remaining type of predicate) only if we have numinous feelings. This implies the rather curious conclusion that only a man who has had numinous experiences can understand religious statements.

This is not completely accurate, however, for if schematizing concepts are unintelligible and if metaphors (in my strong sense) are equally so (and the second clause is a consequence of the first) then there remains one sort of predicate which can be intelligibly applied to the numen, namely those which indicate the property which excites a particular numinous feeling. The 'cash value' of the religious predicate 'Q' will then be 'the numen excites feeling f like feeling g'. For those of us who have not had numinous feelings, then, the numen can be characterized only as 'something, we know not what, which causes feelings like sublimity and fear and...etc.' This is certainly a stark result.

2. Schematizing ideas are given a priori--absoluteness, completion, necessity, substantiality, the Good as an objective value. We must first notice that these concepts are sup-

posed to be derived from pure reason and in fact seem to be an analogue to, or parallel with, Kant's Ideas of Pure Reason, except for the fact that Otto has now supplied an intuition --'numinous feeling'--which allows us to attach them to Reality. However, Otto has said in discussing Schleiermacher that causality is a schematization of God's relation to us. Now this is a category, not an Idea. But we are supposed to be able to apply it to the numinous. As such we must conclude that the category of causality can be applied both to sense intuitions and to that which is given in numinous feelings. But these are two different sorts of objects. The category must then be applied in two different ways. But this must mean that Otto is working with some form of the analogy theory, i.e., 'cause' means one thing in sense experience and another thing when applied to God (an obvious difference is that when applied to God the category is functioning as a schemata). We must not then identify schematizing concepts with Kant's Ideas (even though the source of both is called 'pure reason'). Rather the situation is simply this: All those predicates which we want to apply to God in a more literal fashion than those like wrath, etc. are schematizing concepts, and the source of these is some faculty which Otto labels 'pure reason'. (Which is otherwise unexplained).

How, then, are we to construe schematizing concepts? Among schematizing ideas are such predicates as 'love'. Now how are we to understand them?

> God's rational attributes can be distinguished from like attributes applied to the created spirit by being not re-

> lative as those are but absolute. Human love is relative, admitting of degrees and it is the same with human knowledge and human goodness. God's love and knowledge and goodness...are formally absolute. The content of the attributes is the same; it is the element of form which marks them apart...Our understanding can only compass the relative. That which is... absolute though it may in a sense be thought, cannot be thought home...[1]

This passage seems to suggest the following: We form a scale of steadfast behavior from less to more or of love from a less complete love with a greater admixture of selfishness to a more complete and selfless love, or of less knowledge to more knowledge. Assuming we can do this, we can form the notion of the limits of these series. The limiting concept is then applied to God, i.e., most knowledge, most complete and selfless love, most steadfast behavior. However, the content is the same as when the words are ordinarily used. If so, the properties designated by 'love', etc., must be within the series. If so, the properties in question can only be the highest members of their respective scales. But if this is the case, there is no break in meaning when the predicate 'love' is applied to man and when it is applied to God. But if so, then to say we take 'love' absolutely when we apply it to God, is to reduce the absolute-relative distinction (the distinction between the limit of a series and a member of that series) to a distinction between the highest member of a given scale and the lowest members. Is this tenable? Perhaps it is. There does seem to be one significant difference between the highest member and the lower members--

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[1] Ibid., p. 141.

only the highest member would be perfect in the various scales. But does this say anything more than that the highest member is the highest member? Is not 'perfect love' =df. love which is highest in the scale? Yet presumably Otto wants to say more than this. God must somehow be incommensurable with anything else (He is wholly other). Therefore He must somehow be outside the series or perhaps its limit as suggested. Yet the content of 'love' when applied to God must be the same as when applied to persons. But if so, God's love must fall within the scale. God is either both within the scale and outside the scale, or the limit of the scale (neither outside nor inside) and yet inside the scale. These demands seem self-contradictory and Otto, at least, has not told us how to reconcile them.

Furthermore, the above account will only be adequate for predicates which stand for qualities and admit of 'more or less'. Yet do all schematizing concepts admit of degree? What about 'judge'? Perhaps we can speak of a better or worse judge, and this is the scale in question. Yet it is not obvious that every schematizing concept can be treated in this way. What about 'necessity', 'simplicity', 'substantiality'? Are things more or less necessary, more or less simple, more or less substantial? Perhaps so. If not, however, I believe that Otto will be forced to back into a position such as that presented in The Philosophy of Religion. But this we have already seen to be inadequate.

3. Let us now see if we can make sense of the relation-

ship between schematizing ideas and the numen. The relation of rational to non-rational elements (i.e., the relation of schematizing concepts like 'love', 'justice', 'omnipotence', etc. to the numinous) is one of schematization, the connection between the two being a priori. Since Otto presumably borrows the term 'schematize' from Kant, let us assume that Kant's account of schematization is intelligible, and see in what respects Otto's use of the term resembles and differs from Kant's. (a) Kant's schemata schematize categories, such as the category of causality, by outlining the conditions under which the categories can be applied to experience, and the category itself is an instrument for handling or organizing sense experience. But Otto seems to be proposing to schematize an object or entity, the numen--and not a category. But perhaps he is offering a schemata for the numinous quality. Now though there is (according to Kant) a category of quality, in what sense can a specific quality, i.e., the numinous quality, be regarded as a category? But if it is not a category, then what exactly does Otto mean by schematization? (b) Again, in Kant the schemata is a means of applying a category to experiences. Now under what circumstances might I be said to apply the category of the numinous to experience? I suppose in cases where I say 'the numen is present' or 'this is numinous'. But what allows me to do this? Not the supposed schematizing concepts of love and justice, etc., but the fact that I have had certain numinous feelings, i.e., the feelings mediate the application of the category, not the supposed

schemata. (c) Again, the category is for Kant the source of intelligibility, the schemata is simply a means of applying it to sense experience. But for Otto, the schemata --'love', 'just', etc.--is the source of intelligibility. That which is schematized--the numinous--is per se unintelligible.

Now if the relation of concepts like 'love', 'omniscient', etc., to the numen is not one of schematization in Kant's sense, then precisely what is it? Are these qualities simply analogous to those which the numen possesses? The connection seems to be tighter than this. The connection between the numen and its schemata is a necessary one, like that between the category of causality and its schemata. And what Otto seems ultimately to be saying is that the connection is given a priori, and beyond this is unintelligible.

Or perhaps this meant: The numinous feelings are the data or given which is structured by the category of the holy, schematized by the concepts of love, justice, etc. But does it make any sense to say that the concept of the holy is applied to feelings under the conditions that...? Presumably the concept of holiness is not applied to my feelings but to some object of these feelings.

Otto says that the relation between rational and nonrational elements is analogous to the relation of words and music in a song. The words may arouse certain emotions which are appropriate to the situation described. But the music releases feelings which cannot be adequately conveyed in words.

This analogy seems unilluminating. For the lyric excites feelings in us by using words in their ordinary senses or by means of metaphors, both terms of which are in principle directly accessible to us, while the 'rational' schemata of the holy employs words in stretched or analogous senses which have yet to be specified. In the second place, we may notice that certain combinations of words and music are inappropriate. The Ode to a Grecian Urn should not be set to a march. How do we judge appropriateness? I am not sure. Perhaps we just feel that one combination is appropriate while another is not. We get a feeling of satisfaction or something of the sort. But the numinous (the analogue to the music) is inaccessible to those of us who have not had numinous feelings. As such we are not in a position to judge of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of any given predicate, i.e., we cannot know whether (a) a given predicate P does apply in fact nor (b) whether P is the sort of predicate which can apply to the numen. But if we do not know whether P is the sort of predicate which can apply, then we do not even know if 'the numen is P' is intelligible. A category mistake might have been made. I cannot know whether this is the case unless I know to what 'numen' refers. For all we have seen, however, we can only know to what 'numen' refers if we have access to the numen in feelings. It seems curious to maintain that those who have not had numinous experiences cannot know whether religious statements are intelligible or

not.[1]

But something tighter is intended than is suggested by the analogies with a song and love. "The same a priori character belongs...to the connection of the rational and the non-rational elements in religion, their...necessary union."[2] (my italics) Now presumably concepts and rules may be a priori in the sense that they are not derived from experience, but are imposed upon it and structure it. But this passage suggests not only that rules and concepts are a priori, but that certain particular propositions can be known a priori. Thus 'the numen (God) loves us' is not a rule or concept but is a judgment which predicates a certain concept of a particular subject, the subject being given to us through numinous feelings. To know that the subject and predicate are connected a priori is to know a priori that the concept 'love' may be truly predicated of the numen. But this is to know the truth of a particular judgment a priori. If so,

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[1]Another analogy is proposed. The rational and non-rational elements are supposed to interpenetrate one another like the sex-instinct (non-rational) and personal affection (rational) in love. But if the analogy is meant seriously, it would seem that not only are we unable to explain the connection between rational and non-rational elements in the Idea of the Holy, we are unable to determine what these rational elements are. In what sense is personal affection rational? It can be described of course, but so can the sex-instinct. We might say it is rational since it is nobler, or something of the sort. But this is to make 'rational' a value term. Yet we have been assuming that 'rational' was being used to mean 'intelligible', 'capable of comprehension' and was as such a predicate which is to be applied to concepts and not to feelings. If Otto does not mean this, I do not know what he means.

[2]Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 136.

then statements about God are synthetic a priori. But this is perhaps not what we would expect. Compare 'x causes y' where both x and y are natural phenomena, and 'God causes the world' or compare 'John loves us' with 'God loves us'. Though (on the Kantian view) 'x causes y' involves an application of the a priori concept of causality and 'John loves us' involves an application of the a priori concept of substance, the truth of these judgments is not determined a priori, but by an inspection of the actual state of affairs. Thus though 'God causes the world' and 'x causes y' seem to be formally identical, the truth of the latter is determined a posteriori and the truth of the former is determined a priori.

But what more does this involve than the simple claim that we 'just know' these propositions to be true, i.e., we are convinced of their truth? It is not clear, however, why conviction should be allowed as a test of truth in this case any more than in any other case. I think, however, that what is really happening here is that we see the truth of the particular judgment by appealing to numinous feelings in which the numen is disclosed. That is, the connection is seen to be appropriate if we possess numinous feelings.

I have argued that Otto's conception of the relation of schematizing concepts to the numen which they schematize is inadequate because of (a) internal difficulties involved in the application of the Kantian notions to the case at hand and (b) the failure of the analogies by which Otto hopes

to make this relation intelligible. I concluded that the 'cash value' of the claim that the relation is a priori is that we 'just see' that the predicate in question does apply to the numen, if we possess numinous feelings in which the numen is disclosed. We will discuss the claim that the numen is disclosed in feeling in Chapter IX.

4. Let us now consider the uncanny character of the numinous object--the super-rational somewhat which is supposed to be grasped by numinous feelings. Such an object is 'holy' and an apprehension of its holiness precedes an apprehension of its other attributes.

(1) 'Holy' contains an element which "completely eludes apprehension in terms of concepts".[1] "The same thing is true of the category of the beautiful."[2] It contains moral significance but also an "overplus of meaning".[3] The holy object which is grasped by numinous feelings eludes our understanding. How, then, does something elude our conceptual understanding? (a) There is this general difficulty. 'X eludes our comprehension' is a proposition which might be established in two ways. (i) We have made continual efforts to understand x, but these attempts have been uniformly unsuccessful. But this set of facts does not warrant the conclusion that x is incomprehensible. It simply justifies the more limited conclusion that we have been unable to comprehend it. Otto

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[1] Ibid., p. 5.

[2] Ibid., p. 5.

[3] Ibid., p. 5.

wants more than this. (ii) Or perhaps from an examination of the nature of the mind we conclude that x must be in principle incomprehensible. But why should the nature of mind make x incomprehensible? Presumably because x is of such and such a nature. But this presupposes that we know something about x, and therefore that x is not completely incomprehensible. (b) Or perhaps something is incomprehensible if it cannot be analyzed into constituent parts. Thus, following Moore, yellow is an unanalyzable simple property. There is no way of telling a person what yellow is like--he must see it for himself. Perhaps the numen or holy object is of this sort. However, objections immediately arise. The numen is not a property but an entity--a particular which is the subject of predicates (e.g., loves us, wrathful, etc.) Or if this is misleading, Otto would presumably think it correct to say that the numen is more like a subject than a property. It may be found 'in' natural objects or situations, yet it is not a property of those objects or situations. Now granting that there can be simple unanalyzable properties like yellow, is it clear that there could be a simple unanalyzable particular? What would be an example of such a particular? Is a simple unanalyzable particular one which has only simple unanalyzable properties? Say something is yellow, tastes bitter and has a pungent odor? If so--if the holy object is simple in this sense--we must make out that all its properties are simple in the above sense or can be reduced to such simple constituents. But are reason or purpose simple

in this sense? Can they be reduced? Yet we attribute these to the holy object. Perhaps, though, I am misstating the problem. (c) Or is the numen incomprehensible in the sense in which we might say 'love is a mystery'? We mean simply that we cannot exhaust the richness of the concept--that whatever we say there is more to be said, a new nuance always presents itself. But if so, 'incomprehensible' does not mean 'inconceivable' but simply 'not completely conceivable'. And this does not mean that there is any particular element or feature which is inconceivable, but that we will in fact never be able to conceptualize all aspects of love. (Though we would know this to be true is unclear.)

(2) Again, the numen is wholly other. The question is 'other than what?' The answer is supposed to be 'other than everything'. But what sense does this make? For an x to be other than everything it must be other than itself. Or perhaps it means 'other than everything which is not wholly other'. But given any y it is other than everything which is not-y! Now pretty obviously what is meant is that x is mysterious, uncanny, different, not in the same category as natural objects.

The first three of these characterizations involve a reference to the effect of the numen on the subject of numinous feelings. The last characterization says something about the numen itself and this is what we are after. We must then ask 'What are the characteristics of this new category'. The differences are not specified (beyond saying that the numen

is other than natural objects) and so we are left with 'mysterious', 'uncanny', etc., which primarily seem to refer to the way in which the numen impresses us. (Not entirely, however, since a further claim is also being made--'we cannot comprehend or categorize x and x would impress most people as uncanny, etc.' To say that we cannot categorize x, however, does not advance our understanding of it.)

(3) Otto has said that the various predicates which we can apply to the numen do not exhaust the idea of deity, but in fact "imply a non-rational or Super-rational subject of which they are predicates...[this]...must be in some way or other within our grasp, else absolutely nothing could be asserted of it".[1] We have already encountered some of the difficulties inherent in an attempt to grasp the numinous object. Let us, however, try a new approach. Suppose we say that 'greeness', 'lives 100 years', etc., do not exhaust the idea of a tree but in fact imply some supra-rational (non-conceptual) subject of which they are predicates, i.e., to talk about trees, to attribute predicates to them, presupposes that there are trees, some subject which is somehow given to us, and that this is a necessary condition of predication. Now how do we know there are trees? How are they given to us? (a) Perhaps we see them--a tree is standing before me and I can point to it or indicate its presence by a demonstrative. (b) Or someone whom I trust assures me that there are such objects. But if asked how he knows, he will presum-

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[1] Ibid., p. 2.

ably say that he has seen them, etc., i.e., been in a position where he can point to them or refer to them by demonstratives. If not, he will refer me to someone who has. The ultimate tie-up will be with sense perception and a situation where the use of demonstratives is in order. There will then always be this distinction between predicates and the object to which they are applied, that the object can be singled out or pointed to (at least in principle) by demonstratives. I can perhaps point to instances of, e.g., red or of other characteristics but I cannot point to or indicate the property itself. (There are, of course, various subjects which cannot be so indicated, e.g., electrons, humanity, etc. But the latter seems to be a universal or to behave as one, and there seems no reason to conclude that Otto would want to regard the numen as a theoretical construct [like an electron], since it is presumably something which we can encounter--not something we infer.) To say, then, that a group of predicates fail to exhaust their subject might be to indicate a distinction between two sorts of things I do--predication and indexical references to an object. Now such an indexical reference always seems to be in order when what I am referring to is a particular rather than a property or universal. As such, if the numen is a particular (and it seems to be treated as one) then an indexical reference is in order. But how do I point to the numinous object, where do I point, etc.? How do I indicate a particular which is (it seems) neither spatial nor temporal? When I

point to, e.g., a car in front of my house, two conditions are fulfilled. (a) The car is within my present visual field and (b) I presume that the car is within the visual field of a normal person who is standing roughly where I am. If the second condition is not fulfilled I will not use demonstratives but will consider them to be inappropriate. (What would be the point of saying 'This is blue' if my hearer does not know what 'this' refers to?) Now what is the situation with respect to the numen? In what sense is the numen part of a sense field which is given to me? It is a 'transcendental' object. Does it simply differ in the way that a visual object differs from an auditory object? Is it a new datum as different from visual, tactual, etc. data as they are from each other? Or is the difference more pronounced? The difference must be more pronounced since condition b does not hold. It would seem to be the case that two persons, A and B, can both be in the same spot, both possessed of normal faculties, yet A claims to apprehend the numen while B does not. Now possibly we might say that B is numen-blind as we say that a person is color-blind. (We will examine this possibility at another point.) If we do not, then the whole situation is abnormal, since the fact that B does not grasp the numen does not prohibit A from saying 'There is numen here' which is presumably an indexical reference to the numinous object.

We may then, I think, conclude that it is unclear as to exactly how we are to construe the statement that the numen

eludes our conceptual apprehension, that it is not exhausted by our concepts. We have reached this result both by a consideration of the general difficulties involved in claiming that anything is incomprehensible and by a consideration of several possibilities which Otto may have had in mind, yet which are inadequate.

More exactly, Otto has maintained that the numen (or part of it, i.e., the non-rational part) is essentially incomprehensible or wholly other. I have argued (a) that there is a general difficulty in calling anything incomprehensible unless we simply mean that we cannot fully explain or describe it, or unless this is simply a means of indicating the emotional impact which the object in question has upon us. (b) Claiming that there is a non-rational element in the notion of deity which cannot be exhausted in concepts, may be simply a means of saying that an indexical reference is ultimately essential. I have argued that in the case of the numen, an attempt to make an indexical reference to the numen reveals significant differences from the situation in which ordinary indexical reference is made, and that the notion of such an indexical reference may be unintelligible.

CHAPTER IX

NUMINOUS FEELINGS AS COGNITIVE

We are now in a position to turn to the claim that numinous feelings are cognitive, grasp the numen in some way. More exactly these feelings seem both to give us the numen itself and assure us of the truth of certain propositions which are made about the numen.

Religious statements are true, according to Otto, but they are "bound up with exalted states of feeling"[1] and thus differ from ordinary assertions. Religious propositions could not be arrived at "without conscious consent and a certain exaltation of spirit on my part".[2] They "must be judged entirely by the standards of conscience and feeling, by their own self-sufficiency and validity".[3] This suggests (a) that the proposition is only presented in a state of exaltation or heightened feelings and (b) that the feelings convince us of their truth, or their truth is seen through the feeling, i.e., the state of exaltation is an intuitive faculty of some sort. Disputes on religious questions thus usually fail, since one of the disputants lacks this 'enthusiasm'. "If they both have it...dialectics are out of

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[1]Rudolf Otto, Naturalism and Religion, tr. J. Arthur Thomson and Margaret R. Thomson (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1907), p. 31.

[2]Ibid., p. 31.

[3]Ibid., p. 31.

the question."[1]

We are not, however, simply intuitively aware of the truth of certain propositions, we have a direct access to the numinous object itself. Thus in Chapter III of Naturalism and Religion, Otto maintains that in feeling and intuition, the world of appearance points beyond itself to the true nature of things, i.e., Reality. (Is intuition something different from feeling? It would seem not. There is certainly no suggestion that the intuition can exist apart from the feeling or vice versa. And Otto does talk as if we apprehend reality through feeling. I conclude, then, that if it is not quite truth that feeling = intuition, yet feeling is somehow itself intuitive.)

For Otto, meanings are part of the numinous experience from the start.[2] My first report may simply express or refer to my experience, e.g., 'How uncanny' or 'How dreadful this place is'. I may then proceed to explicate this by expressions like 'It is not quite right here' or 'This is none other than the house of Elohim'. "The first sentence[s] give plainly the mental impression itself in all its immediacy...The second [set of statements] gives this process of explication and interpretation; it is no longer simply an expression of the actual experience."[3] (a) This pretty clearly suggests that the experience contains a cog-

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[1] Ibid., p. 31.

[2] Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 126.

[3] Ibid., pp. 126-27.

nitive element, i.e., puts us in contact with something outside ourselves, serves to detect it. There is a stronger statement of this claim. The numen "can be firmly grasped, thoroughly understood and profoundly appreciated, purely in, with, and from the feeling itself".[1] (my italics)[2]

(b) But assuming that there is something present to detect, how can we explain the fact that feelings are cognitive? How does this supposed faculty work? How do we correct its mistakes? The numen is given to us only in these intuitive feelings, so we cannot assume the existence of the numen until we know under what conditions it can be veridically perceived. But if we cannot assume there is a numen we cannot ask how it is perceived. We can, however, ask what feature of the experience would lead us to think that it has an object and then ask whether these circumstances are sufficient to justify the claim that there is a numen.

Again, the numen "may be directly encountered in particular occurrences and events, self revealed in persons and actions".[3] This is to be distinguished from cases in which

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[1] Ibid., p. 35.

[2] However, Otto says at one point that numinous experiences "are themselves not perceptions at all, but peculiar interpretations and valuations, at first of perceptual data, and then...of posited objects and entities, which themselves no longer belong to the perceptual world..." (Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 113.) Now Otto does claim that the numen is directly encountered, though this passage would suggest that it is not encountered by any sort of perception. But if not, how is it encountered? It must be given in some way. Perhaps Otto is simply claiming here that numinous experiences are not sense perceptions.

[3] Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 143.

natural objects or events suggest or excite the numinous feeling by producing analogous emotions.

"Let us call the faculty...of genuinely cognizing and recognizing the holy in its appearances the faculty of divination."[1]

> Wherever a mind is exposed in a spirit of...submission to impressions of the 'universe' it becomes capable--so [Schleiermacher] lays down--of experiencing 'intuitions' and 'feelings' of something, that is as it were, a sheer overplus, in addition to empirical reality... [they] are true as far as they go; and for all Schleiermacher's aversion to the word...they must certainly be termed cognitions, modes of knowing, though, of course, not the product of reflection but the intuitive outcome of feeling.[2]

The plainest analogy, according to Otto, is to be found in Kant's aesthetic judgments.[3]

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[1]Ibid., p. 144.

[2]Ibid., pp. 146-47.

[3]In The Philosophy of Religion Otto characterizes aesthetic judgments in the following manner: "In the aesthetic sentiment we have the faculty of referring and subordinating the manifold that appears to us, to the highest forms of unity." (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 92.) The subordination comes about in a feeling which cannot be regarded as a conception. The aesthetic judgment is based on Ahnen, i.e., a perception developed in feeling and inexpressible in concept. In such a 'perception', in relating the manifold to unity, we clearly see the Eternal.

There are some emotions the cause of which we are aware, while others reveal themselves only after long search. There are still others, however, "where the feeling is utterly incapable of being analyzed and is absolutely proof against presentation in conceptual form. These emotions have their origin in the profoundest depths of human nature." (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 133.) In a logical judgment, a definite conception is predicated under which the subject is subsumed. The feelings which we are now considering lead to aesthetic judgments. But these are not logical. Here we have to do with things which "are in general able to create impressions on our mind in which the content of the intuitive perception far transcends the content of their 'concept'." (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 134.) We see, then,

These are not simply judgments of taste--they are objective, universal and necessary but they are based on feeling and not on discursive thought. "It is not worked

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that the feeling in question is more properly an intuition or perception of some sort. "Through some resemblance or analogous relation...the Idea is 'brought to remembrance'... and with it at the same time, the corresponding emotion of the mind." (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 135.) We must understand by 'feeling', then, primarily an intuition. Emotion either accompanies it or is a consequence of it.

Let us hope these points will be made clearer by an examination of the three sorts of feeling and the corresponding aesthetic judgment.

(1) We may judge x to be beautiful. Though 'beauty' is incapable of definition, the judgment is objectively and universally valid, i.e., x really has the property and every rational being must recognize that it does so. The feeling of beauty is then an intuition of this unanalyzable property. (We have noticed that Otto maintains that aesthetic feelings are unanalyzable. The case we are now considering suggests that he means two things by this: (i) That the property which feeling intuits is unanalyzable and (ii) that the causes of the feeling are undiscoverable. It is simply part of the equipment of the rational man and cannot be further explained.) We can, however, suggest a feature which is involved in the predication of 'beauty'. "Beauty only exists when a perceived multiplicity is felt by us in some particular manner as a unity." (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 139.) By 'unity' Otto apparently means 'Reality' in some sense, since he says that "the multiplex comes in an undefined way under the power of the concepts of Nature and of the Ideas". (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 141.) In the aesthetic judgment "I recognize...ideal existence in the world of phenomena...[and it is this world] which is the spiritual world in reality..." (Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 141.) The feeling is related to Reality in this (to me) confused way. It is apparently an intuition of the property 'beauty'. An element of this is the apprehension of the one in the many, the infinite in the finite. Apparently, then, in intuiting beauty we intuit the infinite in the finite, and thus intuit the infinite itself.

(2) We also have feelings of sublimity and corresponding judgments. These feelings seem to intuit a property of sublimity in a way analogous to that in which the feelings discussed above intuit beauty. They are, however, related to Reality in an (apparently) different way. The sublime may be distinguished as the mathematically sublime, as the dynamically sublime (a la Kant) and as the spiritually sublime. Now the mathematically sublime is an image (Otto's term) of the Completed Great, while the dynamically sublime is an

out in accordance with a clear intellectual scheme but in conformity to...principles which must be felt and cannot be stated explicitly as premisses."[1] They are unausgewickelte Begriffe.

Now since these judgments to the effect that someone or something is numinous are based on feeling, I presume that the feelings in question are numinous feelings. If so, these numinous feelings can function in at least two ways. (i) They can disclose the numinous quality of an object or person presented to the senses and (ii) when excited by analogous feelings, e.g., sublimity and when no (natural) object is present which is numinous, may result in an implicit or explicit judgment to the effect that the numinous is present, i.e., the numen itself is apprehended though not as qualifying any natural object. This must be the case since Otto has elsewhere said that creaturely feeling (and presumably all the components of numinous feeling) is "a first subjective concommitant and effect of another feeling element which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself indubitably

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image of omnipotence and the spiritually sublime (heroic moral actions, etc.) is presumably an image of the holy. I am not clear what Otto means by saying that x is an image of y. I suggest, however, that he means 'x is like or analogous to y'. If so, the attributes which we apprehend through feelings of sublimity are analogues of certain attributes of Reality (and apparently also serve to remind us of these attributes of Reality, call them to mind in some way). As such we have the analogy problem again. The respects in which, e.g., the dynamically sublime is different from and resembles the property of omnipotence is not specified.

[1]Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 148.

has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self"[1] (my italics) and in the context in which this passage occurs there is no suggestion that the object is a person or natural object perceived as holy. 'Faculty of divination', then, is simply a name for numinous feeling which functions in the first way.

Yet there is the suggestion of a third sort of cognition performed by numinous feeling and this presents us with a new difficulty. Let us provisionally grant that we understand the concept of the holy, that we have such a concept and that if we encountered a person like Christ, or if we know that the records about Him were true, we could conclude that Christ was holy--that the numinous is present in Christ. But what are we to say if no such direct encounter is possible due to distance in time, and if the records which purport to record the career of Christ are not sufficiently authenticicated. Otto claims that:

> There is no harm even in the fact that the records of Christ's life are fragmentary, that they contain manifold uncertainties, that they are intermingled with legendary and overlaid with Hellenistic elements. For the Spirit knows and recognizes what is of the spirit.[2]

Two things might be meant. (a) That much in the documents is sufficiently attested by recognized historical criteria and that this is sufficient to arouse the numinous feeling, and judgment that the man was holy. Otto must mean this. (b) There is the suggestion, however, that numinous feelings

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[1] Ibid., p. 10.

[2] Ibid., p. 162.

can pronounce on the truth of the documents--that 'the spirit recognizes its own'. Thus "and so only on the basis of a first hand religious experience of and from the Spirit is there any possibility of a real and genuine historical knowledge of these things"[1], i.e., of the Resurrection. (my italics) This suggests that the spirit can select veridical passages from those which are mistaken. But this means that numinous feelings are the judge of historical truth in certain instances. This seems quite unacceptable. However, we might qualify the claim. We shall therefore read Otto as claiming that 'numinous feeling may decide on questions for which the historical evidence is lacking or is evenly balanced pro and con'. This would not conflict with our ordinary standards of historical evidence, though it would seem to put quite a burden on numinous feelings.

A. The feeling element itself "indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self"[2], i.e., the numen. If this is the case, we must ask how a feeling can be said to refer. (a) A feeling is aroused by a certain situation or beliefs about a situation which may be said to justify it. That is, if the situation is as it is believed to be the feeling in question is appropriate. The feelings might then be said to refer to the situation. But notice that the situation is not apprehended by the feeling itself. Jones sees certain things, makes inferences on the basis of

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[1] Ibid., p. 224.

[2] Ibid., p. 10.

past experience perhaps, remembers certain things which apply to the present situation, etc. As a result of this overall view of the situation, he feels a certain way. There is no sense in which the situation is apprehended by the feeling per se. (b) There is a sense in which some feelings might be said to take an object. Thus I may love Mary, hate John, feel dependent on my great aunt, be disgusted at the world situation. These are to be contrasted with feelings like sadness. I feel sad, but not at or towards anything, though I may feel sad <u>because</u> of some situation. I feel happy because of such and such, but not towards it. The former class of feelings might then be distinguished from the latter on the grounds that the former refers to an object, or is directed towards it. But is there any sense in which the feeling may be said to apprehend or grasp its object? Love may blind me to certain defects of the beloved object, while hate may direct my attention towards them, but love or hate themselves are not doing the looking or noticing. Love and hate are rather emotions which are directed towards objects which are apprehended or presented by other means--by my senses or (possibly) by a proffered description. (c) What Otto in fact seems to suggest is that the feeling in question apprehends its object in the way in which sight or hearing apprehends its objects, that it is some sort of intuitive faculty by means of which a special object is given to us. This would presumably be something like the putative intuition of ethical properties. Let us then consider the

latter for a moment. Imagine a situation in which rival ethical claims are being made. If the intuitionist view is correct then A is claiming to intuit p and B claims not to intuit p. Unless we show that one of them must be lying (and it is not clear how this would be made out) then only one intuition can be veridical. Now if intuitionism is to be a method of deciding disputes, then we should be able to see which intuition is correct and which is incorrect as we distinguish the blind man from the man who is not blind. But how do we do this? What are the tests for intuition blindness? That a person acts in such and such a way? But what ways? Ways which I happen to disapprove? But why do I disapprove? Do I intuit that the action is wrong? But he does not. Why am I in a better position than he to make a decision? Again, the blind man is unable to do certain things which normal persons can do--he cannot make certain discriminations, and thus is unable to perform certain actions (like picking out red objects from a heap). But the ethically blind person <u>can</u> act just as I do--it is simply that he does not think that he should. What about the religiously blind man--the one who either has no intuitions or has incorrect ones? The analogy at first seems close. As there are certain sensations which the blind man does not have, so there are certain feelings which the religiously blind man does not have. As the blind man fails to make certain discriminations, so does the religiously blind man (e.g., distinguishing holy from non-holy objects). But are the tests

parallel? In the case of blindness the blind person may admit that he fails the tests and is therefore blind. Do we get an analogous situation in religion? If not, why does the analogy fail? Why are there not certain standard tests which have been commonly agreed upon? Is this simply a practical failure--it remaining logically possible that such tests might be devised? If so, we must know what we are testing, i.e., we must know what a numinous feeling-perception is. But do we? Our examination of such feelings has so far been inconclusive. The suggested (Part I) verbal and behavioral criteria seem inadequate yet surely these are necessary unless the discussion of these feelings is to be restricted to believers.[1] Otto maintains that the numen is felt as 'objective' and 'outside the self'.[2] Perhaps the 'objective' is being used metaphorically, i.e., 'it is more like seeing than dreaming'. This, of course, possible, but we must ask in what respects it differs from seeing and in what respects it resembles seeing. Obvious differences are the absence of a special sense organ, the fact that numen-blindness is a great deal more common than blindness, that the object which is visually apprehended has a spatial location while the numen does not. What do they have in common?

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[1]It might be suggested that numinous feelings can be identified by their causes. But a person with, and a person without, the feeling in question are likely to disagree as to the nature of the cause. (One says God or the numen and the other mentions certain physical antecedents.)

[2]Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 10.

Presumably Otto would say that an object is given to us, that the feeling is a warrant for the claim 'numen is present' in the same way that visual sensations warrant the claim 'a tree is present'. But this is the difficulty--how can a feeling serve as a warrant for an existence claim (unless of course the claim is that the feeling in question exists)?

B. One of the crucial difficulties which stands in the way of an acceptance of the cognitive claim of numinous feelings (and one to which we have been leading up) is the absence of public agreement on the presence of the numen. The following situation could occur: Several people seem to be in precisely the same circumstances. One of them says, 'The numen is present' while others fail to notice anything special. Now imagine an analogous case with respect to seeing. Suppose I claim to see an elephant three feet in front of me, while my four companions fail to do so. It seems likely that I will withdraw my claim and conclude that my senses are deceiving me. The absence of public corroboration is then normally accepted as a reason for withdrawing a claim to the effect that a certain x is present. Yet the absence of corroboration by others in the case in which the numen is claimed to be present is not accepted as counting against the existence claim (or it is at least not accepted as sufficient).[1] But that such corroboration is necessary to the

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[1]This is pointed out by C. B. Martin in "A Religious Way of Knowing", New Essays in Philosophical Theology.

claim that there is such and such an entity is shown by the following case. Suppose 3000 people are present and 1500 claim to see an elephant while 1500 claim not to see it. All are truthful and in equally advantageous positions to see an elephant if one were there. Is an elephant objectively there or not? I doubt if we would know what to say. If only one or two people claimed to see it while the rest did not, we would undoubtedly conclude that it was an illusion. But what if twenty per cent of the people present claimed to see en elephant? Would we be so sure that it was an illusion or would we be hesitant about coming to any conclusion whatsoever? Now I suggest that what Otto might claim is the following. A large percentage of people (though by no means fifty per cent) have had the numinous experience and claim on the basis of that experience that 'the numen was there'. It is therefore by no means clear that there has been an illusion. There is in fact a certain amount of public corroboration and as such there is no reason to conclude that it must be an illusion. But if it is not illusory it is objective.

Several objections can be made to this argument. (a) Though it is not clear that we can say that the judgment is the result of a delusion, neither is it clear that we can say that it is objective or veridical. The situation seems rather that we do not know quite what to say. (b) The man who has a numinous experience does not seem to think that public corroboration is necessary. The experience is supposed

to be self-certifying. It would seem that a man who has had such an experience claims that it is objective on the face of it. He does not in fact look to see if fifteen or twenty or sixty per cent of persons who have been in roughly the same circumstances have had a similar experience. It is not clear that he would repudiate the claim even if everyone disputed it. He could in fact claim they were intuition blind, lacked grace or something of the sort, i.e., would advance some reason to show that the circumstances were not in fact the same. We must then examine the reasons which he advances for this new claim. But these are presumably religious beliefs which are themselves supposed to be founded on numinous experiences. We are in a circle.

Let us return to the elephant situation where fifty per cent see the elephant and the rest do not. Otto is one of those who do. He has all the sensations which we would expect if an elephant were in fact there. Nothing surprising happens beyond the fact that half the people present do not see it. The case we are considering is not one of simple illusion for none of my other expectations are disappointed. The elephant does not vanish, is tangible, etc. Now Otto might maintain that this is the sort of situation which obtains with respect to numinous feelings. He would then admit that whether we say that numinous feelings or our elephant sensations are subjective or objective is purely verbal. He is simply deciding that 'objective' is to be used in this situation since it sufficiently resembles those which are

normally called objective. Can we object to this? We may simply deny that the situation is sufficiently like the normal one--and if we are one of the unfortunate fifty per cent we may refuse to give credence to the existence claim. For (a) it is improbable that fifty per cent of the population have had numinous feelings and (b) we have suggested that the elephant situation is a new one which has been preceded by many other situations in which this sort of thing did not occur, i.e., we have previously had workable and commonly accepted criteria for the presence of elephants which are now suspended by the new situation. But in the religious case there has never been a commonly accepted set of standards for the presence of the numen.

It would seem, then, that when Otto makes the claim that we have access to a numinous entity through numinous feelings we ought to ask for the criteria in virtue of which we can move from the feeling to the claim that the numen exists, i.e., we want to ask whether delusion is possible or not, under what circumstances the feeling is veridical. If delusion is not possible, we want to know why. If it is possible, we must ask for the criteria which distinguish veridical judgments from non-veridical ones. Otto may reply, however, that my question is improper since we make no inference, no leap from the feeling to the numen, but rather the numen is directly given in feeling. However, I may say 'There's an oak tree' without reflection, without applying any criteria and without being aware of any elusive inference

from visual sensations to the existence of the oak tree. But though no criteria are employed, there are criteria which distinguish veridical sensations from those which are not, though they only come into play when I suspect that I have been deceived by my senses. If this is the case, then it would seem that if I can mistakenly say 'There is a numen present' (and I do not see why I cannot) there must be such criteria though they are not employed when I make the judgment.

C. Mystics claim to have a direct encounter with deity. Perhaps, then, numinous experience is simply mystic experience. The term is vague, but if 'mystical experience' means some sort of union with the deity, then though all mystical experiences may be numinous, the converse will not be true. As Otto uses the term, it would seem that in fact numinous experience is a presupposition of mystical experience. In a numinous feeling I grasp the quality of holiness, find the holy object. This generates the desire to get some of the quality by a participation in that holiness. Only this participation can properly be called mystical. The participation is built upon an encounter, however. Since there seem to be recognizable cases of mystical experiences and since these involve an encounter with the numen, we perhaps ought to ask if these experiences are a valid foundation for the claim that there is an unseen presence or something of the sort. If cases of mystical experience are readily identifiable in a way in which numinous experiences are not ('nu-

minous' being a broader term since mystical experiences are numinous though the converse is not true) we ought to be able to specify the characteristics in terms of which we identify them. What are they? The first is simply the report of the mystic himself, the second is that there is perhaps a trance state, or near-trance state, neurasthenia, hyperesthesia, etc., a conviction that one is having an important revelation though one is unable to verbalize it. Perhaps there are various hysterical symptoms, perhaps photism, etc. Do such feelings and experiences justify the claim that there is a deity who is apprehended in the mystical state? It would seem that the proper answer is that <u>if</u> there were a deity who communicated with man, such experiences might accompany a revelation, i.e., if there were such a being we might expect some such untoward effects on the nervous system. However, though such effects may be compatible with the existence of such a being and the fact that he communicates with man, they do not tend to establish their truth. That is, the feeling components we can identify in the mystical experience do not seem to be a warrant for the claim, 'There is numen here'.

I believe, then, that our conclusion must, in view of the above difficulties, be that the cognitive claims of the numinous experience or religious feelings in general, are untenable. Let us briefly review these difficulties. (a) We might construe feeling as an intuitive faculty of some sort. As such, in the case of the atheist, we have a man who is in-

tuition blind. Since an analogy is made between numinous feeling and perception, intuition blindness must be something like blindness, deafness, etc. But if so, then there ought to be tests for such intuition blindness just as there are generally accepted tests for ordinary blindness. There are no such tests other than that the intuition blind man fails to perceive the numen. But it is precisely the possibility of this which is at issue.

Secondly, I have argued that one of the criteria for the objectivity of a perceptual claim is public agreement, i.e., that anyone in the same circumstances will in fact have the same feelings or sensations. That is, if this condition is not met, I will withdraw the objectivity claim. Now in the case where someone claims to apprehend the numen, people who seem to be in precisely the same circumstances fail to perceive anything. We could meet this objection if we could show that there were certain factors present such that these others could not be expected to see the numen. (I am not worried if a blind man fails to see a tree when I claim that one is present.) But this supposes that we can form a clear conception of numen-blindness, the conditions under which one will fail to perceive the numen. We have (I hope) already shown that we have no such tests.

Finally, we have investigated the possibility that the numinous experience is a mystic experience. But if we examine the feeling components of such an experience, we seem to find no element which would warrant the conclusion that a

numen is present.

It would seem to me, therefore, that numen-apprehension is not sufficiently like ordinary perception to make the claim that numen-apprehension is some form of perception or like ordinary perception, an intelligible one.

CHAPTER X

'HOLY' AS A VALUE PREDICATE

According to Otto numinous feelings do more than simply give us an object not presented to the other senses. They evaluate an object which is given to the senses, e.g., Christ, and the (non-sensuously presented) numinous object itself.

We may thus speak of 'holiness' as a value term or category. The category is composed of two elements--'the numinous' which itself functions as a value category, and 'moral goodness and justice'. The 'numinous' as a predicate attached to feelings, as the name of the numinous object, as the quality of a natural object or as a value term, comprises what is peculiar to the religious situation. As such, I shall not speak of holiness (which includes moral worth) but of numinous value--that peculiar value which is to be found in the religious situation.

The numinous is a value category. What other value categories are there? Well, there is moral goodness, beauty, the delicious, etc. These are distinguished from one another in that they apply to different sorts of objects and use different criteria. Thus 'morally good' may be applied to men and actions on the grounds of criteria like 'produces the greatest happiness of society'. 'Delicious' may be applied to foods on the grounds of criteria like 'has a sweet taste'. 'Beautiful' applies to no special set of objects but employs

certain unique criteria such as those involved in the following passage. "The daring originality which Giotto shows in placing the predominant figure at the extreme edge of the composition...are proofs of Giotto's rare power of invention."[1] It would seem proper to ask for the criteria for the application of 'numinous value'.

But let us first ask how we make the evaluation 'x is holy'. Do we make our evaluation on the basis of these numinous feelings or are the numinous feelings themselves an evaluation? That is, do we have a certain value predicate, 'the numinous', which we apply when we possess a certain complex of numinous feelings? Are the feelings simply the ratio cognosendi, i.e., is the statement 'When we have numinous feelings, the object towards which these feelings are directed possesses numinous value' synthetic? If so, we must ask how we arrive at the predicate. Is it given to us a priori? Presumably. Or rather than the value judgment being based on numinous feelings is it that the judgment, i.e., 'x is holy' is simply an expression of numinous feelings? If we do this we get around the difficulties over intuited or a priori concepts, but must ask for the special criteria which justify the judgment.

1. When we evaluate an object as better or worse, we do so within a given class of comparison or from a special point of view. 'Moral' applies to certain actions within the class

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[1]Roger Fry, Vision and Design (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 158.

of actions. The pair 'beautiful-ugly' applies to all objects when regarded from a special point of view. There appear to be no criteria for a good object per se (unless of course we can show that, e.g., pleasure is always present when we commend an object) but only criteria for good men, good strawberries, beautiful objects, etc. We are judging some members of a class of phenomena to be better than others, or are judging objects from a special point of view. Now when we speak of numinous value, is there a special class of comparison? Not numinous objects, since all numinous objects possess numinous value by definition. We cannot say that there is a numinous value whose range of possible application is numinous objects, for if so, we could speak of numinous-numinous objects or of non-numinous, numinous objects. The former is apparently a tautology, the latter a contradiction, since 'numinous' as designating an entity, also contains value meaning, is a category of value. This aspect of its meaning is inseparable from its other aspects. The proper answer seems to be--'numinous' means better than any other object, i.e., our class is the class of all objects. If so, then the criteria which mark off the valued objects from others are simply those by which we identify the presence of the numen apart from any evaluation of it, i.e. the test of value is the presence of numinous feelings.

We have the curious consequence, then, that the criterion for the application of 'numinous value' is the same as the criterion for the identification of the numinous object.

Are we then justified in concluding that the value is the object (or quality)? --That to apprehend the value is to apprehend an object or quality? If this is the case, and if the value situation here is to parallel the value situation elsewhere, then we must generally establish that 'good' and other value terms denote a property or object. But any such account will have to meet the difficulties which beset the naturalistic and intuitionist positions. Unless these difficulties can be met, then Otto's suggestion that to apprehend the numen and to apprehend its value are one and the same thing, seems unacceptable.

Otto maintains that 'numinous value' behaves something like 'beautiful'.[1] This would suggest that when we are judging numinous values, we are taking up a special point of view. When we classify all objects as beautiful or the reverse, we are considering them from a special point of view, i.e., we are not considering their use value, or their moral quality, etc. Now if 'numinous value' functions in an analogous way, it would seem that there might be a corres-

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[1]To say an object is beautiful may be simply to commend it. But it would seem (unless we want to posit a natural or non-natural quality of beauty) that we must still specify in detail criteria in virtue of which we call an object 'beautiful'. Now here Otto does seem to posit a non-natural property or object the presence of which permits the application of 'beauty'. But if we follow Otto here we must face the difficulties involved in positing the intuition of non-natural properties or objects. Let us then simply suppose that 'beautiful' has an expressive or commendatory function, its application being governed by criteria which specify the features an object must have to be called 'beautiful'.

ponding point of view from which I consider all objects and classify them as holy or the reverse. But what is this point of view--what aspect of objects do I consider? Presumably their possession of numinous quality (or its absence --the profane or secular). Now while this may not be a tautology, (if we separate the value and non-value sense of 'numinous') it certainly does not help us much. It would be like saying that the standpoint from which I make judgments of beauty is the point of view in which I can see whether an object does, or does not, possess a property named 'beauty'.

2. There is a more general difficulty. We are not evaluating an object or situation which is given to us naturally, but are evaluating the numen itself, i.e., the evaluation is not directed towards natural objects themselves but the numen which they suggest or which permeates them. The feeling, then, both gives us the numen and evaluates it. Normally it would seem that we evaluate what is given to us in some other way, i.e., the examination of a situation by means of my senses, inferences, etc., precedes the evaluation proper. Otto's conception of the way in which the numinous evaluation is made seems to be like the intuitionist view which claims that we intuit non-natural quality of goodness upon inspecting a certain situation and that thus a non-natural property and value are apprehended at one and the same time since the non-natural property is the value. But there is a marked difference since we are not evaluating the non-natural property but the object

which possesses it. While for Otto we are evaluating the non-natural property or object which we intuit.

Again, if the numen is value, it is unclear in what sense its apprehension is an evaluation. Since it would seem that we are simply saying that the valuable is valuable. It would seem that if the numen is value then there must be other things which have this value, and that it would be this latter which we are evaluating. But suppose the numen is not value but what is evaluated. If so, then there is both a numen which is apprehended and a numinous value. Numinous value is then presumably that value which things like numens possess. Two cognitive functions are then performed by the numinous feeling--the apprehension of the numen per se and its evaluation.

Again, if I evaluate the numen, it would seem that its presence in feeling is not the source of my evaluation except in the sense in which the presence of an act of promise keeping to my senses is the source of the judgment that it is right. But the action of promise keeping is not the source of the concept of right. By analogy the encounter with the numen is not the source of the concept of numinous value, but merely the occasion for its application. If not, where do I get the concept? Presumably Otto must posit another a priori notion.

Let us consider the analogy with the apprehension of beauty in the light of this new difficulty.

> I ascribe to the object an attribute that professes to interpret it which I do not and cannot get from sense experience, but which I rather ascribe by a spontaneous judgment of my own. Intuitively I apprehend in the object only its sensuous qualities and its spatial form ...that the meaning I call 'beautiful' fits the object, i.e., that these sense data mean 'beautiful'...--these are facts which sensory elements can in no wise supply.[1]

How can sense data 'mean' or be interpreted as beautiful? There are two alternatives. (a) I may employ certain standards which being satisfied are the occasions for the application of the concept, or (b) I may 'intuit' a connection between a property called 'beauty' which is not given by my senses and certain properties of the object under contemplation. I suggest that it is the latter which Otto intends. How does the religious situation parallel this? We must first ask what is being interpreted. (i) Is it the numinous feelings themselves? Presumably not if the feelings themselves involve (implicitly) an interpretation or "contain the meaning".[2] These feelings are then the source of meaning and not that to which meaning is attached. (ii) Is it some natural object or situation? Presumably it is in certain cases, e.g., we 'divine' the numinous quality of Christ. But we may experience the numen on certain occasions where natural objects, and the emotions they arouse, suggest or excite numinous feeling but are not themselves numinous. What is interpreted here? It would seem that the only possible answer is the numen. But the numen would cor-

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[1] Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 134.

[2] Ibid., pp. 126-27.

respond to beauty in our analogy. And the object is interpreted as beautiful. Beauty is not itself interpreted. Again, how could we interpret the numen? Presumably we interpret it when we schematize it and feeling is the source of the conjunction of the schemata with the numen. But is this what is intended here? If the analogy is to hold it would seem that the apprehension of the numen must itself be considered as an interpretation, though I am at a loss as to what it is an interpretation of.

I think the general source of difficulty in this section has been the identification of value with the thing valued. A distinction seems demanded here, and it is the failure to observe this distinction which has generated our perplexities.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS

What have we discovered in our discussion of Otto? I suggest that we have discovered the following: (a) That there is no reason to think that religious feelings are radically different in nature from other feelings, i.e., numinous feelings differ from sadness no more and no less than sadness differs from anger. Of course they may be radically different, but in the absence of positive reasons to this effect, I believe we are justified in treating them as on a par with other feelings (since the initial presumption would seem to be that they do not so differ). (b) We have found that Otto's construction of religious predicates is inadequate. I would here like to suggest that this is due to the fact that he is working with an analogy theory of religious predicates, and that the objections which we have raised at this point in our discussion can be applied to any analogy theory.[1]

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[1]The difficulty is essentially this (though to argue it at length would take me beyond the scope of this thesis): We are either able to specify the points in which God and natural objects are analogous or not. If we are not able to specify the point of analogy, then it would seem that what we are saying is hopelessly vague--'God's love is like human love, though I do not know in what respects it resembles it or differs from it.' On the other hand, if we can specify the points where, e.g., God's love resembles human love, then we have no need of an analogy theory, i.e., if we can say that God's love resembles human love in respects a, b and c and differs in respect q, then we can simply say 'God is (does) a, b, c' which is not construed analogously but literally. If so, we no longer need an analogy. (I believe this is essentially the objection Scotus raises to Aquinas.)

(c) We have found that many difficulties stand in the way of construing numinous feelings as cognitive. The difficulty is part of a more general difficulty which is found when we attempt to construe any feeling as cognitive.

What might we be able to retain? I suggest that we may profitably use two features of Otto's account. First, the central role which he allows these feelings in the religious situation and secondly the interpretation of these feelings as evaluative, as the source of the judgment 'x is holy'. This will be taken up in Part III.

PART III

A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AND VERIFICATION SITUATION

CHAPTER XII

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RECONSTRUCTION

We will now attempt to present a reconstruction of religious language including the verification procedures appropriate to sentences constructed in that language. Since I am presenting a reconstruction, some of the subtleties of religious language as actually employed will be glossed over. I hope, however, that my reconstruction or model will be sufficiently close to the actual use of religious language to be useful.

I will restrict myself to a reconstruction of the language and verification situation of Christianity (primarily in so far as this bears on propositions about God. I will not discuss the logic of Christology, Eschatology, etc., except in so far as these topics bear upon this purpose.) My reasons are twofold: (a) We are more familiar with Christian theology and practice and (b) I am inclined to think that the verification situation in religions such as Jainism and Buddhism in some of its forms may be radically different from the verification situation in Christianity. I cannot support the claim here, but will mention one crucial difference, viz., the absence of an historical founder who bases his claims on an alleged revelation from a personally conceived deity.

I would like to suggest (though I shall not argue)

that my model could be extended to cover Judaism and Islam.

I would like to conclude this introduction by making explicit some of the considerations which will guide me in my attempt to construct a model of the Christian language-verification situation. (1) (a) I will try to avoid an analogical theory of meaning. My reason for doing this is that it seems to me that so to construe religious predicates is to make them ultimately unintelligible (this has been argued briefly in connection with our discussion of Otto and Schleiermacher). (b) I will try to reconstruct the situation in such a way as to avoid contradictions and obvious paradoxes. It seems to me the Christian language is intelligible only if these two conditions are met. (2) With these reservations, I will try to stay close to what I consider the actual situation to be in its main outline. That is, except where I reconstruct to preserve intelligibility, I will attempt to keep as close to the actual situation as is compatible with simplicity of presentation. The model may not fit the actual situation in all cases, but I hope (and believe) that it will fit most, or a large number, of such cases.

CHAPTER XIII

THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS PREDICATES

I first want to draw a distinction between five sorts of religious predicates. There are (a) those like 'omniscient', 'omnipotent', 'infinite', 'triune', 'invisible', (b) those like 'creator', 'just', 'loving', 'judge', 'powerful', 'wise', (c) those like 'holy' and 'good', (d) those like 'father', and finally (e) those like 'rock of salvation', 'fortress', etc. I shall call these respectively (a) 'second order predicates', (b) 'first order predicates', (c) 'value predicates', (d) 'quasi-metaphorical predicates', and (e) 'metaphorical predicates'.

Now I want to claim that the bed-rock predicates are those which I have called 'first order predicates' and 'value predicates' and that the former are to be taken literally or <u>can be given</u> straightforward literal senses. Second order predicates will be regarded as disguised rules directing the use of first order predicates or as logical remarks about first order predicates. Metaphorical predicates will be explained or given glosses by means of first order predicates. Let us discuss each of these categories. Note: I will <u>provisionally</u> understand by 'God' a disembodied mind. This will be discussed.

A. <u>First Order Predicates</u>: I would like to select as my examples of first order predicates, 'loving', 'judge', 'creator',

'powerful', and 'wise'.[1] Now I wish to argue that these are to be taken literally. That is, 'loves' in 'God loves us' is to mean the same thing as in 'John loves us'. What, then, does 'John loves us' mean? It seems to mean two things. (a) It implies that John has a disposition to certain kinds of behavior. He will look out for our safety, provide medical assistance, help us in time of need, etc., and (b) it indicates a particular emotion on the part of John. That is, when John thinks of us he experiences certain feelings --feelings of affection, etc. Now I am proposing that we treat 'loves' in 'God loves us' in the same way. Thus, the sentence implies (a) a disposition on the part of some x to help us in times of need, to alleviate our suffering, etc. and (b) that this x must also be capable of, and actually experience, the appropriate feelings.

Let us consider 'creator'. I will interpret 'God is creator' as saying 'for any x, a necessary condition of x is a decision on the part of God'. If we can make sense of propositions ascribing mental states quite literally to a disembodied mind--and I am arguing that we can--then it would seem that we can make sense of the proposition, 'This disembodied mind makes a decision, forms a resolution'. My proposition does <u>not</u> claim that God creates the universe. (I am not quite sure what this would mean, since as Kant argues, the

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[1] 'Just' falls in this class if it is regarded as indicating a disposition rather than as making an appraisal. Actually, of course, 'just' does both and therefore falls both with the class of first order predicates and within the class of value predicates.

universe is a quite different thing from a member of the universe, and it is not clear that 'cause' or 'create' will mean the same when applied to the universe as when applied to a member of the universe.) What it does claim is that God's decision is a necessary condition of this tree, this person, this chair, etc., etc.

Let us next consider 'powerful'. John is considered to be powerful if he can effectively realize all or most of his decisions. It does not seem to be the case that the meaning of 'John is powerful' involves any reference to the nature of the means by which John effects his decisions, or ever implies that there are any means. 'God is powerful' is then to mean 'God can realize all or most of his decisions'.

'Wise' will be given the following literal sense--'knows what means are appropriate to his ends and knows our moral dispositions'. It seems unnecessary to include more than this in the meaning of the term.

Finally, let us take 'judge'. A judge is someone who apportions rewards or punishments according to the legal qualities of ones actions. 'God is our judge' means then that 'the disembodied mind under discussion rewards and punishes according to whether or not ones actions meet certain standards.

Comment: (1) It might be argued that it is impossible to take concepts like 'loves us' literally, since the entity to which we intend to attribute the predicate is too dissimilar

to an ordinary object like John to allow such an application. After all, John possesses a body, operates in the world, etc. while we are eventually going to maintain that the entity called 'God' is infinite, invisible, etc. Surely, then, the predicates cannot mean the same thing in the two cases.

Several remarks are in order. (a) A common argument is that since God is infinite we cannot treat 'love' as conveying the same sense when applied to God as when applied to a finite object. But (i) I am treating first order predicates as primary and am not interpreting second order 'predicates' as predicates at all but as disguised rules or logical remarks. It will become clear, I hope, that I will not interpret 'infinite' in such a way as to interfere with a literal application of 'loves us' to God. (ii) I will attempt to define 'God' primarily in terms of first order predicates. Now these predicates are to be taken literally. Consequently it will not be the case that God is 'wholly other' and therefore the objection that since God is wholly other the predicates must have different meanings when applied to God and to human beings, will not in fact be to the point. (b) It must be admitted that the subject of the predicates in question is being treated as inaccessible in principle to our senses, i.e., we can never see, feel, hear or taste God. And this brings us to an examination of our provisional interpretation of God as a disembodied mind. Does this imply that we cannot understand 'God loves us' or that at least we

must be using 'loves us' in a stretched or analogous sense? I do not see why this must be the case unless we presuppose that it is logically impossible (i) for anything to experience the feeling of love unless it is embodied and (ii) for anything but an embodied being to exert real effects in the world. It is not obvious to me that this is the case.

Is a disembodied mind logically possible? The difficulty seems to revolve around our inability to find a perfectly satisfactory criterion of identity for the supposed disembodied mind. Memory is proposed as a candidate but may be considered inadequate on the grounds that an experience can then belong to the disembodied mind if and only if the experience is a memory or is later remembered. (cf. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge) But though it is perhaps unlikely that the latter condition is ever fulfilled, is it logically impossible? It is not obvious to me that it is. I conclude, then, that the notion of a disembodied mind is--as Ayer puts it--not obviously meaningless. But if so, then we can understand what it would be like for a disembodied mind to love us. It has (a) certain feelings which we ourselves have experienced and (b) a disposition to act in certain ways towards us. (It should be noted that the disposition need not result in an action. It would be possible for a person to love us --for the statement 'He loves us' to make perfect sense--and yet for the conditions for the actualization of this disposition not to be realized.)

But how can a disembodied mind be said to act? Let

us imagine the following case. Jones is bed-ridden and paralyzed with one exception--he can talk. He tells us that he is about to cause a chair to move--that he will will that it move and that it will then move. Suppose it does. Suppose further that after other such announcements, pages are turned, doors are slammed, cups are moved, etc. Now suppose we ask Jones how he does this. He replies, 'Well, I feel tense, concentrate on the cup for example. Sometimes I rehearse inner sentences like "Move! Move!" while thinking of it. I feel relief when it does move. Perhaps I do not always feel so intense, perhaps I do not always rehearse the same inner sentences, but something of this general sort is always going on when I move cups, etc.' Would we deny that Jones is intentionally doing something? I suggest that we would not.

It is worth noting that (a) we can form a notion of the inner events Jones is describing. Suppose someone (a la Rhine) orders me to try to make a die turn up ace without coming in physical contact with it. It seems to me that we can at least understand this order and that we do something very like what Jones has described.

Now though there may be no such cases as those which I have described, they do seem to me to be logically possible. What we have in effect is simply a constant conjunction of mental events of a certain description and certain physical events, and the conjunction I have described can (I believe) be called 'intentionally moving an object'. (And presumably

'a physical event is caused by a mental event' means no more than that one generally follows another. There is a problem here only if we assume that more is involved in 'cause' than a reference to such a conjunction and the claim that any particular instance of such a conjunction is an instance of a law like statement.)

If we can understand this case, and I have suggested that we can, then there would seem to be no difficulty in understanding, e.g., 'A disembodied mind moves a cup'. It claims no more than that mental events like those above described are usually followed by the movement of the cup and that an instance of this is now occurring.

It may be objected, however, that the statement is unverifiable since we have no access to the mental states of a disembodied mind. Two things may be said. (i) Though it is true that we have no access to these mental states, it does not seem obvious to me that we are unable to understand the claim that there are such mental states. (ii) 'A mental act precedes the movement of the cup and mental events of that description are always or usually followed by the movement of a cup' is the analysis of 'A disembodied mind moves the cup'. Now the latter statement is partially verifiable, i.e., the cup will either move or will not move. As such (since they are equivalent) it would seem that the analyzing statement is partially verifiable.[1]

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[1]It may be objected that all that has been verified is 'a cup moves in absence of an apparent cause'. It seems to

(2) Another objection seems to arise from a consideration of 'creator'. It may be objected that what is a necessary condition of everything is in fact the cause of nothing. That is, when we ask for a causal explanation of the phenomenon in question, we are asking for the peculiar antecedent conditions of the phenomenon in question, i.e., those special conditions which cause one phenomenon to arise rather than another. The point of the objection is this--that there is no discernible difference in the empirical expectations of one who maintains that everything is created by God and one who denies the proposition in question. As such, the proposition is unverifiable. Now it does seem to be true that the proposition in question is, scientifically speaking, unverifiable. (We will examine the peculiar sort of verification to which religious statements are subjected later.) And thus, since 'John caused the light to go on' and 'Michelangelo created the statue called "Moses"' can be scientifically verified, it would seem that 'creator' or 'cause' cannot mean the same when applied to God and when applied to John.

If this simply means that the method of verification is different, this must be admitted. (I shall argue that in fact the modes of verification are radically different.) It

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me, however, that this consideration only shows that the verification of 'a disembodied mind moves the cup' is the same as that of 'a cup moves, etc.' This does not show that the meaning is the same unless we assume the verification theory of meaning. This will not be done. Though we will insist on verification, we will refuse to identify it with the meaning.

is not clear to me, however, that 'meaning' can be equated with method of verification, that difference in mode of verification implies a difference in meaning. If it is granted that the meaning of a predicate involves more than the verification procedures appropriate to a sentence employing that predicate, then it is this something more which I am claiming is the same in 'God created x' and 'John created x'. The something more consists in large part, I believe, in the expectations to which the sentence in question leads or which it would be judged as warranting. When this has been pointed out, then it would seem that the only way to settle the question as to whether the difference in verification procedures involves a difference in meaning, is by a verbal decision.

(3) This leads us to another difficulty. I have argued that these predicates can be taken literally. It would seem, however, that this is easier to do in the case of 'loves us' and 'judge' than in the case of 'creator' and 'powerful' for the following reason: When we hear 'God loves us' or 'God is our judge', we form certain expectations, expectations of the same order as those implied by 'John loves us' or 'John is our judge'. Thus, in the way I am using the terms, 'God loves us' <u>does</u> imply that He will not let children suffer, let good men die of cancer, etc., etc. 'God is our judge' does <u>imply</u> that good men will be rewarded, etc., etc. But what expectations do we form if we accept 'God is creator' or 'God is powerful'? The latter case is the easier one. By

itself, 'God is powerful' would seem to lead to no particular expectation. But taken in conjunction with other first order predicates we do form certain expectations. Thus, 'God loves us and is powerful' leads us to expect, e.g., cures in a large number of cases. 'God is our judge and is powerful' leads us to expect that in all or most cases rewards or punishments will be distributed according to deserts.

But what expectations are based on 'God is creator', i.e., what empirical difference does the proposition make? How are the expectations of a theist different from those of an atheist at this point? Again, I think that taking the proposition in isolation, there is no significant difference. There may be such a difference, however, when the proposition in question is taken in conjunction with other propositions. Thus 'God created everything and God is loving' leads us to expect that in fact things will be amenable to our purposes, that 'The world will be a friendly place', etc.

In conclusion I want to say that my reason for deciding to take first order predicates literally, or assigning literal meanings to them, is that if we do not take them in this way, I am unable to determine what sense these predicates have, if any. (Furthermore, I suspect, though I cannot prove, that the ordinary religious believer takes these predicates in much the way that I have suggested.) What we do when these expectations are disappointed (as they usually are) is another question (and one which I will discuss later).[1]

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[1]I have said that certain religious predicates are to

B. Value Predicates: I only want to discuss one predicate here--'good'. (I shall reserve a discussion of 'x is holy' for a later place, agruing that it is a presupposition for the whole religious enterprise.) Now I will take 'good' to be (following Hare in The Language of Morals and the OED) the most general instrument of commendation in the English language. I will not consider the various criteria which are offered to back the judgment 'x is good' to be part of the meaning of 'good'. As such there will be no difficulty in understanding 'God is good'--we are simply commending God, expressing our approval of Him. It may, of course, be the case that we employ special criteria when we apply 'good'

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be taken literally. This would seem to be impossible, for if I want to say both that 'God loves us' and 'God is changeless' am I not contradicting myself if I construe these sentences literally? For if 'God loves us' is taken literally, it would imply that God's mind is subject to passion and hence change. Now this difficulty has been avoided in the model, for 'changeless' has not been included as one of the predicates of the model. I have omitted it on the (perhaps mistaken) impression that it is not an essential predicate in Christian language. If 'changeless' had been included, it would have been construed as a first order predicate, synonymous with 'steadfast'. If construed in this way it is difficult to see how 'changeless' could conflict with 'loves us'. The contradiction seems to arise only when 'changeless' is interpreted as implying absolutely no change. I see no reason to so interpret it, for it would seem that the point of maintaining that God is 'without shadow of turning' is that His love towards us is constant, that He will keep His covenant, etc. It should be noted, however, that the view in question by explicitly ruling out any analogical construction of religious predicates places us in the following situation: If we take 'changeless' in the rejected sense, we can accept 'God loves us' only at the expense of contradiction. We can say 'God is changeless and loves us' only if changelessness is interpreted as being steadfast.

to God. This will present a difficulty, however, only if the criteria employ words in stretched senses or in senses which have not been explained. I suggest, however, that the criteria offered will be like 'God loves us', 'God is our judge', etc. It may of course be argued as to whether or not we ought to employ 'good' on the basis of such criteria. If, however, the meaning of 'loves us', 'judge', etc. have been explained satisfactorily, there should be no <u>logical</u> objection to the move.

'Perfect' is to be interpreted as 'better than any other object'. To say that God is better than any other object is to commend God more highly than any other object with which we are acquainted.

C. <u>Second Order Predicates</u>: As I have indicated, I will not treat these as predicates at all, but as disguised rules, higher order statements about first order statements, and as logical remarks about the verification of first order statements. My reason for classing together predicates with these various functions is that they may all, I believe, be profitably regarded as the result of reflection upon statements using first order predicates.

(1) Second Order Predicates of Type I: These are higher order statements about first order statements. I will define 'God is omnipotent' as 'propositions p, q, r...are false' where p, q, r take as values propositions proposed by certain heretics which deny that God can do so and so. (e.g., 'God cannot save men against their will', 'God cannot raise the

body'.) I will define 'God is omniscient' as 'propositions p, q, r...are false' where p, q, r take as values propositions proposed by certain heretics which deny that God can know so and so. (e.g., 'God cannot know what I will do next'.)

Consequently, 'God is omnipotent' does not mean (in our model) 'for any x, where x is a possible action, God can do x'. But it is rather the denial of a finite number of propositions--the number depending upon those which have actually been proposed by heretics.

Now what is my reason for this proposal? My reason is simply greater flexibility. It seems that the most important propositions for religious purposes are first order propositions. (The bulk, if not all, of the New Testament propositions about God are, I believe, first order propositions.) Furthermore, it seems to me that many of the most important difficulties in theology arise because predicates like 'omnipotent', etc. are taken in the rejected sense. (For example, the problem of evil arises only if 'omnipotent' is taken in the rejected sense.) On the other hand, the 'cash value' of these predicates seems to be the rejection of certain heretical opinions. This I wish to retain. It is to be noted that the proposal I have suggested leaves as a logical possibility the possibility that there might be some action which God cannot perform, or something which God cannot know.

I will define 'infinite' as a shorthand way for asserting the following conjunction: 'God is omnipotent and God is

omniscient and God is perfect'. The predicates involved in the conjunction have already been explained.

(2) Second Order Predicates of Type II: These will be (disguised) rules or will contain disguised rules as part of their meaning. Our example will be 'triune'. I will define 'God is triune' as a conjunction of a rule, a first order proposition and a second order proposition of type I. The rule is this: 'One must worship God, and one must worship Christ and one must worship the Holy Spirit'.[1] The first order proposition is 'The will of Christ and of God and of the Holy Spirit cannot conflict' where 'cannot' has the sense it has in 'John is so intelligent and has studied so hard, he cannot flunk his exam'. The second order proposition of type I is to the effect that various propositions such as those proposed by the Arians, are false.

(3) Second Order Predicates of Type III: These will consist in logical remarks about the verification of first order statements. Thus 'God is invisible' can be construed as such a remark to the effect that God is in principle unobservable, i.e., all observation tests (e.g., taking a good look, employment of telescopes, etc.) are inappropriate.

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[1]I will not (though perhaps I should) discuss the logic of 'Holy Spirit'. I would suggest the following definition in use: 'The Holy Spirit is present' is equivalent to 'One is experiencing grace' which in turn is equivalent to 'One is experiencing feelings of holiness'. The latter will be discussed later. The proffered definition does not account for the ascription of personality to the Holy Spirit. With all due modesty, however, I suggest that the fault is that of Christianity.

D. Metaphors: Predicates like 'rock of salvation', 'a fortress', etc., can now be regarded as metaphors which can be given literal paraphrases in terms of first order predicates. Thus, 'a fortress' can be broken down to 'just, loving, and powerful'. 'Rock of salvation' can be translated into 'steadfast and loving'. There will, of course, be a poetic loss as in the case of any literal paraphrase, but there will be no unintelligibility.

E. Quasi-Metaphors: A statement like 'God is our father' cannot be taken literally, since as such it is quite obviously false. My father, for example, is F. J. Wainwright. Furthermore, whatever God is, He is not the sort of being who can be a father. On the other hand, the predicate is not a sheer metaphor like those mentioned above. What happens in this case is that a portion of the meaning of 'father' can be applied to God--and quite literally as in the case of any first order predicate, while another portion cannot be literally applied. Thus 'father' in ordinary contexts does not simply mean biological father (otherwise it would be inappropriate to call ones adopted parent 'father'). It can also mean someone who stands in a certain (legal?) relation to a second party--provides for his education, welfare, has certain disciplinary privileges, etc. It is then in this second sense that we can apply 'father' to God. This does not exhaust the meaning of 'God is our father' however, since the statement implies that God feels the sort of paternal love which we expect from fathers, but which is not always

forthcoming and is therefore not included in the meaning of the term. It is this relatively vague penumbra of associations which is one of the grounds which distinguishes 'father' from a first order predicate, and is the reason for our according it a quasi-metaphorical significance. The other is that while God creates me (in the sense explained) he does not do so in the sense that my father does so.

In concluding my discussion, I wish to point out that one thing which has governed the inquiry is the attempt to avoid contradictions. It seems to me that as defined, we can assert that there is a being who is loving, powerful, judge, omniscient, omnipotent, steadfast, etc. without fear of contradicting ourselves. (The propositions may of course be utterly false.) In reconstructing Christian language, I will then adopt a rule to the effect that no contradictions are to be admitted.

At this point we may now offer a definition of God in terms of certain first order predicates (loving, powerful, wise) and one second order predicate (invisible). The selection is fairly arbitrary since another selection might do as well. It is to be noted, however, that the definition offered here will include the provisional definition, since a being who is loving, powerful, wise and invisible (in the defined senses) can only be a disembodied mind. The definition will be completed in Chapter XV.

CHAPTER XIV

VERIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS

We must now examine the method of verification appropriate to religious statements. Again, I must warn the reader that I am making a proposal, suggesting a simplified model, rather than offering an analysis of the actual modes of verification employed. I hope, however, (and believe) that my simplified model is very close to that which is actually employed in Christian religious contexts.

I wish to maintain that the ultimate appeal in the attempt to verify a religious statement is an appeal to authority, and that in our model the authority is of three sorts, (a) a figure like Christ (b) scripture and (c) the church. I now want to distinguish three sorts of religious statements according to their subject matter: (i) Those statements which have 'God' as their subject, e.g., 'God is our father', (ii) those about some historical event (putative) e.g., 'The man called "Jesus" died and became alive again' and (iii) rules, moral maxims and precepts, e.g., 'Love your neighbor'. We will examine each of these in turn.[1]

A. How do we establish a statement like 'God is love' or 'God can be moved by contrition'? I suggest that there are several ways in which this can be established, by appealing

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[1]The logic of the last two statements has not been discussed but presents no special problem. In our model, the second sort of statement is construed in its ordinary sense. Rules are taken as universal recommendations.

to (a) a Christ-figure (b) scriptures or (c) the church acting through a council or pope. In this case the issue is closed.[1] We will examine (in detail) the basis for using Christ and/or the church and/or scriptures as an authority. But let us for the moment assume as a fundamental axiom: 'Whatever the Christ-figure (or the church or scriptures) says about God is true'. Assuming this as fundamental, there are two other ways in which a statement about God can be established. (a) The first is by a deduction from a statement, or conjunction of statements, of the Christ-figure or church or scriptures, using the ordinary canons of deductive reasoning. (b) There is a looser way in which religious statements may be related to the authoritative statements. Suppose that a non-authoritative religious statement is proposed for our belief--Boehme's doctrine of creation for example. Let us further suppose (i) that the doctrine does not follow logically from the body of authoritative statements, (ii) that there is no logical conflict with the authoritative statements, (iii) that the entertainment of the proposed doctrine does not lead to behavior which conflicts with behavior enjoined by the authoritative statements, and (iv) that the proposed doctrine answers a religious question, say the problem of evil. If these considerations are fulfilled, the doctrine may be entertained as a valid religious

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[1] Some Christians, of course, will not accept the church as an authority. Our model leaves this open--either the Christ-figure or the church or scriptures or a selection of these are authorities.

hypothesis.

We must notice two things about this relation of non-authoritative statements to authoritative statements. (i) We must be prepared to give the hypothesis up if it should prove on further inspection to conflict with the authoritative statements. (ii) We are not simply entertaining the proposed doctrine as an hypothesis which is logically possible in terms of the model. It is not something which might just be the case but which has no further relevance. (A doctrine of this sort might be for example a doctrine to the effect that there are angels in charge of small children.) The doctrine, as was said, is rather an answer to a religious problem, an attempt to make ones religious views more coherent. There are, however, no positive grounds which can be advanced under the conditions which we have specified other than a general intellectual demand that the religious situation must be coherent and that therefore there must be some solution to religious problems which cannot be settled on the basis of authority. This, however, is a demand, not a reason.[1]

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[1]This ought to be qualified. It might be deduced from authoritative statements that since God is good all religious problems are potentially capable of being solved by human beings. This would provide a justification for the attempt to devise a solution to religious problems, i.e., a solution is possible at least. It cannot, however, be advanced as a reason for the acceptance of any particular solution. If the particular solution can be deduced from authoritative statements, then the problem is not a religious problem in the sense in which 'religious problem' has been used in the last few paragraphs. (I am thinking particularly of the problem of evil as an example of such a religious problem.) Nor if

Under the conditions specified above a proposition may be believed but is not compelled by the model techniques.

Let us return to the authoritative statements. What conditions must x fulfill to be an authority in religion? There are two conditions:

(a) x must be a person(s) or book(s).

(b) We must be prepared to say 'x is holy'.

(We will examine the logic of 'x is holy' later.)

These conditions I will regard as necessary and sufficient to constitute an authority. They are not, however, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the acceptance of a proposition as authoritative. A proposition is authoritative if and only if it has been pronounced by an authority. But this raises a further question as to how we know that a given proposition has been pronounced by the authority in question.

Let us first take those propositions which are supposed to have been pronounced by the church. I will stipulate that here the question as to whether or not a given proposition has been pronounced by the church is to be decided in accordance with the usual criteria used to establish any historical statement. The degree of certainty of the proposition proposed to our belief will then be proportional to the strength of the evidence for the statement 'The church has said such and such'.

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it can be solved on other grounds (say by the use of scientific techniques) is it a religious problem since a religious problem, by definition, is one which can only be settled by religious techniques.

The question with respect to the Christ-figure is, however, more complex and I suggest that there we have a very peculiar feature of the Christian verification situation. The figure in question is Jesus. Reports of his utterances are found in the Bible. We must then suppose that the Bible is accurate. How will this be established? We might suggest that we treat it simply as an historical document. As such, it is subject to the same criteria to which any other historical document is subject. But this would suggest that we hold the authoritative statements only with some degree of probability, since we argue in the following way:

> Any statement uttered by Christ is true. (axiom)
> This statement was (probably) uttered by Christ.
> (Since any historical evidence will yield only probable conclusions)
> Therefore, the statement in question is (probably) true.

But this seems to conflict with the actual logic of the Christian verification situation, i.e., the propositions in question are <u>not</u> accepted as probable, but as certain. Is this a simple case of going beyond the evidence? Perhaps it is. There is, however, another alternative, and it is this latter which I wish to incorporate in my model of Christian religious language. Historical criteria will be regarded as largely irrelevant to the truth of the Biblical account of Christ's teachings about God. This means that the Bible or certain selected portions of it[1] are accepted as authorita-

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[1]To accept something as authoritative we must remember it is only necessary that it be a person or book, and

tive. Why are they accepted as authoritative? Because they are holy. But why are they judged to be holy? Because (a la Brunner) they present Christ, or present his view as to the nature of God. That is, in less high flown lingo, because of their subject matter.

If this is the case, we seem to be in a circle, since our argument on the one hand is:

I

(i) Whatever an authority says is true.
(ii) Christ is an authority.
(iii) Therefore, whatever Christ says is true.
(iv) p is a proposition uttered by Christ.
(v) Therefore, p is true.

Now we want the proposition p to be authoritative and therefore certain. But it can only be certain if all the premisses of the above argument are certain. We might, however, question the certainty of premiss iv. This is established by means of the following argument:

II

(i) Whatever is found in the Bible (or portions of it) is true.
(ii) The Bible says that Christ said p.
(iii) Therefore, Christ said p.

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that we be prepared to judge that it is holy. As such, my model does not commit the believer to all portions of the Bible or any other book--simply those which he is prepared to evaluate as holy. Thus a man could logically (i.e., in accordance with my model) accept the teachings of Christ about God and reject everything else--still remaining within the context of the model. I think that this observation is important since it allows a certain amount of flexibility which would seem to be lost when we base religious verification procedures upon an appeal to authority. <u>There is a sense in which we set up the authority which we accept</u>.

But the major premiss can be accepted only if we accept (by our definition of 'authority') the statement that the Bible or selected portions of it are holy. Now it would be possible by our definitions simply to accept this statement as fundamental. (We will in fact see that some judgment of the form 'x is holy' must be accepted as fundamental.) All that our model requires is that the historicity of statements to the effect that the Christ-figure says p are not to be established by historical criteria. (This provision is necessary to ensure the certainty of statements uttered by the Christ-figure regarded as an authority--see above.) I am inclined to think, however, that as a matter of fact the statement that the Bible, or certain selected portions thereof, is holy, is not (always or usually) accepted as fundamental in the above sense, and I would like to explore this for a moment.

I have suggested that there is a reason for making the evaluation in question and that the reason is precisely the nature of the contents of the portion in question. The argument now is that:

III

(i) Anything which says such and such is holy.
(ii) The Bible, or portions of it, says such and such.
(iii) Therefore, the Bible is holy.

Now this means that we may be in a circle though we are not forced to be. If our argument is:

Anything which says q, r...is holy.
The Bible says q, r...
Therefore, the Bible is holy,

where q=(Christ says that p), then we assume the conclusion of argument II in attempting to establish its major premiss. On the other hand, if neither q nor p is involved in the 'such and such' of the major premiss of argument III, then it is not obvious that we are in a circle. I would not, however, be surprised if it were shown that q or p was often involved in the 'such and such'.

My reason for this digression has been that though the situation I have outlined presents (I believe) no difficulty for my model, there does seem to be this constant shift in Christian contexts between an appeal to Christ and an appeal to scripture as an authority and that therefore (since the model is designed for Christian language) the apparent circularity involved required a brief explanation.

B. Let us now briefly consider verification of statements like 'Christ rose from the dead' which are historical, i.e., are about datable past events which might have been experienced by human beings. Here, I think, the actual verification situation is quite peculiar, and it is this peculiar situation which I am going to incorporate in the model. The proposition says that a certain man at a certain place and time died, and then at another specific place and time was found to be alive, where 'died' and 'alive' have their usual meanings. Whether the proposition is true or not would seem then to be an ordinary empirical question. We would, I suppose, have to weigh the antecedent improbability of the event in question against the reliability of documents which de-

scribe the event. We would then form a probable judgment as to the truth of the proposition (undoubtedly quite low). This does not seem to be what happens, however. Imagine (following MacIntyre)[1] that suddenly the sworn testimony of 330 prominent Romans, Greeks and Syrians (i.e., people who had no ax to grind) was found testifying that they watched the body of Christ for 30 days, and that there was no resurrection. What would happen? I suggest that though some people would undoubtedly give up their religious convictions, those who were committed Christians would suggest that it was a forgery, that there was some mistake or something of the sort. Suppose, on the other hand, the same situation with the 330 reporting that on the third day the man did rise from the dead. I suspect that the convinced atheist would make one of two moves. He would either suggest catalepsy or something of the sort, or if the usual explanations fail, appeal to 'some queer sort of natural connection'. Or he might suggest that the newly discovered document is a forgery. --That is, I am suggesting that the normal criteria for an historical statement are (often) not used when the question is a religious one.[2] Now we could suggest that this sus-

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[1]Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Logical Status of Religious Belief," Metaphysical Beliefs, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre and Ronald Gregor Smith (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1957), pp. 169-211.

[2]This does not mean that the question could not be examined as an historical one. Of course it could. But rather that when the question is raised in a religious context, we play fast and loose with the usual methods of verification.

pension of the usual verification procedures is simply irrational. There is an alternative however. This is to suggest that it is not the case simply that the empirical verification procedures are suspended, but that another verification procedure is substituted. I suggest that this is simply (in this case) an appeal to an authority. This in turn is based on the (as yet unexamined) judgment that x is holy. This is all we need for our model. In practice, however, we may add that the authority in this case is scripture. The criteria for the judgment that scripture is holy involve a reference to the contents, among which is the account of the Resurrection. If the latter is included in the specification of the contents used to back the judgment that scripture is holy, then we are in a circle.

C. Finally, let us examine the verification of maxims like 'We ought to love our neighbor' (p). After what we have said above, the situation would seem to be quite straightforward. The argument will go as follows:

(i) Whatever the authority enjoins is right.
(ii) The authority enjoins p (either directly or else indirectly where p is deduced from some direct utterance of the authority or is in the spirit of such an utterance).
(iii) Therefore, p is right (where to say an action is right is to prescribe it and/or to commend it).

There is one peculiarity however. It would seem that the most fundamental value judgment is the major premiss, 'Whatever the authority enjoins is right'. I think, however, that this is in turn founded on a value judgment of a different order, i.e., 'The authority is holy'. To understand religious

value judgments, then, we must examine the logic of 'x is holy'.

Before we do this, however, I would like to discuss a consequence of the analysis of statements and the mode of verification found in my model. What is the logic of the situation where (i) one man asserts on historical grounds that there is no evidence for the resurrection, while another person asserts the resurrection on religious grounds or (ii) one man asserts that there is no disembodied mind which loves us since there is no evidence for the existence of such a mind, and if there were, the suffering we find would belie his love, while his opponent asserts that God loves us, basing his statement on an appeal to authority?

It might be said, that since the logic of the statements is different, there is no real conflict. The seemingly incompatible statements slide over one another, so to speak, just as value judgments are (logically) compatible with any and every empirical statement. I think that this view, though attractive, is mistaken. At the same time it contains some measure of truth. (a) I have maintained that first order statements about God, and historical statements (like the resurrection claim) are to be taken literally. As such, the man who maintains these propositions to be true forms certain expectations, e.g., that suffering will be prevented (formed on the basis of 'God loves us') and certain contrary to fact conditionals, e.g., that if we had been present at such and such a place at such and such a time, we

would have seen the man called 'Jesus' walk out of the tomb. When a man denies the religious propositions, he is directly countering these expectations and beliefs. ('We have no reason to expect that suffering will be prevented and in fact it is not.' 'If we had been at such and such a place ...we would not have seen a man called "Jesus" walk from the tomb.') There is, then, a head-on conflict between the man who accepts the model and the man who does not. That is, their expectations as to what will happen and their convictions as to what has happened are radically different. When the atheist objects to Christianity, he is not misunderstanding the statements in question. (b) We might then go on to say that if our atheist and our Christian are agreed as to the meanings of the statements and the expectations which they warrant, then it should be in principle possible to decide this argument, i.e., we simply look to see if the expectations are fulfilled, i.e., certain predictions have been made and we use ordinary empirical methods to ascertain the outcome.

The curious thing is this. The issue could be decided if both parties to the dispute would accept the relevance of the empirical verification procedures. This is not the case, however, (in terms of my model--which as I have said, I believe to be reasonably faithful to religious practice) since one party to the dispute says that the only criteria relevant to the truth of religious assertions are those which I have outlined above--criteria which are quite clearly

non-empirical. Since the parties to the dispute admit different verification procedures as relevant, it would seem that what is verified by one set of techniques might be falsified by the other and vice versa. This seems to me to actually be the case with respect to the use of religious language.

The dispute now becomes one as to the relative merit of the proffered verification processes. It may be that we would be foolish to accept any but the scientific verification procedures. To attempt to argue this pro or con, however, would be to go beyond the purpose of this thesis, which is simply to present a model in terms of which we can construe religious language and logic.

There is, however, one more issue which must be explicitly discussed. What happens if an expectation which has been formed on the basis of certain religious statements is disappointed? The situation I have in mind is this:

A is an authority and A says 'p'.
p implies a.
But not-a occurs.

There seem to be at least seven moves which might be made. (a) We might admit that not-a has occurred but add that A did not <u>really</u> mean p (but something analogous to p) by 'p' and so the consequent, a, does not follow. Since our model is designed to avoid an analogy theory of meaning, we must reject this move as inadmissable.

(b) We might conclude that not all of the statements of an authority must be true and that therefore the falsity

of p does not necessarily disprove his authority though it does count against it. Here, of course, not-a is accepted as disproving p. There is a disadvantage in this move, however. For if A (the authority) can be mistaken, then for any proposition p, asserted by A, we cannot conclude with certainty that it is true. Our conclusions will in fact be only probable, i.e., the argument will be:

> Most statements of A are true.
> A says that p.
> Therefore, p is (probably) true.

As we have mentioned before, this seems to conflict with the certainty with which the authority's statements are in fact held. As such, it seems that we must exclude this move from our model.[1]

(c) We might conclude that since A uttered 'p' and since p is false, A is not an authority. As a matter of fact I think that this often happens and would certainly happen if enough of the statements of the putative authority seem to be manifestly false. However, since this line of attack is directed towards the authority, and since the acceptance of the authority is a condition of using the model, it is not a move which is permissible <u>within</u> the model. Any move within the model presupposes that an authority has been accepted.

(d) We might conclude that since A is an authority and since p is false, A could not have uttered 'p'. By making

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[1]What are we then to do with, e.g., Christ's statement that He would return within the lifetime of his disciples--a statement that is surely false? I think that in practice it is simply ignored. However, for another alternative see (f) below.

this move we can always save the authority of A, but only at the expense of making the authority useless. For what we seem to be doing is saying that only statements which have not been shown to be false on independent grounds are statements uttered by the authority. We no longer have a criterion for true statements, but rather a criterion for 'the authority said such and such'. The ultimate arbiter of the truth of a statement is, say, science, not the authority. But if so, the authority is no longer functioning as an authority.

There are three other moves, however. Each of these is, I believe, sometimes made and each of these moves will be considered to be acceptable in the model.

(e) It is postulated that the only relevant evidence for p is its utterance by the authority. The observation of not-a is not an utterance by the authority. Consequently it is not relevant to the truth and falsity of p. This move may be objectionable, but I wish to include it in the model.

(f) It may be claimed that what seems to be a case of not-a is not really a case of not-a. (i) This move is possible in cases in which a value predicate occurs in the characterization of a situation. Suppose it is predicted that good things will happen to the believer. Since we are unable to see all the consequences of our actions, since apparent disasters do sometimes lead to overwhelmingly good conclusions, it seems always to be possible to believe that given any immediate distress is in fact only a prelude to a great good.

This is particularly easy to do if one believes in immortality. (ii) This move seems also possible in cases where the description of a is vague, e.g., 'conducive to moral perfection'. If (as I suspect) no one is quite sure what this involves, or can be positive that some bizarre training method may not be in order, it may not be too difficult in a given case to produce arguments both for the claim that a given event a does, and for the claim that a does not, fall under the concept of conducing to moral perfection.

That is, I think that there are at least two cases where a re-interpretation of a putative negative instance is possible. (I have not suggested that it is plausible.) First where the account of the situation involves an appraisal and secondly where the description is vague.

(g) Finally, many of the predicates with which we are concerned involve an implicit reference to the long run. 'The saints will be rewarded in the long run.' 'The Kingdom of God will come in the long run.' If this is the case, then it would seem that given any chain of untoward events, we can still claim that the run has not been long enough.

Does this then mean that nothing is allowed to count against p? No, for suppose we refuse to re-interpret not-a and we refuse to appeal to the long run. At this point we either admit not-a as relevant evidence or not. But if we do admit not-a as relevant evidence we must (unless we conclude that A did not say 'p') reject A as an authority and thus step outside the model. The situation is then this, contrary

evidence can be admitted, but to accept it is to step outside the model.

It follows from this that cases in which a person allows an empirical event like suffering to count against a belief, such as the belief that God loves us, is a case in which a person's confidence in the whole model is shaken. That as long as the model is accepted, nothing empirical is allowed to count against a religious assertion, though empirical events can weaken ones confidence in the model via a weakening of faith in the particular authority and possibly faith in all authority. Thus, acceptance of such an authority being a central feature of the model, to reject the authority is in effect to step outside the religious context. On the other hand, to accept an authority is to accept his statements and this implies a certain obliviousness to the course of events.

Thus religious statements differ from empirical statements in what we allow to count against them.[1]

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[1]I wish to acknowledge my debt to Alasdair MacIntyre's suggestion that authority is central. Responsibility for the detailed development of the conception is, however, mine.

CHAPTER XV

ANALYSIS OF 'X IS HOLY'

A. Let us now turn to the analysis of the statement 'x is holy'. I shall define 'holy' as a value term which (a) is used to commend and (b) expresses certain emotions or feelings which I will call (borrowing Otto's term) 'numinous feelings'.

What, then, are we to understand by 'numinous feelings'? In the first place, I do not mean any 'a priori feeling', any 'sui generis feeling', any emotion somehow incommensurable with our other emotions. In the second place, I do not wish to decide as to whether 'numinous feeling' stands for a unique feeling (unique in the sense that sadness is unique) or for a combination of feelings (e.g., a combination of fear, dependence, awe, etc.) I shall, however, give a criterion by means of which we can determine when the statement 'A is experiencing numinous feelings' is true. The criterion is the practice of worship, or engaging in worship.[1] What is involved in the practice of worship? There are undoubtedly borderline cases in which we are unable to determine whether a man is worshipping or not. But there also seem to be situations in which the case is perfectly clear.

Now worship is to be distinguished both from the experience of certain feelings and emotions on the one hand, and

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[1]To say 'A is experiencing numinous feelings' is not equivalent to saying 'A is worshipping'. The latter is simply a criterion for the former.

from overt behavior on the other, i.e., it is not to be equated with either. 'To worship' thus behaves something like 'to think'. To think is not necessarily to perform a bit of overt behavior though it may involve this, e.g., writing symbols on a sheet of paper, screwing up ones eyebrows, opening reference books, etc. Nor is thinking simply the experience of a group of emotions such as perplexity, etc. There is no one feeling or set of feelings, no one overt action or set of overt actions which is denoted by 'to think'. Yet this does not prevent us from saying 'A is thinking' and often being quite certain that we are correct.

I suggest that 'to worship' behaves in an analogous way. There are certain practices associated with worship, i.e., certain bits of overt behavior, e.g., saying prayers, kneeling in a church, a prayerful attitude of the body, etc. No one of these by itself constitutes worship. They are rather signs on the basis of which we feel entitled to infer that the man is worshipping.[1] Worshipping would seem then to be an activity which is as readily identifiable as thinking.

In short, to worship is to do something. I suggest that primarily it is to do something overt (to say prayers aloud, kneel, sing praises, etc.) There is no one act or group of acts which exhaust the concept of worship but rather

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[1]This is not quite correct. For 'sign' suggests a gulf between the observed behavior and some inner act of worship. But these bits of behavior are in fact <u>part</u> of what is involved in worshipping. That is, when we see a man praying in church, we do not infer that he is worshipping, we see that he is worshipping.

an open list of such acts, with no clear rule for deciding just which or how many of these acts are necessary. Derivatively one can worship without engaging in overt behavior just as one can think to oneself. I think that what is primarily involved here is praying silently, where the distinction between praying aloud and praying silently is not more mysterious than the distinction between speaking aloud and speaking to oneself.

To return, numinous feelings =df. those feelings which accompany an act of worship. This must immediately be qualified by adding that the worship in question must be sincere. This should present no difficulty however. We can in practice determine whether a worshipper is sincere by criteria like the following: By what he says, by whether he appears distracted when he claims to be worshipping, by facial expressions ('He seems rapt in worship'), by future conduct (he does not get up and spit on the cross), etc., etc. A Tartuffe is always possible, but deceit is possible in other areas as well, and the bare fact that some man may be a consummate actor and may be therefore able to make people, e.g., believe him to be virtuous when he is not, does not lead us to say that we are unable to distinguish virtuous men from wicked men.[1]

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[1]It might be objected that we cannot identify worshipful behavior without a reference to religious propositions or to special religious arguments. Suppose a man kneels before a king, uses terms like 'your worship', 'your majesty', etc. It would seem that he is exhibiting worshipful behavior, yet we would not want to say that he is worshipping. Now the

It is then these emotions connected with the activity of worship which are expressed by 'holy' in the judgment that x is holy.

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reason we would refuse to say that he is worshipping, so the argument goes, is that the being towards who the quasi-worshipful behavior is directed is not a religious object or god. It would seem, then, that we must assert that a necessary condition of a behavior pattern being worshipful is that it is directed towards a god. As such we cannot understand worshipful behavior without understanding propositions about those gods. But (a) it is not clear to me that the behavior of a worshipper towards his god would be sufficiently like that of a quasi-worshipper towards his king to make it impossible for us to distinguish the two cases without reference to a god or to religious propositions. If we are unable to make the distinction, then perhaps we have a case of worship proper (e.g., the Roman emperors, or various god-kings who in fact were treated as divine. (b) But passing over this for a moment, it would still seem that no question is begged. For while granting that to identify behavior as worshipful, we must include a reference to the object of worship, we can do this in the following manner:

Conduct is worshipful only if the object to which it is directed is called 'God', 'a god' (or something of the sort) by the putative worshipper.

That is, we determine whether he would say that the object of his activity is a god, i.e., we are simply adding one more behavioral test to those which we have already suggested above. We are not presupposing any religious propositions but the truth of certain propositions which include these as parts. That is, where p is a religious proposition, constructed in accordance with our model, the only proposition at issue in determining whether a given mode of behavior is worshipful or not, is a proposition like 'He said p' or 'He thinks p' but not p itself. We can therefore describe worshipful behavior and identify numinous feelings without committing ourselves to any religious proposition.

B. We may now specify the role which 'x is holy' is to play in our model. It has two roles.

In the first place 'x is holy' is to be a necessary condition of 'x is an authority' and as we have seen 'x is a person or a book and x is holy' is both a necessary and sufficient condition for 'x is an authority'.

In the second place, in our model 'God is holy' will be taken as a necessary condition of 'There is a God', i.e., in our model anyone who claims that there is a God is (logically) committed to evaluating God as holy.[1] Our definition of God is now in its final shape. We provisionally defined God as a disembodied mind. We then offered a more precise definition--God =df. a being who is invisible, wise, powerful and loving, i.e., God =df. the being who possesses certain first order predicates and one second order predicate, these having been previously defined. We must now add that 'holy' is to be added as a defining property, and our definition is complete.[2]

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[1]It is to be noted that this may be a departure from some uses of religious language. For it would seem that a person who accepts the existence of a being called 'God' might refuse to worship him, i.e., refuse to regard him as holy. The Black Mass is a religious phenomenon.

[2]There are several other senses of 'There is a God'. I am inclined to think that 'There is a God' is sometimes roughly equivalent to 'There is somewhere an authority, i.e., something I would worship or evaluate as holy'. I may assert this whether or not I have found such an object. (It is in this sense that I might say 'There is a God--there must be'. Note that Unamuno defines faith as the wish to believe, not belief.) There is a stronger sense of 'There is a God'. The sense I have in mind here is equivalent to 'I believe in God'. Suppose I am confronted with Christ or some other Christ-figure. I exclaim, 'There really is a God, I believe!' There

C. We have remarked that 'x is holy' is not only to be construed as expressing the feeling of holiness, but is also used to commend, i.e., the statement is an evaluative one. As such, we must ask what criteria, if any, are employed in applying 'holy'.

What values may 'x' have? It would seem almost anything--historical figures, places, books, buildings, artifacts, trees, invisible persons, etc., etc. Examples from all these classes can be, and have been, considered holy. What, if anything, do these persons, objects, etc. have in common which might serve as a criterion for the application of the predicate in question? The only thing which is obviously shared by these various objects is that they all elicit the feeling of holiness. It would seem, then, that the proper reply to the question, 'Why do you say that x is holy' is that x causes us to feel in a certain way, elicits a certain sort of feeling response. This reply would seem improper however, for we are asking for a justification, not for a causal explanation.

There are three sorts of questions which may be asked about the feeling of holiness. (a) What is the cause of this

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is no longer the expectation that a sacred authority will be found--we are now facing it. 'There is a God' may then express the acceptance of an authority as sacred, as well as the predisposition to regard some authority as sacred. Perhaps the difference is between 'I think there is a God' (where 'I think' indicates the degree of certainty with which I hold the proposition--but does not refer to a subjective state of my mind) and 'There is a God'.

feeling? (b) Towards what is the feeling directed and (c) is the feeling appropriate? The answer to the first question is to be given in terms of the nature of the object, the individual's personal history, general psychological laws, etc. But though the genetic question may be an intrinsically interesting one, it is more properly a question for psychology than for philosophical analysis. The second question can be answered by observing the behavior of the person who makes the judgment, or by asking him a simple question. It is the third question which is interesting for our purposes, since the answer to 'Under what conditions is the feeling of holiness appropriate' is identical with the answer to 'What features justify, or what criteria are relevant to, the judgment that x is holy'. The fact that we feel a certain way whenever x is presented is not, then, the reason for the judgment that x is holy. (Though it may be a necessary causal condition for the making of such a judgment.) It is rather something which must itself be justified.[1] How will such a justification proceed? Presumably we will mention characteristics of the object towards which the feeling is directed. The features mentioned in such a justification will be precisely those which would be specified in an attempt to back 'x is holy' with appropriate justifying reasons.

What sort of criteria are advanced to back 'x is holy'?

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[1]If we feel the justification in question to be inadequate we may accuse the maker of the judgment of idolatry, idolatry being by definition misplacing ones judgments of holiness.

There would seem to be three possibilities. (a) That no criteria are advanced, i.e., that the value judgment that some particular x is holy is fundamental in the sense that while it may be used to justify other evaluations, it cannot itself be justified by an appeal to any further evaluation. (b) The criteria will be given in sentences which employ predicates which do not occur in our model, i.e., in terms of extra-religious predicates. (c) The predicates which occur in the justifying reasons will be predicates which do occur in our model, i.e., religious predicates.

Now in the case of our model, there are two primary objects which are evaluated as holy--the authority and God. We may divide authority into two sorts--Christ-figures and books. Now scripture is judged holy either because of its source or because of its contents. In general it seems correct to say that the source in question must be a holy man in order for the book to be judged to be holy, or else it presents a story of someone or other who is judged to be holy.[1] As such, the judgment that scripture is holy depends upon the judgment that some Christ-figure is holy. Our question, then, comes to this. We must then ask in what way or ways we back the claim 'God is holy' and the claim that, e.g., Christ, is holy. It will be seen that in terms of the proposed model,

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[1]This may not be the case, e.g., the Upanishads, or generally any document which simply presents a set of doctrines or precepts. In such a case, if the book is treated as holy, it would seem that the judgment that it is holy is fundamental in the sense that it admits of no further backing.

the logic of the two statements is quite dissimilar.

Let us first ask how we back 'A is holy' where A is a Christ-figure. Our model is designed to fit (however roughly) Christian language and verification procedure. The primary authority in Christianity is Christ. Let us ask, then, what sort of predicates occur in the statements which are brought forward to back the claim that Christ is holy.[1] We have seen that there are three possibilities. We may rule out the possibility that there are no criteria, for whatever else he may be, Christ is supposed to be an historical figure singled out from others by the peculiar nature of his activity. It is precisely this latter to which appeal is made. What, then, is the nature of the predicates which occur in the justifying statements? (a) Some of the predicates are what I have called 'non-religious', e.g., 'heals the sick', 'teaches such and such an ethical doctrine', 'exhibits a highly moral character' (i.e., in effect, 'lives up to those moral standards which I consider to be highest'). (b) Others, however, are definitely religious in nature, e.g., 'son of God', 'will come again in glory'. (c) Still others hover somewhere between religious and non-religious predicates, e.g., 'forgives sins'.

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[1]Let us waive the question as to whether to accept Christ as an authority we must accept the Bible as an authority. For if asked to justify the latter we will probably appeal to the character of the person(s) which it presents. That is, we appeal to the content which is among other things, precisely a specification of the features of Christ's activity which are supposed to justify the judgment that Christ is holy.

Let us first examine the religious predicates. 'Son of God' is less a characteristic or feature than a title, part of the basis for the application of which is precisely the evaluation of Christ as holy. To argue that Christ is holy because he is the son of God is then to fall into a circle.

Let us examine the prediction that Christ will come again in glory. The only basis for accepting this is that Christ has said that he will come again, and Christ is an authority. But we are justified in accepting Christ as an authority only because he is holy. Again, we can back 'Christ is holy' with 'Christ will come again in glory' only at the expense of landing in a circle. I suggest that what we have found true in this case will be true in the case of the other religious predicates ascribed to Christ, e.g., Messiah, Son of Man, judge, savior, etc. That is, they will either be titles, partly relying on the judgment that he is holy, or will be descriptions depending upon his authority for their acceptance.

Let us next examine a quasi-religious predicate--'forgives us'. In part, forgiving is an ordinary activity which anyone may perform on certain appropriate occasions. In so far as 'forgiveness' indicates an activity of this sort, it is a non-religious predicate. The situation is complicated by the following factors however. A man can only be said to forgive offenses which have been committed against him. This implies, since Christ forgives all offenses, that all offenses

have been committed against Christ. This is intelligible only if we provide some gloss like 'Christ is God' or 'Christ is the son of God'.. But these in turn rest on 'Christ is holy' and therefore cannot be appealed to to back 'Christ is holy' without circularity.

If we are to avoid circularity, it would seem, then, that we must appeal for criteria to those characteristics which I have called non-religious. A non-religious predicate being by definition a predicate which is always employed in sentences to which ordinary verification procedures are under some conditions relevant (e.g., 'goes to Samaria' as opposed to 'knows our every thought'. The latter may occur in 'God knows our every thought' which is accepted only on authority. The former occurs only in sentences which could be verified in the usual ways.)

As has been pointed out many times, our basis for ascribing even non-religious predicates to Christ is scripture, and scripture is accepted as authoritative, i.e., even the non-religious predicates are in fact backed by appeal to authority. They are, however, non-religious in the sense that if we were at a certain place at a certain time, we would rely on ordinary empirical techniques to verify statements employing them. It may perhaps be best to distinguish them in the following manner. Under certain contrary to fact conditions (we are at such and such a place...) the predicates are non-religious in the full sense. Under present conditions they are religious predicates, where I mean by this simply that

religious verification procedures have been substituted for empirical verification procedures. They are still to be distinguished from religious predicates proper, i.e., those which under all circumstances can only be properly verified by religious techniques, e.g., 'loves us' in 'God loves us'.

The situation then seems to be this: To back 'Christ is holy' we can (a) appeal to sentences containing religious and quasi-religious predicates at the expense of circularity. (b) We can appeal to sentences containing non-religious predicates though at the expense of some thinness, since it does seem to be the case that it is precisely the religious predicates which are as a matter of fact the foundation for the ascription of holiness to Christ--whether or not the situation is vicious is a moot question.

We must now ask: What reasons are advanced as backing for 'God is holy'? It will immediately be seen that the question cannot properly arise. Since holiness has been put forward as a defining characteristic of God, the statement that God is holy is analytic.

D. Assuming that we know exactly what sort of being it is whose existence is in question when we say that God exists, we must ask how the existence of such a being is established. Here we may suggest that it is not established in any particular way. The situation is rather this in terms of our model:

(i) We must accept some authority to use the model.

(ii) To accept Christ or some other person as an authority is to accept the statements which he utters as true.

(iii) Among the statements which the authority utters may be statements like 'God is our father'.

(iv) In accepting a simple subject-predicate sentence we are implicitly accepting the existence of the subject term. Thus, if I claim that 'this table is brown' I presuppose that there is a table. If I claim that John is a braggart, I presuppose that there is such a person as John.

(v) Thus, if I accept 'God is our father', I implicitly accept the proposition that there is a God. The proposition does not explicitly come up for discussion within the model itself. (It could, of course, if a putative authority denies that there is a God.)

It would seem that the question 'Is there a God?' (when God has been defined in terms of our privileged predicates) might profitably be regarded as a disguised version of the question 'Why accept the statements of the authority', i.e., 'Why accept the authority', for to challenge 'There is a God' is to challenge the authority's statements and thus to challenge the authority himself.

There is, however, another sense which we can attach to 'Is there a God'. We may construe this as asking if there is any scientific evidence for the existence of a being defined in terms of the first order predicates and one second order predicate, but omitting the predicate 'holy'. Now since I have argued that first order predicates do not have a stretched sense but mean what they do in ordinary contexts (i.e., justify the same expectations)--or else have assigned literal meanings

to these predicates, the question is a proper one. It is important to remember, however, that the evidence (if any) which can be obtained in this way is considered irrelevant by anyone using the model.

There might, however, be still another point to the question 'Is there a God'? The atheistic query might in fact be a disguised version of the question 'Why should I think in terms of the model?' This is the last and perhaps the most important question which we must raise.

E. The question 'Why should I think in such and such a way' seems to be a queer one. It may be interpreted in several ways. (i) One is 'Why should I believe some specific proposition, p?' This is not at issue, for though it is true that to accept Christianity I must accept specific propositions, this is not involved in accepting the model. To accept the model is to accept first, a certain analysis of religious predicates, secondly a specific definition of God, thirdly a certain method of verification, and finally the relation of 'x is holy' to other religious statements. Now it is true that to operate with the model, I must accept an authority and therefore the statements made by the authority. But the difficulty we are considering is not primarily a difficulty in accepting those statements but in allowing an authority at all. The question at issue is really (ii) 'Why accept this method of verification?' This is a peculiar question because it is unclear as to exactly what would constitute an answer to it. It would seem for example that a scientific or philo-

sophic justification would proceed in terms of their own peculiar techniques. And what would it be like to justify one set of verification procedures (those of the model) in terms of verification procedures of a radically different sort (e.g., those of science). Furthermore, what precisely is the conclusion which we are trying to establish? Presumably the conclusion to be established is the following: 'One ought to accept the verification procedures found in our model.' But this is a value conclusion, and it would seem that as such it cannot strictly follow from a philosophic or scientific argument. If it is a value question, it would seem, then, that we ought to justify it either on the grounds that it is expedient or that it is the morally right thing to do. If so, the question becomes (iii) 'Why is it expedient or morally right to accept the model?' What is involved in saying that a certain verification procedure is expedient or useful? Perhaps that those who adopt it get certain desirable experiences, or are able to get about better in the world. But how do we know this? Presumably by employing common sense and scientific verification procedures, i.e., procedures radically different from those found in our model. But this justification of one set of verification procedures in terms of another brings us back to the point made above. We rest one set of procedures upon another. Could not we as easily (logically, not psychologically) turn this relationship around? Again, why might such an adoption of a set of procedures be considered morally right? It would, of course, be so con-

sidered if we in fact accept a moral rule to the effect that we ought to use these procedures. This, however, is what is at issue. It might, however, be the case that the adoption of the techniques of the model is a necessary condition of, or a better means to, behaving in a moral fashion.

But suppose we accept the conclusion that it is expedient and morally right to accept the method of verification found in our model. At this point a peculiarity of the model emerges which indicates the pivotal role of the judgment that something or other is holy. For to accept the judgment that we ought to accept the proposed method of verification is not enough. We cannot accept it without accepting an authority, and we cannot accept an authority without making a judgment that the proposed authority is holy. The judgment that something is holy is therefore a necessary condition of accepting the model.[1]

What I attempted to do is (a) to propose a model in which five types of religious predicates have been distinguished, and examples from each type defined, the concept of God being defined in terms of a certain specified collection of these predicates, (b) to propose a set of verification procedures ultimately resting on the notion of an authority in

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[1]To use the method if verification which we have set up in our model, we must take something to be holy. The converse does not hold however. For the authority to which ultimate appeal is to be made must not only be holy, but must be a person(s) or book. It is thus perfectly possible to judge something to be holy (e.g., a place, object, etc.) and yet be unable to use the verification procedures of the model.

terms of which sentences containing these predicates may be justified, (c) to specify that a precondition of accepting the second feature of the model is the judgment that something or other is holy and (d) to propose that 'x is holy' is to be interpreted as commendatory in function, and as expressing certain religious feelings which are identified as those which occur in worship. As such, to accept the model, i.e., to work in terms of it, it is (factually) necessary to possess the feeling in question. It is logically necessary to accept the judgment that 'x (the authority) is holy', since the only statement which is to be accepted as backing for 'x is an authority' is 'x is holy'.

In conclusion, let me make a few remarks on the way in which I consider the accounts of Schleiermacher and Otto to be related to the model.

In general, what I have tried to do is to present three separate accounts in which religious feelings are considered relevant to the verification of religious statements. The accounts formally parallel one another quite closely, for each presents a view as to the nature of religious predicates, attempts to give some account of the nature of religious feelings, and allots a role to religious feelings which makes them, as I have said, relevant to the truth or falsity of religious statements. Let us examine this point by point.

(a) Schleiermacher considers religious statements to be descriptions of or expressions of religious feelings. Otto proposes two separate accounts in The Philosophy of Religion

and in The Idea of the Holy. In the latter, predicates are divided into ideograms and schematizing concepts. In Part III of this thesis a five-fold division of religious predicates has been proposed. I have argued in Parts I and II that Schleiermacher and Otto are driven to an analogy theory of meaning, i.e., a theory in which it would be claimed that, for example, 'love' is like some attribute of God without being able to specify in exactly what respects it is like. I have attempted to remedy this by proposing a literal interpretation of religious predicates.

(b) I have argued that neither Schleiermacher nor Otto gives us criteria by which we may identify the presence of religious feelings. I have proposed such a set of criteria (centering around the notion of worship) in Part III.

(c) If, as Schleiermacher holds, religious statements are descriptions of feelings, are about feelings, then the relation of these feelings to the truth of religious statements is obvious. In Otto, the numen is apprehended in religious feelings, the apprehension serving as a warrant for religious statements. In the model, I have suggested that statements can be verified only by appealing to authority. But the authority can be accepted only if we accept the claim that he is holy. The latter judgment is construed as expressing religious feelings. Religious feelings are thus indirectly relevant to the truth of religious statements.

In short, Otto, Schleiermacher and I are all trying to do the same thing. As I have said, the accounts are thus

formally parallel. The first two accounts have been rejected for reasons developed in Parts I and II. The model proposed in Part III attempts to present an account--of the same general sort as Otto's and Schleiermacher's--which yet avoids the difficulties occasioned by these accounts.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Schleiermacher has maintained that no finite object can arouse the feeling of absolute dependence. But provisionally granting that no finite object is able to arouse the feeling of absolute dependence, why could not the world as the totality of objects gathered in a system, be the object (and partial cause) of the feeling? Or to put the question in a slightly different form, how does Schleiermacher distinguish God and the world? In the second edition of the Discourses, Schleiermacher characterizes piety as the feeling produced in an individual by God, but by means of the world.[1] We grasp the existence of finite things in and through the infinite, by surrendering to the whole.[2] But is this whole God or the world? Or again, "the sum total of religion is to feel that in the highest unity all that moves us in feeling is one...to feel that is to say that our being and living is a being and living in and through God".[3] Is the world or God the object of religious feeling? It is to be noticed that Schleiermacher makes a point of speaking of the 'world-spirit' rather than 'world-soul'[4] apparently leaving the question of theism vs. pantheism an open one. In the Dialektik God and the world are distinguished as that

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[1] Schleiermacher, On Religion, Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, p. 45.

[2] Ibid., pp. 48-49.

[3] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

[4] Ibid., p. 111.

which is essentially one and that which is essentially a multiplicity.[1] In The Christian Faith the distinction is maintained and the object of the religious feeling is a God who is something other than the world. The relation between God and the world is still an intimate one, however, since one cannot be conceived without the other.[2]

This brings us to the claim that God is related in certain intimate ways to the world. In particular that certain objects in the world may help to arouse religious feelings. In the Discourses Schleiermacher says (and his position on this point seems unchanged in The Christian Faith) "miracle is simply the religious name for an event",[3] i.e., any event may be considered as a miracle. Why, then, are some events singled out as miracles in preference to others? His answer is that if in considering an object we are interested in its natural causes or uses, the sense of the whole is at a minimum. On the other hand, an event whose natural causes or uses are hidden may direct us to the whole--in part at least because our utilitarian and scientific interests are frustrated for the moment.[4] What has Schleiermacher said? He has said that if we look at an event in a religious way, we feel that it is incomplete by itself, yet somehow charged with signifi-

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[1]Friedrich Schleiermacher, Dialektik (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1839), p. 162.

[2]Ibid., p. 162.

[3]Schleiermacher, On Religion, Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, p. 88.

[4]Ibid., p. 114.

cance or pregnant with meaning. Every object can be seen as a sign of the infinite.[1] But why does it impress us as a sign of the infinite? Presumably because it points to the infinite. But as to what this might involve Schleiermacher does not tell us. All that can be gathered is that the event is significant, 'pregnant with meaning'. But what does this involve? I suppose our attention is directed towards the object, we feel all sorts of vague emotions, a train of revery is started, we think the object to be somehow important, etc. But to get what we want, these vague impressions and feelings must lead to a definite terminus--the feeling of absolute dependence and its appropriate doctrinal expressions. But how this happens is unclear, though perhaps a chain of thoughts might lead to the thought of God, certain pious feelings might be excited, etc. which would be initially occasioned by some specific event. (And about all Schleiermacher seems to be saying here is that as a matter of fact this happens frequently.) Under what conditions does this happen? How is the impression of significance which certain events make upon us related to the feeling of absolute dependence? We are not told. This is unfortunate, since if we knew more precisely the sort of events which were 'pregnant with meaning' in the required sense, or if we knew under what conditions events could make an impression which would lead to the religious feeling, we would have certain criteria for the presence of the feeling of absolute dependence at certain points

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[1] Ibid., p. 88.

in the world, i.e., we would know the conditions under which the feeling would be present.

APPENDIX II

To ask for the criteria for the presence of the feeling of absolute dependence is to ask for the criteria for the presence of God since for Schleiermacher this feeling is the presence of God in the individual. Sabatier (in Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion) accepts this and goes on to say that the essence of religion consists in the relation between ourselves and the mysterious power on whom we feel dependent --that this is somehow a feeling or affective state in which God is present. What is this relation. Prayer, since it contains both sides of the transaction. It is an address to God on the one hand and on the other hand involves a relation of God to us since the fact that we do so address ourselves is the being of God within us.[1] This suggests that the act of prayer is a criterion for the presence of the feeling. It is not sufficient since the prayer must be a sincere one. But this presents little difficulty since we have certain standard and fairly reliable tests for sincerity. We can observe whether a person acts in accordance with his profession. We can ask him certain pertinent questions, etc. Is, then, sincere prayer a sufficient criterion for the presence of the feeling in question? Perhaps, but we ought to note that it is not a necessary condition. Putative mystical experience would seem to be the case par excellence in which the feeling is supposed to be present. Now prayer as usually understood

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[1]Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, pp. 25,30.

involves a dialogue in which resolutions are expressed, praises are offered, confessions are made, etc. This supposes that we are active mentally while it would seem that at least some mystical states involve an abeyance of this sort of activity. In fact some mystical states approach unconsciousness (cf. Leuba, Psychology of Religious Mysticism). If so, it would seem that prayer may be absent when the feeling is present. Of course we may define prayer as the presence of the feeling, in which case it is both a necessary and sufficient condition of the feeling. (And I believe Sabatier does this.) But then prayer becomes as elusive as the feeling itself.

Let us try another criterion. We will say that the feeling is present in those persons who are called saints or holy men. But this raises a further question. What is it to call someone a saint? In a religious context it means that he is holy, special, has a supernatural character, is supremely virtuous and the like. Someone may add that he is possessed by God or that God dwells in him. But this is pretty general. How might I make the criteria more specific? There are several possibilities. (a) Perhaps there has been a conversion experience, a person changes his character, acts in a new and presumably better fashion. This begins to set him apart from other men, but leads to a new criterion. (b) His actions must be such as would be considered good. Whether they are considered good or not depends on their relation to the ideal of life presented by the particular religion. This

is certainly a necessary condition yet it is not sufficient since a further criterion is employed--(c) the person must be holy in some sense. He must be more than simply virtuous (unless virtue is to include all these characteristics, states, trances, etc., which are present in those who are called saints. What do we do when we call someone holy? We do at least this--we commend him, claim that he is worthy of esteem, etc. If so, our judgment that someone is holy is a value judgment and its position in relation to our other value judgments remains to be investigated. This will be done later. Up to this point the argument is as follows. We might say that the religious feeling is present in the saint. But a person is a saint only if he is holy. This is a value judgment (in part at least) and it is not yet clear under what conditions (if any) we are justified in making this judgment. As it stands, then, sainthood is an inadequate (or at least unexplained) criterion.

Sabatier, however, presents us with a new possibility. If we maintain, as Sabatier seems to do, that revelation is simply the presence of the religious feeling, and that revelation is that which enriches human life, inspires confidence etc.,[1] then the criterion we are looking for might be a pragmatic one. But this presents difficulties. We simply seem to be defining the presence of God as the feelings and attitudes which lead to some improvement in life. But the claim that there is a mysterious being who manifests Himself in feel-

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[1] Ibid., pp. 60-61.

ing certainly involves more than this. In the first place, the criterion is much too broad. We are interested in special manifestations, in cases where the feeling of dependence is in the foreground, while it is not at all obvious that the feeling is so dominant in all acts which tend to enrich life. In the second place, the mysterious being must be more than the manifestation. If we accept sainthood, the activities of certain mystics, etc., as paradigm cases of the manifestation of God and so of the presence of the feeling, (and I think Sabatier would accept this) then it seems unlikely that there would be any such manifestation at all unless the persons in question thought there was some being over and above the manifestation who produced it. Now, unless the being is real, the saints are deluded. But it is not clear how such a grave delusion could be anything but pitiable. But if this is the case, then life is not enriched and so sainthood is not a manifestation of God. But it would seem difficult for anyone who wishes to accept the religious structure to accept the latter. Such a person cannot, then, accept the pragmatic criterion as I have outlined it without bringing in supporting criteria.

Or again, Sabatier says that my feeling towards God is filial. In what sense is the feeling filial? It might be the same sort of feeling which one has towards his father only directed towards a different object. But if this is the case, to distinguish the two feelings I must know something about the objects, and this would seem to presuppose a theory about

God which would in turn only be understandable on the basis of the feeling in question. But I may claim, on the other hand, that the religious filial feeling resembles the ordinary filial feeling only in certain respects. But if this is so, it seems fair to ask in what sense the two feelings resemble one another, and in what respects they differ. Is it possible to point out the respects in which the feelings differ without a discussion of the sorts of objects towards which the feelings are directed and the appropriate reactions to them. That is, I could say 'The religious feeling is like the feeling one has towards ones father, but since God has properties A, B, C...etc., it will differ in certain respects'. If I simply say 'It is like ordinary filial feeling in this and that respect, but is still somehow different' without stating the differences, one would be justified in concluding that perhaps there are no differences at all. It might be retorted 'Well, they just feel different'. No doubt. But assuming that I do not have the feeling in question, this is unenlightening.

We have tried various criteria for the presence of religious feeling which have been suggested by Sabatier. These have been (i) the activity of prayer, (ii) the behavior of various holy men, (iii) the enrichment of life and finally (iv) its resemblance to filial feeling. Our results have so far been inconclusive.

APPENDIX III

I would like to comment on certain remarks on Otto made by Moore in the second chapter of his Theories of Religious Experience.

(a) In discussing the numinous feeling Moore says:

> There is no genuine immediacy in this case, for the numinous feeling is regarded as having 'reference to an object outside the self'. The presence of an interpretation or judgment here is obvious, and hence the 'numinous object' cannot be said to be immediately present. Nor can the interpretation be said to have immediate certainty, for a feeling, however vivid, cannot guarantee the validity of an inference. There is no warrant for supposing a feeling to contain an immediate knowledge of its cause...[1]

I believe that this comment is based upon a certain account of ordinary perception which would go somewhat as follows: When we are said to apprehend a tree, what we really apprehend are certain visual data. On the basis of this we can truthfully say 'There is a tree' but the judgment is an interpretation of the visual data in question. Several remarks seem in order.

(i) Otto does not suggest this view of perception. Therefore, what Moore must be saying is that this is all Otto could mean, since this is the correct interpretation of perceptual judgments. That is, Moore recognizes that Otto does make an analogy between religious judgments, e.g., 'the numen is present', and perceptual judgments. He then seems to argue that since his interpretation of ordinary perceptual judgments is correct, the religious judgments in question must possess

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[1]John Morrison Moore, Theories of Religious Experience (New York: Round Table Press, 1938), p. 93.

the same features, i.e., be interpretations of, or inferences from, numinous feelings. However, we need not accept Moore's account of perceptual judgments, and I suggest that Otto does not.

(ii) Though it certainly must be admitted that perceptual judgments are corrigible, it is not clear in what sense, if any, they are interpretations of sense data, or inferences from them. In what sense am I making an inference, or going beyond the data when I say 'There is a table here'? Is to say this to say anything more than that they are corrigible? I would be inclined to think not, though I will not argue the point here. But if these remarks are correct, then it would seem that we have no more reason to regard 'The numen is present' as an interpretation or inference than we have for regarding 'There is a table here' as an interpretation or inference.

(iii) As far as I can see, Otto could admit that judgments as to the presence of the numen are corrigible. All he claims is that numinous feelings disclose an object outside the self, i.e., that numinous feelings are analogous to visual, auditory and tactual impressions. These impressions might be said both to disclose an object apart from the self, and nevertheless to be the foundation of corrigible judgments.

(iv) It must be admitted, however, that Otto <u>may</u> think that judgments like 'numen is present' are incorrigible in the way that 'I seem to see a tree' is incorrigible, i.e., that there is a self-evidence about these judgments which is only

appropriate to introspective reports.

(b) Since numinous feelings, the schema and the relation between them are all a priori, Moore says "we may rightly ask; what then is a posteriori in religious experience".[1]

Presumably the numinous feeling is only a priori in a special sense, i.e., in the sense that the capacity to experience this feeling is innate in every rational being. If there is any other sense in which the feeling is a priori, I fail to see it. Now the feeling itself is a discernment of the presence of the numinous object--which is somehow objectively there. Here, then, we have the a posteriori element, i.e., that which is given to us in numinous feelings.

(c) Moore writes, "It would seem perfectly obvious that all of these varied appeals to the a priori contain one form or another of the basic assumption of rationalism--that there is a pre-established harmony or congruence of structure between mind and reality."[2]

But it is not simply that we have certain categories, feelings, etc., which apply to reality only because there is a certain pre-established harmony between mind and reality. Numinous feeling is itself a discernment of an objective order, a means by which the self apprehends an object distinct from itself. We are in no sense (according to Otto) excluded from the numinous object.

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[1] Ibid., p. 103.

[2] Ibid., p. 106.

APPENDIX IV

Some analogy with sense perception is claimed by both Otto and Schleiermacher. 'There is a God' is supposed to be more like 'There is a stone' than it is like 'There is a number which is the square root of four'. For my claim that there is a God is based on certain experiences and feelings which seem to allow me to say 'God was there' in the way I might claim 'There is a stone' because 'A stone was there', and claim that a stone was there because I saw it. My visual experience can be given as a backing for my statement if it is challenged. But I cannot support 'There is a number which is the square root of four' by saying 'There was a square root of four there'. The fact that I happened to have certain experiences upon the realization that there is a number which is the square root of four, is irrelevant to my claim that there is such a number. I rather support my claim by reasons drawn from mathematics and logic.

Could we draw an analogy between the sort of view which is held by Schleiermacher and Otto and the sort of view which maintains that we infer the existence of physical objects from the occurrence of sense data?

It seems to me that Otto's position is quite dissimilar. What we apprehend through numinous feelings is the numinous object itself and not anything analogous to a sense datum. Suppose we distinguish (in the case of sense perception) the act of sensing, the sense datum or object of the act of sensing, and the physical object. If we are to make an analogy we must

then have the act of awareness, the numinous sense datum and the numinous object. But the following difficulties arise. Is the numinous feeling the act of apprehension or the sense datum? If it is the act of apprehension then its object is clearly the numinous datum and not the numinous object, and thus the feeling does not grasp the numinous object directly. If it is the datum, then there must be an act of awareness which has the numinous feeling as its object. But if so, it is not correct to say that we apprehend the numinous object by numinous feelings but only via an interpretation of, or inference from, these feelings, which therefore act as a 'screen' so to speak, between the mind and its object. Neither of these alternatives seems to be suggested by Otto.

The only other possibility is that the numinous feeling is both an act of apprehension and datum (and there is some suggestion of this). But if so, the datum component of numinous feelings is not described nor clearly distinguished from the awareness component. I conclude, then, that Otto construes the numinous feeling as directly apprehending the numinous object without the mediation of any sort of datum.

Schleiermacher does, however, suggest that the move from the feeling of absolute dependence to God is an inference. So the feeling of absolute dependence might be treated as a datum analogous to sense data.

But whether or not we can squeeze the views of Otto and Schleiermacher into the mold of a quasi sense-data position, such a view of the relation of religious feelings to their ob-

ject may be intrinsically interesting, and I propose to develop it further.

Let us assume we possess certain visual, auditory, tactual, etc. sense data. Now I am concerned with the move from certain statements about sense data to the statement that there is a physical object of such and such a description. What justifies us in concluding that there is a physical object when we are the subject of certain sorts of sensations? There are at least two possible views.

(i) Physical objects =df. certain clusters of sense data connected in certain characteristic ways (e.g., resemblance, contiguity, etc., a la Ayer). When we say that our sensations are of a physical object rather than the reverse, we are in fact saying that certain sense data are arranged in characteristic ways, predicting that certain sense data will occur upon certain conditions, that they will occur in a certain order and so on. Let us call this 'the phenomenalist view'.

(ii) Alternatively we may define 'physical object' as the source of our sense data. We are justified in inferring the existence of a physical object as the cause of these sensations when certain conditions are fulfilled. The objects in question may or may not resemble the visual, tactual, etc. sense data which arise from them. Let us call this 'the causal view'.

The religious claim is the following: On the basis of certain feelings (numinous feelings, feeling of absolute de-

pendence, etc.) we are justified in asserting that a certain kind of object (God, the numinous object) exists. This is presumably like the claim that upon the basis of certain sensations (visual, auditory, etc.) we are justified in asserting that physical objects exist.

A. The Phenomenalist View: On this view when we say that there is a God or numinous object, we are in fact saying that our religious feelings are related in certain characteristic ways (whatever the relations might be) and making predictions to the effect that other feelings will follow upon the occurrence of certain conditions. That is, 'God' is given a definition in use, i.e., God is regarded as a logical construction out of certain feelings. Two difficulties can be raised at this point. (a) In the first place, it may be doubted whether anyone has ever meant this by 'God'. It may be further doubted whether the proposed definition is by any means an adequate substitute for 'God' as ordinary worshippers use it. For it seems plausible to maintain that anyone who regards 'God' simply as a name for a cluster of feelings, would cease to have those feelings. That is, it would seem that the belief that there is an entity over and above these feelings as their cause, is a necessary condition for the maintenance of these feelings.

(b) In the second place, a sense datum might be regarded as a quasi-object of some sort. As such, to translate physical object statements in terms of sense-datum statements is to replace a sentence about one sort of object by a sentence about

another. (I will not discuss the question as to whether sensa are objects or only pseudo-objects.) But is there any temptation to regard a feeling as an object--even a queer sort of object? It would seem not. (This probably depends upon the fact that we might be prepared to divide visual, tactual sensations, etc., into an act of sensing and object sensed but are not so tempted to divide feelings. We have feelings of joy--but joy is not some object which is felt. The feeling is a joy-feeling so to speak.) Now if feelings cannot be regarded as quasi-objects, and if God is generally considered to be an independent entity of some sort, can the analysis of a God-statement in terms of feeling statements even appear as initially plausible? It would seem that the analysis is plausible only if our new statement would do the same job and this seems doubtful in view of the considerations which were advanced above (a).

B. The Causal View: Perhaps God is supposed to be related to religious feelings in the way in which physical objects might be supposed to be causally related to our visual or tactual sensations. Now with respect to the relation of sensations or sense-data to physical objects, we can ask the following question: Is the physical object like our sensations (sense-data) of it? (a) We might wish to maintain that certain sensations, say those of touch, give us direct access to the object (or the data of these sensations resemble the object) while others (those of sight for example) are caused by the object but do not give us direct access to the object

(nor do their data resemble the object). But if so, we may ask, 'Why give this privileged status to certain sensations as opposed to others?' If the immediate object of all our senses are sense-data and not the objects themselves, then how can we determine whether or not any of our sense-data resemble the object? Since we do not know whether any sort of sense-datum resembles its object, then there is as much reason to say that none do as that all do. Again, what special arguments may be brought to back the claim that one sort of sensation affords direct access to the object (or its datum resembles the object) which cannot equally be brought to back the claim that some other sort of sensation affords us such access (or resembles its object). I am not aware that any argument has been advanced beyond the mention of the bare fact that I 'cannot escape' from the belief that I am in direct contact with a physical object when I am the subject of tactual sensations. But if so, then on the theory that we are considering we have no means of determining which (if any) of the various sorts of sensation is to be privileged. If so, we have two logical possibilities. (b) Perhaps all our sensations are objective in the sense that the corresponding sense-data resemble the object. Or (c) perhaps all our sensations are subjective in the sense that none of the corresponding sense-data resemble their object. I do not know how either (b) or (c) could be established.

Now let us suppose that God is regarded as the cause of our religious feelings in the way that physical objects

might be thought to be the cause of visual, tactual, etc., sensations. (a) Let us suppose that in a mystic experience, the subject has feelings of floating, of increasing unconsciousness, of separation from the body, experiences photism, etc. (cf. Leuba) Now the mystic may (and does) regard all these as caused by some object called 'God'. But presumably only some of these could be regarded as giving us any direct access to God. Is there any reason for singling out some of these feelings as furnishing us a direct access to the object --the feeling of joy say, or a floating feeling?

There is perhaps one such feeling--the feeling of revelation (cf. Leuba). This is the feeling that there is a gain or increase in knowledge, that we see things more clearly than before. (This is also the effect of certain drugs.) The feeling might be compared to the feeling we get when we have solved a puzzle or see all the ramifications of a situation clearly for the first time. (The feeling of revelation will be discussed at some length in Appendix V.)

The mystics' claim, then, would presumably be that the whole complex of feelings is caused by God, but that one member of this complex (the feeling of revelation) somehow gives direct access to God.

However, this is not like the claim that our tactual sensations are directly cognizant of (or resemble) their object. For in the first place, a feeling of revelation or conviction does not resemble God (nor is it claimed that it does). In the second place, far from giving us direct access to God,

it does not even furnish us with any information about Him, nor does it detect anything. It would rather seem to accompany the acquisition of such information or detection. But if this is so, the feeling is not an essential, but a contingent accompaniment of the contact with God. And this is contrary to our assumption that the feeling in question gives us direct access to God. (b) If the feelings are all subjective effects of an object, then we would have to discard the claim that feelings give us direct access to deity in any other sense than that in which a pain in my finger gives access to a knife. But surely more than this is claimed by the mystic or the man who has experienced numinous feelings.

(c) It seems doubtful whether anyone would want to maintain that all the feeling components of the religious experience are somehow objective--tell us about God. For example the feeling of floating or the experience of photism. Or consider the feeling of awe. This feeling is supposed to be aroused by certain 'awful' attributes of deity. But though the feeling is appropriate to these attributes of deity, in what sense can it be said to be like these attributes or to cognize them? It would be like saying that my feeling of pleasure upon listening to a piece of music is somehow like the music or that it cognizes the music. Both these interpretations seem, then, to be untenable.

APPENDIX V

Our difficulties with the position of Otto and Schleiermacher have centered around the following point. We are supposed to have feelings by means of which we become aware of God or a numinous object. In order to explain the operation of these feelings, an analogy has been made with sense perception (at least in the case of Otto). We have found reasons to object to this analogy. In The Varieties of Religious Experience, James discusses the feeling of an Unseen Presence, i.e., the claim that a somewhat is present though unidentifiable by any of the ordinary senses, and the feeling of revelation or contact with God. This resembles Otto's claim and therefore merits closer attention.

A. "The following impressions come into my mind like a powerful but still small voice...It seemed as if God were praying in, with and for me..."[1] (my italics) Now 'seemed' may be used in two senses. (i) To put forward a claim tentatively and (ii) to make an analogy. Thus 'It seems like it will rain' and 'She almost seems to be a princess at times' illustrate (i) and (ii) respectively.

Let us consider the sentence 'It seemed as if a person were here'. Has a claim been put forward tentatively? Is it that since I know no person was visible my feeling is suspect and I realize the possibility that perhaps my feeling is not an experience of an unseen presence? Or is the person ex-

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[1]William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: The Modern Library, 1929), pp. 213-14.

pressing an analogy between perceiving unseen presences and perceiving persons? The latter seems to be the case since a usual feature of these experiences is the sense of conviction they carry with them, i.e., the claim is not put forward tentatively. If, then, we are making an analogy as we seem to be, we must ask in what resepcts these experiences are alike.

Imagine the following case: A man is constitutionally incapable of experiencing tactual sensations. Touch is one of my means of detecting things. Suppose our man tries to grasp the concept of touch. What could we say to him, except that it is more like visual and auditory sensations than it is like anything else, and, like them, is used to detect? We are presumably in the same boat with respect to the man who claims to have had the unseen presence experience. I do not think that the cases are exactly parallel. For example, tactual blindness is quite rare, while I suspect that unseen presence blindness is not. The tactually blind can detect the same objects by sight which others can detect by touch, while if we are unseen presence blind, we apparently have no other means for detecting its presence. Still, I do suggest that this kind of comparison is intended and it seems to me to be intelligible. But to claim that I can understand the sentence 'The feeling of unseen presence is like perception' in a rough way is <u>not</u> to claim that I have any better idea of it than a tactually blind man has of touch nor is it to claim that this feeling would warrant statements like 'An unseen presence is

here'.

Now the peculiarity of the feeling of an unseen presence is this. It would seem that we normally identify objects only by means of tactual, visual, olfactory, auditory and gustatory sensations. Yet James' correspondent claims (and this is a fair sample of such reports) that:

> Suddenly I felt something come into the room...It remained only a minute or two. I did not recognize it by any ordinary sense, and yet there was a horribly unpleasant 'sensation' connected with it. It stirred something more at the roots of my being than any ordinary perception. The feeling had something of the quality of a very large tearing pain...chiefly over the chest--and yet the feeling was not pain so much as abhorrence.[1] (correspondent's italics)

We must notice the following features of this account. (a) The feeling was not an ordinary perception but something like a perception. (He thought he was identifying something.) (b) There were definite localized bodily sensations.[2] But this sensation is only 'connected' with the perception. It is not the 'perception' itself. Presumably the sensation did not do the identifying, but was a result of the identification. That is, it is a result of the 'perceptual' experience, not a component of it (as visual data are components of visual experiences). (c) There is apparently no question of an inference from certain sensations of abhorrence to a cause of these sensations. The 'unseen presence' is not simply a bad

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[1] Ibid., p. 59.

[2] With respect to this kind of sensation: "It is sometimes so definitely characterized, that I could point to its exact position."--friend of Prof. Flournoy. (James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 62.)

attempt at a causal explanation. Rather, the 'perception' or conviction is entirely unmediated--at least as far as introspection can judge.

What would the feeling of a 'seen presence' be like? Suppose I abstract from certain visual sensations, tactual sensations, etc. Is there anything over and above these which comes into play when I am in contact with a person? Presumably there is. I may experience emotions of love, or resentment. The person may have occupied an important role in my history which shapes the ways in which I will react to him. Also there is something like a 'ready frame of mind' to borrow a phrase of Ryle's. I am ready to respond, to speak, to react to the person in some way. There is then something over and above the various sensory impressions which seem to be involved in personal contact. We will call this the 'attitude set'. (cf. Leuba, Chapter XI of Psychology of Religious Mysticism).

Now we must ask (a) whether there is any sense in supposing that these attitudes, etc., could be present in a case in which the sense impressions are absent and (b) whether, if these could occur apart from sensations, they would be sufficient to warrant the judgment 'I felt (identified) an unseen presence'.

(a) I cannot see that there is any logical inconsistency in supposing that the ready frame of mind, the various emotions, etc., occur apart from the sensory impressions. Whether they can so occur would seem to be an empirical ques-

tion. Of course, normally the attitudes, etc., seem to be triggered by the identification which is performed by the senses. But it is logically possible (i) that these could occur without any prior identification or (ii) the identification might be performed by some means other than the five senses.

This brings us to (b). If these emotions, etc., are triggered by an identification, it is hard to see how they could themselves constitute an identification, and thus warrant 'an unseen presence is here'. It is of course possible that there is some other means of identification than the five senses. But this leaves us where we were. That is, we have distinguished sensory identification and the responses triggered by the identification. But the suggestion now is that some new 'faculty' comes into play when we detect unseen presences. It is unclear as to what this might be.

But perhaps the attitude set itself identifies the object. Now in a sense this is true. The meanings called into play, my past experience of the person, etc., do help me to categorize the individual as, e.g., a friend, intelligent, etc., etc. But this only means that we must distinguish two senses of identification. (i) The detection of the presence or existence of an x and (ii) the classification of the x so presented. Now we are interested in identification in the first sense, and it is difficult to see how this could be performed by the attitude set.

Perhaps we can be helped in isolating this feature if

we turn to several attempts to describe the experience under discussion. (a) 'It was like a person was present only he was not (since I could not see him, etc.)' Take an analogous statement, 'They tasted like strawberries only they were not'. Here one of the identifying criteria for the presence of strawberries is fulfilled, i.e., the taste, but the others presumably are not. But in the unseen presence case, it would seem that none of the identifying criteria for the presence of the person are fulfilled (if these identifying criteria are--as they seem to be--the presence of certain sense experiences).

(b) Let us try another description. 'I had experiences like those which I would have had if a person were present.' This is presumably the case. But more than this is intended. If I had these experiences I might be led to infer that there was an immaterial person present (whatever this might mean) but there seems to be no question of inference in the case under discussion. The presence is 'detected' or 'perceived' (so it is claimed) but not inferred. So in addition to the emotions, etc., which would be felt if a person were present, the unseen presence perceiver also has another state of some sort, though it is by no means clear as to what this perceiving state might be.

(c) Perhaps it is like 'hearing music in the mind's ear'. The difficulty with this is that one is not inclined to think that there actually is any music being performed in this case. One makes no existence claim of the basis of such

an experience beyond the claim that one has had such an experience.

It is true, too, that I may think someone is present when no one is. I may have been talking to someone while making a cocktail. In the meantime he leaves. My attitude set, I suppose, remains the same. Yet no one is present. But this is not sufficiently like our unseen presence case. In the case at hand I have made a simple mistake and will admit that I have done so when I turn around. The unseen presence perceiver, however, has not simply made a mistake. This becomes obvious when we ask, what would convince him that a mistake has been made. Not the failure to experience certain sensory impressions, for he recognizes that these are absent. What sense, then, does 'He mistakenly perceived an unseen presence' make? It would seem that we could understand this sentence only if we can understand 'He (veridically) perceived an unseen presence'. And this is our problem.

But perhaps some of the identifying signs were present. Perhaps there was a sound like foot steps (say the floor creaked), while the perceiver, busy about other things, failed to notice the creak consciously. Yet normally the sound of foot steps is a sign of the presence of a person. (I do not mean to imply any gulf between sign and that of which it is a sign.) But the foot step-like sound has been registered subliminally. The result is that our man thinks that a person is present. A few comments seem in order. (i) Is it plausible that in all cases in which a person claims that an unseen pre-

sence has been experienced, signs of this sort have been registered subliminally? It is of course possible. (ii) It would seem that when our person turns around, he will conclude that a mistake has been made, i.e., he will not continue to maintain the existence of a presence if other sensations (visual, etc.) do not follow. Yet this is not true of the person who claims to have experienced an unseen presence. I suppose it is possible that the subliminal perception may 'hang over' even when the person turns around, and that thus though some of his expectations are disappointed, he wil continue to feel that someone or something is present. But I see no reason to accept this hypothesis until we have some evidence for it. I am not aware that any such evidence exists.[1]

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[1]Leuba maintains (Psychology of Religious Mysticism) that the sense of presence may be produced under experimental conditions. Subjects are seated in a dark room and blindfolded. Other persons come in from time to time and stand behind them. Sometimes the subjects heard a noise and inferred that someone was present. This was not, however, confused with the sense of presence. Leuba makes these comments. (i) The subjects desired and expected the presence, but their efforts were unable to produce it. It only came when they relaxed. (ii) The subjects agreed that the experience did not include an image. (iii) The inferences left the subject indifferent while the sense of presence created intense emotion. Furthermore, the subjects' assurance was greater in the latter case.

These comments seem in order. (a) The subjects were expecting a sense of presence. This does not seem to be the case in the experiences which James records, i.e., the subjects in Leuba's experiment knew the sort of experience they were supposed to have. (b) Leuba states that about half had the feeling of presence. We must ask why the other half did not. Exactly what was involved in the one case which was absent in the other? (c) In the case of the experiences which James records, the attitude set seems to come into play with no preceding sensory detection. Leuba claims that this is

Our general difficulty is this: If we think there is something to detect, then (perhaps) there is no illusion in the cases in question, while if we have independent grounds for thinking that there is nothing to detect, the feelings must be considered to be illusions and an account devised to explain them. But can we even understand 'There is nothing there to detect'? Presumably the only way to establish 'There is something there to detect' is to detect the x by means of the feeling of unseen presence. Now to say 'There is nothing there to detect' presupposed that we knew the grounds which would establish the former statement, i.e., to understand one statement we must understand the other. But this we are unable to do.

B. Let us now turn from considerations of the feeling of unseen presence to the examination of the claims of the mystic to the effect that he has contact with God in his experiences.

One significant feature is that these experiences "are

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the case with respect to the subjects of his experiment. But (i) the subjects knew that persons would enter the room and stand behind their chairs. This is a factor peculiar to the experiment and (ii) though no conscious inference was made, it would seem possible that impressions were registered subliminally which induced the judgment or conviction that a person was present. Would the persons in Leuba's experiment continue to have had the feeling of presence if they had turned around and found no one there? This is the case in the experiences which James records.

Leuba concludes that the sense of presence roughly equals the attitude set, and thinks this may be set off by other means than the detection of a presence. I think that the latter is true, but I do not understand how the attitude set could lead to the conviction of presence in the absence of the standard conditions (visual experiences, etc.) for the presence of a person.

proved real to their possessors because they remain with him when brought closest into contact with the objective realities of life. Dreams cannot stand this test."[1] (J. Trevor, My Quest for God) These experiences, Trevor goes on to say, are the most real in his life.

The claim is not simply that we cannot doubt the experience. This is obvious. (I.e., I cannot doubt that I have had such an experience.) The claim is rather that the interpretation which is put upon it--that it is a revelation --cannot be doubted. That is, there is supposed to have been some sort of 'intellectual illumination'. What does this involve?

It is not simply the case that we entertain certain propositions, though this is sometimes the case. (James speaks of certain persons who have had anesthetic revelation which they claim is an insight into the proposition that everything is one.)[2] It is rather, that if propositions are entertained, we somehow see them in a new light or recognize their force. I believe that this makes sense. We may entertain certain propositions, then suddenly be overcome with a sense of their importance and significance which was absent before. I may, for example, believe that love is beautiful without having experienced it. I then experience it and exclaim, 'Now I know what it really means to say that love is beautiful'. I may have believed the proposition both before

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[1]James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 388.

[2]Ibid., p. 379.

and after the experience. I may not (conceivably) be able to say anything about love now which I could not say before the experience. Yet I do have the sense that I now know what the proposition means in a much more adequate fashion.

What is involved here? I do not quite know except that what was previously known simply by description is now known by direct acquaintance. It is true that I may now be in a position to utter true propositions which I was unable to make before (e.g., 'I am in love with Mary') but I do not see why this would necessarily be the case, nor why these new propositions would be directly relevant to the characterization of love in general.

Take another case, 'Life is but a walking shadow'. This may suddenly come home to me, so to speak. I am not clear, however, that I would now be in a better position to verbalize certain feelings or attitudes towards life, or that I can now make true propositions which I could not before--except those describing the occasion on which the proposition first came home to me.

Yet there does seem to be a sense in which I now apprehend something which I missed before. Perhaps this is just an impression of the importance of a statement which I thought true on other grounds. But what is involved in calling a proposition important? Presumably (among other things) I must take it into account if I want to live well. Or perhaps I am now convinced of the truth of a statement which I held before with some degree of doubt.

But, granting all this, we must notice that such feelings do not tend to establish the truth or falsity of the propositions under consideration--they are not a warrant for such propositions, i.e., if what is involved is simply a sudden conviction or feeling of importance, it is hard to see how such a conviction or feeling of importance could affect the truth value of the propositions in question.

But apparently there may sometimes be no proposition which we can recall after the mystical experience. We simply bring back the sense of revelation and say that the experience was ineffable. What would a sense of revelation be like?

It would seem that the closest analogy might be with the sudden insight which may break in upon one after repeated attempts to solve a problem. There is a feeling of relief, satisfaction, etc. Now suppose the mystic to have been bothered by problems of a religious nature. It would seem possible, at least, that the feelings of relief, satisfaction, etc., could be experienced in the mystic experience in such a manner as to quiet the uneasiness, tenseness or whatever accompanies the unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem, though no solution has been offered.

Since this is possible, if the mystic is unable to give us the solution, then it would seem that the burden is up to him to prove that the solution has been vouchsafed.

There is another possibility which I want only to sug-

gest (though not too seriously). Jastrow's picture[1] may be seen as either a duck or as a rabbit. Now though I may shift between seeing it as a duck and seeing it as a rabbit, no new element is presented to my senses. The picture, i.e., the lines on the paper, has not altered. There is rather a shift in perspective or interpretation. Now perhaps such a shift of perspective is possible in the body of propositions which I entertain about the world. If so, the mystic experience could involve simply such a shift, with no new propositions being suggested. This would account for (a) the fact that the mystic is unable to say what revelation has been vouchsafed to him (there has been no new proposition), (b) the feeling that something new has been experienced (the shift) and (c) the sense that his experience was somehow cognitive in nature. (Just as the shift from duck to rabbit is visual in nature.)

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[1] cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953), p. 194e.

APPENDIX VI

There is another view which bears some resemblance to that presented in Part III. Though attractive, I believe it to be mistaken. I shall call this view (borrowing the term from Hare,[1] though changing its sense) 'the blik view'.

Fundamentally the view maintains that we are in a position to understand and test religious statements if and only if there is a shift in our way of viewing phenomena. (References to Jastrow's duck-rabbit picture may be made at this point.)

Perhaps we can explain the notion of a blik in the following way. Let us consider the example which Wisdom offers us in "Gods".[2] We come across some flowers in the forest. I suggest that a gardener has been there. My friend denies this. No tests which we invent to test 'A gardener has been at work here' yield positive results. Suppose, however, that I continue to claim that it is a garden and my friend continues to deny it. Am I simply being irrational? Perhaps I am, but perhaps I am not seeing the situation as he is seeing it. A primary difference may be that I see the flowers as arranged or planned, while to my friend they appear to be distributed at random. It is not that I see any color or

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[1]R. M. Hare, "Theology and Falsification," New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1955), pp. 99-102.

[2]John Wisdom, "Gods," Logic and Language, First Series, ed. Antony Flew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), pp. 192-93.

shape which my friend fails to see. It is that I take it as planned, while my friend does not. And whatever is involved in taking something as planned, more seems to be involved than simply a belief that there was a planner (a gardener in this case). The difference between us does not lie in what we see and it is more than a difference in the explanations we offer of what we see. It is a difference in the way in which we take what we see.

I suggest that a religious blik is something of this sort--it is a way of taking the world as planned, as purposeful.

This suggestion might explain the difficulty which lies at the basis of the dispute between the atheist and the theist. One says that there is a God and the other denies it. The explanation is that one has the religious blik and the other does not have it. The only way the theist can win his argument is to get the atheist to change his blik. That this can be done is shown by the effect of powerful preaching. I may point out certain facts in the world, say the beauty and order of nature. Or say that the atheist has been brought up in a Calvinistic household. I may paint his childhood in such vivid colors that all his old fears return and with them the accompanying religious pictures. I may thus get him to change his blik--certain of my statements will have caused him to do so--and he now says on the basis of that blik 'There is a God'. But in so far as the blik is itself a way of seeing and not a statement, it cannot be proved.

But it is objected that we are not trying to prove ways of seeing but statements, viz. 'There is a God'. Well and good, but on the view under consideration it would seem to be the case that no one would make the statement without such a blik. That, therefore, the only way to convince an opponent is to change that blik. At the same time the blik view considers 'There is a God' to be a cognitive, not an emotive, utterance. If this is the case, it would seem that the statement is subject to proof and refutation. However, the view is set up in such a way that the only way of obtaining evidence for the proposition is to have the blik--and this brings us back to a consideration of the blik as a way of seeing.

The main difficulty with this proposal is that it is unclear as to exactly what a blik might be. Perhaps a blik is a predisposition to find something sacred. Now this predisposition may or may not be realized. Suppose it is realized. If it is realized it would seem to involve no more than the attitude of worship with the appropriate evaluation and its expression in 'x is holy'. This I have regarded as fundamental. The second alternative is that the predisposition remains unrealized. There may be such a predisposition, I suppose, and it may <u>cause</u> a man who possesses it to be ready to accept something like our model, or rather it would pave the way to such an acceptance. But though the feelings and the predisposition towards them are thus psychologically fundamental, they are not logically fundamental. Yet the view

under consideration seems to give the blik some logically fundamental role. But it can only be the assertions to which it leads which can thus be fundamental, i.e., only statements can be logically fundamental, and a predisposition is not a statement.

This last argument can be brought to bear against any interpretation of a blik where the blik is not construed as a statement. (And to construe it as a statement seems hopelessly far-fetched, or at least an abandonment of the position.) But even apart from this general argument the blik view presents us with other difficulties.

Let us return to the claim that a blik is a way of seeing, of looking at things in a new perspective. The difficulty here is that it is unclear just what is being 'seen'. Presumably a sacred quality of certain events, and thus 'sacredness' or 'holiness'. But this suggests that sacredness and holiness are qualities which may be seen in the way in which, e.g., red may be seen. This is very close to the notion which we find in Otto to the effect that feelings of holiness are somehow cognitive, enable us to grasp a novel property or object. We have discarded this suggestion because of the difficulties which it presents. If I am correct, 'holy' no more stands for a property than does 'good' but is rather a term which is used to commend, and to express certain appropriate feelings.

It may be argued, however, that though the feeling of holiness, or blik, does not put us in contact with a novel

property directly, i.e., is not cognitive as seeing is cognitive, it nevertheless causes us to look at phenomena in a new way, to make the sort of shift involved in Jastrow's picture, seen now as a duck, now as a rabbit. The objector may add that I am confusing seeing with a way of seeing (the blik). The blik as a manner of seeing is not itself seeing and therefore does not claim to be cognitive. This may be true but it should be pointed out that more is going on than a simple shift of perspective. In the case of the duck-rabbit picture, we are after all looking at the same thing no matter how we take it. If I see it now as a duck after seeing it as a rabbit, I posit no new entity. The core of the theist position is, however, that such a new entity, God, is posited. If there is a shift, the shift is taken as justifying the claim that there is such an entity. It seems to me that at this point we can no longer place too much reliance on the analogy between the blik and Jastrow's phenomenon.

Having noted this difference, we must ask the adherent of the blik theory to specify more precisely what is involved in the religious point of view. At this stage I am inclined to suspect that when the protagonist of this view is asked to specify in detail the features of this way of seeing, he will advance something like our model (though perhaps not the one I have offered), i.e., an analysis of religious predicates and modes of verification. If anyone wishes to call this a way of seeing, I have no objection, but there is not much resemblance left to the phenomenon of the duck-rabbit picture.

In short, I wish to distinguish my view as clearly as possible from the one just discussed, since I believe that we can reconstruct the religious language-verification situation without placing any reliance on intuitions, the cognitive nature of feelings, etc., etc. The notion of a way of seeing can, I think, be profitably replaced by that of taking something as an authority on the basis of our feeling reaction to it.

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