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A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT IN QUEBEC AND BELGIUM

by
Wallace Dzu Loh

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Psychology)
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> All events occurring in the international arena must be conceived of and understood from two angles simultaneously: once calling for concentration on the behavior of states as organized bodies of men, the other calling for concentration on human beings upon whose psychological reactions the behavior credited to states ultimately rests (Wolfers, 1962, p. 9).

> The most productive research on political psychology in the future will treat childhood socialization, modal personality tendencies, political orientations, and political structure and process as separate variables in a complex, multidimensional system of causality (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 35).

The present is an era of nation-building. Since the end of World War II, half a billion people have become citizens of newly independent countries, and half a billion more are citizens of old nations striving to become modern political states. Both share the task of generating consensus to support the political order. In response to these upheavels in the international system and as an extension of new methodological developments in survey research, the field of political integration and nationalism during the past two decades has begun to command the increasing attention of empirical social scientists. The central question is: How do different groups of people, especially in ethnically plural societies experiencing rapid social changes, reconcile loyalty to parochial interests with generalized commitment to the overarching political order?

This study begins by outlining a theoretical framework in which empirical research on this question could be pursued. It is an attempt at formulating a distinctively social psychological approach, one that in Wolfer's terms takes into account both the behavior of "organized

bodies of men" and the "psychological reactions" of individuals. This approach begins at the level of the subject under consideration, viz., the social-political system, and only then brings in psychological concepts as they become relevant for explanation. It is also an attempt at formulating the kind of multidimensional model that Almond and Verba have called for, one that focuses on both process and structure. The process or historical aspect of the theory conceptualizes political integration (or disintegration) and nationalism as products of, and responses to, social mobilization and economic development -- it asks when these phenomena occur. The cross-sectional dimension locates different forms of system integration and individual political commitment in certain structural positions -- it asks where they occur in society. Selected formulations of nationalism and integration in the social science literature that we found useful in the construction of the theory are reviewed in the next chapter. Chapter III describes the main concepts of the theory and hypothesizes some relationships between them that serve as guidelines for empirical research.

The theory was applied to the analysis of ethno-linguistic conflict and nationalism in two Western societies, Quebec and Belgium. They were selected because of the broad similarities in their nationalist development that render them ideal cases for a cross-national test of the theory. There is also a dearth of comparative empirical research on the nationalist problems of these two countries. Even the empirical studies within each country are relatively few, since most of the existing literature on the subject consists of historical and legal scholarship, journalistic reports, and political tracts. In addition, our first-hand familiarity with the countries and the established

contacts with local colleagues that would facilitate field research were also factors determining their selection. Chapter IV sketches the history of nationalism in Quebec and Belgium and relates it to some demographic, social, economic, and political trends from census data. From the leads that history and the aggregate data provide, we derive hypotheses from the theory that are directly applicable to the two countries.

Chapters V to VII present the methods and results of a questionnaire survey of political commitment. We emphasize at the outset that the objective of the study was to test relationships proposed by the theory and not to describe population parameters. An explicit epistemology was relied on in the research and the presentation of this report. We saw comparative research as a link between historical analysis and general social science theory. The aim was not to explain nationalism and integration in Quebec and Belgium as accurately as possible in terms of specific historical circumstances, but to try to account for the conditions producing these phenomena wherever and whenever they occur. This is based on the assumption in social science, since the classical theories of Marx and Weber, that there are a limited number of recognizable patterns in the process of social development which are not specific to particular social systems. Thus, Silvert (1963) argues that, although the total developmental process of each country will naturally be unique, there are nonetheless elements within this process that are universal. Intrinsic to development is nationalism, and "part of its nature remains structurally as well as functionally unchanged everywhere it appears" (p. 9). Comparative inquiry, in this view, seeks to identify these patterns while controlling spatial-

temporal parameters. "Studies with two or more groups ... might be seen in terms of generalizations where time and space factors are incorporated as control variables into the statement of generalization itself" (Suchman, 1964, p. 129). Analytically, our comparative study is based on Przeworski and Teune's (1969) "most different systems" design. We begin at the intra-system level, assuming that the Quebec and Belgian samples come from the same homogeneous population. If the same pattern of relationship among the variables as predicted by the theory is observed in both countries, then system differences need not be taken into consideration. For example, if elites in both countries exhibit a similar kind of nationalism under a given condition, it is not critical for prediction that these elites are citizens of Quebec or Belgium. At some point, of course, system particularities do affect relationships. But the strategy is to assess step-by-step the variables of the theory and account for as much of the variance as possible by them before relying on system-specific sources of explanation. The approach is to study Quebec and Belgium not as systems but as cases of more general processes. Therefore, this report focuses on the pattern of relationships among theoretical variables within each country, rather than an in-depth analysis of each country or a string-of-beads comparison of characteristics between the countries.

In the final Chapter VIII, we attempt to interweave the theory, historical background, and aggregate and survey data into a succint narrative that highlights the main patterns of nationalism and political commitment in the two countries, and to discuss the implications of the theory and results for the broader themes of the political integration literature.

CHAPTER II

SOME CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF NATIONALISM AND INTEGRATION

The extensive literature on nationalism (cf. bibliography of Deutsch and Merritt, 1966) and political integration and development (cf. Jacob and Toscano, 1964; Almond and Coleman, 1960; Palmer, 1970) generally falls into two categories. One category is what Rokkan and Campbell (1960) label "macropolitics," the traditional domain of political science and history. The other is "micropolitics," or the domain of individual political psychology. With a few significant exceptions (Erikson, 1958; Almond and Verba, 1965; Katz, 1965), most studies have failed to relate the two domains systematically and empirically. They tend to focus primarily on either the individual level of analysis -- the individual differences in the genesis and development of nationalist attitudes and behavior -- or, more often, the system level of analysis -- the historical development of nationalism and its impact upon the social-political system. This chapter selectively reviews some of the conceptualizations of nationalism and integration according to the respective levels of analysis. It does not attempt to summarize the field, integrate the issues, or disentangle the ambiguities that surround the concepts of nationality, nationalism, and integration -- they have been discussed and thoroughly deplored before in almost any review of the subject. The aim, rather, is simply to discuss a few writings which we have found useful (or not useful) in our own thinking, and from which we will draw ideas later for evolving a social psychological theory.

The Individual Level of Analysis

Most of the behavioral science contributions to the topic of nationalism has been at the level of personality structure. Cultural anthropologists have focused on the concept of national character (e.g. Brodersen, 1961), and some social psychologists have tended to subsume nationalist ideology as an aspect of interpersonal attitudes or personality dynamics (e.g. Scott, 1960; Levinson, 1957; Perry, 1961). Perry, for example, defines his approach as "the study of the situation of human behavior in which one or more persons are behaving as nationals" (p. 81). The basic social system consists simply of interlocking sets of reciprocal expectations held by a national vis-a-vis the extra-national (foreigner). The problem with this analysis is that it begins at the level in which the greatest amount of psychological data are available, viz., interpersonal relations, rather than the level at which the problem under study occurs. The outcome is some shrewd observations at the individuals-as-actors level, but the generalizations to the social system are tenuous and far-fetched.

A common meeting ground of politics and personality is in the process of political socialization. Two individually-oriented schemes are relevant here because of their focus on social roles and national identification. Almond (in Almond and Coleman, 1960) describes three stages of socialization. In basic or latent socialization, the child is inducted and trained to be a member of the culture. In the next manifest stage, he is taught to realize his political identity according to prescribed roles. Finally, in political recruitment, the individual moves from the role of passive observer to active participant. This is a useful way of looking at the assumption of national roles in

development. Often basic socialization is faulty in that it conforms to traditional patterns instead of preparing the individual for an urban industrialized world. A person socialized under the aegis of a traditional or colonial regime may be at a loss when he assumes roles in a modern or post-independence society. The three processes often lack coherence as a result of rapid social change and lead to identity problems. The scheme of Greenstein (1965) is similar in that it too focuses on role learning. He sees political socialization involving "citizen role learning," "subject role learning," and performance of roles. This learning is presumed to have an effect, "by extension, upon the political system," but this process is not developed nor are the consequences for system integration of such learning elaborated.

The System Level of Analysis

Nationalism

The writings of some historians and political philosophers are also individually oriented. Nationalism is variously identified with an active corporate will (Kohn, 1955; Hertz, 1951), an idea, an emotional stance, a sentiment (cf. review by Silvert, 1963) — the underlying communality is that of an all-embracing phenomenon anchored in the individual without specification of its role in social organization. The bulk of the literature, however, is at the system level. But here too, nationalism is given a catalogue of characteristics: ethnicity, language, territoriality, religion. Schafer (1955) lists ten national characteristics and indicates their institutional expression, but they are uneven in their level of generality and unclear as to their rank

order of importance. Perhaps, as Emerson (1960) said, "There is no real agreement as to what a nation is" (p. 90), and that "reduced to its bare bones, nationalism is no more than the assertion that this particular community is arranged against the rest of mankind" (p. 10).

Silvert (1963) has summarized the various conceptualizations of nationalism in four categories: (1) Nationalism as a formal juridical concept: the legal relationship between individuals and the state. (2) Nationalism as a symbolic concept: the stock of patriotic symbols or external marks of national identification which affirm internal unity and individual integration to the nation. Silvert notes, however, that an elaborate symbolic apparatus of nationality that is emotionally charged is not a sufficient cause for producing institutional political integration. (3) Nationalism as an ideology: the "express bodies of political thought concerning what a nation was, is, and ought to be, and the means for seeking national goals" (p. 18). Ideology, like symbols, is also emotive in content, but in addition it incorporates specific political beliefs. (4) Nationalism as a social value: the normative prescriptions that define citizen loyalties and obligations vis-a-vis other citizens and the state. The social value provides the cohesive force of nationalism within the state. It should be noted that the interpretation of social value can be colored by the researcher's country of study. Those studying underdeveloped countries are biased towards the positive aspects of nationalism in building social integration, whereas those studying advanced countries often tend to emphasize the malintegrative influences.

Political integration

"Integration," like "nationalism," is a concept that covers a wide range of phenomena. Essentially political integration refers to the kind and degree of consensus governing the political behavior of members of the political system -- it is that which holds the polity together. Since writers generalize from the integration patterns of the particular societies they are analyzing, each person might have a somewhat different notion of integration. As Weiner (1965) notes, "Since there are as many ways in which systems may fall apart, there are as many ways of defining integration" (p. 54). Thus, Haas (1958) sees political integration as "the process whereby political actors in distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation-state" (p. 16). Coleman and Rosberg (1964) see two auxiliary processes in operation: the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap in the course of building an integrated and participant community, and the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions in the course of creating a homogeneous territorial community. Deutsch (1963) and Binder (1964) both conceptualize national integration as the process of creating intra-state consensus.

Weiner (1965) has summarized the conceptualizations of political integration into four types in much the same manner as Silvert has done with nationalism: (1) National integration refers to the putting together of diverse and discrete cultural loyalties and the development of a sense of nationality. National integration is a threat to the dominant elite (e.g. colonial rulers) but it is essential to the

maintenance and legitimacy of the subordinate challenging group (e.g. revolutionary leaders). (2) Territorial integration involves the creation of a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows or eliminates parochial loyalties. For most new states and some old ones as well, the establishment of territory precedes national integration, but there are cases where the nation preceded the territorial state, such as Israel. (3) Elite-mass integration refers to the link between rulers and ruled, the consent of the governed and the authority of the governor. (4) Integration as value consensus is parallel to Silvert's nationalism as social value and as ideology, in that it refers to the establishment of the minimum consensus needed to hold the social-political order together.

There are two main sources of bias in this literature. One is that the data and models are almost entirely drawn from the experiences of developing, post-colonial countries within the past two decades (Ake, 1967). The second is an implicit normative preference for integration -- it is good to unite different tribes, clans, and ethnic groups into a central system. Most of the writings detail how integration occurs but are less explicit on how disintegration comes about. If Silvert and Weiner are correct that the area of study colors the researcher's conceptualization, then some of the theories of nationalism and integration based on non-Western experiences cannot be generalized to Western societies.

A different perspective on the problem of political integration is provided by the systems-oriented theorists of political socialization. The model of Easton and Hess (1961) emphasizes the system acting

and the participants being acted upon; that is, how a system maintains itself through "a set of shared political values and attitudes" socialized into its members (p. 227). Specifically, socialization leads to the development of three kinds of "common expectations:" knowledge, values, and attitudes toward the polity. When these expectations are shared, consensus is said to exist. The three objects of consensus, or levels of the political system, are "government," which includes specific political roles and partisan orientations; "regime," which includes the rules of the game that legitimate actions and the general norms of the system; and "community," which consists of the group of persons that seek to solve in common their problems through shared structures. The nine-cell matrix defined by these three kinds of expectations and levels of consensus serves to classify the outcomes of political socialization, those shared attitudes that sustain stability and integration. This approach based on levels of consensus is directly relevant to the types of nationalism described by Silvert. One can conceive of nationalism as social value, which emphasizes normative obligations and the cohesion of the system, as being directed towards the regime level. Ideological nationalism will be oriented to the government level of consensus, since it involves explicit sets of political beliefs. And the underlying substratum of consensus, the community level, is likely to be associated with symbols of nationalism that provide for internal unity and identification of its members.

Another major formulation that concentrates on political socialization as a function performed by the political system is that of Almond and Verba (1963). The individual level is also

accorded due consideration in their concept of political culture. It stems from Almond's (1956) earlier observation that "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action." As Pye (1962) puts it, "a political culture can be found only in men's minds, in the patterns of action, feelings, and reflections which they have internalized and made a part of their very existence" (p. 124). Political culture, then, is the subjective half of political behavior. It serves to guide individual action and give systematic structure and coherence to institutions. And political socialization is the "process of induction into political culture" (Almond, 1960, p. 27). The end product of this process is a set of attitudes and cognitions directed towards three levels of the system: specific roles, incumbents of roles, and particular policies and decisions. This trichotomy is not dissimilar to those of Greenstein and Easton described above. Almond and Verba also postulate three types of political cultures: parochial, subject, and participant, which are congruent, respectively, with the traditional, centralized authoritarian, and democratic political systems -- they constitute the system context of socialization. The writings of Almond and his colleagues certainly represent the most comprehensive formulations on the subject. The construct of political culture is potentially a powerful tool for bridging the political systems analysis of Easton and the individual political learning analyses of Greenstein. We will return to these concepts later, refining and extending them to our own approach.

Social integration

Particularly relevant to social integration are the writings

of the classical sociological theorists: Marx, Weber, Simmel, and Durkheim. They have decisively influenced the idiom, concepts and normative assumptions of the current literature on political integration. Although they do not present articulated theories of political integration, they do provide insights that facilitate the development of such theories.

Marx's Capital is an attempt to grapple with the problems that arise from the production and allocation of economic resources in a capitalist system, and in the process he helps to illuminate the structural conditions of alienation or non-integration. The laboring masses in a capitalist society, who do not own the means of production, are chained to a work that may satisfy minimal material needs but not the emotional needs of a sense of dignity and identity with the larger social system. When the workers are of a different ethno-linguistic stock than the owners of the means of production, we could extend Marx's analysis to suggest that the alienation may take the political expression of separatism. Thus, Rioux (1971) argues that even though the French Canadians are "the richest and oldest colonized people in the world," they "do not grow used to slavery ... and a high standard of living is not enough to make them forget their values, their dignity and their honor" (p. 3).

Like Marx, Weber attempted to systematize historical trends; but unlike Marx who focused on class struggle, Weber was concerned with the rational organization of labor. In the Theory of Social and Economic Organization, he saw social development as evolving from traditional systems legitimized by customs to bureaucratic systems legitimized by impersonal norms. These systems represent, in effect,

types of integration, and his subsequent analyses of their consequences has been included in contemporary theories of political integration (cf. Bendix, 1960).

Simmel in Conflict: The Web of Group Affliliation also held implicitly a theory of social evolution. In earlier times, the individual lived exclusively in a network of primary, particularistic relationships. As society evolved, secondary relationships were established anchored in mutually defined interests and exchanges rather than primary loyalties. Multiple affiliations characterize this latter stage and these overlapping ties add to stability. The problem, however, is that the psychological security afforded by the primary group gives way to the uncertainty of secondary affiliations. Here again we encounter an analysis of alienation or non-integration. Marx located alienation in social-economic organization; Simmel in interpersonal relationships; and both can be applied to problems of multi-ethnic societies. For example, an ethnic minority member who succeeds in rising to upper echelons of the economic world dominated by a different ethnic group will be torn between his original primary loyalties and the newly established secondary relationships. Unless he has a "core of inner ego unity," as Simmel would say, then the conflicting multiple loyalties could lead to a "schizophrenic break" (p. 141). At the societal level, however, it is precisely these crisscrossing cleavages generated by multiple individual loyalties that give people a vested interest in the system. Integration of the social order, according to Simmel, lies in perpetuating and institutionalizing the network of affiliations.

Perhaps the most direct concern with integration in the classical

tradition is found in Durkheim's The Division of Labor in Society. Earlier societies are organized on the basis of mechanical solidarity, and collective coercive values, institutionalized in penal law, permeate the group members. With the progressive division of labor, the old order is replaced by organic solidarity legitimized by restituive law which is more stable and morally superior. A mechanical whole composed of parts that do not need each other breaks down easily since the parts can be severed from the whole. An organic whole differentiated by the functions the individual parts perform has greater solidarity due to the complementarity of these different functions. Division of labor reinforces integration.

There are common themes in this classical literature that reappear in contemporary writings on political integration. All the classical sociologists present a structured process of development, of societies passing from one form of structure to another. They also neglect the individual's day-to-day actions and attitudes that are the dynamic that determine these evolutionary trends. The individual level of analysis is unimportant relative to the development process. The influence of this kind of thinking is evident in the formulations of integration of traditional to participant (Lerner, 1958); tribal to traditional to modern (Silvert, 1963); parochial to participant (Almond and Verba, 1963) and so on. There is, further, a strong normative preference in the classical theorists for organic integration. They assume that greater development leads to more cohesion and enlarged opportunities for individual and social welfare.[1] This analytical perspective of classical theory is often applied directly in studies of underdeveloped countries. But as Almond (1960)

has cautioned, in the modernizing process both the traditional and the bureaucratic, the primary and the secondary ties, are simultaneously present. In Japan, for example, these conflicting modes of integration exist side by side rather than as evolutionary stages succeeding one another. And finally, the classical theories, perhaps because they grew out of a fairly homogeneous Western European milieu, tend to underestimate the force of primordial cleavages and loyalties in the ideal-type societies they describe. Linguistic, religious, and ethnic cleavages, if present, are important only in the early stages of social development since they are overcome later through division of labor, rationalization of means, or secondary affiliations. This view has led some contemporary theorists to associate social-economic development with the increase of political unity whereas, in fact, the opposite trend can be observed in multi-ethnic societies, such as Quebec and Belgium.

A Summing-up

It is time to pull some of these conceptual strands together. We have described several different aspects of, and theoretical approaches to, nationalism and integration at the system and the individual levels of analysis. Given the terminological variations in the literature, the task now is to provide some definitional conventions that will be observed throughout this report.

We shall use the term political integration or social integration when referring to the problem of holding a political or social system together. Integration will refer to consensus at the system level: the forms, strategies, and mechanisms by which established institutions bring about this consensus. On the other hand, commitment will refer

to personal involvement in the fulfillment of role expectations; it is the individual attitudinal orientations to levels of consensus in the system. In this vew, there are different ways to be committed to the social-political system according to the level of consensus. Nationalist political attitudes represent only one form of commitment, viz. that oriented to what Easton and Hess call the government level. Another form of commitment may be to the normative or regime level. A person can internalize the normative requirements without subscribing to nationalist symbols and ideology, and this form of commitment, too, will contribute to system integration.

The concept of national is particularly ambiguous. For French Quebeckers, for example, national integration and national elections mean Quebec integration and Quebec elections, whereas for English Quebeckers the same terms connote an all-Canada perspective. It will be less confusing to use a qualifying adjective to refer to the locus of integration. Henceforth we shall speak, for example, of Canadian or central integration, and French Canadian or regional integration.

To these two key constructs of system integration and individual commitment, a third concept is frequently associated in the literature: social-economic development, also variously termed social mobilization, modernization, and industrialization (cf. Deutsch, 1961). We have noted that common to all the classical theorists is a developmental or evolutionary framework. System integration (or disintegration) and individual forms of commitment (or non-commitment) are products of, and responses to, evolutionary social changes. Thus, Hayes (1926) identified nationalism as correlative to the emergence of a middle class. Emerson (1960) associated nationalism with "deep running social

ferment and change which disrupt the old order of society and bring about a rise of social consciousness and ... a 'fundamental democratization of society,' the stirring into action of those who were previously excluded from political life" (p. 30). Silvert (1963) proposed that with industrial "take-off," nationalism becomes an intrinsic partner in the process. The basic rationale for linking integration and commitment with development is not unlike that of the classical theorists. When societies undergo mobilization -- as universal suffrage widens the electorate; education opens new mobility channels; industrial investments provide new opportunities for wealth -- the rapid rate of changes may have malintegrative consequences. The status of social groups is changed, new cleavages emerge and old ones realigned, and new ideologies appear to redefine the world. As the system is strained under these new demands, different patterns of national, elite-mass, territorial, or value consensus integration become necessary, together with redefinitions of the forms of individual commitment. To the extent that systems are continually evolving and actively taking on new functions, new patterns of integration can be expected; no single form of integration or commitment represents a final state.

In fine, we see political integration as the creation of a political culture -- the ideologies, values, symbols and norms that constitute the objects of consensus and define the context in which political action occurs -- and the induction of individual commitment to it. Our next task is twofold: First, to define the forms of individual commitment and locate them in social structure, i.e., to identify the locus of consensus to which each form of commitment is

oriented. And second, to specify the kinds of social structural arrangements resulting from developmental changes that give rise to one or another form of commitment. These two parts constitute the structural and developmental dimensions, respectively, of the social psychological theory of political commitment presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT

The Social Psychological Level of Analysis

The term level of analysis implies three distinct meanings. It may refer (1) to the level at which the phenomena under study occurs; (2) the level at which data are collected and analyzed; and (3) the level at which explanation is formulated. Confusion of these meanings often leads to the translation of all problems to the level in which there is the greatest amount of information available irrespective of the context in which the problem occurs (e.g. "war begins in the minds of men, and therefore in the minds of men the defenses of war must be constructed"). The social psychological approach adopted here begins at the level of the subject under study, viz. the political system, and only later are psychological concepts brought in as they become relevant for explanation and integration.

A social psychological analysis, anchored in both the individual and collective matrix, should include the following: (1) the antecedent socialization and social influence processes which, if successful, insures that the individual will internalize the appropriate beliefs and values of the culture, leading to (2) the development of individual differences; (3) the institutional role structures or major social, economic, and poltical organization, which establish (4) the demands and norms attached to specific statuses and roles; (5) specification of the cultural context in which these structures and processes take place, lest culture-specific variables be confused with those that are more general in their influence; and the effects of the preceding

variables upon (6) the main dependent variable, the behavior of individuals interacting in roles. The relationship between the analytical categories of the social psychological framework can be diagrammed as follows:



The left side of the diagram can be viewed as the domain of individual psychology and the right side as that of sociology. The distinctiveness of the social psychological approach, as presented here, is that it conceptualizes behavior as an interactive function of individual and structural variables, and further, it focuses on behavior that occurs in the context of social roles.

This set of general analytical categories serves as an outline for our own thinking and as a "filing cabinet" for variables. Although the mere location of variables in a conceptual outline does not explain anything, it is an indispensable preliminary to explanation. The next diagram summarizes the main variables used in the theory:



The principal dependent variable is the type of commitment associated with social roles and oriented towards different loci of consensus or levels of the system. The psychological independent variable we shall consider is cognitive differences in language learning, and the two structural independent variables are status discrepancy and social mobility. Culture-specific influences, when relevant, will be included as "control" variables (cf. Chapter I). In this study we are not including socialization and social influence variables, since this would over-extend our research into a domain that requires its own separate investigation. It should be noted that political commitment, as the literature review has shown, is related to a wide range of psychological and societal characteristics. We have sought an "intermediate level theory," in Merton's (1957) words, avoiding the shotgun inclusion of a wide range of variables as is at times typical of some survey research and, on the other hand, eschewing any claim that these three variables account for all of the variance in forms of commitment. An all-inclusive theory has little practical empirical value, and reduction to a common principle such as status discrepancy would be an oversimplification. We recognize that more than one perspective and other sets of variables could provide an equally satisfactory interpretation. We arrived at these variables by culling the literature for those that seemed most important theoretically and operationally measurable, and then sought to replace some of the vast amounts of conjecture on the integration subject by empirical data gathered according to a delimited theory based on these variables.

The social-political context

The basis for defining the social-political context of commitment is Parsons' (1951) four functional imperatives for any social system. The idea of using this scheme comes from Deutsch (1964) who attempted to combine systems theory and Parsonian analysis to the integration of political communities. The take-off point here in Parsons' theory is thus similar to Deutsch, but the working-out from these premises follows a different direction. Parsons views a system as a set of parts, or role structures, and their interaction with each other which is conducive to the maintenance of the system is its function. The four functions of any system are: Pattern-maintenance (PM), the basic social units aimed at the preservation of the system; Adaptation (A) to change; Goal-attainment (GA), which refers to the structure of authority or the means through which wants of system members are converted into binding decisions; and Integration (I) within the system by mechanisms that provide an orderly context for role interaction. They are present in any in any political system, and they can be seen as corresponding to four sub-systems of institutionalized role structures. Extending Easton and Hess' (1961) formulation, PM corresponds to the community level, the broad substratum of consensus necessary for the continuity of the system; it includes the sets of roles defined by household and family, voluntary associations, religious groupings, etc. A corresponds to the sub-system of economy and technology, the roles in which the needs of the members are satisfied through performance of instrumental tasks. GA corresponds to the governmental level, the political roles and partisan positions. And I corresponds to the normative expectations and rules of the system that insure internal cohesion and order. The

figure below illustrates the conceptualization of a political system in terms of the functional imperatives; the lines indicate interrelationships:



The usefulness of this framework is that it helps to integrate some previous formulations. The four sub-systems represent four conceptually distinct sets of roles or loci of consensus to which political commitment can be directed. Commitment must be present to all these levels (though not necessarily by the same individual) if the system as a whole is to maintain itself through time. We can also distinguish between society and polity. The former represents the web of personal and group role relationships that constitute collective existence; the PM, I, and A sub-systems, taken together, define the social structure. The latter represents the complex of institutions and procedures by which society is governed; it consists of the GA sub-system.

Role involvement

We have conceptualized the social-political system as sets of role structures and the individual's participation in the system as one of involvement in and interaction through these roles. Before we outline the typology of role involvements vis-a-vis the system, the concept itself should be briefly discussed.

Role is distinct from social position or social status (Levinson, 1959). The latter is a location in social space, a category of membership; the former involves function and process. This is important because the nature and degree of role involvement, as will

be shown later, depends upon the individual's social position. The term role may mean (1) the system-given demands associated with the social position, i.e. the prescribed norms and expectations for behavior, and (2) the individual's own conception of the part he is to play in the system, his definition of his actions relative to the prevailing norms. Role, then, reflects at the same time the psychological properties of social structure and the structural properties of individual adaptation. It is this twin characteristic that makes role a useful construct in mediating the individual and system levels.

Dependent Variable: Types of Commitment

Four types of commitment can be distinguished according to their locus of orientation: Symbolic, Ideological, Functional and Normative. This typology was first formulated by Katz and his associates, and it represents perhaps the first major attempt at empirical measurement in an area traditionally characterized by historically-based theories and at constructing a distinctly social psychological theory anchored in the concept of "national role" (Katz, Kelman, and Flacks, 1963; Katz, 1965). Measurement of these forms of commitment have been developed and applied in surveys of an American community (Delamater, Katz, and Kelman, 1969) and of national samples in Yugoslavia (Delamater, 1969) and Greece (Katz, Kelman, and Vassiliou, 1968). In general, the results have shown that the types are relatively independent and the measures possess a fair degree of reliability and validity. In this section we will describe each type of commitment as developed in these earlier studies. We shall also attempt to relate them to other similar conceptualizations reviewed in Chapter II.

Symbolic commitment

Katz et al. (1963) define Symbolic commitment as "the value systems which justify the common purposes of the national structures and its perpetuation, and associated symbols capable evoking strong affective responses when they are presented" (p. 115). Symbolically involved persons have "a strong emotional investment in the nation ... the enactment of role requirements is intrinsically valuable ... (and they) derive direct and consummatory satisfaction identifying themselves as nationals and assuming the appropriate national roles" (p. 115-116). In historical perspective, Katz sees Symbolic commitment as particularly salient in formative periods of a country's growth, when patriotic rhetoric and symbolism are the principal expressions of loyalty. In cross-sectional perspective, Delamater et al. (1969) have shown that in an American sample, Symbolic commitment is more pronounced among rural than urban dwellers, the less educated and lower income persons than higher classes, and is generally related to a "love it or leave it" Americanism. Symbolic commitment, then, is used in the special sense of attachment to "symbols that take on a life of their own and are not cognitive maps of empirical reality... in intense form ... it is an important component of chauvinism" (Katz et al., 1968, p. 2).

Our conceptualization here is slightly different in emphasis. Since this study is of multi-ethnic societies, our focus is on the collective, affective identification with the language, history, culture, folkways, and religion of one's ethno-linguistic in-group. These too are symbols, but they are not cut-off from historical roots —

they are existentially real and important ends in themselves. Symbolic commitment is oriented to the PM or community level of consensus, the collective aspect of consciousness of kind. Ethnic minorities, whether black Americans, French Canadians, Flemish, or Jews in the Diaspora, have typically been concerned less with personal identity and Lockean individual rights, and more with group rights and a Rousseaunian general will to survive as a collectivity.

This form of commitment is akin to Geertz's (1963) concept of primordial attachment: loyalties that stem from the "givens" of social existence and tie, ipso facto, those speaking a certain language or practicing a particular religion. Like Simmel's primary relationships or Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, these ties are not based on common interests but on the inherent moral coerciveness of the sentiments themselves; they flow from a sense of group affinity rather than social interaction.

Silvert's definiton of nationalism as a symbolic concept also shares the meanings we describe. This nationalism is expressed in love for the "patriotic symbols enveloping common cultural characteristics;" it is infused with emotive content and is expressed through external markers that affirm individual solidarity with the nation (p. 18). Terhune's (1964) measures of "affective involvement;" Guetzkow's (1955) description of "loyalty as an autonomous need;" and Emerson's (1960) notion of a "terminal community," all partake of what we characterize as Symbolic commitment. In all these conceptualizations the process of self-definition is at the core. In this form of commitment the interweaving of political identity and ego identity described by Erikson (1958) is realized more than in any

other form of commitment.

Ideological commitment

This type of commitment occurs "when people accept the values and beliefs associated with national institutions" (Katz et al., 1968, p. 3). Every political system develops an ideology and a set of beliefs and values which define the essential characteristics of the system and give it its basic legitimacy. One such ideology is "statism" which centers around the doctrine of national sovereignty, that the state is the supreme and absolute arbiter of decisions. Another is "institutional nationalism," the belief in "certain societal institutions as the embodiment of national purpose and national goals" (Katz, 1965, p. 360). The individual comes to identify with the system ideology to the extent that he sees the achievement and maintenance of the objectives defined by these values as desirable.

Ideological commitment is oriented towards the GA sub-system or the government level of consensus. We conceive it as including two interrelated components: (1) the overarching values, myths, and beliefs that maintain the system as Katz has described, and in addition, (2) specific social-political issues that are salient at certain times and around which sectors of the population can be mobilized. For example, Mechelena (1967) identifies many Latin Americans who are nationalistic, not because of Symbolic attachment to culture and heritage, but because of commitment to current issues such as anti-imperialism, agrarian reform, nationalization of industries, and other issues. This conception is similar to Silvert's view of nationalism as ideology, that is, beliefs regarding the appropriate means and actions for achieving national goals. It focuses

on the obstacles blocking the realization of political objectives, the causes of national unity, and defines the enemies of national development. Ideological nationalism is by definition emotionally charged, but as distinct from Symbolic nationalism, it also includes political belief systems.

The distinction between Symbolic and Ideological commitment, perhaps one of degree only, is nonetheless important to make. In a discussion of the psychological foundations of patriotism and nationalism, Doob (1964) sees the first as an affective predispositon that influences perceptions and responses to stimuli; the second arises when patriotism leads to a set of demands and possibly also to action. Nationalism (=Ideological) is not a psychological construct, but the cognitive demands and behavioral intentions stem from a psychological state (=Symbolic). In a similar vein, Geertz (1963) has distinguished between primordial attachments and their overt expression in "a sort of parapolitics" (p. 125). He describes certain characteristic battlegrounds -- language of instruction in schools; historiography; census statistics on ethno-religious compositon -- as the institutional settings in which promordial discontent spills over into ideological, parapolitical conflict. Ideological commitment, then, can be seen as the mediating link between political action and political beliefs -- it makes explicit the basis for action.

Another way of distinguishing between Symbolic and Ideological commitment is by looking at the antecedent political socialization. Affective attachment to symbols is probably based largely on emotional pre-verbal conditioning in childhood (Katz et al., 1963), whereas commitment to ideology presumably requires the prior maturation of the

necessary cognitive skills. Easton and Dennis (1965) have shown that emotional attachments occur prior to the acquisition of political information: by the second grade, an American child "learns to like the government before he really knows what it is" (p. 6). Easton and Hess (1961) propose that these positive political attitudes are transferred from attitudes toward parents, and LeVine (1963), on the basis of anthropological data, posits imitation and stimulus generalization as the underlying mechanisms of this affective transfer. More generally, we suggest that socialization of commitment can be categorized according to the level of consensus. Indirect political learning, or what Almond (1960) and Pye (1962) call basic or latent socialization, results in Symbolic commitment aimed at the community sub-system. It is acquired early in life in non-deliberate ways, by conditioning rather than direct tuition, often in settings devoid of political stimuli. On the other hand, direct politization, or political recruitment or manifest socialization, results in Ideological commitment to the government sub-system, and is acquired after verbal communication with the child is possible.

Functional commitment

Involvement in reciprocal patterns of role behavior based on mutual dependency leads to Functional commitment. It is an instrumental one, based on the stakes the individual has in the on-going system which, in turn, assures rewards for his participation (Katz et al., 1963). In historical perspective, the growth of bureaucratic organizations and industrial technology has broken-up self-sufficient local units and led to an increasing differentiation of roles which are interdependent for the satisfaction of individual needs, material and

psychological. The multiple loyalties spawned by the expansion of secondary relationships and the organic division of labor assure greater stability and reliability of the system. Thus, to the extent that the Adaptive level of consensus -- the technological, educational, and economic sub-systems -- control reinforcement contingencies, the individual will feel responsible and committed to the continued functioning of that system. The maintenance of these sub-systems and of one's own social position in them are dependent upon satisfactory role performance. This kind of involvement has also been described by Guetzkow (1955) as "loyalty through attachment to means," and by Terhune (1964) as "goal involvement," defined by the perceived relationship between national progress and one's personal goal attainment. It would follow, therefore, that this form of involvement is found primarily in the upper social-economic groups, whereas the unemployed and deprived groups would be alienated from Functional participation in the reward structure. In an American sample, Delamater et al. (1969) found that Functional commitment was positively related with high income and education; with interest in and support for international activities, such as the United Nations; and with low affect for national symbols. Functional attachment, then, is not a "nationalist" commitment in the sense of Symbolic or Ideological, but it is an equally important source for system integration.

Normative commitment

The fourth type of commitment is oriented to the Integrative sub-system, the system norms and codes for behavior and the associated sanctions capable of enforcing conformity to them. Katz et al. (1963) suggest that most Americans today are involved in the political system

primarily via Normative commitment. The fact that most of the expectations are embodied in written laws, communicated through formal mechanisms, and sanctioned by juridical systems, results in a certain "role readiness" or predisposition to accept these requirements if they are perceived as equitable and legitimate. This does not mean, of course, that deviance does not exist. It means that when norms are violated, it still occurs within the context of the rules of the system, viz. the application of appropriate sanctions. Thus when a child is being socialized to symbols and ideologies, he also begins to learn that certain forms of behavior are approved and others are unacceptable; he learns, in effect, the norms and expectations associated with various roles. It is precisely the success in developing this common adherence to norms which provides a unity of behavior and a responsiveness to the demands of the state and other members in the system.

The individual, then, can be attached to the system because he perceives it as "the arbiter of orderly and consistent procedures;" he commits himself to law and order because violation of the rules is a threat to the integrity of society and to his own position in it (Kelman, 1969). Silvert (1963) would probably see this type of commitment as a component of "nationalism as social value," the tacit consent to activities of the state and its normative prescriptions. In the American survey, Delamater et al. (1969) found Normative-involved persons were more passive and disinterested in politics relative to the Symbolic and Functional respondents. They had a lower level of interest, information, and participation in national or international affairs; a tendency to accept uncritically decisions by government

leaders; a moderate amount of affect for national symbols; and they represented primarily the lower middle and working class groups. Since they have no direct involvement in the maintenace of the system or its major institutions, they seemed to discharge their citizenship obligations in a perfunctory manner, and were more interested in simply keeping the fabric of everyday life undisturbed.

A two dimensional approach

We can summarize this typology of commitment with the following two dimensional sketch:



The horizontal plane consists of the four types of commitment, each oriented to a different sub-system or level of consensus. Theoretically, these types are independent and represent four different ways in which system integration can be built-up at the individual level. In actuality, as the studies of Katz and his colleagues have shown, they are interrelated to some extent. Most individuals are likely to be predominantly involved through one mode or another, but many also exhibit more than one form of commitment; for example, both sensitivity to norms and affective attachment to symbols. One can conceptualize the types as related in a Guttman scale order: support for basic role structures (PM and I) are necessary before support for second-order structures (GA and A) can be established.

The vertical plane consists of the central-regional loci of commitment. This second dimension is relevant only in systems marked by ethnic, linguistic or religious cleavages that crystallize with political boundaries. Belgium, for example, is a unitary regime, but the three major subgroups -- Brusselers, Flemings, and Walloons -- are also formally delimited by territorial boundaries. In such cases, an individual may be committed Symbolically, Functionally, Ideologically or Normatively either to Belgium as a whole, or to a regional subunit, Brussels, Flanders or Wallonia. We thus have a two dimensional model of commitment defined by type and locus, and different combinations of horizontal and vertical linkages can be visualized. One group, for example, may be Symbolically attached to the regional locus of Flanders, but Functionally committed to the central locus of Belgium. In certain cases the vertical dimension might not be relevant. If the same set of laws and norms applied equally to all regions of Belgium, there would be no grounds for distinguishing between Normative commitment by regional loci. But if there were different regional regulations in addition to system-wide norms, it would be necessary to specify the regional and central loci of Normative commitment.

Theory Construction Through Construct Validation of Commitment Types: The Independent Variables

The next step is to relate the four types of commitment, the dependent variable of the social psychological theory, to selected independent variables. We begin by describing the logic by which these relationships are established before delving into the substance of the theory itself.

The logic is based on construct validation of the commitment types, not in the narrow psychometric sense, but as an analytical tool for theory construction (cf. Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; Loevinger, 1957). The commitment types, as theoretical constructs, have been described in the previous section but not operationally defined. Given the complexity of the phenomena, probaby no clear-cut operational definition of commitment can be encompassed in a single questionnaire measurement scale, and no single criterion would validly define what is being measured. To investigate the types of commitment, therefore, it is necessary to have construct validation: the establishment of functional relationships between the types and other theoretical constructs in an inferential "nomological network" (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). In the studies by Katz, the emphasis was primarily on the internal structure of the commitment types, i.e. their reliability; and on the systematic differences between the types with respect to demographic indices, social-economic characteristics, and other attitudinal measures, i.e. their concurrent and predictive validity. Building on this methodological foundation, our strategy is to extend the earlier work by developing an interlocking network that links together, in Carnap's (1956) reconstructionist view of science, several different constructs with each other at the theory-language level; the empirical referents with each other at the observation-language level; and the theoretical constructs with the empirical referents across levels by correspondence rules. Two implications follow from locating the commitment types as constructs in such a network. First, theory construction is seen as a cumulative enterprise. The fact that one type of commitment does relate as predicted to another construct, e.g. status inconsistency,

does not automatically confirm the entire theory; neither does the absence of a relationship serve to discomfirm it. A series of inferences need to be tested. Second, since validation and theory construction are one and the same process, rejection of the theory implies rejection of the validation. One cannot accept the commitment types as somehow psychometrically valid without also accepting the concomitant theory. Proposal of an alternative theoretical explanation would require a new and independent process of validation. In the next sections, we will propose some functional relationships between the types of commitment and three other constructs for which there are known empirical referents: status inconsistency and intergenerational mobility at the social structure level, and bilingual ability at the individual level.

Status Inconsistency

Dynamics and consequences

This discussion of the literature on status inconsistency (cf. bibliography of Segal, 1970), as the earlier review of nationalism and integration, aims not at a systematic survey of the field, but only at culling selected studies that are directly relevant to our purposes. We wish to see if there is any basis in the literature for proposing that differential rates of development and social change lead to discrepancies in status ranks which, in turn, result in different forms of political commitment.

In social stratification there often are imperfect correlations between status dimensions. Weber (1953) and Sorokin (1947) early noted that rank on one status does not necessarily coincide or determine rank in other status dimensions. This idea has been introduced more recently

by Lenski (1954), from a small groups and individual perspective, in his theory of status crystallization. We will concentrate on Lenski's formulation and various variations thereof. Also, to delimit the field, we will consider only inconsistencies between achieved status (e.g. occupation) and ascribed status (e.g. ethnicity) which are, according to Lenski, the inconsistencies of greatest theoretical interest.

The principle of Lenski is straightforward. Through processes of social change and mobility, a person with low ascriptive status succeeds in rising along achieved dimensions; inconsistency is thereby created. In this situation, the person will try to balance the inconsistency by disregarding his lower ascribed status and focusing on his higher achieved status. Others, of course, may not respond to him on the basis of the higher status, and his deference expectations are frustrated. This stress will be greatest in the low ascribed/high achieved combination (Lenski, 1966). A variety of consequences are proposed to ensue from this stressful imbalance. Jackson (1962) argued that low ascribed/high achieved persons (e.g. a Negro doctor) will tend to be extra-punitive, to blame societal barriers for his situation, and to express liberal political attitudes. Conversely, the high ascribed/low achieved person (e.g. white laborer) will tend to be intra-punitive and blame himself, thereby having psychosomatic symptoms. Goffman (1957) proposed that status inconsistency leads to a desire to change the distribution of power in society in a way that makes the lower status of the inconsistent individual less relevant. Lenski (1967), Segal (1969), and Segal and Knoke (1968) have found

status inconsistents support parties that favor social change; in the U.S., this translates to voting for the Democratic Party. Studies in other Western countries have also shown this tendency to support the liberal party (Alford, 1963; Segal, 1971).

Let us now examine critically the underlying dynamic of status inconsistency as proposed by Lenski and others. At the outset it should be noted that although contradictory results have occurred, the bulk of the empirical data show that achieved/ascribed inconsistencies do produce effects on political attitudes, social relationships, and psychosomatic symptoms. But often ad-hoc principles are used to explain particular results. Lenski (1967) also claims that not all forms of status discrepancy generate stress. The question, then, is not whether effects occur, but why do they occur (Segal, Segal, and Knoke, 1970). There are three concepts presented in subsequent studies or in other contexts that should be added to give greater explanatory power to the status inconsistency concept: social comparison, expectancy, and relative deprivation.

Inconsistency per se is not an explanation of what activates the re-balancing or equilibrating process. Zelditch and Anderson (1966) ask: "If Robinson Crusoe had been a garage mechanic making $ 40,000 a year would he have known he was overpaid? If he had been paid $ 100 would he have known he was underpaid?" (p. 250). If there was no one else on the island with whom Crusoe could compare himself, obviously he would not have known whether he was being over- or underpaid. One condition, then, that determines whether balancing is activated is the presence of a comparison process. Inconsistency without comparison does not produce stress. In fact, the term itself

implies a comparative reference: a person's status X is high or low relative not only to his other status Y, as Lenski proposes, but also relative to another person or group's status X and Y. For example, Lenski's theory describes a Negro doctor in American society as status inconsistent. But he is inconsistent only because the implicit comparison reference is the dominant white group. If a black doctor was explicitly compared with another discriminated minority, such as Chicanos, he would no longer be inconsistent or, at least, the comparison would not be stressful. The theory implies comparison and social relations, but it does not spell out this relational perspective. As Mitchell (1964) notes, "The pattern of rank and rank inconsistency holds little meaning unless we specify the subject's social milieu" (p. 320). The point is that the theory should specify in advance what are the relevant status dimensions being compared. Otherwise there can be a tautology: given a dependent variable, it is only a question of time and research imagination to find some status inconsistency that relates to it.

A second determinant of stress in imbalanced ranks, related to comparison processes, is the concept of expectancy. Sampson (1963) proposed expectancy as the link between the sociological variable of status and the psychological concept of cognitive dissonance. He argued that only those discrepancies that presuppose consistent expectations will produce dissonance. If there is an underlying expectation that status X and status Y are positively related (X implies Y), then a person who is high on X and low on Y will experience dissonance (X implies not-Y). On the other hand, if the expectation is that X and Y are not related, or inversely related, the above

ranking although inconsistent would not produce any dissonance. In sum, status discrepancy must correspond with expectational discrepancy to produce stress and hence the behavioral consequences. But like Lenski and other writers in this area, Sampson's perspective is also intra-personal. The expectancy discrepancy is among statuses of the same person and the status and expectancy of reference persons is excluded from the model.

The idea of comparison also implies the idea of relative deprivation (Merton, 1957). A low ascribed/high achieved person uses the high/high persons as reference group even if his original membership was in the low/low group. The low/low persons are unlikely to use the high/high group as reference because of the wide discrepancy between their positions. The low/low person has considerable absolute deprivation, but the low ascribed/high achieved has greater relative deprivation built into his position. The deference mechanism of Lenski — that the low ascribed/high achieved person minimizes his ascribed status and expects deference on the basis of his achieved status — can be seen as a case of relative satisfaction. This is the "white" Negro or the Republican Jew, for example, who de-emphasize their ethnicity and over-identify with characteristics of the dominant group. In effect this is like saying, "I'm just a black man so I should be (relatively) satisfied with the fact that I've become a doctor." In terms of our theory, these individuals are expected to show a high Symbolic attachment to the culture and values of white America. However, this is not the only dynamic operating in low ascribed/high achieved conditions -- in fact, it probably is the less frequent one

today among American blacks. Another more plausible dynamic is relative deprivation: "I've achieved as a doctor, so why should my race preclude me from getting my full due as whites have?" The status inconsistent person may engage in activities to change the low social evaluation of his ascribed status, or even erase ethnicity as a relevant status dimension. Thus, he may develop Symbolic commitment to Afro-American heritage ("Black is beautiful;" "Afro-American studies") and/or espouse some form of black Ideological nationalism. In fine, the deference or relative satisfaction explanation of status inconsistency is essentially how the topdog views the underdog; the relative deprivation explanation is how some underdogs view themselves and the topdogs. They are not mutually exclusive dynamics. It is possible that in pre-mobilization periods, only a few minority group members can rise on the social ladder and individual careerism or relative satisfaction is predominant. Later with social change and new mobility opportunities, relative deprivation becomes the dominant dynamic.

In some of the studies of status inconsistency, no distinction is drawn between the inconsistency of the low ascribed/high achieved and that of the high ascribed/low achieved. As a consequence, Zelditch and Anderson (1966) note, "the politics of status inconsistency" has not emerged too clearly; sometimes it is left politics (Lenski, 1954), sometimes right politics (Lipset, 1960); sometimes it is "a curious blend of the two" (p. 204). They suggest that right-wing politics is associated with high ascribed/low achieved inconsistency when the emphasis on race can serve as a defensive mechanism to off-set challenges based on achieved statuses. Left-wing politics is associated with low ascribed/high achieved inconsistency when the importance of

ascribed status is de-emphasized, made non-relevant as a basis of social cleavage, or raised in importance to parity with other ascriptive characteristics.

Social mobilization, status inconsistency and types of commitment

Nationalism, we noted earlier, is intrinsic to social mobilization. By social mobilization is meant the overall process of change, a general term that brackets a number of specific changes "in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded and broken, and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior" (Deutsch, 1961, p. 495). Further, social mobilization is not merely a collection of changes, but implies that there are recurrent and identifiable processes similar in their essentials across social systems. We propose that one common structural arrangement resulting from rapid social mobilization is discrepancy in achieved and ascribed status ranks which, in turn, eventuate in different forms of political commitment.

Organski's (1958) theory of conflict in the international system is relevant here. "The international order has striking similarities with that of a national society; it is legitimized by an ideology and rooted in the power differential of the groups that compose them" (p. 364). The hypothesis is that differential rates of industrialization and uneven growth throughout the world result in the decline of established nations relative to rapidly modernizing challengers. The stability of the system is disrupted and conflict most likely to occur in that uncertain "power transition" interval when the challenger is ready to surpass the dominant state. In a similar vein, Davies'

(1962) theory of revolution is based on this kind of developmental perspective. He notes that Marx locates the source of revolution in the proletariat. But the enduring poverty and exploitation are not conducive to revolution; there is low level of organization, a lack of ideas, leadership and vision. On the other hand, de Tocqueville tied conflict to amelioration of the situation: "Nations that have endured patiently and almost unconsciously the most overwhelming oppression often burst into rebellion against the yoke the moment it grows lighter (in Davies, p. 5). Davies then combines the two to argue first for a Marx-effect followed by a de Tocqueville-effect: an improvement accompanied by rising expectations, followed by a crisis and deterioration in level of need satisfaction, producing a gap between what people want and what they can get. Note that both Organski and Davies predict <u>when</u> conflict occurs, but not <u>where</u> it occurs in social structure; they locate conflict in time but not in social space. A cross-sectional perspective can readily be added by translating their ideas into status inconsistency terms. The idea of relative deprivation is similar to Organski's idea of an industrializing (achieved status) subordinate state challenging an older, established (ascribed status) power; the former employs the latter as a reference group and perceives itself as relatively deprived.

The connection between nationalism -- as one of the ideologies that accompany conflict and revolution — and structural discrepancy in ranks was formulated this way by Deutsch (1953): "The intensity and appeals of nationalism in a world of sharply differentiated income and living standards perhaps may tend to be inversely proportional to the barriers to mobility between regions and classes, and

directly proportional to the barriers against cultural assimilation, and to the extent of the economic and prestige differences between classes, cultures, and regions" (p. 180). Disregarding commensurable units, Deutsch's relationships can be expressed as follows:

$$\text{Appeal of nationalism} = \text{Rate of mobility} \times \left[\begin{array}{c}\text{cultural-linguistic barriers}\end{array} \times \begin{array}{c}\text{achieved-ascribed rank differences}\end{array}\right]$$

Mobility, as an indicator of social mobilization, serves a "gate-keeper" function (Himmelstrand, 1969). If mobility is zero, or below some threshold level, the appeal of nationalism is also zero. We will discuss the cultural-linguistic barriers later when the variable of language is taken up. For now we simply note that such barriers and rank discrepancies are in a multiplicative relationship, because it is precisely the raising of barriers that permits status inconsistency to occur. If there were no barriers and hence no inconsistency, or if the existing barriers were unsurmountable and hence impeded any mobility, the appeal of nationalism would be absent.

We can summarize this discussion of mobilization, status inconsistency, and nationalism with the diagram in Figure III-1. In Figure 1a, group A is completely dominant; it is high on achieved and ascribed status. Group B, on the other hand, is completely subordinate; it is low on both dimensions. The rate of mobility is zero; the barriers are insurmountable; there is intra-group status consistency and inter-group stability. In Figure 1b, at some later point in time, there is potential for inter-group friction when, as a result of social mobilization, group B ascends in achieved status to challenge the dominance of group A. Group B is now less absolutely deprived than before, but

Figure III-1

Hypothetical Diagrams of Consistency and Inconsistency Between Achieved and Ascribed Statuses



Note: X = dimension of achieved status (e.g. economic)

Y = dimension of ascribed status (e.g. ethnicity)

In Figure 1a, there is intra-group status consistency and inter-group stability.

In Figure 1b, there is consistency for group A, inconsistency for group B, and inter-group instability as B rises to challenge the economic dominance of A.

more relatively deprived as the achieved status of group A becomes the reference point. Mobility is high, the barriers are lower, and group is status inconsistent. Nationalism and conflict is assumed to have maximal effects when group B reaches the critical "power transition" interval and begins to catch-up with group A's achieved status.

This developmental picture can now be combined with the cross-sectional typology of commitment. Table III-1 presents commitment types as a function of two levels of achieved and ascribed status. It summarizes the basic propositions of the theory. It is interesting to observe that the table corresponds in a general way with historian Hayes' (1926, 1931) classical descriptions of four types of nationalism.

Table III-1

Types of Commitment as a Function of Status

Ascribed Status (ethnicity)	Achieved Status (economic): High	Achieved Status (economic): Low
High	Functional commitment	Symbolic and Ideological commitment (defensive)
Low	Symbolic and Ideological commitment (expansive)	Normative commitment

The cell of Functional commitment corresponds to Hayes' "liberal nationalism," characterized by system-openess. The Functionally involved are status consistent, since they they typically come form the educational and economic elite classes. The consistent cell of Normative commitment corresponds to "traditional nationalism" that favors the status quo. The passive acceptance of the normative order

is found primarily among those who no direct involvement in the maintenance of society's major institutions, viz. the working masses of low ascribed status. The two inconsistent cells are the most interesting ones. Hayes would associate the low ascribed/high achieved cell with "Jacobin nationalism," a dynamic force that demands revolutionary changes in the system; and the high ascribed/low achieved cell with "integral nationalism," or the absolute maintenance and defense of national integrity. In terms of our theory, the former cell includes the rising elites of the subordinate ethnic group who are Symbolically and Ideologically committed to changes in the system, and the latter cell includes the masses of the dominant group who are Symbolically and Ideologically committed to the defense of what they perceive as a threat to their interests by the newly rising elites.[2]

Intergenerational Mobility

A second theoretical construct that we attempt to relate to the types of commitment is intergenerational mobility. In fact, the problem of status inconsistency is formally the same as that of mobility (Jackson and Curtis, 1969). The only difference is that in the former case, two (or more) contemporary statuses are compared, whereas in the latter the statuses are at different points in time.

The classic work of Bettelheim and Janowitz (1964) on mobility and prejudice is sufficiently known so that the rationale can be stated briefly. They begin by cautioning that social mobility itself does not explain the historical genesis of ethnic prejudice in any group. It is relevant only is explaining the mobile person's deviation from, or conformity to, group norms. The effects of mobility on beliefs

and attitudes stem from break-downs in group norms and personal control. Progressive division of labor weakens social bonds and the "collective representations" upon which social integration rests. Greater mobility opportunities become available and the social and personal disruptions wrought by mobility loosen personal control. Ethnic prejudice is associated with downward social mobility and extremely rapid upward mobility; moderate upward mobility, however, is associated with ethnic tolerance. The downwardly mobile person experiences feelings of insecurity and deprivation, and the prejudice is a defensive reaction against the crumbling social order. He should be even more prejudiced than the stationary lower status group to which he is about to enter. Likewise, extremely rapid upward mobility produces disruptive effects on the individual such that he becomes more prejudiced than the stationary high status group he is entering. Just as all forms of status inconsistency are not necessarily stressful, the authors emphasize that the economic context in which mobility occurs must be taken into account (is it a desired economic goal in the society?), as well as the norms of the groups to and from which the mobile person is moving.

In a parallel way, we could hypothesize different forms of commitment as a function of intergenerational mobility. Table III-2 describes the commitment types in a 2 X 2 table defined by the fathers' occupation and the respondents' own expected occupation. There are two mobile and two stationary conditions; we are excluding the finer differentiation of Bettelheim and Janowitz between moderate and rapid upward mobility. High stationary status is predicted to be associated

with Functional commitment, since persons in this condition are involved in high educational, technological, and economic roles in the system. The stationary low status persons are expected to be Normatively committed. The downwardly mobile, threatened by the expected loss of status, are likely to engage in "rightist" or defensive Ideological and Symbolic commitment. Finally, the upwardly mobile are predicted to show an expansive or "leftist" kind of Ideological and Symbolic commitment oriented toward structural changes. These predictions of commitment for status mobility, as can be expected, parallel those made earlier for status inconsistency.

Table III-2

Types of Commitment as a Function of Intergenerational Mobility

		Fathers' Occupation: High	Fathers' Occupation: Low
Respondents' own expected future occupation: High		Functional commitment	Symbolic and Ideological commitment (expansive)
Respondents' own expected future occupation: Low		Symbolic and Ideological commitment (defensive)	Normative commitment

Language

Since our interest is in commitment in multilingual societies, we shall turn to language as the third independent variable of the theory. The objective, at the system level, is to trace the stages in the social organization of language that arise from social mobilization which lead to greater system integration or disintegration;

and at the individual level, to see how the acquisition of bilingualism in the process of mobilization could lead to forms of commitment and non-commitment or alienation.

Language, ethnicity and nationalism

The connections between these three variables are complex and merit study in their own right (cf. Deutsch, 1953; Weinreich, 1953). Yet in a review of the literature, Fishman (1968) notes there is "very little language-related research on the development of identification with broader nationality and the broader nation" (p. 216). If the language dimension in integration and nationality has been slighted, its influence on perception and thought processes has not been unrecognized (e.g. the Whorfian hypothesis). If language influences cognition, then ethnic groups with distinctive languages may respond differently to the same social stimuli (Ervin, 1964), including perceptions of the same political system.

Ethnic groups and languages are closely related; in many cases, the word for an ethnic group is identical or has the same root as the word for their language. Since different ethnic groups usually speak different languages, Fichte was led to claim that "Whenever a separate language is found, there is also a separate nation which has the right to manage its affairs ... and rule itself" (in Roy, 1962, p. 158). A common language can be a vehicle for uniting a group and protecting it against outsiders. This is one way in which language is related to nationalism. Hertzler (1965) observed that until the appearance of modern nationalism, language had never been an object of political and cultural conflict. Park (1922) found that linguistic revivals preceded almost every European nationalistic movement since the 18th

century. The reason why language differences are often entangled with broader political issues is the inherent competition that arises when different language groups come in contact. The conditions that favor one group are often to the detriment of the other. The establishment of Hindi in India, for example, was opposed by elites who spoke different tongues for fear it would disadvantage them for government jobs. Ethno-linguistic cleavages within a system, then, render more difficult the task of political integration. Deutsch (1961) observes: "Other things being equal, the stage of rapid social mobilization may be expected to promote the consolidation of states whose people already share the same language, culture, and major social institutions, while the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages, or cultures, or basic ways of life" (p. 501). When rapid mobilization produces competitive situations in which one group advances at the expense of, or independently of, other groups, three outcomes could take place: assimilation of the subordinate language group to the dominant group, thereby surrendering one's ethnic identity; institutional reforms to remove some of the barriers and handicaps to mobility; or disintegration of the political order through secession, outmigration, or independence (Lieberson, 1970). In the next section we will consider some of the conditions produced by mobilization that lead to one or another of these outcomes.

Mobilization and language development

Fishman (1967) has presented a typology of nation-states characterized by the presence or absence of bilingualism and diglossia. We

apply the logic of his approach to propose three stages of mobilization and language development. These are diagrammed in Figure III-2.

Stage I: Role separation and language separation. Diglossia, as described by Ferguson (1959), is a general term for situations in which a high (H) or standard linguistic code is used for formal communication, and a lower (L) or "uncultivated" variety is used for more intimate, informal communication. The H and L codes can be two different languages or two dialects of the same language. The independence and absence of conflict between them is assured by having each code serve a different set of functions. According to Fishman (1967), each language is associated with a set of compartmentalized roles. The H code is used in high economic, political, and educational roles by the dominant ethnic group; the L language is associated with lower work roles of the subordinate group. The separation of linguistic and social roles is thus mutually supportive. If social roles were not differentiated, one language would displace the other — one code would suffice. This state of affairs is depicted in Stage I. Two monolingual speech communities are separated by impermeable ascribed boundaries but are still "united" in a single body politic. One group occupies the high roles and speaks the H language, and the other is associated with the low roles and L language. Note that Stage I corresponds to the previous Figure III-1a, which showed a state of stability between the high and low groups because of the large gap between them in ascribed and achieved status. The two analyses are complementary: one focuses on status and the other on the linguistic correlates of status and roles.

Figure III-2

Mobilization and Stages of Language Development



Stage II: Breakdown of role separation and threat of assimilation. As a result of mobilization leading to increased mobility opportunities, coupled with institutional reforms, some members of the subordinate group succeed in rising along achieved status dimensions. Role compartmentalization begins to break down; roles previously held only by the elite are opened-up. But as subordinate members enter high roles, they necessarily also have to learn the H language and the accompanying values and culture patterns associated with the high roles. Bilingualism appears among some subordinate members occupying high roles. The monolingual nature of the subordinate ethnic group is broken, and there is a threat of assimilation to the dominant roles and language. As Fishman (1967) observes, "Without the functional separation of roles and language, the language that is fortunate to be associated with the currents of social change tends to become the dominant one, displacing the other" (p. 35).

Stage III: Role integration and language separation. With greater industrialization and social change, the breakdown of role separation becomes almost complete. Role integration begins in the sense that more and more high and low roles are allocated on an achievement rather than ascriptive basis. This chain of events results in an ever increasing danger of absorption into the dominant language group. Mackay (1967) notes that when one speech community within a system becomes increasingly bilingual, "it assures the linguistic dominance of the other (monolingual community), which can then assimilate the bilingual community. This has been the fate of many bilingual communities in the past and is why bilingual countries seek their survival in regional monolingualism" (p. 12). Stage III corresponds to the situation

depicted in Figure III-1b, which showed status inconsistency in the rising subordinate group. In terms of the theory of commitment, we propose that the response of the new rising elites to the status inconsistency and the increased mobility opportunities can take one of two expressions as a function of language knowledge: (1) the more bilingual members of the subordinate group will reject or be non-committed culturally to their own ethno-linguistic group and assimilate to the dominant language group; (2) the monolingual members of the subordinate group will reject, or separate from, the dominant language group and be more committed culturally and politically to their own ethno-linguistic group. We will examine next some evidence for these propositions.

Language and alienation

The implication we have derived from the foregoing theoretical analysis is the necessity of considering also non-commitment or alienation. The rationale was that the breakdown of role and language separation resulted in more subordinate group members attaining high roles and bilingual proficiency, thereby absorbing the values and behavior patterns codified in the dominant language. These persons should experience role uncertainty and feelings of marginality since Stages II and III represent the structural conditions that Durkheim in Suicide described as leading to anomie.

Lambert (1967) and his associates, starting from the different task of developing a social psychological theory of second language acquisition, presents evidence that fits our theoretical argument. Gardner and Lambert (1959) and Anisfeld and Lambert (1961) have shown

that successful mastery of a second language results in the gradual adoption of various features of the language community. As one becomes proficient in the new language, his position in his own membership group changes as the new language group becomes more than a reference -- it becomes almost a second membership group. This process of bilingual acquisition involves a conflict of values and allegiances that affects the evaluation of self and own ethnic group. Thus, a series of studies showed that French Canadian college students who were bilingual evaluated their own ethnic group less favorably than monolinguals (Lambert et al., 1960). The results were replicated with children. Ten year old French Canadians of upper middle class background also tended to downgrade their own ethnic group and evaluate more positively the English Canadians; the greater the bilingual skill, the more pronounced the effect. Children from lower income levels also rejected their own ethnic group relative to the English -- but only if they were bilingual. Comparable monolingual children did not downgrade their French Canadian ethnicity.

Clearly language is a critical variable in ethnic perceptions and attitudes. It should be noted that it is not the second language per se that produces these feelings of rejection of one's ethnicity. Rather, they are occasioned by the role uncertainty and self-identity conflicts that arise when that language is acquired by the subordinate ethnic member. Cross-pressures on his sense of belonging arise from the speech community he is being pulled out of, and the community he is being assimilated into.

In a study of French Americans in New England, Lambert (1967) described four modes of role adjustment which parallel Child's (1943)

earlier study of second generation Italian Americans. First, those most proficient in English were also strongly attached to American culture and rejected their own ethnic background (French or Italian). This mode of adjustment is similar to the relative satisfaction or individual careerism response of the status inconsistent persons we described earlier -- the denial of own ethnicity and over-identification with the dominant group, as in the case of "white Negroes." A second mode found by Lambert and Child was the opposite of the first: a rejection of American culture and a greater attachment to, and fluency in, the own original culture and language. This parallels the relative deprivation outcome of status inconsistency described before -- an enhanced identification with own ethnic in-group, as in the case of the current black cultural nationalism. A third group was found to be ambivalent about their cultural identity, confused regarding their ethno-cultural allegiances, and retarded in their command of both English and French. These are persons alienated from, or non-committed to, either the central or regional locus. The final group described by Lambert appeared to have developed a comfortable Franco-American bicultural identity. They have overcome the cross-pressures of role conflict, are bilingual and at ease in both cultural communities, and have an open-minded, non-ethnocentric view of peoples. In terms of our theory, they are probably Symbolically committed to both the central and regional locus. Using these findings as guidelines, we will attempt to seek similar systematic patterns of language knowledge and cultural allegiances in our own research in Quebec and Belgium.

To sum up, we have examined in some detail Deutsch's observation

that social mobilization in linguistically plural societies can lead to malintegrative effects. At the individual level we examined cultural alienation and assimilation as two response correlates of mobilization. On the basis of this theoretical discussion the the literature reviewed, we propose the following hypothesis on language and political commitment in multilingual societies: The greater a person's bilingual fluency, the less the Symbolic commitment to own ethnic group (alienation) and the more the Symbolic commitment to the central political system and the ethnic out-group (assimilation). Conversely, the less the bilingual fluency, the greater the Symbolic commitment to own ethnic group and the less the Symbolic commitment to the central political system and the out-group.

CHAPTER IV

NATIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT IN QUEBEC AND BELGIUM

In all cross-national research a measure of historical perspective is needed. This chapter presents historical sketches of social mobilization and nationalism in Quebec and Belgium. The objective, to be certain, is not to describe all the specific circumstances surrounding these events in the two countries. The aim is simply to place in broad historical context those variables and relationships discussed in the preceding chapter -- to give some substance and human significance to an otherwise abstract framework. This also allows us to introduce some social, economic, and political aggregate data that are illustrative of, and provide indirect evidence for, some of the relationships proposed by the theory. From the leads that history and the aggregate data afford, we can derive hypotheses from the theory that are directly applicable to Quebec and Belgium.

Quebec: The Defeated Keep the Faith

> English Canadians make no effort to learn French. Some of them have lived here in Three Rivers (95 % French-speaking population) for 50 years and still don't know a word of French. They think themselves culturally superior; they own 75 % of the local capital --- they're camping here like some imperial army in a colony (interview in Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission, 1965, p. 38).
>
> "You know, they are building Manicougan in French," a proud Quebecker said today. He meant that the blueprints and specifications for the multi-million dollar hydroelectric plant under construction on the Manicougan River were in French as well as English. "You have no idea, but there is something precedent-breaking in a French Canadian engineer getting to read building plans in his own language" (in New York Times, March 17, 1965).

The traditional nationalism

Tradition permeates contemporary French Canadian problems and the salient features of Quebec history need to be pointed out because of their bearing for the present. All French Canadian political thinking, according to Trudeau (1968), stems from historical origins. Rioux (1971) opens his book stating: "When Champaign founded Quebec in 1608, nearly four centuries ago, the Quebec problem was born. Everything goes back to that" (p. 4). The motto of Quebec is "Je me souviens," and above all, the French Canadian remembers the golden age of New France (1534-1759), a period romanticized and glorified by Quebec historians. Founded by missionaries of the Counter-Reformation, New France developed a unique social organization that persisted virtually unchanged until well into the 20th century. The basic unit was the parish and priests held unrivalled prestige and power. Nationality and religion were early welded together. It was a two tier system: the clergy and a few noble seigneurs, and the masses.

The so-called inferiority complex of French Canadians stems from the consciousness of belonging to a conquered people. The defeat of New France in the hands of the British in the Plains of Abraham in 1759 marked the beginning of "la survivance." Isolated from France, encircled by an English-speaking world, pushed out of commerce and administration, "all Quebec became a subjugated ethnic class" (Rioux, 1971, p. 27). To survive, the French Canadians developed one of the highest birth rates in the world; in the next 200 years, while the world population multiplied by three, the French Canadian population multiplied by eighty. The Rebellion of 1837-38 of the Patriot Party against the British is important as a precursor to the independence

ideology of contemporary separatists. It was led by an emerging elite of the liberal professions -- lawyers, notaries, physicians, classically trained intellectuals -- and opposed by French Canadian business circles much as their present counterparts oppose separatism. The Rebellion failed, but in the aftermath there emerged a new elite composed of clergy and the liberal professions. They molded an ideology of survival rather than independence, of resisting British assimilation rather than seeking statehood. This ideology of preservation of laws, language, customs, and faith was to become the dominant definition and unifying thread of Quebec society for over a century. This is the traditional, conservative "French Canadian nationalism" which, according to Wade (1964), is actually "a provincialism complicated by ethnic and religious factors" (p. 3).

The British North America Act of 1867 creating the Confederation of Canada is another historical source of current conflicts. For the British, Confederation was simply a federal union of provinces, but the French saw it as a treaty or pact between "two founding races" which guaranteed each group equal rights and partnership in the new polity. The present insistence of French Canadians for Quebec autonomy and decreased centralization of power in Ottawa, and for a bicultural Canada, stem from this interpretation of history (Preliminary Report, 1965). The French feel they have more than kept their part of the "treaty" in their tolerance of English minorities in Quebec, while they feel the English have violated the spirit and letter of the pact.

Industrialization and the new nationalism

In 1871, 80% of the population was rural; by 1921, 51 % was urban.

The English minority and foreign interests controlled the financial and economic power; in 1934, American companies represented one third of Quebec's industrial capital. The French Canadians trailed behind in industrial leadership. Trained in exclusive Catholic classical colleges, and scorning technical and commercial subjects, the French Canadian elite was more adequately prepared, as Wade (1964) wryly noted, for the Kingdom of Heaven than the Province of Quebec -- a perfect example of institutional failure. The 1930's saw the start of the rapid transition from agrarian to industrial society, described in Hughes' French Canada in Transition. He argues that Catholic values prevented the crystallization of a religious and economic ethic. The French Canadian elite resisted industrialization and urbanization, and sought to preserve the Catholic, agrarian, way of life which, though necessary a century before for collective survival, was no longer functional in the 20th century. The rule of this elite was one of enlightened despotism: the masses were commendable in their place so long as they accepted their spiritual and political leadership. They served as middlemen between the growing French Canadian industrial proletariat composed of rural migrants, and the English economic overlords (Wade, 1964). It is ironic that they who fought so strenuously for the survival of French Canadian institutions were unable or unwilling to adapt them for survival in an industrial epoch.

Between 1939 and 1949 the rate of industrialization in Quebec was higher than that of Canada as a whole. In an essay on social development, Guindon (1960) showed how this industrialization served the converging interests of the traditional French elite and the English and foreign entrepreneurs. More importantly, he links this to the

emergence of a new middle class composed of technicians, artists, social scientists, journalists, and younger government bureaucrats. This new elite, no longer inspired by the traditional nationalist ideology, began to sow the seeds of discord throughout the 1950's. A new era dawned in Quebec in 1959 with the death of Premier Duplessis who, as the personification of the traditional elite, ruled for fifteen years as the Huey Long of "a reactionary coalition with economic and ecclesiastical powers" (Wilson, 1967). In 1960 the Liberal Party was swept into office for the first time in two decades, led and supported by the new elite, under the banner "Maître chez nous" and "Il faut que ça change" — the Quiet Revolution was begun.

Since 1960 sweeping economic and social reforms have been attempted to bring the French Canadian masses into the modern world. Institutional reforms, of course, come slowly and the pent-up frustrations of the "100-year winter" erupted in occasional terrorist bombings, the defacing of British monuments and recently in kidnappings that shattered the "Quiet" of the Revolution. Rioux (1971) observes that "the struggle to destroy the status quo is as much a struggle within Quebec, between different population strata, as one against the Ottawa government" (p. 173). Cook (1966) also notes that the current crisis is first of all one of rising expectations within Quebec itself and only secondarily of Confederation. There are, thus, two dynamics to the Quebec questions: An internal one directed against the old French clerical-political elite and the English economic elite, and an external one vis-a-vis the rest of Canada. Although the two aspects are obviously related, we shall focus primarily on the internal dimension. Specifically, our interest is on the "new nationalism"

of the rising middle class (Fortin, 1969). Since the 1950's this new elite has been seeking its own power base by displacing the old elite and competing economically with the English. Many, but not all, see the instrument of national development in the state -- that is, an independent political state of Quebec. "The new middle class produced by recent industrialization has provided the backbone for the independence movement. The poor and uneducated French Canadians have thus far shown no interest in it but have provided the backbone for Confederation" (Wilson, 1967, pp. 122-123). History has come to a full circle. The elite that took over after the Rebellion of 1837-38 substituted an ideology of survival for independence. The elite that took over after the Quiet Revolution substituted independence for cultural survival.

Social-economic structure

Economics and political independence are the two main components of the internal dimension of the Quebec question and we will examine both briefly. Differences in economic power and mobility between the English and French in Quebec are a central point of contention. The Royal Commission (1965) described the "privileged position" of the British minority as "living in a social world of its own, apart from the French ...they prosper in splendid isolation ... they live as if not a thing had changed in their lives" (p. 83). Relations between the two ethnic groups are neither good nor bad, simply non-existent. "We began to sense an actual barrier between the cultures that is extremely difficult to cross" (p. 40). One reason of the barrier is economic. De Jocas and Rocher (1967) found intergenerational mobility was greater for British than French. British fathers and sons were

concentrated in white collar occupations and it was double for sons than for fathers. French fathers and sons were in the "workers level," and the proportion did not change significantly over the years. This situation is made all the more acute in the context of the population distribution of Quebec. As of the last census in 1961, the French in Quebec constituted 80.6% of the population and this proportion has rested quite stable over the past several decades. The English, however, composed only 10.8%, and their numbers have been declining over the years (e.g. 13.6% in 1941).

Unfortunately we have no economic trend statistics to present. However it is a safe assumption that the present economic differences between English and French were certainly no smaller in earlier years. Table IV-1 shows the differences in occupational distribution between British and French in 1961. At the upper echelons, those of French origin fare worse than the British, and the difference is greater in Quebec where they constitute the majority of the population than in

Table IV-1

Occupational Distribution (in %) of British and French in Canada, Quebec, and Montreal in 1961

	Canada		Quebec		Montreal	
Professional, Technical, Managerial	British 21.4	French 13.5	British 30.4	French 13.9	British 38.9	French 16.6
Difference:	7.9		16.6		22.3	
Craftsmen, workers, laborers	30.1	38.9	26.1	39.2	25.4	42.7
Difference:	8.8		13.1		17.3	

Source: Census of Canada, 1961, in Report of the Royal Commission, Book III, p. 42.

Canada as a whole; in Montreal, the industrial center of Quebec, this difference is the greatest. The reverse trend occurs at the lower occupational levels. Lieberson (1970, p. 6) also reports data showing that the French in Montreal have a lower income than the English even when sex, education, and occupation are controlled. Part of the problem is due to the predominance of the English language in the modern business and technological world. "I learned to think in French, I learned to manage a small business in French ... but when I walk into a factory they ask me, 'Mister, do you speak English?' In other words, I learned everything I know in French but I am forced to earn my living in English" (interview reported in Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission, 1965). Since three out of every four French Canadians in Quebec do not speak a word of English, or about 3 million individuals, the consequences of not knowing English for mobility are obvious. But conversely, the ambitious upwardly mobile English Quebecker faces no similar pressures to learn French (cf. Brazeau, 1958; Royal Commission, Book III, 1968). Further, "the young French Canadian who contemplates a career in industry finds himself in a dilemma. He feels that to be successful he will have to sacrifice a part of his linguistic and cultural identity. This man feels profoundly alienated" (Rioux, 1971, p. 94). Table IV-2 illustrates the degree of British and foreign control in the Quebec economy. Except for agriculture, services, and retail trade, all the other major sectors of the economy are owned by non-French interests.

Occupation, of course, is closely related to education. In this domain the French also lag behind the English. On the average,

Table IV-2

Size of Establishments Owned by Francophones, Anglophones, and Foreign Interests in Selected Industrial Sectors in Quebec

	employees in thousands	% of labor force in establishments owned by:		
		Francophones	Anglophones	foreign interests
Agriculture	131.2	91.3	8.7	0.0
Mining	25.9	6.5	53.1	40.4
Manufacturing	468.3	21.8	46.9	31.3
Transportation	102.4	37.5	49.4	13.1
Wholesale trade	69.3	34.1	47.2	18.7
Retail trade	178.7	56.7	35.8	7.5
Finance	62.2	25.8	53.1	21.1
Service	350.9	71.4	28.6	0.0

Source: Report of the Royal Commission, 1969, Book III, p. 54.

male English Quebeckers have spent 9.6 years in school while French Quebeckers have spent 7.1 years according to the 1961 census. Of the seven different ethnic groups in Quebec, the educational attainment of the French ranked sixth; only Italians were lower. Table IV-3 shows the number of students enrolled in French and English-speaking universities in Quebec over the years. The two are not directly comparable since a large proportion of English enrollment comes from outside Quebec. Nonetheless it is interesting to note that in recent years, paralleling the rapid industrial growth of Quebec, there is a sharp percentage increase of the French university population. It even surpasses the English enrollment which is already inflated by the non-Quebec students. This is important, since it is from the university ranks that emerge the new nationalist elite.

Table IV-3

Number of Students and Percentage Increase in French and English Universities in Quebec

Years	N in French Universities	% increase	N in English Universities	% increase
1947-48	23,444	(baseline)	36,472	(baseline)
1952-53	24,743	105.5	41,697	114.5
1957-58	36,302	146.7	60,122	144.2
1961-62	56,508	155.7	85,492	142.2

Source: Annuaire du Québéc, 1957, 1966.

Political trends

We have described the emergence out of industrialization of a new elite committed to challenging the status quo. In a democracy the most tangible expression of that challenge is found in the ballot. One would expect, of course, some time lag between the initial industriali-

zation period and the time the new middle class makes its political impact felt. Figure IV-1 presents the percentage of votes received by the various Quebec political parties since the aftermath of the Second War. From 1944 to 1960, every general election was controlled by the conservative Union Nationale Party under Duplessis, the representative of the traditional French Canadian nationalism. The first break occurs in 1960 when the death of Duplessis paved the way to power for the Liberal Party. The major realignment in Quebec politics occurs in 1970. The separatist-oriented members of the new middle class, frustrated by what they saw as insubstantial gains of the Quiet Revolution of the 1960's and pulled by the vision of what an independent state could offer, abandoned the Liberal Party and established a third party, the Parti Québéçois, committed to a separate Quebec by democratic channels. Lemieux et al. (1970) consider the 1970 elections as the most significant break in Quebec electoral history. For the first time, a third party (and a separatist party at that) captured 23.5% of the popular vote, surpassing the conservative party and establishing itself as the second major party in Quebec. A populist party, the Ralliement Creditiste, also appeared in 1970. What is perhaps most interesting for our purposes is the composition of the voters for the separatist party. Tables IV-4a, 4b, and 4c, present the results of a poll of pre-election voting intentions by ethnicity, education level, and occupation. The separatist voters are predominantly French, highly educated, and from upper-middle class occupations. The separatist supporters, as Wilson (1967) noted, are clearly "more intellectual than popular, more bourgeois than proletarian" (p. 123).

Figure IV-1

Percentage of Votes for Political Parties at General Elections of Quebec, 1944-1970



Source: Based on Annuaire du Québéc, 1966, and Lemieux et al., 1970.

Table IV-4

4a. Pre-election Voting Intentions (%) by Years of Education in Quebec

Intend to vote:	0-7 years	8-12 years	13+ years
Liberal	41.9	41.8	30.3
Separatist	23.7	28.9	44.4
Conservative	16.1	16.0	16.2
Populist	18.3	13.3	9.1

Source: Poll of Soleil, April 1970, in Lemieux et al., 1970, p. 66.

4b. Pre-election Voting Intentions (%) by Occupation in Quebec

Intend to vote:	Lower	Lower-middle class	Upper-middle class
Liberal	28.6	52.2	35.7
Separatist	28.6	4.3	42.9
Conservative	17.0	34.8	14.8
Populist	25.9	8.7	6.6

Source: Idem.

4c. Pre-election Voting Intentions (%) by Ethnicity in Quebec

Intend to vote:	French	English
Liberal	34.7	71.9
Separatist	34.3	15.6
Conservative	16.8	9.4
Populist	14.2	3.1

Source: Idem.

It can also be inferred that the young are primarily separatist. In the 1970 elections the voting age was lowered to 18 years, and 40% of the newly franchised voted for the Parti Québéçois. Thus, the rebirth of the independence movement, some thirty years after the rural-to-industrial transition period, is now spearheaded by those one would expect to be the most satisfied with the status quo.

Belgium: An Oppressed Majority and Two Oppressed Minorities

> In the cemeteries of Brussels the majority of the inscriptions on the tombs are engraved in the French language. This is well the proof that Brussels is an essentially French-speaking city and that the imposed bilingualism is odious (a Brussels municipal councilor, in du Roy, 1968, p. 9).
>
> Why should the Congolese learn French and not Flemish? The Belgian Congo is a zone where the two communities have the same rights. It is necessary to align a linguistic division on the Congo as on Brussels ... (Flemish colonist in 1958; in du Roy, 1968, p. 104).
>
> A union of Walloon employees appealed to the Secretary General of the U.N. against the "repression" of which the Walloons are victim (du Roy, 1968, p. 10).
>
> Let me tell you the truth, the great and terrible truth: there are no Belgians. (Jules Destrée, Letter to the King, 1912).

A cursory reading of Belgian history would dispel any doubts that the size of a country can be inversely proportional to the complexity of its integration problems. At casual glance the linguistic quarrels are all part of the folkloric charm of Belgium. But this surface covers over a century of intransigeance and misunderstandings among the three principal regional groups -- Flemings, Brusselers, and Walloons -- that at times have brought the country to the brink of break-up. At the same time, considering the tragic history of other ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe in this century, one marvels

at the largely non-violent, constitutional management of ethno-linguistic conflict in Belgium that has produced some highly ingenious modes of equilibrium and compromise.

Belgium, at its farthest points, is 170 miles long and 110 miles wide with a population at the last census of 1961 of 9,189,741 inhabitants. A linguistic frontier separates the four northern, Dutch-speaking (plus Flemish dialects) provinces of Flanders with 51.3% of the population, and the four southern French-speaking (plus Walloon dialects) provinces of Wallonia with 33%; the province of Brabant is partioned by the frontier into Flemish and Walloon cantons, and it includes the bilingual capital of Brussels with 15.9% of the population. Ninety percent of the population lives within 50 miles of Brussels. This frontier, although legally established only in 1963, has remained immutable since the 5th century when it separated the Gothic and Germanic invaders.

Lorwin (1963) has described Belgium as a Verzuiling system — a Dutch term that implies a system of spiritual pillars or families that support and compartmentalize the social-political system. There are three families — bourgeois-conservative, Catholic, socialist — and they correspond to the three major political parties: Liberal, Catholic, and Socialist, respectively. Each family has its own ideology, life style, and historically accumulated cultural and economic institutions. Most conflicts and compromises, according to Lorwin, are conducted within this system of Verzuiling. Such a system has significant implications. Earlier we described Simmel's theory that secondary relationships tend to weaken primary identifications because of overlapping multiple loyalties. Thus in the U.S. multiple affiliations

in voluntary associations effectively dilute particularistic loyalties. In the Belgian Verzuiling, multiple affiliations reinforce primary loyalties because all the affiliations of an individual are made in the context of one spiritual family and the same linguistic group. It is possible for a Catholic, for example, "to spend womb to tomb in a series of Catholic sub-cultures:" parish, school, youth groups, professional organizations, family organizations, credit unions, insurance, hospital, cemetery. A similar but less extensive network is supported by Liberals and Socialists. It should be added, though, that membership in these families is today often more an act of social conformity (party membership is requisite for public jobs, and voting is compulsory) than an act of political commitment. Still, the important fact is that the organizational pillars remain and are strong.

However, some events fall outside the Verzuiling system and threaten it. The most notable is ethnic-linguistic conflict. It challenges not only the system and the traditional parties but the state of Belgium itself. This conflict has three aspects corresponding to the three regions, each with its own historical antecedents: the Flemish problem, the Walloon problem, and the Brussels problem. We shall briefly review each in turn.

The Flemish problem

Herremans (1948) argues that the Flemish problem pre-existed the creation of Belgium in 1830, that it has its historical roots in the 17th and 18th centuries. This is reminiscent of the Quebec historians who trace the origins of the Quebec problem to Champaign. From 1794 to 1814, the Flemish provinces were annexed to France. There was no overt linguistic conflict, but the seeds were sown as French, then the

language of all European elites, was established in the high levels of Flemish society. Flemish was banished from the schools; Flemish newspapers had to publish a French translation. The cultural decay and economic backwardness of Flanders at this time contrasted, on the one hand, with the glory that was Antwerp's in the 16th century, and on the other, with the brilliance of French culture and civilization during the annexation period. With the fall of the French Empire, Flanders was reunited with the Netherlands (1815-1830) and the Dutch language reestablished. This satisfied the masses but it so antagonized the French-speaking Flemish elite that the official use of French was instituted again in 1829.

In 1830 the Kingdom of Belgium was created, and the first act of the government was to proclaim French as the official language. Later, Article 23 of the Constitution of 1831 declared the free use of language in Belgium, but for nearly 100 years, it was not applied as French continued to be dominant in commerce, education, and affairs of state. Article 23, like the British North America Act for the French Canadians, was to become a legitimate basis for grievances of Flemish nationalists. Like early Quebec's two-tier society, Van Haegendoren (1966) describes Flanders at this time as "a bimodal polarized society," composed of the French-speaking bourgeois elite and the politically disenfranchised Flemish masses. The Flemish were a colonized nation in their own country. "One could say that the Fleming of the time was governed, judged, educated, and ordered in French. A sentiment of linguistic humiliation was added to all the other sources of contemporary vexations" (Herremans, 1948, p. 52). Unemployment was high in agrarian Flanders, and many Flemings migrated to France or industrial Wallonia

for work, where the "francisation" of the Fleming was considered a "civilizing activity" (Brazeau, 1966).

The 1850's and 1860's saw the emergence of a Flemish cultural nationalism. It was romantic and literary, not political. Under the slogan "De Taal is gansch het volk" (The language is the people), cultural associations sprung-up to re-kindle in the masses a love for the mother tongue and pride in the past. A national Flemish anthem, flag, and holiday were adopted; chapters of history were romanticized. Meanwhile French continued to be indispensable for mobility. "To be Belgian," complained a Fleming of the period, "we must cease to be Flemish" (in Lorwin, 1966, p. 4).

The first of three sets of linguistic laws aimed at correcting the injustices was promulgated between 1873 and 1898. Dutch was recognized as the second official language and the use of Dutch was provided for in high schools, in administration, and in the courts of Flanders. The First World War accentuated the differences between the Flemish and the Walloons. Some of the growing number of Flemish nationalists collaborated with the "Flamenpolitik" of the German occupiers under the slogan "Nu of Nooit" (Now or Never) for the establishment of an autonomous Flanders. The Walloons considered them as traitors; the Flemish demanded their amnesty claiming the entire Flemish people stood in judgment. The between war years, according to Lamberty (1944), Flemish nationalism reached proportions it had never attained before. It was a period of "the flamandisation of the masses;" it was no longer simply a cultural movement, it had become a political force. The passage of universal male suffrage after the First War allowed the previously unfranchised Flemish majority to send more representatives

to Parliament to argue their cause. For the first time, specifically Flemish nationalist parties appeared, but they did not seriously threaten the established parties. A second set of linguistic laws was decreed between 1932 and 1938, that created the present linguistic pattern of Belgium. The compromise between the Flemish demand for a bilingual Belgium and the Walloon demand for unilingualism ended up with regional monolingualism. The University of Ghent was made an all-Flemish institution in 1930, one of the principal goals of the Flemish movement, thereby paving the way for new generations of Flemish elites to be entirely educated in Dutch. 1930 also saw the first annual pilgrimage to l'Yser, where around a tower engraved with the initials AVV-VVK in the form of a cross (All for Flanders, Flanders for Christ), tens of thousands gather to reaffirm their commitment to the Flemish cause in a religious-nationalistic ritual that can only be likened in stirring fervor to a Southern Baptist revival. At this time, too, the expression "Flemish imperialism" begins to be heard in Wallonia.

World War II further deepened the rifts between Flemish and Walloons, as many individual Flemings again collaborated with the German occupation to further the goal of an autonomous Flanders and many Walloons joined the underground resistance. The return of exiled King Leopold III after the War again split the country into pro-monarchist Flemings and republican Walloons; in typical Belgian fashion, a compromise was reached and Leopold's son acceded to the throne. The 1950's saw the rapid transformation of the agricultural economy of Flanders to an industrial one. And "the prosperity and industrialization of Flanders was accompanied by an expression of dynamism and

nationalism" (Brazeau, 1966, p. 2.5). The Vlaamse Volksbeweging (Flemish Popular Movement) and several cultural foundations were created at this time as mass political pressure groups. A new Flemish political party, the Volksunie, appeared committed to a federalist Belgian state with autonomous Flemish and Walloon regions. Like the new French Canadian nationalism, the Flemish movement is also distinguished by two dimensions. An external dimension involves grievances against the French-speaking part of the country and Brussels in particular. The internal aspect involves the new Flemish elite, emerging since the 1930's and entirely trained in Dutch, challenging the old francophone Flemish elites condescendingly called "fransquillons." But the French Canadian and Flemish movements are different in the internal dimension in one respect. In Quebec the old French elite was more concerned with protecting their French language and culture than in adapting to the industrial world. In Belgium the old Flemish elite is more concerned with maintaining its economic power than in protecting Flemish linguistic rights. Both the new French Canadian and new Flemish elites, born out of the recent industrialization, are equally concerned with cultural-linguistic identity and political and economic power.

The 1960's brought a third set of linguistic laws designed to insure the application of previous legislation. They included the establishment of the linguistic frontier and the bilingual regime of Brussels. The Flemish movement has since continued unabated but with more emphasis on (1) Flanders' relationship to Brussels rather than to Wallonia, and (2) on the political consolidation of earlier economic and linguistic gains. As one Flemish writer puts it, "The Flemish

lower middle class, especially in Brussels, still strives to learn French for status-seeking reasons or economic pressure, and as long as this situation occurs there will be a Flemish movement" (Van Haegendoren, 1965, p. 10).

The Walloon problem

In the early 19th century popular sentiment favored the attachment of Wallonia to France. When this proved unfeasible, Walloons were among the principal leaders in the creation of Belgium in 1830. The next seventy years were marked by unparalled economic prosperity. Wallonia was at the forefront of Europe's industrial revolution with its rich coal mines and heavy industry. Herremans (1952) locates the origins of the Walloon movement around the 1890's when the first Walloon nationalist groups were formed. These were small, unorganized, and principally anti-Flemish rather than for the defense of Wallonia. "As long as Wallonia prospered and the French-speaking ruled the country, there was no Walloon problem" (Lorwin, 1966, p. 17). They identified themselves as "Liègois" or "Namurois" (people of Liège or Namur, cities in Wallonia) rather than the general "Walloon" category. In 1905 the first Walloon Congress met documenting clearly for the first time a distinct Walloon national sentiment. As with the Flemish in the 1870's, a Walloon Assembly in 1913 adopted a national flag, coat of arms, and national holiday -- all the symbols and trappings of nationhood. During the two World Wars, the Walloon movement was all but non-existent as the nationalist leaders joined the resistance. In the Second War a Free Wallonia was created after De Gaulle's Free France. In between and during the Wars, the movement was never monolithic in ideology or organization; splinter groups kept appearing.

The Walloon movement, unlike the Flemish, was never able to command mass popular appeal. "It addressed itself primarily to intellectuals and the masses remained out of its domain of action" (Herremans, 1951, p. 213). They were not for or against it, but simply indifferent.

The 1950's saw a rapid development of the Walloon movement on a mass base. It is at this time that the industrial "take-off" of Flanders and the economic decline of Wallonia became painfully obvious to the Walloons. The stagnation and inefficiency of the old Walloon industries contrasted with the new factories dotting the Flemish countryside largely built with American and other foreign investments. The fall of the coal industry and the continuing drop in birth rates in Wallonia began to alarm government officials as well as Walloon nationalists. Liège emerged as the capital of the Walloon movement. In a National Walloon Congress at Liège after the War, the delegates voted on the political future of Wallonia. On the first ballot, a "sentimental vote" was taken and the overwhelming vote was for attachment to France. On the second "rational vote," the majority opted for a federalist state with autonomous Flemish and Walloon regions. The coincidence of opposites is realized as both Walloon and Flemish nationalists favor the same political solution -- but for different motives. The former seek regional autonomy for economic survival; the latter for cultural integrity.

Frustrations reached a peak in the general strike of December 1960. Originally called to protest government economic policies due to the loss of the Congo, the focus of the strike was shifted to the economic ailments of Wallonia. From this strike arose the Mouvement Populaire Wallon, a mass-based pressure group similar to the Flemish VVB

and dedicated to federalism. But whereas the VVB and the Flemish nationalist movement as a whole grew out of, and is still partly rooted in the Catholic family of the Verzuiling, the MPW and the Walloon movement was born in the socialist family. In the 1960's a number of Walloon cultural foundations were created, much like the Flemish organizations of the 1870's and 1950's, devoted to the propagation and preservation of Walloon history and culture. A nationalist party was also created for the first time, the Rassemblement Wallon. Unlike the Quebec and Flemish movements, there is no internal dimension to Walloon nationalism. Since historically there have been no linguistic barriers to mobility in Wallonia, the Walloon elite was ipso facto the Belgian elite; there was no phenomenon of a rising new middle class challenging an established elite. However, there is an external dimension to Walloon nationalism with respect to the other two regions and especially the new Flemish elite which, by dint of its numerical majority, is displacing the Walloons as the dominant political and economic group in Belgium.

The Brussels problem

As there is a Flemish problem and a Walloon problem, so there is also, to balance the regional fulcrum, a Brussels problem. Part of the problem stems from its unique geographic position. The linguistic frontier passes just south of Brussels so the capital is actually in Flemish territory. Its 19 suburbs sprawl out in both Flemish and Walloon Brabant. Although it is bilingual in principle, it is francophone in practice. This is one of the main grievances of the Flemish who complain they cannot "feel at home" in the capital. Brussels was originally an entirely Flemish city. The francisation began in the

19th century such that by 1910, about 48% of Brusselers were francophones and, today, almost three-fourths are francophone (Herremans, 1963). Since 1949, for every one Flemish immigrant to Brussels, four came from Wallonia. In a way Brussels is a bastard city, neither Flemish nor Walloon; the Brusselers speak French or Dutch with their own distinctive accent and lead a sophisticated and cosmopolitan life style strikingly different from the rest of the country. In a recent survey, Klupft and Van der Voorst (1969) found that 47.3% of Dutch-speaking Brusselers identified themselves as Flemish; 36.8% as Flemish Brusselers; and 11% as French Brusselers. Among the francophone Brusselers, 20% identified themselves as Walloons; 65.5% as French Brusselers, and 8.8% as Frenchmen. Since the city is predominantly francophone, it is not surprising that more French- than Dutch-speaking residents identify themselves as uniquely Brusselers.

Throughout most of the past and present century the linguistic quarrels were between Flanders and Wallonia. In the last two decades the focus of contention has shifted to Brussels. For Flemish nationalists, Brussels is today <u>terra irrendenta</u> to reconquer. Until recently the children of Flemish immigrants to Brussels were totally lost to the French influence. There is also an increasing francophone exodus to the suburbs, which naturally means into Flemish territory. This "oil spill" blighting Flemish Brabant is deeply resented as "theft of Flemish land" (Lorwin, 1966). Both Flemings and Walloons accuse Brussels of having pushed the highly centralized Belgian system to its own profit at the expense of the provinces. All government, administration, industrial and financial offices are located in the capital. Pressured from both sides, but primarily from the north, it was only time that

a Brussels nationalist movement would come into being. In 1963 the Front de Defense Francophone was created primarily by French-speaking academics of Brussels and Louvain. As a political party, it is allied with the Rassemblement Walloon against Flemish demands and expansion. But unlike the Walloon nationalists, the Brussels movement is strongly for a united Belgium. A federalist state with two decentralized units would effectively undercut the present power of Brussels.

To sum up the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels problems, this wry remark by Lorwin (1966) can hardly be more appropriate: "In this unique national triangle of an oppressed majority and two oppressed minorities, rational and tolerant discussion is not easy" (p. 22). On one side is the Flemish majority, perceiving itself still as the colonized and oppressed nation of yesteryear, despite their population superiority, their progress in insuring and expanding their linguistic rights (except in Brussels), and their remarkable industrial growth. According to Lorwin (1966), "the reflexes of the underdog extend beyond the original conditions that created them" (p. 23). Herremans (1970, personal communication) feels that the motivation of the present Flemish nationalism stems more from a desire to redress past injustices than from current social conditions. "History has led Flanders from the condition of dominated to that of dominator" (du Roy, 1968, p. 15). However, Herremans (1948) also adds that "Flanders needs to become more Flemish in order to become more human;" that is, Flanders must shred its provincialism, inferiority complex, and lingering gallophobia and "search in herself the spiritual strength and affirm the autonomy of her culture in order to participate more fully in a world culture" (p. 145).

On the other side is Walloon nationalism, representing the

"reflexes of the overdogs" or former overdogs. Wallonia looks back at the glory of her industrial past to contrast this earlier security with the fears for the future: their minority position in Belgium in demographic, economic and political terms, and the perceived threat of bilingualism to their language and culture. Thus, "Walloon nationalism is preventive while that of the Flemish was curative" (du Roy, 1968, p. 16). On the third side of the triangle stands Brussels, feeling menaced by Flanders and abandoned by a Wallonia more engrossed with its own than the capital's problems. Given this situation, the marvel is not how a small country can have so many conflicting interests at once, but how it manages to compromise them and still thrive and prosper in the process.

Demographic and social-economic trends

Population, according to Organski (1958), is a source of national power. Table IV-5 shows the demographic evolution in each region of Belgium since 1920. Flanders has always been numerically superior and by 1961 it contained over one half of the population. This was due to the high birth rate. In 1920 the number of births per 1000 inhabitants in Flanders was 23.7; in 1961, 18.8; and in 1968, 15.5. This drop is associated with the region's increasing urbanization and industrialization, but these rates are still higher than those in Wallonia. Throughout this century Wallonia has been undergoing a demographic crisis; its death rate is rising and its birth rate is declining. Thus, in 1920 the birth rate was 17.9 per 1000; in 1961, 15.8; and in 1968, 13.7. The death rate exceeded the birth rate in 1968.

A rough index of the ascribed status or social prestige of an ethnic group is the number of monolinguals in that group. Originally

Table IV-5

Evolution of Regional Population as a Percentage of Total Belgian Population

Years	Flanders	Wallonia	Brussels
1920	47.2	38.2	14.6
1930	48.0	37.1	14.9
1947	50.2	34.5	15.3
1961	51.3 (4,711,409)	33.0 (3,038,796)	15.7 (1,439,536)

Source: Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique, 1933, 1965.

the Flemish language was downgraded and those Flemings who sought upward mobility had to become bilingual. However, as linguistic laws were passed and their economic lot improved, French became less necessary for mobility. We would expect that the rise of the social status of the Flemish be accompanied by an increase in monolingualism (or conversely, a decrease in bilingualism). Figure IV-2a shows the percentage of monolinguals in each region of Belgium from 1900 to 1947 (date of the last linguistic census). Our proposition is not supported. The percentage of Flemish monolinguals in Flanders tends to decline over the years; likewise the percentage of French monolinguals in Wallonia. In both regions, more than 3 out 4 persons do not know the other national language. The decline of Flemish and the rise of French monolingualism in Brabant province is consistent with the increasing francisation of the Greater Brussels area which is, of course, the object of ire of Flemish nationalists. Figure IV-2b, which is essentially the mirror-image of the former one, presents the percentage of bilinguals in each region. The most interesting trend here is the rise in bilinguals in Flanders between 1930 and 1947. After 1930, it will be recalled, all education in Flanders from primary through university was given in Dutch. This should have decreased the number of bilinguals. The fact that the opposite occurs must indicate that, despite the linguistic laws and economic progress of the Flemish, knowledge of French was still an important objective for the Flemings, presumably for social mobility purposes. And it is perhaps for this reason that Flemish nationalists have effectively agitated for the abolition of the linguistic census after 1947.

Another index of the social status of the Flemish relative

Figure IV-2a

Percentage of Flemish Monolinguals in Flanders, of French Monolinguals in Wallonia, and of Flemish and French Monolinguals in Brabant Province, 1900-47



Source: Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique, 1922, 1940, 1950.

Figure IV-2b

Percentage of Bilinguals in Flanders, Wallonia, and Brabant Province, 1900-47



Source: Idem.

to the francophones is the proportion of university students. We have no data prior to 1952 because the census statistics did not distinguish student enrollment by language spoken before that date. This is not serious since the past two decades are the most important ones of our purposes; it is generally agreed that the rapid economic growth of Flanders and the economic decline of Wallonia began after the Second War. Figure IV-3a shows the percentages of Flemish and francophone students in the total university population from 1952 to 1967. The percentage of francophones declines and the percentage of Flemish students increases. Nonetheless, by 1967 the Flemish represented only 42% of the university population though they represent over half of the country's population. Conversely the francophones made up about 58% of the university body and they represent less than half of the national population. Thus one may infer that the Flemish still held subordinate social status to the Walloons and French Brusselers in the late 60's. However, they were rapidly catching-up; Figure IV-3b re-plots the data as percentage increase of students using 1952 as the baseline year. In every year after 1952, the percentage increase of Flemish students is higher than that of francophones.

Until the Second War, Flanders was still predominantly an agricultural region. The mechanization of agriculture after the War produced a high unemployment rate. The availability of labor, the expansion of the port of Antwerp, and governmental incentives to foreign investors contributed to the rapid industrialization of Flanders. One industrial indicator is American investments since it represents 20% of the total industrial investment of Belgium. In the 1960's, over half of the new factories built in Belgium were by American

Figure IV-3a

Percentage of Flemish- and French-Speaking Students in the Total Belgian University Population, 1952-1967



Source: Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique, 1970.

Figure IV-3b

Percentage Increase of Flemish- and French-Speaking University Students From 1952 (Baseline) to 1967



Source: Idem.

companies. From 1960 to 1968, 68% of this American capital was invested in Flanders, 23% in Wallonia, and 9% in Brabant province (Mingret, 1970). Concomitantly, the unemployment rate in Flanders dropped from a high of 12.8% in 1953, to 8.5% in 1960, to 4.5% in 1968. In Wallonia, on the other hand, unemployment rose in the same years from 5.1% to 4.4% to 6.6% (Institut Wallon, 1970)

The best single index of economic development is gross national product (GNP). Figure IV-4 presents the GNP per capita in the three regions of Belgium from 1955 to 1966. Again we have no data prior to 1955 because the census statistics on GNP were not classified by linguistic region. But it probably would not be incorrect to assume that the economic differences between the regions were greater, not smaller, in the years before 1955. The most interesting feature here is the rapid rise in the GNP/capita in Flanders so that by mid-1966 Flanders has surpassed Wallonia in economic development. The GNP/capita of Brussels remains far superior to the rest of the country. However, if we compare the income of the French- and Dutch-speaking Brusselers, it would become apparent that the high GNP/capita is due to the high economic status of the former ethnic group. Klupft and Vander Vorst (1969) showed in a survey in 1968 that 34% of the Flemish Brusselers earned less than 7000 Belgian francs a month compared to 20% of the French Brusselers; at the upper end, 11% of the Flemish and 22% of the French Brusselers had incomes over 22,000 francs.

Political trends

We now turn to the political trends after the Second War that accompanied the rapid social mobilization of the 50's and 60's. The general developmental pattern we expect in Flanders is an increase

Figure IV-4

GNP/Capita in Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders, 1955-66



Source: Institut Wallon, 1970.

in nationalism (indexed by vote) as Flanders' economic status (indexed by GNP/capita) rises rapidly to challenge the economic position of Wallonia, but Flanders' social prestige (indexed by the proportion of the university-trained) rises more slowly than her economic achievement and also lags behind the social prestige of the francophones. Figure IV-5a shows the percentage of voters for the various political parties in the national elections since 1946 in Flanders. The most striking trend is the rise of the Volksunie Flemish nationalist party. In 1968, only 14 years after its organization, the Volksunie captured 16.9% of the popular vote and surpassed one of the three traditional parties (Liberal) in Flanders. After the First War several Flemish nationalist parties appeared but they never attained the number of votes as did the Volksunie in 1968 and they dissappeared after the Second War. The decline of the Catholic vote can be interpreted, according to a survey by Delrouelle et al. (1970), as defections from the ranks to the Volksunie. It is important to recall that Catholicism and nationalism have always been closely intertwined in Flanders. During the years that a Flemish nationalist party did not exist, the nationalists worked primarily through the Catholic party. When a separate nationalist party was created, many of the older nationalists continued their action within the Catholic fold. The Volkunie vote, then, gives an underestimated index of the Flemish nationalist sentiment. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note the parallel between the rise of this nationalist party from 1954 to 1968 and the economic rise of Flanders from 1955 to 1966 (in Figure IV-4). The Volksunie vote reached its high point shortly after Flanders surpassed the economic development of Wallonia.

Figure IV-5b presents the voting trends in Wallonia. To the extent that Walloon nationalism is a defensive reaction against the Flemish advance, we would expect that Wallonia's economic decline is associated with a rise in nationalist votes. The Walloon nationalist party appeared for the first time in 1965 (previously a Walloon movement had existed but it was never institutionalized in a political party) and rose sharply at the next elections of 1968. There is also a sharp rise in conservative votes from 1961 to 1968 and a corresponding decline in leftist and Catholic votes. It should be noted that many Walloon nationalists worked in the framework of the Socialist and Liberal (conservative) parties and many continued doing so after the establishment of the Walloon nationalist party. In addition, the francophone half of the Liberal Party began to adopt an increasingly anti-Flemish platform in the 1960's. For these reasons the percentage of votes for the Walloon party reflects only part of the total nationalist sentiment. Still, the very appearance of a separate nationalist party at the height of Wallonia's economic crisis and Flanders' economic expansion is consistent with the general developmental pattern.

The voting trends in Brussels are given in Figure IV-5c. As in Wallonia, the most interesting finding for our purposes is the appearance of the FDF French nationalist party in 1965. The fact that there had never been a French Brussels party before, and that within three years it obtained 18.6% of the Brussels vote, is indicative of how defensive the francophone inhabitants of the capital have become regarding the Flemish movement. Considering the overwhelming economic superiority of the French Brusselers over the rest of the country, this nationalist voting trend is somewhat disquieting. And it should be added that

Figure IV-5a

Percentage of Votes in Flanders for Political Parties at National Elections, 1939-1968



Source: Based on Delruelle et al., 1970.

Figure IV-5b

Percentage of Votes in Wallonia for Political Parties at National Elections, 1939-1968



Source: Based on Delrouelle et al., 1970.

Figure IV-5c

Percentage of Votes in Brussels for Political Parties at National Elections, 1939-1968



Source: Based on Delrouelle et al., 1970.

the FDF vote, as the Flemish and Walloon nationalist party votes, underestimates the true extent of nationalist feeling in Brussels, because many francophone leaders work within the ranks of the Liberal party.

In a national survey shortly after the 1968 elections, Delruelle et al. (1970) obtained data on the age and social-economic background of the voters. In Flanders and Wallonia, more people under the age of 40 years voted for the respective nationalist parties than for any of the three traditional parties. In both regions, the largest percentage of the vote of the professional and managerial occupations (the highest SES level) is found among conservatives (19.3% in Flanders and 23% in Wallonia), but the next largest percentage of votes of this elite group is garnered by the nationalist parties (18% in Flanders, 20% in Wallonia). In Brussels, the same pattern occurs: the highest percentage of elite votes is obtained by the conservative party (32.3%) and the second highest by the FDF (23.7%). What is fascinating about these data is that they match the background data of nationalist voters in Quebec described earlier from the Lemieux et al. (1970) survey. The Flemish, Walloon, French Brusseler, and French Canadian nationalist voter is uniformly young, highly educated, with high occupational status -- in a word, the nationalist electorate is recruited primarily from the ranks of the elite. This is significant because in Western countries generally, "third parties" have typically recruited from the less educated, the less privileged, and the previously politically uninvolved segments of the population. In Quebec and Belgium we are seeing the defection of some of the most politically involved persons from the established parties to the new nationalist parties. Further,

Delrouelle argues that "the elections of 1965 mark a rupture in the long history of stability of the Belgian electoral corps," and that this first major break was "more profound than a simple episodic gesture of bad humor" (pp. 20-21). Lemieux's study also concluded that a first and major realignment in Quebec electoral history occured in 1970 when the new separatist party appeared on the political scene.

It is more than coincidence that the two principal investigators of political behavior in Quebec and Belgium should arrive at similar conclusions for each country. An explanation of the dynamic underlying these voting trends would require a separate and more thorough comparative study than the general social and economic patterns we have outlined here. At this point we will only speculate on the implications of these changes. It would seem that the criss-crossing cleavages of religion, class, and party are presently being undermined by the ethno-linguistic cleavage. In the Verzuiling system of Belgium, a Fleming and a Walloon could agree and vote similarly on an issue because both belonged to the Catholic family. This religious cleavage criss-crossed the ethnic cleavage and aided internal cohesion. In recent years, the rise of the nationalist parties have challenged the Verzuiling system in that a new dimension, language, is restructuring all the other cleavages in the same direction. A Fleming and a Walloon are no longer tied by religion — indeed, witness the separation of the Catholic Party into two distinct Flemish and francophone Catholic parties in 1968 — but split by language; each now is more likely to vote along linguistic rather than confessional lines. Ultimately the undermining of overlapping loyalties facilitates separatism in Quebec and federalism in Belgium, inasmuch as both forms of political disin-

tegration presuppose the primacy of the linguistic cleavage over all others. In fact, Claes (1963-64) feels that in Belgium the "unitary structure has already been abandoned without the logic of federalization having been accepted ... there exists, de facto, a stunted and camouflaged official federalization" (p. 51).

The Theory Applied: Hypotheses of Commitment in Quebec and Belgium

In this chapter we have sought to place in historical perspective the problem of nationalism and integration in Quebec and Belgium. We have described some general similarities in the nationalist movements in the two countries and related them to broad social-economic, demographic and political trends. The common pattern in the French Canadian and Flemish experience went something like this: A majority ethnic group at first is totally subordinated to a dominant minority ethnic group; with social mobilization, the gradual rise in the achieved but not ascribed statuses of the subordinate group is accompanied by greater commitment, not to the central political system, but to the regional sub-system; and this regional (nationalistic) commitment appears to intensify when the subordinate group begins to challenge and overtake the power of the dominant group. The aggregate data presented served to illustrate rather than to test directly the relationships proposed by the theory. In this section we will attempt to bring together the theory and hindsights from the historical background to formulate hypotheses regarding the effects of the principal independent variable -- status inconsistency -- on commitment in Quebec and Belgium.

Tables IV-6a and 6b summarize the principal types of commitment hypothesized for each ethnic group in Quebec and Belgium respectively. The standard design is a 2 X 2 table with two levels of achieved status (elite/mass, indexed by education or occupation) and ascribed status (high/low, indexed by ethnicity). In Quebec we assume French has the low ascribed status and English the high status; in Belgium, Flemish has the low and French the high status. This defines two status consistent cells (1 and 4) and two status inconsistent cells (3 and 4). We will consider the historical and theoretical reasons for associating an ethnic group with a certain type of commitment.

Functional commitment (cell 1), we have seen earlier, is associated with the upper social-economic classes since it is a product of, and a response to, involvement in high language and economic roles in the system. English Canadian elites are therefore predicted to be Functionally committed. The Royal Commission (1965) described their outlook this way: "They seemed to have a great interest in economic matters and talk much of practical achievements and aims. Improvements in welfare and education, in social and economic organization, and international questions interest them ... what national pride existed was in having been the chief architects of modern Canada" (p. 120, 121). This is the Functional orientation <u>par excellance</u>. The same argument can be made for the francophone elites of Belgium, the Brusselers and Walloons who still occupy many of the dominant economic and political positions in the country. And to the extent that Wallonia's economy is in crisis, the Walloon elites should be even more Functionally involved in practical questions of jobs,

Table IV-6a

Types of Commitment of Different Ethnic Groups in Quebec as a Function of Status

Ascribed Status (ethnicity)	Achieved Status (economic): High	Achieved Status (economic): Low
High	1. Functional commitment by English elite	2. Ideological & Symbolic commitment to Canada by English mass
Low	3. Ideological & Symbolic commitment to Quebec by French elite	4. Normative and Symbolic commitment to Quebec by French mass

Table IV-6b

Types of Commitment of Different Ethnic Groups in Belgium as a Function of Status

Ascribed Status (ethnicity)	Achieved Status (economic): High	Achieved Status (economic): Low
High	1. Functional & Ideological commitment to Brussels & Wallonia by French elite	2. Symbolic commitment to Belgium, Brussels, & Wallonia by French mass
Low	3. Ideological & Symbolic commitment to Flanders by Flemish elite	4. Normative and Symbolic commitment to Flanders by Flemish mass

unemployment, education, and welfare.

Ideological and Symbolic commitment to the subordinate regional locus (cell 3) -- what we have been describing as "nationalist movements" -- is predicted to be found among elite members of the subordinate ethnic groups, i.e., the new middle class created during the industrialization period who have high achieved but low ascribed status. Thus, we have noted that status inconsistent French Canadian elites most often expressed dissatisfaction and separatist tendencies. They "seem to be expressing two, perhaps contradictory, deep-seated convictions: on the one hand, they belong to an overwhelming majority, to a distinct 'society' or 'nation;' on the other hand, this real social entity is, in spite of its aspirations, blocked in its forward thrust, torn in its design, in a word, unfulfilled... (the) exasperation seemed heightened by their beginning to sense ... their coming into collision with English-speaking people in positions of control" (Royal Commission, 1965, p. 110, 111). In terms of the theory, we expect them to manifest Ideological and Symbolic commitment to Quebec. A similar picture of the new Flemish elite is drawn by Verhaegen (in Van Haegendoren, 1965): "The essential point is that the conflict confronts ... a leading minority (francophone Brusselers and Walloons) which is economically threatened and consequently hanging on to its acquired positions with a growing social class of Flemish intellectuals, and technicians who lack the positions corresponding with their capacities or, because of the language, the prestige which should go with their positions" (p. 13). These status inconsistent Flemings, we hypothesize, will be Symbolically and Ideologically committed to Flanders.

Ideological and Symbolic commitment to the central locus or the dominant regional locus is associated with the other status inconsistent cell of high ascribed and low achieved ranks. In this category fall the English Canadian masses who did not "make it" but perhaps felt they should have by virtue of being English. The Royal Commission (1965) reported some English Quebeckers who resented the French separatist movement and were highly defensive about and committed to the integrity of Canada. We predict that these English masses will exhibit primarily Ideological and Symbolic commitment to Canada. The Belgian case is a bit more complicated. On the one hand, we expect the status inconsistent francophone masses to be Symbolically attached to Wallonia and Brussels. Historically, as we have seen, it was the working class and rural segments of the population that were the custodians of Walloon folklore, tradition, social customs, and the various dialects. The francophone elite was culturally oriented toward Parisian rather than Walloon culture. We also expect the francophone masses to be Symbolically attached to Belgium as a whole, since until only recently most Belgian institutions were francophone and identified with Walloon interests. On the other hand, we do not associate these francophone masses with Ideological commitment for an obvious historical reason. The francophone nationalist movement and the two nationalist parties, FDF and RW, still attract primarily the elite groups; unlike the Flemish counterparts, they have not yet developed as extensive a popular base. We predict, therefore, that Ideological and Symbolic commitment to Brussels and Wallonia will be expressed mainly by the status consistent French elites. It is reasonable to expect that Walloon elites will be both Functionally

committed to the economic redevelopment of Wallonia and Ideologically defensive about the perceived Flemish challenge. In Quebec, of course, the English elite is so far ahead economically of the French that there has been no need to organize an English nationalist party to defend its interests. They will manifest, therefore, only Functional commitment.

Finally, we hypothesize that the masses of the subordinate ethnic group (cell 4) will exhibit Normative commitment and Symbolic attachment to their own region. The French Canadian masses still largely conform to the century-old traditional nationalism created by the old elite which emphasized preservation of French culture, language, religion and norms. They are as attached to the symbols of their heritage as are the new French elites but, unlike the latter, they do not challenge the present status quo and are committed to the law and order of the system. As Schwartz (1967) observes, the more parochial elements of French Canadian society are less likely to recognize and act on the ideological possibilities of their common cultural consciousness. Likewise, the Flemish masses early acquired from the elites a sense of Flemish consciousness but have not translated it into political action. They are Symbolically but not yet Ideologically committed to Flanders; they are also committed to the Normative order of the system.

We have proposed that the two kinds of status inconsistency each produce a different kind of Ideological or political nationalism. However, there are two possible alternative hypotheses. One is that Ideological nationalism is primarily the result of class or status. Porter (1965) argues that "French Canada could well be described as

one of those societies in which class conflict becomes diverted into ethnic hostility" (p. 93), and his reasoning can be equally applied to Belgium. He notes that in Quebec the French and English live as separate social groups, each with its class system of aristocratic families and working classes. The old French Canadian elites, which have controlled every structure of power in Quebec except the economic, "have worked with the British to create the kind of society that Quebec is today" (p. 92). The subordinate status of the French mass is "as much a consequence of the power enjoyed by the French Canadian provincial politicians in coalition with 'alien' corporate powers as they are a consequence of the domination of the British charter group" (p. 383; cf. Trudeau, 1956). The newly emerged French middle class, since it has to challenge both the old French elite and the English elite, tends to express grievances within the framework of ethnic protest rather than class protest. An ethnic framework allows them to use the traditional nationalism of the masses as the foundation for the new nationalism of independence. But in fact, according to Porter (1965) and Schwartz (1967), these new elite leaders are far ahead of the proletariat masses they presume to lead. And "the dilemma posed for the French Canadian intellectuals is that, by articulating economic deprivation in ethnic rather than class terms, they will succeed only in strengthening the divided elements of society" (Porter, 1965, p. 490). A similar argument can be made for the Flemish problem. The Flemish masses in the early stages of industrialization were dominated as much by the French-speaking old Flemish elite as by the Walloon and Brussels elites. And this class conflict hypothesis is reappearing today with respect to the Walloon

problem. The economic troubles of the Walloon workers, according to this argument, are due as much to the dominance of the francophone Brussels elite as to the so-called imperialism of the new Flemish elite.

The other hypothesis is based on the popular view that the French Canadian, Flemish, and Walloon movements are monolithic in ideology and outlook. The Royal Commission reported that "very seldom was there any mention in our presence of social classes, still less of class conflict, among French Canadians. It was as though the entire community was regarded as a single social class which was pictured, according to the speaker, either as a militant middle class or an exploited proletariat" (1965, p. 116). Our prediction that both the French Canadian elite and mass will be Symbolically committed to Quebec, and that both the Flemish elite and mass will be Symbolically committed to Flanders, represents an "ethnicity hypothesis." The assumption is that Symbolic nationalism, to the extent that it mobilizes the cultural attachments and emotions of a group, will over-emphasize within-group similarities and maximize between-group differences.

The previous Tables IV-6a and IV-6b lend themselves to a differential test between these three hypotheses. As examples, let us take the French Canadian and Flemish nationalist movements. Our principal dependent measure for each country would be, respectively, a scale of French Canadian Ideological and Flemish Ideological commitment for the political aspect, or a scale of Quebec Symbolic and Flemish Symbolic commitment for the cultural aspect. The rank order of scores on either one of these scales for each ethnic group that would support one or the other hypothesis would be as follows:

Class differences hypothesis:

Quebec: French elite = English elite > French mass = English mass

Belgium: Flemish elite = French elite > Flemish mass = French mass

Ethnicity hypothesis:

Quebec: French elite = French mass > English elite = English mass

Belgium: Flemish elite = Flemish mass > French elite = French mass

Status inconsistency hypothesis:

Quebec: French elite > French mass > English elite > English mass

Belgium: Flemish elite > Flemish mass > French elite > French mass

In terms of an analysis of variance of Tables IV-6a and 6b, the column (achieved status) main effect would support the class differences hypothesis; a row (ascribed status) main effect would support the ethnicity hypothesis; and an interaction effect would support the status inconsistency hypothesis. Of course, it probably will not be exclusively one or the other hypothesis, but this kind of approach enables us to determine the proportion of variance accounted for by each.[3]

CHAPTER V

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY OF A QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY IN QUEBEC AND BELGIUM

Samples and Procedure

A questionnaire survey was conducted in Quebec and Belgium for a cross-national test of the hypotheses on political commitment. Since this was an exploratory study, we developed two parallel forms of the questionnaire, A and B. In Quebec, 178 questionnaires of Form A and 166 of Form B were successfully completed in April 1970; Form C is currently under preparation. In Belgium, 204 questionnaires of Form A and 174 of Form B were collected in June 1970; 410 questionnaires of Form C were completed in January 1971. In this report we will present only the results of Form A. The analysis of the Form B data is not yet complete, and the Form C survey is still in progress. We plan to present these latter results in a later report.

The respondents of Form A in the two countries were male students in the last two years of secondary school, ranging in age from 16 to 19 years. We did not have the resources to obtain a representative sample of any kind. The choice of a high school sample was dictated by the accessibility of the students, their higher motivation and aptitude than the general population for successfully completing a two-hour long questionnaire, and the fact that advanced secondary students have played an active role in the youth branches of the nationalist movements. We did not sample university students because they are too homogeneous and select a group in which to find wide attitude variations. The nature and size of these samples, therefore, preclude any extrapolation of our findings to the populations at

large, or even to the youth populations. However, to the extent that our primary interest is in the pattern of relationships between variables for hypothesis-testing, and not in the description of the population parameters, this sampling limitation is not a serious problem for our research objectives. Nonetheless we took care to consult with education officials in the selection of schools so as to insure a broad social-economic range in the sample. In Quebec, with the assistance of the school commissions, we selected a total of fourteen schools in metropolitan and suburban Montreal and Quebec City, and in rural Nicolet. These were Catholic (both French and English) and Protestant (English) public schools and private collèges (French), located in residential and inner-city industrial areas. The names of the schools are not mentioned here to preserve the requested anonymity. In Belgium, with the unofficial assistance of the Ministry of Education (French section) and of Flemish colleagues, a total of fifteen schools were selected in metropolitan and suburban Brussels, and in urban and rural areas of Flanders and Wallonia. In Flanders we also sampled school-age members of the Boy Scouts, Catholic Rural Youth, and Catholic Workers' Youth when some schools became unaccessible. Catholic (collège) and state (athenée) schools and public technical institutes were selected in all three regions; in Brussels, non-Catholic private schools were also included. They were located in residential, inner-city, and rural areas. In both countries the questionnaires were administered in the classroom under the supervision of the teacher and the writer. The members of the Flemish youth groups completed the questionnaires in their regular meeting places supervised by an adult leader.

Table V-1 presents some demographic characteristics of the Quebec and Belgian respondents. In general the Quebec sample contains a higher proportion of fathers in the top educational and occupational categories than the Belgian sample. We therefore employed, as shown in the table, different cut-off points for dichotomizing the Quebec and Belgium samples into two approximately even groups on these two variables. In all our subsequent analyses, the "high" and "low" occupation and education classifications refer to this dichotomy. It will also be observed that the linguistic representation of the samples does not correspond with the proportions in the national populations. The Belgian sample contains 59.4 % French- and 40.6 % Dutch-speaking persons, and in the true population these groups are reversed. The Quebec sample contains 60.6 % francophones and 42.8 % anglophones; in reality the latter are only about 10 % of the Quebec population. In this study, the ethno-linguistic origin of a respondent is identified by the principal language of instruction of the school he attends. Of course some persons do attend schools of a different linguistic regime than his family origin. A cross-check of the sample showed that such discrepancies occurred in less than 5 % of the cases in both countries. We have, therefore, adhered to the school language as the criterion of ethnicity.

Commitment Measures

Item construction

The principal content of the questionnaire consisted of attitude items designed to measure the various types of commitment. Some of the items were taken from previous surveys by Katz and his associates;

Table V-1

Characteristics of Belgian and Quebec Samples of Secondary Students

	Belgium		Quebec	
Fathers' Education				
	N	%	N	%
1. Primary only	21	10.3	46	25.9
2. Some secondary or technical	43	21.0	22	12.4
3. End secondary or technical	42	20.6	33	18.6
4. Post-secondary and university	66	32.3	73	40.9
Don't know	32	15.8	4	2.2
(Cut-off points for dichotomy)	Low education: 1-2 High education: 3-4		Low education: 1-3 High education: 4	
Father's Occupation				
1. Farming	7	4.5	10	5.6
2. Blue collar	22	20.4	26	14.6
3. Service	30	19.4	20	11.3
4. Small entrepreneur	17	11.0	10	5.6
5. Low managerial, salesmen	16	10.4	20	11.2
6. Professional, high managerial, high white collar	42	27.2	88	49.5
Don't know	11	7.1	4	2.2
(Cut-off points for dichotomy)	Low occupation: 1-4 High occupation: 5-6		Low occupation: 1-5 High occupation: 6	

Geographic Location of Schools Sampled

	N	%		N	%
Brussels (French) (Brussels, Uccle, Etterbeek, Auderghem, Anderlecht)	87	42.6	Quebec (French) (Quebec, Ste. Foy, Charny)	46	25.9
Brussels (Flemish) (Brussels, Uccle, Kotenberg)	27	13.2	Quebec (English) (Quebec)	30	16.9
Flanders (Antwerp, Leuven, Ieper, Diest, Brugge)	56	27.4	Nicolet (French)	16	8.8
Wallonia (Liège, Jodoigne)	34	16.8	Montreal (French)	46	25.9
			Montreal (English) (Montreal, Hudson, D'Iberville)	40	22.5
	N = 204			N = 178	
	mean age = 17.2 years			mean age = 16.7 years	

most of them, however, were new. In writing the items we sought to assure their content validity by adhering closely to the theoretical definitions of the commitment forms. Several of the Symbolic and Ideological items were derived from the historical and nationalist literature. About 8 to 12 items were included in the questionnaire for each type of commitment. The reduced set of items that defined the final commitment scales used in the analyses of Quebec are presented in the lower half of Tables V-4a to 4e. The final commitment scale items for Belgium are in Tables V-5a to 5e. For the moment we will discuss only the content of the items and defer until later the correlations presented in the upper half of these tables.

Symbolic commitment is defined by endorsement of items such as to honor and defend one's cultural heritage; to feel ashamed when the nation's disgraced; etc. Ideological items involve stands on current nationalist and political issues: The Flemish movement is a threat to Brussels; or the French Canadian workers are exploited by English Canadian businessmen. Note that for these two forms of commitment there is also a central or regional locus of orientation (e.g. honor Canada; honor Quebec). Normative commitment is assumed when the respondent favors stronger punishment for criminals; believes in the sanctity of the country's constitution and laws; etc. A person is Functionally committed when he perceives his personal future tied to the economic development of the country, or is satisfied with the work possibilities he anticipates. We also included items tapping a non-political, interpersonal morality dimension (cf. Almond and Verba, 1963). Our Belgian colleagues pointed out that some Belgians define their citizenship roles in terms of leading a moral life, fulfilling

family obligations, or following religious precepts, rather than in explicitly political terms. Agreement with these non-political values was labelled Moral commitment -- a fifth form of commitment that we added ad hoc to our typology.

In studies of this kind the question of cross-national comparability of items arises: Are the items measuring the same construct in Quebec and Belgium? We followed the logic, if not the mathematics, of Cronbach (1951) and Przeworski and Teune's (1969) models of scale construction.[4] Basically, we attempted to write items for each form of commitment that were common to both cultures, and items that were specific to each culture but correlated with the former set. The Belgian Normative scale, for example, has five items identical with the Quebec Normative scale, plus four other items specific to Belgium but correlated with the culture-common items (cf. Tables V-4d and V-5d). The inclusion of culture-specific items, far from detracting comparability, actually enhances the research by providing for a more contextually relevant instrument (content validity). Ultimately, evidence for the comparability of the measures can only come from construct validation. The commitment types, as constructs, are not self-defining nor are they fully explicated by the operational items. They derive their meaning from relationships to other theoretical and empirical variables linked by theory. To the degree that the same pattern of relationships between the commitment scales and other variables are observed in Quebec and Belgium, there is evidence for the theory and for the conceptual equivalence and comparability of the measures.

The items were originally written in English; then translated

into Quebec French and Belgian Dutch; and finally back-translated (Levine and Campbell, 1969) into English. The following triangulation sequence was followed:



In the Quebec case, the original English items (O_1) had two parallel forms (O_a and O_b). A French Canadian bilingual (a) translated form O_a into the target language T (Quebec French), and a second French Canadian bilingual (b) translated form O_b into T. Then bilingual a back-translated T_b and bilingual b back-translated T_a. The writer served as judge (J_o) for comparing the original English (O_1) with the back-translated English (O_2) items. When O_2 was significantly different in meaning from the original O_1, the item was discarded; when the meaning had not changed, the translated item was retained. The French Form A questionnaire used in Quebec consisted of the translated T_a items. The English Form A questionnaire consisted mostly of the original O_a and some back-translated T_a items. For Belgium, the same procedure was employed for translating the original English into Belgian Dutch. The French version of the Belgian questionnaire, however, was not fully back-translated due to time limitations. A bilingual simply translated the Dutch version to French using, where appropriate, the Quebec French version as a guide. In both countries, only the commitment items were back-translated; the rest of the questionnaire was directly translated.

In preparing the item formats, caution was taken to minimize response styles and biases. About half of the commitment items were

were in the 5-point Likert scale format; half of them were keyed in the "Agree" and half in the "Disagree" direction. About one fourth of the items had the Campbell "polar choice" format (in Robinson and Shaver, 1969). This new format combines the forced-choice method of presenting a pair of opposite items (e.g. A. Life is good. B. Life is not good) with the Likert format of allowing degrees of choice of either alternative (A a ? b B). Unpublished pretests of items using this polar approach show remarkably little response set (Campbell, 1970, personal communication). The remaining one fourth of the items were in "check list" format. Each item was a question and the respondent answered by checking one of the several alternative answers that presumably formed at least an ordinal scale. We have noted in parentheses after each commitment item presented in Tables V-5 and V-6 whether it was in Likert, Campbell or check-list format.

Factor structure of commitment

The items composing the final commitment scales were reduced from a larger pool of questionnaire items via two steps: first, a factor analysis of the entire pool of commitment items in the questionnaire of each country; and second, intercorrelations of sets of items designed a priori for each type of commitment. We will describe each step in turn.

The purpose of the factor analysis was to see if the five hypothesized types of commitment would emerge from the attitude items as five distinct empirical factors. In this first stage, we were more interested in ordering the vast array of items than in constructing factor scales. Table V-2 presents the results of the principal axes analyses with Varimax rotations (using the Kaiser criterion) of 41

commitment items. The six interpretable factors accounted for 63 % of the variance. An additional five factors each had only one item with high loading and were not interpreted. Factor I is Ideological commitment; Factor II is Symbolic-Quebec and Factor III is Symbolic-Canada. It is noteworthy that the Symbolic items emerged as two distinct clusters according to locus of commitment, whereas the Ideological items did not. This means that cultural attachment to Quebec and to Canada are independent dimensions, but political nationalism constitutes a single English-French continuum. Factor IV is Normative and Factor V is Moral. Factor VI is Functional, but the fact that the only two items that loaded highly have the same phrasing, and none of the seven other items designed for this type had high loadings, suggests that this cluster represents only method variance. All but two items defining these six factors were originally written expressly to measure that particular type or factor. The two exceptions are in parenthesis. In general, we conclude that four of the five postulated forms of commitment (Functional excluded) can be identified in our Quebec sample.

Table V-3 presents the Varimax factor solutions for Belgium. Eight interpretable factors were extracted from a total of 48 items representing 80.1 % of the variance. Another three factors appeared but were not interpreted since each loaded on only one item. Factor I accounts for more variance than any other cluster and defines Ideological commitment. Factor II is Symbolic-French and Factor III is Symbolic-Flanders. This pattern is the same as the Quebec results. Cultural attachments to the Flemish and French-speaking regions appear as independent dimensions, whereas political nationalism forms a single

Table V-2

Varimax Rotated Factors of Commitment Items (41) in Quebec (N = 178)

Factors	Commitment Items (Item No.*)	Factor Loadings
I.	IDEOLOGICAL (FRENCH AND ENGLISH) (13.5 %)**	
	French Canadians' demands are unfair (6)	.57
	Economic inferiority of French Canadians (7)	.46
	Nationalist movement is threat to English (5)	.69
	Desire of French Canadians for emancipation (1)	-.68
	English are unconcerned of French demands (2)	-.65
	English businessmen exploit native French (3)	-.67
	(I feel pride and attachment for Quebec)	-.50
II.	SYMBOLIC-QUEBEC (13.1 %)	
	It bothers me when French speak English (5)	.56
	Feel ashamed if French person disgraces Quebec (6)	.58
	First duty is to honor French Canadian history (7)	.65
	(A disgrace that Montreal is so English)	.60
III.	SYMBOLIC-CANADA (8.5 %)	
	First duty is to honor Canadian history	.46
	Feel ashamed if English person disgraces Canada (2)	.85
	French culture should mix with Anglo-Saxons	.54
IV.	NORMATIVE (10.8 %)	
	Sanctity of laws of Canada should be respected (1)	.66
	Have more severe punishment for criminals (2)	.77
	Sanctity of laws of Quebec should be respected (3)	.76
	Obey a law on fingerprinting (6)	.59
V.	MORAL (9.6 %)	
	Responsibility to lead a moral life (1)	.61
	I prefer not to talk politics (3)	.73
	Practice of Golden Rule in daily life (4)	.74
VI.	FUNCTIONAL (response bias) (7.6 %)	
	My future tied to economic progress of Quebec (1)	.62
	My future tied to economic progress of Canada (4)	.81

Note: Factors VII to XI each had only one item with high loading and hence are not interpreted.

* See Table V-4 under corresponding commitment type and item number for complete item phrasing.

** Percentage of variance accounted for by each factor.

Table V-3

Varimax Rotated Factors of Commitment Items (48) in Belgium (N = 204)

Factors	Commitment Items (Item No.*)	Factor Loadings
I.	IDEOLOGICAL (FRENCH AND FLEMISH) (14.3 %)	
	Flemish nationalism threatens French Brussels (1)	.58
	Brusselers are only ones to profit from Belgium (3)	.59
	Flemish are favored by the linguistic laws (5)	-.72
	Francophone businessmen exploit Flemish (6)	-.65
	Walloons are favored by the linguistic laws (8)	.70
II.	SYMBOLIC-BRUSSELS, WALLONIA, BELGIUM (13.7 %)	
	First duty is to preserve Belgian history (1)	.71
	Feel pride and attachment for Belgium (3)	.62
	Responsibility to defend our capital (4)	.71
	Brussels has distincitive cultural character (5)	.67
	Proud of contribution of Wallonia to Europe (9)	.37
	First duty is to honor Walloon heritage (12)	.53
III.	SYMBOLIC-FLANDERS (9.9 %)	
	I feel more at ease with Flemings (7)	.65
	Proud of cultural contribution of Flanders (8)	.64
IV.	NORMATIVE (7.9 %)	
	Respect regulations of Flanders (4)	.52
	Respect regulations of Wallonia (5)	.53
	Punish more severely juvenile delinquency (6)	.52
	Own standards and society's standards (8)	.66
	Obey a law on fingerprinting (9)	.46
V.	MORAL (9.6 %)	
	Responsibility to lead a moral life (1)	.50
	Main citizenship obligation is to family (2)	.61
	I prefer not to talk politics (3)	.76
	Practice of Golden Rule in daily life (4)	.68
VI.	FUNCTIONAL I (response bias) (9.3 %)	
	My future tied to development of Wallonia (1)	.69
	My future tied to development of Flanders (2)	.71
	My future tied to development of Belgium (3)	.80
VII.	FUNCTIONAL II (response bias) (7.0 %)	
	Chances of obtaining good job in Flanders (4)	.74
	Chances of obtaining good job in Wallonia (5)	.85
VIII.	SYMBOLIC (response bias) (8.8 %)	
	Feel ashamed if someone disgraces Belgium (2)	.77
	Feel ashamed if Fleming disgraces Flanders (6)	.80
	Feel ashamed if Walloon disgraces Wallonia (10)	.45

Note: Factors IX to LL each had only one item with high loading and hence are not interpreted.

* See Table V-5 under corresponding commitment type and item number for complete item phrasing.

* Percentage of variance accounted for by each factor.

French-Flemish dimension. Factor IV is Moral and Factor V is Normative. Factor VI (Functional), Factor VII (Functional) and Factor VIII (Symbolic) represent only method variance. As in Quebec, the items defining each factor were all phrased the same way, while other items phrased differently that should also have loaded on these same factors did not. It should be noted that all the items loading high on the first seven factors were those designed a priori to measure that specific type. There were three exceptions, but these three items were not included in any of the final commitment scales and so are not presented here. In Belgium, then, as in Quebec, we have identified four of the five types of commitment (Functional excluded).

We recognize that the interpreted factors in the two countries do not account for a large amount of the variance and that only about 65 % of our inital pool of items loaded at all on the factors. Nonetheless, considering that most of the items were never tested before and that the instrument was applied to two fairly dissimilar samples, the finding of some cross-national invariance in the factor structure of commitment supports all the more strongly the theoretical typology.

Inter-item correlations of commitment

In one respect the factor solutions were not satisfactory. We had prepared 8 to 12 items for each type and the factor analysis yielded only about 3 to 6 high loading items per factor. More items per scale would increase the alpha reliability coefficient (Cronbach, 1951). Therefore product-moment correlations were performed between sets of items designated a priori to measure a type of commitment. The final commitment scales used in analyses consisted of the core of items that had high loadings, plus additional items that simple inspection of the

correlation matrix revealed were highly intercorrelated with these core items. The intercorrelated items for each type presented in Tables V-4a to 4e are the final Quebec commitment scales, and those in Tables V-5a to 5e are the Belgium scales. We will describe only salient features of these tables.

The Ideological items for both Belgium and Quebec emerged as a single dimension in factor analysis. For conceptual purposes, however, it is still useful to distinguish them by locus of commitment. It will be recalled that the theory predicts an expansive, dynamic kind of nationalism on the part of the rising subordinate group, and a defensive kind of nationalism by the dominant status inconsistent group. For Quebec, therefore, we will use in analyses two Ideological sub-scales: Ideological-English and Ideological-French. The correlation matrix of Table V-4b shows that the Ideological-English items correlate negatively with the Ideological-French items. For Belgium, likewise, we distinguish three Ideological sub-scales according to locus: Ideological-Brussels, Ideological-Flemish, and Ideological-Walloon. Table V-5b shows that endorsement of the Flemish items is negatively related with endorsement of the Brussels and Wallonia items; the latter two sets of items are positively related. This pattern corresponds to the present existence of three distinct nationalist movements in Belgium: Flemish, Walloon and francophone Brussels, where the latter two are often allied against the Flemish. To reiterate: empirically it would be more justifiable to employ a single English-French Ideological scale or a single French-Flemish scale; historically and theoretically, it would be clearer and more useful to employ Ideological sub-scales according to locus. In all of our analyses we have opted for the

latter approach.

The same rationale is applied to the Symbolic items. The Belgian factor analysis yielded only two Symbolic factors: Symbolic-Flanders and Symbolic-French. The second factor was a composite of Symbolic items of Belgium, Brussels, and Wallonia. The correlation matrix in Table V-5a shows that these three sets of items are positively interrelated, as would be expected since they form a single factor. Nonetheless, we thought it conceptually clearer and historically more accurate — if not empirically more parsimonious — to distinguish four sub-scales of Symbolic commitment: Symbolic-Flanders, Symbolic-Belgium, Symbolic-Brussels, and Symbolic-Wallonia. This division, of course, results in only a few items per sub-scale. To remedy this situation, the three items of Factor VIII that constituted a response bias pattern were included in the Belgium, Flanders, and Wallonia sub-scales.(cf. Table V-3). It was a choice between unreliability of these sub-scales due to too few items, or unreliability due to some method variance with more items — we decided on the latter as the lesser evil. In the same manner, the Symbolic items in Quebec were divided into two sub-scales: Symbolic-Quebec and Symbolic-Canada. In this case the division is empirically justified since the factor analysis yielded these two clusters.

Tables V-4c and V-5c present the correlations of the Functional items for Quebec and Belgium, respectively. In both tables the magnitude of the correlations is uneven; the very high correlations are due to response bias. This can be ascertained by locating the high items in the factor analysis table that showed them forming a single response set pattern. It is ironic that with the elaborate controls

for response bias described earlier we forgot the simplest caution: the same phrasing of items. Fortunately this oversight was restricted to only five Functional items and three Symbolic items in Belgium, and to two Functional items in Quebec. In the analyses we still employed the Functional "scale" on the assumption that information obtained with an impure scale, at the exploratory stage of research, is better than no information at all.

The principal feature of Tables V-4d and V-4e of Normative items is the absence of negative relationships. The fact that obedience to Flemish and Walloon laws is positively correlated, as is obedience to Quebec and Canada laws, suggests that there is commitment to the normative order across locus of orientation. The factor analyses too revealed a single Normative dimension in both countries. Thus, a person may be differentially attached to the cultural heritage of Quebec or Canada, but he will conform equally to the rules and regulations of both regions.

Tables V-5d and V-5e present the correlations of Moral items. Since these non-political values and morality are culture-common, the same set of items emerged in the Quebec and Belgian factor analyses. The magnitude of the inter-item correlations in both countries is also about the same.

Inter-scale correlations: multitrait-multimethod validation

To summarize, we have constructed seven commitment scales and sub-scales in Quebec: Symbolic-Canada, Symbolic-Quebec, Ideological-English, Ideological-French, Functional, Normative, and Moral. For Belgium there are ten commitment measures: Symbolic-Belgium, Symbolic-Flanders, Symbolic-Wallonia, Symbolic-Brussels, Ideological-Flemish,

Table V-4a

Correlations and Content of Symbolic Commitment Scale Items in Quebec

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2	37						
3	30	26					
4	09	04	07				
5	-01	02	12	26			
6	17	39	05	27	36		
7	46	18	13	26	32	49	
8	13	05	11	13	25	16	16

Symbolic-Canada items

1. The first duty of every young Quebecker is to honor and defend the national Canadian history and heritage. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

2. Suppose a well-known English Canadian public figure does something that is internationally disgraceful to Canada. How would you feel about it? (Check-list: Very ashamed-Not ashamed at all)

3. (A) French Canadian culture is rich and should remain separate from Anglo-Saxon culture. (B) French Canadian culture can be be made richer by borrowing and mixing with Anglo-Saxon culture. (Polar choice)

Symbolic-Quebec items

4. I feel a great pride and attachment for that beautiful land that is our Quebec. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

5. It bothers me when I hear French Canadians speak English among themselves. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

6. Suppose a well-known French Canadian public figure does something that is internationally disgraceful to Quebec. How would you feel about it? (Check-list: Very ashamed-Not ashamed at all)

7. The first duty of every young Quebecker is to honor and defend French Canadian history and heritage. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

8. (A) I feel more comfortable when I'm with English Canadians than with French Canadians. (B) I feel more comfortable when I'm with French Canadians than with English Canadians. (Polar choice)

Table V-4b

Correlations and Content of Ideological Commitment Scale Items in Quebec

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6
2	25					
3	42	43				
4	16	26	36			
5	-08	-10	-19	-20		
6	-25	-37	-34	-37	30	
7	-14	-26	-14	-05	12	14

Ideological-French items

1. The desire of French Canadians for emancipation from oppression is similar to the liberation movements around the world, like those of Latin American and of the American blacks. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

2. (A) Most English Canadians in Quebec are open and willing to listen to the demands of French Canadians. (B) Most English Canadians in Quebec are unconcerned and have no desire to listen to the demands of French Canadians. (Polar choice: A a ? b B)

3. English Canadian businessmen in Quebec carry on their businesses as if they were in a colonial territory, and they exploit the native French Canadian worker. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

4. (A) It's a disgrace that Montreal, the second largest French-speaking city in the world, should still look so English and use only English for most of its business life. (B) It's perfectly understandable and normal that Montreal, a major center of North American business, should use English for most of its business life. (Polar choice)

Ideological-English items

5. (A) The nationalist movement in Quebec is a real threat and danger to the rights of the English-speaking minority in Quebec. (B) The nationalist movement in Quebec recognizes and protects the rights of the English-speaking minority in Quebec. (Polar choice)

6. Today the French Canadians are making too many and too unfair demands, since they already have many special privileges. (Likert)

7. (A) The economic inferiority of French Canadians is primarily the result of discrimination by English Canadians. (B) The economic inferiority of French Canadians is primarily the result of their own religious and agricultural outlook, and their lack of business ability. (Polar choice)

Table V-4c

Correlations and Content of Functional Commitment Scale Items in Quebec

Items	1	2	3	4	5
2	13				
3	19	04			
4	-10	15	16		
5	05	08	19	15	
6	28	05	07	08	08

Functional items

1. To what extent do you think that your future opportunities for advancement in your work are closely tied to the economic progress of Quebec? (Check-list: Very closely tied-Not tied together at all)

2. After you finish your schooling, what do you think are your chances for getting a prestigeful and well-paying job in Quebec, compared with other people of your age? (Check-list: Much better than average-Much below average)

3. There is no use in making long-range plans, because your plans hardly ever work out anyway. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

4. After you finish your schooling, what do you think are your chances for getting a prestigeful and well-paying job in an English-speaking Province of Canada, compared with other people of your age? (Check-list: Much better than average-Much below average)

5. I like to set difficult goals for myself which I attempt to reach. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

6. To what extent do you think that your future opportunities for advancement in your work are closely tied to the economic progress of Canada? (Check-list: Very closely tied-Not tied together at all)

Table V-4d

Correlations and Content of Normative Commitment Scale Items in Quebec

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6
2	23					
3	57	29				
4	23	21	26			
5	31	08	08	10		
6	05	16	15	16	20	
7	14	10	26	04	13	14

Normative items

1. The sanctity of the laws and of the Constitution of Canada should be respected and defended. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

2. It would be a good idea to have more severe punishment for criminals who repeatedly break the law. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

3. The sanctity of the laws and of the Constitution of Quebec should be respected and defended. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

4. How far apart or how different do you think are your own standards of conduct and the standards of society? (Check-list: Very apart-Not apart at all)

5. Sometimes a person is justified in disobeying a law made by the federal Parliament in Ottawa. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

6. If a law was passed that ordered everyone must be fingerprinted, what would your reaction be? (Check-list: Definitely obey-Definitely refuse)

7. (A) Most of the laws and institutions of Quebec benefit only some of people, and discriminate against others. (B) Most of the laws and institutions of Quebec benefit all the people equally. (Polar choice: A a ? b B)

Table V-4e

Correlations and Content of Moral Commitment Scale Items in Quebec

Items	1	2	3
2	38		
3	16	14	
4	28	29	14

Moral items

1. A person's first responsibility is to lead a moral and correct life. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

2. (A) In the future, my main obligation as a citizen will be to take good care of my family and be an honest, hard-working person. (B) In the future, my main obligation as a citizen will be to take an interest in the social and political problems of the country. (Polar choice: A a ? b B)

3. (A) I prefer not to talk politics with friends since this only leads to arguments and bad feelings. (B) I enjoy talking politics with my friends. (Polar choice)

4. I feel that practicing the Golden Rule in my daily life is more important than getting involved in politics. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

Table V-5a

Correlations and Content of Symbolic Commitment Scale Items in Belgium

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
2	24										
3	50	33									
4	36	25	39								
5	36	22	37	47							
6	09	32	13	00	-08						
7	14	11	22	13	-13	44					
8	10	12	11	15	-11	18	21				
9	31	28	30	24	23	-08	00	-10			
10	21	59	19	22	24	29	-08	-07	32		
11	17	14	17	21	33	-26	-24	21	11	22	
12	37	28	28	34	19	22	17	-16	30	23	10

Symbolic-Belgium items

1. The first duty of every young francophone or Fleming is to preserve Belgian history and heritage. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

2. Suppose a well-known political leader does something that is internationally disgraceful to Belgium. How would you feel about it? (Check-list: Very ashamed-Not ashamed at all)

3. I feel a great pride and attachment for beautiful land that is Belgium (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

Symbolic-Brussels items

4. I feel personally responsible to defend and insure the growth of our capital, Brussels. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

5. Brussels, as the capital of Belgium and Western Europe, has a special and distinctive cultural character that we must proudly preserve. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

Symbolic-Flanders items

6. Suppose a well-known Flemish leader does something that is internationally disgraceful to Flanders. How would you feel about it?

7. (A) I feel more at ease with Flemings than with Walloons. (B) I feel more at ease with Walloons than with Flemings. (Polar choice)

8. I am proud of the great contribution that Flanders has made to European civilization, notably in art and culture. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

Symbolic-Wallonia items

9. I feel proud of the great contribution that Wallonia has made to European civilization, notably in science and industry. (Likert)

10. Suppose a well-known Walloon leader does something that is internationally disgraceful to Wallonia. How would you feel about it?

Table V-5a

(continued)

Symbolic-Wallonia items (continued)

11. (A) I feel more at ease with Walloons than with Brusselers. (B) I feel more at ease with Brusselers than with Walloons. (Polar choice)

12. The first duty of every young francophone is to honor and preserve Walloon history and heritage. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

Table V-5b

Correlations and Content of Ideological Commitment Scale Items in Belgium

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	22								
3	18	17							
4	30	30	43						
5	-36	-30	-27	-36					
6	-30	-41	-25	-43	41				
7	-07	-22	-29	-08	14	33			
8	24	23	34	40	-46	-44	-26		
9	27	20	14	21	-42	-12	-16	17	
10	25	14	19	20	-29	-15	-07	16	22

Ideological-Brussels items

1. (A) The Flemish nationalist movement is a real threat to the rights of francophone Brusselers. (B) The Flemish nationalist movement recognizes and protects the rights of francophone Brusselers. (Polar choice: A a ? b B)

2. (A) Most Brusselers are open and receptive to the demands of the rest of the country. (B) Most Brusselers are deaf to the demands of the rest of the country. (Polar choice)

3. Brusselers are the only ones to profit from a unitary Belgian state. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

4. At present, Brusselers are favored by the linguistic laws and are economically superior, so there are no good reasons for their grievances. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

Ideological-Flemish items

5. At present, the Flemish are favored by the linguistic laws and are economically superior, so there are no good reasons for their grievances. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

6. Francophone businessmen and bosses located in Flanders act as though they were colonial masters and they exploit the Flemish workers. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

7. All the "belgicistes" and the "fransquillons" are the enemies of Flanders. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

Ideological-Walloon items

8. At present, the Walloons are favored by the linguistic laws and are economically superior, so there are no good reasons for their grievances. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

9. The integrity of French language and culture in Wallonia are threatened by the Flemish nationalism. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

(continued next page)

Table V-5c

Correlations and Content of Functional Commitment Scale Items in Belgium

Items	1	2	3	4
2	41			
3	44	42		
4	10	23	09	
5	08	06	03	45

Functional items

1. To what extent do you think that your future opportunities for advancement in your work are closely tied to the economic development of Wallonia? (Check-list: Very closely tied-Not tied at all)

2. To what extent do you think that your future opportunities for advancement in your work are closely tied to the economic development of Flanders? (Check-list)

3. To what extent do you think that your future opportunities for advancement in your work are closely tied to the economic development of Belgium? (Check-list)

4. After you finish your schooling, what do you think are your chances for getting a prestigeful and well-paying job in Flanders, compared with other people of your age? (Check-list: Much better than average-Much below average)

5. After you finish your schooling, what do you think are your chances for getting a prestigeful and well-paying job in Brussels, compared with other people of your age? (Check-list)

Ideological-Walloon items (continued)

10. (A) Flemish grievances are more important than Walloon grievances, so priority must be given to the Flemish. (B) Walloon grievances are more important than Flemish grievances, so priority must be given to the Walloons. (Polar choice: A a ? b B)

Table V-5d

Correlations and Content of Normative Commitment Scale Items in Belgium

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2	26							
3	22	23						
4	23	34	08					
5	09	14	13	25				
6	09	34	26	28	22			
7	05	26	-09	30	06	08		
8	08	28	12	15	13	20	17	
9	11	17	09	22	15	24	17	20

Normative items

1. (A) At present, the people must demand the revision of the Constitution in order to assure equality for all. (B) At present, the people must show more respect for the Constitution. (Polar choice)

2. The laws and Constitution of Belgium should be defended. (Likert)

3. (A) We should accept and obey all the laws voted by Parliament regardless of our personal opinion. (B) We should accept and obey only those laws voted by Parliament that are just and equitable for all. (Polar choice: A a ? b B)

4. The provincial and communal regulations of Flanders should be respected and defended. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

5. It is sometimes justifiable to break the provincial and communal regulations of Wallonia. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

7. Habitual criminals should be punished less severely. (Likert)

8. How far apart or how different do you think are your own standards of conduct and the standards of society? (Check-list: Very apart-Not apart at all)

9. If a law was passed that ordered everyone must be fingerprinted, what would your reaction be? (Check-list: Definitely obey-Definitely refuse)

6. The authorities should be less severe and not punish minor events, such as juvenile delinquency. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

Table V-5e

Correlations and Content of Moral Commitment Scale Items in Belgium

Items	1	2	3
2	22		
3	18	39	
4	42	27	37

Moral items

1. A person's first responsibility is to lead a moral and correct life. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

2. (A) In the future, my main obligation as a citizen will be to take good care of my family and be an honest, hard-working person. (B) In the future, my main obligation as a citizen will be to take an interest in the social and political problems of the country. (Polar choice: A a ? b B)

3. (A) I prefer not to talk politics with friends since this only leads to arguments and bad feelings. (B) I enjoy talking politics with my friends. (Polar choice)

4. I feel that practicing the Golden Rule in my daily life is more important than getting involved in politics. (Likert: Agree-Disagree)

Ideological-Walloon, Ideological-Brussels, Functional, Normative, and Moral. Tables V-6 and V-7 summarize the principal psychometric characteristics of these Quebec and Belgium scales, respectively. Four sets of information are given. The first column shows the alpha reliability of each scale; it ranges for both countries from .40 to .66. For exploratory survey research this degree of internal consistency or homogeneity of the scales is probably as good as can be expected. The second column shows the correlation between seven items of the Crowne-Marlowe Scale of Social Desirability and each of the commitment measures. The Quebec and Belgium questionnaires each contained 11 social desirability items. These were correlated and in both countries seven items (though not necessarily the same ones) had high intercorrelations and were used to form an index. Social desirability is not associated with any of the scales except Functional commitment in Quebec.

The third set of information in these tables is the inter-scale correlations. We will remark only on the principal patterns. In Quebec (Table V-6), Symbolic-Canada is significantly associated with Symbolic-Quebec (.28). We will later show that this is due to the responses of French Canadians who are culturally attached to both Canada and Quebec, but is not true of the English Canadians. Symbolic-Quebec, as can be intuited, is negatively related to Ideological-English (-.34) and positively related to Ideological-French (.60). If a person is culturally attached to Quebec, he is not likely to endorse English nationalist stands but he probably would accept French Canadian nationalist ideology. Ideological-English and Ideological-French scales, of course, correlate negatively (-.38). Moral and Normative scales also go together (.22). In Belgium (Table V-7), the inter-scale correlations are in essentially

the same directions as the Quebec results. Ideological-Flemish is positively associated with Symbolic-Flanders (.28) but negatively related to all the francophone-oriented scales, whether Ideological or Symbolic. It is interesting that Symbolic attachment to Flanders does not correlate with Symbolic attachment to Wallonia (.04) or to Brussels (.01), but does correlate with Belgium (.28). This means a Fleming may identify himself as both a Fleming and a Belgian, but never as a Fleming and a Walloon, or as a Fleming and a francophone Brusseler. Symbolic-Flanders is also negatively related to Ideological-Brussels (-.44) and Ideological-Walloon (-.36). Symbolic-Wallonia, however, is positively correlated with Ideological-Brussels (.24) and Ideological-Walloon (.33). As in Quebec, Moral commitment correlates with Normative (.36) since both are essentially non-political in orientation. Moral also relates to Symbolic-Belgium (.31): to be a a "good citizen," for many Belgians, implies leading a morally correct life and fulfilling family obligations. In brief, there is a wealth of relationships in these two tables and we cannot describe all of them here. Suffice to say that none of the significant correlations are inconsistent with the theory, historical data, and common sense. It should also be evident by now the heuristic value of having sub-scales by locus of commitment even though, strictly speaking, such a break-down was psychometrically unwarranted. By collapsing all the Ideological sub-scales and the Symbolic sub-scales, many important regional relationships would have been obscured.

The fourth set of information consists of correlations between the commitment scales and voting intentions for different political parties, presented in the lower half of Tables V-6 and V-7. These data

allow examination of the convergent and discriminant validity of the scales. Campbell and Fiske (1959) describe a scale as a union of trait (construct) and method variance, and propose that a multimethod-multitrait matrix be used to partial-out the two sources of variance. We have several traits (types of commitment) and two methods (attitude scale; voting intentions). Each pair of traits can be examined with the two methods using the Campbell and Fiske procedure. For example, we can compare Symbolic-Canada and Ideological-French in the following bitrait-bimethod matrix:

			Method 1	
			A_1	B_1
			Sym-C	Id-Fr
Method 1	Symbolic-Canada	A_1	.57	
(scales)	Ideological-French	B_1	.11	.64
Method 2	Liberal Party	A_2	.09	-.46
(vote)	Separatist Party	B_2	-.12	.55

The top diagonal contains the alpha reliabilities of Symbolic-Canada (.57) and Ideological-French (.64) scales. The second diagonal presents the monotrait-heteromethod validities; i.e. Symbolic Canada should correlate with the external criterion of Liberal vote (.09) and Ideological-French should correlate with the criterion of separatist vote (.55). To claim convergent validity, the validity diagonal should be absolutely greater than the adjacent lower and upper heterotrait-heteromethod triangles. The correlation of Ideological-French and separatist vote (.55) is greater than the correlation between Ideological-French and Liberal vote (-.46) and greater than the correlation between Symbolic-Canada and separatist vote (-.12). The Ideological-French scale, then, has convergent validity. A similar examination shows that Symbolic-Canada does not have convergent validity. Finally, (1) the

validity diagonal should be greater than the top heterotrait-monomethod triangle, and (2) the bottom two heterotrait-heteromethod triangles should show the same pattern vis-a-vis the upper heterotrait-monomethod triangle. These two conditions are requisite for discriminant validity, viz. a low correlation between scales that should not correlate. The Ideological-French scale has discriminant validity in that its correlation with separatist vote (.55) is greater than its correlation with Symbolic-Canada (.11), and the two lower triangles both contain negative correlations vis-a-vis the positive correlation in the top triangle. The Symbolic-Canada scale lacks discriminant validity.

Similar bitrait-bimethod matrices can be devised for any pairs of scales of Belgium, say Symbolic-Flanders and Moral:

			Method 1	
			A_1 Sym-F	B_1 Moral
Method 1 (scales)	Symbolic-Flanders	A_1	.61	
	Moral	B_1	.12	.63
Method 2 (vote)	Volksunie Party	A_2	.48	.04
	No vote preference	B_2	.02	.49

Both scales have acceptable reliability and both demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity. To present here an examination of all the commitment scales of Tables V-6 and V-7 would be unnecessarily tedious. The data are there for anyone who wishes to examine any scale by this procedure. We have compared every possible pair of scales and the findings can be summarized briefly. The inferences from a multitrait-multimethod matrix, as in all validation, are a matter of degree. It is especially true in this case because a scale A may be valid when

Table V-6

Convergent and Discriminant Validation of Quebec Commitment Scales: Reliability (Alpha), Inter-scale Correlations, and Scale Correlations with Social Desirability and Voting Intentions

Commitment Scales +	Alpha	Soc.* Des.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Sym-Canada	57	07							
2. Sym-Quebec	65	08	28a						
3. Ideo-English	41	-02	08	-34a					
4. Ideo-French	64	03	-11	60a	-38a				
5. Normative	52	06	45a	01	10	11			
6. Functional	45	18b	14	17b	-05	04	16		
7. Moral	52	08	22a	02	06	06	22a	11	
Voting Intentions									
8. Liberal		-07	09	-36a	31a	-47a	29a	14	17
9. Separatist		09	-12	45a	-38a	55a	-33a	-08	-05
10. Conservative		-10	08	-05	07	-11	12	-01	-15
11. No voting preference		07	07	-04	-2	-09	10	18	20b

[a] $p < .01$

[b] $p < .05$

* Items from Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale.

+ Sym-Canada = Symbolic-Canada
Sym-Quebec = Symbolic-Quebec
Ideo-English = Ideological-English
Ideo-French = Ideological-French

Table V-7

Convergent and Discriminant Validation of Belgium Commitment Scales: Reliability (Alpha), Inter-scale Correlations, and Scale Correlations with Social Desirability and Voting Intentions

Commitment Scales +	Alpha	Soc.* Des.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Id-Flem	55	03										
2. Sy-Flan	61	05	28b									
3. Id-Wall	40	-02	-44a	-36a								
4. Sy-Wall	52	06	-29b	04	33a							
5. Id-Brus	60	-08	-53a	-44a	48a	24b						
6. Sy-Brus	65	07	-22b	01	16	45a	26b					
7. Sy-Belg	63	03	-15	28b	10	55a	09	48a				
8. Funct	55	06	-02	03	04	24b	04	20	26b			
9. Norm	66	-01	-06	14	09	18	01	24b	32a	19		
10. Moral	63	-06	08	12	04	25b	-12	19	31a	23b	36a	
Voting Intentions **												
11. FDF/RW		-04	-30a	-34a	49a	26b	34a	23b	09	09	22	03
12. PLP		08	-27b	-25b	21	06	28b	07	03	13	06	-03
13. PSC		07	07	09	-15	04	-13	-01	17	-03	09	25b
14. VU		-02	53a	48a	-46a	-28b	-57a	-15	-19	-11	-07	04
15. No voting preference		00	-08	02	-05	-05	-02	-05	-10	13	02	16

[a] $p < .01$

[b] $p < .05$

* Items from Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale

\+ Id-Flem = Ideological-Flemish
Sy-Flan = Symbolic-Flanders
Id-Wall = Ideological-Walloon
Sy-Wall = Symbolic-Wallonia
Id-Brus = Ideological-Brussels
Sy-Brus = Symbolic-Brussels
Funct = Functional
Norm = Normative

** FDF/RW = French nationalist
PLP = Conservative
PSC = Catholic
VU = Flemish nationalist

with B but less valid if compared with C. In general, taking into account all comparisons, the scales fall into one of three categories: (1) some scales that show strong convergent and discriminant validity; (2) a few scales that show neither form of validity; and (3) a majority of scales that show either one or the other validity but not both, or both in a weak pattern and inconsistently across paired comparisons. In the Quebec data, the Symbolic-Quebec and Ideological-French scales fall in the first category; Symbolic-Canada in the second; and Ideological-English, Functional, Moral, and Normative in the third category. In Belgium, Symbolic-Flanders, Ideological-Flemish, Moral, and Ideological-Walloon are in the first category; Symbolic-Belgium and Functional in the second; and Ideological-Brussels, Symbolic-Brussels, Symbolic-Wallonia, Moral, and Normative in the last category. The fact that many of the scales only partially satisfy the rigorous validational criteria that Campbell and Fiske propose is not serious in our view. Construct validation, as we have argued, is a continuing process of hypothesis-testing. The multitrait-multimethod technique is only one aspect of the process, and it is the cumulative pattern that emerges from the research that is the ultimate arbiter of validity. So long as these scales have some convergent and discriminant validity, and these data are not inconsistent with the results from other validational procedures, we can conclude that construct validation has been advanced another step.

Concurrent validity relationships of commitment types

The objective of this section is to study the concurrent validity of the commitment types -- are the types systematically different in their relationships to a wide range of demographic, attitudinal, and

and behavioral criterion variables? Such relationships have substantive as well as methodological interest. Table V-8a presents the concurrent validity relationships for the Quebec scales.[5] The top of the table shows the number of "High Type" respondents, i.e. the number of respondents who had an average score of 4.0 or higher on the 5-point commitment scales. The reason why the total number of High Types exceeds the total sample is because some respondents scored high on more than one commitment scale. An attempt to obtain "pure types" -- persons with a high score on one and only one scale -- yielded too few cases for each type to permit any meaningful analysis. The present High Type respondents are "impure" in the sense that some of them overlap different commitment scales. Later we will present the overlap distribution for each pair of commitment types. This analysis is less elegant than a "pure" one but not less valid. In fact, overlapping respondents should work against our attempt to show that the types differentiate systematically different criterion variables. It is more difficult to obtain differences with impure or correlated types than with pure or independent types.

Only the most important relationships of Table V-8a will be highlighted here. An economic way of examining the table is by comparing certain pairs of commitment types: (1) Ideological-French (Id-Fr) with Symbolic-Quebec (Sy-Q); (2) Ideological-English (Id-En) with Symbolic-Canada (Sy-C); (3) pair 1 with pair 2; and (4) examining Functional (Ft) and Normative (Norm) individually. We begin with relationships to the demographic variables. The largest percentage of Id-Fr (45.5) and Sy-Q (46.0) respondents are Montreal-French; most Id-En (36.6) types are Montreal-English; and most Sy-C (33.3) types

are Quebec-French. We will defer for a moment an explanation of this surprising finding that more French than English Quebeckers are Symbolically attached to Canada. With respect to social-economic status, there is a direct increasing relationship between fathers' educational and occupational status and the percentage of Functionally committed respondents.

On personal characteristics, most Id-Fr (86.4) and Sy-Q (85.7) persons identify themselves as French Canadians; most Id-En (51.2) see themselves as Canadians; and most Sy-C (50.7) types identify themselves as French Canadians. Looking at travel experiences, almost half of the Id-Fr and Sy-Q types have never gone out of the province of Quebec. 62.8 % of the Id-En have travelled three or more times outside of Quebec and 41.6 % of the Sy-C types have done so. A pattern is now emerging. The fact that 96.8 % of the Sy-Q types are found in French schools (add Quebec-French, Nicolet, and Montreal-French under "location of school" for Sy-Q) and that 66.6 % of the Sy-C types are also found in French schools, means that although the majority of the French sample is culturally attached to Quebec, many are also attached to Canada as a whole. And unlike the former, the French-speaking Sy-C types have travelled more often outside of Quebec, and some of them define themselves as "Canadians" rather than "French Canadians." These differences become even more marked in terms of provincial voting intentions. The Id-Fr, as can be expected, vote overwhelmingly for the separatist party (72.7). The Sy-Q types also favor the separatists but less strongly (55.6). But the Sy-C types, which we have just seen are composed mainly of French Canadians, vote largely for the Liberals (46.5) -- only 26.1 % of the Sy-C types vote separatist.

Clearly the French Canadian sample is not monolithic in background and ideology. The Id-En, as expected, vote largely for the Liberals (66.1), as do the Ft types (44.6).

Comparison of the fathers' provincial vote with the respondents' voting intention tells something about family political socialization. Among the nationalist French Canadians there is a generation voting gap: Most fathers of the Id-Fr and Sy-Q respondents vote Liberal (40.9; 37.1); most of the respondents themselves, as we have noted, prefer to vote separatist. There is virtually no discrepancy among the English. 73.8 % of the fathers of the Ed-En types vote Liberal; 66.1 % of the Id-En themselves also vote Liberal. Likewise, there is no discrepancy between fathers' vote and that of Ft and Norm types, even though these two types are also constituted primarily by French Canadians. At the federal voting level, the generation gap in voting for the French nationalists disappears. Most Id-Fr and Sy-Q types vote Liberal in the same proportion as their fathers. The same is true for all other types. What is most interesting here is the exceedingly high apathy towards federal politics in the entire sample, but especially among the French. Thus, whereas only 2.3 % of the Id-Fr and 4.8 % of the Sy-Q types expressed no provincial voting preferences, fully 54.5 % of the Id-Fr and 49.2 % of the Sy-Q had no federal political preferences.

Systematic differences between the types appear too on political issues. In general, attitudes of the Id-Fr and Sy-Q are always in the same direction but the former are always more extreme. The attitudes of the Id-En types are always in the opposite direction. The Sy-C types, because they are French Canadians who are also attached to

Canada, sometimes exhibit attitudes in the direction of the Id-Fr and Sy-Q, sometimes in the direction of the Id-En, but always more moderately than either side. Thus, 72.1 % of Id-Fr and 58 % of Sy-Q persons favor Quebec separatism; 86.1 % of the Id-En and 70.6 % of the Sy-C persons oppose it. Consistent with their pro-separatist attitude, most Id-Fr and Sy-Q types believe separatism is very likely to occur in the near future; consistent with their anti-separatist attitude, most Id-En think separatism is very unlikely. But most of the Sy-C types, who oppose separatism, believe it will come about. Regarding the kind of future government preferred, again most Id-Fr and Sy-Q types wish an independent Quebec. The Id-En favor maintaining the status quo or giving more power to Ottawa -- the two political solutions that the French Canadians are most strongly opposed to. The Sy-C, Pt, and Norm types prefer the moderate solution of greater autonomy for Quebec but still remaining a part of the Confederation.

Table V-8b presents the percentage overlap of High Types. The overlap of the Ideological and Symbolic types are presented separately from the overlap of Functional and Normative types, in order to avoid the cumbersome comparison of every possible pair of types. The principal pattern is that Symbolic and Ideological commitment form a rank-order kind of relationship: the respondents who are Ideological are also Symbolic, but the converse is not necessarily true. For instance, of the 69 high Sy-C types, only 24 or about one-third are also Id-En; but of the 43 high Id-En types, 24 or over one-half are also high on Sy-C commitment. In like manner, half (50.8) of the Sy-Q respondents are Ideologically committed to Quebec; but about two-thirds (72.7) of the Id-Fr types are also Symbolically attached to Quebec.

Table V-8a

Concurrent Validity Relationships of Quebec Commitment Scales to Criterion Variables: Percentage Endorsement by Respondents With High Scale Scores (≥ 4.0 on 5-point scale)

	I-Fr*	Sy-Q	I-En	Sy-C	Func	Norm
N=	69	63	43	44	56	47
DEMOGRAPHIC						
Birthplace						
Quebec	97.7	96.8	79.1	87.0	92.9	85.1
English Canada	0.0	1.6	14.0	8.7	1.8	10.6
Abroad	2.3	1.6	7.0	4.3	5.4	4.3
Location of school						
Quebec-French	27.3	34.9	26.8	33.3	38.2	38.3
Quebec-English	2.3	1.6	19.5	20.3	9.1	23.4
Nicolet-French	25.0	15.9	4.9	10.1	7.3	4.3
Montreal-French	45.5	46.0	12.2	23.2	34.4	14.9
Montreal-English	0.0	1.6	36.6	13.0	10.9	19.1
Fathers' education						
Low	36.4	34.9	45.4	36.7	25.0	36.2
Medium	22.7	30.2	28.4	33.8	34.7	25.5
High	40.9	34.9	26.2	29.5	40.3	36.2
Fathers' occupation						
Low	25.1	27.4	19.0	25.4	14.7	21.7
Medium	36.3	29.1	28.7	22.4	38.0	21.8
High	38.6	43.5	52.3	52.2	47.3	56.5
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS						
Ethnic self-identity						
Canadian	11.4	14.3	51.2	34.8	41.1	53.2
English Canadian	2.8	0.0	18.6	11.6	1.8	6.4
French Canadian	86.4	85.7	27.9	50.7	53.6	38.3
Other ethnicity	-	-	2.3	2.8	3.6	2.1
Religion						
Catholic	84.1	90.5	44.2	71.0	71.4	66.0
Protestant	2.3	1.6	44.2	21.7	10.7	27.7
None	13.6	7.9	9.3	5.8	14.3	4.3
Language used at home						
English only	2.3	-	41.9	18.8	14.3	25.5
English > French	-	3.2	16.3	10.1	7.1	14.9
English = French	-	-	2.3	4.3	1.8	4.3
French > English	6.8	14.3	14.0	14.5	19.6	10.6
French only	90.9	82.5	25.6	52.4	55.4	44.7

Table V-8a (continued)

	I-Fr	Sy-Q	I-En	Sy-C	Func	Norm
Travel in Canada						
Never left Quebec	52.0	47.6	14.0	34.8	31.5	29.8
1 - 2 times	34.4	28.5	23.3	23.6	30.9	36.2
3 - 4 times	13.6	23.8	62.8	41.6	37.5	34.1
Number of out-group friends						
None	40.9	35.5	20.9	23.5	25.5	19.6
1 - 2	27.3	24.2	11.6	16.2	20.8	17.4
3 - 4	15.9	14.5	18.6	19.1	10.9	13.0
5 or more	15.9	25.8	48.8	41.2	42.8	50.0
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR						
Own provincial vote preference						
Liberal (PL)	20.5	28.6	66.1	46.4	44.6	53.2
Separatist (PQ)	72.7	55.6	10.6	26.1	21.4	23.4
Conservative (UN)	-	6.3	7.0	7.2	5.4	8.5
Social Credit	4.5	4.8	2.3	4.3	5.4	4.3
None; don't know	2.3	4.8	14.0	15.9	23.2	8.6
Fathers' provincial vote						
Liberal (PL)	40.9	37.1	73.8	60.3	44.6	54.3
Separatist (PQ)	20.5	21.0	-	8.8	16.1	6.5
Conservative (UN)	6.8	11.3	7.1	7.4	7.1	8.7
Social Credit	9.1	8.1	-	2.9	-	2.2
None; don't know	18.2	21.0	16.7	17.7	25.0	21.7
Mothers' provincial vote						
Liberal (PL)	38.6	36.5	76.2	58.0	50.0	54.3
Separatist (PQ)	27.3	20.6	-	4.3	12.5	6.5
Conservative (UN)	6.8	12.7	4.8	7.2	7.1	8.7
Social Credit	6.8	6.3	2.4	4.3	-	4.3
None; don't know	18.1	20.7	16.7	21.7	28.5	21.7
Own federal vote preference						
Liberal	29.5	36.5	65.1	60.9	53.6	66.0
Conservative	4.5	6.3	4.6	5.8	1.8	4.3
Social Credit	9.1	4.8	2.3	2.9	1.8	2.1
others	2.3	3.2	2.3	2.9	1.8	-
None; don't know	54.5	49.2	25.6	27.5	41.1	27.7
Fathers' federal vote						
Liberal	36.4	38.3	76.2	66.7	53.8	54.3
Conservative	6.8	5.0	4.8	1.5	5.8	6.5
Social Credit	13.6	10.0	-	3.0	-	2.1
others	4.5	1.7	-	1.5	-	-
None; don't know	36.4	45.0	16.7	27.2	34.6	34.7

Table V-8a (continued)

	I-Fr	Sy-Q	I-En	Sy-C	Func	Norm
Mothers' federal vote						
Liberal	38.6	31.7	76.2	59.4	46.4	54.3
Conservative	2.3	3.2	7.1	4.3	3.6	6.5
Social Credit	9.1	7.8	-	2.9	-	4.3
others	6.8	3.2	-	-	3.6	-
none; don't know	43.2	53.2	16.7	33.3	44.6	34.8
POLITICAL ATTITUDES						
Attitude towards separatism						
Very pro; pro	72.1	58.0	9.3	25.0	27.3	23.4
neutral	-	1.6	4.7	4.4	3.6	2.1
Very anti; anti	27.9	40.4	86.1	70.6	69.1	74.5
Likelihood of separatism						
Very likely, likely	80.5	67.8	41.9	45.6	43.6	30.2
neutral	5.8	11.3	7.0	17.6	21.8	13.0
Very unlikely, unlikely	13.6	21.0	51.2	36.8	34.5	56.5
Type of government preferred						
Status quo	-	1.6	34.9	17.6	16.4	28.3
Stronger Ottawa	6.8	6.5	30.2	13.2	5.5	17.4
Separate Quebec	27.3	41.9	27.9	50.0	54.5	37.0
More autonomous Quebec	65.9	50.0	7.0	19.1	23.6	17.4
In Quebec, social cleaveages:						
Exist	42.2	57.9	62.4	62.7	68.5	61.9
Don't exist	40.5	26.3	20.0	20.7	22.2	19.1
Neutral	17.4	15.8	17.5	10.2	9.3	19.0

* I-Fr = Ideological-French
Sy-Q = Symbolic Quebec
I-En = Ideological-English
Sy-C = Symbolic Canada
Func = Functional
Norm = Normative

Note: Some columns do not total 100 % due to exclusion of missing data and/or some response alternatives from the table.

Table V-8b

Percentage Overlap of Quebec "High Types:" Number of Respondents With High Score on a Commitment Scale (Row) Who Are Also High on Other (Column) Scales

	Sy-C	I-En	Sy-Q	I-Fr
Sy-C N=69	—	34.7 (24)	49.2 (34)	24.6 (17)
I-En N=43	55.8 (24)	—	23.2 (10)	11.6 (5)
Sy-Q N=63	54.0 (34)	15.8 (10)	—	50.8 (32)
I-Fr N=56	38.6 (17)	11.4 (5)	72.7 (32)	—

	Func	Norm
Func N=56	—	33.9 (19)
Norm N=47	40.4 (19)	—

Sy-C = Symbolic-Canada
I-En = Ideological-English
Sy-Q = Symbolic-Quebec
I-Fr = Ideological-French

Table V-9a presents the concurrent validity relationships for the Belgium scales. Again, the top of the table shows the number of High Type respondents for each scale. As with the Quebec data, the most organized way of examining this table is by comparing certain pairs of commitment: (1) Ideological-Flemish (I-F) with Symbolic-Flanders (S-F); (2) Ideological-Brussels (I-Br) with Symbolic-Brussels (S-Br); (3) Ideological-Walloon (I-W) with Symbolic-Wallonia (S-W); (4) pair 1 with pairs 2 and 3; and (5) examining Symbolic-Belgium (S-B), Functional (Ft), and Normative (Norm) types individually. We will describe only the principal relationships of the High Types with the criterion variables. On demographic variables, there are no differences between the I-F and S-F; both reside primarily in rural areas and their fathers have a medium occupational and educational level. On the other hand, there are systematic differences between the Ideological and Symbolic types of Brussels and Wallonia. More I-Br (57.1) than S-Br (51.2) respondents live in large urban areas; likewise, more I-W (64.7) than S-W (37.9) types are urban dwellers. Most I-Br (57.1) and I-W (45.9) have fathers with high education; most S-Br (45.3) and S-W (43.8) have fathers with only medium level of education. As in Quebec, the proportion of the Functionally committed is directly related with increasing educational and occupational status of their fathers.

With respect to ethnic self-identification, 70 % of the I-F and 53.7 % of the S-F define themselves as Flemish. The I-Br see themselves as Belgians and Brusselers, but the S-Br see themselves mostly as Belgians. The I-W, like the I-Br, label themselves as Belgians and Brusselers, but the S-W see themselves mostly as Walloons.

This is due, as will be shown later, to the fact that those who score high on I-W are also high on the I-Br scale, but there is much less overlap of respondents on the S-W and S-Br scales. Not surprisingly, most S-B, Ft, and Norm types consider themselves as Belgians. In all regions, the Symbolically committed attend religious services more often than the Ideological. This is understandable since Catholicism is deeply ingrained in the country's culture. In all regions, too, more Symbolic than Ideological respondents speak the out-group language at home and, concomitantly, the Symbolic respondents have higher speaking and comprehension ability of the out-group language than the Ideological (this latter result is not presented in the table because it was computed on the basis of means rather than percentages). In all regions, finally, the Symbolic have more out-group friends than the Ideological, but the latter more often discuss politics and are more politically informed than the former types.

The pattern of family socialization of voting preferences among the Flemish is more similar to that of French Canadians than that of francophone Belgians. Conversely, the pattern among Walloons and Brusselers parallels that of English Canadians. Thus, most I-F and S-F vote for the Flemish nationalist party; most of their fathers, however, vote for the Catholic party. Among the Flemish and French Canadian nationalists there is this generation voting gap. On the other hand, most I-Br and S-Br, and most I-W and S-W, vote for the French nationalist party and the conservative party; almost the same proportion of their fathers vote likewise. Among the francophone Belgian and English Canadian nationalists, then, there is no generation discrepancy in voting. In the same way, the Ft and Norm types tend

to vote Conservative as do their fathers.

On political attitudes the same general patterns appears in Belgium as in Quebec. The attitudes of the I-F and S-F are always in the same direction but the former are more extreme. The attitudes of the Walloons and the Brusselers are in the opposite direction, with the I-Br and I-W being always more extreme than the S-Br and S-W. Differences between the Brussels and Walloon scales also appear on issues that divide the two groups. For example, on the question of type of future government preferred, most I-F (51.4) and S-F (36.2) opted for the federalization of Belgium. Most I-Br (27.3) preferred a more centralized government in Brussels, a solution in which they would reap the benefits. The S-Br and I-W equally favored the solutions of more centralization, decentralization, or federalism. Most interesting for validity is that the S-B types chose the status quo solution, that is, to maintain the present unitary regime of Belgium. None of the other commitment types favored this option by a majority. On the attitude towards federalism, the Symbolically committed are more strongly against the partitioning of Belgium than the Ideological across all regions. The highest percentage of anti-federalists is found among the S-B types (44.9); the lowest among the I-F (2.6). Here an interesting difference between the French Canadian and the Flemish nationalists should be pointed out. A large percentage of the former desire separatism (72.1 of Id-Fr; 58.0 of Sy-Q) and an even larger number believe separatism is likely to occur (80.5 of Id-Fr; 67.8 of Sy-Q). A large percentage of the Flemish nationalists desire federalism (74.4 of I-F; 61.2 of S-F), but curiously, a smaller percentage believes federalism will actually come about (43.6 of I-F;

41.8 of S-F). Attitude and expectation are consistent among the French Canadians but not among the Flemish. One may speculate that the dissonance the Flemish must experience might be a motivating force for their nationalist demands. On the other hand, most of the I-Br, S-Br, I-W, and S-W types also favor federalism and about an equal number of them expect this form of government to occur in the future. In this respect their cognitive structure is similar to that of the French Canadian nationalists.

Erstwhile we noted that the Flemish nationalist movement might derive its moving force more from a desire to redress past injustices than from present social conditions. When faced with this question, most I-F (60.5) and S-F (57.5) persons claimed that the causes of the movement are rooted in contemporary problems; the I-Br (51.3) and I-W (52.2) persons felt it was due to past injustices; and the S-Br (41.9) and S-W (43.4) persons sided with the Flemish interpretation. Attribution to past or present causes can serve, respectively, to deny or enhance the legitimacy of the current nationalist demands. The Symbolic francophones appear to adopt a moderate stance between the I-F and S-F on the one hand, and the I-Br and I-W on the other.

An interesting cross-national pattern appears with respect to perception of social class differences in society. It is popularly assumed that all the Flemish constitute a monolithic entity, that they are like a united family with no internal social cleavages. Actually only a minority of I-F (34.2) and S-F (27.5) believe in a monolithic Flanders, and the I-Br (15.8) and I-W (19.2) believe it even less. When inquired about the social class differences in Wallonia, the reverse pattern occurs: the Flemish are less likely than the franco-

phones to accept the monolithic view of Wallonia; and among the francophones, the Symbolic are less likely than the Ideological to accept it. It is as if each ethnic group was more anxious to deny the existence of a one-class society in the opposing ethnic group than in one's own. The recognition of social cleavages in the ethnic out-group implies the opposition is fragmented and, conversely, that one's own group has a united nationalist front. In Quebec the same pattern occurs (cf. Table V-8a): 40.5 % of the Id-Fr and 26.3 % of the Sy-Q claim that French Canada constitutes a single social class, whereas only 20 % of the Id-En and 20.7 % of the Sy-C types are willing to grant this view. And again, it is the more politicized Ideological French Canadian types that provide the strongest endorsement.

Table VI-9b presents the percentage overlap of Belgian High Types. As in the Quebec case, the Ideologically committed person is probably Symbolically committed too, but the converse is not true. For example, of the 86 S-Br types, 29.4 % of them also score high on I-Br; but of the 45 I-Br types, 55.1 % of them score high on S-Br commitment. As another example, only 32.8 % of the S-F are also I-F types; but among the I-F, 55 % of them are also S-F. In general, then, Symbolic commitment -- or "patriotism" in Doob's term -- is the more universal psychological condition. However, Ideological commitment -- or "nationalism" according to Doob -- is a less common form of commitment that arises from Symbolic roots and expresses itself in the political domain. Thus, most Flemish are Symbolically attached to Flanders but only a smaller number of them are also Ideologically committed to the Flemish nationalist cause. The percentage overlap data are also useful for examining the discrimination between scales

Table V-9a

Concurrent Validity Relationships of Belgium Commitment Scales to Criterion Variables: Percentage Endorsement by Respondents With High Scale Scores (≥ 4.0 on 5-point Scale)

	Id-F*	Sy-F	I-Br	S-Br	Id-W	Sy-W	Sy-B	Func	Norm
N =	40	68	45	86	52	29	49	57	42
DEMOGRAPHIC									
Urban/rural residence									
Large urban	25.6	19.1	71.1	51.2	64.7	37.9	36.7	49.1	48.8
small urban	30.8	39.7	22.2	19.8	15.7	27.6	30.6	27.3	22.0
rural & farm	43.6	41.2	6.7	29.1	19.6	34.5	32.7	23.6	29.2
Birthplace									
Brussels	20.0	23.5	64.4	39.5	57.7	35.9	38.8	45.2	43.9
Flanders	67.5	60.3	13.3	33.7	9.6	13.8	32.7	31.0	28.1
Wallonia	5.0	8.8	11.1	18.6	25.0	40.9	24.5	14.3	14.0
Congo & abroad	7.5	7.3	11.1	8.2	7.7	9.3	4.1	9.5	14.0
Fathers' education									
Low	22.6	14.1	4.8	9.5	6.1	17.9	8.5	17.5	5.3
Medium	54.0	54.7	35.7	45.3	37.9	43.8	53.1	35.0	47.4
High	16.2	23.5	57.1	35.7	45.9	34.7	27.6	42.5	42.1
Fathers' occupation									
Low	22.5	23.5	8.8	20.2	13.7	32.2	14.6	19.5	10.0
Medium	51.5	43.3	26.7	34.5	33.4	21.3	43.7	31.7	35.5
High	25.0	34.3	62.2	45.2	51.0	46.5	41.7	48.8	55.0
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS									
Ethnic self-identity									
Belgian	15.0	32.8	36.6	47.0	38.8	30.3	46.8	48.8	42.6
Brusseler	10.0	6.0	40.0	18.1	30.6	11.1	10.6	14.6	16.7
Fleming	70.0	53.7	6.3	19.3	6.1	11.1	21.3	17.1	25.9
Walloon	5.0	4.5	14.6	14.5	22.4	40.0	19.1	14.6	13.0
Foreigner	-	3.0	2.4	1.2	2.0	7.4	2.1	4.9	1.9
Church attendance									
Often	67.5	71.6	22.2	40.0	25.0	35.7	56.2	33.3	41.1
Never	17.5	10.4	77.8	42.4	57.7	35.7	27.1	40.5	39.3
Language used at home									
French only	15.4	22.7	83.7	50.6	69.2	62.1	54.2	53.7	52.6
French & Walloon	5.1	3.0	4.7	10.6	17.3	17.2	8.3	4.9	5.3
French & Dutch	-	4.5	-	4.7	7.7	3.4	4.2	9.8	10.5
Dutch only	20.5	25.8	4.7	12.9	3.8	6.9	16.7	14.6	5.3
Dutch & Flemish	59.0	43.9	7.0	20.0	1.9	10.3	16.7	17.1	26.3

Table V-9a (continued)

	Id-F	Sy-F	I-Br	S-Br	Id-W	Sy-W	Sy-B	Funo	Norm
Number of out-group friends									
None	42.5	27.9	35.6	27.9	30.8	31.0	30.6	31.0	33.9
Four or more	12.5	33.8	22.2	31.4	25.0	34.5	28.6	31.0	32.1
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR									
Own vote prefererence									
French nationalist	5.0	5.9	28.9	17.5	30.8	27.6	20.4	16.7	19.3
Conservative (PLP)	7.5	4.4	26.7	19.8	28.8	20.7	18.4	33.3	24.6
Catholic (PSC)	15.0	10.3	4.4	8.1	1.9	10.3	18.4	7.1	12.3
Socialist (PSB)	5.0	5.9	6.7	3.5	3.8	10.3	6.1	7.1	3.5
Flemish nationalist	47.5	39.7	2.2	16.3	1.9	6.9	12.2	14.3	10.5
Communist (PC)	5.0	4.4	8.9	4.7	7.7	3.4	6.1	2.4	1.8
None; don't know	15.0	24.0	22.3	30.2	17.3	20.6	18.1	29.1	28.1
Fathers' vote									
French nationalist	5.0	1.5	26.2	13.7	28.0	18.5	10.4	10.0	13.2
Conservative (PLP)	2.5	10.8	38.1	25.0	34.0	22.2	27.1	32.5	32.1
Catholic (PSC)	12.5	38.5	9.5	22.5	12.0	14.8	22.9	12.5	18.9
Socialist (PSB)	12.5	7.7	2.4	7.5	8.0	14.8	8.3	10.0	7.5
Flemish nationalist	15.0	15.4	2.4	3.7	2.0	3.7	6.2	10.0	5.7
Communist (PC)	5.0	-	-	-	2.0	-	-	-	-
None; don't know	25.0	24.6	21.4	27.4	14.0	25.9	25.0	25.0	22.6
Mothers' vote									
French nationalist	7.5	6.0	25.0	31.1	28.9	22.2	12.4	15.0	12.7
Conservative (PLP)	-	7.6	29.5	20.2	30.8	22.2	20.8	20.0	21.8
Catholic (PSC)	37.5	40.9	15.9	28.6	13.5	22.2	31.3	20.0	21.8
Socialist (PSB)	7.5	4.5	4.5	6.0	5.8	14.8	4.2	15.0	7.3
Flemish nationalist	15.0	10.6	-	2.4	-	-	-	2.5	3.6
Communist (PC)	2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
None: don't know	30.0	30.3	25.0	29.8	21.2	18.5	31.3	22.5	30.9
Very often:									
Talk politics	55.0	28.4	44.4	26.7	46.0	31.0	29.2	28.6	21.0
Informed on politics	32.5	29.9	34.3	27.1	36.0	27.6	27.1	19.0	17.5
POLITICAL ATTITUDES									
Type of government preferred									
More centralized in Brussels	10.8	15.5	28.3	16.2	18.0	7.4	13.3	16.2	12.7
Status quo: unity of Belgium	2.7	5.2	11.4	13.7	12.0	18.5	28.7	5.4	9.1
Decentralization	13.5	25.9	18.2	22.5	22.0	18.5	20.0	27.0	27.3
Federalization	51.4	36.2	19.5	21.2	22.0	25.9	22.4	24.3	20.0
Independence of Flanders/Wallonia	8.1	3.4	4.5	6.2	4.0	-	2.2	-	9.1
Unification with Holland/France	2.7	6.9	11.4	7.5	12.0	18.5	6.7	16.2	7.3
Don't know	10.8	6.9	6.8	12.5	10.0	11.1	6.7	10.8	14.5

Table V-9a (continued)

	Id-F	Sy-F	I-Br	S-Br	Id-W	Sy-W	Sy-B	Func	Norm
Flemish nationalism stems from:									
Past injustices	18.4	26.3	51.3	36.5	52.2	34.7	44.5	44.5	47.0
Present problems	60.5	57.7	32.4	41.9	26.1	43.4	35.0	30.5	23.6
Neutral;don't know	21.1	16.4	21.7	21.6	21.7	21.7	22.5	25.0	29.4
In Flanders, social classes:									
Exist	60.5	62.9	73.7	57.3	72.3	54.2	73.1	69.5	76.5
Don't exist: a united people	34.5	27.5	15.8	26.6	19.2	25.2	29.5	11.1	11.8
Neutral;don't know	5.3	9.7	10.5	16.0	8.5	20.8	7.3	69.5	11.8
In Wallonia, social classes:									
Exist	55.3	58.7	64.1	56.0	64.8	58.3	70.8	58.4	76.5
Don't exist: a united people	15.8	16.1	12.8	20.0	28.8	33.3	21.9	22.2	11.8
Neutral;don't know	28.9	23.3	23.1	24.0	6.4	8.3	7.3	19.4	11.8
Attitude towards federalism									
Very pro, pro	74.4	61.2	46.5	50.6	41.1	53.5	30.6	46.3	40.3
Neutral	23.1	19.4	18.6	23.5	19.6	28.6	24.2	31.7	28.1
Very anti, anti	2.6	19.4	34.9	25.8	39.2	17.9	44.9	22.0	31.6
Likelihood of federalism									
Very likely, likely	43.6	41.8	47.7	45.2	38.2	35.7	38.7	39.1	31.6
Neutral	25.6	23.9	31.0	29.8	36.0	32.1	34.7	39.0	36.8
Very unlikely, unlikely	30.8	34.3	21.4	25.0	26.0	32.2	26.5	22.0	31.6

* Id-F = Ideological-Flemish
Sy-F = Symbolic-Flanders
I-Br = Ideological-Brussels
S-Br = Symbolic-Brussels
Id-W = Ideological-Wallonia
Sy-W = Symbolic-Wallonia
Func = Functional
Norm = Normative

Note: Some columns do not total 100 % due to exclusion of missing data and/or some response alternatives from the table.

Table V-9b

Percentage Overlap of Belgium "High Types:" Number of Respondents With High Score on a Commitment Scale (Row) Who are Also High on Other (Column) Scales

	Id-F	Sy-F	I-Br	S-Br	Id-W	Sy-W	Sy-B
Id-F N=40	—	55.0 (22)	10.0 (4)	30.0 (12)	7.5 (3)	7.5 (3)	20.0 (8)
Sy-F N=68	32.8 (22)	—	7.5 (5)	44.1 (30)	19.4 (13)	20.6 (14)	42.6 (29)
I-Br n=45	8.8 (4)	11.1 (5)	—	55.1 (25)	48.8 (22)	15.6 (7)	31.3 (14)
S-Br N=86	13.9 (12)	34.9 (30)	29.4 (25)	—	30.6 (26)	20.9 (18)	41.8 (36)
Id-W N=52	5.7 (3)	25.0 (13)	42.3 (22)	50.0 (26)	—	25.0 (13)	36.5 (19)
Sy-W N=29	10.3 (3)	48.6 (14)	24.1 (7)	62.0 (18)	44.8 (13)	—	68.8 (20)
Sy-B N=49	16.3 (8)	59.1 (29)	29.2 (14)	73.5 (36)	39.6 (19)	40.8 (20)	—

	Func	Norm
Func N=57	—	29.0 (16)
Norm N=42	38.0 (16)	—

Id-F = Ideological-Flemish
Sy-F = Symbolic-Flanders
I-Br = Ideological-Brussels
S-Br = Symbolic-Brussels
Id-W = Ideological-Walloon
Sy-W = Symbolic-Wallonia
Sy-B = Symbolic-Belgium

by comparing any two scales vis-a-vis a third. Thus, among the Flemish, the Symbolically committed (42.6) are more culturally attached to Belgium than the Ideologically committed (20). Likewise among the Walloons, the high Symbolic types (68.8) are more attached to Belgium than the Ideological (36.5). Finally among the Brusselers, the high Symbolic persons (41.8) are more attached to Belgium than the Ideological (31.3). Other systematic relationships of this kind can be seen in the table, but we will not describe them further here.

This concludes the presentation of methodology. We began by describing the back-translation of the commitment items and their cross-nationally invariant factor structure. The factorially derived items were then combined with other intercorrelated items to form the final set of commitment scales. Evidence for internal consistency and response bias of these scales was shown, and their convergent and discriminant validity was examined. Finally the concurrent validity relationships of these scales to external criterion variables was reviewed. In general the relationships of the various scales to each other and to external variables exhibit an overall systematic pattern of variation, even if each individual relationship was not strong or clear-cut. On balance we feel the scales possess sufficient reliability and validity so that we can now proceed to employ them in testing the substantive problems of our research.

CHAPTER VI

RESULTS OF STATUS AND COMMITMENT

Effects of Class, Ethnicity, and Status Inconsistency

The principal theoretical problem of this study is a differential evaluation of three interpretations of nationalism in Quebec and Belgium: the class differences hypothesis, the ethnicity hypothesis, and the status inconsistency hypothesis. The operational dependent measures are Ideological commitment, or political nationalism, and Symbolic commitment, or cultural nationalism. The standard design for testing these hypotheses in Quebec is presented at the top of Table VI-1. It is a 2 X 2 table with two levels of achieved (social class) and ascribed (ethnicity) status . Class is indexed by fathers' educational level, high (elite) or low (mass). The correlation of fathers' education with occupation was .58. We employed the former index in the analyses because it was obtained from a close-ended question and we were more confident of its reliability than the open-ended question on occupation. Ethnicity is indexed by the general social prestige of the two ethno-linguistic communities. We identified English with high ethnic status and French with low status.

Table a presents the Ideological (Id-Fr) commitment means. There is a strong ethnicity main effect: the French have a higher Id-Fr commitment than the English. There is also a class main effect: the elites are more Ideologically committed than the masses. Due to the additive main effects, the following rank-order of means was found: The French elite (low ascribed/high achieved) have the highest Id-Fr mean; the English masses (high ascribed/low achieved) have the lowest

mean; the English elite and the French masses, both status consistent, fall in between. Although this is precisely the rank-order predicted by the status inconsistency hypothesis, the interaction term is not significant; the ordering must be attributed to the main effects. Table e shows the Ideological-English (Id-En) means. Again, there are strong class and ethnicity main effects. The rank-order of means is the opposite of the Id-Fr table: The English masses, who are most directly threatened by the French Canadian advances and most defensive about their status in Quebec, show the highest Id-En commitment; the French elite has the lowest commitment; and the status consistent groups are in between. But as before, this rank-order must be attributed to the additive main effects than to status inconsistency since the interaction term is not significant. The Symbolic-Quebec (Sy-Q) means of Table b present the same pattern as the Id-Fr means. Since most Ideologically committed French Canadians are also Symbolically attached to Quebec, it is to be expected that the means on the two scales be in the same direction. The Symbolic-Canada (Sy-C) means of Table c show no significant differences; the elites and the masses, and the French and the English, do not differ in cultural attachment to Canada. This is understandable because, as noted previously, many of the Sy-C High Types are French Canadians, and this would cancel-out any ethnicity main effect in the table.

A second theoretical objective of the study was to see if the status consistent groups demonstrated a characteristic form of commitment. We had hypothesized that the high achieved/high ascribed (English elites) would be Functionally (Ft) involved, and the low achieved/low ascribed (French masses) would be Normatively committed. We might add

that the latter would also be Morally committed since the Moral and Normative forms of commitment share similar non-political features. Table f presents the Ft means. Contrary to our expectation, the French are more Functionally committed than the English, and the elite more than the masses. The additive main effects result in the French elite exhibiting the highest Ft mean, not the English elite as predicted. It must be recalled, though, that the Ft "scale" has more method than trait variance so this finding may not be reliable. Table e shows the Normative means. The French masses are not more Normatively committed than the others; there are no differences between the groups. On Moral commitment (Table g), the only significant finding is an unexpected interaction effect. This is due to the English elite and French masses, the two consistent groups, having the lowest Moral commitment.

Table VI-1 also presents the means of three other relevant political attitudes. None of these individual attitudinal items were part of the commitment scales. Their analysis follows the same standard design of the commitment means. Table h shows the means on the question of separatism. The French are more pro-separation of Quebec than the English, and the elites more than the masses. The ordering of the means, as can be expected from this kind of question, is identical to the ordering of the Id-Fr and Sy-Q means. Again the interaction test for status inconsistency is not significant. The question on the likelihood of separatism in the near future (Table i) shows that the French, more than the English, estimate this to be a likely event. No class differences appeared. On self-rated frequency of participation in political demonstrations (Table j), there is again an ethnicity main effect: the French are more politically active than the English across

Table VI-1

Analysis of Variance of Quebec Commitment and Other Political Attitude Means by Class and Ethnicity

Ascribed Status: Ethnicity	Achieved Status: Class (Fathers' Education) High (Elite)	Low (Mass)
High (English)	27	38
Low (French)	46	63

F = class main effect
F = ethnicity main effect
F = class X ethnicity
F-ratios for 1, 170 d.f.
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to j. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High. (Except Table j: 1 = Low; 3 = High)

a. Ideological-French

2.62	2.26	F = 3.71 *
		F = 62.38 ***
3.60	3.40	F = .41

b. Symbolic-Quebec

2.88	2.80	F = 2.79 *
		F = 91.43 ***
4.05	3.76	F = 2.07

c. Ideological-English

3.26	3.77	F = 11.86 ***
		F = 22.90 ***
2.64	3.09	F = .09

d. Symbolic-Canada

3.35	3.27	F = .00
		F = .44
3.40	3.44	F = .10

e. Normative

3.56	3.46	F = 1.15
		F = 1.14
3.45	3.32	F = .01

f. Functional

3.49	3.37	F = 2.75 *
		F = 9.42 ***
3.80	3.64	F = .05

g. Moral

2.96	3.28	F = .20
		F = .73
3.10	3.00	F = 2.77 *

h. Pro-separatist attitude

1.44	1.29	F = 4.78 ***
		F = 47.78 ***
3.32	2.64	F = 1.32

i. Likelihood of separatism

2.54	2.66	F = 1.11
		F = 22.23 ***
3.87	3.43	F = 1.67

j. Participation in demonstrations

1.32	1.18	F = 1.39
		F = 33.03 ***
1.86	1.76	F = .02

social class.

It may be argued that "English" and "French" are categories too gross to capture regional variations. We therefore analyzed all the commitment and political attitude means in a 2 X 5 design (2 levels of fathers' education and 5 levels of region). Subsets of 2 X 2 tables can be derived for testing status inconsistency effects while controlling for region (e.g. Montreal-French/Montreal-English; High/Low education). We found no interaction effects and the significant main effects were essentially the same as those in Table VI-1. There results of these analyses, therefore, are not included here but are presented in Appendix A.

The results of the Belgium commitment means are presented in Table VI-2. Again, the standard 2 X 2 design is described at the top of the table. Achieved status is indexed by fathers' education (which correlates .53 with occupation). The French-speaking (Walloons and Brusselers) are assumed to be of high ascribed status, and the Flemish of low status. Table a shows the Ideological-Flemish (I-F) means. There is a strong ethnicity main effect: The Flemish are more Ideologically committed to Flanders than the francophones. There is no class main effect. The Flemish elite (high achieved/low ascribed) exhibit the highest I-F mean and the French masses (low achieved/high ascribed) the lowest mean, as predicted by status inconsistency theory. However, this ordering is not significant by the interaction term. On the Symbolic-Flanders (S-F) scale (Table b), the Flemish are again more culturally attached to their region than are the French, and there are no differences between the elites and masses of the two ethnic groups. There is futhermore a significant interaction effect due to the high

S-F mean of the Flemish elite. This is our first weak evidence in support of the status inconsistency hypothesis.

Tables c and e present the means for Ideological-Brussels (I-Br) and Ideological-Walloon (I-W), respectively. We examine them together because they show essentially the same patterning of the means. In the historical sketch of Belgium, we observed that it was the francophone elite who provided the leadership and membership of the Brussels and Walloon nationalist movements; the masses by and large have remained faithful to the traditional parties rather than join the new nationalist parties. Further, since these elites are now being challenged by the rising Flemish elites, we predicted that these francophones will be Ideologically committed to defending their threatened status. The tables show a strong ethnicity main effect: the French are more Ideologically committed to both Brussels and Wallonia than the Flemish. There is no class effect. But more interesting for our hypothesis is the fact that the French elite exhibit the highest I-Br mean and this status inconsistency effect is significant by interaction. The French elite also exhibit the highest I-W mean as predicted, but in this case the interaction falls short of significance. It was also observed earlier that the custodians of francophone Belgian culture have been primarily the French masses inasumuch as the French elites were culturally oriented towards Paris. We would expect, therefore, that the status inconsistent French masses exhibit the most Symbolic commitment. Tables d and f present the means on the Symbolic-Wallonia (S-W) and Symbolic-Brussels (S-Br) scales, respectively. In both cases there are class and ethnicity main effects: the masses have higher S-W and S-Br means than the elites;

and the French have higher S-W and S-Br means than the Flemish. The ordering of the means is as predicted: the status inconsistent French masses exhibit the highest S-W and S-Br means, and the inconsistent Flemish elites the lowest means. However, both interaction terms are not significant and the ordering must be attributed to the additive main effects. With respect to Symbolic commitment to Belgium (Table g), there are no differences between the French and the Flemish; the masses, however, are more attached to the country as a whole than the elites.

We had hypothesized that the francophone elites would be Functionally committed. The Functional (Ft) means of Table h do not support the expectation. There are no differences between the groups. We also predicted that the status consistent Flemish masses would be characterized by Normative commitment. Again this was not supported by the data in Table i. However, the predicted pattern for the Normative means does appear instead with the Moral commitment means (Table j): the masses are more Morally attached than the elites; the Flemish more than the French; and the Flemish masses exhibit the highest Moral commitment and the French elite the lowest. This significant ordering is intuitively reasonable. This scale reflects attachment to the system via religious and interpersonal ethics rather than specifically political values. The masses are less politicized than the elite and the Flemish have traditionally been more faithful Catholics than their francophone counterparts.

We present the means of three other relevant political attitudes. These individual items were not included in any of the commitment scales. Table k gives the means on the question of federalism. Since

this is the basic demand of the Flemish nationalists, we would expect that the results of this item be essentially the same as those of the I-F scale. This is in fact the case. The Flemish are more pro-federalism than the French, and there is a non-significant tendency for the Flemish elite to show the highest pro-federalism mean. There is no difference due to class. However, class is important in estimating the likelihood that federalism will occur in the near future (Table 1). Elites are more likely than the masses to expect the occurrence of this event, but the Flemish and the French do not differ in their estimates. Table m shows the mean of self-rated frequency of participation in nationalist demonstrations. There are no main effects due to class or ethnicity. There is an interaction effect indicating that Flemish elites and French masses, the two status inconsistent groups, are the most frequent participants in demonstrations. The fact that the Flemish elite engage in nationalist behavior is in line with their high I-F and S-F commitment and supports the status inconsistency hypothesis. On the other hand, the demonstrations by the French masses does not agree with their commitment means. Since the highest I-Br and I-W means were shown by the French elite, it is they and not the masses who should have shown the nationalist behavior. It appears, then, that Ideological commitment leads to nationalist behavior among the Flemish elite, but among the French elite -- unless the self-reported behavior is inaccurate -- commitment and demonstrations are uncorrelated.

To control for the possibility of regional variations, we reanalyzed all the commitment and political attitude means in a 2 X 4 design with two levels of social class and four levels of region. These results are presented in Appendix B. The overall pattern is

Table VI-2

Analysis of Variance of Belgium Commitment and Other Political Attitude Means by Class and Ethnicity

Ascribed Status: Ethnicity	Achieved Status: Class (Fathers' Education) High (Elite)	Low (Mass)
High (French)	72	24
Low (Flemish)	33	39

F = class main effect
F = ethnicity main effect
F = class X ethnicity
F-ratios for 1,164 d.f.
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to m. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High. (Except Table m: 1 = Low; 3 = High)

a. Ideological-Flemish

2.57	2.40	F = .68
		F = 48.40 ***
3.62	3.46	F = .05

b. Symbolic-Flemish

2.62	2.92	F = .00
		F = 51.16 ***
3.94	3.67	F = 2.97 *

c. Ideological-Walloon

3.61	3.50	F = .29
		F = 75.63 ***
2.48	2.40	F = .01

d. Symbolic-Wallonia

3.10	3.55	F = 8.55 ***
		F = 20.12 ***
2.51	2.81	F = .36

e. Ideological-Brussels

3.66	3.44	F = .00
		F = 97.69 ***
2.34	2.57	F = 3.36 *

f. Symbolic-Brussels

3.38	3.77	F = 3.08 *
		F = 3.16 *
3.03	3.30	F = .10

g. Symbolic-Belgium

3.02	3.11	F = 2.93 *
		F = .67
2.64	3.15	F = 1.28

h. Functional

3.35	3.65	F = .60
		F = 1.68
3.30	3.21	F = 1.87

i. Normative

3.36	3.35	F = .83
		F = .17
3.56	3.29	F = .76

j. Moral

3.05	3.60	F = 7.53 ***
		F = 5.27 **
3.51	3.79	F = 4.61 **

k. Pro-federalist attitude

3.01	3.42	F = .28
		F = 16.25 ***
4.06	3.89	F = 1.43

l. Likelihood of federalism

3.15	3.00	F = 3.00 *
		F = .54
3.56	3.00	F = .93

m. Participation in demonstrations

1.44	1.72	F = .22
		F = 1.34
1.69	1.57	F = 2.89 *

similar to that of Table VI-2, but there are a few important discrepancies which we will note here. In the analysis by regions, the significant interaction terms of Table VI-2 disappeared. In fact the only significant results in the commitment means are the ethnicity main effects. This effect is in the same direction as the ones in Table VI-2. For example, on the I-F scale, the regions of Brussels-Flemish and Flanders have higher means than Wallonia or Brussels-French; likewise on the I-W scale, the latter two regions had higher means than the former two. A regional main effect was also found for Ft commitment. This was due primarily to the very high Ft means in Wallonia. It will be recalled that in Quebec the subordinate French Canadians were more Functionally committed than the English, precisely the reverse of our prediction. In Belgium we see that the Walloons, who are today economically subordinate, are also the most Functionally involved. The francophone Brusselers, who because of their economic dominance should be expected to show the highest Ft means, actually had the lowest of any group (Appendix B, table h). This finding could be as unreliable as the scale used to measure it, but the fact that the same pattern appears cross-nationally requires some explanation over and above solely method variance. We will defer such an explanation until more data have been presented.

In summary, we have compared three hypotheses of Ideological and Symbolic commitment in Quebec and Belgium. In both countries, the ethnicity hypothesis was strongly supported; different ethnic groups are more Ideologically and Symbolically attached to their own regional locus. However, the different ethnic groups are not ranged against each other in monolithic solidarity. There are also class differences

within each ethnic group that determine the form of commitment. In Quebec, the French and English elites are more Ideologically and Symbolically committed than the masses. In Belgium, the Flemish elites and masses do not differ in either form of nationalist commitment. This supports Herremans' (1948) contention of "flamandisation" of the entire Flemish people since the mid-1930's, or what Carr (1945) would call the "massification" of the Flemish nationalist movement. The francophone Belgians also do not differ on Ideological commitment, but the masses are more Symbolically committed to Belgium, Brussels, and Wallonia than the elites. Thus, there is support for the class differences hypothesis in Quebec and among the francophone Belgians. Finally, the evidence for status inconsistency was weak and irregular, and we have to conclude that the hypothesis was not supported. To be certain, the ordering of the means on the Ideological and Symbolic commitment scales in both countries was exactly as predicted by status inconsistency: the highest mean was shown by the high achieved/low ascribed group, and the lowest mean by the low achieved/high ascribed group (except on I-Br and I-W scales for historical reasons discussed before). However, the rank ordering was not sufficiently large to produce the significant interaction term needed to show an inconsistency effect, and this ordering could be accounted for simply by the additive main effects of class and ethnicity.

Perceptions of Status and Status Inconsistency

In most studies of status inconsistency, ascribed status is a matter of "objective" definition by the researcher. In American samples, Negroes, Jews, Catholics, and other minority groups are invariably classified as low ascribed status, and white Protestants as high status.

In this study, we too have classified ethnic groups into high and low ascribed status from our own external viewpoint. However, many French Quebeckers would probably take issue with our dichotomy, arguing that their social and cultural status is superior to that of the English -- their heritage of classical humanism and spiritual values have much to offer to a materialistically-oriented Anglo-Saxon culture. The Flemish, too, would argue that since Flanders is in the midst of a dynamic social and cultural expansion, the attribution of low ascribed status to their ethnic group is, at best, historically outdated. We now feel that the subjective perceptions of status of the respondents themselves must also be taken into account. Few studies in the literature have measured the subjective domain (e.g. Laumann and Segal, 1971, did use status awareness as an indirect index of subjective status rank). There is an important theoretical reason for considering it. In Chapter III we criticized Lenski's theory on the grounds of neglecting social comparisons. He had proposed that discrepancy between a Person A's status X and status Y was sufficient to produce stress. We argued that the very definition of status X and Y as having high or low rank presumes an implicit comparison with Person B's status X and Y. If Person A does not compare himself with B, he would have no reference cues for knowing if X and Y are high or not in rank, and therefore the motivational basis for assuming inconsistency would be absent. Further, if Person B's status X and status Y are as discrepant as A's status X and Y, there is no reason why the latter should feel relatively deprived and experience imbalance. This relational or comparative perspective that is being neglected can only be measured by subjective perceptions of status and not by "objective" definition. We felt that, both

historically and theoretically, status inconsistency is a parsimonious and powerful explanatory concept of nationalism in Quebec and Belgium. If the objective approach yielded only negligible effects, it seemed appropriate to employ a subjective approach before rejecting the status inconsistency explanation and seeking alternative formulations. It is conceivable that the respondents' definition of ascribed status rankings did not match ours, or that even different ethnic groups in a country, knowingly or unknowingly, do not share the same status evaluations. If this is the case, an analysis of the subjective perceptions is definitely in order.

In this section we examine the perceptions of status ranks of the various ethnic groups. The purpose is to see if the groups share the same evaluations of status. We are, in effect, testing a cardinal assumption of the objective status inconsistency literature that different parties agree on whether a given status is high or low in rank (Segal et al. 1970; Zelditch and Anderson, 1966). In our questionnaire, each respondent ranked his own and other ethnic groups on two 10-point scales of economic status and social prestige. In addition, each respondent was asked to place himself in the shoes of an ethnic out-group member and rank all the ethnic groups (including his own) on two other similar 10-point scales in the way he thought the out-group member would rank them. There are thus four sets of information for each person: (1) how he sees his own ethnic group (on social and economic status); (2) how he sees other ethnic out-groups; (3) how other out-groups see his own ethnic group; and (4) how he thinks other other out-groups see his own ethnic group, or "mirror" perception. To determine if the various groups share the same evaluations of status,

we can compare (1) with (3) and (1) with (4). The latter comparison should be particularly dissonance-arousing if the discrepancy between self-perception and mirror-perception is large. The consequences of these comparisons for political commitment will be presented in the following section.

Figure VI-1 shows (a) the subjective economic and social status rankings, and (b) the subjective "mirror" economic and social status rankings of English and French Canadians of each other and of themselves. A positive difference (D) score between the economic and social status means for any ethnic group signifies that the group has a higher economic than social status; a negative D score signifies that the social prestige is higher than the economic status. In Figure VI-1a, the French see themselves as highly discrepant: their social status is significantly higher than their economic status ($D = -1.78$; $t = 2.89$, $p < .001$). Note that this pattern does not contradict the earlier 2 X 2 table in which French elites were classified as having high achieved/low ascribed status. The present rankings represent respondents' evaluations of the ethnic group as a whole and not of themselves personally. There are individual French Canadians in our sample whose family economic position is as high as that of the English. The fact that the French rate their own social prestige (6.73) lower than that of the English (7.04), and the English also rate the French social status (6.77) lower than their own (8.10), justifies our earlier "objective" classification of French elites as having low ascribed by high economic status. In addition, the French also see the English as having little status discrepancy ($D = +.27$, ns). On the English side, they perceive themselves as essentially status

Figure VI-1a

Mean Subjective Economic and Social Status Rankings of Two Ethnic Groups in Quebec



Figure VI-1b

Mean Subjective "Mirror" Economic and Social Status Rankings of Two Ethnic Groups in Quebec



consistent (D = -.26, ns), but they see the French as having higher social than economic status (D = -1.26, $\underline{t}$ = 2.18, $p < .001$). Thus, the way the French see themselves and the English is basically the same as the way the English see themselves and the French -- in other words, they share the same evaluations of status ranks.

Figure VI-1b shows the subjective mirror rankings. The French Canadians think the English see them as having higher social than economic status (D = -.74; $\underline{t}$ = 1.96, $p < .05$), and this mirror-image is consistent with how the English actually perceive the French (D = -1.26). Further, the French think the English see themselves as having higher social than economic status (D = -1.86; $\underline{t}$ = 2.71, $p < .001$), and again this mirror-image corresponds with the general direction of the English's view of themselves (D = -.26). In short, the French have an accurate perception of the cognitive structure of the English -- of how the English see the French and themselves. In Mead's (1934) terms, the French can successfully incorporate the role of the "generalized other." On the English side, they think the French see them as having higher economic than social status (D = +.65, $\underline{t}$ = 1.71, $p < .10$), and this mirror-perception agrees with how the French actually see them (D = +.27). Also, the English think the French see themselves as having higher social than economic status (D = -1.79; $\underline{t}$ = 2.81, $p < .001$) and this mirror-view is consistent with how the French see themselves (D = -1.78). In short, the English too have an accurate perception of the cognitive structure of the French -- of how the French see the English and themselves. This achievement of the English is all the more noteworthy because the original perceptions of the status of the English by the English and the French are in opposite

directions: the English see themselves as social higher than economic (D = -.26); the French have the opposite view of the English as economic higher than social (D = +.27); and the English proved that they were cognizant of this discrepancy in rating the mirror-image of themselves as economic higher than social (D = +.65). This finding of discrepancy calls into question the assumption blithely held in the objective status inconsistency literature that different parties share the same evaluations of the relevant statuses and they agree on the weights of the criteria for evaluating these statuses (Anderson and Zelditch, 1966, p. 249). The empirical fact is that different ethnic groups often do not subjectively evaluate status ranks in similar fashion (even though the researcher may do so). What is important is that the groups recognize the existence of differences in perception -- as the English Quebeckers have done -- and operate in the context of these differences without necessarily agreeing or internalizing dissonant evaluations. One can take the role of the other without taking his standpoint, and the researcher should not confuse this fact for shared consensus in status rankings. On the other hand, it would be ominous for inter-group relations when groups do not perceive positions similarly and each group operates on the assumption that the other sees things the way it does -- that is, the mirror-image is merely a projection of one's own perception. The implications of these kinds of perceptions for inter-ethnic group conflict management are obvious. The simplest form of social interaction to the most complicated forms of group negotiations require accurate empathy. We will presently show how these perceptions affect nationalist commitment.

Figure VI-2 shows (a) the subjective economic and social status

rankings and (b) the subjective mirror economic and social status rankings of French Brusselers, Flemings, and Walloons of each other and of themselves. In Quebec the analysis of perceptions by regions yielded no new or different information than the analysis we presented by English-French ethnicity. In Belgium, however, there are regional variations that must be taken into account. We will examine each region in order. Again, a positive difference score means that the economic status is higher than the social, and viceversa for a negative score. In Figure VI-2a the French Brusselers rate their social status significantly higher than their economic status ($D = -.86$, $\underline{t} = 3.44$, $p < .001$). However, all the other ethnic groups — the Brussels-Flemish ($D = +.36$, ns); Flanders ($D = +.50$, ns); Walloons ($D = +.41$, ns) — see the French Brusselers as having higher economic than social status. It is interesting that both the French Brusselers and the English Canadians, the two dominant economic groups, should rate their economic status as inferior to their social prestige, whereas all the economically surbordinate groups rate them in reverse order. It is not surprising that self-perception and perception of others do not coincide. The important question is: are French Brusselers aware of this discrepancy? Turning to the mirror-perceptions in Figure VI-2b, we see that they are not aware of it. The French Brusselers think the Flemish see them the same way they see themselves, viz. social higher than economic status ($D = -.49$; $\underline{t} = 2.58$, $p < .01$). They are in fact projecting their own perceptions to the mirror-perceptions. What is most ironic is that all the other groups — Flemish Brusselers ($D = -.20$, ns); Flanders ($D = -.80$; $\underline{t} = 2.47$, $p < .01$); Wallonia ($D = -.79$; $\underline{t} = 1.96$, $p < .05$) — recognise that the French Brusselers have a distorted mirror-

Figure VI-2a

Mean Subjective Economic and Social Status Rankings of Three Ethnic Groups in Belgium



Figure VI-2b

Mean Subjective "Mirror" Economic and Social Status Rankings of Three Ethnic Groups in Belgium



Figure VI-2a (cont.)

Mean Subjective Economic and Social Status Rankings of Three Ethnic Groups in Belgium

Rankings by Flemish Brusselers of (N = 27):



Rankings by Flemings (Flanders) of (N = 56):



Rankings on 10-point Scale

Figure VI-2b (cont.)

Mean Subjective "Mirror" Economic and Social Status Rankings of Three Ethnic Groups in Belgium

Mirror Rankings by Flemish Brusselers of (N = 27):



Mirror Rankings by Flemings (Flanders) of (N = 56):



perception. It is commonly complained by both Flemings and Walloons that the francophone inhabitants of Brussels are self-centered and do not understand or do not care with what goes on in the provinces. These data show that the grievance has a foundation. Not only do the French Brusselers define their position in society differently from the rest of the country; they also project their view to others as if this were the consensual state of affairs. To examine further this phenomenon, we re-analyzed the French-Brussels data controlling for different variables. First, we controlled for fathers' education on the assumption there might be an elite-mass difference. Second, we controlled for frequency of reading newspapers since level of political information might play an intervening role. And third, we controlled for individual bilingualism on the assumption that knowledge of the Dutch language would help the understanding of the Flemings' point of view. In all three analyses the same pattern of perception and mirror-perception appeared. When bilingualism was controlled, the difference (D) scores were no longer significant but they were still in the same direction as before. It seems that an explanation must be sought in the more general principles of motivation and perceptual categorization.than in situational variables. We suggest that the projection of the French Brusselers represents a judgmental assimilation effect due to emotion-arousing cues (cf. Berkowitz, 1957). The Flemish represent a distinct threat to their position and they are highly defensive about it. Consequently, the experience of taking-on the role of the Flemish could be an emotionally arousing one. Under motivated conditions, disparate elements tend to be categorized together. The defensiveness felt by the French Brusselers may have

facilitated the assimilation of the Flemish position to their own. In comparison, the English Canadians are so well entrenched in their dominant economic status that they are not yet seriously threatened by the rising French Canadian elite. With low motive arousal, the stimulus determinants will be maximal, and perception would be relatively accurate. This, of course, represents an entirely ad hoc interpretation that needs to be tested in research.

Let us now examine the perceptions of the Flemish. In Figure VI-2a, the Flemings of Brussels have a non-significant tendency to rate their social status higher than their economic (D = -.24, ns); the Flemings of Flanders rate their two statuses at the same level (D = -.01, ns). The Flemish of both regions, then, essentially see themselves as status consistent. Further, both Brussels-Flemish (6.96) and Flanders (6.38) evaluate their own social prestige as higher than that of the Walloons (5.28 and 5.43, respectively), but lower than that of the French Brusselers (7.48 and 6.46, respectively). This suggests that the earlier objective classification of the Flemish as low ascribed status group is only partly in accord with the Flemings' own definition of the situation. They have low ascribed status vis-a-vis the French Brusselers but high status vis-a-vis the Walloons. This could be a reason why clearer status inconsistency effects were not obtained using the objective dichotomy. The Flemish elite does not feel relatively deprived in comparison to the Walloon members of the francophone reference group. Although the Flemings perceive their own statuses to be congruent, the French perceive them to be discrepant. The Brussels French rate the Flemings as having higher social than economic status (D = +.58; t = 2.53, $p < .01$); so do the Walloons

(D = +.32, ns). Are the Flemish aware of this discrepancy? Yes, according to the mirror-perception results in Figure VI-2b. The Brussels-Flemish think the Walloons rank them as social higher than economic (D = +.44, ns), and so do the Flemings of Flanders (D = +.64; $\underline{t}$ = 2.34, $p < .05$). In other words, the Flemish show the same kind of accurate perceptual capacity as the English Canadians. They are fully cognizant of what the perceptions of others towards them are, even when such perceptions are distinctly different from their own self-perceptions.

Finally, the Walloons perceive themselves as highly status discrepant: their social prestige is significantly higher than their economic status (D = -1.33; $\underline{t}$ = 2.74, $p < .01$). In fact, the Brussels-French also perceive the Walloons as having higher social than economic status (D = -.57; $\underline{t}$ = 3.05, $p < .01$) as do the Flemings of Brussels (D = -.60; $\underline{t}$ = 1.94, $p < .05$) and of Flanders (D = -.26, ns). Asked how the Flemish perceived them, the Walloons thought the Flemish rated them as social higher than economic (D = -.83; $\underline{t}$ = 1.71, $p < .10$). For the Walloons, then, their self-perceptions, perceptions of others, and mirror-perceptions were all in the same direction. The interesting feature here is the almost universal agreement on the low economic position of the Walloons. Even the Walloons themselves rated their economic standing (4.93) below that of the Flemish (6.36) and of the French Brusselers (7.15). Fifteen or twenty years ago, few would have admitted the rapid economic fall of Wallonia. Now it appears that the inferior economic status of Wallonia is a subjectively felt and widespread fact in the population.

Effects of Subjective Status

The previous section described the measurement of subjective status and subjective status inconsistency, and showed the different perceptions of such status and status inconsistency held by the various ethnic groups. In this section, the effects of these perceptions on types of commitment and voting intentions will be examined by multiple regression analysis. This will show the relationship of each subjective status -- economic and social prestige -- to the dependent measures. Conceptually this is equivalent to the main effects of objective achieved (fathers' education) and ascribed (ethnicity) status that were discussed earlier in the results of the analyses of variance.

Table VI-3a presents the regression coefficients (standardized betas) of subjective economic and social prestige rankings of English Canadian Protestants (stimuli) made by English Canadians (respondents) on the dependent measures of commitment and voting preferences. The regressions represent the effects of English Canadians' self-perceptions. The multiple correlation of the economic and social status is also given. There are no significant relationships between either economic or social status ratings of own ethnic group and any of the Ideological, Symbolic, or Normative scales. The regression of social status on Functional commitment is significant (.19). This means that the higher the English's perceived own social prestige, the greater their Functional involvement in the system. The combined main effects of social and economic status on Functional commitment are also significant as indicated by the multiple R (.24). High economic status is related to voting intention for the Liberal party (.31), and high social status is negatively related to the separatist vote (-.35). The joint effects

of economic and social status on both voting intentions are highly significant. In fine, the higher the English's self-perceptions of their combined economic and social status, the greater their Functional commitment, the more likely their voting Liberal, and the less likely their voting separatist.

Table VI-3b shows the results of a similar multiple regression analysis of self-perceptions of economic and social status of French Canadians on commitment and voting. Subjective economic status is positively related with Ideological-French (.30) and Symbolic-Quebec (.24) commitment. This is in accord with the earlier ahalysis of variance that found a significant main effect for class: elites were more Ideologically and Symbolically attached than the masses (cf. Table VI-1a, b). On both objective and subjective measures of achieved status, then, we find support for the class differences hypothesis. The higher the achieved status, the greater the nationalist commitment. As may be expected, there is a slight negative relationship between economic status with the Ideological-English and Symbolic-Canada scales. Subjective social prestige, however, is not significantly related to any of the Ideological and Symbolic scales. This suggests an interesting theoretical distinction. We know that French economic elites are more nationalistic than the masses. We can now add that it is clearly the economic elite, not the perceived social elite, that exhibits this nationalism. One can speculate that high social prestige in French Canadian society refers to the old, established elite, while high economic status is associated with the rising new middle class. It is consistent with the historical background and the theory that this new elite, which we assume is indirectly indexed by perceived

social prestige, is Functionally committed to its interests, shows no inclination to vote for the separatist party, and is committed to the existing Normative order.

The results for Belgium are presented in the series of Tables VI-4. Table VI-4a shows the regression coefficients of the Flemings' self-rated economic and social status on commitment and voting. None of the relationships are significant except for the effect of social status on vote for the Flemish nationalist party (.19). The two subjective variables appear to have no other main effects among the Flemish. Table VI-4b presents the regression analysis of the French Brusselers. The regressions of economic (-.36) and social status (-.36) on Ideological-Flemish commitment are negative: the higher the status, the less likely the French Brusselers would endorse the Flemish nationalist demands. High self-rated social prestige is also associated with Symbolic commitment to Brussels (.19), Functional commitment (.17), and voting intention for the Conservative party (.26). This pattern fits, in a general way, with the picture of the traditional French Brussels elite. The regressions for the Walloons are given in Table VI-4c. The Walloons' self-ranked economic and social status are negatively related to the Ideological-Flemish and Symbolic-Flanders scales, and positively related to the Ideological-Brussels and Ideological-Walloon scales. Further, social but not economic status is associated with intention to vote for the French nationalist parties. The subjective statuses have clear main effects on nationalist dependent measures. The class differences hypothesis is supported in Wallonia in that the self-rated Walloon economic elite is more Ideologically committed to Wallonia than the masses. High self-rated social prestige

Table VI-3a

Regression Coefficients (Standardized Betas) of Subjective Economic and Social Status Rankings of Anglophone Protestants by English Canadian Respondents, on Commitment Scales and Voting Intention (N=68)

Commitment scales	economic ranking of anglo-prot.	social ranking of anglo-prot.	multiple R
Ideological-French	-.06	-.01	.06
Symbolic-Quebec	-.02	-.03	.05
Ideological-English	.15	.01	.15
Symbolic-Canada	.07	.10	.15
Functional	.10	.19 *	.24 **
Normative	-.09	.08	.08
Voting intentions			
Separatist (P.Q.)	-.15	-.35 ***	.30 ***
Liberal (P.L.)	.31 ***	.20	.43 ***

***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

Table VI-3b

Regression Coefficients (Standardized Betas) of Subjective Economic and Social Status Rankings of Francophones, by French Canadian Respondents, on Commitment Scales and Voting Intention (N=110)

Commitment scales	economic ranking of francophones	social ranking of francophones	multiple R
Ideological-French	.30 ***	.02	.30 ***
Symbolic-Quebec	.24 ***	.01	.34 ***
Ideological-English	-.05	-.06	.09
Symbolic-Canada	-.07	-.08	-.12
Functional	.31 ***	.16 *	.30 ***
Normative	.15	.21 **	.31 ***
Voting intentions			
Separatist (P.Q.)	.15	.06	.18 *
Liberal (P.L.)	-.04	-.02	.05

***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

Table VI-4a

Regression Coefficients (Standardized Betas) of Subjective Economic and Social Status Rankings of Flemings, by Flemish Brussels and Flanders Respondents, on Commitment Scales and Voting Intention (N=83)

Commitment scales	economic ranking of Flemings	social ranking of Flemings	multiple R
Ideological-Flemish	.10	.01	.09
Symbolic-Flanders	.04	.10	.10
Ideological-Brussels	-.05	-.12	.14
Symbolic-Brussels	-.08	.07	.10
Ideological-Walloon	-.11	-.06	.14
Symbolic-Wallonia	.05	-.12	.12
Symbolic-Belgium	-.01	.12	.12
Functional	.07	.16	.16
Normative	.05	.12	.13
Moral	.09	.17	.18
Voting intentions			
Flemish nationalist (VU)	.01	.19 *	.19 *
Catholic (PSC)	.00	-.06	.07

* $p < .10$

Table VI-4b

Regression Coefficients (Standardized Betas) of Subjective Economic and Social Status Rankings of French Brusselers, by French Brussels Respondents, on Commitment Scales and Voting Intention (N=87)

Commitment scales	economic ranking of Brusselers	social ranking of Brusselers	multiple R
Ideological-Flemish	-.36 ***	-.36 ***	.38 ***
Symbolic-Flanders	-.09	-.15	.15
Ideological-Brussels	.03	.01	.03
Symbolic-Brussels	-.09	.19 *	.19 *
Ideological-Walloon	.04	.12	.12
Symbolic-Wallonia	-.10	.15	.14
Symbolic-Belgium	.10	.11	.11
Functional	.23 **	.17 *	.24 **
Normative	.09	.15	.16
Moral	.13	.10	.15
Voting intentions			
French nationalist (FDF/RW)	.03	.05	.07
Conservative (PLP)	.01	.26 **	.26 **

***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

Table VI-4c

Regression Coefficients (Standardized Betas) of Subjective Economic and Social Status Rankings of Walloons, by Walloon Respondents, on Commitment Scales and Voting Intention (N=60)

Commitment scales	economic ranking of Walloons	social ranking of Walloons	multiple R
Ideological-Flemish	-.30 ***	-.21 *	.28 **
Symbolic-Flanders	-.41 ***	-.35 ***	.39 ***
Ideological-Brussels	.32 ***	.29 **	.32 ***
Symbolic-Brussels	.08	.13	.18
Ideological-Walloon	.22 *	.16	.20
Symbolic-Wallonia	.01	.03	.04
Symbolic-Belgium	.03	.10	.12
Functional	.12	.28 **	.24 **
Normative	.10	.17	.18
Moral	.12	.18	.20
Voting intention			
French nationalist (FDF/RW)	.17	.43 ***	.37 ***
Conservative (PLP)	.16	.02	.17
Catholic (PSC)	.10	.03	.10

***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

is also significantly related with Functional commitment. In general, we conclude that the main effects of subjective status in Belgium are less clear-cut and strong than the effects in Quebec. The Flemish data, especially, are virtually devoid of any main order relationships. It is possible that most of the variance in commitment and voting is determined by status inconsistency effects rather than main status effects, and to this we turn next.

Relative Status Inconsistency

Measurement

The earlier section on perception of status measured only subjective status inconsistency, that is, the difference between perceived economic and social status of an ethnic group. This kind of measurement remains at the intra-individual level -- it lacks a relational or comparative perspective. In this section we present the measurement and effect of subjective "relative" status inconsistency (RSI). That is, we take the difference between perceived economic and social status of one's own ethnic group (self-perception) relative to the difference between perceived economic and social status of another ethnic reference group (perception of other). This allows the specification, theoretically and operationally, of the comparative social context in which the presumed status inconsistency dynamics take place. To illustrate, suppose we are measuring the status inconsistency of English Canadians (EC) relative to that of the French Canadians (FC). The formula used is:

$$\text{RSI of EC} = \text{EC}\ (E - S) - \text{FC}\ (E - S)$$

where E = subjective economic status and S = subjective social prestige.

Likewise, to measure the status inconsistency of the French Canadians relative to that of the English Canadians, the formula is:

RSI of FC = FC (E - S) - EC (E - S)

Thus, looking at the first formula for the English, we subtract their self-ratings on economic and social status, EC (E - S); since the statuses are rated on 10-point scales, this self-perceived English status inconsistency score can range from +10 to -10. Next we subtract the English's ratings of the French Canadians' economic and social status, FC (E - S); this perceived French status inconsistency score can also range from +10 to -10. Finally we take the difference of these two intra-group inconsistency scores -- the difference of differences -- to obtain a RSI score for the English which can range from +20 to -20.

Let us consider now the meaning of this RSI score. It can be shown that any <u>positive</u> RSI score (range: +20 to +1) can only be derived from a limited set of combinations of values in the formula. If we substitute all possible combinations of values from 0 to 10 (corresponding to the 10-point scales of social and economic status) into the formula, there are only seven combinations that would yield a positive RSI score. These are outlined in footnote 6. One such combination, as an example, is the following:

+RSI = EC (E > S) > FC (E > S); or substituting hypothetical values:

= EC (8 - 3) - FC (6 - 5)
= (5) - (1)
= +4

That is, an EC rates his economic status higher than his social, and this discrepancy is (absolutely) greater than his rating of the FC's

economic higher than social status discrepancy. Taking into account all the combinations of values that can be substituted into the formula, including those of the foregoing example, we can generalize the meaning of a positive RSI score for English Canadians as follows: their self-rated own economic status is higher than their own social prestige, relative to (or in comparison with) any difference (equal to; less than; greater than) between their ratings of the French Canadians' economic and social statuses. A positive RSI score for the French Canadians would be interpreted likewise: their self-rated economic status is higher than their own social prestige, relative to any difference between their ratings of the English Canadians' economic and social status.

It can also be shown that any <u>negative</u> RSI score (range: -1 to -20) is derived only from a limited set of combinations of values in the formula (cf. footnote 6). An example of a combination that produces a negative RSI score for English Canadians is the following:

- RSI = EC (E < S) > FC (E < S); or substituting hypothetical values from the 10-point rating scales:

$$= EC\ (3 - 8) - FC\ (5 - 6)$$
$$= (-5) - (-1)$$
$$= -4$$

In this case, an EC rates his social prestige higher than his economic status, and this discrepancy is (absolutely) greater than his rating of the FC's social higher than economic status discrepancy. Again, taking into account all other possible combinations of values that could be substituted into the formula, the general meaning of a negative RSI score for English Canadians is as follows: their self-

rated own social prestige is higher than their own economic status, relative to (or in comparison with) any difference (equal to; less than; greater than) between their ratings of the French Canadians' self-rated economic and social status. Likewise a negative RSI score for the French Canadians means that their self-rated own social prestige is higher than their own economic status, relative to any difference between their ratings of the English Canadians' economic and social status.

Finally, it can be shown that any <u>zero</u> RSI score is also derived only from a limited set of combinations of values in the formula (cf. footnote 6), such as the following for English Canadians:

$$\text{Zero RSI} = EC\ (E \geq S) = FC\ (E \geq S)$$

It is intuitively obvious that any ratings (on the 10-point scales) with this combination would yield a score of zero.

The total range of RSI scores, then, varies from +20 to -20. For the analysis this range was trichotomized into two relatively status inconsistent categories and one relatively status consistent category. The exact cut-off points were not always the same for different ethnic groups in order to seek an approximately even number of respondents in each analytical category. Each respondent, of course, was classified into only one of the categories. For example, the English Canadian sample was trichotomized this way:

1. Status inconsistent: (economic higher than social, relative to French Canadians): +20 to +4
2. Status consistent: (economic approximately equal to social, relative to French Canadians): +3 to -3
3. Status inconsistent: (social higher than economic, relative to French Canadians): -4 to -20

These cut-off points were decided upon after examining the distribution of RSI scores. Since the majority of the scores clustered in the middle of the distribution, the two status inconsistent ranges were made wider than the consistent range.

At this point an important methodological problem must be raised. It was observed erstwhile that the multiple regression analysis of economic and social status was conceptually equivalent to the main effects of achieved and ascribed status, respectively, of analysis of variance. However, the RSI measure is only approximately equivalent to the achieved by ascribed status interaction term of analysis of variance. We qualify the equivalence because of the problem of identification (cf. footnote 1). It will be recalled that there is no methodological difficulty in specifying the main effects of a status X_1 and status X_2 on a dependent measure Y, because a linear additive model, without cross-products, is assumed ($Y = b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 +$ error). But status inconsistency involves the creation of a new "independent" variable Z which is a perfect mathematical function of the difference between the two status variables ($Z = X_1 - X_2$). The identification problem is obvious if we multiple the Z equation by a constant, add it to the Y equation, and produce a third equation that is undistinguishable mathematically from the first. In other words, we cannot partial-out the main effects from the difference (inconsistency) effects.

In the measurement of RSI, the identification problem is still present. However, we argue that RSI, though partially confounded with the main effects, still contributes additional information over and above that of the main order variables. Suppose we are measuring the

status inconsistency of the English relative to the French. If only intra-group subjective status inconsistency was measured, or EC ($E_1 - S_1$), such a measure clearly would be completely confounded with the main effects of the English Canadians' self-rated economic and social status. But in the RSI formula, this measure is made relative to an exogeneous variable, or FC ($E_2 - S_2$). This expression is not, of course, independent of the status variables E_2 and S_2, but it is independent of the status variables E_1 and S_1. Consequently the resulting RSI score contributes information not contained in the main effects of E_1 and S_1 alone. It is for this reason that we are presenting the results of the main effects of subjective status and of relative status inconsistency. Admittedly, this simple "difference of differences" formula is not as pure and direct a measure of inconsistency as may be desired. It is nonetheless, in our view, an advance over most of the procedures used in the current literature in two respects: It explicitly incorporates the relational perspective, and it suggests a partial resolution of the identification dilemma.

Effects on commitment and voting

Table VI-5a presents the product-moment correlations of the RSI scores of the English Canadians with their commitment means, voting intentions, and attitudes toward separatism. In the far-right column are the status inconsistent English who have higher self-rated social prestige than economic status relative to the French. In the center column are the relatively consistent English. And in the left column are the status inconsistent English whose self-rated economic status is higher than the social relative to the French.

In the right column, the RSI scores are negatively associated

with Ideological-French (-.37) and Symbolic Quebec (-.38) commitment, and with separatist voting intentions (-.32). On the other hand, the scores are positively related to Ideological-English commitment (.47) and Liberal voting intentions (.56). The meaning of these results is similar to those of the analysis of variance in Table VI-1. Let us assume that these relatively inconsistent English with higher self-rated social prestige than economic status (right-hand column) are conceptually comparable to the earlier category of status inconsistent English masses (high ascribed/low achieved). Table VI-1c showed the English masses were more committed to Ideological-English nationalism than the English elites, but the interaction term was not significant. In this analysis we see again that the relatively inconsistent English of low economic status (right column) show a higher correlation (.47) with Ideological-English commitment than the relatively status consistent (center column; .24) or the relatively inconsistent of high economic status (left column; .13). The same ordering is seen on the behavioral intention measure on voting: the inconsistent English of low economic status are more likely to vote Liberal (.56) than the relatively consistent (.49) or the inconsistent of relatively high economic status (.15). These correlations, then, support the status inconsistency hypothesis as measured by the subjective RSI procedure, and are also in the same direction as the earlier results of status inconsistency defined in terms of the objective achieved/ascribed classification. Further, Tables VI-1a and Vi-1b showed that the English masses had lower means on Ideological-French and Symbolic-Quebec scales than the English elites. Here we see that the inconsistent English of relatively low economic status show negative correlations with

Ideological-French (-.37) and Symbolic-Quebec (-.38) scales, more so than the relatively consistent and relatively inconsistent respondents of high economic status. They also show a negative correlation with Functional commitment (-.27), while the relatively consistent English show a high positive correlation (.42). This pattern of correlations agrees with the results of Table VI-1f which showed that status consistent English elites had a higher Functional mean than the inconsistent English masses. In fine, the results of subjective RSI and objective status inconsistency complement each other.

Table VI-5b presents the correlations of the RSI scores of the French Canadians with the dependent measures. In the right-hand column are the status inconsistent French who have higher self-rated social status than economic status relative to the English. It should be noted that the self-rated social prestige of the French sample as a whole is significantly higher than their self-rated economic status (cf. Figure VI-1a), such that almost half of the sample falls in this relative inconsistency category. The consequence is that status inconsistency defined by the objective and the subjective criteria do not coincide. For the English, both criteria worked in the same direction. The English masses were objectively of low achieved/high ascribed status, and subjectively of lower economic status than social prestige relative to the French -- in either case they were status inconsistent. The French masses, however, are objectively of low achieved/low ascribed status, and subjectively of lower economic than social status relative to the English -- in the former case they are status consistent, in the latter inconsistent. The objective criterion of the researcher assumed that the only status on which the French could rank high is

Table VI-5a

Correlations of English Canadians' "Relative" (to French Canadians) Status Inconsistency (R.S.I.) Scores with Commitment Scales, Voting Intentions, and Separatist Attitudes

	R.S.I.[1] econ > soc	R.S.I.[2] econ ≈ soc	R.S.I.[3] soc > econ
N =	23	24	20
Score range =	+20 to +4	+3 to -3	-4 to -20
Commitment scales			
Ideological-French	-.09	.18	-.37 *
Symbolic-Quebec	-.10	.07	-.38 *
Ideological-English	.13	.24	.47 **
Symbolic-Canada	-.09	.07	.21
Functional	.06	.42 **	-.27
Normative	.08	.27	-.20
Moral	-.06	-.28	-.12
Voting intentions			
Separatist (P.Q.)	-.24	-.26	-.32
Liberal (P.L.)	.15	.49 ***	.56 ***
Separatist attitudes			
Pro-separatism	-.06	.22	-.36 *
Likelihood of separatism	-.17	.09	-.31

***p ≤ .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

[1] Subjective economic status higher than social, relative to French.

[2] Subjective economic status approximately equal to social, relative to French.

[3] Subjective social status higher than economic, relative to French.

Table VI-5b

Correlations of French Canadians' "Relative" (to English Canadians) Status Inconsistency (R.S.I.) Scores With Commitment Scales, Voting Intentions, and Separatist Attitudes

	R.S.I.[1] econ > soc	R.S.I.[2] econ ≠ soc	R.S.I.[3] soc > econ
N =	22	29	48
Score range =	+20 to +2	+1 to -4	-5 to -20
Commitment scales			
Ideological-French	.17	-.01	.33 **
Symbolic-Quebec	.21	.04	.23 *
Ideological-English	-.13	-.01	-.04
Symbolic-Canada	-.34 *	-.04	-.01
Functional	.29	.35 **	.22
Normative	-.24	.13	-.04
Moral	-.13	.33 *	.17
Voting intentions			
Separatist (P.Q.)	.40 **	.08	.21
Liberal (P.L.)	-.41 **	.05	-.25 *
Separatist attitudes			
Pro-separatism	.02	.14	.19
Likelihood of separatism	.29	-.11	.04

**p < .01 *p < .10

[1]Subjective economic status higher than social, relative to English.

[2]Subjective economic status approximately equal to social, relative to English.

[3]Subjective social status higher than economic, relative to English.

the economic, since by definition they are of low ascribed status; in actuality, the subjective view of the respondents themselves was just the reverse, that the only status they rank high on is social prestige. The implication of this is that the right-hand column is not comparable to the objective classification of French masses of Table VI-1. Bearing this in mind, if we look down this column, it can be seen that there are significant positive correlations with Ideological-French (.33) and Symbolic-Quebec (.23), but a negative correlation with Liberal vote (-.25). This pattern of relationships is the same as that observed for the French elite of Table VI-1. They had the highest means on both of these scales compared to any other group in the 2 X 2 table, but we could not conclude this was due to their inconsistent status due to the non-significant interaction term. The results of this analysis of variance and the present RSI correlations are not necessarily contradictory. The self-ratings are of one's ethnic group as a whole, not of one's own or family status. Consequently it is possible that French respondents, who objectively are of high achieved status, rate the French Canadians as having lower economic status than social prestige relative to the English. That is, the right-hand column could contain respondents of both high and low objective achieved status. The left-hand column (economic status higher than social prestige), however, is more directly comparable with the French elite category. The correlations of this left column are not as high as those in the right-hand column, but all of them (except for the correlation with Moral commitment) are in the same direction. Comparing the left and right columns with Table VI-1, we can conclude that (1) objective status inconsistency of French elites shows no

significant effect on French nationalist commitment, and that (2) subjective RSI in either direction -- economic higher than social or viceversa -- does relate with French nationalist commitment and voting intentions for the separatist party.

The results for Belgium are given in the series of Tables VI-6. In general the Belgian data are not as strong as the Quebec data, but a few interesting relationships are present. Table VI-6a shows the correlations of the RSI scores of the Flemings with the dependent measures of commitment and voting intentions. The left-hand column includes the status inconsistent Flemings whose self-rated economic status is higher than their social prestige relative to the Walloons. The only significant correlation is with Ideological-Flemish commitment (.39). There are non-significant negative relationships with Ideological-Brussels (-.34) and Symbolic-Brussels (-.30), and a positive tendency to vote for the Flemish nationalist party (.34). The small number of respondents in this category accounts for the lack of statistical significance of these correlations. This column is comparable to the objective definition of status inconsistent Flemish elites (high achieved/low ascribed). Table VI-2a showed that the Flemish elites exhibited the highest Ideological-Flemish mean, but the interaction effect that would have supported a status inconsistency interpretation was not significant. Tables VI-2e and VI-2f also showed that these Flemish elites exhibited the least Ideological-Brussels and Symbolic-Brussels commitment means, but again the interactions were not significant. But these means are in the same direction as the correlations of subjective RSI. One can conclude that objective inconsistency of Flemish elites has no significant effect on Ideological-

Flemish nationalism, but that the Flemings' subjective inconsistency of economic higher than social status relative to Walloons is significantly associated with this type of nationalist commitment. And we can also add that this effect is due to the inconsistency effect and not to the main effects of subjective economic and social status, since the regression analysis produced no effects of these two statuses on any commitment scales (cf. Table VI-4a). Turning now to the center column of relatively consistent Flemings, positive correlations can be observed with Functional commitment (.35) and voting preference for the conservative party (.43). None of the relationships in the right-hand column of relatively inconsistent Flemings are significant.

Table VI-6b presents the correlations of the RSI scores of the French Brusselers with the dependent measures. The left column includes the status inconsistent Brusselers whose self-rated economic status is higher than their social prestige relative to the Flemish. There are no relationships with the commitment scales, but there are highly significant correlations with voting preference for the French nationalist party (.81) and the conservative party (.80). These correlations, though, may not be very reliable due to the small sample (N = 15). The center column presents the relatively consistent Brusselers. There are positive relationships with Symbolic-Wallonia (.33), Symbolic-Belgium (.52), and Functional (.35) commitment, as well as a tendency to vote for the French nationalists (.36). We admit that the only relationship here that can be interpreted in terms of the theoretical framework is the Functional commitment correlation. It was hypothesized that status consistent elites would be most involved Functionally. While this has not always been found with the objective

status measures, this hypothesis has been supported with the subjective relative measure among English and French Quebeckers, and now among the Flemish and French Brusselers. The right-hand column shows no significant correlations. Since the relatively inconsistent French Brusselers in this right column, with social prestige higher than economic status, are comparable to the francophone masses (high ascribed/low achieved) of Table VI-2, the status inconsistency hypothesis would predict that the direction of the correlations should be the same as the direction of the means by analysis of variance. In Tables VI-2d and VI-2f, respectively, it was found that the French masses exhibited the highest Symbolic-Wallonia and Symbolic-Brussels means, but the interaction terms were not significant. The right-hand column shows that the correlations with Symbolic-Wallonia (.01) and Symbolic-Brussels (.18) are also non-significant. One can conclude that both objective status inconsistency and RSI measures produce no effects on Symbolic commitment to Brussels and Wallonia.

The RSI scores of the Walloons are given in Table VI-6c. The left-hand column is missing because the sample of two respondents precluded any analyses. The correlations in the other two columns are probably unreliable due to the small sample sizes. Those in the right column, especially, are the highest correlations found in the present research and certainly somewhat suspect. However, the fact that almost all of the significant relationships are shown by the relatively inconsistent rather than the consistent respondents has some suggestive value. The right column for the Walloons, as for the French Brusselers, is comparable to the francophone masses category of Table VI-2. It was just described how the inconsistent Brusselers

Table VI-6a

Correlations of Flemish "Relative" (to Walloons) Status Inconsistency (R.S.I.) Scores With Commitment Scales and Voting Intentions

	R.S.I.[1] econ > soc	R.S.I.[2] econ ≈ soc	R.S.I.[3] soc > econ
N =	17	41	20
Score range =	+20 to +2	+1 to -1	-2 to -20
Commitment scales			
Ideological-Flemish	.39*	.01	.18
Symbolic-Flanders	.08	.24	.16
Ideological-Brussels	-.34	.15	-.01
Symbolic-Brussels	-.30	-.17	-.01
Ideological-Walloon	-.06	.10	-.17
Symbolic-Wallonia	-.06	-.07	-.29
Symbolic-Belgium	-.03	.03	.20
Functional	.29	.35 **	.20
Normative	-.15	.23	.19
Moral	-.10	.17	.27
Voting intentions			
Flemish nationalist (VU)	.34	.22	.07
Conservative (PLP)	-.21	.43 ***	-.12
Catholic (PSC)	.32	.03	.05

***p< .01 **p< .05 *p < .10

[1]Subjective economic status higher than social, relative to Walloons.

[2]Subjective economic status approximately equal to social, relative to Walloons.

[3]Subjective social status higher than economic, relative to Walloons.

Table VI-6b

Correlations of Brussels-French "Relative" (to Flemish) Status Inconsistency (R.S.I.) Scores with Commitment Scales and Voting Intentions

	R.S.I.[1] econ > soc	R.S.I.[2] econ ≅ soc	R.S.I.[3] soc > econ
N =	15	31	30
Score range =	+20 to +1	0 to -2	-3 to -20
Commitment scales			
Ideological Flemish	-.17	-.20	-.21
Symbolic-Flanders	-.17	.17	-.22
Ideological-Brussels	.20	-.11	.00
Symbolic-Brussels	.22	.23	.18
Ideological-Walloon	.06	-.03	.10
Symbolic-Wallonia	.26	.33 *	.01
Symbolic-Belgium	.26	.52 ***	.18
Functional	.31	.35 ***	-.29
Normative	.09	.20	.14
Moral	-.12	-.17	.23
Voting intentions			
French Nationalist (FDF/RW)	.81 ***	.36**	.27
Conservative (PLP)	.80 ***	.17	.21

***p< .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

[1]Subjective economic status higher than social, relative to Flemish.

[2]Subjective economic status approximately equal to social, relative to Flemish.

[3]Subjective social status higher than economic, relative to Flemish.

Table VI-6c

Correlations of Walloons' "Relative" (to Flemish) Status Inconsistency (R.S.I.) Scores with Commitment Scales and Voting Intentions

	R.S.I.[1] econ > soc	R.S.I.[2] econ ≈ soc	R.S.I.[3] soc > econ
N =	2	12	11
Score range =		+1 to -1	-2 to -20
Commitment scales			
Ideological Flemish		.03	-.26
Symbolic-Flanders		-.17	-.49 *
Ideological-Brussels		.03	.44 *
Symbolic-Brussels		.20	.66 **
Ideological-Walloon		.13	.62 **
Symbolic-Wallonia		.17	.30
Symbolic-Belgium		.40	.29
Functional		.33	.36
Normative		-.15	.28
Moral		.22	.11
Voting intentions			
French Nationalist (FDF/RW)		.64 **	.87 ***
Conservative (PLP)		.44	-.35
Catholic (PSC)		.29	.21

***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

[1]Subjective economic status higher than social, relative to Flemish.

[2]Subjective economic status approximately equal to social, relative to Flemish.

[3]Subjective social status higher than economic, relative to Flemish.

with relatively low economic status showed no relationship with Symbolic commitment to Brussels and Wallonia. Since the Tables VI-2d and VI-2f showed the francophone masses exhibited the highest means on these two scales, this effect must be due to the Walloons if not to the Brusselers. We can see that the inconsistent Walloons with relatively low economic status show a positive relationship with Symbolic-Wallonia (.30) and Symbolic-Brussels (.66) scales. To the extent that the direction, if not the magnitude of these correlations could be trusted, one could conclude that both objective status inconsistency and RSI of the Walloon masses do in fact determine Symbolic commitment to the francophone regions.

Intergenerational Mobility Aspirations and Commitment

The second independent variable that we consider is intergenerational mobility, or better, mobility aspirations, since the comparison is between the respondents' expected occupations and their fathers' occupations. Formally the problem of mobility is the same as that of objective status inconsistency since both involve the comparison of two statuses. The difference is that in the former case, the two statuses are at different points in time, and in the latter, the two statuses are contemporaneous. The predictions of type of commitment as a function mobility were given in Table III-2. It will be recalled, briefly, that the high non-mobile status respondents, like the high status consistent persons, are expected to be Functionally committed. The downwardly mobile persons, like the low achieved/high ascribed persons, are predicted to show a defensive kind of nationalism; the upwardly mobile, like the high achieved/low ascribed, are expected to show a dynamic,

expansive kind of Ideological nationalism. Finally, the low non-mobile status respondents, like the low status consistent persons, are predicted to be Normatively committed.

Table VI-7 presents the means of the Quebec commitment scales and other political attitude items in 2 X 2 tables of fathers' occupation and respondents' own expected occupations in the future. The questionnaire asked for the "occupation you would like to have" and "the occupation you actually expect to have " in the future. The latter, more realistic response which correlated higher with fathers' occupation, was employed in this analysis. It is understood, of course, that here we are dealing with expected mobility or non-mobility of the sample. The same cut-off point was used in dichotomizing fathers' and sons' occupations (cf. Table V-1). Most of the high and low non-mobile status respondents identify themselves as "Canadians" and "French Canadians." The majority (72.5 %) of the upwardly mobile are "French Canadians;" and most of the downwardly mobile (N = 7 out of 11, or 63.6 %) are "Canadians." Table a presents the means on Ideological-French commitment. As predicted, those expecting upward mobility have the highest mean on this kind of nationalism and, conversely, those expecting downward mobility have the lowest mean; the interaction term is significant. The mirror prediction that the downwardly mobile express a defensive kind of nationalism is not supported. Table c shows no differences between the Ideological-English means. The expectation that Normative commitment would be associated with low non-mobility was also not borne out in Table e. The Functional means in Table f show an interesting pattern. The significant main effect for expected occupation is due to the higher means of those with high occupational aspirations regardless

Table VI-7

Analysis of Variance of Quebec Commitment and Other Political Attitude Means by Fathers' occupation and Own Expected Occupation

Fathers' Occupation

Own Expected Occupation		High	Low
	High	65	51
	Low	11	25

F = fathers' occ. main effect
F = own exp. occ. main effect
F = fathers' X own interaction
F-ratios for 1, 148 d.f.
**p < .05 *p < .10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to i. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High.

a. Ideological-French

2.99	3.34	F = 6.00 **
		F = .12
2.26	3.24	F = 3.27 *

b. Symbolic-Quebec

3.43	3.53	F = .65
		F = .53
3.47	3.64	F = .06

c. Ideological-English

3.21	3.09	F = .18
		F = 1.14
3.22	3.39	F = .62

d. Symbolic-Canada

3.29	3.31	F = .02
		F = .23
3.36	3.42	F = .00

e. Normative

3.44	3.30	F = 1.38
		F = 1.15
3.65	3.49	F = .00

f. Functional

3.62	3.80	F = .38
		F = 3.62 *
3.46	3.43	F = .26

g. Moral

3.09	3.09	F = .00
		F = .10
3.16	3.14	F = .00

h. Pro-separatism attitude

1.23	2.84	F = 3.58 *
		F = 1.63
1.89	2.17	F = .21

i. Likelihood of separatism

3.23	3.64	F = 2.33
		F = 1.30
1.89	3.17	F = .04

Note: Ethnic self-identity of respondents in each cell of above standard table in N and %:

	"Canadian"	"English Canadian"	"French Canadian"
High-High (High non-mobile)	35.4 % (23)	15.4 % (10)	44.6 % (29)
High-Low (downward mobile)	63.6 (7)	27.3 (3)	- (0)
Low-High (upward mobile)	23.5 (12)	3.9 (2)	72.5 (37)
Low-Low (low non-mobile)	48.0 (12)	4.0 (1)	48.0 (12)

of their fathers' present occupation. This suggests that Functional commitment, in a youth sample not yet gainfully employed, may reflect more of a future aspiration or achievement orientation than present involvement in the economic roles of the system via their fathers' positions. None of the other Symbolic and Moral commitment scales show means that are significantly different. Table h shows that pro-separatist attitudes are significantly higher among those of low rather than high occupational class. The upwardly mobile also have the highest pro-separatist attitude, but the interaction term is not significant. The general trend, however, is clear. The upwardly mobile, who are mostly French Canadians, are Ideologically committed to Quebec, favor the independence of Quebec, and are Functionally committed as would be expected from a rising new middle class. We also analyzed the same measures separately for French and English Quebeckers, and essentially the same pattern of findings was obtained. However, the small cell sizes when ethnicity is controlled make the comparisons less meaningful, and these analyses are omitted from this report.

Table VI-8 presents the means of the Belgian commitment scales and political attitudes by intergenerational mobility aspirations. Again the standard table is a 2 X 2 design with fathers' occupation and respondents' expected occupation. Almost half of the high non-mobile cell consists of those who identify themselves as "Belgians" (43.9 %), and the second largest group are the "Flemish" (24.2). The majority (61.7 %) of the upwardly mobile identify themselves as "Flemish," and none of the downwardly mobile are "Flemish;" the few respondents in the downward mobility cell are "Belgians" (N = 5) and

"Brusselers" (N = 2). All ethnic groups are represented in the low non-mobility cell.

Table a shows the means on Ideological-Flemish commitment. The fact that low economic status respondents have higher means than the high status does not contradict the earlier results of the status inconsistency tables which showed a (non-significant) reverse effect. In the earlier analysis, the sample was also dichotomized by ethnicity, whereas here the Flemish and francophones are collapsed together and most of the Flemish are in the low occupational cells. It is noteworthy that the highest Ideological-Flemish mean is exhibited by the upwardly mobile, but the interaction term is not significant. Table b shows that the upwardly mobile are also more Symbolically attached to Flanders, but this is due to the additive main effects since the interaction term is not significant. The opposite trend is seen with the Ideological-Walloon (Table d) and Ideological-Brussels (Table c) scales. The highest mean in both forms of commitment is exhibited by the downwardly mobile, but again, this effect cannot be attributed to mobility since the interaction term was non-significant. There is, however, a main effect by fathers' occupation: the high occupational class respondents have higher means than the low class. Mobility has no effect on Symbolic commitment to Brussels or Belgium. The predictions that low non-mobility is associated with Normative commitment (Table h), and high non-mobility with Functional commitment (Table i), are not supported. However, to the extent that the Moral scale shares overlapping characteristics Normative, it is interesting that the highest Moral commitment is shown by the low non-mobile respondents (Table j). In general, then, the results may be summarized this way: there is a regular but non-

significant trend for the upwardly mobile persons, who are mostly Flemish, to be more Ideologically and Symbolically committed to Flanders, and to be more pro-federalization. The downwardly mobiles, who are mostly francophones, are Ideologically committed to Brussels and Wallonia and are least favorable towards federalization of the country.

Table VI-8

Analysis of Variance of Belgium Commitment and Other Political Attitude Means by Fathers' Occupation and Own Expected Occupation

Fathers' Occupation

Own Expected Occupation	High	Low
High	62	43
Low	8	23

F = fathers' occ. main effect
F = own exp. occ. main effect
F = fathers' X own interaction
F-ratios for 1, 132 d.f.
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to k. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High.

a. Ideological-Flemish

2.85	3.33	F = 4.57 **
		F = .05
2.88	3.01	F = .17

b. Symbolic-Flanders

3.26	3.68	F = 3.57 *
		F = 3.89 **
2.83	3.02	F = .17

c. Ideological-Walloon

3.18	2.53	F = 11.82 ***
		F = 2.47
3.59	3.17	F = .29

d. Symbolic-Wallonia

3.00	2.70	F = 2.28
		F = 5.83 **
3.12	3.22	F = 1.58

e. Ideological-Brussels

3.20	2.68	F = 10.35 ***
		F = 1.64
3.58	2.98	F = .06

f. Symbolic-Brussels

3.34	3.52	F = .97
		F = 1.05
3.50	3.43	F = .38

g. Symbolic-Belgium

3.13	3.09	F = 1.11
		F = .95
3.38	3.21	F = .04

h. Normative

3.54	3.39	F = .07
		F = 1.13
3.16	3.29	F = .99

i. Functional

3.30	3.44	F = .19
		F = .84
3.07	3.51	F = .03

j. Moral

3.38	3.49	F = 4.57 **
		F = 2.87 *
3.41	3.79	F = .44

k. Pro-federalism attitude

3.40	3.86	F = 5.77 **
		F = 3.43 *
2.00	3.34	F = 1.86

Note: Ethnic self-identity of respondents in each cell of above standard table in N and %:

	"Belgian"	"Brusseler"	"Fleming"	"Walloon"
H-H (High non-mobile)	43.9 % (29)	13.6 % (9)	24.2 % (16)	6.0 % (4)
H-L (downward mobile)	62.5 (5)	25.0 (2)	- (0)	12.5 (1)
L-H (upward mobile)	25.5 (12)	6.3 (3)	61.7 (29)	2.1 (1)
L-L (low non-mobile)	32.1 (9)	10.7 (3)	21.4 (6)	32.1 (9)

CHAPTER VII

RESULTS OF LANGUAGE AND COMMITMENT

Social Motivations of Language Learning

In the foregoing chapter we presented the effects of status inconsistency and intergenerational mobility -- two consequences of social mobilization processes -- on commitment. In this chapter we examine the effects of language knowledge or bilingualism -- a variable at the individual level of analysis -- on forms of commitment and non-commitment.

We begin by considering the social-motivational bases of language acquisition. We have described earlier the research of Gardner and Lambert (1959) which found that social motivation, independently of verbal ability, determined language learning among Quebeckers. They identified an instrumental motive based on the utilitarian objectives of the language, and an integrative motive based on the desire to learn about the culture of the language community. Types of commitment to the social-political system, then, may be a function not only of the degree of bilingualism but also of the motivational reasons that produced the bilingual fluency in the first place.

For both the Quebec and Belgium questionnaires, the same instrumental and integrative motivational indices were employed. The former consisted of two, 3-point Likert-type items: the importance of learning the ethnic out-group's language for "getting a job" and "advancement in my future work." In Quebec the product-moment correlation between these two items was .45; in Belgium, .51. The latter index was also composed of two items of the same format: the importance of language

for "making friends" and "learning the way of life" of the ethnic out-group. In Quebec the inter-item correlation was .45; in Belgium, .51. The correlation of the two indices in Quebec was .05, and in Belgium -.02; the two motivational orientations, then, are independent.

Table VII-1 presents the means on instrumental and social motivation and language ability of English and French Quebeckers. The standard design is a 2 X 2 table with two levels of ethnicity and social class (high/low fathers' education). There are no differences due to instrumental motivation (Table a). This is contrary to the results of Lambert (1967) and Johnstone (1969) which showed that French Canadians are more instrumentally oriented than English Canadians. The findings on integrative motivation (Table b) do conform with these earlier investigations. The English Canadians are significantly more likely to learn French for integrative reasons than are the French Canadians to learn English. There is also an interaction effect indicating that English elites are the most motivated to learn for cultural integration reasons. It is interesting to note that it is not the English masses who exhibit the highest integrative motivation, since it is they who show the highest Ideological-English nationalism. Table c shows the means on the ability to speak the language of the out-group. This was measured by a 10-point self-rating scale. As can be expected, the French Canadians speak English significantly better than the English Candians speak French.

The means on language motives and spoken language ability of Flemish and francophones are presented in Table VII-2. Again the standard table has two levels of ethnicity and social class. Tables a and b show the Flemish are more instrumentally and integratively

Table VII-1

Analysis of Variance of Quebec Language Motivation and Bilingualism Means by Class and Ethnicity

Ethnicity	High (Elite)	Low (Mass)
High (English)	27	38
Low (French)	46	63

F = class main effect
F = ethnicity main effect
F = class X ethnicity
F-ratios for 1, 170 d.f.
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to d. Range of means of Tables a, b: 1 = Low; 5 = High; of Tables c, d: 0 = Low; 10 = High.

a. Instrumental motivation

2.30	2.55	F = 1.80
		F = .22
2.48	2.50	F = 1.92

b. Integrative motivation

2.46	2.03	F = .25
		F = 52.69 ***
1.46	1.64	F = 11.17 ***

c. Spoken ability in out-group language

5.20	5.03	F = .27
		F = 3.48 *
5.28	6.05	F = 1.80

d. Comprehension ability in out-group language

6.08	6.47	F = .31
		F = .08
6.68	6.12	F = 1.55

Table VII-2

Analysis of Variance of Belgium Language Motivation and Bilingualism Means by Class and Ethnicity

Ethnicity	High (Elite)	Low (Mass)
High (French)	72	24
Low (Flemish)	33	39

Class (Fathers' Education)

F = class main effect
F = ethnicity main effect
F = class X ethnicity
F-ratios for 1, 164 d.f.
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to d. Range of means of Tables a, b: 1 = Low; 5 = High; of Tables c, d: 0 = Low; 10 = High.

a. Instrumental motivation

2.15	2.30	F = .42
		F = 8.56 ***
2.48	2.47	F = .62

b. Integrative motivation

1.30	1.52	F = .31
		F = 17.84 ***
1.76	1.66	F = 3.21 *

c. Spoken ability in out-group language

4.61	5.27	F = 1.88
		F = 8.84 ***
5.54	5.88	F = .20

d. Comprehension ability in out-group language

5.52	5.61	F = .03
		F = 26.22 ***
7.42	7.37	F = .03

motivated to learn French, respectively, than are the francophones to learn Dutch. Since French has world-wide usage and is historically a language of high culture, it is not surprising to find its integrative appeal for all population strata: for the dominant English minority in Quebec, and for the subordinate (or formerly subordinate) Flemish majority in Belgium. The ability to speak and comprehend the language of the ethnic out-group was measured on 10-point self-rating scales. Tables c and d show the Flemish speak and understand French significantly better than the francophones, as can be expected.

Effects of Bilingualism on Commitment and Alienation

In presenting the theory, we proposed that political alienation could be interpreted in terms of non-commitment, or better, as substitutions of one type or locus of commitment for another. Such a conceptualization of alienation does not, of course, encompass the range of meaning usually associated with the concept. But for our research purposes, this interpretation represents a more parsimonious approach than defining alienation as a separate construct. Except for Durkheim's early classification of alienation as a function of organic and mechanical solidarity, the current empirical literature is notably lacking in systematic theoretical treatment of the subject. Robinson and Shaver's (1969) review of fourteen alienation measures shows that only three make any kind of distinction between different forms of alienation, and none of them are based on an explicit model of the conditions of their arousal. The advantage of our approach to alienation is that this construct can be fitted into the broader theory of political commitment and from which specific hypotheses can be derived. To restate the principal predictions, it was proposed that the greater the

bilingualism of an individual, the less the Symbolic attachment to his own ethnic group (cultural alienation or rejection, so to speak) and the greater the Symbolic attachment to the ethnic out-group. Conversely, the less the bilingualism of the person, the greater the Symbolic commitment to his own ethnic group and the less the Symbolic attachment to the ethnic out-group.

Table VII-3 presents the analysis of variance of commitment means and other political attitude means by social class (high/low fathers' education) and bilingual fluency (high/low spoken French ability) of English Canadians only. The results of the French Canadians are presented separately. The questionnaire asked for self-ratings of fluency in speaking and comprehending French on 10-point scales. The responses were dichotomized at the median for the high and low bilingual categories. We employed spoken knowledge in the analysis since this is a more stringent criterion of bilingualism than passive comprehension. It should be noted that previous studies in Quebec have shown that self-reports of language knowledge are as good and reliable a predictor as school grades in language courses (Lambert, personal communication). The first step in the analysis was to control for the social motivation of language acquisition. Since there were not enough respondents in the cells to actually control for this factor, the next best procedure was simply to examine the means on the motivation measures. If there is no main effect for bilingualism on these measures, it may be inferred that acquisition of French by English Canadians is not affected by instrumental or integrative orientations. Table a shows there is no main effect on the instrumental means due to bilingualism. There is a class main effect

indicating that the English mass is more likely to learn French for instrumental purposes than the English elite. Table b also reveals the absence of a main effect of language on the integrative means. There is a class main effect, but this time in the opposite direction: the English elite is more likely than the English mass to learn French for integrative reasons. This pattern of class effects is completely consistent with intuitive expectations. The English workers are becoming aware that things are changing in Quebec and that French is increasingly used as a working language of business and commerce, certainly at the rank-and-file level if not yet at the high executive levels. The English elite, on the other hand, can afford the "luxury" of learning French for cultural enrichment. The absence of language main effects permits the conclusion that the relationship between bilingualism and commitment types is not affected by motivational factors.

Table c shows the English elite is more Ideological-French than the English masses, and Table e shows that the English masses are more committed to Ideological-English nationalism than the English elite. This difference by class is not directly relevant to our purposes here. We are more interested in seeing if there are any main effects due to bilingualism. Bilingualism is not a determinant of either type of Ideological commitment, or of Symbolic-Quebec commitment. However, Table f reveals that the more bilingual the English Canadians, the more Symbolically attached they are to Canada. This finding is precisely the reverse of the prediction that French knowledge would decrease attachment to Canada. Language was not expected to have

an effect on Normative and Functional commitment, and the means of these scales in Tables g and h, respectively, show no significant differences. There is also no language main effect on Moral commitment (Table i), or on the attitude towards Quebec separatism (Table j).

Table VII-4 presents the analysis of variance of commitment means and other political attitude means by social class and bilingualism of French Canadians. Looking first at the social motivation for English language learning of the French Canadians, it can be seen in Table a that there is no relationship of either social class or bilingualism to instrumental motive. However, the high bilingual French Canadians are more integratively motivated to learn English than the low bilinguals, and the French elite is also more integratively motivated than the French masses (Table b). Therefore the relationships between language and commitment among French Canadians must be interpreted with this integrative orientation in mind. That is, commitment or non-commitment could be a function not of language per se, but of the integrative orientation associated with the language knowledge. Table c presents the Ideological-French means. The less bilingual French Canadians are significantly more committed to Ideological-French nationalism than their more bilingual fellows. Likewise, the less bilingual ones are more culturally attached to Quebec than the more bilingual ones (Table d). There is also a main effect of class: the French elite is more Symbolically committed to Quebec than the French masses. Table e shows a class main effect: the French masses are more committed to Ideological-English nationalism than the French elite. On the Symbolic-Canada scale, again the French

Table VII-3

Analysis of Variance of Quebec Commitment, Language Motivation, and Other Political Attitude Means by Class and Bilingualism (for English Canadians only)

Self-rated Ability in Spoken French	Class (Fathers' Education): High (Elite)	Low (Mass)
High	12	19
Low	15	19

F = class main effect
F = bilingualism main effect
F = class X bilingualism
F-ratios for 1, 61 d.f.
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to j. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High. (Except for Tables a and b: 1 = Low; 3 = High)

a. Instrumental motivation

2.17	2.69	F = 4.66 **
		F = 1.65
2.22	2.39	F = 1.28

b. Integrative motivation

2.55	2.13	F = 6.73 **
		F = .67
2.40	1.93	F = .03

c. Ideological-French

2.79	2.26	F = 4.34 **
		F = .33
2.50	2.25	F = .63

d. Symbolic-Quebec

2.82	2.88	F = .02
		F = .00
2.87	2.85	F = .07

e. Ideological-English

3.34	3.68	F = 5.74 **
		F = .00
3.19	3.85	F = .57

f. Symbolic-Canada

3.70	3.42	F = .15
		F = 2.93 *
3.06	3.13	F = .47

g. Normative

3.47	3.56	F = .28
		F = .00
3.63	3.36	F = .82

h. Functional

3.40	3.36	F = .59
		F = .35
3.57	3.38	F = .20

i. Moral

2.92	3.17	F = 3.18 *
		F = .68
3.00	3.39	F = .15

j. Pro-separatist attitude

2.00	1.39	F = .01
		F = .18
1.55	1.22	F = 2.26

Table VII-4

Analysis of Variance of Quebec Commitment, Language Motivation, and Other Political Attitude Means by Class and Bilingualism (for French Canadians Only)

Class
(Fathers' Education)

Self-rated Ability in Spoken English		High (Elite)	Low (Mass)
	High	17	21
	Low	29	42

F = class main effect
F = bilingualism main effect
F = class X bilingualism
F-ratios for 1, 105 d.f.
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to k. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High. (Except for Tables a and b: 1 = Low; 3 = High)

a. Instrumental motivation

2.50	2.52	F = .09
		F = .26
2.44	2.47	F = .00

b. Integrative motivation

1.53	1.90	F = 3.05 *
		F = 6.63 **
1.40	1.48	F = 2.12

c. Ideological-French

3.28	3.00	F = 1.40
		F = 9.17 ***
3.78	3.61	F = .02

d. Symbolic-Quebec

3.74	3.50	F = 4.73 **
		F = 8.40 ***
4.24	3.89	F = .11

e. Ideological-English

2.84	3.28	F = 6.57 **
		F = 2.55
2.56	3.00	F = .09

f. Symbolic-Canada

3.60	3.45	F = .20
		F = 2.81 *
3.05	3.28	F = .49

g. Normative

3.52	3.35	F = .85
		F = .34
3.41	3.30	F = .05

h. Functional

3.91	3.69	F = 1.92
		F = 1.23
3.73	3.60	F = .11

i. Moral

3.08	2.87	F = .42
		F = .49
3.11	3.06	F = .24

j. Pro-separatist attitude

2.71	2.00	F = 5.78 **
		F = 8.11 ***
3.77	2.96	F = .92

k. Likelihood of separatism

3.42	2.15	F = 2.07
		F = 3.47 *
4.08	2.61	F = .10

who speak English well have higher means than those who are less fluent (Table f). This pattern of results is exactly as hypothesized. We argued that the French Canadian, as he rises in achieved status and is forced to learn English for advancement in his career, also absorbs the values and behavioral norms of the Anglo-Saxon culture. The fact that those fluent in English also exhibited a higher motivation for cultural integration into the English community than the less fluent ones is consistent with this interpretation. But at the same time, the French Canadian begins to feel "alienated" from his own ethnic in-group and not fully integrated into the out-group. He is straddled between two membership groups, one to which he was born into, and the other toward which he is achieving. It should be emphasized that it is not language knowledge as such that produces alienation. Rather, it is the adoption of values and life-styles that differ from one's own in-group, and the difficulty of reconciling these conflicting allegiances, that produces this situation. One resolution of this dilemma is non-commitment or a shift in locus of commitment. Thus, the results showed that the more bilingual the French Canadian, the more culturally attached to Canada and, conversely, the less culturally attached to Quebec. On the other hand, the less bilingual, the more his cultural attachment and his Ideological commitment to French Canadian nationalism. The means on pro-separatist attitude (Table j) and the estimated likelihood of Quebec independence (Table k) also fall in the same order as the commitment means. The less knowledge of English, the greater the favorableness toward separatism, and the more likely its estimated probability of occurrence. There is also a class main effect; the French elite are more predisposed

toward separatism than the masses. Finally, no effects of language on Normative, Functional, and Moral commitment were expected, and the means of Tables g, h, and i, respectively, show no significant differences.

The effects of language and class on commitment for the Flemish are presented in Table VII-5. Again the standard design is a 2 X 2 table of class (fathers' education) and spoken fluency in French, indexed by a 10-point self-rating scale dichotomized at the median. Tables a and b show there are no relationships between the Flemings' language knowledge and their instrumental or integrative orientation, respectively. The relationships between bilingualism and commitment, therefore, can be presumed to be free of motivational factors. There are no significant differences between the means on the Ideological-Flemish (Table c), Symbolic-Flanders (Table d), Ideological-Brussels (Table e), and Ideological-Walloon (Table g) scales. However, there is a language main effect on Symbolic-Brussels (Table f), Symbolic-Wallonia (Table h) and Symbolic-Belgium (Table i) scales: the more the Fleming's knowledge of French, the more his cultural attachment to Brussels, Wallonia, and to Belgium as a whole. These results confirm only part of the hypothesis. The prediction that greater bilingualism leads to Symbolic commitment to the ethnic out-group is supported. However, the converse effect that it also leads to less Symbolic commitment to Flanders is not confirmed. On Normative commitment (Table j) there is an unexpected main effect due to language; the more bilingual, the greater the Normative commitment. There are no differences on any of the remaining commitment scales or political attitude items.

Table VII-6 presents the results for the Belgian francophones. Tables a and b show, respectively, that greater fluency in Dutch on the part of the francophones is associated with an instrumental but not an integrative motivation. They attained bilingual proficiency out of practical necessity rather than a desire for cultural enrichment. Table d shows a main effect of language on Symbolic-Flanders: the more bilingual the francophones, the more culturally attached they are to Flanders. But this attachment does not translate into endorsement of Ideological-Flemish nationalism, as witnessed by the absence of significant differences between the means of this scale (Table c). Further, the greater the knowledge of Dutch, the more the Symbolic attachment to Brussels (Table f), Wallonia (Table h), and Belgium (Table i). Again these Symbolic commitments do not imply endorsement of either the Ideological-Brussels (Table e) or Ideological-Walloon Table g) nationalism, since there are no language main effects on these scales. These results confirm only part of the hypothesis. The prediction that knowledge of Dutch among French-speaking Brusselers and Walloons would lead to enhanced Symbolic commitment to Flanders is supported. However, the converse result that it would also lead to decreased Symbolic commitment to Brussels and Wallonia was not confirmed -- in fact, Symbolic commitment to own ethnic locus was also enhanced. For Belgian francophones, then, the greater the bilingualism, the greater the Symbolic attachment to all regions, including the country as a whole. There are no language effects on Functional (Table k), Normative (Table j), or Moral (Table l) commitment. With respect to political events, language also has no effect on attitudes toward federalization of Belgium (Table m), but

Table VII-5

Analysis of Variance of Belgium Commitment, Language Motivation, and Other Political Attitude Means by Class and Bilingualism (for Flemish Only)

Class
(Fathers' Education)

Self-rated Ability in Spoken French	High (Elite)	Low (Mass)
High	17	20
Low	16	19

F = class main effect
F = bilingualism main effect
F = class X bilingualism
F-ratios for 1, 68 d.f.
**p<.05 *p<.10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to n. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High. (Except for Tables a, b, n; 1 = Low; 3 = High)

a. Instrumental motivation

2.58	2.42	F = .21
		F = .56
2.36	2.43	F = .77

b. Integrative motivation

1.82	1.89	F = .93
		F = .69
1.70	1.33	F = 2.69

c. Ideological-Flemish

3.49	3.26	F = .47
		F = 2.26
3.77	3.66	F = .05

d. Symbolic-Flanders

3.76	3.82	F = 1.32
		F = .04
4.12	3.50	F = 2.16

e. Ideological-Brussels

2.48	2.56	F = 1.53
		F = .47
2.18	2.57	F = .71

f. Symbolic-Brussels

3.08	3.70	F = 2.01
		F = 3.03 *
2.96	3.02	F = 1.31

g. Ideological-Walloon

2.58	2.42	F = .08
		F = .22
2.37	2.42	F = .24

h. Symbolic-Wallonia

2.60	2.95	F = 3.60 *
		F = 2.78 *
2.32	2.66	F = .12

i. Symbolic-Belgium

2.65	3.50	F = 5.21 **
		F = 3.01 *
2.64	2.78	F = 2.54

j. Normative

3.72	3.50	F = 2.42
		F = 4.55 **
3.40	3.07	F = .09

k. Functional

3.42	3.26	F = 1.03
		F = 1.54
3.22	3.05	F = .00

l. Moral

3.52	3.50	F = .27
		F = .35
3.50	3.70	F = .43

m. Pro-federalism attitude

4.32	3.99	F = .32
		F = .43
3.73	3.86	F = .90

n. Participate in demonstrations

1.70	1.46	F = .34
		F = 1.23
1.73	1.80	F = .81

Table VII-6

Analysis of Variance of Belgium Commitment, Language Motivation, and Other Political Attitude Means by Class and Bilingualism (for Francophones Only)

Class
(Fathers' Education)

Self-rated Ability in Spoken Dutch		High (Elite)	Low (Mass)
	High	25	8
	Low	50	15

F = class main effect
F = bilingualism main effect
F = class X bilingualism
F-ratios for 1, 94 d.f.
***p .01 **p .05 *p .10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to n. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High. (Except for Tables a, b, n: 1 = Low; 3 = High)

a. Instrumental motivation

2.41	2.50	F = .09
		F = 2.41
2.03	2.07	F = .01

b. Integrative motivation

1.29	1.68	F = 4.43 **
		F = .65
1.29	1.50	F = .46

c. Ideological-Flemish

2.46	1.95	F = .19
		F = 2.57 *
2.60	2.73	F = 2.25

d. Symbolic-Flanders

2.92	3.43	F = .90
		F = 5.74 **
2.54	2.60	F = .90

e. Ideological-Brussels

3.73	3.37	F = 1.45
		F = .18
3.61	3.48	F = .44

f. Symbolic-Brussels

3.88	3.81	F = .32
		F = 5.98 **
3.24	3.70	F = 1.12

g. Ideological-Walloon

3.68	3.69	F = .11
		F = .63
3.57	3.46	F = .07

h. Symbolic Wallonia

3.29	3.66	F = 4.32 **
		F = 2.89 *
3.01	3.38	F = .02

i. Symbolic-Belgium

3.38	3.26	F = .66
		F = 2.78 *
2.89	3.27	F = .96

j. Normative

3.57	3.56	F = .00
		F = 2.00
3.26	3.23	F = .00

k. Functional

3.60	3.48	F = 1.42
		F = 1.50
3.20	3.90	F = 2.60

l. Moral

3.31	3.63	F = 9.30 ***
		F = 1.35
2.92	3.87	F = 1.51

m. Pro-federalism attitude

2.82	3.50	F = .51
		F = .07
3.14	3.15	F = .56

n. Participate in demonstrations

1.17	1.62	F = 5.65 **
		F = 3.44 *
1.54	2.00	F = .02

it does influence participation in nationalist political demonstrations (Table n) -- the less bilingual the francophones, the more likely they are to engage in demonstrations. The French masses are also more frequently involved in demonstrations than the elite.

The effects of bilingualism on commitment are complex, and clearly the hypothesis requires revision to account for the results. There are, nonetheless, certain consistent trends and we shall attempt to point them out as a way of ordering the data. First, there is a strong cross-national pattern of enhanced Symbolic commitment to the nation-state with increased bilingualism. The English Quebeckers who know French, and the French Quebeckers who know English, are both more culturally attached to the Confederation of Canada than their less bilingual counterparts. Likewise, the Flemish who know French, and the French Brusselers and Walloons who know Dutch, are both more culturally attached to the Kingdom of Belgium. This is an intuitively reasonable pattern. To the extent that language learning involves also the acquisition of values and behavioral norms codified in that language, the bilingual is likely to be committed to the institutional framework that embodies and sustains the two sets of values and norms -- his own and the outgroup's -- that he has internalized.

A second and weaker cross-national trend that was observed is the enhanced Symbolic attachment to the ethnic out-group with increased bilingualism. The Flemish who know French are more culturally attached to Brussels and Wallonia; the French Brusselers and Walloons who know Dutch are more culturally attached to Flanders; and the French Quebeckers who know English are more culturally attached to English Canada (in this latter case, the out-group locus

and the nation-state are the same entity).

The third general pattern involves the influence of the motivational bases. When a language is learned primarily for integrative reasons, the bilingual is likely to be less Symbolically attached to his own ethnic group ("alienated" from it) and more Symbolically committed to the new language group. He will be in a marginal role because he is deliberately trying to incorporate the values and culture of an ethnic out-group and, thereby, risking rejection of his own in-group. Thus, the bilingual French Quebeckers are integratively oriented, and exhibit less Symbolic attachment to Quebec and more Symbolic attachment to English Canada than their less bilingual counterparts. On the other hand, when a language is learned primarily for instrumental reasons, the ethnic self-rejection is less likely to occur. Rather, the bilingual is likely to be more Symbolically attached to both his own ethnic group and the new language group. Since he is learning the language for a practical function, he will not be faced with conflicting value allegiances as would occur if he attempted to integrate culturally into the out-group. Incorporation of the values of the out-group codified in the language is inevitable, and hence the Symbolic attachment to the out-group locus. But this is not necessarily accompanied by alienation from one's own in-group. Thus, the bilingual francophone Belgians learned Dutch for instrumental reasons, and exhibit enhanced Symbolic commitment to both Flanders as well as to their own regional loci of Brussels and Wallonia. It should be cautioned that this pattern of motivation, bilingualism and commitment represents a post-hoc interpretation of the data, and therefore must be considered as a hypothesis for research rather than

as a verified empirical generalization.

The fourth cross-national trend is the absence of any language effects on Ideological nationalism of the out-group. The fact that increased knowledge of an ethnic out-group's language leads to enhanced Symbolic attachment to the out-group locus does not imply enhanced commitment to its Ideological nationalism. Thus, the bilingual Quebec French are culturally attached to English Canada but are not committed to Ideological-English nationalism; the bilingual Flemish are Symbolically but not Ideologically committed to Brussels and Wallonia; the bilingual Belgian francophones are Symbolically but not Ideologically commited to Flanders. This is an important distinction. It suggests that knowing the out-group's language may facilitate communication and interchanges at the cultural level but not necessarily at the political level. It may be proposed, then, as a research possibility, that institutional procedures that increase bilingualism in a mixed society could help reduce inter-ethnic conflict and enhance internal integration, not by reconciling different nationalist political positions, but by increasing commitment to the culture of the out-group and to the central political system. Thus, the Walloons who know Dutch will not be any more accepting of Flemish nationalist demands than the Walloons who do not know that language; but the bilingual Walloons will be more receptive and committed to Flemish culture and heritage and to Belgium as a whole. The bilingual Flemings, likewise, will not necessarily endorse the Walloon nationalist demands any more than the monolingual Flemings, but the former will be more committed to the integrity of Walloon language and culture as well as to the state of Belgium. These two bilinguals, belonging to

different ethnic groups, thus share a common cultural ground that is less likely to be present in monolinguals, over and above their political differences: attachment to each other's cultural background and to the Belgian state. Lord Acton remarked that "The coexistence of several nations under the same state is the test, as well as the best guarantee, of freedom." We would add that one of the conditions for such a coexistence is the presence of bilinguals with overlapping Symbolic sentiments.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter we shall attempt to interweave the theory, historical background, and aggregate and survey data into a continuous narrative that highlights the main patterns of nationalism and political commitment in Quebec and Belgium. The detailed expositions of the preceding chapters have often blurred the overall theoretical outline of the research and the relation of the empirical findings to it. The objective here is to summarize the theory and the principal results in the context of the historical background of the two countries, and to discuss briefly their implications in terms of the broader theoretical themes of the political integration literature.

Our initial interest in this subject grew out of the observation that the problem of nationalism and integration in Quebec and Belgium share certain similarities that would not be expected from classical theories of social integration, or even some contemporary writings on political integration. The assumption of the integration literature is that increasing industrialization and social development is associated with role differentiation and greater interdependencies of structures. Consequently, divisive primary group loyalties break down and are replaced by instrumental attachments to an overarching social-political order. But in fact, in some multiethnic and multilingual societies such as Quebec and Belgium, the opposite trend can be observed. The pattern common to the two countries is something like this: A majority ethnic group (French in Quebec; Flemings in Belgium) at first is totally subordinated to a dominant minority ethnic group

(English in Quebec; French Brusselers and Walloons in Belgium); with industrialization and social mobilization, some members of the subordinate group begin to rise along achieved status dimensions (e.g. economic) but not on ascribed status (e.g. ethnicity, cultural prestige); this economic development is accompanied by greater attachment, not to the central political system, but to the regional ethnic sub-unit; and this regional nationalism appears to intensify when the subordinate group begins to challenge and overtake the power of the dominant group. This was the general picture we derived from culling the historical literature and which served as the starting point for the research. We proceeded to develop a social psychological theory of political commitment in multilingual societies and conduct a cross-national test of some of the hypotheses by a comparative questionnaire survey in Quebec and Belgium.

A comparative social psychological study implies a distinctive analytical perspective. We see comparative research as a bridge between historical description and general social science theory. Our primary interest is not the study of Quebec and Belgium as systems but as cases of developmental processes and integration patterns taking place in different times and places. The objective is hypothesis-testing rather than description of population characteristics. This kind of comparative study focuses on the pattern of relationships among variables within each system. The social psychological approach is distinctive in that it conceptualizes behavior as an interactive function of individual and social structural characteristics, using social role as a mediating concept. In the study of nationalism and political integration, the main dependent measures are the forms of

commitment associated with different roles in the social-political system. We use the term political integration to refer to system-level consensus and political commitment to refer to the attitudinal orientations that derive from involvement in certain roles that make possible this consensus.

The construction of the theory and the comparative analysis followed two stages. First, the different forms of commitment and the levels of the system to which each form is oriented were postulated and measured. And second, the social structural conditions and individual difference characteristics that determine the arousal of one or another form of commitment were hypothesized and tested. Let us review each in turn.

Four types of commitment have been proposed by Katz and his colleagues. Each is derived from and is oriented towards a different set of role structures in the system. Symbolic commitment refers to affective attachment to the language, culture, heritage, and other symbols that reflect the "givens" of one's ethno-linguistic membership group -- in a word, cultural patriotism. Ideological commitment, or political nationalism, includes values and ideologies that legitimize political action. Functional commitment stems from involvement in the organizational, economic, and educational roles of the system that are based on division of labor and instrumental achievement. And Normative commitment reflects an orientation towards law and order, the norms and sanctions that regulate uniformity of behavior. In principle, these four attitudinal bases of consensus must be present (though not necessarily in the same individuals) if the system is to maintain itself through time. In addition, each type

of commitment can be oriented to the nation-state or to an ethno-linguistic sub-unit which may or may not have distinct political boundaries. This locus of orientation may not coincide for the different forms of commitment. Thus a French Canadian may be Symbolically attached to Quebec and Functionally committed to Canada.

The first step in the comparative analysis was to measure empirically the commitment types. An exploratory questionnaire was administered to 174 Quebec and 204 Belgian male high school students in the Spring of 1970. These were not representative samples of any kind, but the schools were selected from several different urban and rural regions containing a wide range of the social-economic distribution. The questionnaire attitude items were back-translated in each country. A factor analysis of the items of each country yielded six interpretable commitment factors. In Quebec, these were: Ideological, Symbolic-Quebec, Symbolic-Canada, Functional, Normative, and Moral. In Belgium: Ideological, Symbolic-Wallonia, Symbolic-Flanders, Functional, Normative, and Moral. Moral commitment was included ad hoc after Belgian colleagues advised us that good citizenship in that country is often interpreted in terms of non-political moral behavior, such as obeying religious precepts and providing for the family. In general, these results gave evidence for the cross-national invariance of the factor structure of commitment.

The commitment scales were constructed of the items with high factor loadings plus other items that intercorrelated highly with them. Seven scales were constructed for Quebec: Ideological-French (Id-Fr), Ideological-English (Id-En), Symbolic-Canada (Sy-C), Symbolic-Quebec (Sy-Q), Functional (Ft), Normative (Norm), and Moral. Although

it would have been empirically more justifiable, on the basis of the factor analysis, to treat the first two scales as a single English-French Ideological dimension, we felt that historically and theoretically it would be more meaningful to treat them separately. Likewise ten scales were developed for Belgium, some divided by locus of orientation: Ideological commitment to Brussels (I-Br), Flanders (I-F), and Wallonia (I-W); Symbolic commitment to Brussels (S-Br), Flanders (S-F), Wallonia (S-W), and Belgium (S-B); Functional (Ft), Normative (Norm), and Moral. There were 3 to 8 items per scale. The Ft scale in both countries was unreliable due to response set. All of the other scales had alpha reliabilities ranging from .40 to .66 and had no correlation with social desirability. A few scales had high convergent and discriminant validity when compared with political voting intentions; most had moderate validity; and three scales (Sy-C, S-B, and Ft) had none.

This kind of validation is rather abstract, so next we tried to show how the commitment scales can discriminate people systematically on a variety of demographic and personal characteristics, attitudes, and voting intentions. Groups of respondents who scored high on each of the commitment scales were selected and cross-tabulations performed with these criterion variables. The profiles of the Ideologically and Symbolically committed nationalists that emerged were remarkably similar in both countries. In Quebec, the persons scoring high on Id-Fr and Sy-Q scales showed different responses than those high on Id-En and Sy-C. Within both ethnic groups, the Ideologically committed were consistently more extreme (in the "nationalist" direction) than the Symbolic persons. Thus, the French are more religious and more bilingual than the English, but in both groups the Ideological types

are less religious and less bilingual than the Symbolic types. The French Ideological nationalists have fewer English friends and travelled less often outside Quebec than the Sy-Q persons; the Id-En nationalists have fewer French friends and travelled more often than the Sy-C persons. In the political domain, more of the Id-Fr respondents would vote for the French nationalist party than the Sy-Q types, even though their fathers equally and overwhelmingly tend to vote Liberal. More Id-En respondents vote for the Liberal Party than the Sy-C types, and the majority of the fathers of both also vote Liberal. The French are more in favor of Quebec separatism than the English, but within each group, the Id-Fr favor it more than the Sy-Q, and the Id-En reject it more than the Sy-C persons. In fact, most of the Id-En prefer to centralize the power in Ottawa or maintain the status quo in Quebec.

Likewise in Belgium, the responses of the Flemish were in opposite direction of the francophone Brusselers and Walloons, but within each ethnic group the Ideological were more extreme than the Symbolic types. The Flemish are of lower social-economic status, more rural, and more religious than the francophones. But in both language groups, the Ideological nationalists are of higher SES, more urban, less religious, and have fewer ethnic out-group friends than the Symbolic. Asked for their ethnic self-identification, more I-F than S-F types define themselves as Flemings; more I-Br than S-Br as Brusselers; most I-W see themselves as Belgians or Brusselers; most S-W as Walloons; and most S-B as Belgians. In politics, more of the I-F than S-F types would vote for the Flemish nationalist parties, even though their fathers mostly and equally vote Catholic. More of the I-Br and I-W would vote for the French nationalist parties than

the S-Br and S-W, respectively, and most of the fathers of the I-Br and I-W types also tend to vote nationalist. More I-F than S-F prefer the federalization of Belgium; most I-Br favor more centralization of power in Brussels; and the S-B types wish to maintain the unitary status-quo of the country. In short, we have shown that it is valid to distinguish between cultural patriotism and political nationalism even though they lie on a continuum, and that in both countries the persons endorsing one or the other type of orientation show similar systematic differences in background and outlook.

The second phase in the development of the theory and in the comparative analysis was to relate each form of commitment to selected independent variables. This was a process of theory construction via construct validation of commitment -- the establishment of functional relationships between the types and other constructs in an inferential nomological network. The independent variables we considered were status inconsistency and intergenerational mobility at the structural level, and bilingualism at the individual level.

We began with the proposition from the literature that the emergence of nationalism is associated with social mobilization -- that it is a product of, and a response to, rapid social changes and mobility. To examine this relationship, we described the history of nationalism in Quebec and Belgium and related it to some broad demographic, economic, and political trends from census data. In Quebec, the rapid industrialization since the early 1930's created a new French middle class. It began to challenge the economic dominance of the minority English elite and the traditional French elite composed of clergy and liberal professions. The new elite offered political

independence as an alternative to the conservative, agrarian-based, cultural survival ideology of the French elite. The 1970 elections represented a watershed in Quebec electoral history when a new separatist party -- led and supported by this middle class -- established itself as the second major political party. In Belgium three nationalist movements were described. Flemish nationalism is an expansive movement that flowered after almost a century of economic and cultural subjugation under the Brussels and Walloon minority and, to a lesser extent, the old French-speaking Flemish elite. After the Second War, Flanders was rapidly transformed to an industrial economy and by 1966 its GNP per capita had surpassed that of Wallonia. The economic expansion was accompanied by a renewed nationalism such that by 1968 a decade-old Flemish nationalist party, constituted by the rising middle class, established itself as the third dominant political force in Flanders. Walloon nationalism did not become a broadly based mass movement until the 1950's. It was a defensive reaction against Flemish advances, and against its own steady economic and demographic decline. From top-dogs they had passed to under-dogs. In 1968 a a Walloon nationalist party appeared for the first time in national elections. The French Brussels nationalism is a recent phenomenon. Despite their clear economic superiority over the other two regions, it too nurtured a Brussels nationalist party for the first time in 1968, apparently as a defensive backlash against Flemish demands. In short, in both Quebec and Belgium we observed the emergence of nationalism associated with either economic expansion or decline. Further, the appearance of nationalist parties represented major breaks in the electoral history of both countries. Their ranks are

uniformly composed of a highly educated, politicized, new middle class -- a distinct contrast to the typical working class composition of third parties in Western countries.

This developmental perspective tells only when but not where nationalism occurs. It locates nationalism in time but not in social space. We therefore introduced the construct of status inconsistency. It was proposed that rapid social change often results in discrepancies between achieved (e.g. economic) and ascribed (e.g. language prestige) status ranks which, in turn, determine certain forms of political commitment. When one ethnic group is totally dominant and another totally subordinate, there is intra-group status consistency and inter-group stability. But when the subordinate group rises in achieved but not ascribed status as result of social mobilization processes, it becomes status inconsistent. It is less absolutely deprived than before but it is also more relatively deprived as the achieved status of the dominant group becomes the reference comparison. The potential for inter-group nationalist conflict appears.

The empirical test of this general proposition was the main objective of the cross-national survey. The basic design for formulating and testing hypotheses was a 2 X 2 table in which the columns define achieved status (high/low economic class or elite/mass) and the rows define ascribed status (high ethnic prestige: English Canadians or francophone Belgians; low: French Canadians or Flemish). Three differential predictions were made on the effect of status on Ideological and Symbolic nationalism. We will summarize only the Quebec predictions; the Belgian predictions are directly parallel. First, the status inconsistency hypothesis predicts that the inconsist-

ent French elites (high achieved/low ascribed) would exhibit the highest Id-Fr and Sy-Q commitment; in terms of analysis of variance, this represents an interaction effect. Second, the ethnicity hypothesis assumes that French Canadians form a monolithic ethnic bloc ranged in opposition against the English. It predicts a main row effect of ethnic status, that the French elite and mass are equally more nationalistic than the English. And third, the class differences hypothesis proposes that the French Canadian masses are equally exploited by the French elites as well as the English elites. Consequently, the prediction is a column main effect of economic status on French nationalism. In addition, two other predictions were made from the theory: Functional commitment is associated with high status consistency (English elite), and Normative and Moral commitment with low status consistency (French masses).

The Quebec results clearly supported the ethnicity and class differences hypotheses but not the status inconsistency hypothesis. The French Canadians were more committed than the English to French political and cultural nationalism, and the elites more than the masses. The English were more committed to English political nationalism than the French, and the masses more than the elites. The different groups did not differ in cultural attachment to Canada. The ordering of the means on all these scales was exactly as predicted by status inconsistency -- French elites showed the highest French nationalism and the English masses the highest English nationalism -- but the non-significant interaction term meant this ordering was due simply to the additive main effects of ethnicity and class rather than to status inconsistency. Contrary to the prediction, the French elite

was the most Functionally committed group, not the English elite. No differences were observed on Normative and Moral commitment.

The pattern of Belgian results is quite similar. On Flemish nationalism, only the ethnicity hypothesis was supported. This means the Flemish were more Ideologically and Symbolically committed to Flanders than the francophones, but there were no differences between elite and mass. This supports the argument of the "massification" of Flemish nationalism. There was a weak status inconsistency effect: the Flemish elite exhibited the highest cultural nationalism. On Walloon and Brussels nationalism, again the ethnicity hypothesis was supported. But an interesting reversal occurred: there was a class difference on cultural nationalism. The Walloon and Brussels masses were more culturally attached to Wallonia and Brussels than the elites, whereas the latter were more Ideologically committed to Walloon and Brussels political nationalism than the former. This finding agrees with the historical experience of the French masses as the custodians of local francophone culture while the elites adopted French Parisian culture. Again the predictions for Functional and Normative commitment were not upheld. Highest Moral commitment by the Flemish masses was found as predicted.

It may be criticized that this objective classification of status is inadequate because the different ethnic groups may have different rank perceptions than the investigator. We therefore also measured subjective economic status and social prestige of each ethnic group by self-rating scales. For each respondent, four sets of information were available: how he saw his own ethnic group on these two statuses; how he ranked other groups; how other out-groups saw his ethnic group;

and how he thinks others see his own group ("mirror" perception). In Quebec we found that the French and English did not share the same perceptions of status of each other, but they were capable of recognizing the fact that their perceptions were dissimilar. For example, the English saw themselves as having higher social than economic status; the French have the opposite view of them. Yet the English showed they were cognizant of this discrepancy in rating the mirror-image of themselves as having higher economic than social status. This is an important theoretical finding. It shows that different ethnic groups often do not evaluate status ranks in similar fashion, as the status inconsistency literature assumes they do. What is more important is that a group can recognize differences in perception and take on the role of the other without necessarily agreeing with the discrepant views.

The Belgian data are even more fascinating in this respect. The French Brusselers, who objectively are economically dominant, saw themselves as having lower economic than social status. All the other ethnic groups -- Flemings of Brussels and Flanders, and Walloons -- saw them in reverse order. Self-perceptions and perceptions of others do not always coincide; but the crucial question is, are the French Brusselers aware of this discrepancy? Their mirror-rankings showed they were not: they thought the others saw them as they saw themselves -- they projected their own view onto others and perceived it as the consensual state of affairs. The common grievance that French Brusselers do not understand and do not care with what goes on outside of Brussels appears to have foundation. On the other hand, the Flemish saw themselves as having equal social and economic status. The French

Brusselers and Walloons saw them as having higher economic than social status. When asked for their mirror-perceptions, the Flemish showed that they realized the others rated them as having higher economic status than social prestige. Among the Walloons, accurate perceptions were also found.

A theoretical and methodological implication can be drawn from these results for the political integration literature. Deutsch has proposed using communication channels as an index of system integration. But effective communication and interaction in multiethnic societies presuppose accurate empathy. Lerner (1958) sees high empathic capacity as the major characteristic of modernity, and Silvert (1963) proposes that "nationalism is the institutionalized power reflection of empathy" (p. 24). It would be a disquieting situation when different ethnic groups in a system not only do not share the same perceptions, but each believes that others see the world the same way it does. We have measured only perceptions of status. Future research could use this simple procedure of direct and mirror-ratings for a variety of important issues that divide a population. This can provide a picture of the interlocking patterns of perceptual maps and cognitive expectations of different segments of society which could be used as a subjective index of system integration, much the same way as the number of communication links is an objective index of integration.

Next we examined the relationship of subjective status to types of commitment and voting intentions. The objective was to test again the three hypotheses of ethnicity, class differences, and status inconsistency using subjective measures of status. It was feasible that the weak inconsistency effects obtained with the objective criteria

of status resulted because different ethnic groups have different perceptions of status ranks -- different vis-a-vis themselves and the researcher's view. Two sets of analyses were performed. First, multiple regression analyses of the self-rated economic and social status on commitment scales and voting were performed. This was conceptually equivalent to the main effects of achieved and ascribed status, respectively, of the analysis of variance. In general, the subjective status effects were in accord with the objective status main effects. Second, we correlated subjective "relative" status inconsistency (RSI) with commitment scales and voting. This was more or less conceptually equivalent to the interaction term. This measure consisted of the difference between perceived economic and social status of one's own ethnic group relative to the difference between the perceived economic and social status of another ethnic reference group. This difference of differences formula, in contrast to a simple difference formula, introduces a comparative perspective into the measurement. The distribution of difference scores was then trichotomized into three groups: those who were status consistent; those whose social prestige was higher than their economic status; and those whose economic status was higher than their social prestige -- in all three cases, of course, relative to a comparison group.

The results, in general, were in agreement with the analysis of variance of data, and they showed that RSI is associated with certain forms of commitment. For example, in Quebec the English with lower economic than social status relative to the French -- the subjective equivalent of the English masses -- were strongly against French nationalism and separatism, and were strongly for English Ideological

nationalism and the Liberal party. In Belgium, the French Brusselers higher economic than social status relative to the Flemish -- the francophone elites -- tended to vote for the French nationalist party and show high but not significant relationships with Ideological-Brussels and Symbolic-Brussels commitment scales. The relatively inconsistent Flemish elites strongly endorsed Flemish Ideological nationalism. And the inconsistent Walloons with higher social than economic status relative to the Flemish -- or francophone masses -- exhibited Ideological and Symbolic attachment to Wallonia. Finally, in both countries, the persons with relative status consistency showed Functional commitment.

These results and procedure suggest a theoretical and methodological implication for the status inconsistency literature. The gravamen of our criticism of Lenski's theory of status inconsistency is its absence of a relational perspective. The dynamics of the activation of inconsistency processes is unclear because no comparison processes are specified. But in fact, the very definition of high or low rank of a status of a person implies that the status ranks of another person are used as a comparison standard. A black doctor in America has low accribed and high achieved status only relative to whites; he would not be inconsistent relative to, say, American Indians. We suggest for futher research that a reason why some studies of objective status inconsistency obtain predicted effects and others do not depends upon whether the objective definition of status rank by the researcher is in the same direction as the respondents' perceptions. Obviously a black American compares himself more often with whites than Indians, so in this case the objective and subjective

definitions operate in the same direction. But in the Flemish case, for example, the objective and subjective definitions operate in opposite directions, and measurement at one but not the other level can give a distorted picture. In fine, we have made an explicit attempt to incorporate into the theory and measurement the comparison process by using subjective perceptions, an approach that has been largely neglected in the literature.

The second independent variable of the theory was intergenerational mobility aspirations, an indicator of social mobilization. The basic design was a 2 X 2 table of respondents' expected occupation and their fathers' occupation. The Quebec results showed that an approximately equal number of French and English expected no mobility, but those anticipating upward mobility were primarily French and those downward mobility were primarily English. In fact, upwardly mobile aspirants exhibited the most French political nationalism, were the most in favor of Quebec independence, and were Functionally committed. No differences were found on the other commitment measures. In Belgium, again about the same number of Flemish and French expected no mobility, but the majority of the upwardly mobile aspirants were Flemish and the downwardly mobile were French. As predicted, there was a consistent but non-significant trend for the upwardly mobile aspirants to be more Ideologically and Symbolically committed to Flanders and to favor federalization of the country. On the other hand, the downwardly mobile were Ideologically committed to Brussels and Wallonia and were the least favorable to federalism. Also as expected, the low non-mobiles were Morally committed. No differences were found on any of the other measures.

The third independent variable of the theory was bilingualism. We felt that the theory was incomplete until the possibility of alienation from the system was also considered. The aim was to conceptualize alienation in terms of the existing framework of commitment rather than as a separate construct, even if the range of its meaning was not entirely captured this way. Since language plays an obviously dynamic role in the mobilization of multilingual societies, and it is known to influence cognition, we sought the individual difference roots of commitment and alienation in linguistic fluency. In terms of the earlier developmental sketch of nationalism, a subordinate ethnic group rises in achieved but not ascribed status. Since the high achieved roles are associated with the high ascribed language, upward mobility may depend on mastering this new language. It is known from the social psychology of language that second-language acquisition results also in the adoption of cultural features of the language community. One learns not only the language but also the values and behaviors codified in the language. Consequently, the attainment of bilingualism may involve a conflict of values and allegiances as the dominant ethnic group becomes not only a reference group but a second membership group. The cross-pressures can lead to alienation. In terms of the theory, this cultural alienation can be conceptualized as a change in locus of commitment. Our hypothesis was that greater bilingualism leads to decreased Symbolic attachment to (alienation from) one's own ethnic group, and increased Symbolic attachment to (assimilation) the ethnic out-group or the central political system. Conversely, less bilingualism leads to increased Symbolic attachment to one's own ethnic group, and decreased

Symbolic attachment to (alienation from) the ethnic out-group or the central political system.

The results only partly supported the hypothesis, but several regular trends were detected. First, in Quebec and Belgium, the greater the bilingualism, the more the cultural attachment to the nation-state. The English who know French and the French who knew English were more Symbolically committed to Canada than their less bilingual counterparts. Likewise, the Flemish who knew French, and the Brusselers and Walloons who knew Dutch, were more culturally attached to Belgium. Second, in both countries, the greater the bilingualism the more the cultural attachment to the ethnic out-group. For example, French Quebeckers who knew English were more attached to English Canada than the less bilingual persons; or the French Brusselers who knew Dutch were more attached to Flanders. However, the predicted converse effect -- decreased cultural attachment to, or alienation from, one's own ethnic group -- was not always borne out. In fact, decreased cultural commitment to one's own ethnic group was present only when the bilingual was deliberately motivated to integrate himself to the new language community. This, of course, could not be considered cultural alienation in the usual sense of the term. Finally, in both countries, there were no language effects on Ideological commitment. The fact that bilingualism leads to greater cultural attachment to another ethnic group does not, therefore, imply also endorsement of the political nationalism of that group.

In concluding, we return to a leitmotif of the political integration literature that initially prompted this research. This is the assumption, derived from the classical sociological theorists, that the differentiation

of roles brought by development has a levelling effect on primary loyalties which facilitates overlapping secondary loyalties and system integration. But in fact, Symbolic attachments and Functional commitment are not always in direct evolutionary opposition to one another; one does not flourish at the expense of the other. In multilingual societies, there is often a dialectic interplay of the two forms of commitment that stem, not from any inherent contradictions, but from changes in social structure. The Royal Commission (1965) observed: "It is almost ironical to recall now the opinion of people who expected that as a result of modern education and industrialization there would be an increasing assimilation of Quebec to the rest of Canada. In one sense it is true that North American technology is bringing the two groups closer together and is developing similar patterns of behavior ... but the greater closeness makes the competition that much keener and strengthens the determination to live and work under the new conditions in a French way" (p. 110). Thus, an expanding economy and interlocking roles do not do away with collective solidarities -- it simply modernizes them. The survey data supports this interpretation. The French Canadians were not only strongly attached to their cultural heritage, but they were also Functionally committed. Likewise the Walloons, who are economically subordinate, showed a strong cultural attachment to Wallonia combined with a Functional outlook. In other words, they were simultaneously motivated by two powerful, interdependent drives -- an affirmation of a unique collective identity and a practical desire to build an efficient and modern society.

This, of course, leads to the corollary theme in the literature of whether this modern society represents the existing nation-state or

one's ethno-linguistic community which could separate itself and become an independent state. At first it may appear that social-economic development would enhance integration of the existing nation-state if the population was initially ethnically and linguistically homogeneous; and conversely, that social mobilization would strain internal unity in heterogeneous populations. However, language per se cannot be the cause of political divisiveness since there are countries such as Switzerland and the Philippines which have been spared serious linguistic conflict despite the profusion of languages. Also, political secessions have occurred when a population shared the same language and culture, as in the American Civil War. The survey data do not bear directly on the possibilities of separatism of Quebec or federalization of Belgium. However, we can conceptualize the issue in terms of the theory and suggest its implications. Separatism and federalization represent the politization and institutionalization of Symbolic commitment. When cultural attachments are equated with political ideology, the moral coerciveness of these basic ethno-cultural ties are transferred to, and legitimize, political action. The problem, then, is to inquire into the social conditions that must be present for this equation to occur. In the theory we focused on blocked mobility opportunities, discrepancies in economic status, and frustrated cultural aspirations. In other words we went beyond language as such to seek the origins of nationalist conflict in the unresponsiveness of institutions to felt needs of segments of the population. To the extent that structural reforms are undertaken, as embodied in the linguistic laws of Belgium, and institutional safeguards are adopted to insure the maintenance of a profoundly rooted consciousness

of kind concomitant with the development of an overarching civil order, the likelihood of the politization of Symbolic ties will be minimized. Kohn (1944) has argued for the "depolitization of nationalism," in much the same way that religion was once depoliticized without any resulting diminuition of religious influence over individual consciences. Geertz (1963) too has called for the "domestication of primordial discontent," or the divesting of legitimacy of ethnic ties vis-a-vis political authority. Our research suggested that increased bilingualism is one way of depoliticizing Symbolic ties. We found that knowledge of the ethnic out-group's language led to greater cultural attachment to that out-group and to the nation-state as a whole, without a concomitant attachment to the political nationalism. This, of course, is not a practical option at the present since the majority of the ethnic groups in Quebec and Belgium are monolingual. The task that lies ahead is to devise ways that will insure the development of each ethnic group's sense of selfhood in step with its parallel social-economic development. In this perspective, the nationalist problems of Quebec and Belgium are but special cases of a world-wide problem -- how to be equal, without being identical, and flourish.

FOOTNOTES

1. It should be noted that in subsequent revisions of the Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim had increasing reservations about cohesion in an organic society, and his principal concern was the mechanisms that held together such a society.

2. This distinction between a Symbolic and Ideological nationalism oriented towards changes in the system, and a Symbolic and Ideological nationalism committed to the preservation of the status quo, will be spelled out more precisely later on in terms of locus of commitment.

3. This is an important methodological point because of the "identification problem" (Blalock, 1966a; 1966b; 1967): There are too many unknowns for a solution in the regression model such that status inconsistency cannot be automatically equated with interaction. Most studies of status inconsistency have employed Lenski's procedure of percentages instead of means. Lenski takes the difference between percentages in the cell diagonals as evidence for inconsistency. This procedure, of course, cannot partial-out the interaction effects from the main effects. We are following Blalock's suggestion of specifying a priori the main effects and the magnitude and direction of the interaction effects in order that, if interaction effects are found, they are attributable to status inconsistency.

4. Cronbach's (1951) multifactor model of mental tests conceptualizes each test item as composed of common factors, specific factors, and error variance. Likewise one can conceptualize a commitment scale as composed of items (X_c) common to two cultures and items (X_{n-c}) specific to a culture, and both sets of items operationalizing the same construct. There are also items that contribute only error variance (X_e). The initial scale for each culture consists of $X_c + X_{n-c} + X_e$ items. By factor analysis or some other empirical item analysis, X_c items emerge as a homogeneous set in both cultures; these items are defined as identical cross-culturally (Przeworski and Teune, 1969). The X_{n-c} items that emerge as homogeneous within each culture and correlate with the identical X_c items are defined by Przeworski and Teune as equivalent cross-culturally. The items that do not correlate with either set are error items and are discarded from the final scale. We followed this logic, if not all the associated statistical procedures, in constructing the commitment scales. As will be shown later, we first performed a factor analysis and identified the culture-common X_c items for each commitment type; then we added additional culture-specific X_c items that correlated highly with the former cluster but did not appear in the factor analysis. This is why some of items for each scale in Quebec are the same as those of Belgium, and some are different. One can compare scale by scale for each country and identify the culture-common and culture-specific items. The traditional dilemma of having only identical items and thereby missing-out on important culture-specific data, or having measures that are presumably non-comparable because they contain

only culture-specific items, is actually a pseudo-dilemma. An instrument can and should incorporate both kinds of items if they are identical and equivalent in the above sense.

5. Since the Moral commitment scale was added ad hoc to our typology and did not form part of the original conceptualization, we did not examine the concurrent validity relationships of the Moral scale with criterion variables.

6. If we substitute hypothetical ratings (from 10 to 0, corresponding to the 10-point rating scales of subjective social prestige and economic status) into the RSI formula, it will be seen that any positive RSI score (range: +20 to + 1) has to come from one of the following combinations of rating values (using the RSI formula for English Canadians as an example):

(1) EC (E > S) > FC (E > S)
(2) EC (E > S) > FC (E < S)
(3) EC (E > S) > FC (E = S)
(4) EC (E > S) < FC (E < S)
(5) EC (E > S) = FC (E < S)
(6) EC (E < S) < FC (E < S)
(7) EC (E = S) < FC (E < S)

A numerical example of the first combination has been given in the body of the report (p. 190). In the second combination, an EC rates his economic status higher than his social prestige, and this discrepancy is (absolutely) greater than his rating of the FCs' social higher than economic status discrepancy. To illustrate:

$$\begin{aligned} +RSI &= EC\ (8 - 3) - FC\ (5 - 6) \\ &= (5) - (-1) \\ &= +6 \end{aligned}$$

Combinations (3) and (4) are to be read in like manner. In combination (5), an EC rates his economic status higher than his social, and this discrepancy is (absolutely) equal to his rating of the FCs' social higher than economic status discrepancy. Nonetheless, the resulting RSI score is positive. Thus:

$$\begin{aligned} +RSI &= EC\ (8 - 3) - FC\ (3 - 8) \\ &= (5) - (-5) \\ &= +10 \end{aligned}$$

Combinations (6) and (7) are the only two possible combinations that yield a positive score when an EC rates his own social prestige as higher than, or equal to, his economic status. To illustrate combination (7):

$$\begin{aligned} +RSI &= EC\ (5 - 5) - FC\ (3 - 8) \\ &= (0) - (-5) \\ &= +5 \end{aligned}$$

Empirically, of course, not all these combinations will be found in a sample of those with positive RSI scores. We took a random sample of forty of our Quebec respondents and examined their status ratings.

Over 80 % of those with positive RSI scores exhibited one of the first five combinations. We may, therefore, generalize the meaning of a positive RSI score for English Canadians this way: the English Canadians' self-rated economic status is higher than their own social prestige, relative to any difference between their ratings of the French Canadians' economic and social status.

Now, if we substitute again hypothetical ratings (from 10 to 0) into the formula, it will be found that any <u>negative</u> RSI score (range: -1 to -20) also has to come from one of the following seven combinations (again using the EC example):

(1) EC (E < S) > FC (E > S)
(2) EC (E < S) > FC (E < S)
(3) EC (E < S) > FC (E = S)
(4) EC (E < S) < FC (E > S)
(5) EC (E < S) = FC (E > S)
(6) EC (E > S) < FC (E > S)
(7) EC (E = S) < FC (E > S)

It will be observed that these combinations are the same as the earlier set of seven, except that the ordering of the economic and social status ranks has been reversed. In the first combination, an EC rates his social prestige higher than his economic status, and this discrepancy is (absolutely) greater than his rating of the FCs' economic higher than social status discrepancy. Thus:

$$\begin{aligned} -RSI &= EC\ (3 - 8) - FC\ (6 - 5) \\ &= (-5) - (1) \\ &= -6 \end{aligned}$$

An illustration of the second combination was given in the body of the report (p. 191). Other examples could be worked out for the other combinations by substituting hypothetical values. In general, not all of these seven combinations will be found empirically. In the random sample of Quebec respondents whose status ratings we examined individually, about 90 % of those with negative RSI scores exhibited one of the first five combinations. Therefore, the meaning of a negative RSI score for English Canadians was interpreted as follows (based primarily on the first five combinations): The English Canadians' self-rated social prestige is higher than their own economic status, relative to any difference between their ratings of the French Canadians' economic and social status.

Finally, if we substitute hypothetical values into the formula, it will be seen that a <u>zero</u> RSI score can only come from one of three different combinations (using the EC example):

(1) EC (E = S) = FC (E = S)
(2) EC (E > S) = FC (E > S)
(3) EC (E < S) = FC (E < S)

It is obvious that any ratings (from 10 to 0) in these combinations would yield a score of zero. For instance, in combination (3):

$$\begin{aligned} RSI &= EC\ (3 - 8) - FC\ (3 - 8) \\ &= (-5) - (-5) \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

APPENDIX A

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF QUEBEC COMMITMENT AND OTHER POLITICAL ATTITUDE MEANS BY CLASS AND REGION

Achieved Status: Class
(Fathers' Education)

Region	High	Low
Quebec-French	23	20
Quebec-English	14	15
Nicolet-French	3	11
Montreal-French	17	30
Montreal-English	4	16

F = class main effect
F = region main effect
F = class X region interaction
F-ratios for 4, 143 d.f.
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to j. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High. (Except Table m: 1 = Low; 3 = High)

a. Ideological-French

3.34	3.27	
2.65	2.16	F = 5.82 ***
4.33	4.00	F = 18.30 ***
3.80	3.29	F = .47
2.55	2.29	

b. Symbolic-Quebec

3.94	3.65	
2.97	2.83	F = 4.17 ***
4.33	4.15	F = 22.11 ***
4.17	3.70	F = 1.07
2.74	2.93	

c. Ideological-English

2.93	3.20	
3.17	3.67	F = 13.44 ***
2.00	3.12	F = 5.92 ***
2.44	3.01	F = .51
3.27	3.82	

d. Symbolic-Canada

3.62	3.57	
3.57	3.63	F = .07
3.50	3.77	F = 1.94
3.10	3.22	F = .07
3.15	3.13	

e. Normative

3.61	3.38	
3.68	3.51	F = .57
3.42	3.26	F = 1.10
3.25	3.29	F = .24
3.42	3.44	

f. Functional

3.76	3.67	
3.43	3.35	F = 2.14 *
2.83	3.53	F = 3.81 ***
4.00	3.65	F = 1.70
3.57	3.38	

g. Pro-separatist attitude

3.22	2.65	
1.08	1.47	F = 4.96 ***
4.67	2.73	F = 10.65 ***
3.30	2.60	F = 1.46
2.25	1.06	

h. Likelihood of separatism

3.40	3.20	
2.43	3.07	F = 1.45
5.00	4.19	F = 5.27 ***
4.18	3.37	F = 1.36
3.00	2.57	

i. Participate in demonstrations

1.96	1.75	
1.36	1.20	F = 1.20
1.67	1.82	F = 6.45 ***
1.82	1.73	F = .17
1.25	1.19	

j. Moral

3.11	3.23	
3.02	3.30	F = .11
2.58	3.04	F = .72
3.17	2.83	F = 1.02
3.06	3.32	

APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF BELGIUM COMMITMENT AND OTHER POLITICAL ATTITUDE MEANS BY CLASS AND REGION

Achieved Status: Class
(Fathers' Education)

Region	High	Low
Brussels-French	65	11
Brussels-Flemish	12	10
Flanders	21	29
Wallonia	10	13

F = class main effect
F = region main effect
F = class X region interaction
F-ratios for 3, 163 d.f.
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Standard design; standard order and notation of F-ratios and significance levels; constant N per cell for Tables a to m. Range of all means: 1 = Low; 5 = High (Except Table m: 1 = Low; 3 = High).

a. Ideological-Flemish

2.56	2.36	
3.71	3.50	F = .80
3.57	3.45	F = 16.02 ***
2.60	2.56	F = .04

b. Symbolic-Flanders

2.54	2.81	
3.92	3.85	F = .58
3.95	3.60	F = 19.10 ***
3.40	3.00	F = .91

c. Ideological-Walloon

3.58	3.18	
2.41	2.80	F = .78
2.52	2.29	F = 27.05 ***
3.75	3.81	F = 1.20

d. Symbolic-Wallonia

2.95	3.01	
2.30	2.85	F = 2.83 *
2.57	2.79	F = 21.32 ***
4.00	4.10	F = .56

e. Ideological-Brussels

3.71	3.72	
2.21	2.22	F = .56
2.46	2.68	F = 38.99 ***
3.25	3.19	F = .25

f. Symbolic-Brussels

3.39	3.82	
3.00	3.55	F = 2.73 *
3.04	3.31	F = 2.02
3.85	3.78	F = .41

g. Symbolic-Belgium

2.89	2.68	
2.00	3.00	F = .63
3.01	3.20	F = 11.01 **
4.10	3.84	F = 2.28

h. Functional

3.20	3.15	
3.26	3.24	F = .15
3.40	3.36	F = 4.30 **
3.73	4.21	F = .88

i. Normative

3.26	2.90	
3.62	3.60	F = 3.26 *
3.53	3.19	F = 3.43 *
4.00	3.73	F = .19

j. Moral

2.89	3.42	
3.43	3.72	F = 1.05
3.56	3.55	F = 1.52
4.22	4.10	F = 13.96 ***

Appendix B (continued)

k. Pro-federalist attitude

3.19	3.25		
4.41	4.22	F =	.41
3.85	3.80	F =	5.98 ***
2.00	3.50	F =	1.48

l. Likelihood of federalism

3.34	3.25		
3.66	3.00	F =	1.07
3.50	2.96	F =	1.38
2.14	3.12	F =	1.79

m. Participation in demonstrations

1.46	1.75		
1.50	1.22	F =	.14
1.85	1.76	F =	2.68 **
1.28	1.75	F =	1.40

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