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THE ENDS OF THE AMERICAN EARTH: PITTSBURGH AND THE UPPER OHIO VALLEY TO 1795. (VOLUMES I AND II)

The University of Michigan PH.D. 1983

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THE ENDS OF THE AMERICAN EARTH:

PITTSBURGH AND THE UPPER OHIO VALLEY TO 1795

Volume I

by
James Patrick McClure

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(History)
in The University of Michigan
1983

Doctoral Committee:

Professor John Shy, Chairman
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PREFACE

This study examines the upper Ohio Valley region, which in terms of modern political boundaries consists of southwestern Pennsylvania and adjacent parts of West Virginia and Ohio, during the second half of the eighteenth century. The primary focus of attention, after a fashion at least, is on politics, the disposition of power within the region and the responses of local inhabitants to the authority of government. I believe that an examination of such factors can lead to a better understanding of the region's initial decades of development as a British-American settlement frontier, from the competition of ambitious hide traders and land speculators in the 1760s, through a major jurisdictional dispute, the Revolutionary War, and the beginnings of commercial and industrial development, to the disturbance of 1794 known as the Whiskey Insurrection. The main title of the work, "The Ends of the American Earth," is a phrase from a petition, discussed in chapter 7., presented by inhabitants of the region to one of the commandants of Fort Pitt during the Revolution.

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Early in my research and writing I came to distrust existing generalizations about the upper Ohio Valley as an eighteenth-century frontier society. I also see this case as an instance in which matters of politics and social order were tightly woven within the larger texture of the regional society as a whole. As a result I have constructed fairly thorough depictions of some aspects of the regional society and hope to show some of the relationships among its social, economic, and political elements.

A number of related factors shaped the society I depict in these pages. There was, from the beginning of European involvement in the region, competition among interest groups who had strong perceptions of the economic opportunities offered by the region. The question of precisely who would make the important decisions concerning the region was an issue from early on, and affected both the regional society's internal politics and its relations with extraregional governmental authority. Some ambitious individuals were willing to exploit a weak presence of government and a lack of political rigidity to assert themselves within the regional competition for power. Local society was, at the same time, affected by the mobility, transience, and diversity of its population; by economic change and rapid growth; by tendencies toward localism within the larger region;

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and by a continuing experience of conflict, periodically violent, with American Indians. Within regional society there were forces both of order and of disorder, elements of fluidity and of structure. Through the initial decades of white settlement a question faced persistently, if for the most part unconsciously, by locals was the problem of how to balance political fluidity and open competition with the requirements of a society that could function without perpetual chaos -- how to channel political ambition, frustration, and dissatisfaction in a way that would avoid social disintegration.

This depiction of an eighteenth-century frontier society is, in the end, somewhat at variance with the often heroic and even mythical image of the advance of the settlement frontier. If the backcountry inhabitants I describe had only an imperfect notion of what they were about in larger historical terms, if they were at times flustered, violent, or burdened by a sense of victimization, it is not because I set out to create a negative image of them but because I have tried to understand them and the reasons behind their actions as completely as possible.

I have as a matter of choice avoided historiographical discussions in the text. Readers familiar with the literature can draw their own conclusions as

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to my place within it, and those without such a background would be put off by digressive comments about previous scholars' efforts. For those readers not thoroughly schooled in the writings on the subject I should note here that I follow in the path of, and have benefitted greatly from the labors of, previous students of the Ohio forks country. These include Solon J. Buck, Elizabeth H. Buck, Randolph C. Downes, Leland D. Baldwin, and Russell J. Ferguson, who were active in the Western Pennsylvania Historical Survey of the 1930s and wrote a series of monographs on the region's initial decades of white settlement. The names of Alfred P. James, Charles M. Stotz, Lois Mulkearn, and Nicholas Wainwright, all of them energetic contributors to the history of the region, will also appear in my citations. As for the larger western region as a whole in the eighteenth century, especially within the context of British imperial politics, I should mention in particular the scholarship of Jack M. Sosin and Thomas Perkins Abernethy. The writings of Merle Curti, Richard C. Wade, Don Harrison Doyle, and Robert Dykstra concerning later American frontier societies have also helped me in the formulation of questions to ask in my research. My scholarly debt

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is large, and these are but a portion of the large pool of authors who have aided me.

All quotations have been left essentially as they appear in the original sources. Except for an occasional bracketed insertion for the sake of clarity, spelling, grammar, and punctuation in quotations have been left alone. Superscript letters have been lowered to the line. I have consistently transcribed the thorn (as in "ye") as "th," and the ampersand (&) as "and," even in cases in which my source is a printed volume whose editor favored the alternate form. Quotations from manuscripts owned by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania and by the College of William and Mary are used by permission.

The expenses of research and photocopying were defrayed in part by a dissertation support grant from the Horace H. Rackham Graduate School of the University of Michigan. I am also grateful for a John D. Pierce fellowship from the Department of History.

My research took me to several institutions. The only fair way to acknowledge all the helpful and courteous treatment I received is to thank collectively the staffs of the following institutions: the Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh; the Pennsylvania Division of the Carnegie Library of

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Pittsburgh; the Darlington Memorial Library, University of Pittsburgh Libraries (Special Collections); the Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh; the Manuscripts Department of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; the Division of Archieves and Manuscripts,Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg; the Virginia Historical Society, Richmond; the Archives Division of the Virginia State Library, Richmond; the Manuscripts and Rare Books Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, the College of William and Mary in Virginia, Williamsburg; the Historical Collection of the Library of Washington and Jefferson College, Washington, Pennsylvania; Westmoreland County Historical Society, Greensburg, Pennsylvania; Westmoreland County Clerk of Courts Office, Prothonotary's Office, Recorder of Deeds Office, and Register of Wills Office, Greensburg, Pennsylvania; Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.; the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; and the Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library, University of Michigan, particularly the Department of Rare Books and Special Collections and the Map Room. I would also like to thank Harriet McLoone, Assistant Curator of Americana Manuscripts at the Huntington

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Library, San Marino, California, for efficiently responding to my mail inquiry concerning some maps in her library's collection. Mr. Edward G. Williams of Pittsburgh was kind enough to give me the benefit of his experience in, and great enthusiasm for, the study of western Pennsylvania's eighteenth-century history.

I owe a large academic debt to Professor John Shy, who suggested the topic and oversaw the project from the beginning. An excellent mentor, he was always supportive of my efforts while quietly challenging me to do the best I was able. Professors Shaw Livermore, Jr., and Kenneth Lockridge helped me immensely with their insights, as anyone who has worked with them will readily understand. Without Professor George Kish I would have had very little understanding of either the technical or the intellectual aspects of cartography, surveying, boundaries and geography within a historical context. Thanks also to members of John Shy's weekly informal discussion group in eighteenth-century studies, who read and commented on portions of the draft. Listing their names might overtax the reader's patience, but I cannot let the occasion pass without also thanking, collectively, all my undergraduate and master's level teachers at Utah State University and the College of William and Mary.

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I would be most remiss not to thank Esther H. McClure, Gladys T. August, and Robert B. August for their interest and unflinching parental support through the course of my doctoral education. As those who know her will understand, the deepest debt of all I owe to Betsy August McClure. She typed the working draft, rendered diligent and able service as a proof-reader, gave cogent advice regarding style and usage, and has been, most of all, very patient. Without her this work would not have been finished in any timely fashion, or perhaps at all.

I of course must take the burden of the remaining flaws in this work onto myself alone.

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PART I:

RATS AND ENGLISH FLIES

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CHAPTER 1

A PLACE OF "GREAT IMPORTANCE"

When viewed on a map the spot can be compelling: the confluence of the Allegheny River winding from the north and the Monongahela from the south to create the Ohio, water highway to the west; the natural convergence of the resources and transport routes necessary for an industrial center. Yet the establishment of a British strategic center at the Ohio forks in the mid-eighteenth century was not inevitable, nor was the place's development inexorable. British-American activity in the region was the product of the perceptions, goals, and decisions of various private interests and government officials, and was shaped by circumstances of geography and technology, the accident of events, and the presence in and near the region of powerful Indian nations with their own patterns of political interaction and expectations for the area. It was the people with the desire and power to effect change in the region who, in their interpretations of the area and of their own roles within it, assigned importance to the forks of the Ohio. Only at great effort was the military outpost at Pittsburgh maintained, and the situations and perceptions that had brought its establishment changed with time. By

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the early 1770s the British government decided that the cost of the place far exceeded its worth in terms of the government's goals, and left Pittsburgh to others. By that time the degree of British-American activity in the region was considerably greater than it had been two decades earlier.

Sometime prior to the mid-1750s, a Pennsylvania trader observed the killing of a rat at a Delaware Indian town on the Allegheny River. The trader, no doubt familiar with rats and glad to be rid of them, was intrigued by the reaction of the "antiants" of the town, who "seem'd Concearned and told him that the French or English should get that Land from them, the same prediction being made by their Grandfathers' on finding a Rat on Delaware before the White People came there."[1] To the Native Americans of the upper Ohio Valley, the presence of rats and an increasing number of bees -- "English flies," they called them -- were signals of ecological changes associated with white settlement.[2] No fates were sealed when the rodent was discovered on the Allegheny, but the Delaware had seen the Europeans come before at other places. To them the rat served notice that European culture was beginning to impinge upon the region to a significantly greater degree than it had ever done before.

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The Indians visited by the trader along the Allegheny had not lived there overly long. Decades earlier the aboriginal occupants of the upper Ohio River had been killed, dispersed, or absorbed by aggressive Iroquois from the northeast, who based eighteenth-century claims to suzerainty over the region on these victories. By the second quarter of the eighteenth century, groups of Shawnee, who were probably among the nations expelled earlier by the Iroquois, entered the Ohio Valley from the east, as did numbers of Delaware-speakers coming in a series of moves away from Atlantic coast homelands as white settlement pressed upon them. Members of these Algonquian groups continued to migrate into the Ohio forks region from the east, especially from the upper branches of the Susquehanna, for several decades. During the same period independent bands of Iroquoian people filtered into the Ohio River watershed from the Six Nations' territory in New York. Those Iroquois who settled in the region were often, but not always, called Mingoes to distinguish them from the "League" Iroquois to the north.[3]

These residents of the upper Ohio Valley were mobile but not nomadic. As hunters and warriors they ranged widely, often for fairly extended periods. Yet another major economic activity, the cultivation of corn and various garden crops, required a villager's sedentary lifestyle.[4] From at least the 1720s through the 1740s, as Iroquoian, Delaware, and Shawnee settlers migrated into

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the region they built towns and villages of various sizes throughout the area, along the Allegheny and its tributaries, down the Ohio as far as the Scioto River, and along that river and the Muskingum in what is now Ohio. Among the better known of these for the pre-1750 period were towns along the Allegheny, its Kiskiminetas-Conemaugh tributary system, and the upper reaches of the Ohio River proper, for they comprised the area known generally as "Allegheny" to far-ranging English traders who entered the vicinity as early as their Indian peltry sources did.[5] In the immediate vicinity of the forks of the Ohio was Shannopin's Town, some two or three miles above the mouth of the Allegheny at a spot where that river could be forded. It contained about twenty Delaware families in the early 1750s and at times served as a residence of Tanacharison and Scarouady, envoys sent by the Iroquois council at Onondaga to oversee the Ohio Valley nations, over whom the Six Nations claimed authority. On the north side of the Ohio several miles below the forks was Logstown; below it at the mouth of the Beaver River was a significant Delaware and Shawnee town. Also along this portion of the upper Ohio were one or more villages of Iroquois-speakers or "Mingo," towns which seem to have changed position occasionally.[6]

Residents of these villages often were bound by social and kinship ties, and the towns were centers for community rituals punctuating the seasonal cycles of hunting and planting. Some towns were accorded more importance

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than others, usually as council seats or "national" foci. Examples were the residences of the chiefs of the three phratries of the Unami-speaking Delaware or the Shawnee center at the so-called Lower Shawnee Town at the mouth of the Scioto, a community of perhaps over a thousand residents in 1751. These political centers could move if a chief altered his place of residence, and although they were important as meeting places of councils, other towns and villages, which might be as small as a few families each, were relatively autonomous. The members of one nation often predominated in a town, but Shawnee, Unami-speaking Delaware, Munsee-speaking Delaware, and Mingo could be found mingled in various proportions in some towns.[7]

The region occupied by these nations was an extensive plateau lying west of the Appalachian Mountains, separated from the Great Valley by over eighty miles of parallel ridges and valleys. Before the 1750s knowledge of the area's configuration was almost nonexistent in Britain's seaboard colonies. The plateau of the upper Ohio basin was a tumbled upland, a confused terrain of twisting creeks and wooded hils. Major rivers such as the Monongahela, the Youghiogheny, the Allegheny, the Ohio, and the Beaver were the most prominent features of the region. During the second quarter of the eighteenth century cartographers understood that a major stream ran west from the

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lands beyond the mountains, but they knew almost nothing else about it. Only in the 1750s did mapmakers begin to comprehend the configuration of the Ohio and its tributaries in relation to one another, the mountains, and the Great Lakes.[8]

Even so, other information about the topography of the area was not to be found on maps; for that knowledge one had to rely on traders or hunters who had traveled beyond the mountains. As often as not their information was unreliable or only partially useful, especially since their working knowledge of routes and terrain might not contain information needed by others. "I am not at all surprized that we are ignorant of the Situation of this Country in England," wrote an army officer in 1755, "when no one except a few Hunters knows it on the Spot; and their Knowledge extends no further than in following their Game. It is certain that the ground is not easy to be reconoitered for one may go twenty Miles without seeing before him ten yards."[9]

Before mid-century the only whites to visit the upper Ohio Valley were the traders who sold European goods to the Indians in exchange for deer hides and other pelts. Both French and British traders moved among the Ohio Valley towns in the thirty years preceding the Seven Years War. By the late 1740s numerous traders from the English colonies operated throughout the region south of Lake Erie, and several built trading houses to shelter their wares.

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Trading activity was highly decentralized and dispersed, and white traders traveled to a number of Indian villages to buy skins. By the early 1750s, however, commercial competition between the British and the French gave an enhanced importance to certain Indian towns. Two sites in particular attracted French notice as centers of an English trade influence that threatened to encroach on what the French considered to be their sphere, and each of these towns became the target of an aggressive French strategy intended to curtail that influence. The first of these sites was Pickawillany, located in what is now western Ohio. It was the headquarters of an anti-French faction of Twightwee (Miami) Indians and in the late 1740s was a center for English trade and gift distribution. To prevent the decay of their alliances with other branches of the Twightwee and with other western nations, the French took direct military action against Pickawillany in summer 1752, when a French-directed force of Chippewa and Ottawa warriors raided the town, killed the rebellious Twightwee leader, and abducted several English traders based there.[10]

Closer to the Ohio forks was Logstown, a town of Shawnee, Delaware, and Iroquoian people frequented by "a parcel of reprobate Indian traders."[11] Beginning in 1748 the town, located on the north side of the Ohio River near the present town of Ambridge, served as the site of conferences between the Indian nations and representatives of interests in Pennsylvania and Virginia, and it became an

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important council center for English trade alliances with the area's residents.[12]

The British participants in the Logstown meetings after 1748 intended to engineer and maintain trade alliances through the giving of presents and an exchange of assurances, but the Virginians involved in the conferences had other motives as well. In the 1740s the Virginia government began approving claims to large tracts of land, some of them hundreds of thousands of acres, in the watersheds of the Ohio River and other tributaries of the Mississippi. One group of patentees, the Ohio Company, sought in the early 1750s to develop a grant that potentially could include as much as half a million acres along the Monongahela and upper Ohio. The leadership of the Ohio Company and the executive side of Virginia's government were closely tied during these years -- Governor Robert Dinwiddie became a company member in 1750, and for two or three years before that Thomas Lee was a prime mover in the company, a member of the provincial council, and the interim executive of Virginia before Dinwiddie took office. Most of the two dozen Virginians who comprised the majority of the company's members were also members of the House of Burgesses. At conferences at Logstown and at Winchester, Virginia, in 1752 and 1753 the company and province sought, and to their own satisfaction gained, confirmation of the Treaty of Lancaster of 1744, which granted Virginia a right to those western lands within its bounds claimed by the

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Iroquois through their seventeenth-century victories.[13]

The company's scheme included plans for trade with the Indians, but the heart of the enterprise was the establishment of "a very strong Settlement." A "fort," varyingly interpreted as everything from a fortified trading house to "a regular Fort and Garrison for the protection of the Countrey," was to be part of the project.[14] By the summer of 1753 the Ohio Company had developed a plan to encourage German Protestants to settle its lands, and drew up specifications for a town of 200 acres and an adjacent fort to serve as the focus of the settlement. The site chosen for the projected town of "Saltsburg" was near the mouth of Chartiers Creek, on the south side of the Ohio some three miles below the junction of the Allegheny and the Monongahela rivers. A trading house was there in early 1754. Information about the spot probably came from the company's agents in the west, Christopher Gist, Thomas Cresap, and William Trent, who had supervised company trade activities, explored the area on its behalf, and represented it at the Logstown conferences. The site's greatest virtue was its defensibility. The company's plans specified the high ground just downriver from the mouth of Chartiers Creek, a commanding eminence, as the location of the fort and town. Also, the Chartiers Creek site was reasonably close to, but did not command, the mouth of the Monongahela River, which with its tributaries lay along the company's approach route to the Ohio country from western

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Maryland and the upper Potomac. It is not certain how much this fact weighed in the company's assessments. In addition, the company proposed to build a second fort down the Ohio at the mouth of the Kanawha.[15]

The Iroquois of New York, cherishing their role as nominal overlords of the Ohio Valley and as holders of the balance between French and British power, would have preferred a strict neutrality in which aggressive inroads into the region by either European nation would be unwelcome. More content with trade alliances formed at Logstown than with control by the Onondaga council of the Six Nations, many Indians of the upper Ohio watershed -- including Wyandot from the northwest -- were not averse to the construction of fortified trading houses in their country if it would bolster their trade ties with the British and help fend off the increasingly irate and aggressive French, who also valued the trade of the area and were frustrated by British success. Permanent settlement was another matter, however, and was viewed with apprehension by local Indians. Ohio Company scouts learned to use their compasses in secret when inspecting lands in the Ohio forks vicinity.[16]

Equally apprehensive of the Ohio Company-Virginia plans for settlement was the proprietary government of Pennsylvania, which between 1750 and 1754 sent cartographers and traders west under secret pretense to gather information about the land itself, the extent of various provincial boundaries, the activities of the Ohio Company, the

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disposition of the Indians, particulars about the region's trade, and, since the true whereabouts of the western limits of Pennsylvania were unknown, the distance that Shannopin's Town, a site at the Ohio forks known to traders, lay west of Philadelphia. Proprietor Thomas Penn, responding to interests who sought to ensure the province's trade position, also offered to contribute proprietary funds to the construction of a fortified storehouse. Pennsylvania's assembly refused to accept the notion of a fort, favoring instead expenditures for presents to ensure Indian friendship. Even after the construction of French posts on the upper Allegheny the assembly maintained that the territory at issue did not fall within the bounds of the province.[17]

By 1754 the Ohio Company's efforts to begin a fort on the Ohio had received imperial sanction as a defensive measure to block France's aggression in the Ohio Valley, which had reached the point of frequent seizures of British traders' employees and goods in the Indian country and the initiation of a string of forts intended to run from Lake Erie down the Allegheny and Ohio rivers. Yet to French planners these measures were defensive moves, designed to protect French commercial influence against British encroachments. In the early 1750s strategists from each nation interpreted the other to be on the verge of constructing forts as a means of wielding power in the Ohio country. Officials in Canada feared possible British

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settlement of the western territories, but the immediate problem concerned the Indian occupants of the area. English trade and presents already had challenged France's ability to exert influence in the area, and British forts would only compound the problem. The French task was to supplant the Anglo-American commercial influence but avoid war with the Indian residents of the country.[18]

From the French decision makers' point of view there was too much British activity in the lower Allegheny-upper Ohio region by the early 1750s. There had long been English traders coming and going there, especially from Pennsylvania, but now Logstown was the diplomatic center of alliances stretching far beyond the Ohio forks area and the vicinity was a likely place of entry for further British-American involvement in the transmontane regions. In planning their line of forts the strategists in Canada, men such as Intendant François Bigot and the Marquis Duquesne, the Governor-General, contemplated both Logstown, which they called Chinenqué, and the high ground at Chartiers Creek -- the spot chosen by the Ohio Company -- as possible sites for a post in the neighborhood of the Ohio River forks. Influence with the Indians won out over any other considerations, and by spring 1753 Logstown, the Anglo-Indian diplomatic seat, was the projected site of Fort Duquesne. The decision proved temporary. An advance party of French soldiers at Logstown in January 1754 confirmed the rumor that the place was almost deforested and

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could not provide enough wood to construct a fort. In addition, Duquesne, whose own knowledge of the region was as fuzzy as that of his English counterparts, learned that a major river entering the Ohio from the south some six leagues above Logstown -- the Monongahela -- seemed to be a primary English commercial route into the region. If this information proved correct the main body of French troops was to place its fort not at Logstown but at the mouth of the Monongahela "to bar the way and block their trade."[19] Duquesne hoped that once the post was established the Indians would relocate there, so that the advantage of the Logstown site would not be lost. Then the fort could both obstruct English infiltration into the area and serve as a center of influence among the Indians by showing the flag, facilitating trade, and acting as a council and gift distribution center.

Robert Dinwiddie, lieutenant governor of Virginia and member of the Ohio Company, was concerting moves on the British side. By early 1753 he was aware that Logstown was an objective of French strategy, and he used the threat of an enemy fort "so nigh us" to raise support for colonial action on the Ohio. British officials, not unlike their French counterparts, were worried about protecting the commerce of their own nationals in the Ohio Valley and maintaining good relations with the Indians. They also wanted to be as economical as possible. They gave Dinwiddie their blessing, pledged some aid for the proposed

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Ohio Company-Virginia fort, and hoped that the American colonies would bear much of the burden.[20] The garnering of support was "a very up-hill Work," Dinwiddie learned. Many people were "indifferent in settling the Lands on the Ohio," he claimed, yet he found his counterpart in Pennsylvania, James Hamilton, to be far less than indifferent to Virginia's desire to settle the west. Hamilton knew better than to relinquish any possible claim of his proprietors to the transmontane region, at least until proper boundaries were surveyed. When Dinwiddie offered lands in the area to anyone enlisting to serve at the intended fort on the Ohio, Hamilton demanded assurances that such a grant would not preclude any future Penn family claim to quit-rents should the territory prove to be within Pennsylvania's limits.[21]

As Hamilton was no doubt well aware, Dinwiddie had a keen understanding of the tools available to him, as governor of the crown's province of Virginia, to assert the colony's and the Ohio Company's claims to the region. Cloaked in royal authority and armed with Virginia's sea-to-sea charter, he spurned any aspirations of the proprietary colonies to land on the Ohio. He expected the Ohio region to fall within the limits of his colony as soon as the boundary could be determined and anticipated appointing civil magistrates there. "The Plan of my Operation," he sniffed to Hamilton, "is agreeable to his Majestie's Commands to take Possession of the Lands on the Ohio in his

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Name."[22] He promised to grant some 200,000 acres there to entice enlistment in the project and strengthen Virginia's foothold in the west. To William Trent, the company's agent, he issued a militia commission that made Trent's actions on the Ohio those of a provincial officer and authorized him to raise 100 men who would then be subject to pay by the province. Trent's party was "to protect and assist" the Ohio Company's people building a fort on the Ohio, but Trent's party was the company party.[23] The governor claimed that the unfinished structure surrendered to the French in April 1754 was a fort under construction in the king's name; in later claims the Ohio Company declared that it was strictly a company venture. There was an element of truth in each version, but on its own neither was strictly correct, for Dinwiddie had consciously intertwined royal, provincial, and company claims to legitimacy in his attempt to exercise Virginia authority in the Ohio country while saving it from the French.[24]

The incomplete little fortified compound surrendered to the overwhelming French force in April 1754 was not on the Ohio Company's original Chartiers Creek site, but on the point of land where the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers met. The Virginians' assessment of the situation had changed. During 1753 Trent scouted the vicinity for the company and stated his belief that the French intended "to proceed down the Ohio, to build a Fort in the Fork, made by that River and the Monongahela." Then George

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Washington, a young militia officer sent by Dinwiddie to warn away the French moving south of Lake Erie, viewed the point at the forks with Christopher Gist, also of the Ohio Company. Washington pronounced the point superior to the Chartiers Creek site. It guarded the Monongahela, a likely transport route, was flat and well-timbered, and would be a less troublesome construction site than the high ground downriver, he reported.[25] The change was amenable to the leaders of company and province. In geographical terms the problem was merely academic to Governor Dinwiddie and most of his contemporaries. During the first three months of 1754 Dinwiddie referred to the intended location of the fort as "the Ohio," "Monongahela," "Forks of Monongahela," "the Fork of Ohio," and "Allegany."[26]

Dinwiddie had dreams of additional forts on the Ohio, but when a large French force hastened to the Ohio forks in spring 1754 they found only a group of Virginians building a modest stockaded warehouse. Seeing that the British indeed planned to use the Monongahela as an approach route to the Ohio, the French officers obeyed their instructions and laid out their fort on the site vacated by the Virginians. The provincial support column rushing forward under George Washington was unable to dislodge them, and the French remained in occupation of the Ohio forks.[27]

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In terms of European power Fort Duquesne gave a single focus to the upper Ohio Valley. The physical existence of a European fort there overwhelmed all previous considerations of site and gave strategic value to the spot where the rivers converged. French military superiority at the forks also changed Indian politics in the region. The official Iroquois policy of neutrality in the valley was now a dead letter. Scarouady and Tanacharison, the Iroquois chiefs in the area, reduced Logstown, the hub of Anglo-Indian diplomacy on the Ohio, to ashes and withdrew to the east with their pro-British retinue of Indians. Most Shawnee, Delaware, and "Mingo" Iroquois, more flexible in their attachments, unresponsive to the presumed diplomatic leadership of the League of Six Nations, and unimpressed by British attempts to exert power, stayed put. Some remained passive during the ensuing war but numbers became French allies and raided the English colonies, especially after the debacle of Braddock's defeat in 1755.

The French helped build new houses at Logstown for their allies, and more at the mouth of the Beaver River downstream. Other Shawnee, Delaware, and Mingo lived up the Beaver at the Kuskuskies villages, westward through the Ohio country, and up the Allegheny where Delaware from the east came to join their fellows. Adjoining Fort Duquesne itself at the Ohio forks were the huts and cabins of a varying number of Indians. Never able to control these

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independent allies to the degree they wished, the French nonetheless used Fort Duquesne and smaller posts to the north as contact points where native raiders could gather, confer with French officers and one another, ask for gifts or provisions, and perhaps plant corn to be tended by women during the warriors' absence.[28]

The site between the Monongahela and the Allegheny was in several respects a poor spot for a fort. Without the protection of a substantial mobile force, which of necessity must consist largely of Indians, Fort Duquesne and the forks of the Ohio could not be defended. Squatting on the low ground at the junction of the rivers, the fort's sod and log works could be commanded by artillery placed on hills in back of the point or on the massive ridge running along the south bank of the Monongahela River. Governor Duquesne in Montreal insisted that the fort and site were both adequate to do all that French posts were supposed to do: the fort guarded the Monongahela route, acted as a trading center, was a staging area and intelligence gathering point for the military, and could be defended against attackers with small arms. Confident that distance and terrain would shield the fort, he stubbornly insisted that England and the colonies could never accomplish the logistical feat of hauling a siege train with artillery over the mountains and through the forest to attack it.[29] The logistical problems and military failure of Braddock's expedition in 1755 momentarily confirmed the governor's

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opinion, but Vaudreuil, his successor, realized what a near miss the attempted British invasion had been. New works were added to increase the number of men the fort could hold, but it was understood nevertheless that the only defense against an English army with artillery was to strike them in the woods before they could emplace their guns. Vaudreuil hoped also that the assaults of the Indians against the English settlements could keep the colonies on the defensive and check the formation of any offensive strike into the interior.[30]

The spot had other disadvantages as well. One problem with the site, one that the French may have anticipated but which troubled them nevertheless, was flooding. After the earth and timber structure sustained a "freshet" in the spring of 1756, General Montcalm dourly proclaimed the fort "not worth a straw."[31] In many respects, however, the most excruciating problem in maintaining the fort was that of food. Fields were cleared as soon as the fort was built, yet in the summer of 1755 Duquesne predicted that it would take another two years for the crops of corn and peas and the produce of a small herd of cows and pigs to be sufficient to sustain the post. In feeding the mouths at Fort Duquesne the French learned just how isolated the place was. The route from Niagara through Presque Isle and down the Allegheny was tormented by portages and low water that made the transport of large supplies of provisions a battle. At times all available surplus was squeezed from

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the posts at Detroit and the Illinois country, both blessed with settlements of farmers, in order to supply Fort Duquesne. From the Illinois outpost the food had to be batteaued up almost the entire length of the Ohio River.[32]

The failure of the colonies to defend the Ohio country on their own prompted the British government to send the expeditionary force under General Edward Braddock in 1755. Braddock was to expel the French from the Ohio, then "a good Fort should be erected on the most convenient Pass upon that River" to prevent any further encroachments by the French. Its military failure aside, Braddock's attempt showed how expensive and difficult the capture of Fort Duquesne would be in terms of wagons, food, horses, roads, and equipment.[33] For over two years after Braddock's defeat the colonies, left to their own devices, withdrew into a defensive posture as Indians from the Ohio Valley raided settlements well east of the Appalachian Mountains. Virginia forces tried, but failed, to mount an assault against the Shawnee. The only offensive strike made into the transmontane area was a blow against Kittanning, a Delaware town up the Allegheny from Fort Duquesne that served as a base of operations of two noted war leaders, Shingas and Captain Jacobs. Pennsylvania's governor, Robert Hunter Morris, was able to set this campaign on foot despite his conflict with the province's assembly over matters of money and authority.[34]

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In 1755 there was no consensus in Great Britain or America that the fork of the Ohio was the key to empire. There were published tracts advocating the view that the Ohio Valley held great merit for its own sake as a source of wealth and a place for settlement, but many in the royal government continued to view the dispute with France as one over commercial spheres and the wealth to be drawn from the Indian trade only. Questions of strategy arose also: even before Braddock's defeat some planners felt that campaigns against Fort Duquesne were too arduous and costly when the seizure of Niagara could accomplish the same result from another direction.[35] Yet, others saw Fort Duquesne as the best spot from which to unravel the French line of communication between Canada and New Orleans, arguing that its capture by British forces would precipitate the abandonment of smaller posts and open the way for a back-door campaign on Niagara.[36] The earl of Loudoun, commander of Britain's North American forces, decided by 1757 that Fort Duquesne would be one of the objectives of his long term strategy. By the campaigning season of 1758 William Pitt personally directed war strategy, and under his direction the empire made the investment of labor, men, supplies, and money necessary to carry General John Forbes and his army through the mountains to force the French abandonment of the Ohio forks. It was a victory of sustained logistical effort, in which roads were cut over imposing mountain ridges and tons of supplies consumed, and of diplomacy, for the Ohio Valley

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Indians were courted during the summer and fall with English assurances of friendship. At the Treaty of Easton in October the colony of Pennsylvania even renounced its claims to settlement from the mountains to the western end of the province. These peace overtures, combined with the Indians' growing weariness of fighting France's war for it, stripped the French of their Native American allies.[37]

The campaign had cost, according to one British officer, "half a million." It was as though the value of the site was enhanced by the investment of what had been required to win it. At a council of war in November 1758, one argument in favor of pressing the conquest of Fort Duquesne before winter was to justify the monetary expense of the campaign "and the hopes of our colonies who, ignorant of the difficulties the enterprise involves, regard the Fort as a very easy objective for the body of troops undertaking this expedition."[38] As the French destroyed Fort Duquesne and evacuated at the approach of the British forces, they promised the Indians that they would return in the spring to oust the English and build a new fort, not of mere dirt and logs, but of stone. Once in possession of the spot Forbes, uncertain of provincial support, knew only that he could sustain but a fraction of his army at the forks for the winter, and he returned east with the bulk of his troops in late 1758. Instructions from William Pitt, for whom the spot had been renamed with the change of possession, arrived in the spring of 1759. The army was to

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repair the French fort if possible (it was not), or build a new post "of Sufficient Strength, and every Way adequate to the great Importance" of its purpose: to ensure "the undisputed Possession" of the region, to block French aggression, to cut the enemy's ties with the western and southern Indians, and to serve as a center for alliances with the area's Indian residents.[39]

At that time, to the leadership of the royal government and army, "of sufficient strength" meant a fortress of no modest scale. From its limited support of Virginia's measures of 1753-1754, Great Britain moved into a major war with France in which North America played a key role, and the outcome of which, in 1759, was not certain. During that year commanders spoke in terms of 1000 to 1500 men as a garrison for Fort Pitt. In the summer of 1760, during the construction of a permanent fort to replace the temporary one of 1758-1759, over 2700 soldiers, officers, and engineers from royal, Pennsylvania, and Virginia units were present at the site.[40] The fortress itself was a tremendous earthen structure enclosing over eighteen acres in its outworks. The bastioned main fort held barracks buildings, officers' quarters, storehouses, magazines, and a two acre parade ground. A sod fort with brick facings on the two landward of its five sides, its construction required months of toil by hundreds of men and horses.[41]

General John Stanwix was present during the early stages of construction, which began in September 1759.

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Before seeing the site, he informed William Pitt of reports that "the Spott on which Fort Duquesne stood, is inconvenient on many Accounts, but it is proposed to Build in The Forks on Higher Ground, but near it." Officers inspecting the vicinity were quick to point out the advantages of the high ground at the mouth of Chartiers Creek, the spot favored originally by the Ohio Company for its town and fort. In his final decision, however, Stanwix chose the point between the Allegheny and the Monongahela where the French fort had stood, doing so apparently for the same reasons that had led George Washington and the French army to approve the location.[42] In choosing the site Stanwix and his subordinate officers must have felt that they could cope with the problems faced there by the French -- the nearby hills commanding the spot, floods, and the difficulties of transport and supply -- for they were aware, by report or their own observations, of all these disadvantages.[43]

In the ensuing years the fort became a source of frustration for many commanders and engineers, who often became critics of its design or location. Essentially completed by fall 1761, it was almost constantly in need of repair thereafter. Flood damage in 1762 would have required £7000 (sterling) to repair thoroughly, and only through emergency measures was the fort made fit to withstand the Indian attack of Pontiac's War in 1763.[44] Several freestanding redoubts were added to the complex in

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late 1763 and 1764, and from that time until the evacuation of the post in 1772, every year saw some form of significant repair either carried out or postponed. General Thomas Gage, who as commander-in-chief for North America had to answer for such expenditures, lamented that "one officer makes additions which the next pulls down, and there is no End to the different opinions of Officers who relieve each other in the Command of the Forts."[45]

Critical officers often wished that the fort could be replaced by simple blockhouses or relocated on higher ground. Engineer William Eyre, frustrated by Fort Pitt's vulnerability to floods, dubbed it "that unlucky Fort" in 1764 and wrote, "What a most unhappy and expensive Undertaking the attacking that Part of this Country has been to the Crown." In 1767 another officer declared that portions of "this Untenable Fort" provided "Only A Shadow of Defence."[46] Yet with the end of the Seven Years War and the French cession of North America, the fort was no longer intended or garrisoned as a fortress to confront a European enemy. Its function during the second half of the 1760s was that of a trading center and regulatory post, intelligence outpost, Indian conference center, and way station on the route to the Illinois country. In case of war it needed only to provide defense against Indian attackers with small arms and to serve as a depot for offensive operations. General Gage, pressed to exercise economy, believed that the army must make do with what it had, since

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if necessary the fort could be made defensible against Indians. He realized, however, that the monstrous structure was too big to defend with anything but a substantial garrison, and was still subject to floods and weathering. He too became something of a critic who longed for more compact, durable, and economical masonry forts to replace the sprawling log and dirt works of the French war.[47]

For three years after Forbes' capture of the point it was unmolested by damaging flood waters, but in January 1762 heavy precipitation and a sudden thaw set both rivers to rising at about a foot an hour for roughly thirty-six hours. The garrison boated what effects they could to higher ground. At the flood's peak the Allegheny and Monongahela were joined upriver from Fort Pitt, their waters as high as some of its earthen ramparts, and storage magazines under the walls brimmed with water. The two bricked curtain walls withstood the force of the water, but stockade pickets were washed away, sod work disintegrated, and a large barracks and several traders' buildings were swept downstream in pieces.[48] The scene repeated itself in March 1763, when the waters rose two feet higher than they had in 1762. This time the damages were "only trifles" in the opinion of the post commander, but losses included smiths' forges and tools at the fort, "several worthless houses" nearby, a portion of sod along the walls, considerable garden fencing, and the lives of two people who drowned in creeks a few miles away.[49] Two major floods so

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close together jarred commanders responsible for the post. "Floods Seem to become annual at Fort Pitt," a troubled Colonel Bouquet wrote General Amherst. The 1762 flood was enough to prompt Amherst to observe that "it is an Alarming thought that So Much Money has been Expended on a Work, Which now promises to be So Subjected to Ruin." The high water of 1763 confirmed his opinion, but authorities in England would have to decide if expensive changes in "the Design" of the fortress were warranted.[50] Although bruised again by moderately high waters in later years, Fort Pitt remained where it was. Commandants learned to take precautions to keep provisions and powder dry, just as engineers assigned to repair the post coped as economically as possible with its constant demands for maintenance.[51]

A great deal of such tolerance was required to maintain the post. For example, the transport of bulky equipment and supplies to and from it was a burden that escalated the cost of keeping the fort. In 1759 the transport alone of precious salt from Carlisle to Pittsburgh cost £3 per bushel; the wholesale price of salt in Philadelphia at the time was two to three shillings a bushel. Transport costs of articles hauled from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh during the early 1760s ran from £2 15s. to £3 per hundredweight, while all but four pence of the 1s. 1 1/4d. needed to buy a pound of pork at the outpost was for carriage costs.[52] There were two principal land routes to

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

Map 1. British Entry into the Ohio Valley

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Pittsburgh, one run by General Braddock from Fort Cumberland on the Potomac to the Youghiogheny River, thence to the Ohio forks area, the other cut by Forbes' army west from Raystown, Pennsylvania. The Virginians, particularly Colonel George Washington, protested loudly and incessantly against Forbes' route selection, and as everyone knew, the dispute involved politics as much as logistics. It was a question of which province would have the most advantageous route to the Ohio country. After observing and listening to officers from Virginia and Pennsylvania throughout the campaign, Forbes was convinced that "both are aiming at engrossing the commerce and Barter with the Indians, and of settling and appropriating the immense tract of fine country to be under the direction of their own province by fixing of the roads and the prices of the goods they exchange against the furrs."[53]

In 1760 Colonel Henry Bouquet decided that the astute course for the army, should it really wish to reduce costs and draw provincial support for road upkeep, would be to build a compromise route leading from York, Pennsylvania, to Fort Pitt by way of Frederick, Maryland, and Fort Cumberland. Bouquet's superiors did not embrace the idea. Instead they maintained Forbes' road as "the communication," the official umbilical tying Pittsburgh to army commanders in New York and Philadelphia and to the towns and farms of southeastern Pennsylvania. Most of the road west of the Shippensburg-Carlisle neighborhood was

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uninhabited through the mid-1760s, and the route -- "that difficult and long communication" -- was kept up only through the maintenance of posts at Littleton, Bedford, and Ligonier.[54] By the later 1760s and early 1770s there were small communities at these places as well as private houses offering services to travelers on both of the major roads to Pittsburgh, "but the entertainment is a little rough."[55] The military could not ignore the southern route, for during 1759 and the early 1760s supplies from western Maryland and Virginia were crucial to the support of Fort Pitt. Near the mouth of Redstone Creek on the Monongahela River the army saw to the construction, by Virginia troops, of a little fort where provisions from the southeast could be transferred to boats to save some forty expensive miles of land carriage to Pittsburgh.[56]

Problems of topography and weather remained along both routes. Rain or snow quickly made the steep Pennsylvania road impassable to loaded wagons, requiring frequent resort to packhorses, and supplies not at Pittsburgh by late fall would have to wait until spring for transport over the mountains. Braddock's road was only slightly better, especially in the early years. Both routes required periodic maintenance and repair. Even in the late 1780s stretches of Forbes' road could be nearly impassable at times, even on horseback without wagons.[57]

Once in the Ohio watershed one could use rivers to aid in the transport of heavy supplies, but the tributaries

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

Map 2.

The Upper Ohio Valley

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of the upper Ohio were never fully cooperative. Loaded batteaux could pass between Fort Pitt and the Redstone post with some regularity, but the upper reaches of the Monongahela, Redstone Creek, and much of the Youghiogheny, while passable in canoes, could not be used to transport goods in larger craft.[58] To the north, a communication with Niagara by way of the Allegheny and Lake Erie was secured by the establishment of outposts at Venango, Le Boeuf, and Presque Isle, but the Allegheny River and French Creek were as arduous a means of travel for provisions and supplies as the tortuous and swampy land route.[59] The French supplied Fort Duquesne by provisions from Niagara, Detroit, and the Illinois country, but in British hands the roles of the posts changed. Fort Pitt served in its early years as a deposit point and transfer center from which provisions could be sent to Presque Isle, Le Boeuf, and Venango, overland or by Lake Erie to Detroit and Sandusky, and, beginning in 1765, down the Ohio to Fort Chartres and British troops in the Illinois country.[60] The Ohio could be a fickle partner in the latter enterprise. During periods of high water, as in the spring "freshes," the heaviest boats moved downriver without difficulty. In periods of low water, which were frequent and long in summer and fall, the upper Ohio could be difficult to navigate even in an empty batteau, and impassable in one laden with stores.[61] For the army, the provisions contractors, and the Illinois traders the task was the same: to have boats, batteaumen,

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high water, and Illinois-bound troops and goods all converging at Pittsburgh at precisely the same time. The failure of any element meant costly waste.

Boats sent to the Illinois country, especially by the army, almost never came back, for the Ohio's current and a portage at the falls of the Ohio, where Louisville is now located, conspired against it.[62] Batteaux, which were twenty-five or thirty feet long, were built by skilled boat carpenters, along with sawyers, nailers, and smiths, most of whom, along with oakum, pitch, nails, tools, and ironwork, came over the mountains from Philadelphia. The standard procedure was to construct a number of boats in a building campaign of several weeks; then the skilled workers were dismissed to return east and the batteaux, costing £50 to £55 (Pa.) each, made their way downriver, only a fraction of them ever to return for reuse.[63] More might have returned if the motivation of the men powering them had been great enough, as a detachment leaving Fort Chartres for good, loaded with military stores, demonstrated in 1772. In reference to those troops required to move up and down the Mississippi and the Ohio with heavy boats in low water, General Gage asserted that "the most severe European Service in time of War is not equal to these duties in times of peace in America." Lieutenant Samuel Steel, who during a spell of low water and cold weather had to issue 537 gallons of rum to his recruits, Indian escorts, and interpreters in order to get a

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detachment and its cargo of provisions downriver through the falls of Ohio, would have agreed most readily.[64]

The large garrisons initially stationed at Fort Pitt could not survive without the transport of food over these supply lines. The army planted a "King's Garden" adjoining the fort, and expected the problem of provisions transport to be eased by farmers allowed to settle along the two "communications" to grow food for animals and people alike.[65] There were also independent civilian settlers who brought foodstuffs to Pittsburgh. Still, supplies could run low. The entire year 1759 was difficult as the army struggled to build a provisions supply at the post in the face of consumption by the large numbers sent to begin the fortress. Supplies began to run out as the post anxiously awaited a convoy in the summer of 1764; in that instance "even the Commanding officer at this place was reduced to the necessity" of drinking whiskey, and in last resort, water, for several weeks.[66] The situation demonstrated the necessity of maintaining a well-stocked provisions magazine at Fort Pitt. Otherwise the isolated post, tied only by the thread of the "communication" to sources of support near the coast, was vulnerable to an Indian "infestation" such as that of 1763-1764. Once peace with the region's Indians was restored, however, and the problem of supplying Fort Chartres by way of the Ohio arose, General Gage felt more confident about maintaining the flow of supplies to Fort Pitt than between the forks

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of the Ohio and the Illinois. "As We can at all times Supply Fort Pitt," he assured one commandant, "You need not fear sending too much down the Ohio."[67]

In 1758 the royal government had no intention of shouldering the burden of Fort Pitt by itself. British commanders expected aid from the colonies, especially Virginia and Pennsylvania, in the "vigorous Measures" necessary to capitalize on the capture of the Ohio forks from the French. "We have acted our part, let you do yours," Colonel Bouquet wrote William Allen of Pennsylvania upon the capture of Fort Duquesne.[68] Yet it was impossible to sustain the desire of provincial assemblies to support troops. Forces from Pennsylvania and Virginia helped build and secure Fort Pitt, the roads to it, and the smaller posts along them, but interest in their support soon waned. At first it had seemed that a spirit of competition might fuel Pennsylvania and Virginia to supply men, money, and provisions for the support of Fort Pitt, but the chief product of this spirit was the Pennsylvania assembly's alarm when it heard an ultimately false rumor that Colonel William Byrd III of Virginia would receive command of all forces in the Pittsburgh region in 1759.[69] After that year the British command found it increasingly difficult to cajole assemblies into providing soldiers, despite the frequent support of colonial governors. The frustration of royal officers peaked during the 1763-1764 Indian war, when the Virginia and Maryland assemblies refused to allow their

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militias to act outside the limits of their respective colonies, and Pennsylvania, which had no militia, agreed reluctantly to pay some volunteers but would raise none itself. "I see that the whole Burthen of this War will rest upon you," Bouquet wrote General Amherst, "and while the few Regular Troops you have left can keep the Enemy at a distance, the Provinces will let them fight it out, without interfearing."[70] Bouquet predicted that when the crown learned of the lack of support for his 1764 campaign the colonial frontiers "will hereafter be lefft to fight their own Battles themselves," and, with time, that is indeed exactly what the royal government decided to do.[71]

By 1763 Amherst had begun seriously to consider closing the more minor posts in the interior and reducing the size of the garrison at Fort Pitt. After the fall of Canada in 1760 there was little need for a major British fortress the size of Fort Pitt on the Ohio River to thwart French armies, and while the British army was not sure of its long term role in the west, the fort could still have utility in the overseeing of British interests. With the onset of the Indian uprising of 1763, Amherst swore that every British post in the interior would remain, yet the factors that argued in favor of reducing the army's presence in the west before 1763 were still there after the Indian war. The logistical drain, above all else, was enormous: only at tremendous expense could the fort, so far from ports and agricultural settlements, be maintained,

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its garrison fed and clothed. Provincial aid in the form of troops could not be counted on, and was available only in times of crisis. The daily contingency expenses of Fort Pitt were solely the crown's to defray, and the post was certainly not self-sufficient. In the middle 1760s Pittsburgh was important as a staging area for the British entry into the Illinois country, and had functions associated with the supervision of Indian affairs, the regulation of trade, and the enforcement of royal policies in the west. But the expense of maintaining the post could only be justified so long as the crown believed that these functions, as carried out at the forts, were of sufficient importance to its presence in North America, and effective enough to justify the cost. In 1766 most of the posts along the Pennsylvania "communication" were closed, and Pittsburgh's garrison was pared to a modest force of Scottish Highlanders. General Gage and members of the government in England also began to discuss the possibility of evacuating all royal forts in the interior regions of the continent.[72]

Meanwhile the expenses continued. Over £1200 (sterling) was required just for firewood, candles, and barracks repairs at Fort Pitt and its dependent posts on the "communication" from November 1765 through December 1768. Issues of provisions to Indians, ever a problem, comprised "an enormous Account" at Pittsburgh, far higher than that at other posts.[73] Most important of all, during

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the latter half of the 1760s Fort Pitt's greatest value to the army was as a forward base in the supply of Fort Chartres, and that system was simply too expensive to bear. If supply convoys were not expense enough, on two occasions in 1772 it cost $200 or more merely to pay civilian and Indian expresses to carry dispatches to the Illinois.[74] "Independent of it's use for a Communication with that Country," Gage informed the government in 1768, "I should not hesitate a Moment to give my Opinion, that it ought to be abandoned." He explained: "Except Fort-Chartres, there are few Posts more costly, none more difficult, critical, or dangerous to Support in Case of a Quarrel with the Savages, or more likely to involve Great Britain in a War with them, on the Consideration of the Safety of it's Garrison."[75] By 1772 the decision had been made. The government no longer considered the Ohio forks to have the "great importance" assigned the spot by William Pitt, or at least saw better uses for its resources, and evacuated the post.[76]

Native American reactions to white activities in the west were often mixed. Trade with the Europeans, for example, had economic and material benefits and was generally viewed with favor. Permanent white intrusion into the region was another matter, however, as Indian leaders

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frequently told the British and white Americans. Because British-American presence was considered a mixed blessing, and because of the high value placed on autonomy of action within Indian societies, there was no single unified Native American response to the presence of whites at Fort Pitt and elsewhere west of the mountains.

The Indians' mobility and dispersal makes it difficult to know how numerous they were, but their population in the upper Ohio Valley of the 1760s was by no means insignificant. In 1771 the British officer in charge of Fort Pitt reported that "by every Acct. of Traders and Interpreters" there were at least 2000 Indian men of fighting age in the Ohio country between Pittsburgh and Lake Erie.[77] Figures reported from about the time of the construction of Fort Pitt through the 1770s give a range of 300 to 500 fighting men for the Shawnee and 600 to 750 warriors of the Delaware. Sometimes added to the figures for the latter nation were the smaller numbers of Mahicans and Munsee, closely related in both language and origins to the groups usually called Delaware, who moved westward from the upper branches of the Susquehanna before the American Revolution. When counted alone the Munsee, many of whom resided along the upper Allegheny and its tributaries by the 1760s, were thought to have about half the number of warriors given for the Shawnee. West and northwest of the Shawnee on the Scioto were the groups called "western" or "lakes" Indians -- Ottawa, Chippewa, Twightwee, and several other groups.

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The closest of these to the Ohio forks region were the Wyandot of Sandusky and elsewhere south of Lake Erie, whose population was slightly less than that of the Shawnee according to British figures.[78]

The Iroquoian residents of the Ohio Valley are the most difficult to enumerate, for they seem to have been included in counts of the Seneca and other Iroquois nations living east of Lake Erie, or not counted at all. Seneca groups did live on the far upper Allegheny, but there were also small Iroquoian groups scattered down as far as the upper portions of the Ohio River itself. There also were hundreds of Seneca, Oneida, Cayuga, and other Iroquoian warriors moving back and forth through the area as they passed to and from raids against the Cherokee to the south. When the Mingo were listed separately in British population estimates their number of warriors was sixty, which in all likelihood represented the adult male population of the village sometimes called Mingo Town, located on the Ohio just below the present city of Steubenville, Ohio. Their independence from outside control, their proximity to white settlements by the late 1760s and early 1770s, and their location on the water route to the Illinois country gave the occupants of this village a bad reputation among many whites -- "a banditti of plundering drinking wretches," they were called. Hostile opinion was so common among whites that in 1771 the Shawnee offered the residents a place to relocate on the Scioto River should encroaching

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white settlement make Mingo Town too uncomfortable a spot to occupy.[79] By 1760 another group of mostly Iroquoian people had settled near Indian agent George Croghan's house up the Allegheny not far from Fort Pitt. They soon shifted to the west side of the river at the mouth of Pine Creek, a location less than five miles from the junction of the Monongahela and the Allegheny.[80]

Shawnee and Delaware groups lived and hunted in most of the Allegheny and upper Ohio watershed. Logstown was essentially abandoned with the English victory of 1758, but the Kuskuskies villages up the Beaver River became a Delaware center during the early 1760s.[81] By the middle of the decade the most important Delaware towns were those on the Tuscarawas and Muskingum rivers, while many Shawnee settled along the Scioto, but there were also many other towns and villages in the region.[82]

Of great importance to these Ohio Valley nations' relationship with the British was their relationship with the Iroquois confederacy, an association which could be complex. The Iroquois league's military power in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, coupled with old feelings of enmity toward Algonquian nations such as the Delaware and the Shawnee, fostered an Iroquois notion of superiority over those nations. The Six Nations claimed specifically the right to control the territory of the Ohio Valley as a result of their victories in war over the region's seventeenth-century occupants. It was, in this

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sense, their land, in that they could grant or withhold permission to use it when people such as the Shawnee and the Delaware entered the area in the eighteenth century. The narrow issue of a right to approve use of league-claimed territories was subsumed, however, by a broader view which held that the Iroquois confederacy could control the diplomacy of the region's occupants. Only by holding some veto power over decisions of alliance and war could the confederacy determine the fate of the vast territory separating the French and the English, a crucial element in the Iroquois tactic of neutrality in which the league tried to offset any imbalance of power between the two European nations in North America.

At the simplest level Iroquois diplomacy recognized but two categories of nations, enemies and non-enemies, yet the confederacy's power was great enough in the seventeenth century and the early decades of the eighteenth to allow a more hierarchical situation. Algonquian groups that were no longer enemies were certainly not to be accepted into the confederacy as peers, but were given instead a subordinate status. In the Iroquois interpretation the residents of the Ohio Valley were transient hunters, people without permanent council centers, for whom the Onondaga council of the league of the Iroquois could make certain diplomatic decisions, or, more precisely, who would defer to the Iroquois in matters of external politics. In the language of Indian politics, the Six Nations were to be the

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"uncles" or even the "grandfathers" -- those vested with superior wisdom, greater strength, more experience -- while the Shawnee and the Delaware were to be the "nephews" -- children, clearly subordinate, expected to defer to wiser counsel.[83]

This situation, as depicted by the Iroquois ideal, had great attraction for British administrators in the west after the establishment of Fort Pitt. It offered a means of exerting influence over the plethora of Indian groups in the Ohio Valley: the British need only deal with the Iroquois, who could in turn control their "nephews." The chief officers of the British Indian department's northern district, superintendent Sir William Johnson and his Pittsburgh deputy George Croghan, did much to perpetuate this assumption. Johnson's powers as an Indian agent stemmed primarily from his great influence with the Mohawk, members of the Iroquois confederacy. He flattered the Iroquois by regarding them as "proprietors" of the Ohio forks region who granted "their temporary Indulgence" to the region's occupants. There was, in his opinion, no problem he could not fix through a proper meeting with the Six Nations in New York.[84] Moreover, the claims of George Croghan and a number of his friends to lands in the Ohio Valley were dependent upon the validity of the Iroquois "title" to the region by conquest.[85]

Yet the actual situation was not as the Iroquois ideal would have it, and by the middle of the eighteenth

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century the Six Nations' power over their "nephews" was anything but complete. The Delaware and Shawnee had always chafed, in particular, under the Iroquois' haughty reference to them as "women," which removed from them all status as warriors and impugned their autonomy. Many of the Ohio Valley Indians who fought with the French beginning in 1755 did so because it presented an opportunity for them to discard their "petticoats," "to shew the Six Nations that they are no longer Women, by which they mean no longer under their Subjection."[86]

Even Iroquoian people in the Ohio Valley had interests more aligned with those of the other nations in the region than with the wishes of the Onondaga council. During the late 1740s and early 1750s, a period of close trading ties to the English colonies, there was what amounted to a regional council in the upper Ohio Valley. The two resident Iroquois "half kings," Tanacharison and Scarouady, were much in evidence at the Logstown conferences and other meetings with the Virginians and Pennsylvanians. The strength of their attachment to the home council in New York seems to have depended on circumstances: when it suited them, or perhaps when certain kinds of issues were at stake, they referred decisions to the Onondaga council; in other instances they acted independently. Their powerful role in the conferences with Virginia and Pennsylvania derived as much from British-American approval as from any delegated authority from the

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Iroquois league. They were, however, completely Iroquois in their presumption of superiority over the local Algonquian groups. "You belong to me," Tanacharison growled at the Delaware and Shawnee at Logstown in 1752, "and I think you are to be ruled by me." At that meeting Tanacharison and the Virginians also appointed the Delaware chief Shingas to be "king" -- making him, in theory, the single Delaware spokesman for authorized dealings with his Iroquois and white lords. Despite this ceremony, Shingas -- along with most Shawnee and Delaware -- simply refused to heed Tanacharison when he decided on a pro-British course and left the Ohio Valley in the face of the French incursion in 1754.[87]

By the 1760s many of the Iroquoian people living among the Delaware and Shawnee on the Allegheny and Ohio watershed had been there for years, and, during the Seven Years War and the 1763-1764 Indian uprising, tended to behave more as their Algonquian neighbors did than as Six Nation council policy would dictate. These local Iroquois were those people sometimes referred to by the British as the Mingo, although they were still called "Seneca" or just "Iroquois" quite often. As the British worked to regain control of the western situation after the 1763 uprising, a three-way correspondence among General Gage, Colonel Bouquet, and Superintendent Johnson brought agreement that the Mingo should be required to move northward to merge with the regular members of the Iroquois confederacy.

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Otherwise, the trio felt, there was no controlling the Mingo, "as they are the most Corrupted of all Indians, live by Robberys, and always Endeavor to Embroil Matters, to have the Opportunity to plunder Friends and Foes." The central council of the Six Nations did exhort the Mingo to leave their home on the Ohio and come closer to the Iroquois fold, but the occupants of Mingo Town ignored the suggestion.[88]

By the 1760s the "national" feelings of the Shawnee, and even more so of the Delaware, were stronger than they had been for a long time. The initial immigrants of each tribe had entered the Ohio Valley several decades earlier, and their numbers continued to be augmented as new families came to the region. The Delaware in particular had a strong tradition of group identity before their migration to the west. They considered themselves the ancient "grandfathers" of the other Algonquian groups of the Atlantic coastal region, and valued a long history of dealings with the proprietors and government of Pennsylvania. They were themselves "uncles" or "big brothers" to the Munsee and the Mahicans, groups for whom they often spoke in council. Their traditions recognized that Iroquois dominance stemmed from the close association, beginning in the seventeenth century, between the Iroquois, especially the Mohawk, and the Dutch and the English, and that terms denoting a group's status or role -- such as "women" and "nephews" -- were weapons used in the

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perpetuation of the Six Nations' favored role with the Europeans.[89] While the Delaware experience in the eighteenth century had been one of westward retreat from tribal homelands, the Shawnee had for a century wandered in a kind of diaspora, and only in the Ohio Valley after 1720 did they really begin to coalesce again. Their reputation among the British by the 1760s was one of independence, usually described in terms of "insolence," "pride," and stubbornness. George Croghan called them "a very proud and high Sperreted pople, Very Breave . . . Easey Lead Butt hard to Drive." White observers believed that the Shawnee were the most ready of any Ohio Valley group to join in action against the English and to forge associations with like-minded nations to the northwest.[90] The Delaware and the Shawnee were not in fact the dependent groups Iroquois imagery depicted them to be; their autonomy served as a counterweight to the Six Nations' claims to suzerainty. This is not to say that the Iroquois were never offered deference in councils during the 1760s. There were also, however, conferences dominated by the hegemony of the Iroquois-British power alliance, when only crass bullying on the part of the Iroquois won them even the simplest acknowledgment as elders and landlords.

From an early date the region's Indians found friends to help them counter Iroquois power. According to a Pennsylvania trader's report, in the late 1720s a Shawnee delegation visited Montreal "to seek Protection from the

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French against the five Nations, who they suspected would hinder their settling at Allegeney."[91] In addition, allies were available in the form of the Wyandot Indians living south of Lake Erie and the Ottawa confederacy residing in the Michigan area. These nations were bitter enemies of the Iroquois a century or more before Shawnee, Delaware, and Munsee groups even entered the Ohio Valley, and had suffered much hardship at the hands of European-supplied Iroquois warriors through much of the seventeenth century. Many of the western nations had a history of alliance with the French. The Delaware looked upon the Wyandot as friendlier landlords than the Six Nations, and considered the territory in eastern Ohio occupied by Delaware people in the 1760s and 1770s to be held under a Wyandot, not an Iroquois, grant.[92] At Pittsburgh in 1759, when the region's Indians were worried about the ascendancy of British power in the Ohio forks area, the Delaware pointedly referred to the Wyandot as "uncles" in the presence of imperial and provincial military and Indian affairs officers. The western nations reciprocated by smoothing the feelings hurt by Iroquois arrogance: while discussing anti-British strategy in 1763, the Delaware thanked the Ottawa "for looking upon them now as Men."[93] In different circumstances the roles would have been reversed and the Ohio Valley nations would have sought an understanding with the Iroquois confederacy to counter the power of the Wyandot or the Ottawa. By maintaining friendly ties with

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the one confederacy or alliance the local Indians could counter the otherwise overbearing power of the other; in this way they worked to avoid becoming the lackeys of either confederacy while enjoying benefits from each association. Reluctant to deny outright the Iroquois' claims -- or their power, even in the 1760s -- the Delaware and Shawnee did much to preserve their own independence of action.

These connections between the Indians of the Ohio Valley and those living to the northwest, coupled with the possibility of continuing French agitation from the Mississippi Valley, worried British policymakers a good bit. While the British presumed that uniting so many autonomous groups into a single course of action against British interests would be almost impossible, there were, periodically through the 1760s, reports of secret conferences and circulating "war belts" of wampum. There was also a persistent undercurrent of discontent over the presence of Fort Pitt as a center of British power in the region. It was clear at the time of its establishment that many Indians in the region harbored an "appearant Jealousie of that Post" -- trading houses were welcome, they told the English, but military garrisons and permanent settlers were not.[94] During the early 1760s, and especially in 1762, British officers received reports of war plans on the part of the Indians near Detroit, the Shawnee, the Delaware, and even the Seneca, the westernmost of the Iroquois nations

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and the one least attached to Great Britain. Colonel Henry Bouquet was unimpressed: "The whole will vanish into Smoke."[95]

Bouquet was wrong, and in the spring of 1763 the Ottawa, the Chippewa, the Wyandot, the Shawnee, the Delaware, the Mingo, and the Seneca initiated a number of attacks on British outposts in the interior. Although it did not have the centralized direction implied by the name "Pontiac's War," it was the closest thing to a unified Indian revolt that the British would see. Several factors contributed to the groundswell of discontent: General Amherst's stringent insistence on economy, which kept Indians from receiving presents of ammunition vital to their hunting and led them to question British friendship; British demands that white prisoners still with the Indians be returned; a revival movement, originating with the Delaware, which called for a complete rejection of whites and their technology; and news that France would cede its North American possessions to England, leaving Britain as the sole European power in the region. In general, "they begin more and more to dread our growing power," Indian agent Croghan observed late in 1762.[96] When the uprising began, isolated raids away from the posts in May gave the commanders at Fort Ligonier and Pittsburgh sufficient time to gather local civilians within their defensive works and make hasty preparations. For all of June and July 1763, Fort Pitt was surrounded by a seemingly nebulous but very

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real army of Delaware, Shawnee, and other warriors encamped with their families out of sight of the fort. Foodstuffs were a potential problem for the besieged, especially since the flour supply, through gross error or dishonesty on the contractors' part, proved to be several thousand pounds less than what the army's records indicated it should be. The post held, and Bouquet relieved the siege with a supply convoy from Pennsylvania in early August.[97] For months thereafter, until Bouquet took an army into the Ohio country in late 1764, Ohio Valley Indians continued to make plans to overcome Fort Pitt, harassed the communication, and even attacked parties of soldiers close to the fort.[98]

The conflict brought out the ferocity and racism of the British army's officers in the region. Commander-in-chief Amherst, who had a very poor understanding of Native Americans, thought at first that the attacks were localized to the Fort Pitt district; when more information arrived and he learned that every British post beyond the northern frontier was taken or assaulted, he was enraged. The insurgents were "Perfidious Villains" who "shall most Certainly, in the End, pay Dear for their Temerity," he declared. They must be "Sufficiently Punished," and Amherst became "more and more Convinced of the Necessity of Keeping them in Subjection, as the Surest, and Indeed the only Method, of preserving the Country, which by the Fate of War, has been Ceded to His Majesty."[99] Furthermore, Amherst and Bouquet at times spoke as though the Indians'

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attempt to kill or expel the British from the Ohio Valley should be met with a like strategy from the whites. After his relief of Pittsburgh, Bouquet bragged that with enough good men he could "clear the Country of that Vermine between this Fort and Lake Erie"; when he repeated the boast a month later he said he could "drive the brutes beyond the Mississippi or the Lakes."[100] A false rumor reached Amherst as Bouquet marched to Pittsburgh's rescue, to the effect that the Indians of the Ohio watershed would all flee beyond the Great Lakes. "My Answer is," Amherst replied, "that I Wish there was not an Indian Settlement within a Thousand Miles of our Country; for they are only fit to Live with the Inhabitants of the Woods, being more nearly Allied to the Brute than the Human Creation."[101] His and his subordinates' tactics during the crisis reflected their attitudes toward the Indians. Captain Simeon Ecuyer, the European-born mercenary in command of the troops at Fort Pitt, passed blankets and kerchiefs infected with smallpox, which had broken out in the town, to his besiegers. Both Amherst and Bouquet approved of this tactic and may have initiated it.[102] Ecuyer -- who stated that the Indians "must be driven back by one single stroke and exterminated" -- also used beaver traps on the ramparts and caltrops in the ditches to help protect the fort against his "savage" enemies. Bouquet for his part wanted to develop the tactic of using hounds to pursue mobile raiding parties.[103]

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Bouquet was unable to satisfy his boast by expelling the Indians from the Ohio Valley. He did, however, mount a bloodless campaign into the home territory of the Delaware and the Shawnee late in 1764 that brought their compliance with English peace terms. At their towns in the Muskingum watershed he forced them to turn over a large number of captives, made them give hostages to guarantee compliance with his terms, and tried to leave an impression of British power by telling them that submission would spare them the fate they deserved. "You must be sensible that you deserve the severest Chastisement," Bouquet explained "-- but the English are a merciful, and generous People averse to shed the Blood, even of their most cruel Enemies." The British message to the Ohio Valley's residents was clear: do not expect us to leave; we have the power to remain. Fifteen months earlier Pittsburgh's attackers told Captain Ecuyer of their distress over the permanent British occupation of the region in garrisons such as Fort Pitt. Ecuyer replied plainly that "this is our Home." "We shall never abandon it as long as a white Men lives in America."[104]

In compliance with terms laid down by Bouquet in the Muskingum territory, Shawnee and Delaware representatives visited Sir William Johnson in New York in 1765 to sign formal peace treaties. There they were chastised by both Johnson and deputies from the Onondaga council, and told that only through submission could they expect to

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regain the favor of the British and the Iroquois. Curiously, one of the instruments by which the Iroquois worked to maintain some hegemony over the Ohio Valley after 1765 was Guyasuta, a Seneca chief. Guyasuta was of the Seneca living on the Genessee River and the upper Allegheny, a people with distinct ties to the Onondaga council but who tended to blend somewhat with the more independent "Mingo" groups of the Allegheny region. They were never as strongly pro-British as Johnson's friends the Mohawk. In 1761 Guyasuta had been one of the most active plotters calling for attacks on the English, and he fought with the insurgent Seneca groups in 1763. Yet in 1765, as a chief of the "Mingo," he received his chastisement from the British and the Onondaga council and simultaneously took on a new role as an Iroquois overseer of the Ohio Valley tribes, a position traditionally held by Seneca chiefs. He promised, for example, to supervise a relocation of the Shawnee and the Delaware to village sites closer to the British at Fort Pitt and the Iroquois in New York, which did not actually occur on any significant scale. Guyasuta's interest as supervisor over the Ohio Valley tribes, like that of the "half king" Tanacharison a decade earlier, was obviously political, and his alliances had more to do with power than with sentiment. British Indian agents, for their part, were eager to reconsolidate, through Guyasuta and other Iroquoian chiefs, some form of more or less direct Iroquois-British control over the Mingo, the

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Delaware, the Shawnee, and the Munsee of the Ohio Valley.[105]

Nevertheless, the Shawnee and the Delaware also looked to their own interests after the war. They submitted formally to Johnson, but asked for and received his acknowledgment that they were, equally with other nations of the region, the "children" of King George -- "to whom they will pay all due submission and subjection so far as the same be consistant with their Native rights." Within the formal structures of Indian diplomacy this could be nothing less than an attempt to redefine their status vis-a-vis the Iroquois league, to make them "children" of the British rather than "nephews" of the Iroquois. A similar veiled denial of Iroquois supremacy came earlier in 1765 at a Pittsburgh conference, when the Delaware reported that one of their number had visited heaven; there he was told that the Delaware should make their peace not with the crown's agents, but with the Pennsylvania Quakers, with whom the Delaware had a longstanding relationship of trust.[106] It was a futile effort, but it demonstrated a refusal on the part of the Delaware to think of themselves as dependents of the Iroquois confederacy. Colonel Bouquet wished, in 1764, that the Delaware, the Shawnee, the Mingo, and the Wyandot could be forced to renounce any ties with nations other than the Iroquois confederacy, and that any claim they might make to their territory could be erased in favor of that of the Six Nations. However, he made a tacit acknowledgment of the importance of Delaware political

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leadership when he presumed to depose and replace the chief of the Turtle division of the tribe. His new commanding officer, General Thomas Gage, also recognized that, despite Iroquois claims to the Ohio Valley, the local nations would not be arbitrarily dictated to in matters of land disposition.[107]

There were no more assaults on Fort Pitt, but the undercurrent of distrust of English encroachment into the transmontane region remained during the second half of the 1760s. The nations of the Ohio Valley were particularly incensed by what seemed to be British-Iroquois collusion in the sale, at Fort Stanwix, New York, in 1768, of lands east of the Ohio River. Moreover, in terms of control over the region's Indians, Britain found itself in about the same situation after 1764 as it was before, for there was no single source of political authority through which the Europeans could exert power over the Indian nations. Autonomy of action was simply too much a part of the Indians' politics, from the tribal level to the smallest group; coercion had little place in a system based primarily on persuasion and respect for decisions reached in council. National councils, including that of the Iroquois, were in any event concerned primarily with relations with other groups, and could not dictate compliance with their measures. Thus the Seneca, or certain groups of Seneca, might take action independent of the rest of the Six Nations. Similarly, Indian leaders on occasion stated "that they

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have lost all their influence upon their young Men," explaining that "we have No Law to oblidge our people to Do what they ought to Do" -- a situation that at times may have worked to the Indians' advantage in their dealings with the British.[108]

From the British point of view it was a more complex political situation than they would have preferred: dealing with one great monolithic Indian entity -- which in administrative terms took the form of the Iroquois confederacy -- would have suited them better, in their occupation of the Ohio watershed, than dealing with a variety of groups with differing goals. There were complex factors involved from the Native Americans' point of view also. Some, such as Delaware George, who was given a military funeral at Pittsburgh in 1762, allied themselves to the British and even derived a certain status or power through the association.[109] Others resisted white presence at times, and on other occasions seemed quiescent. Trade with the Europeans, after all, was not insignificant in economic terms, so for many Indians it was not a question of British presence or absence but of the kind and degree of white presence. Could, for example, control of the region remain in the hands of the resident Indians, with white activity limited to a few unfortified posts? If not, then the question was how to respond. In the 1750s one could ally with the French to counter a growing British power, or vice versa, but by 1764 the Indians' options were, as Bouquet

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explained on the Muskingum and Tuscarawas Rivers, clearly limited by the apparent ability of the British and British-Americans to persist in their occupation. Neither group succeeded in driving the other from the Ohio Valley during the 1763-1764 war; nor, afterwards, did either feel totally comfortable with its situation in the region. Neither group was powerless, but neither had the ability to dominate completely.

"This is our Home," Captain Ecuyer told the Indians in 1763, and it was a telling statement. A decade earlier the only Europeans in the upper Ohio Valley were traders, although the interest of the Ohio Company in the Ohio forks region foretold the possibility of permanent occupation by whites. The most significant change in the area came when France and Great Britain came into direct confrontation over the region, which brought French and then British occupation of the Ohio forks, and, through a combination of choice and circumstances, made the site at the junction of the Allegheny and the Monongahela the focus of European attention in the region. In 1758 and after, the British government shouldered aside those provincial and private interests whose activities brought imperial attention to the area in the 1750s. Long term plans for the site were indefinite, other than the British government's belief that imperial and not provincial authorities should control the North American interior after the French threat was quashed. The promise of overall control by the British

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government -- by regulating traders and blocking access to the region by settlers -- was, from the Indians' view, just about the only virtue promised by the British army's presence at Fort Pitt. The 1763 uprising against British presence only strengthened Great Britain's commitment to continue at Fort Pitt because it seemed to give a clear, unquestionable reason for British troops to stay in the interior regions of the continent. In peacetime a garrison's function at Pittsburgh was not so obvious, and the maintenance of the post meant great cost in supplies, repairs, and presents to visiting Indians. The continuation of a British presence at Fort Pitt through the 1760s was as much a matter of inertia as it was of planning, but it made Pittsburgh a site of British-American activity that would continue even after 1772, when the British army withdrew and once again left the area almost wholly to provincial and private interests.

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CHAPTER 2

"PITTSBURGIAN TERRITORIES"

The development of the town at Fort Pitt was affected by a peculiar set of circumstances. In 1758 no one knew what the situation at the junction of the Allegheny and the Monongahela would be in 1765 or 1770, and the configuration of the fortress itself was the only aspect of the development of the site that was truly planned. The town's initial development was by nature almost totally spontaneous. Yet from the beginning one group, the British army, was both interested in and in a position to make decisions that, in an ad hoc, pragmatic fashion, affected the town.

After November 1758 the army had a much stronger presence west of the Appalachians than any provincial government which might harbor desires to control the region. Confronted with a continuing French and Indian problem, the military asserted itself as the chief determiner of policy in the area. That policy, confirmed by the royal government in the Proclamation of 1763, was embodied in Colonel Henry Bouquet's proclamation of October 1761. The army's goal was "the preservation of the peace and a good understanding with the Indians, to avoid giving them any Just cause of Complaint." Bouquet's proclamation retained all lands west

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of the mountains as an Indian tract, and settlement was to be by written permission only.[1] A special consideration also influenced the situation at Fort Pitt. There all settlement was an appendage to the fortress, and the defensibility of the fort required the imposition of some control over the physical landscape. A few months before he issued the proclamation restricting settlement Bouquet commanded that no one at Pittsburgh was to build or remove a building without the approval "of the Chief Engineer present." The order added that "no Houses, Lotts, Gardens, or Improvements are to be sold let Or given, as the Inhabitants have only the use, and not the property of the same."[2] By Bouquet's conscientious formulae, no one could own property in the Ohio Valley until the Indians relinquished the rights returned to them at the Treaty of Easton in 1758; all settlement on the communications and at posts would be strictly controlled; and all buildings, appurtenances, and improvements at Pittsburgh were artifacts for use only -- no value could be accrued by their construction or transfer. In accepting permission to settle, one also agreed "to be Subject to such Regulations as may be order'd by the Commander in Chief, or by the Commanding Officer of the District, for the good of his Majesty's Service."[3]

By appearances the civilian population of Pittsburgh was fairly content to let the army run the show, although the military never had quite the degree of control that Bouquet for one would have liked to see. In a practical

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sense the rules of the game actually were laid down well before Bouquet's commands of 1761. In July 1759 a French attack was considered imminent, and all structures outside the small temporary fort then standing on the shore of the Monongahela were razed to the ground to clear a field of fire.[4] The attack never materialized, and a new town, undaunted, sprouted with the construction of the permanent fortress over the next couple of years. This settlement was a haphazard collection of trading houses and dwellings clumped in two more or less distinct groups: the "lower town" near the fort and the "upper town" on higher ground a little to the east. In addition there were scatterings of other civilian and military structures. The settlement appears to have been poorly defined on its eastern edge, and some houses were located up the Allegheny River at least as far as George Croghan's house, between three and four miles upriver from the fort.[5] When the post was attacked during the Indian uprising of 1763, defensive considerations outweighed all others just as they had in 1759. The local inhabitants were brought into the fort for protection and to aid in its defense, most of the upper town was burned, and the majority of the lower town's buildings were torn down to prevent Indian raiders from using them as cover. In the army's opinion this was a hazard of war, and no one had "the least right or Title to bring any Charge against the Crown or the Officer Commanding" for the loss of buildings

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

Map 3.

Fort Pitt

KEY

1. Fort Pitt
2. Lower Town
3. Upper Town (possible location)

} before mid-1763

4. King's Garden
5. site of town laid out by Reid's order, 1765
6. "Coal Hill"

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and effects.[6]

In an effort to prevent the problems created by the dismemberment of the town, Lieutenant Colonel John Reid tried to give the third incarnation of Pittsburgh, that which succeeded the destruction of the 1763-1764 war, more regularity than its prodecessors had shown. "I have laid out a Small Town for the Traders here, on the Bank of the Monongahela," Reid informed the commander-in-chief, "and at a proper Distance from the Fort, to prevent their building too near, or in an irregular manner as was formerly their Practise; and in case of any future Insurection of the Indians, it could be easily defended by the addition of two Samll Block houses, which the Inhabitants might be made to build at their own Expence." Reid laid the town out in uniform lots and charged their occupants a £5 fee plus £1 annual rent.[7] If the commanders hoped for perpetual order they were mistaken, for two years later a number of "Scatter'd Huts" had sprung up in random fashion to irritate the new commandant. However, most development stayed on the lots and streets of the site designated by Reid, and this was the little town of log buildings that continued into the 1770s. It stood on the Monongahela shore two to four hundred yards from the fort, separated from it by a wash or gully.[8]

Although miniscule compared with that of the next two centuries, the ecological and physical impact of the early Anglo-American occupation of the site was far from insignificant. By mid-1766 the immediate vicinity of the

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point had been deforested, and the local commander reported that "a Log now cant be found nearer the Fort then four Miles" -- the consequence of a technology requiring wood for boats, buildings, fences, stockade pickets, barrels, oars, fuel, and countless other uses. A water-powered sawmill, its machinery hauled over the Alleghenies, was built in 1759 to assist several man-powered pit saws to cut the timber needed for the fort.[9] In the same year the army learned that the ridge towering some five hundred feet above the south bank of the Monongahela was a rich source of both coal and limestone. Quarries were opened to mine stone, some of which was used for building, while much of it was reduced in lime kilns for use in mortar. The ridge itself was known commonly as "Coal Hill"; coal extracted from shafts near the summit regularly supplemented wood as a fuel in Pittsburgh from at least 1761. On at least two occasions, in 1766 and 1772, the hill smoldered for months at a time from subterranean fires in the colliers' shafts.[10] These forthright extractive efforts underscored the matter-of-fact pragmatism that guided the physical development of both the town, which must have appeared particularly motley before 1765, and the fort, whose almost continual state of undress and disrepair belied the knife-edged lines of its plan on paper.

The town itself was not large. In July 1760 the army counted 149 civilian residents: 88 men, 29 women, 14 male children, 18 female children. There were 146 com-

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pleted "houses," a term which probably included a variety of buildings, plus 19 unfinished buildings and 36 "Hutts." The population was not listed by family; on the basis of surnames there were a maximum of 22 husband-wife pairs, plus possibly two men with children but no spouse present, and two women in the same circumstance. No family had more than three children, and one or two was much more common. All but a handful of the children shared surnames with one or more adults in the town.[11]

Another census was made in the spring of 1761, but in this case only householders were named and all others simply enumerated by household. The 1761 tally listed 160 houses, ten of them empty. There were 163 civilian men, 45 women, and 25 children, plus 43 soldiers living outside the fort in the company of another 23 women and 13 children. (Unfortunately it is not always possible to distinguish these "outlying soldiers" from civilian householders in the body of the census.) Women were present in 66 households, and three of them were heads of households. In 54 houses one adult male and one adult female were paired, with or without children. There were never more than two women to a household, and the majority (59) contained only one. The pattern was similar regarding children: of 31 houses with children, none contained more than two and most (24) had but one; in addition, children were never present in a house without adult women in the home also. Some houses were exclusively

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or very predominantly male, the residences of groups of batteaumen, artificers, and traders' employees. For the majority of the population, those who were enumerated but not named, it is impossible to determine their relationship to the named householder. They could have been spouses, children, siblings, servants, employees, or friends.[12]

No official house or population counts were made after 1761, and information for the years following is extremely sparse. At the height of the Indian siege of 1763 Fort Pitt held 338 men, 104 women, and 106 children, but probably half the men were regular soldiers, while others were packhorsemen, passing traders, or "country people" from along the communication who were not ordinarily residents of Pittsburgh.[13] Early in 1768 the town claimed it had 169 "Men able to Bear Arms," but there is no indication of what proportion of the population or even of adult men that figure represents. Two and a half years later George Washington estimated that the town consisted of about twenty log houses, but in 1772 another traveler placed the figure at "about 40 dwelling houses made of hewed logs," while a third observer simply called the place "a small town chiefly inhabited by Indian traders, and some mechanicks."[14]

"The Resort of numbers of People to this Place is very considerable," a British officer wrote from Fort Pitt in 1766. "They are building good Houses fast, on the Spot Colo. Reid has very judiciously made choice of for the Town;

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and if this continues the thorough fair to our Posts on the Mississipi The Number of People will soon considerably increase."[15] Yet 1766 was a flush time, a period of recovery from the 1763-1764 war and of activity centered on the opening of the Illinois, and the bustle may have been deceiving. Although sketchy, the post-1761 population information indicates that the population did not expand a great deal during the 1760s, and consisted of a few hundred people at most. Before 1768 the government's regulation of settlement may have deterred growth. In addition it is likely that neither the Indian trade nor local sutlering and other services, which together comprised the village's reason for being, provided any impetus for a great augmentation of the population after the early part of the decade, especially since the garrison was kept small during peacetime for reasons of economy. As the clerk of one trading store observed in 1762, "Bussiness seems but Dull at this place this summer, and many people has left it; if it comes right settled times and but a small Garrison kept here, I think it will not incourage many to Settle a Town here."[16]

Since the 1760 list is the only source to list all inhabitants by name, it is virtually impossible to study the persistence of residence at Pittsburgh. The military and commercial nature of the town's activity encouraged transience, especially among batteaumen, traders' employees, coopers, boatbuilders, and the like. Traders were themselves a mobile group, and some such as William Trent moved elsewhere during

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the decade to pursue other business interests. Some were no doubt like George Croghan, the entrepreneurial Indian agent, who maintained "Croghan Hall" near Pittsburgh but could be absent for extended periods on business or official matters. Yet at least two-fifths of the adult males on the 1760 list were around a year later, while the same proportion of the forty-nine signers of a 1767 petition had been at Pittsburgh at least since 1763. Among the latter group were James Milligan, Devereux Smith, William Christy, John Ormsby, and Andrew McFarlane, who with others formed a persistent core of residents who lived at or near Fort Pitt through much or all of the 1760s.[17]

Although the town's enumerated population may be presumed to have been largely white, scattered references indicate that a few of the servants in the upper Ohio River area during this period were blacks, both male and female, most of them slaves working as laborers or personal servants for traders, artisans and army officers.[18] It is impossible even to guess their numbers. The largest group of blacks seen in early Pittsburgh was no doubt the group of eighty Jamaican slaves sent to Illinois in a 1767 venture by the Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan company. Blacks captured from Virginia and Maryland settlements could also be found among the Delaware and Shawnee of the Ohio country, where the ownership of blacks may have enhanced the prestige of some Indian lenders.[19]

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Pittsburgh was essentially a village of convenience, a pragmatic gathering of individuals drawn together because the military and the Indian department had by choice and by the accident of their presence there made it a center of activity. There was no courthouse, market house, or church building in Pittsburgh during the 1760s, and its log structures often served multiple functions as dwellings, trading houses, grog shops, and social centers. There was as yet none of the conscious promotion or boosterism of the sort that motivated Croghan and Trent, who owned land near Fort Bedford, to advocate that place as a town site. The settlement at Fort Pitt had no chartered existence as a town nor local government. There is evidence of crime, theft in particular, but no indication of how anyone except the army dealt with it.[20] Local regulation came in the form of orders instituted by post commanders such as Bouquet, who during 1761 and 1762 regulated sutlering and liquor sales, fixed prices for beer, milk and butter, and ordered inhabitants to leash their dogs, yoke their swine, confine their livestock and fowl, and refrain from stealing the king's equipment and building materials.[21] He did this not out of regard for the community but to retain order at his post and to keep his fortress from being eaten and scratched away. It is uncertain how effective even such a resourceful officer as Bouquet could be at the job of regulating a town full of independent-

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minded traders, and there is no evidence that any of his successors as commandant tried quite as hard as he. In reference to the army's regulation of the post, one observer in the early 1760s noted that "Some people have had their Houses pull'd Down for the Brech of some of these Laws and themselves Banish'd."[22]

On two occasions the army ordered able-bodied male inhabitants to muster themselves into a militia for the post's protection. The first instance was in anticipation of a French attack in the summer of 1761. Hugh Crawford, a trader of long experience and some stature in the business, was selected by the men of the lower town as their captain, and Robert Pearis acted as captain of the company from the upper side of the village. The French never attacked, and the only sparks that flew that summer were when Crawford "summon'd Josiah Davenport and Capt. Trent to join the Militia and stand Sentrys" with the night watch, and they, "thinking themselves above it," refused. Crawford also tangled with Samuel Dean and James Kenny, Quaker employees of the provincial trading store who refused to bear arms.[23] William Trent got his chance to command the town's men during the crisis of Pontiac's uprising. Crawford had had the misfortune of being taken by Indians in the Ohio country at the outbreak of hostilities. Trent rose to the occasion: "No one has offered to help me but Mr. Trent," Captain Ecuyer observed in the midst of the siege. As major of the militia

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-- and with Josiah Davenport assisting as captain, not sentry -- Trent marshaled the inhabitants for the defense of Fort Pitt.[24]

The only eivdence of cooperative action for defense without initial instigation by the army came with a 1767 petition to General Gage, in which forty-nine locals asked that the town be stockaded. They did this because they knew that unless the town was defensible it could be leveled in the event of a crisis just as its two predecessors were, and apparently they had realized that a modicum of collective action in making the request could help save their investment in the town. They also gratuitously assured Gage "that they will on every Occasion to the Utmost of their Power Exert themselves against his Majestys Enemys either Offensively or Defensively, Seperately, or Jointly with the Garrison of Fort Pitt as your Excellancy or the Commanding Officer may direct." While they were at it they also tried to argue that a stockaded town, instead of being the defensive liability it was at present, could actually help defend Fort Pitt itself against attack. Gage was sympathetic to the idea but there is no evidence of construction of a wall around the town.[25]

The petition was a rare example of community action, evidence of which is sparse during the first decade of the town's existence. As early as the end of 1761 some inhabitants grouped together to hire a schoolmaster, who instructed

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"about Twenty Schollars" and also led a Sunday service by reading from the "Littany and Common Prayer." It is not known how long the schoolmaster stayed, but within a few months commandant Bouquet had assumed the initiative in encouraging the weekly prayer meetings, and the reading was performed by a resident of the village.[26] The particulars of theology were less important in this effort than the moral order associated with churchgoing. When passing missionaries or other itinerant clergymen gave sermons, which only six or seven did before 1773, they could rely on the support of the post commandant in the scheduling of services for both town and garrison. One minister was optimistic about the religious ardor of the inhabitants and thought the citizenry quite alert and interested in his sermons. His enthusiasm may have been born of hope more than fact, for another clergyman conceded that "part of the inhabitants are agreeable and worthy of regard," but insisted that "others are lamentably dissolute in their morals."[27] A man who seemed pious might be dubbed "Solomon" in mockery, and there was no regular observance of a sabbath day by the majority of the population. Both Indian and white women lived with traders as what one shocked preacher called "temporary" wives; he also reported that a large number of residents "have escaped from Justice and from Creditors, in the old settlements." "Very dissipated," he labeled the town -- "they seem to feel themselves

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beyond the arm of government, and freed from the restraining influence of religion."[28]

Only a year after the French abandonment of the Ohio forks in November 1758, John Stanwix described the new little town there as "a thriving place and pritty full of trading Houses within the works."[29] The civilian occupants of the village were there for two commercial reasons, to sell goods and services to the military and to trade with the Indians. Long before the construction of Fort Duquesne, whites engaged in the Indian trade frequented the Ohio forks region. Arriving again on the very heels of Forbes' army, they and the enterprising sorts who came to trade with the garrison were responsible for the appearance of the town that immediately sprang up adjoining the fort.

For some people the reassertion of British control in the region came none too soon. As soon as Forbes' campaign ended, Colonels George Washington of Virginia and Hugh Mercer of Pennsylvania wrote their respective governors urging the immediate opening of the Indian trade at the new post called Pittsburgh. An urgent sense of competition pressed their efforts. They advocated provincial regulation of trade to control the "set of rascally fellows, divested

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of all faith and honor" who otherwise would dominate the trade. Each officer believed, of course, that his province should be the first to establish control over the situation.[30]

Virginians were not total strangers to the western trade, but their experience was conspicuously slim. As a part of its ambitious program the Ohio Company was involved in the business as early as 1750, building storehouses and selling goods to traders operating from the upper reaches of the Potomac, but these efforts did not survive the French incursion into the Ohio Valley.[31] The trade in fact involved systems of supply and credit with which few Virginians were familiar or cared to deal. When two Winchester merchants dispatched a factor on a trade venture to Pittsbugh in 1759 they discovered "that they cant get a sortable Cargo," and "as it is a new Trade to Them, they are very cautious."[32] At least one strident Ohio Company advocate claimed that the Pennsylvanians plotted with the army to exclude Virginia from the Ohio Valley trade and win the region for the proprietary colony, but Pennsylvanians won the contest for trade largely by default.[33] As Washington admitted to a group of Indians in 1770, "the Virginians were a People not so much engaged in Trade as the Pensylvanians."[34]

By "Pensylvanians" Washington meant those traders who, no matter what their own origins, had credit and supply connections with Philadelphia, Lancaster, or Carlisle.

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In contrast to the Virginians, business firms in those towns had for decades been suppliers of the goods, the peltry markets, and the credit -- much of which derived originally from English firms -- needed to keep traders operating in the Indian country. Sometimes these Pennsylvania companies hired employees and engaged in the trade directly, perhaps under the personal supervision of one or more of the firm's partners. They also supplied independent traders in what were essentially speculative ventures. Usually this meant providing a likely prospect with trade goods on credit, as well as transport assistance if necessary, in return for a substantial share of the profits.[35]

The trade itself was based on a simple exchange of European goods for the skins of animals killed by the Indians. In the case of the Ohio Valley the trade was founded, above all else, on deer hides. The bulk of the region's annual yield consisted of several hundred thousand deer skins, classified as "fall," "summer," "dressed," or "parchment" depending on when taken and how prepared. The hide of a buck killed during autumn was the standard by which other skins were rated. During the year the Indians also trapped or shot thousands of other animals, including beaver, raccoon, otters, fishers, martins, mink, foxes, wolves, bobcats, cougars, muskrats, bears, and elk, but these skins were secondary to the great staple of the trade, the deer hide. Over a quarter of a million deer skins were

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traded through Pittsburgh in 1767.[36] That figure indicates that during the 1760s the Pennsylvanians' total business in the skins, drawn from the Susquehanna frontiers northwest of the colony's settled areas as well as from the Ohio watershed, probably equaled or surpassed that of any of the southern colonies noted for their exports of deer hides. The trade through Pennsylvania also included more pelts from beaver and other furbearers than did the southern trade, although Pittsburgh's business in furs was trifling compared with the great Canadian trade to the north.[37]

From the point of view of the British and their kinsmen in America, the end result of the skin trade was a soft, light-colored leather that could be fashioned into buckskin or doeskin gentlemen's riding breeches or artisans' working breeches, as well as buckskin boots, deerskin or fawnskin gloves, and other items.[38] Access to those European manufactured products that had been adopted into the Delaware, Shawnee, Mingo, Ottawa, Wyandot, and other Ohio Valley hunters' material culture was the Indians' motivation for participation in the trade. For while he might partake of an extension of credit from the trader, the Indian was no partner in the business. Instead of bartering for the best price for his skins, he generally had to sell his product for prices fixed by the Europeans, and he paid more for what he got than whites paid for the same items. He sold his

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peltry for powder, lead, flints, and firearms, which improved his technology as hunter and warrior, and for animal traps, kettles, knives, needles, scissors, awls, cloth and clothing, liquor, combs, rings, looking glasses, buckles, beads, vermillion for paint, and other articles of adornment.[39]

It was an extremely competitive business. In the traders' view the task was not to manage a renewable resource but to grab a piece of a very finite pie. The ideal of every participant in the trade was to achieve, for himself and perhaps a few associates, a monopoly, if not over the entire business, at least over a portion of it. Competition was too keen to allow a true monopoly, for no one had the resources or power to overwhelm his competitors. One could, however, seek advantage. A common means of doing this was to get to the trade first, which is what the Philadelphia firm of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan hoped to do with their venture into the Illinois trade following the installation of British control there in the mid-1760s. In the effort they badly strained their resources, and when they placed the company into the hands of its creditors in 1767 it was clear that "ill disposed people" in Pittsburgh were licking their chops like wolves beyond the firelight.[40] The situation of the Baynton firm was not unique. In the drastic slump that Pennsylvania's commerce fell into following the cessation of hostilities with France in 1760, numerous companies

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went bankrupt or temporarily ceased payments to their English creditors. Credit was tough to secure in Pennsylvania during the early and middle 1760s, Pittsburgh's early years as a trade center.[41]

Under these circumstances business arrangements that were simple in theory could become labyrinthine in practice. A trader selling goods forwarded to him on credit might at the same time form a partnership with an associate, hire employees, extend credit to Indian hunters or to other traders. Partnerships that failed or nearly failed often reappeared in slightly or completely different configurations. "I think it my duty," trader Devereux Smith explained, "for to endevor to make the Best of my Pilltery [peltry] or any Goods thats my Reall Property Providing that my Creditors ar Not Soforing in the mention."[42] At times creditors did "suffer in the mention." Michael Teaffe bought several hundred pounds' worth of goods on credit from Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, then when he had disposed of it all he forgot his allegiance and sold the skins not to them but to Simons, Franks, and company. He and others like him were accused of using Pittsburgh "as an Assylum" where they were shielded from the legal actions of irate creditors and could still continue to trade with goods purchased on the spot.[43] On the other hand, Joseph Spear was a trustworthy man, worth "some thousands more then will pay all his Debts," but his assets consisted not of ready cash

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but of goods and "many considerable Debts owing him." In addition, "he is a very bad Accountant" with little idea, on paper at least, of how to sort out his obligations to creditors.[44]

Pittsburgh was a regional center for the Indian trade partly as a matter of economics and convenience, but largely because the British government wanted it that way for purposes of control. Army and Indian affairs officers could, at least in theory, regulate trade at posts much easier than they could decentralized, mobile trade scattered through the Indian towns. Yet, as officials were aware, Indians living northwest of the Ohio River disliked lugging hides to Pittsburgh and preferred that the traders come to them instead.[45] Traders embroiled in a competitive scramble with their fellows were eager to oblige, and the trade tended to diffuse through the Indian country. At first the British army restricted the area's trade to Pittsburgh, but by the early 1760s certain merchants were licensed to go out to trade at specified places between Detroit and Fort Pitt. By the outbreak of Pontiac's War in the spring of 1763 between one and two dozen individuals and partnerships operated in the Ohio country, employing a total of over ninety servants and hired workers.[46] The Indian war of 1763-1764 demolished this outlying trade. With the peace came a plan whereby trade would be licensed by the provincial governors, confined to the posts, and policed by Indian de-

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partment commissaries appointed by Sir William Johnson, the superintendent of Indian affairs in the northern colonies.[47] Yet before long traders were over the Ohio at the Indian towns despite official efforts to limit their business to Fort Pitt.

Still, Pittsburgh served as an entrepôt for outlying traders' pelts, which were packed in on horseback or brought up the Ohio in boats and canoes from downriver areas such as the Scioto River, where numerous Shawnee lived. Goods destined for the Western trade also passed through the town.[48] In addition, Pittsburgh was the base of operations for the Illinois trade beginning in 1765, but pelts from that region frequently went downstream to New Orleans.[49] In 1767 the official figure for merchandise brought to Fort Pitt by licensed traders -- a sum that did not include a substantial illicit liquor trade -- was over £26,000. Another £40,000 "or upwards" passed through the post as goods bound for Illinois.[50] The amount of that value that stayed in Pittsburgh is difficult to assess. Some traders maintained permanent residence in the town, others came and went, and still others lived elsewhere for most or all of their trading careers. A substantial portion of the business' gains went east to the traders' credit sources. The total investment in the Indian trade of the upper Ohio Valley was in the tens of thousands of pounds, and a single trader or partnership was often involved for somewhere between a few

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hundred and several thousand pounds' worth. Most of this was tied up in debts due and in stocks of goods and pelts. Depending on the size of the operation, there would also be some horses and gear, perhaps a few canoes and boats, and one or more storehouses. It was common to have anywhere from a couple to a half-dozen or even more servants and employees laboring for the operation.[51] Many factors -- the trade's mobility and decentralization, the credit system, the competition, the extractive nature of the business -- discouraged large-scale investment at Pittsburgh. Of at least equal importance, perhaps, was the fact that until 1768 Pittsburgh was under the army's tight control, at least in theory. No one could build there without the commandant's permission, which granted rights for use only and not title to the property, and the military could use its authority to remove buildings, a fact which may have precluded expensive physical investment in the town.[52]

The Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan company used Fort Pitt as its base of operations for the Illinois trade beginning in 1765, and the firm's records survive to illustrate their activity there. They placed an agent and store in Pittsburgh, and at times employed numbers of coopers, boatbuilders, horse drivers, and batteaumen. The foreman of an Illinois-bound convoy inspected "the ship-yards" in summer 1766 and found "business going on briskly."[53] But this

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activity, like that of the army in its supply of the Illinois country, came in flurries. Between the campaigns of intense effort came slack periods during which laborers might be discharged to return east. At least one company agent, John Irwin, urged his employers not to increase the number of sawyers, carpenters, and batteaumen at Pittsburgh more than was absolutely necessary, "for I assure you, that the more of these people are Collected together, the more drunkness Idleness, and every Kind of Vice is carried on to excess among them; -- one always encourages another in Wickedness in Spite of any Means can be used to prevent it." They were, he asserted, "a troublesome Rabble," not worth the "Expence and Trouble" of keeping them around.[54] As a result there could be a shortage of labor during a busy period, and a periodic resupply of artisans and batteaumen, who appear to have been a very mobile lot, was required. Ever mindful of competitors, the Baynton firm specified in its contracts with skilled boatbuilders from Pennsylvania that they were to work for no one else in the Fort Pitt region without company approval, not even after their specified terms of service were completed.[55]

Company agent Irwin, who was not above assaulting an underling or having him thrown into the post guardhouse, presided over the company's assortment of artificers and batteaumen with a combination of verbal and physical abuse: "I

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Know how to manage them." "Perhaps you may immagine that I deal rather Severely with these people," he explained, "but you cannot Conceive how deserving they are of Such Treatment, for in Short the most of them are a parcel of abandoned Wretches."[56] During 1766 he and four or five other employees shared eating utensils and lived in a single room of the company's store at Pittsburgh. Two other rooms were stuffed with goods and another was constantly occupied by Indians. Irwin begged his employers to invest a bit more in their Fort Pitt operation by sending the bare necessities of civilization: he and his fellows could make do with tin cups for their tea, but needed a tea kettle, a pewter teapot, more plates, knives and forks, tea, coffee, sugar, writing paper and ink powder. Otherwise they would continue "like as Many piggs in a Stye." "In Short," Irwin threatened, "were we to Continue long in this Manner, we Woud Certainly Degenerate into Savages, and I am Sure we are not one Degree above them now in our way of living." To feed the company's men Irwin was reliant at times on the condemnation of army provisions found unfit for the troops. Another Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan employee found the Pittsburgh store "dirty beyond endurance, without the least necessary utensil or convenience."[57]

Irwin's employers were too strapped by creditors to overlook a single teacup, and usually too far from Pittsburgh to trust their agents completely. They replaced

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Irwin as their Pittsburgh agent late in 1767 and charged him with raking off company funds to support an extravagant lifestyle.[58] Such accusations of irregularity, while not necessarily standard procedure, were common enough when agents supervised the interests of distant employers, as John Langdale was aware. When Langdale left his post as the agent of Pennsylvania's provincial trading store at Fort Pitt, he filed written charges against his clerk and his successor accusing them of irregularities during his absence. The clerk knew that Langdale did this "chiefly, as he told me, to clear himself if any thing happen'd in the Goods which he said was only matter of form, as he never alledg'd any dishonesty to any of us." To be on the safe side, the resourceful clerk and the new agent not only answered Langdale's charges but also suggested that they were a smoke screen covering the former agent's own bookkeeping irregularities.[59]

In their efforts to gain advantage and secure a portion of the trade most traders were quite willing to test the limits of government control over the business, and were also willing to use political or personal connections to put themselves into a favored position. They approved regulation of the peltry trade if it worked to their advantage, and if it did not, sought means of evasion. With the establishment of Fort Pitt both royal army officers and Indian department authorities were concerned about the

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control of the trade because it affected the larger question of Indian affairs in general, although neither group had sole control over the traders. The Indian department in the region fell under the authority of its superintendent for the northern colonies, Sir William Johnson, in New York. Its staff at Fort Pitt consisted of Johnson's deputy, George Croghan, then later of his successor, commissary Alexander McKee, and a small group of interpreters and gunsmiths to repair Indians' firearms. Johnson and his agents were to oversee all the crown's dealings with Indians, including conferences, treaties, and trade regulation, but in practical terms their ability to police traders outside the posts was weak. In addition, ministries in London during the 1760s occasionally tinkered with the status and budget of the Indian department and always fretted over the amount of money it cost. Between them, however, the army and the Indian agents issued orders that attempted, with limited success, to control where trading would take place and to regulate prices. Neither agency had the resources necessary to control all trading activity in the vast hinterland of the upper Ohio Valley.

The army made special efforts in the late 1750s and early 1760s to regulate liquor sales at Pittsburgh. There were two reasons for military action. First, commandants such as Colonel Henry Bouquet were interested in

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allaying Indian complaints and regulating trade, not out of love for the Indians but because their docility and cooperation were predicated on their contentment. The second reason had nothing to do with Indians. By 1761 whiskey and rum were so widely available from the gaggle of sutlers and grog shops near the fort that the always difficult task of maintaining discipline among the troops was becoming even tougher. Bouquet's military regulations forbade any sale of liquor to Indians, an order which had to be repeated periodically. Another series of orders confined to certain hours the sale of liquor to soldiers and prohibited the transport of any food, liquor, or goods to Pittsburgh without a pass from the fort's commandant.[60] Liquor was not only a lucrative trade item, but also a staple of the diet of both soldiers and civilians, and Bouquet's orders were widely evaded by smugglers who stashed rum in isolated forest caches or buried their illicit cargo.[61] Sir William Johnson's trade regulations of 1765 confronted the problem by allowing liquor sales to Indians while maintaining order and decorum near the posts. There was to be a single liquor storeroom with two locks, one key to stay in the army's hands and the other kept by a representative of the merchants. Liquor sold to Indians was to be turned over to them at a minimum of two leagues from the fort as they returned home. By 1770 this rule was entirely forgotten at Pittsburgh and the army had to remind

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the local commandant of its existence.[62]

At Bouquet's elbow during the implementation of the early trade regulations of 1759-1762 was George Croghan. A trader in the Ohio Valley since the 1740s, Croghan became William Johnson's deputy agent for Indian affairs in 1756. This position allied him with the imperial government, and in the three or four years after Forbes' campaign he sought to entrench himself as the sole overseer of Indian-white relations in the region. His rough Irish exterior notwithstanding, Croghan understood the powerful role played by the Indian trade within the scheme of government policy toward the Native Americans: despite their efforts to control it, provincial and imperial policymakers needed the trade as a prerequisite for peaceful relations with the Indians. Given his office, he was also a difficult man to trust, or even to keep track of. He was certainly aware of the degree of independence inherent within the deputy agent's position at Fort Pitt, and, despite the supposedly disinterested nature of his post, he never really relinquished his interests in the peltry trade or in acquiring Indian lands for speculative purposes. Army officers such as Colonel Bouquet, who would have liked to keep Indian affairs more under their own control, occasionally lamented of Indian agents such as Croghan that more energy was required "in managing the Managers than the Indians."[63]

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Croghan had to labor a bit to place himself into a monopoly as mediator between government, traders, and Indians. In 1759 the Pennsylvania government opened a trading store at Fort Pitt and issued, through a panel of commissioners, a list of prices to regulate the trade there. Croghan maintained that the provincial store and another one financed by private Quaker interests created more problems than they solved. Asserting himself as deputy agent, he imposed price regulations and claimed the right, in conjunction with the army, to issue licenses to traders. Nothing appealed to Croghan and his trading friends less than a "Quaker" monopoly over the trade. For both soundly professional and ambitiously selfish reasons the Indian agent maintained that provincial, and especially Quaker, activity in Indian matters amounted to meddling and divided the consistent policy sought by the British government. Through the early 1760s he railed against the Quakers, who in turn accused him of winning influence over the Indians in order to secure land grants from them.[64]

At bottom the issue was whether Croghan, as Johnson's deputy in the Indian department, or Pennsylvania, through its appointed commissioners, would regulate the trade. In 1759 the provincial commissioners protested that their adversary "has assum'd a power of Licencing such persons to trade with the Indians at Pittsburg, as he thinks proper, and also to

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fix the prices Goods shall be sold at, and of the Skins and Furrs to be received in Payment."[65] What the Pennsylvania board did not acknowledge, and perhaps did not fully understand, was that Croghan was no capricious individual in his regulation of the trade at Pittsburgh, but a royal officer. His actions had the general support of regular army officers in the district and of the home government, for as the Seven Years War wound down the imperial government, through the army and Indian department, took onto itself the control of Indian affairs in the west and frowned on provincial involvement in the matter. The agent of the provincial store at Fort Pitt could do little to assert his own power against that of the aggressive Indian agent and the army commandant, so in the long run Pennsylvania had to surrender any pretension to regulate traders directly or to determine prices at the Ohio forks.

Within a few years Croghan, acknowledged by a Quaker critic to be master of the "Indian Helm," informed the Delaware Indians "that now the Quakers were nothing," and boasted that only he could manage the valley's native residents.[66] But while the private trading store of Israel Pemberton's Quaker associates closed after a short life, the Pennsylvania store managed to survive through the early 1760s in the thickets of Pittsburgh's trade competition despite Croghan's bullying. In 1760 Croghan's old business associate William Trent led six other traders in a petition

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to Colonel Bouquet complaining of the provincial store's violation of regulations instituted by General Monckton. John Langdale, the store's agent, argued that the incident in question, involving the sale of two quarts of rum, was exaggerated by the petitioners, but he was in the uncomfortable position of asserting the provincial commissioners' authority to regulate the trade while at the same time pleading obedience to the regulations imposed by the army. According to Langdale's description of the trade at Pittsburgh, Croghan embraced Monckton's orders to give legitimacy to his own regulatory actions, then gave the store of William Trent and Levi Andrew Levy a favored position, quietly allowing them to trade in rum and ammunition when others could not. "So far is it from being a free Trade which Croghan made such a Bustle about," Langdale groused.[67] Croghan's chums Levy and Trent, along with Hugh Crawford, a signer of the memorial against Langdale, continued to use credit, the sale of liquor and ammunition, and propaganda to draw business from the Pennsylvania store.[68] By the summer of 1763 Governor James Hamilton and the Pennsylvania Indian affairs commissioners had decided that it would be fruitless to continue the provincial trading operation at Fort Pitt, and initiated steps to liquidate its holdings.[69]

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Croghan had much more on his mind than just the provincial store. He was, as his critics asserted, in a very powerful position. Liquor regulations he advocated to army commanders as a check on traders' "Contempt of athourety," for example, gave him a great deal of power in determining who could or could not transport alcohol to Pittsburgh. His enemies at the Pennsylvania store also were convinced that he was personally involved in trade through his associates despite prohibitions against trade by Indian agents.[70] Indeed the Irishman's private and public affairs were entangled with those of traders Levy, Trent, Robert Callender, his kinsman Thomas Smallman, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, and others. Samuel Wharton was delighted that Croghan "has our Interest much at Heart. . . . No man knows the Indian Trade better than He does and He is sure, He is a perfect honest man."[71]

It was Croghan who fired Wharton's interest in the Illinois trade and hatched a scheme for an Illinois colony. He convinced Wharton and Robert Callender to steal a march on the competition in the spring of 1765 by sending up goods for the Illinois trade before the trade at Pittsburgh had been formally re-opened by Pennsylvania's governor after the 1763-1764 Indian war. As he knew, military officials were exceedingly anxious to see the trade opened as a means of drawing the western Indians away from French influence

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at the Illinois, and would press colonial governors to open the trade in accordance with provisions laid down in 1763.[72] Personally involved in the venture himself, Croghan claimed the goods were presents he was to carry on an official trip to the Illinois country. Imperial and provincial scrutiny was piqued when the convoy of goods was intercepted at Sideling Hill west of Chambersburg by settlers fearful that weapons and ammunition were going to recent Indian enemies. A morass of confusion resulted from attempts to clarify ownership of the goods, and Croghan was able to extricate himself with an admission that he had encouraged the traders to move the goods up in anticipation of an opening of the trade.[73]

Croghan continued to hold Baynton, Wharton and Morgan's "interest much at heart" a year later when he suggested that George Morgan send a company agent to trade at the Shawnee towns on the Scioto. Despite Shawnee complaints that Fort Pitt was too far away and threats that French traders from Illinois might come to their towns, this move was in violation of orders limiting trade to authorized posts. As the Wharton company soon learned, their maneuver opened them to jeopardy from their competitors more than from the wrath of officialdom. A group of Pittsburgh traders informed the Pennsylvania government, from whom they held licences to trade, of the irregularity. Baynton and Wharton, worried

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about the bond they had pledged for compliance with regulations, quickly made humble excuses to General Gage and Superintendent Johnson. They offered to withdraw their man from the Scioto country and implored Johnson that "if any Merit is due to Merchants, for exploring a newly acquired Country for Trade and thereby supporting the important negotiations of your Honor's agent" (meaning Croghan), then the irregularity should be overlooked.[74]

They were supplicating themselves before the wrong group of men. Their Pittsburgh competitors wrote Johnson protesting the firm's attempt to establish an illegal monopoly of the Ohio trade while the petitioners, having each promised £ 500 (Pa.) bond and built "proper Houses" for trade at Pittsburgh, were restricted to business at the fort.[75] The memorial was simply a formality, and within months the petitioners had their own illegal operations on the Scioto and Muskingum Rivers. Indian department commissary Alexander McKee, long Croghan's right hand in Indian affairs and now in charge of the department's activities at Fort Pitt, was unable to restore control and force them to trade at Pittsburgh. General Gage went through the motions of ordering the commandant at Fort Pitt to assist McKee, but refused to take any unilateral action since the civil authority of Pennsylvania, which issued the traders' licences and accepted their pledges of bonds, was responsible for the initiation of any legal steps against violators.[76]

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The traders' unlicensed exodus to the Indian towns might well have come even if Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan had not sent goods to the Scioto, but in any event the door to virtually unrestrained competition had been wrested open. The company's Pittsburgh agent formally petitioned Croghan, nominally on behalf of the town's traders, complaining that business was "much Decayed of late" due to the entry of traders into the Indian country and unlicensed trade by settlers at Redstone Creek. At the same time, late in 1767, he supported the petition to Gage asking that a stockade be built to protect the town against Indian attack. This project, due to its mutual benefit to all, drew the endorsement of a number of prominent inhabitants and traders, including George Croghan and several of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan's competitors trading across the Ohio.[77]

The petition was a single cooperative effort in a sea of vindictive competition. Just weeks after their agent signed it, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan informed Colonel John Wilkins of the British army that Joseph Spear, Alexander Lowrey, and John Gibson, three endorsers of the memorial protesting the Philadelphia firm's trade at the Scioto, intended to trade among the Delaware and Shawnee towns again during the upcoming season. Wilkins was asked not to reveal that the firm's new Pittsburgh agent, John Campbell, was the source of this information. "Mr. Campbell's Situation among the Traders," they wrote, "is not the most

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eligible and Therefore We must beg the Favor of You, Not to make use of his Name, In Case you should write to Fort Pitt, respecting the Traders, as it may subject Him to some disagreeable Consequences."[78] The situation did not improve. In early 1769 Campbell wrote George Morgan from Pittsburgh. "From the great Number of Traders in every part of the Woods the Trade of this place is ruined. What little comes John Hart and Charles McClure generally share it," he reported; and "besides there is scarcly a possibility of taking Peltry at any Advantage Occasioned by the opposition the few People in Trade here still carry on against each other."[79]

Throughout the rivalry for commercial advantage Baynton and company also sought to have a favorable, in fact special, relationship with the army. An exchange of favors was the primary basis of the alliance, such as it was, and the initiative usually came from the company. Commander-in-chief Gage at times showed great reluctance to go along with their schemes, such as when they and Croghan contrived a plan whereby they would be paid for goods furnished for crown use well before the goods were delivered. It would allow the company to meet some of its debt obligations, but it was a highly irregular procedure.[80] In several instances the company asked for a large favor, such as special protection of property from creditors or rioters, with little

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to offer in return except reminders of the importance of their Illinois trade.[81] As the company learned, the relationship worked best when they could offer some tangible service to the military. During 1766 and occasionally thereafter, the two parties helped one another overcome the logistical problems involved in opening a British supply line to the Illinois region. They loaned one another boats and contracted for the same laborers when too few could be found at Pittsburgh; the company hired workers for the army and sent them west under contract; oakum, pitch, hemp, and hardware for batteaux were shipped by Baynton and Wharton or furnished to the army from company supplies at the Ohio; company employees carried dispatches to commanders at Forts Pitt and Chartres.

The army was pressed for time, and General Gage was more than willing to utilize the resources of the Philadelphians to help overcome shortages of labor, equipment, and boats at Pittsburgh during the push to establish garrisons in Illinois. The company was careful to point out that "We chearfully relinquished Our Own Interest" in helping the army, but British officers knew better. Soldiers placed in company boats due to transport shortages provided protection and cheaper labor than hired batteaumen. Every boat, nail, and firearm was strictly accounted for and returned or replaced in kind, and at times the company was short of labor and had

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to wait for artisans to finish boats for the military first. The relationship was in Gage's words "a Mutual Advantage" to company and crown.[82] As Baynton and company confessed, their Illinois venture was "both hazardous and extensive," and could not survive without protection and regulation by the military. If the company could ingratiate itself with an officer and receive "the Favour of your Interest" in granting supply contracts or other considerations, so much the better.[83]

Efforts to cultivate cordial relationships with officers were not unusual, especially for operators such as George Croghan, Samuel Wharton, and William Trent. In British and American politics of the eighteenth century, personal influence or attention from the proper official could be crucial to the success of a project or venture, and powerful friends were actively courted. It was usual to preen someone whose decisions could be of great importance, to stay in his attention if for no other reason. Merchants operating in the west politely reminded post commandants of their readiness and ability to supply any needed goods, wrangled for preference in the awarding of contracts, and recommended associates to officers "to beg of you for him your countenance and protection."[84] Large enterprises at times worked hard to gain the interest of military commanders. In 1760, for example, Thomas Cresap of the Ohio Company offered Colonel Bouquet, commander of British forces

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in the region surrounding the forks of the Ohio, a full share -- 25,000 acres -- in the company's requested grant. Bouquet was not completely hostile to the Ohio Company's prospectus for settlement, but he believed, and embodied the view in his 1761 proclamation, that a headlong rush for land without satisfaction of Indian claims would be most unwise, so he declined the offer. Cresap then offered to guarantee Bouquet's election to a Maryland assembly seat, but the colonel quickly refused this favor also.[85] George Croghan and Robert Callender had somewhat better luck as Bouquet's friends. They aided him in land transactions he made in Pennsylvania. Later Indian superintendent Johnson, in an effort to win support for a Croghan-inspired Illinois land scheme, suggested that General Gage might be interested in the deal. Although interested in acquiring some western lands, Gage declined participation in the Illinois venture.[86] As Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan learned when their dealings with Colonel John Wilkins at Fort Chartres soured to the point of conflict, the friendship of important commanders could never be guaranteed absolutely but was far preferable to their animus.[87]

The entire system, from Indian hunters to eastern and British creditors, was shattered twice: once when the French seized large numbers of traders and goods before 1755 and again with the Indian uprising of 1763. These

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losses prompted a number of traders, encouraged by their creditors, to come together as "suffering traders" in hopes of recouping the losses of goods and unpaid Indian debts. Many of the group eventually formed the Indiana Company, which in the late 1760s and early 1770s sought a compensatory grant of land in the upper Ohio Valley. The whole affair was engineered by Samuel Wharton, William Trent, and a few close associates. Wharton and Trent knew how to accumulate the reams of depositions and accounts needed to press the collective claim of the sufferers, and through purchase or proxy became the manipulators of what on paper was a very large group of claims. However, a dissident band of creditors, anxious about their own losses, gathered a rival faction of the "suffering traders," and even within the Trent group many came to view their leaders with suspicion. Competition, not cooperation, still played the primary role in traders' relations with one another.[88]

"The vilest of our own Inhabitants and Convicts imported from Great Britain and Ireland" -- so the Pennsylvania assembly characterized the participants in the Indian trade in 1754.[89] While extreme in its expression, that attitude in its essence was shared by many in government: traders required control, at least if one cared to maintain any sort of cordial relationship with the Indian nations subject to their greed. While the western trade

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was never completely controlled, until the mid-1760s Croghan and commandant Bouquet were about as successful in restricting the upper Ohio Valley's trade to Pittsburgh, and regulating it there, as could be expected. Of course Croghan himself straddled the line separating regulator from regulated, acting more as a willful power broker than as a distinterested policeman. Yet his and the army's efforts helped focus trading activity at Fort Pitt during its early years. In many respects nothing but a way station, the little town reflected the fact that trade endeavors were "ventures" in the terminology of the day, speculative forays to tap the wealth of the interior with a modicum of investment or innovation. Nevertheless, there was a concentration of traders, their stores, and their activity there far greater than anywhere else in the west except at the other major posts such as Niagara, Detroit, and the Illinois outposts. Trading interests still chafed under close regulation if it hurt business, however, and when the opportunity presented itself there were always traders who engaged in illegal forms of trade. The nature of the business itself probably served more than anything else to impose bounds on the competition among traders, for a reckless overextension of resources in search of advantage over others could bring ruin. While not perpetually disrupted or unstable, the situation was

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dynamic, flexible, and, in the view of its participants, potentially rewarding for those who bettered their fellows in the trade.

"The Country People begin to drop in with Indian Meal", Hugh Mercer, the Pennsylvania colonel temporarily in charge at Pittsburgh reported matter-of-factly in January 1759, and drop in they did.[90] During that year people from the western sections of Virginia and Maryland, especially from the South Branch of the Potomac, went to the Ohio forks "in droves," according to one observer, to sell butter, cheese, liquor, flour, cattle, corn, oats, hogs, and salt to the army. This trade was considerably less mysterious to the Virginians than was the Indian trade. Some gentlemen farmers such as Adam Stephen and Charles Lewis used connections in the army to win contracts for supplies. Other people sold to quartermasters sent to purchase food for the hordes of people and animals gathering to build Fort Pitt, or simply packed their goods to Pittsburgh in hopes of some profit in the sutler's trade before returning home. These regions supplied provisions to Fort Pitt at least through the early 1760s.[91] The Pennsylvania road to the north was equally busy. In fact the Pennsylvania regiment's officers, according

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to Hugh Mercer in March 1759, "are one half resigning, to follow the Army Campaign as Sutlers and Pedlars." "Vermin," he called them, and Colonel Bouquet agreed: before receiving their commissions, he asserted, most were "only the basest artisans or Indian traders who are even more contemptible."[92] In the early years of its existence the post was swamped with what Mercer bluntly labeled "blood-sucking Pedlars." During his tenure as commanding officer Bouquet was especially perturbed by a multitude of dram shops, many of them operated by women, offering liquor to the troops. His efforts to deal with the problem led by mid-1762 to the licensing of all sutlers selling provisions and liquor at Pittsburgh, and grog shops thought to be conducive to disorder were clearly not to be among those favored with permits to sell.[93]

Within a short time of the origins of Pittsburgh -- two or three years at most -- one could buy there flour, bread, corn, beans and other vegetables, beef, veal, mutton, pork, venison, turkey, milk, butter, leather, and tallow. In addition, the homespun image of the frontier is belied by the wearing apparel, manufactured items, housewares, and foodstuffs -- such as liquor, wine, sugar, tea, chocolate, pepper, spices, and coffee -- available through the mercantile contacts of sutlers and traders, although perhaps in limited quantities or variety, and no doubt at a high price due to transport costs. In 1761 an ambitious trader

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drew up a list of goods appropriate for the Indian trade at Pittsburgh, then added, "A List of an Assortment of Goods to Suit the white People about the Fort." The latter included needles, pins, and thread, plus white shalloon of "the best and finest kind," "Serving Silk," a variety of types and colors of cloth, bonnets, handkerchiefs, hair ribbons, several kinds of men's and women's stockings, "Newest fashon" hats, "the best Silver Wash'd Buttons with Ivory or Bone Buttons," brass buttons, gilt buttons, and, for the soldiers, shoes, ruffled shirts, and two types of stockings.[94] The achaeological excavation of Fort Ligonier during the 1960s demonstrated that in a surprising number of respects the domestic material culture of that post's occupants differed little from that of the British colonies east of the Appalachians. For example, ceramics used at the site included delftware, redware, slipware, utilitarian stonewares, Chinese and English porcelain, white saltglazed stoneware, and some fragments of still other wares. All of it was packed over the mountains as officers' tea sets, tableware, chamberpots, and storage vessels in the company of bottles, wineglasses, forks, spoons, shoe buckles, candlesticks, and hundreds of other manufactured items.[95] There could of course be shortages of goods at Pittsburgh, and one trading agent explained that "this Place is not like Philadelphia or a Town in the Country where things may be got to Suite either in one Shop or another." Yet all the merchants

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in the town had supply connections in the east, and no one need walk the streets of Pittsburgh in buckskin if he preferred broadcloth.[96]

One commodity that was "always verrey Scarce at this Plas" was cash -- "their is not a farthing of money to be got here," one commanding officer lamented. The problem was particularly hard for the military and for eastern firms such as Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, for the drafts and certificates they frequently used to pay their debts were at times refused by local suppliers of goods and services.[97] Canny wash women and "Milk Women" demanded that Baynton and company's artificers settle their bills either in cash or in "Tea, Coffee, and Suggars." In general, the majority of local transactions were handled the same as they were in other local economies of the period: by running tallies kept in account books, by "noats," by the exchange of services and goods.[98]

There were some factors militating against the development of a resident force of skilled workers plying their trades at Pittsburgh. The army's general policy toward artisans was the same as Baynton and company's, and during the winter or any slack period most artificers were discharged to save money. In the winter of 1765 Captain William Grant learned the effects of such a policy, for "their is not a man belonging to the Garrison that can saw a Board," and the one soldier who attempted to shoe horses inevitably lamed

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them.[99] As late as 1770 there was no such thing as a resident boatbuilder at Fort Pitt, nor could anyone be found who could (or would) fabricate rivets and other ironwork for batteaux. Evidence indicates that many artisans at Pittsburgh were unable to support themselves solely by their trades. Anthony Thompson owned a tanning, currying, and shoemaking operation, most of the product of which was sold to the army, yet he claimed that he could not support his family and pleaded for a retail liquor license.[100] Such combinations of diverse activities were not unusual: for example, Indian trader Devereux Smith also brewed beer. Success was more readily available to the artisan through diversity than narrow specialization. The records of one Pittsburgh shop of the early 1770s, which employed an unknown number of artisans or helpers, contain entries for masonry, carpentry, locksmithing, gunsmithing, horseshoeing, furniture mending, general ironsmithing, tool and wagon repair, even gardening and letter writing. Practitioners of the most functional skills -- house carpenters, tailors, smiths -- were those most likely to be found among the town's residents.[101]

The local economy intersected with the activities of the military and the Indian department in a variety of ways. Local traders and merchants were a source of supply for Indian goods needed as presents from the crown and for breechclouts, leggings, kettles, tomahawks and other sundries furnished to dispatch carriers or provincial troops

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outfitted at royal expense. In the cash-short economy of the post local merchants also helped the government pay its bills. Traders and established sutlers had the goods, and at times the cash, needed to pay interpreters, messengers, batteaumen, and artificers who refused to take army certificates, or who had to be paid before army expense money arrived. No doubt in many cases these payments involved debts already incurred with the merchants by the crown's employees, but traders were willing to negotiate drafts when boatmen would not, so both crown and merchants benefited by the arrangement.[102]

Some men also sought opportunity in employment by the military or its provisions contractors as paymasters, clerks, commissaries, horsemasters, barrackmasters, or in other positions. Such posts could be handy sources of additional income. For John Ormsby, formerly of the British army, a commissary's position was what gave him the opportunity to go west with Forbes' campaign. Ormsby considered the job "a wretched employment" and was in turn thought "an ignorant Creature" by at least one officer, but he remained in Pittsburgh to follow a long and diverse career as retailer, Indian trader, ferry operator, and landowner.[103]

According to the system then in use, the army contracted with a private firm for provisions. These contractors then employed an agent or clerk at a post such as

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Fort Pitt to supervise the laying in of provisions and to protect the firm's interests, while the army appointed a deputy or assistant commissary of stores and provisions to oversee the issuance of rations and to insure the contractors' uprightness in all transactions. Each of these positions provided an opportunity for an enterprising local with the connections needed to get the job. As the army knew, the system could be extraordinarily imperfect and conducive to friction. Commanding officers' complaints of incompetence, negligence, or duplicity on the part of commissaries and contractors' agents were legion. Bouquet tested his theories on the matter for a month at Fort Pitt, during which time he kept the sole key to the provisions storeroom. Wastage under his sharp eye was only one quarter of one percent instead of the usual eight and a half percent -- "Every Body was Surprised but I am not." At the time Bouquet was tangled in a dispute with contractors' agent William Murray over a deficiency of several thousand pounds of rations.[104] There were other disputes as well, other courts of inquiry over provisions matters, but logistic necessity required the continued use of civilians to perform commissary and other functions, and such jobs provided one means by which locals could establish themselves or diversify their economic activities.

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Ever present amid the population of Pittsburgh were the soldiers of the garrison. At the peak of the fort's construction period there were over 2500 provicial and regular troops present, a number that fell rapidly after 1766 to a peacetime force of just two or three companies of regulars, no more than 150 men.[105] Before 1764 the soldiers were Pennsylvanians, Virginians, some Scottish Highlanders, a handful of royal artillerymen, and a core of several companies of the 60th or Royal American Regiment, consisting largely of Germans recruited in Pennsylvania and led by European officers such as Henry Bouquet and Simeon Ecuyer. When the missionary Christian Frederick Post traveled through Pittsburgh he frequently preached in German for the benefit of these men. After the Indian War of 1763-1764 the fort and the communication were garrisoned almost exclusively by the Royal Highlanders of the 42nd Regiment. These Scots were no more English than the Royal Americans had been and were strangers to the region on their arrival there. During their tenure at the post half of chaplain James McCleggan's sermons were in Erse, the Highlanders' gaelic tongue. In 1767 they were replaced by men of the Royal Irish Regiment, the 18th, another unit new to America.[106]

Life at Pittsburgh, at least life with the army, was of limited appeal to many of these men. Once at Fort Pitt both provincials and regulars might find themselves detained

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past their terms of enlistment, a situation creating "a Spirit of discontent and desertion."[107] For this reason and others, desertion and mutinous behavior were not unusual and punishments of as many as one thousand lashes or occasionally of execution were meted out in an attempt to control the situation.[108] Soldiers committed other crimes as well, including assaults on one another and on their non-commissioned officers. One resident of Pittsburgh called them "Superlatively Insolent."[109]

On occasion troops were drilled or practiced firing at marks, but most of their hours were taken up by guard duty or the dull phsycial labor of construction projects, quarrying, gardening, planting and harvesting corn and grain, haying, repairing boats, digging for coal, fencebuilding, and chopping and hauling firewood. In 1761 Henry Bouquet acknowledged that service at Fort Pitt was so much harder than that at most other garrisons, and the necessities of life so much more expensive, that it was just for soldiers there to expect additional pay for their physical labors. He also lamented that his Pittsburgh troops had "been so long labourers that the soldier is buried under the Clown."[110] The soldiers' diet was as dull as their daily routine. It was a bland and repetitive fare of bread, beef or pork pickled in salt and stored in barrels, fresh meat when available, a little rice, and some butter and cheese. In the spring of 1759 the army command agreed that rice,

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peas, and butter were too bulky or perishable to include in the provisions contract for Pittsburgh, and allowances of flour and meat were increased to compensate. On separate occasions the men of the garrison complained that they were being cheated in the issuance of rations, requested more fresh meat in their diet, and refused to consume any more salted provisions.[111] Liquor was another standard element of the troops' enervating diet. In addition, officiers tried, not always successfully, to supply vinegar, hard cider, or fresh greens and vegetables from the woods or gardens to counter scurvy, which they well understood was the result of a constant diet of salted meat, plain bread, and little else.[112] In gardens and nearby fields the soldiers grew corn and garden vegetables to supplement their fare and as a project to keep them busy.[113]

Military life was a different matter for the commissioned officers. "The Soldiers Rejoyce but not the Officers," one observer noticed when news of peace with France arrived at Pittsburgh in 1763.[114] Peace to the officers meant probable reductions in force and the possibility of being placed on the half-pay list. In addition, their daily routine was free of the physical labor of the rank and file, their material surroundings less spartan. As gentlemen, commissioned officers often had personal servants.[115] While their men drank only rum or whiskey, they brought supplemental supplies of madeira, port,

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and spirits to the outpost to cushion life in the wild. The most garish example was that of Virginia planter William Byrd III: while serving with his regiment at Fort Pitt in 1759 he received from his worried mother a wagon brimming with eleven dozen bottles of his "old wine," a demijohn of French brandy, and a trunk stuffed with sweetmeats, coffee, chocolate, tea, sugar, and "good English sope."[116] The officers' mess was, on a small scale, something of a gentlemen's club; there travelers of sufficient notice were invited to take meals and raise a few glasses of good liquor. "Upon Our Arrival here," Samuel Wharton wrote his business partner from Pittsburgh, "We immediately waited upon the Commandant and That Day dined and supped with Him -- In Short for several Days and nights, We were Obliged to undergo a very severe Regimen of Drinking."[117]

The officers' attention to these matters was symptomatic of a larger phenomenon; in fact they as a group went to great lengths to construct at Pittsburgh an idealized environment within which they could feel comfortable and happy. A favorite project of commandants from 1762 to 1764 was the construction near the fort of a formal garden, bowling green, and deer park -- complete with one solitary deer. To its creators this fenced and ordered patch of ground served as a comforting reminder of "civilized" life, a cultivated garden in the midst of untamed wilds.[118] And

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in a striking instance of European social ritual -- one considered tragic and unnecessary by other officers -- two ensigns fought a makeshift sunrise duel that resulted in the loss of one participant's life.[119] Early in 1763 the post's officers eagerly attended a "club" every Monday evening and a "ball" or assembly every Saturday. There is a good chance that these gatherings -- along with a raucous St. Patrick's Day celebration -- were concocted by George Croghan to take advantage of Colonel Bouquet's absence and establish an advantageous personal relationship with acting commandant Simeon Ecuyer. If so, then Croghan judged wisely, for Ecuyer and his fellow officers were enraptured by the twice-weekly opportunity to fend off depression and enjoy the company of local women.[120] Even so, civilization did not always win out over the wilderness. In sharp contrast to the cooly formalized behavior of the ensigns' duel was the quarrel between two officers at Fort Pitt who beat one another with fists and clubs in a battle that continued for three days before the commander could restore order. And on the road east of Bedford in 1761 a lieutenant with a wagon train from Pittsburgh horsewhipped, then fatally shot, a man who struck the officer's dog while breaking up a dogfight.[121]

For many officers Pittsburgh embodied such an image of isolation that service there was tantamount to a period in exile despite reasonably comfortable material surroundings. Ensconced in the gentlemanly comforts of Virginia,

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George Mercer referred to Bouquet as "in the Pittsburgian Territories." "May we not hope my good Sir, to take you by the Hand once again in the Polite World?" he taunted. "Surely you can not be doomed to perpetual Banishment." Another friend informed Bouquet that he would be welcomed in Philadelphia "whenever you please to make your Appearance among Christians."[122] The Swiss officer returned the thought: to Bouquet, Fort Pitt was "this Hutt of savages," a post in the midst of "the eternal horror of the forest." "Three years of Pittsburgh would wear out any man's Patience, and Zeal; and whatever you may think of your Inhabitants, the worst Company is better that None at all," he wrote. "The only means of diversion in thie country is either to take a wife or a mistress. . . . One must be born here or forget all one has seen elsewhere to be content with the men and women found there."[123]

These sentiments went beyond the witty sparring of letters between officers at Pittsburgh and friends enjoying the "civilized" comforts of England or the seaborad. They called attention to a special perception of the environment at Fort Pitt, emphasizing its isolation, its distinctiveness, its separation from the coastal colonies. No doubt some officers of the garrison would have agreed with the quarter-master of the Royal American Regiment who pronounced the forks of the Ohio "a Very Sweet pleasant place," but many shared Bouquet's bleaker view of the situation. Major

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Charles Edmonstone of the Royal Irish Regiment boasted that he had traveled through much of Europe but "never knew what mankind were" before coming to Pittsburgh. Simeon Ecuyer, a Swiss like Bouquet, felt that "months at Fort Pitt are eternities," and declared churlishly that "everyone here, except the garrison, is the scum of nature."[124]

In physical terms the isolation of Fort Pitt from the more settled areas was nowhere as great as that of Forts Chartres or Michilimackinac. Yet a special express could cover the distance between Pittsburgh and army headquarters in New York in no less than twelve or fourteen days, and ordinary dispatches took a week or more longer to make the journey. Officers on the Ohio River complained of the lack of a trustworthy postal service to carry their private correspondence to and from the settlements, and blanched at the high cost of wagonage of personal effects over the mountains.[125] Even in the early 1790s it took six days for a traveler to journey between Carlisle and Pittsburgh under normal conditions, but the sheer distance made less impact in the 1760s than the fact that the route was so bare of inhabitants. Moravian missionary John Heckewelder captured this feeling when he recorded a trip west in 1762: "We felt as if relieved from an insupportable weight, when, on arriving at Fort Pitt, we again found surselves in the company of the living."[126] With time there came to be more settlement in the "glades" between the mountain ridges,

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but much of the mountain country itself was badly suited for farming and remained thinly settled. The Appalachian ranges gave physical substance to the common perception of Pittsburgh's isolation from the colonies. Charles Mason, the boundary surveyor, called Laurel Hill, one of the westernmost of the Allegheny ridges, "a Wild of Wildes; the Laurel overgrown, the Rocks gaping to swallow up, over whose deep mouths you may step. The whole a deep melancholy appearance out of nature." In the prevalent idiom one journeyed "up the country" to Pittsburgh and returned "down the country" to the settlements. It is little wonder that the mother of Colonel William Byrd III fretted over his duty at the Ohio forks: "tis to no purpose my most dear son to tell you how alarm'd I was at your wintering in that inhuman and inhospitable desert, but I must bear my adverse fate, when neither my tears nor prayers can prevent it."[127]

For many British and Americans Pittsburgh bore an almost exotic sense that contributed to its picture of isolation and stangeness. Employees of the provincial store in 1762 sent the Pennsylvania governor a captive wolf, a bobcat, and a raccoon as gifts from the wilds of Pittsburgh; later the agent of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan went one better by sending a carefully restrained cougar to his employers in Philadelphia.[128] The element of the exotic was best experienced through a visit to the site of

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Braddock's defeat. For some reason large numbers of the dead left on that battlefield, as well as those on Grant's Hill, where a British party met defeat in 1758, were never buried.[129] Braddock's Field was a scene that fascinated visitors for years after 1758. Artificers who were sent up the Monongahela after timber diverted to the site to view the trees shattered by cannon fire and the spot "where there are men's bones lying about as thick as the leaves do on the ground; for they are so thick that one lies on top of another for about a half mile in length, and about one hundred yards in breadth." The spectacle both shocked and intrigued its viewers. This confusion was reflected by a transient clergyman who called the ghastly place "a disgrace to the British commanders at Fort Pitt," yet collected a skull and mandible as curios "which I afterwards presented to Mr. Stewart's Museum in Hartford."[130]

The visitor also rubbed shoulders with Native American culture in and around Fort Pitt. As late as 1772 a traveler witnessed a young Indian taking on the physical attributes of a warrior by having most of his hair pulled out to form a scalplock and the fleshy part of his ears slit to form decorative hanging loops. Not long before, a warrior had avenged the death of his father by ceremoniously executing another Indian with his war club in the house yard of a Pittsburgh resident.[131] Indians of a variety of nations and linguistic groups came to trade in the town, while

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parties of warriors, especially Six Nations men bound for war against the Cherokee, stopped to pay respects to Indian agents and commandants and to ask for provisions for their journey. Numerous councils and treaties, ranging from small meetings to major conferences, were also held at the fort; a significant conference might bring several hundred Delaware, Shawnee, Iroquois, Munsee, Mahican, Ottawa, Wyandot, Twightwee, even distant Potawatomie, Indians. Some 685 attended a council in August 1760, while over 1100 chiefs, war captains, warriors, women, and children were at Pittsburgh for an important conference in the spring of 1768.[132]

The cultural exchange between Indian and white societies was both material and social. Through trade and gift-giving, Native Americans adopted elements of European clothing and material culture, which could be valued for political as well as practical needs: as the Delaware leaders Shingas and Delaware George understood, houses built with European technology lent prestige and status to their villages.[133] Natives who dealt frequently with whites sometimes adopted or were known by English names -- not just designations of Captain Johnny, Captain Jacobs, or White Eyes, but also "borrowed" names such as William Davis, Simon Girty, Hutchins, Sir William Johnson, and Jonathan Armstrong. There were also sexual relationships between the two groups. A few missionaries visited the Indians as well. In particular, the Moravians enjoyed some success in the Christianization of

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Delawares.[134] In addition some whites, especially hunters and traders, became Indianized to a degree in their dress and life-style.

Yet the cultural interaction was insufficient to dissolve the pyschological, cultural, and political lines separating Indians and whites. Neither group had a theory of conscious syncretism advocating a blend of the two societies. White prisoners of the Indians, especially those captured while young who grew up with conspicuous elements of Native American culture, were thought "more Stupid and more Indians than their Masters" by many whites.[135] "Savages" was the usual generic term for Indians used by army officers during both peace and war, and even those whites considered most sympathetic to Indians labeled them "theevish" and difficult to control.[136] Equivalent views of whites were not well recorded, but as soon as the British ousted the French from the forks of the Ohio in 1758, Native American leaders sought diplomatically to exclude any permanent Anglo-American presence from west of the mountains.[137] And the relations between the two races were influenced by their contact as enemies at war. Before 1763, despite rumors of French-led offensives, Pittsburgh was threatened only by periodic thefts of livestock or raids on unprotected working parties, but the Indian uprising of 1763 and the subsequent campaigns of 1764 saw the upper Ohio Valley's Indian and

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white residents in direct confrontation. The divergence of Indian and British-American goals in the region, coupled with a continued distrust on both sides, made any wholesale blending of the two cultures difficult even after 1764.

Not even the traders, those who rubbed shoulders with Indian cultures most frequently, often to the point of learning Indian languages or taking Indian wives, ceased to be British Americans. No trader seems to have had any better knowledge than the army or Indian department had regarding the real imminence of a Native American uprising in 1763, and a number of them, along with their servants and employees, were killed or captured while trading away from the post at the outbreak of hostilities.[138] Stuffy Quaker James Kenny reported once that after "a Barbacue of Tortle" on an island in the Allegheny, "[Levi Andrew] Levy the Jew and [Hugh] Crafford the Trader . . . came over about Dusk like so many Drunken Indians."[139] Yet no matter how much they might seem "like" Indians to Kenny at times, they were still Levy "the Jew" and Crawford "the Trader;" few if any whites who experienced Pittsburgh abandoned their previous norms of behavior and truly "went native." For Baynton and company's agent John Irwin, frontier conditions were to be tolerated if necessary, but not welcomed. His essential requirements of life included relatively clean living quarters, orderly and efficient co-workers, knives and forks, a proper teapot. His thoughts were echoed by the factor of another eastern trading firm, to whom Pittsburgh was "this Beggarly place."[140]

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Eighteenth-century British Americans used the term "frontier," but to them the frontier was no crisp line, nor did it move inexorably from east to west. To contemporaries the frontier was where the culture of white Europeans confronted the "wildness" of nature and of Native American cultures, but had not eliminated enough of the wildness to make the area "settled" or "inhabited". There were no clear or firm definitions: it had to do with the number of farmsteads, roads, and towns, the (white) population density, the absence of wildness that each observer found sufficient to distinguish betweeen frontier and non-frontier places. There was usually a vaguely delineated band or zone with very fuzzy edges that might be referred to as "the frontier" by a number of people at any given time. This zone could shift back and forth, east and west, as the effects of Pontiac's War demonstrated. In its early years Pittsburgh -- "this place which is Called an English Town" -- was an enclave well to the west of settlements still considered to be "frontier" settlements, tied by its "communication" to Anglo-American society to the east.[141] What is important to remember is that the "frontier" existed in the observer's perception, and change occurred principally on the part of the environment and the Indians and not on the part of Anglo-American culture.

There was some adaptation to local circumstances, to be sure, but without thinking about it one way or another,

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inhabitants of Pittsburgh retained a great deal of the culture they brought with them. A visitor certainly recognized the architectural form of structures at Pittsburgh even though local circumstances favored their construction of logs rather than of frame or brick. Nor was the absence of local government or the frailty of the steps taken to establish church and school a sign of the rejection of previous cultural norms. The town at Fort Pitt was simply not inwardly-oriented, and a pragmatic self-interest was the primary motivating factor for its residents.

For those who were at Pittsburgh through little choice of their own, the wilderness setting could overpower the material and cultural presence of Great Britain at the forks of the Ohio, creating a dark and gloomy perception of isolation and incompleteness. Less introspective and more utilitarian was the perception of those attracted to the spot for economic reasons, to whom the interaction between "wilderness" and "civilization" meant an opportunity for gain.[142] Those pursuing commercial gain also had sharply delineated goals that did not include a concern for the internal structure or even the permanence of a community at Pittsburgh. Competition could be a much stronger force than mutual association, and a certain lack of restriction was welcomed. The population of the village seems to have been small enough, and the needs of its residents few or simple enough, to allow

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an extremely pragmatic laissez-faire attitude to operate, one based on the circumstances of the situation and not on any articulated ideology of individualism. There was an occasional association of individuals to attack a specific problem, and some limited efforts on the part of the Croghans and the Trents of the town to exert local leadership, but there was no attempt to develop an alternative to the relatively loose regulation of the place by the British commandants or to reproduce the complete institutional structure of an Anglo-American town.

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CHAPTER 3

BEYOND THE PROVINCE OF LAW

For most of the 1760s the upper Ohio Valley was part of an extensive military and Indian reservation that lacked the system of civil jurisdiction common to British colonies along the seaboard. The jurisdictional arrangements governing the region were never completely formalized, nor did they supersede all aspects of provincial authority west of the mountains. A combination of factors produced this curious situation. Prodded by wartime expediency in the 1750s, the British government sought to centralize authority in military affairs and Indian relations, but refrained from building a complete structure of civil government to control the interior. At the same time British army commanders formulated rough systems of regulation intended to give them control over the army's own local situation in the west as well as over trade and Indian affairs. Faced with an explicit British policy placing control of the west in the crown's hands, provincial authorities for their part felt no immediate need to pursue a vigorous role in the Ohio Valley, although they remained constantly aware of the importance of preserving their colonies' chartered claims to the transmontane region. Additionally, colonial officials

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could with little imaginative effort view the crown's position in the west as a temporary one, and were willing to bide their time.

Regulation of the trans-Appalachian area might have been clearer and more consistent except for the fact that there were supposed to be few white inhabitants of the region, a presumption that did not accord with actual circumstances. Although the restriction of access to the region was a pillar of the British government's policy, both with and without official sanction there was migration into the region. While the army and Indian department officials could to some degree regulate the situation near the forts, and even perform some of the functions of the missing civil jurisdiction, a large portion of the settlement occurred beyond the effective bounds of government power. Even at Pittsburgh and other centers of activity there was none of the structure of local government common to the seaboard colonies: no county officers or magistrates, no coroners, sheriffs, or constables, no taxes, no civilian courts, no system of regulating inheritance or overseeing the transfer of property, no commissioners to determine the courses of local roads or to license taverns. Thus the initial settlement of the region occurred without the aegis of any regular jurisdiction by a local civilian government.

Imperial policy regarding the control of the west was founded on the hard facts of the British situation in the Ohio Valley. Even before Forbes evicted the French from

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Fort Duquesne in 1758, the Indians of the upper Ohio, although they ceased to support the French, were unwilling to support actively the British effort without assurances that permanent settlement of the region would not follow an English victory.[1] Misunderstanding, perhaps even duplicity, marked early negotiations on the issue. The Delaware insisted that in December 1758 Bouquet promised to withdraw all English forces as soon as the French threat was nullified, leaving at most an unfortified trading house in the region. Bouquet denied that he ever conceded to abandon the army's forts.[2] British commanders and Indian agents continued to insist on this point, yet for practical reasons were respectful of the Indians' very potent threat that settlement would not be tolerated. The official policy, as conveyed by Generals Amherst and Monckton to the Iroquois, Twightwee (Miami), Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, and other nations in 1760, was that the British did not intend to take up Indian lands, but would establish only very limited settlements for the support of the forts, which were justified as necessary for the protection of trade and defense against French intrigue. To uphold such a promise the British would have to regulate all British-American activity in the region, even to the point of forbidding whites to hunt on Indian lands.[3] The orders issued by Bouquet during the next year translated this commitment into a set of regulations providing for strict military control over entry by whites into the transmontane region.[4]

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In barring unlicensed entry into the transmontane region in October 1761, Bouquet cited the 1758 Treaty of Easton as his authority for preserving the west as an Indian region untrammeled by whites. The treaty itself did no such thing, but was an agreement whereby Pennsylvania returned to the Iroquois confederacy formal title to the unsettled lands between the Alleghenies and the Ohio. The lands had been deeded to the colony in 1754 but were not yet paid for, and the Six Nations, through their councils, had become dissatisfied with the transaction and refused to ratify it. At the time Pennsylvania's government was happy to return ownership of the territory to the Iroquois, for the Easton agreement did much to neutralize France's discontented allies in the Ohio River region during Forbes' advance on Fort Duquesne. Bouquet used a rather broad interpretation of the agreement as the authority for his 1761 proclamation. On the basis of the crown's approval of the Easton meeting's results, he cited the treaty as evidence of royal policy supporting Indian title to the western lands. He also applied his proclamation to everything west of the mountains and did not limit his closure to the region exchanged between Pennsylvania and the Iroquois in the Easton deeds.[5] The colonel cited the royal approval of the Pennsylvania treaty because he had no other formal expression of royal policy on the matter, but within six weeks after he drafted his proclamation the crown issued an official statement of its own. In a directive of December 1761 to royal governors, the

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government insisted that there be no further grants of land in territories owned by the Indians, and no purchases of land from Native Americans without approval from Whitehall.[6]

By late 1761, then, the basic elements of imperial policy had been worked out: centralized control over military and Indian affairs, effected by a commander-in-chief for North America and a royal Indian department superintendent; the need to regulate the peltry trade; the necessity of avoiding war with the Indians of the Ohio Valley; the restriction of settlement; the prohibition of private land purchases from the Native Americans.[7] These policies were confirmed by the royal proclamation of October 1763, which outlined a working program for the American territories ceded by the French at the close of the war. Licensing all British-American access to the reserved lands of the west had been the heart of Bouquet's proclamation two years earlier, which restricted entry into the region even by transient white hunters. The 1763 proclamation by the king focused instead on restricting the issue of warrants of survey or land patents by governors. No warrants or patents were to be allowed in the area beyond the headwaters of the rivers flowing into the Atlantic and not included within the specified bounds of either Quebec or the Floridas. This restriction was to apply "for the present, and until our further Pleasure be known."[8] Furthermore, any present occupants of territories reserved to the Indians were to abandon their settlements and move elsewhere. Trade with

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the Indians was to be free to all, but traders were required to obtain licenses from the governors of the colonies whence they came, as well as posting bond for their compliance with all trade regulations.

The 1763 proclamation lacked the specific enforcement clause of Bouquet's proclamation, which, on the colonel's own authority, had threatened a court martial for anyone in the reserved tract without a proper pass. The king's order did not specify the means by which any encroachers should be removed and punished -- they were "forthwith to remove themselves," or suffer the "Pain of our Displeasure." Yet the crown's proclamation did what Bouquet's could not: it enjoined governors from making land grants, and it gave royal definition and sanction to the Indian reservation west of the Appalachians.

As understood by the Lords of Trade, the reserved lands were "under Your Majesty's immediate Protection, . . . where no Settlement by planting is intended, immediately at least, to be attempted; and consequently where no particular form of Civil Government can be established." The king and his advisors could agree neither to place the tract under the jurisdiction of the governor of Canada nor to grant the army's commander-in-chief a special commission allowing him to exercise civil jurisdiction in the zone. The Lords of Trade finally advised the king that a delay in deciding the form of government for the region would do no harm, so the proclamation did not discuss the subject.[9] One specifically

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jurisdictional clause appeared in the edict, and it was limited: concerned that the reserved lands might serve as a haven for felons, the crown allowed any military or Indian department officer to take up fugitives from justice and return them to the colonies from which they fled. No provisions were made for crimes committed within the restricted zone itself. Several years later Lord Hillsborough acknowledged in hindsight that the western region, "not being included within the Jurisdiction of any other Colony," was subject "to many Difficulties and Disadvantages from the want of some form of Government necessary in Civil Society," but in 1763 the ministry did not see the matter as one of urgent import.[10]

By the time the royal proclamation was issued in the autumn of 1763 the Ohio forks had been occupied by the British army for nearly five years. Naturally the military controlled the affairs of its own house by regulating the soldiers' conduct and punishing their desertions, insubordinations, and similar misdeeds. The army also played a strong role in the control of the western trade and Indian affairs, for the military was the only mechanism in the west by which the regulation of these matters could come about. Regulatory orders issued by Colonel Bouquet during the early 1760s followed the tenet that settlement and trade must be controlled in order to reduce the likelihood of Indian discontent, and also presumed that a commandant had the power to regulate "the safety and Police of this Fort."[11]

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And as Bouquet was aware, these rules, which regulated liquor supplies and sales, trade and local retailing, prices, access to the area by whites, and the construction and occupancy of buildings, often affected civilians.

Bouquet and General Robert Monckton, who was active in promulgating some of the early regulations, had no specific precedent for broad jurisdiction in the Pittsburgh district. Yet the upper Ohio Valley was a theater of war until peace was declared in 1763, and commanders presumed that a certain latitude existed in such circumstances. Such was also the case during the Indians' siege of the fort in 1763, when the commandant exercised authority over civilians sheltered within the fort.[12] Wartime conditions from Pontiac's War only ceased with Bouquet's campaign of late 1764. In all it was an unusual situation, and one not totally disagreeable to the officers, for Pittsburgh's location far from a settled European population gave commanders there a greater degree of control over the local situation then was possible for officers of troops stationed along the seaboard. Officers in the west could do things that commandants of garrisons in New York or Philadelphia could not, such as restricting settlement and approving all construction near the forts, controlling the transport and sale of liquor and provisions, requiring passes of all travelers, even regulating local business hours and livestock in the streets.

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However, the army made no attempt to establish itself as a complete surrogate for civil government, one that could perform all the varied functions of county commissioners and local courts, and the military's jurisdictional role in the west remained imprecise. Bouquet's and Monckton's regulations of the early 1760s were no corpus of law, but merely a series of orders spread over a period of many months, each aimed at a specific problem from the army's point of view: hogs rooting in the King's Garden, soldiers idling away the time in tippling houses, unrestrained sale of liquor to Indians. Yet behind this regulation of the district lay the presumption that the army could regulate civilians. Bouquet assumed that his authority in the district was valid even over persons not enrolled in the army. As he understood the situation there was no civil jurisdiction in effect in the area, and therefore military rule was legitimate.[13] In addition all Englishmen and Americans in the region were, theoretically at least, either attached to the army, settled near a road or post under military permit, or trading under the regulations of the army and the Indian department, and therefore were, in Bouquet's opinion, subject to his control. Courts martial were Bouquet's usual means of dealing with violations of trade regulations, and were the method by which he intended to punish transgressors of his proclamation of October 1761. He also convened what he called a "court of inquiry" -- the composition of which, whether of military officers or

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civilians, is unknown -- for investigative purposes in cases involving civilians. Some of his regulations specified punishment by banishment, the pulling down of the offender's house, or fines, some of which would go to support "the Poor" or the sick in the post hospital.[14] The commandant's own judgment appears to have been the main rule followed in the day-to-day military regulation of posts in the interior.[15]

Military jurisdiction was, then, a very extemporaneous affair in which there were no established provisions for handling many of the functions of civil government in the colonies. Some of these matters were handled in an impromptu fashion by local commanding officers as needed, while others seem to have been ignored. At times a post commandant was called on to perform functions ordinarily handled by a local magistrate in settled regions. For example, in at least one instance Colonel Bouquet assisted a merchant investigating a theft from his store, and in several cases the commanding officer was asked to aid persons bringing official processes or warrants from the colonies in search of debtors.[16] It may have been fairly standard procedure for post commandants to perform marriages, also. Makeshift arrangements were not uncommon. One enamored couple took advantage of missionary Christian Frederick Post's presence at Fort Pitt early in 1763 and requested that he marry them. Post, from Pennsylvania, "advised them to perform it as they do by a Magistrate,"

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and, in the absence of any such official, settled on the clerk of the Pennsylvania trading store as the closest local equivalent. The clerk played his role to the fullest by penning a marriage certificate and advertising the intended matrimony for thirty days, "which makes the people here Stair, in being so Strange a thing here."[17] Since permits to settle on the "communication" or at Pittsburgh did not convey ownership of the soil, landed property was in theory not an issue subject to dispute, and any judgment of the right to settle on a particular spot was officially in the army's hands. Disputes involving other forms of property, which normally might fall under the view of a civil court, were apparently either handled informally or were taken to courts in the provinces where the disputants had business or other interests. In one instance in which a civil court would ordinarily have jurisdiction, anyone with information about the estate and financial affairs of William Clapham, killed at the outbreak of the Indian uprising in spring 1763, was asked to attend a special court of inquiry held at Fort Pitt a few months later to settle Clapham's affairs.[18]

While it might touch a wide range of matters, the impromptu system of military regulation in the west had its limits, even in those matters relating to the "safety and Police" of the garrison town. These limits were more practical than legal in nature. When almost £1,000 (Pa.) of regimental subsistance money was stolen from Bouquet's quarters, the commandant complained that "the great Number

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of Inhabitants here, has made it Impossible . . . to find out if any are missing." At one point Bouquet decided that a fence stretching between the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers was needed to provide even greater control over access to, and egress from, the fort and town than could be provided by licenses and passes.[19] Commandant Simeon Ecuyer attempted to fix the price of corn at Pittsburgh during the 1763 siege, then was forced to allow a higher price when sellers refused to comply. And Pittsburghers drafted as militia for service along the communication during the 1763 conflict comported themselves as though "under no kind of Subordination."[20] Also, as demonstrated by the army's efforts to regulate trade, military regulation in the west of the 1760s was at its very best only garrison law. Under ideal circumstances the army could exert a fair degree of control at the posts, but beyond the forts, in the expanses of the trans-Allegheny territory where no troops were posted, regulation was largely ineffective.

By 1764 the army became considerably more sensitive about the application of its jurisdiction to civilians. The reason for the change was not the royal proclamation of October 1763, which, as noted above, was almost silent on the matter, but rather the entry of General Thomas Gage into the commander-in-chief's office, and his correspondence on the subject of jurisdiction with the judge advocate general's office in England. Bouquet had justified military authority over civilians in the Fort Pitt district on the basis of

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his observation that there was no civil jurisdiction in force there, and on his understanding that any civilians in the region were there under military authority. Under a very broad interpretation of the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War, which together formed the legal foundation for all actions by the British army, these arguments might have some validity. Yet according to the strict interpretation given to Gage by the deputy judge advocate general, military courts were to try only military personnel, and the application of military regulation to civilians as practiced by Bouquet and other officers would not be allowed.[21] For the duration of his tenure as commander-in-chief, Gage remained cautious about the relationship between his army and civilian authority.

In the spring of 1764 Gage hoped that the tract of land immediately surrounding Fort Pitt might be given special status as a form of military colony. Free grants of land could be made to settlers who would grow food and drill regularly as a militia available for immediate use in case of a threat. "They should have Courts of Justice of their own, and in every respect be a Little Community by themselves; of which the Commandant of the Fort should be Governor," Gage wrote. Such a military settlement would solve, in the commander-in-chief's opinion, many of the frustrating problems of supplying and manning the garrison, and would reduce dependence on recalcitrant colonial assemblies in time of crisis. Gage's proposal was based on

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the presumption "that neither Virginia or Pensylvania can claim by their Charter up to the Ohio." Henry Bouquet, commanding the region surrounding the forks of the Ohio, informed the general that the situation was more complex: George Croghan claimed extensive acreage by virtue of a private cession from the Iroquois that predated the French war; Virginia's charter claims had no western limit, and several major grants made by that government were still on the books; Pennsylvania's chartered bounds "will I think reach the Ohio, and extend 60 miles South of the Fort." In Bouquet's opinion the crown could nullify or block all of these claims to the region, but Gage, frustrated especially by the probable extent of the Pennsylvania proprietors' charter claims, let the matter drop.[22]

The creation of a special military colony surrounding Fort Pitt would have clarified the jurisdictional question, at least for that area included within its bounds. Without such a measure legal authority in the west remained muddled. Late in 1763 Gage had advised Bouquet to appoint a qualified officer as judge advocate at Pittsburgh -- "Attestations made before him, where there are no Civil Magistrates, will be Valid."[23] A little over a year later Gage sought a final resolution of the issue. He suggested to the government that the Mutiny Act be extended to North America, which had not been done before, and that the army's courts martial be given specific authority to hear any crimes committed in the territory reserved by the royal proclamation of 1763. The

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government responded with a Mutiny Act for North America in 1765, but, unwilling to grant the army judicial power over civilians, its authors instead provided a clause stating that lawbreakers should be turned over to the civil authorities in the closest adjoining province.[24]

Any pretension by the American provinces for a more direct role in the control of the interior was of course snubbed by British policies established at the beginning of the decade. When Governor Francis Fauquier pressed Virginia's claims to the Ohio Valley after Forbes' campaign, reminding Whitehall of the province's existing grants and of Dinwiddie's 1754 promise of land to anyone enlisting to help secure the forks of the Ohio, the Board of Trade curtly informed him that no such claims could be advanced in the face of Indian displeasure at western settlement.[25] Nevertheless, Fauquier was quick to protest Bouquet's 1761 proclamation barring unauthorized whites from the transmontane regions. The governor reminded Bouquet that Virginia patents from before the war covered land west of the mountains, and also questioned the colonel's threat of courts martial to enforce the proclamation against civilians. Knowing that he could neither negate nor confirm provincial land grants, Bouquet insisted that his orders were intended only to halt those "Vagabonds" who came "under pretence of hunting." He interpreted his actions as a move that would protect, not challenge, any legitimate Virginia grants in the west, and General Amherst concurred. Privately to

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Amherst, Bouquet confided that he believed the Virginians were still angry over his support of a campaign route through Pennsylvania during Forbes' march in 1758; he also confessed that he hoped his proclamation would burst the "bubble" of a resurgent Ohio Company's plans for western settlement.[26] Actually Bouquet's proclamation stated that English subjects west of the mountains must carry a written pass from either the commanding general or the governor of the person's colony of origin. In theory Fauquier's signature could have made legitimate any Virginia activity in the area so far as Bouquet's order was concerned, but the possibility of any action on Fauquier's part was negated by the arrival of the royal directive of December 1761, forbidding further grants in the west.

Although official policies placed control of western settlement firmly in imperial hands, provincial authority in the west was never a completely dead letter. For example, the army often aided people coming from the colonies in search of debtors at Pittsburgh. Yet the jurisdictional role of the colonies in the west was as poorly defined as the army's. The closest the government came to spelling out the situation came with the 1763 proclamation's rule that fugitives be returned to the colonies from which they fled, and the 1765 Mutiny Act clause stating that the nearest province had authority over cases involving civilians in the reserved tract. In one case in 1760, a debtor jailed at Pittsburgh protested that his enemies wanted him transferred

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to Maryland for trial, unfair to him as a Virginian. He also doubted the army's authority to hold him, or that of any sheriff who might come from the colonies to arrest him. The frustrated post commander finally shipped the man and another debtor to Fort Cumberland with orders that they should be released in thirty days if no sheriff appeared to take them into custody.[27] Bouquet appears to have been leery of using courts martial in certain cases even before the army was told to curtail its trials of civilians. In 1762 he called a court of inquiry to investigate the apparently accidental killing of a Pennsylvanian at Fort Pitt, then carefully forwarded both the evidence and the slayer to a magistrate of his own acquaintance in Pennsylvania.[28] Jurisdiction in such cases was never clear, especially before the Mutiny Act of 1765 -- whose origins were more important, the criminal's or the victim's? Maryland refused to deal with the murder of an Indian near Pittsburgh by a Maryland soldier on his way home in 1764. General Gage, attentive that "it is the Business of the Civil Power to detect Criminals, and have them brought to Justice," suspected that more interest would have been shown if a white Marylander had been the victim.[29]

Clearly, since there was no officially established government in the reserved tract, the provinces adjoining it always played some role, even if very badly defined, in the regulation of the region. In addition, British policy relied on the provincial executives to assist in the control

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of trade beyond the mountains by licensing traders and bonding them to comply with trade regulations. Nor did the 1763 proclamation or any other royal instrument attempt to revoke existing provincial charter claims to the west. The London government had made itself the arbiter of all decisions involving land grants, new purchases, and relations with the Indians west of the mountains, which placed limits on colonial expansion. Yet to anyone cautious about denying the ultimate rights of chartered colonies, certain colonial functions in the region might be placed in abeyance by royal edict, but provincial authority in a broad sense ran to the limits prescribed by charter, even if west of the Appalachian ranges. The official map showing the distribution of troops in North America in 1765 bravely depicted provincial bounds extending west of the proclamation limit; a 1766 map of the same subject, less certain, showed provincial claims west of the mountains with dashed lines only.[30]

In practical terms no one knew where those chartered bounds actually ran beyond the mountains. Maryland did not claim the lands surrounding the forks of the Ohio, not even before the western terminus of the Maryland-Pennsylvania line was determined by the Mason and Dixon survey of 1767. The matter involving the chartered limits of Pennsylvania and Virginia was much less clear. Unlike Virginia, whose grant continued in theory to the Pacific Ocean, Pennsylvania had a western limit, to be drawn five degrees of longitude west of the Delaware, but without a survey nobody could say

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exactly where the southwest corner of the Penn colony would fall. The Ohio Company's claims brought calls for a resolution of the problem as early as the late 1740s. When Governor Fauquier, pressed by various claimants to Virginia grants in the west, asked for a survey of the boundary in 1761, the crown concurred with Thomas Penn's view that boundaries foreshadowed settlement, and therefore would not be acceptable to the Indian residents of the Ohio Valley.[31] The boundaries remained unlocated.

If militia service was the issue, then neither Virginians nor Pennsylvanians were willing to assert sweeping claims beyond the settled portions of their colonies, for to do so could mean paying and supplying men serving well into the Ohio Valley on campaigns with the regular army. However, at other times the provinces sought actively to promote their claims to the west. Fauquier attempted to use the peace negotiations between Bouquet and the Ohio country Indians in 1764 as a means of getting what could be construed, under the proclamation of 1763, as an officially sanctioned Indian approval of Virginia settlements in the Kanawha River watershed, but the effort failed. Virginia had granted lands in the west, especially near the Kanawha, New, and Greenbrier rivers, before the French war, and Fauquier continued to assert the ultimate validity of those grants despite any changes in royal policy. Some lands in those areas remained occupied after 1763 despite the fact that they were west of the proclamation line.[32]

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Nor was Pennsylvania's government entirely mute regarding its authority in the west. In 1762 Governor James Hamilton appointed commissioners to receive white prisoners from the Indians at Pittsburgh and deliver a present of thanks on behalf of the province. Colonel Bouquet was extremely put out by what he considered to be the intervention of an individual colony into Indian affairs at the Ohio. Hamilton replied coyly that "I pretend not to understand punctilios of this Kind," yet his explanation was thorough and direct: "As the matter about which these Gentlemen were sent, took its rise at a Treaty held with me, within the undoubted limits of this Government, I did not imagine there could be any objection to its being concluded in my name in any of the Kings Garrisons within these limits as I conceive Fort Pitt unquestionably to be."[33] Stubborn on the issue of authority over Indian affairs, Bouquet nevertheless conceded that Pennsylvania's charter bounds probably did reach the Ohio River. Thomas Gage's opinion on this matter appears to have been shaped by Bouquet's statement to that effect in 1764.[34]

Other circumstances reinforced the view that Pittsburgh was, effectively, under Pennsylvania's jurisdiction. Administratively, the army thought of the post in essentially those terms -- Washington and the Virginians had been perceptive to oppose with such vigor the construction of the main military road westward through Pennsylvania during the 1758 campaign. Equally important was the proprietary

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colony's role in the peltry trade. The Pennsylvania store at Fort Pitt in the early 1760s was an official provincial operation, and traders in the upper Ohio Valley commonly were Pennsylvanians bearing that colony's licenses. Without Governor John Penn's approval, trade through Pittsburgh could not have reopened in 1765, for only by his proclamation could licenses again be issued and trade goods allowed to move along the communication.[35] General Gage for one always acknowledged this de facto rule of the region's trade by Pennsylvania, so much so that he suggested to the British government in 1769, when Indian affairs were to be turned back over to the colonies, that Pennsylvania be given authority to appoint Indian agents not just at Pittsburgh but in the Illinois country as well.[36]

The problems of authority and governmental power in the upper Ohio Valley became considerably more acute by the mid-1760s. For British military and Indian department officers in North America the immediate task remained the same: to keep the reserved tract controlled in a manner that would avoid war. Bouquet's Ohio campaign of 1764 demonstrated that a European army could be effective against Native American opponents, but also demonstrated the great cost of such action. An offensive thrust such as Bouquet's could be mounted only with a large number of men and

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considerable resources, requiring either a huge royal outlay or dependence upon a collection of stingy provincial assemblies. The latter course proved almost impossibly frustrating for the army in 1763 and 1764, while the former was constrained by the curtailment of the army's budget late in 1764.[37] An Indian conflict was no more appealing a prospect in 1765 than it had been in 1760. The best means of maintaining the official policy of Great Britain was to avoid conflict in the interior and keep the situation there as stable as possible by controlling trade and prohibiting settlement so that Indian discontent would not grow. Unfortunately for this policy the ability of English and American leaders to exert power in the region and control the situation was less and less apparent as the 1760s progressed. It was also increasingly clear that to many Anglo-Americans a change in the situation in the west was far preferable to a continuation of the crown's policies of the early 1760s.

Questions of English and provincial jurisdiction and regulation in the transmontane country were almost academic as long as the basic premise held true that there would be very few whites in the reserved tract, and that they would be carefully controlled by imperial officials. As the 1760s progressed both parts of this premise proved less and less valid. Settlement, according to the system framed by Monckton and Bouquet, was to be by military permit only, at posts and along the major communications where it would

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support the army's garrisons. Under these provisions modest settlements grew up at Bedford, Ligonier, Pittsburgh, and other spots along the Forbes road emanating from southeastern Pennsylvania. To the south, the British army encouraged the planting of crops at Fort Burd, a small post at the junction of Redstone Creek and the Monongahela River, to bolster food supplies at Fort Pitt during the early 1760s. The army soon found the situation in the Redstone-Monongahela area, and in the whole stretch of country between the Monongahela and the upper reaches of the Potomac, a difficult one to control. Interlopers in the district, both settlers and transient hunters, provided the direct impetus for Bouquet's proclamation of October 1761. He also issued vain orders that all planting be done within a limited radius of Fort Burd itself, and that there be no hunting in the Monongahela neighborhood by non-Indians.[38]

Military commanders were themselves at least partially to blame for the attractiveness of the Redstone district, for they promoted Fort Burd as a breadbasket for Pittsburgh, a place where ample compensation would be given to those bringing provisions for the troops at Fort Pitt. Also, the region was open to relatively easy access, via Braddock's trace and the upper branches of the Potomac, from the frontier settlements of Maryland and Virginia. In fact, the watersheds of the Monongahela and Youghiogheny rivers were attractive to settlers by the very early 1750s. Before the outbreak of war in the mid-1750s there were a few

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families in scattered settlements along the route of the Ohio Company's advance into the region and on tributaries of the Monongahela as far south as Tygart's Valley, within the present state of West Virginia. These families all fled or died during the Anglo-French conflict, but by 1759 some were returning, and new settlers came also. An unknown number of these people obtained army permits to settle along one of the communications or at forts or way stations.[39] War again disrupted the region in 1763-1764, then a significant influx of persons began again in 1765 and 1766.[40]

There were settlers to the east of Pittsburgh as well, but those in the Monongahela sector, at Redstone and other locations farther south, were far more noticeable in terms of Indian-British relations during the 1760s. In 1765, on the very heels of peace, "A Number of our people came over the Grate Mountain and Settled at Redstone Creek and upon the Monongehela," George Croghan reported. His superior in the Indian department, Sir William Johnson, summarized the problem from an official standpoint: "The Settlers about Redstone Creek increase which is what I apprehended for these people when they have once found a Spot where they are not under Landlord or Law will soon draw other Idle persons about them."[41] Estimates of their numbers varied, understandable since they were scattered over an area extending as far south as the Cheat River, a tributary of the Monongahela that runs for most of its course through what is now West Virginia. No thorough canvass of the

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region was ever made, but there must have been several thousand people in the region by the late 1760s. Estimates made from the summer of 1767 to the spring of 1768 placed the total at one hundred fifty to four hundred families in the Redstone-Youghiogheny-Cheat districts.[42] As early as spring 1766 some army officers credited estimates of at least five hundred families in the area.[43] It was commonly presumed that these people had come from Virginia or Maryland, although by 1768 there were reports that Pennsylvanians also were involved.[44]

Not only did the growth of this unauthorized Anglo-American population fuel the Indians' displeasure at the permanent occupation of the region by British colonists; it also amplified the possibility of friction between Indians and whites, which all too easily could spark into violence. Moreover, revenge -- usually in the form of taking a captive or slaying an enemy in retribution for a murdered kinsman -- was one of the primary motives for warfare on the part of the Indians. If the people closest to the victim could not be assuaged, the cycle of retaliation could escalate an isolated incident into a serious war.[45] The risk of interracial violence on a personal level was evident as early as January 1760, when George Croghan had to use all the diplomacy at his command to soothe a party of Iroquois at Pittsburgh, some of whom had been wounded in a drunken fracas with provincial soldiers from Virginia.[46] There were other incidents during the early years of the decade as well --

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thefts, robberies, fights, even homicides -- enough to stoke the resentments harbored by many in each group.[47]

The problem worsened after Bouquet's campaign into the Ohio country closed Pontiac's War in the autumn of 1764. Within weeks of the Ohio campaign a pair of white men returning to the upper Potomac settlements killed and scalped two Indians south of Pittsburgh. By June 1765 British military and Indian department authorities also had to contend with the murder at Pittsburgh of a trader's employee by a jealous Mingo husband.[48] "The Licenciousness of the Frontier Inhabitants in general is carried to a high degree," Colonel Bouquet wrote, "and unless Severe Measures are taken to restrain them within proper Bounds, and Hunting beyond the Allegheny Mountains is expressly forbid to them, It will be impossible to preserve Peace with the Indians."[49]

Licentiousness was much on the mind of army commanders in the spring and summer of 1765, primarily due to the Sideling Hill affair, when armed bodies of civilians near Fort Loudoun intercepted goods destined for Fort Pitt before the trade was officially reopened. The incident rattled any faith General Gage may have had in the supposedly disinterested deputy Indian superintendent, George Croghan, who helped bring on the whole mess by colluding in the illegal shipment. Equally unnerving was the Cumberland County rioters' open defiance of military authority: they threatened to whip or hang officers and sergeants of the Fort Loudoun troops; they interfered with army dispatch

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carriers; they refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of military passes and orders; and they proclaimed the army's subordination to the civil law, administered in this case by a local magistrate sympathetic to the rioters.[50] Nor was the commander-in-chief happy about the Pennsylvania government's handling of the affair. Gage believed that Governor John Penn's slowness in opening the Indian trade after the war benefited French interests in the Illinois country. The general also expected Penn to bring the full force of civil authority to bear against the Sideling Hill men. Gage offered the aid of troops but required Penn to take the initiative in accordance with their respective constitutional roles. The decisive action Gage hoped for never materialized. Early in the affair Penn confessed that "our Frontier people are certainly a lawless ungovernable crew" -- a group whose "resolution" contrasted sharply with "the extreme weakness of our Government" and made the normal operation of civil authority exceedingly difficult under such circumstances. Bitterly disappointed, Gage chided Penn late in 1765: "If any Shadow of Law or Justice remains in Pensylvania, I Am confident that You will leave no Method untried, to bring these Lawless Villians to condign Punishment."[51] When the entire incident threatened to repeat itself the following spring, Gage again hastened to offer Penn military aid should it be necessary.[52]

If the Cumberland County men were "licentious," even more so were those hardy independents squatting along

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the Monongahela and its tributaries far to the west of Fort Loudoun, people whose very presence was an affront to royal authority in the west. Collectively, they were an extremely persistent group. As early as 1762 a party of troops from Fort Pitt had journeyed up the Monongahela to burn the houses of illegal settlers.[53] Despite this action and the disruption of the 1763-1764 Indian war, a Virginia resident reported in the spring of 1765 that "the Frontier Inhabitants of this Colony and maryland etc., are Removing fast over the Allegany mountains in order to Sittle and live their." That summer, writing Indian superintendent Johnson about the recent interracial murders, the commander-in-chief remarked vaguely that "the Settlers, at Red Stone Creek are ordered away."[54] But the problem could not be solved so easily. Periodically through 1766 and 1767 General Gage, Superintendent Johnson, George Croghan, and Captain William Murray of the Highlanders at Fort Pitt exchanged reports of killings in the Monongahela region and elsewhere on the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontiers. On occasion robbery was a motive. Other times quarrels over liquor or deer hides ended in bloodshed. Tallying the number of whites killed during the last half of 1767, Gage remarked that "upon the whole, they seem pretty even with us in the article of murder."[55] Friction between the two groups was magnified even further by the location of a major warriors' path intersecting the Redstone-Monongahela region. By this route parties of Iroquois from the north journeyed to war

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against the Cherokee, often stopping at Fort Pitt en route, and along the path southward from the Redstone, Seneca and other Iroquois who were not residents of the area occasionally died in brushes with Virginia woodsmen.[56]

Geography and the jurisdictional situation in the west limited the government's ability to eliminate the problem. Officers at Fort Pitt had almost no information regarding the extent of the Monongahela and Cheat settlements: detachments issuing proclamations to the encroachers relied on hired civilians to beat the bushes and call the squatters to a convenient meeting place. Captain Murray at Pittsburgh received orders to dislodge illegal settlers "near your Fort or within your Reach," but the army's effective reach, given the extent of the Monongahela and its tributaries, was slight.[57] The only places where military activity was constant enough to deter squatters were in the immediate vicinity of Fort Pitt and along the Forbes trace into Pennsylvania. General Gage recognized that the Indians themselves could be a more effective police force and a greater deterrent than the British troops. If the Indians capture and execute a murderer, he ordered the Pittsburgh commandant, do not intervene, and if the situation erupts into war, use every effort to limit Indian vengeance to the guilty settlers and avoid a general war along the frontier.[58]

From June 1766 to June 1767 the officers at Fort Pitt issued three proclamations ordering the Redstone-Monongahela-Cheat settlers away and threatening a future use

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of armed force should they disobey. Two of these missives were delivered by detachments of Highlanders, and in June 1767 a party led by Murray destroyed "every House I could find out."[59] None of these efforts was more than temporary and partial in effect, and settlers and hunters in the Monongahela territory continued to violate the 1763 proclamation and foster tension with the Native Americans.[60]

In the matter of jurisdiction, army commanders could feel safe about warning settlers away and burning their cabins in enforcement of the crown's proclamation of 1763. But the commander-in-chief was much less sure of his position should actual force against civilians be necessary. "If a Skirmish happens, and Blood is shed, you know what a Clamor there will be against the Military Acting without Civil Magistrates," he confided to Sir William Johnson. Moreover, he believed that effective authority to act might never come from "such loose and disorderly Governments" as those of the American provinces, plagued by factionalism and a "Weakness of the Governments to enforce obedience to the Laws."[61] Gage's understanding was that if the military was not to have complete jurisdiction in the west, which government policy by 1765 indicated was indeed the case, then some civilian authority must play a role, even if the Mutiny Act did very little to define that role in this particular case. Given the history and circumstances of provincial involvement in the west he probably expected too much.

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Gage wanted very much for the provincial governments to take the initiative in the matter. In July 1766 he offered the governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia the aid of his troops either for the apprehension of individual murderers or for the expulsion of all illegal settlers. His letters implied that the colonies possessed some form of legal jurisdiction within their charter bounds west of the proclamation line, for he presumed, probably because of what Bouquet had told him in 1764 regarding Pennsylvania's charter limits, that the Redstone district would fall within that province.[62] The Pennsylvania assembly was far less certain about the probable location of the boundary, and a confused General Gage wrote the commanding officer at Fort Pitt asking for clarification. That officer, responding some months before the Mason and Dixon survey determined the western portions of Maryland's northern border, informed Gage that Redstone Creek and everything south would fall to Virginia: "It is thought the Line betwixt Virginia and Pensilvania will run a Few miles from this Place, Much about the Place where General Braddock was Defeat[ed]."[63] The Mason-Dixon survey changed Gage's mind again by demonstrating that much of the troublesome area indeed lay north of the Quaker colony's southern boundary.[64] Gage fretted over the matter because Virginia had once protested the use of the military in a similar instance. And as he knew, not only was the army limited in the action it could take against civilians; the army also was subject to civilian law,

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and a misstep could land an officer in court to face criminal charges or a suit for damages. In practical terms the boundary matter was academic anyway, for Gage pressed both provincial governments for action and would have used initiative from either as justification to act against all the squatters.[65]

Both Penn and Fauquier, in response to Gage's plea of summer 1766 -- and to a 1765 crown order admonishing stricter enforcement of the 1763 proclamation -- issued proclamations requiring encroachers on Indian lands to desist. Fauquier's order threatened only to leave intruders to the mercy of the Indians should war break out, while Penn's threatened an unspecified punishment and stated that the squatters would not be allowed to claim rights of occupation when the land was opened to legitimate settlement.[66] The governors agreed that action on both their parts was mandatory, for otherwise the violators "may shelter themselves under an unsettled or disputed Jurisdiction." Yet they put about as much stock in the effectiveness of their proclamations as did Gage, and what is more, they confessed the limits of their governments' powers in the western reaches. Experience had taught them that frontier whites would not act as witnesses against killers of Indians, nor would juries convict such murderers, and it was as difficult for civil officers as for the army to do much against such distant and scattered people. They considered their proclamations to be all that they could do in the matter;

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they agreed that force would likely be required, but implied that that was Gage's affair.[67] The position of the colonial governments seemed hopelessly, even suspiciously, mushy and ineffectual to the commander-in-chief. Gage demanded an unmistakable initiative on the part of the civil authorities for any use of his troops that could lead to an armed clash: the army's role would be limited to the support of actions taken by the provincial governments.[68]

The imperial officers' inability to enforce the law put them into an extremely uncomfortable position in their dealings with the nations of the Ohio Valley. During 1766 and increasingly during 1767, George Croghan and Captain William Murray at Fort Pitt held meetings of condolence to assuage the Indians' grief over murdered comrades, to affirm England's official protestations of friendship, and to forestall the growing discontent. They as much as admitted that their authority over the encroaching settlers was weak, however. When confronted with the Native Americans' challenge that "you have Laws to govern your people by; and could if you had a sincere inclination, prevent their settling on our country," Croghan and Murray replied that the Monongahela settlers were "Lawless Raskals . . . under no Laws, and we looked upon them as not part of us."[69]

Murray and Croghan strove to demonstrate to the Indians that the English government was making efforts to curtail the violators, and to show the squatters that the Indians would not tolerate their presence. Parties bearing

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eviction proclamations to the settlers were accompanied by Indian leaders to witness the scene and tell the encroachers of their displeasure.[70] Yet the Indians were not always enthusiastic about such excursions. The Delaware and the Shawnee, cautious and reluctant to become embroiled in the matter, refused to accompany the soldiers and insisted that the Mingo or other Iroquois deal with the problem. Officers at Fort Pitt were unable to present the settlers with a single, consistent Indian policy calling for their removal. Independent parties of Indians reportedly gave settlers permission to remain, and the Iroquois insisted that certain whites be allowed to stay to furnish provisions to Indians traveling along the warriors' road. Prominent individuals such as Colonel Thomas Cresap of Maryland were rumored to be using their influence with Indians to undermine official efforts and to promote their own settlement schemes.[71]

The attitudes of both the provincial governments and the Indian nations toward the problem of the encroaching settlers may be accounted for largely by the fact that many people expected the situation in the west to change in the near future. The restrictions of the 1763 proclamation, which had been issued only to deal with the particular situation at the time, applied only until the crown's "further Pleasure be known." Great Britain acquired control of the Ohio Valley in the process of its conflict with France; for some time after the war the government was still groping for policies regarding trade regulation, restriction

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or promotion of settlement, the garrisoning of British regulars in the interior, and the means by which American revenues could be raised to pay for such an establishment. Working actively to shape the government's policies, Indian agents Johnson and Croghan, along with interested speculators such as the "suffering trader" group under Trent and Wharton, bent every effort to win from the crown a revision of the so-called "Indian boundary" that would allow them to acquire tracts in the Ohio Valley. Johnson discussed the possibility of a revised limit on land grants with the Delaware and the Iroquois as early as 1765. In the end these lobbyists were able to influence the government's policies through the earl of Shelburne, who became the secretary of state for the American colonies in 1766 and the next year forwarded a plan favoring a revision of the settlement boundary and the encouragement of new colonies in the interior.[72]

Working to advance their own land interests and those of their associates, Johnson and Croghan reported to General Gage and the British government in 1766 and 1767 that there was crisis brewing among the Indians, and stated that the final resolution of a new boundary west of the mountains would do more than anything else to calm the waters.[73] Gage was slow to realize that anyone expected a revision of the limit on western settlement, but when the breadth of that expectation finally came fully to his attention, he perceived its implications. For one thing, the belief that the provisions of the 1763 proclamation were but

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transitory could foster a lack of motivation on the part of colonial legislatures to do much to enforce it; what is more, influential men could use the image of crisis on the Redstone and the Cheat to argue for a new boundary that would open Ohio Valley lands to acquisition and speculation. Gage even noted bitterly that "it is not improbable, I might say very Suspicious, that some Men of Interest Abet these Encroachments" in the Monongahela region.[74] Indeed, early in 1768 Gage learned of rumors in Philadelphia "that Vergenia will claim a prior Right to Redstone Creek and the land thereabout and perhaps will encourage the people to remain thereon."[75]

While there is no evidence to prove or refute such accusations of unscrupulous behavior on the part of influential Virginians, it is beyond doubt that the proclamation of 1763 raised their hackles. Late in 1766 the House of Burgesses addressed the crown, reminding the king of the many Virginia grants made in the west before 1763, suggesting that the proclamation be scrapped and settlement to the Ohio River encouraged, and minimizing the obstacle posed by Indian nations' claims to the region. A few months later the assembly passed a bill for the construction of a new road from the Potomac to Fort Pitt.[76] In the meantime the burgesses took no steps to engage the province in a resolution of the problem of the Monongahela settlements. As related by John Blair, the president of the provincial council, the burgesses "did not think it necessary or

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practicable to raise and send out Forces against those stragling Invaders of the Lands now Assigned to the Indians; but which his late Majesty had encouraged our Seating on the Branches of the Mississippi." The aspirations of ambitious Virginians for speculation in the west had been interrupted by the 1763 proclamation, but these individuals never abandoned their tenacious insistence on the primacy of Virginia's standing patents and grants. By the spring of 1768 the House of Burgesses was confident that the king "will soon have all Matters adjusted with the Indians, so as to leave no Cause of Complaint," and awaited a renegotiation of the Indian boundary.[77]

The Pennsylvania proprietors, too, were interested in an Indian boundary that would allow them to purchase lands west of the mountains. As for the encroachers onto Indian lands, before 1768 Pennsylvania was no more active or effective than Virginia's government. The only flurry of activity came in fall 1766, when John Penn issued his proclamation against the settlers -- almost a full year after the crown's orders for a stricter enforcement of the 1763 policies. Penn maintained that "few or none" of the violators were from his province, and believed that the proclamation was about all that he as a civil officer could do in the matter. The Pennsylvania assembly, for its part, doubted that the troubled area was within Pennsylvania's charter limits and insisted that Virginia bear an equal share of the effort and expense of any action.[78]

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Despite this lethargy, several factors combined in very late 1767 and the early months of 1768 to bring decisive action from Pennsylvania on the western problem. For one thing, the conclusion of the survey of Jeremiah Dixon and Charles Mason, while not completing the full course of Pennsylvania's southern border, made it seem likely that the Redstone country, and much of the Monongahela-Youghiogheny settlement as a whole, was within the colony's charter bounds.[79] Moreover, for some time Pennsylvania had been the special subject of commander-in-chief Gage's insinuations of ineffectiveness on the part of the colonial governments. Gage laid both the Sideling Hill disturbance of 1765, when civilians defied the British army and ran rampant without constraint by civil authorities, and the 1767 refusal of many Pittsburgh traders to comply with regulations confining trade to the posts, at the door of Governor John Penn's government. Even though the general found most provincial governments lacking at one time or another, Penn could not help but be sensitive to Gage's suggestion that the Redstone troubles would never be resolved "if Laws are defective, or the Coercive Powers of Government are wanting."[80] More damning still was the seizure of a similar argument, construed to condemn only the executive arm of the government, by the majority wing of Pennsylvania's own assembly.

The speaker of the assembly in January 1768, when Penn placed Gage's most recent letter on the western troubles before them, was Joseph Galloway. He and his

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political cronies, among them Benjamin Franklin, had tried for years to discredit the proprietary government and bring royal government to the province. Unfortunately for Penn, Galloway's support in the assembly for a change in government was, in early 1768, substantial enough to allow him to seize the western issue as an opportunity to fire another volley against the proprietary government.[81] The assembly chose as their primary weapon the Paxton affair of 1763, during which Lancaster County men murdered defenseless Indians and defied provincial government. All subsequent difficulties of whites murdering Native Americans had, the assembly claimed in a long message to the governor, stemmed from the executive branch's inability to enforce the law and punish the guilty in 1763 and after. They lamented "the lost Authority and Dignity of the Government," and informed Penn that "every impartial Person must be convinced, that the Powers of Government, vested in the feeble Hands of a Proprietary Governor, are too weak to support Order in the Province, or give Safety to the People." In reply, Penn reviewed the events of 1763 and attempted to justify the executive's efforts. A few weeks later the assembly sent him a second address on the matter, ordered it printed in the newspapers, and imperiously adjourned before the governor could reply.[82]

Galloway and his friends had as keen an eye trained on the west as those Virginians most interested in developments in the Ohio Valley. Along with Benjamin Franklin's

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son William, Galloway held a substantial interest in the claim of the "suffering traders" for a compensatory grant of land from the Indians. He was also involved with the Franklins, the Whartons of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, George Croghan, and others, in a plan for speculative land ventures in the interior, especially in the Illinois country. These schemes were not insignificant in the campaign against proprietary authority, for under the proprietary system the Penn family, with whom Franklin and Galloway could count years of enmity and conflict, would become the owners of any new lands purchased from the Indians within the colony's charter limits. Royal government in the province might, on the other hand, give Franklin and his antiproprietary friends a better chance of obtaining tracts in the western portions of the colony. They also, while snapping at the heels of proprietary government, made every effort to bring about a change in royal policy that would nullify the 1763 restriction on taking up lands in the west and open the way for their plans. Through Benjamin Franklin, in England as the agent of the Pennsylvania assembly, they hammered the ministry with the argument that only a redrawing of the boundary of the Indians' land could avert the calamity of war.[83]

In light of these efforts to discredit the proprietary government and boot English policymakers into action, it is difficult, from the vantage of the twentieth century, to know just how genuine the crisis was early in 1768. The

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letters of Croghan, Galloway, and others certainly pictured disaster near at hand, yet these men were astute enough to know that a threat of frontier war was almost ridiculously easy to exploit in a Pennsylvania so recently damaged by Pontiac's War.[84] And as Gage's concern showed, the potential for an explosion seemed real enough. Galloway's tactics in the assembly strove to lay the blame for the frontier mess solely on the governor. Given this climate, it is little wonder that news of the murder of ten Indians, including women and children, on Middle Creek near the Susquehanna by a German settler named Frederick Stump, made an immediate impact. "I am extremely sorry to inform you that an Indian War seems inevitable," Governor Penn wrote his uncle in England soon after hearing of the killings.[85] He had good reason to be glum, for word of the murders traveled quickly to the Ohio Valley, where a major council was called to meet at the Shawnee towns at the Scioto River.[86] Penn began immediately to assuage the Indian nations and assured Gage and William Johnson that Stump would be punished for his crime. Swift action on the part of a Cumberland County militia officer brought the capture of Stump and his servant and accomplice, John Ironcutter, before the end of January. Knowing the reluctance of frontier whites to give evidence against their peers in cases of the sort, and fully aware of the attention focused on his government, Penn ordered the two men transported to Philadelphia for questioning. Before they could be moved from the county seat, however, Stump and

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Ironcutter were released from jail and spirited away by a body of defiant frontiersmen.[87] Unless the entire lot of miscreants was punished, General Gage concluded, "the World must Judge that there is no Government in the Province."[88]

Even before the arrival of the first news of Stump's crime, Penn initiated an act that would punish encroachers on Indian lands. The assembly under Galloway, despite its interest in discrediting the governor, cooperated by drafting a bill specifying the death penalty for anyone refusing to abandon an illegal settlement in the reserved tract after thirty days' proper notice to do so. Since the assembly believed while drafting the act that a redrawing of the Indian boundary and a new western purchase were in the offing, the actual life of the act in terms of controlling violence in the Monongahela country would be short. Perhaps it behooved the assembly's image before the crown to demonstrate the legislators' alacrity in confronting such problems despite the executive's impotence. It is likely, however, that Galloway and his associates interested in western lands saw the act largely as a means of evicting squatters from potentially profitable lands that, with the completion of the Mason-Dixon survey, appeared to lie within Pennsylvania's eventual bounds west of the mountains. Almost certainly the law was intended to open the way for its promoters to seek tracts in western Pennsylvania, once their friend Sir William Johnson was given clearance to renegotiate western affairs with the Indian nations, without worrying about any

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preemptive claims by the hundreds of settlers who had entered the region illegally but might try to claim improvement rights nonetheless. The act also specified fines and imprisonment for anyone caught surveying land in those portions of the reserved tract falling within Pennsylvania's bounds. In addition, the assembly thwarted Governor Penn's attempts to insert into the bill language that could have prevented any enlargement of, or further settlement on, Ohio Valley lands claimed by George Croghan, an active associate of Galloway and Franklin in their western land schemes.[89]

The new law did not promise to be any easier to enforce than previous strictures. Provincial authority in any effective sense remained nonexistent so far west. Moreover, the bill applied only to lands within the chartered bounds of Pennsylvania, bounds still largely undetermined. Nevertheless Penn, moved to act by such strong influences as bore upon him in the early months of 1768, refused to allow the act to lie as a passive measure. Soon after signing the bill into law he drafted a proclamation notifying violators that their thirty days would begin on the first of May, had 250 copies printed, and dispatched them to the west with four commissioners who were to distribute the notices and remind the settlers of "the necessity and use of Civil Government, [and] the Obligation of Laws in general."[90] The commissioners met with settlers at Redstone Creek and at Thomas Gist's house, where those from Cheat River and parts of the Youghiogheny were asked to gather, and sent copies

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of the proclamation to outlying settlers. Although the commissioners hinted that obedience now might lead to the granting of legitimate title later on, a point not included in their official instructions, few squatters promised to leave. Most, aware that new negotiations with the Indians seemed imminent, declared their intention to "wait the issue of the Treaty." They were supported in their resolve by the statement of a party of Indians from Mingo Town on the Ohio, who agreed that a meeting between their "Great Men" and white representatives would resolve the whole affair. In addition, the commissioners reported that "many severe Things were said of Mr. Croghan," and the Redstone group "alledged, that the removing of them from the unpurchased Lands, was a Contrivance of the Gentlemen and Merchants of Philadelphia, that they might take Rights for their improvements, when a purchase was made."[91]

Relying on Sir William Johnson's and George Croghan's advice, Penn also sent two commissioners with a parcel of gifts to a spring 1768 conference with the Indians at Fort Pitt -- the "Treaty" referred to by the Redstone settlers.[92] Under the guidance of Croghan, the Pennsylvania delegates met with a very large contingent of Iroquois, Shawnee, Munsee, Delaware, and other Indians, conveyed the province's condolences for the Indians' kinsmen slain by whites, and expressed Penn's wishes that the "chain of friendship" remain strong despite the criminal acts of a few individuals.

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Aware of the results of the other commissioners' trip to the Monongahela settlements, they also requested that a party of Indians accompany two whites to the settlements to officially disavow the encouraging statements given the settlers by independent Indian groups such as the Mingo on the Ohio. The Pittsburgh commissioners, close associates of the governor, wanted to deliver a tough new message to the squatters by these envoys, but the mission fell through. Representatives of the Six Nations' delegation backed out, claiming no authority from their council to do such a thing. As an Iroquoian leader explained, the Indians expected a new boundary with the whites to be approved and feared eventual retaliation from the settlers should they help evict them at this late date. The Iroquois delegates, representing a confederacy living outside the particular region at issue, wanted an eviction of unlawful settlers as "Proof of the Sincerity of your Friendship," but were far more interested in the anticipated sale of the lands than in restraining white encroachments. The Pennsylvanians also referred to the lands between the mountains and the Ohio River as "not yet purchased," in anticipation that a sale would soon be made. Others at the conference were less complacent about a new purchase. The Delaware were distressed about white intrusion over the mountains but did not vocally oppose the English or the Iroquois. The Shawnee, on the other hand, "uneasy to see that you think yourselves Masters of this Country," questioned the right of any British claim to the

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region and boldly asked for the removal of all forts in the west. They were chastised for their independence by both Croghan and the Iroquois.[93] At the conclusion of the conference Croghan reported that the Indians appeared "well Reconciled" about the murders of their people, but added that the Ohio Valley Indians were still perturbed by the settlers on lands not yet ceded to the whites.[94]

The official readjustment of the western limit on settlement, so widely anticipated, finally came in the autumn of 1768, when Sir William Johnson, having received crown approval to proceed with the matter, met with the Iroquois and other nations at Fort Stanwix in New York. Representatives from Pennsylvania and Virginia, and a herd of those people with speculative interests, were present, and a series of private meetings with the Indians were held. The Six Nations granted a confirmation of the 200,000 acres claimed by George Croghan in the Ohio forks region, as well as title to a large tract to serve as belated compensation to the "suffering traders" group, which was now a speculative land venture. Since efforts to dislodge the Pennsylvania proprietors had proved fruitless, these private agreements carefully specified that the grant to the "sufferers" would fall outside Pennsylvania's bounds, and requested that Croghan receive a compensatory grant outside Pennsylvania should his claims prove to lie within the limits of the colony. These speculators' gains, which cast immediate suspicion upon Johnson's motivations, were part of the

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general change in affairs in the west formalized at the Stanwix meeting. The 1763 proclamation was effectively abandoned, the limits on western settlement extended to the west, and the expected "new purchase" completed. Pennsylvania's proprietors bought formal title to those transmontane lands that should fall within the colony's chartered limits, as far up the Allegheny as Kittanning. The Ohio River became the new boundary between purchased and unpurchased lands in the upper Ohio Valley. The crown purchased the rights to whatever lands in the cession fell outside the Penn colony, which put Virginia, the royal colony whose charter claims encompassed the area, in a position to assert title to lands falling outside Pennsylvania's as yet undetermined limits. These results of the Stanwix conference, but not the private cessions to Croghan and the Pennsylvania trader group, were confirmed by the crown in 1769.[95]

At the local level the situation did not immediately change in the wake of the Stanwix conference. White-Indian friction continued and there was little that concerned officials could do to stop it. Previous actions, such as the colonial proclamations, Pennsylvania's law stipulating the death penalty, and the army's threats of force, had rested ultimately on the royal edicts prohibiting the intrusion of whites onto lands reserved to the Native Americans. These measures fell by the wayside along with the 1763 proclamation. The presence of white settlers between the Appalachian ridges and the Ohio River was no

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longer in itself a violation of explicit royal policies. In response to concerns for the interior expressed by Lord Hillsborough, the secretary of state for America, the Pennsylvania assembly in 1769 did renew the law prohibiting settlement on lands within the province's limits still unpurchased from the Indians, but the only territories answering this description after 1768 were west of the Allegheny and Ohio Rivers and north of the West Branch of the Susquehanna.[96] Regulation of the hide and fur trade of the interior also was given over to the provinces, but here the Pennsylvania legislature balked: "As our attempting to extend the Laws of this Province, beyond the Limits thereof, would be vain and ineffectual, to regulate and restrain the Traders from the adjacent Colonies, we conceive it is not in our Power to apply a Remedy, adequate to the Occasion."[97] For the moment no mechanism of practical jurisdiction, such as local courts, was created in the newly ceded tract by either Virginia or Pennsylvania.

The British army's regulatory status was, if anything, even more indeterminate than it had been before 1768. The Indian and military reservation that had existed de facto since the war with France survived in the interior, but not in areas ceded by the Indians at Fort Stanwix, including Pittsburgh and lands to the east and south; and there the absence of surveyed boundaries made it anyone's guess what province a given spot was in. A year after the Stanwix treaty Captain Charles Edmonstone found himself

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taking a legal deposition in a murder case, and in explanation he referred to himself as "Commanding at Fort Pitt, on the Frontiers of Pennsylvania; where no form of Civil Goverment is yet Established." The advice given by General Gage in this instance was based, in the absence of any other guidelines, on the same sort of working provisions guiding army regulation before 1768: any suspects or affidavits connected with crimes in the region were to be sent to the governors of Pennsylvania or Virginia "as they concern their respective Provinces."[98]

Nor was the sense of impending crisis that surrounded the friction of 1766-1768 entirely dissolved by the Stanwix conferences. In fact, the new situation in the west did much to exacerbate the dissatisfaction of the Ohio Valley nations, for the Stanwix cessions were founded on the Six Nations' presumed authority over the region and were virtually dictated to the Shawnee, the Delaware, and the Mingo.[99] In August and September 1769 there were interracial killings in the upper Potomac and Monongahela regions. Nerves were so taut that whites were apt to shoot at almost any Indian, and a temporary but widespread flight of whites from their homes followed the killing of some livestock by transient Six Nations warriors. The army at Fort Pitt heard of Indian plans for war.[100] A year later quarrels, brawls, and killings between whites and Indians in the farflung settlements of the Redstone and Cheat districts seemed chronic.[101]

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British colonial society in the upper Ohio Valley during the 1760s was beyond the ken of civil government. Only far to the east or southeast of the forks of the Ohio area would one encounter a justice of the peace, elections, taxes, or local government, but in theory it did not matter very much. The peltry trade was presumed to be a regulated activity, and problems arising with a tiny civilian population could be handled on a pragmatic basis as necessary. In reality it did matter, however, for the premise that white society in the west would be tightly controlled required a greater commitment of the resources of government than was made.

The problem to some degree was one of geography. Activity west of the Appalachian ridges was so distant and so scattered that it was well beyond the range of the normal locally-based mechanisms of British civil government as it existed in the colonies. This obstacle could have been overcome, however, provided there had been a clearer definition of jurisdictional roles and, most importantly, a greater commitment to act on the part of the various parties involved. That commitment would have come only if provincial authorities had agreed with General Gage's opinion that Indians were entitled to specific legislative protection of their persons and property.[102] In Gage's view the essential problem was one of control -- of regulating the whites on

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the frontier -- and it would remain so even with a shift in the limits on legal settlement. Provincial authorities were less concerned about regulating the local situation in the west than about guarding what they considered to be their chartered rights to western lands. Royal policy, formulated as a series of solutions to immediate problems and with little cohesive, permanent plan for the future of the reserved tract, did nothing to encourage the colonies to take a bolder, more aggressive course of action in the west, nor did it authorize the army to act forcefully without the backing of civil authorities. By 1768 most provincial leaders did not really view the situation as Gage did, as a crisis of control. Instead they looked ahead to the end of the crown's restrictions. For those bent on attaining fortunes from the lands in the west, the chief frustration of the 1760s was not the difficulty of managing the region and maintaining its stability, but the crown's freeze on their access to it. Gage, realizing the impossibility of the army's effective regulation of the west under these circumstances, began for his part to question the very efficacy of keeping troops in the west.[103]

Society in the west, then, began without the normal daily processes of British government. As noted in the previous chapter, Pittsburgh seems to have lacked any system of law, government, leadership, or decision making other than that provided on an informal basis or by the limited regulations of the British army. Even greater autonomy

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marked the settlements beyond the effective reach of the army. Pittsburgh was neither the geographic center of, nor the entrepôt for, the agricultural settlements dispersed along the creeks feeding the Monongahela and its tributaries. As a whole these settlers had very little contact with governmental authority, and what contact there was usually came in the form of remote commands on the one part and brash evasion on the other part. These settlers had no legitimate title to the land they occupied, but nor did they pay taxes or quitrents, and they could harbor the hope of making their claims good with time. They were, essentially, autonomous -- "not under Landlord or Law," Sir Willian Johnson had said.

At times they justified the reputation of licentiousness given them by their independence. All too frequently group action, at least as depicted in the surviving evidence, was in the form of a man mustering his closest neighbors to pursue a party of Indians for some transgression. In the spring of 1767 it was even thought that the Redstone and Cheat settlers would all mobilize to attack the Mingo settlement on the Ohio.[104] Yet they gave evidence also of cohesion and orderliness. "A considerable Number" of people from the outlying region attended a Sunday sermon at Redstone Creek during the visit by Penn's commissioners in 1768. And at least some of the settlers retained a very clear notion of the proprieties of legal justice despite the absence of formal government in the region. Such were the

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men who in 1767 brought the officers at Fort Pitt information regarding a murder at the mouth of the Cheat. Such also were those who in September 1769 carefully transferred the white killer of three Delawares on Dunkard Creek from one settler to another until he was safely in the custody of the Pittsburgh commandant along with a written accusation of his crime. Ironically enough, the man escaped from the army's guardhouse.[105]

In most aspects of their lives these people operated without formal government. That kind of practical, if not consciously ideological, autonomy from external control did not die quickly. The issue of local government, however, became one of the most hotly contested issues of the 1770s and after. The same sharp competition characteristic of the earliest economic ventures into the area marked the appearance of local government, and political authority immediately became a tool of those vying for power and the spoils of leadership.

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PART II:

BOUNDARIES

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CHAPTER 4

"IMAGINARY AUTHORITY"

During the early years of the 1770s the British army withdrew from Fort Pitt and the usual structures of Pennsylvania county government came to the region. The transition, however, was marked by a high degree of instability. Pennsylvania's authority was in fact openly contested by some parties in the region, and it was the 1780s before one could say with certainty what provincial or state government held jurisdiction over some portions of the country west of Laurel Hill.

Who would hold the power to make influential decisions regarding the disposition of the region? That question lay behind the Virginia-Pennsylvania dispute over jurisdiction that began in early 1774, but was also the issue of contention in a variety of other factional and personal squabbles during the 1770s. The resource whose disposition concerned most people in the Pittsburgh country in the early years of the decade was land: there was a staggering growth of population before the Revolution and a conspicuous amount of competition for land, from the lowest level of dispute involving individual settlers to contests between large, ambitious collections of speculative interests. Some veterans

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of the trade competition of the 1760s played important roles in these quarrels centering on land and jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania-Virginia dispute, which into the 1780s was one of the most important features of a contentious local political situation, was no cultural clash between "Virginians" and "Pennsylvanians." It was rather the most noticeable of several conflicts and factional alignments that pitted contestants for influence over the region against one another.

By the outbreak of war between the colonies and Great Britain, the mechanics of British civil government at the local level had come to the upper Ohio Valley. Nevertheless, jurisdiction was a matter of open dispute between two governments, each of which claimed authority over Pittsburgh and much of the adjacent country. Local government, instead of providing only a framework for the resolution of disputes, itself became a part of the contention, as both a weapon and a goal. Contention, at times moving to the brink of open violence between factions, marked the beginnings of local civil government. The authority of government, so far never very powerful in the region, was cheapened by the competition over it and its use as a tool in these disputes. Questions of how local government would go about its business, how inhabitants would interact with government authority, and who would hold positions of political influence were crucial to the region's development for years after the adjustment of the settlement boundary at Fort Stanwix in 1768.

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The influx of a substantial population into the country between the Allegheny ranges and the Ohio River was one of the most important factors influencing the region from the late 1760s to the beginning of the Revolution. Unfortunately it is impossible to gauge this migration with any precise figures. Estimates given at the time are in very round numbers, often refer to different geographic areas, and are difficult to compare. Population counts given in support of proposals for new colonies in the area may well have overestimated the number of people west of the mountains. In the spring of 1771 Robert Callender, long associated with the western trade, believed that there were "upwards of 2000 Fameleys settled on that side of the Mountains." Governor Dunmore of Virginia, promoting his colony's claim to the region, said there were more than 10,000 people in the "neighbourhood" of Pittsburgh in 1773. Backers of the proposed Vandalia colony, which was to stretch from Fort Pitt along the south side of the Ohio into the Kentucky country, claimed there were 30,000 families there in the summer of 1772, and eighteen months later George Croghan, one of those interested in the new colony, reported that 60,000 people lived within its proposed bounds. In late 1775 or 1776 a petition for a new state, to include present southwestern Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and part of

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Kentucky, estimated that 25,000 families had come to the region since 1768. None of these figures seems to have been any better than an outright guess, and some may have been deliberately inflated.[1]

Other observers did not venture estimates of numbers, but even those familiar with the region were startled by the magnitude of the migration. "Notwithstanding I have had repeated Intelligence of the rapidity of the Settlement in this Part of the World, and particularly West of the Monongahela," George Morgan reported from Pittsburgh in 1773, "I had not an Idea of the great Numbers settled and settling there daily -- The Roads are still alive with Men, Women, Children and Cattle from Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland." Several travelers during the early 1770s noted numbers of "poor and enterprising people" moving into the Ohio's watershed.[2]

This immigration into the region was under way by the time the official settlement boundary was shifted by the Fort Stanwix cessions, and its effect was felt less on the population of Pittsburgh itself than in places with desirable agricultural lands. "Very inconsiderable and Stragling" was how Fort Pitt's commandant described the number of settlers close to the post in the spring of 1772. In fact, a few months after the Stanwix conference a trading firm's agent trying to hire boatmen at Pittsburgh complained that "there is not a Man to be got here now every one being busyly employed in Farming."[3] The Redstone Creek area and

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Map 4.
Economic Development, 1770s

KEY

↔ = ferry

⊗ = mill

Θ = horse mill

Ⓣ = tub mill (less elaborate than a mill with a wheel; some mills other than those identified as such may have been tub mills)

The modifier a next to a symbol indicates an approximate location, based on best available information. Locations of symbols without modifier are relatively precise.

Only mills and ferries known to have been in operation before 1779 and the locations of which could be at least generally determined are shown. There were other mills and ferries in the region in this period. There probably were also horse mills and tub mills for which there is little or no historical record.

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

Map 4.
Economic Development, 1770s

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much of the rest of the Monongahela and Youghiogheny watershed, so attractive to settlers even when living there violated British strictures, had a head start on much of the rest of the region during the surge of new population over the mountains. A correspondent informed George Washington as early as 1767 that most good land between the "Yough" and Monongahela was already taken.[4] During the late 1760s and early seventies there was considerable settlement along the creeks flowing into the two rivers. Numbers of people also came along the Pennsylvania road to take up lands in the Ligonier Valley, at various places near the road between Ligonier and Fort Pitt, on the creeks between that road and the Youghiogheny River, and at some spots north of the road toward the Conemaugh River.

Also, by 1772 and 1773 there were some families building cabins at places on the Ohio well below Pittsburgh, as far down as Wheeling. These settlers were tied to the Redstone settlements and to Pittsburgh by paths traversing the area lying in the loop formed by the Monongahela and the Ohio. This large section was one area that remained thinly populated through the early 1770s. Before the Revolution, however, thousands of acres of this soil had been claimed and surveyed into tracts, and settlement had begun along Chartiers Creek and elsewhere.[5]

It is as difficult to determine the specific origins and backgrounds of these incoming settlers as it is to say how many of them there were. There was, in general, an

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infusion of people from Maryland and Virginia along the Braddock route from the upper Potomac, and of Pennsylvanians along the Forbes route. One would have been likely to find a number of Virginians in the Monongahela watershed, and more Pennsylvanians east of Pittsburgh toward Ligonier and Bedford. The line separating these two generalized zones of population was not at all crisp, however. In addition, while the Pennsylvania road was the more exclusive of the two major routes, carrying migrants primarily from the Cumberland Valley of Pennsylvania and the southeastern portions of the colony, the southern route was convenient for those moving from Maryland, New Jersey, and a good bit of Pennsylvania, as well as Virginia. This mixture of people from a variety of places east of the mountains was further increased by the movement, especially over the span of a generation or so, of people from Pennsylvania along the Great Valley into Maryland and Virginia; some of these migrants or their children then moved over the mountains by way of the Potomac and the road to the Redstone district.

"The inhabitants west of the Appalachian mountains are chiefly Scotch Irish presbyterians," the Reverend David McClure reported on the basis of his trips to the region in 1772 and 1773. "They are either natives of the North of Ireland, or the descendents of such and removed here from the middle Colonies. There are some Germans, English and Scotch."[6] While he correctly identified the national groups usually associated with the upper Ohio region, the relative

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proportions McClure assigned to each group -- as well as those of everyone else who has ventured a statement on the matter -- can be questioned. McClure probably gave an undue preponderance to the Scotch Irish, and correspondingly little weight to what he called the "English." He mistook the relative proportions of the two groups because he first entered the region by way of the Forbes route, through heavily Scotch-Irish areas of Pennsylvania, and because his primary association with westerners was as an intinerant minister visiting Presbyterian groups west of Laurel Hill. On the basis of surnames, historians' primary means of distinguishing national groups in eighteenth-century America, it is quite difficult to separate the various groups originating in the British Isles -- English, Welsh, Scotch, Irish, and "Scotch Irish" -- with any great degree of precision. Still, surname analysis indicates that the "English" proportion of the population in the upper Ohio Valley was higher than McClure's statements would indicate. Forty to fifty percent of the white settlers were English by name, but that figure probably includes an uncertain number of Protestant Scots and Scotch Irish with names virtually indistinguishable from Anglo-Saxon surnames. And on the basis of surnames the proportion of the white population falling into a combined Scottish, Irish, and Scotch-Irish group could have been as low as around twenty percent or perhaps as high as fifty percent.[7]

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It is safe to say that the settlers with English backgrounds and those with Scottish and Scotch-Irish family origins comprised by far the two largest groups in the population. It is not certain that the "English" element resulted from Virginia migration or that the "Scotch Irish" came primarily from Pennsylvania, although a general association of the sort may be valid.[8] Another problem is the degree to which there were noticeable cultural differences between these two major groups on the frontier. Reverend McClure certainly thought he saw a distinction between the Scotch Irish on the frontier and the Virginians of the Youghiogheny Valley. "The manners of the people of Virginia, who have removed into these parts, are different from those of the presbyterians and germans," he concluded. He described the Virginians as "much addicted to drinking parties, gambling, horse race[s] and fighting." He called them "hospitable and prodigal" and claimed that "several of them, have run through their property in the old settlements, and have sought an asylum in this wilderness." The Scotch-Irish Presbyterians that he encountered were, to McClure's satisfaction, much more serious about religion than these wild Virginians.[9] However, his contact with southerners was limited, and the Scotch Irish he met were primarily those who came to his church services, so the distinction he made between the groups may have been overdrawn. In many respects the lives of these groups in the

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Ohio Valley may have differed less than the minister's statements would indicate.

Another group identified by McClure, the Germans, retained a high enough degree of cultural identity to distinguish many of them fairly readily from their British-American neighbors. Despite anglicization of names, a tenth of the white population of the region was definitely of German background. There were concentrations of Germans who had migrated along the Pennsylvania road, such as those clustered in the original Hempfield township of Westmoreland County, yet even well into what is today West Virginia almost one in ten of the settlers were Germans.[10] Occurring in much smaller numbers, but also contributing to the diversity of the region's population, were other groups such as blacks, Dutch, and French.[11]

The country west of Laurel Hill was without a doubt a zone in which two major streams of migration met and people from a variety of places came into contact.[12] It would be an error, however, to consider the Virginia-Pennsylvania dispute over government in the area in the 1770s a direct product of this circumstance. There were other groups in the region, and it is not certain in any event that "Virginians" and "Pennsylvanians" were culturally distinct in a way that would itself initiate such friction. More important, as the next chapter will show, leadership alignments in the interprovincial dispute were in several instances

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not the product of provincial origins. Specific political issues were at stake, and the boundary conflict was only one arena in which they were disputed. There was almost as much contention within the two factions involved in the jurisdictional question as there was between them, and some conflict in the area had little to do with the contest between the two colonies.

In the midst of the population growth of the first half of the 1770s there came some fundamental changes in local government. One of these came late in 1772, when Fort Pitt was closed and its garrison, which by that time consisted of only about fifty enlisted men along with a handful of corporals, sergeants, and officers, marched east.[13] Commander-in-chief Thomas Gage and the British government had agreed for some time that Fort Pitt served no other purpose than as a supply and transport center for Fort Chartres in the Illinois country, and by 1772 Whitehall decided to close the Illinois post. In the spring of that year the Pittsburgh garrison received orders to cease repairs which had been deemed necessary some months before, and in August came detailed orders for destroying the works and withdrawing the soldiers. By November the garrison was on its way to Philadelphia.[14]

General Gage was certainly not sorry to see the post close. For years he had struggled with the garrison commander, Captain Charles Edmonstone of the 18th Regiment,

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particularly over expenses at the fort. Edmonstone, it seems, epitomized much of what could go wrong with a post commandant. Gage was especially frustrated over Edmonstone's handling of provisions at the fort, much of which went to visiting Indians. By the 1770s the mechanism of checks and balances that was supposed to safeguard the army's victualing system collapsed at Fort Pitt in a dispute tangling the contractor's agent and the deputy commissary, both of whom were local residents, George Croghan as deputy superintendent of Indian affairs, and Edmonstone. Unfortunately for Edmonstone, he seems to have fallen under the influence of the contractors' agent, Alexander Ross, whose primary concern was not to safeguard the military's interest, which was the commissary's job, but to protect and forward his own and his employers' interests. This relationship befouled Edmonstone considerably during the closing of the fort. Although he should have known better, he gave Ross a certificate allowing the contractors to deposit tens of thousands of pounds of superfluous pork and flour into Fort Pitt's storerooms during 1772, provisions which never would have been consumed, but for which the contractors would have demanded payment if the army had not stopped the deal.[15] Furthermore, Edmonstone sold a quantity of Indian goods on hand at the fort to Ross, and to Ross and William Thompson he sold the fort's stockade pickets, loose bricks, and structures that remained standing after the garrison's

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demolition efforts. Seventeen Pittsburghers petitioned General Gage in protest, claiming that the sales had been inadequately publicized. Edmonstone argued that the petitioners misrepresented the situation and were upset because they had intended to collude together to buy the materials at bargain rates. Gage, although he admitted that the sale to Ross was not handled as it should have been, was glad just to get Edmonstone out of Pittsburgh, and let the transactions stand.[16]

Edmonstone's little contingent of soldiers worked for two months at the demolition of the fort, but they by no means leveled the fortress' massive walls. What they did accomplish was to pull down several insecure buildings, including the commandant's house, which "never was more than a shell"; to level stockaded portions of the fort's works; and to breach the walls where the bastions were faced with brick.[17] As this work was being finished during October, Arthur St. Clair, a former British officer and prominent resident of Ligonier, raced to Governor Richard Penn in Philadelphia, and then to General Gage in New York, bearing petitions from local inhabitants requesting that the post not be abandoned because of a continuing need for defense against Indians. Gage thought the remaining fortifications might provide defense for settlers in case of any attacks (which he did not foresee), but obviously felt no need for a standing garrison there. He ordered Edmonstone to keep

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twenty-five men at Pittsburgh until a Pennsylvania force could relieve them, but the 18th Regiment was on the road to Philadelphia before Edmonstone received the order, and Gage refused to send men back. It mattered not at all, for the Pennsylvania assembly, after requesting Penn to supply specific information regarding any immediate threats from Indians, and learning only that Penn thought it "good policy" to maintain Fort Pitt, refused to take it on as a provincial outpost.[18]

The departure of the troops removed the strongest element of British imperial authority in the area, leaving only the Indian department to fill this role. However, the forks of the Ohio were brought under Pennsylvania's system of county government well before the soldiers of the 18th marched away. In the 1760s the westernmost justices of Cumberland County lived near Bedford, which is closer to Carlisle than to Pittsburgh, but by spring 1770 at least five of the county's magistrates lived west of Laurel Hill.[19] As early as January 1769 there were petitions asking that the western portions of Cumberland be set off as a new county. These requests pointed out the great distance that settlers in the western reaches of Pennsylvania had to journey to get to the county seat at Carlisle, hard travel that made even ordinary county business difficult and escalated the fees of some civil officers. The petitions were finally answered early in 1771 with the creation of Bedford

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County, which ran to the western limits of the province and had its county seat at Bedford.[20]

A year later the Pennsylvania House received the first petition praying that the western portions of Bedford County, those "on the West-Side of Lawrel Hill," be established as a new county. The assembly obliged in February of 1773 by forming Westmoreland County. The new jurisdiction included all of Pennsylvania west of the Laurel Hill ridge to the still undetermined western boundary of the province. Until a permanent seat was chosen, the county's officers were to sit at Hannastown, a hamlet on the Pennsylvania road some thirty miles east of Pittsburgh, where Robert Hanna, a magistrate and trustee of the new county, resided.[21] In both Bedford and Westmoreland counties, promptly at their formation, the governor and council commissioned men living in several parts of the county to serve as magistrates, so that no resident would be overly far from a justice of the peace, and the county courts began sitting regularly. Each county was also divided into townships, and freemen in the county voted for county commissioners, a sheriff, a coroner, and a representative to the Pennsylvania assembly. The assemblyman's chair for the western marches belonged to Captain William Thompson, holder of an important provincial land surveying office and Alexander Ross' partner in the purchase of the remains of Fort Pitt. Thompson was elected Bedford County's delegate to Philadelphia in 1771

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and 1772, and Westmoreland's in 1773, 1774, and 1775.[22]

With the creation of Bedford County, Pennsylvania's civil government had come close enough to have an effect on the British army's affairs at Fort Pitt. In November 1771 the governor issued a special commission to three Bedford magistrates authorizing them to try, in lieu of the Supreme Court which normally heard such cases, a subaltern of the fort's garrison who killed a fellow officer in a duel. Bedford's justices were also involved in the case of a runaway servant who murdered two Seneca Indians up the Allegheny from Pittsburgh.[23]

In April of 1769 the proprietors' land office began taking applications from people wanting lands between the Appalachian divide and the Allegheny and Ohio Rivers, the area purchased from the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix the previous fall. That same spring, surveyors marked off the boundaries of a proprietary manor at Pittsburgh. Comprising a total of 5,766 acres, the manor included the area between the two rivers where the fort and the town were, plus acreage on the opposite shore of the Monongahela, including "Coal Hill" and extending two to three miles back from the river. The survey was in compliance with provisions in the Pennsylvania charter, which allowed a tenth of the best

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acreage in an area to be set aside in proprietary manors before the land office offered the rest of the territory for sale to individuals. Despite their name, the manors were not feudal estates in any complete sense. They were, however, the proprietors' select tracts, to be disposed of when and how the Penn family chose, and they were located with obvious care. The town of Bedford was surveyed as a Penn manor in 1761. In 1769 and 1770 manors of roughly the same size as that at Pittsburgh were surveyed at Kittanning on the Allegheny and at "Denmark" and "Penn's Lodge," sites to the east and southeast of Pittsburgh.[24]

The survey of the Pittsburgh manor, which for the present meant only the running of its outer lines, also brought the Penns their first whiff of opposition to proprietary authority in the Ohio Valley. Persons holding land within the manor's limits, either by virtue of military permits or through more shadowy claims to possession, were naturally uneasy at this move by the proprietors' surveyors. Governor John Penn, aware of the disquiet, asked the British army to protect the surveying party if necessary, but the survey seems to have been completed without incident.[25]

Resistance of a different sort, and of a very serious nature, confronted the proprietors in 1771 and 1772. In the first two summers of Bedford County's existence there was, in the Redstone and Monongahela settlements that had been so

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troublesome to military and civil officials after 1765, a substantial opposition to the authority of the county's officers. In some instances the resisters did not shrink from direct confrontation. A deputy sheriff intending to serve an ejectment among the Monongahela settlers was firmly escorted from the vicinity by a party of armed men, who told him not to attempt again to exercise Pennsylvania authority west of the Youghiogheny. Some of the same men stopped the Bedford sheriff and a deputy another time, and "Swore in the most dreadfull manner, that if they ever returned to attempt to serve Process, they would Sacrifice them to the most cruel Death." Some of the expressed opposition was to tax collectors. Other resisters apparently held land by titles or claims that rested ultimately on grants made by Virginia many years before, titles which Pennsylvania did not seem likely to accept.[26] In most reports of the resistance, however, such specific issues received less notice than a general expression of opposition to Pennsylvania authority.

The resistance got its muscle from formal associations. The very earliest reports of trouble, received by the provincial government in August 1771, noted that some inhabitants had mutually bound themselves to resist Pennsylvania's civil officers; anyone ascribing to the pledge who did not join in active opposition when his fellows did was obliged to pay a penalty of £50, which could be levied against the

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reluctant one's property.[27] The following summer another agreement was drawn up, its authors "being greatly and unjustly Opprest by the Government of Pensylvania in Taxing and Drawing away all the Wealth and Substance of the said Subscribers, tho settled at the Risque of our lives and Fortunes in a savage Country." The purpose of this subscription was the collection of funds to pay an attorney "to Plead in faviour of the Inhabitants on the said Western Side of Laurill Hill" against the proprietors' claims.[28] Less than a month after this measure was drafted, a petition was presented to the Bedford justices sitting at their July term of court. Presented by George Brent, a Marylander practicing law on the frontier, the petition, bearing two hundred and twenty signatures, requested that the Bedford County sheriff and deputies stop serving any legal processes west of Laurel Hill. As described by Arthur St. Clair, who held several important positions in the county's government, "it charged the Government and the Officers of the Court, with great Oppression and Injustice."[29]

Some of the inhabitants, though in fierce opposition to the proprietary government, indicated that they "would quietly submit" to Pennsylvania authority if, when the western boundary was run, they should prove to be living within the province. Settlers at Redstone told Robert Lettis Hooper, Jr., a Pennsylvanian acting at the time as a

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surveyor for speculative interests in the region, that they did not believe the proprietors' western line would fall that far west. They also objected to paying taxes to support the construction of public buildings at the Bedford County seat when they might prove to be living outside the province. "These Sentiments do not proceed from Licentiousness in the People," Hooper wrote, "nor from a Desire to skreen themselves from Law as some would represent but from believing themselves out of Pennsylvania and being burthened with exorbitant Taxes and Mileage which they are unwilling to pay till it is absolutely determined whether they are in Pennsylvania or not."[30]

The point about levies to pay for county buildings had some sway with westerners. As new counties were formed in Pennsylvania, their officials charged special taxes to raise the funds for courthouses and jails. Over a period of years a settler might find himself, without ever changing his place of residence, in two or even three counties in succession, and each new one required a courthouse levy. It was a burden that inhabitants could easily become riled about, especially if they had little enthusiasm for the new county to begin with.[31]

As for "exorbitant Taxes" in general, the new counties on the frontier had a very bad record of tax collection, and the degree to which taxation was a burden is

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an open question. It is impossible to say how much the problem was one of resistance or poverty on the part of the citizenry, or whether it was chiefly a matter of new, very large jurisdictions not being terribly proficient yet at collecting revenues. In any event the newer counties of Pennsylvania did a very poor job of tax collection. Less than a year after the county's formation, Bedford's officers petitioned the assembly with a plea that the courthouse levy would be £500 short of what was needed. As for provincial and proprietary revenues, there were a series of eighteen-penny property taxes and an excise levied on liquor. Cumberland County was deficient in returning both sets of revenues at the time Bedford was split off from it in 1771. Neither Bedford nor Westmoreland, after the latter's formation in 1773, paid a shilling of excise duty into the provincial treasury before the Revolution. Nor had Westmoreland submitted any money for the provincial taxes by 1776; Bedford paid in a little, but not enough to rectify its deficiencies. Northumberland, another new county (formed in 1772), had a similar record. Westmoreland's collections were impeded by local political disputes that began virtually with the creation of the county, and the economy of the entire frontier was rocked by Indian disturbances in 1774. In recognition of the hardship faced

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by people clearing new land, and to promote settlement on the frontier, the Pennsylvania government in January 1774 allowed county assessors to grant a one year tax abatement to new settlers on uncultivated lands in Bedford, Westmoreland, and Northumberland counties.[32]

A factor that was repeatedly mentioned by Pennsylvania's leading men on the scene as a major contributor to the troubles in 1771 and 1772 was direct agitation, primarily on the part of two wizened veterans of every facet of frontier politics, George Croghan of Pittsburgh and Thomas Cresap of the upper Potomac region of Maryland. Both men counseled the inhabitants that Pennsylvania's western boundary would fall short of the Monongahela country, and Croghan openly resisted and threatened a Bedford County tax collector.[33] It is impossible to determine whether Croghan and Cresap in fact created the entire disturbance: direct historical evidence is usually weak in regard to such matters. Yet whether they orchestrated the entire affair or just took advantage of it once it began, there is no doubt that they actively appealed to many settlers' worries and dissatisfactions about land titles, taxation, and other matters, to suit their own needs. A spirited advocacy was essential if one wanted to make resistance to Pennsylvania authority really work. The apparent success of the arguments of one friend of the Pennsylvania government demonstrated that many in the Monongahela settlements were not automatically

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receptive to opposition to government, or could waver if faced with strong counterarguments, so active leadership was necessary to mobilize enough resistance to have effect.[34] It was certainly Croghan and Cresap who shaped the rebellious group's opinions on the issue of the Pennsylvania boundary; to what degree they gave the resistance its overall form or tactics, or whether the movement was the result of a single plan on anyone's part, is unknown. Writing to a Pennsylvania magistrate, Croghan insisted that he spoke with very few people on the matter and never advised violence against county officers, but he also insisted that the inhabitants were "fools" if they paid any money to Pennsylvania for land or taxes before the provincial boundary was firmly established. Cresap, writing candidly in private, admitted that he had worked hard to convince as many people as possible that they were beyond the proprietary colony's limits.[35] Both man had strong motives for their actions.

Old Colonel Cresap, as he was frequently called, was no stranger to controversies surrounding borders or political jurisdiction. In the 1730s he earned notoriety as the leader of Maryland partisans in a boundary war against Pennsylvania centered at the Susquehanna River. He later moved to the Potomac frontier and was an agent of the Ohio Company. During the 1760s officials learned that Thomas and his son Michael had made private deals with the

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Iroquois for vast tracts of land in the Redstone Creek area and in what is today West Virginia. Contemptuous of governments whose goals countered his own, Cresap sought to establish a monopoly over liquor sales to the region's Indians. According to Virginia's Governor Fauquier, Cresap was responsible for a good deal of the friction between Indians and whites, and did much to bolster the resistance of the Redstone settlers who defied officialdom during the 1760s and refused to leave the area.[36] It suited his purpose to oppose Pennsylvania's authority west of Laurel Hill in the early 1770s. Pennsylvania would never validate his shady land purchases from the Indians, but there was a chance he could make them worth something if they lay outside the colony. Moreover, if the Penns' claim fell short of the Ohio forks, there was a faint glimmer of hope that the old Ohio Company claims to the area could be revived.

Croghan's situation was similar to that of Cresap. Croghan, who resigned from his position as Indian agent in fall 1771, claimed a total of 200,000 acres on the basis of a 1749 purchase from the Six Nations, which he augmented in 1773 with the illegal purchase of another million and a half acres from the Indians. In 1769, as soon as the Penns' manor at Pittsburgh was surveyed, Croghan had the limits of his 1749 purchase marked off, and he began to challenge the

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right of anyone else to lay claim to any part of it. During the next four years or so he had three separate surveys made of his claims south of the Ohio River, each survey including considerably more acreage than the prior one, until he was satisfied that they had taken in enough.[37] Croghan's immediate goal was less to become wealthy than it was to extricate himself from a vast cavern of debt, and during the early 1770s he eagerly sold pieces of his claims to anyone who would buy. To those who were squeamish about the validity of his claims, he offered a bond to guarantee title, but insisted that the purchase money be paid at the time of the sale -- a measure that worked with some, but by no means all, prospective buyers. George Washington's land agent in the Ohio Valley, William Crawford, wrote of Croghan's claims: "I can hear nothing of any confirmation of his grant by any Person but himself." The question of land title was certainly a great fulcrum for political and personal conflict in the territory. "People dos not Know what to do," Crawford reported of Croghan's sales in March 1772; "som in order to Prevent Disputs Enters the Lands with him and then the[y] have six pound pr tract to pay his survayor which acasions much Disputs A mongest the people[,] where it will end I donot now." According to Crawford, Croghan even sold lands that had been officially entered by others in the Pennsylvania land office.[38]

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In addition to his personal land claims, a key factor in Croghan's antipathy to Pennsylvania authority at the Ohio forks during the early 1770s was his association with the Whartons' great scheme for the upper Ohio Valley. This project was what is often called the Vandalia plan, from the name eventually attached to the proposed colony on the Ohio. It was commonly referred to by its hopeful friends as the "new colony" or the "new government." The project originated with Samual Wharton's and William Trent's journey to England in 1769 to plead for royal approval of the Stanwix cessions to the "suffering trader" group. Finding Lord Hillsborough, the colonial secretary of state, unreceptive, Wharton fished for new ways to promote his and his friends' interests. The result was the Walpole Associates, named after one of the syndicate's members in England. The object of the new company was the creation of a new proprietary colony of several million acres in size, to be located on the south side of the upper Ohio.[39]

Croghan was one of those involved in the venture. A new colony with him and his friends as proprietors would mean the validation of his Indian purchases. He also surveyed and made efforts to sell other lands on behalf of the expected colony.[40] The eventual location of the western border of Pennsylvania was crucial to

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these plans, for the new province's territory was to begin at the Pennsylvania boundary. From Croghan's position it was vital that Pennsylvania's jurisdiction not extend as far west as Pittsburgh.

It is difficult to overstress the fact that everyone with an interest in Ohio Valley lands waited through 1771, 1772, and 1773 in constant expectation of hearing whether Samuel Wharton's lobbying efforts in London had succeeded in establishing a new provincial government in the west. In June 1771 Croghan, already impatient, got word that the project was approved and that Wharton would be the colony's governor. The summer of 1772 brought the same rumor, and in November Sir William Johnson ordered Alexander McKee, Croghan's successor as Indian agent at Pittsburgh, to inform the western nations that a new colony was forthcoming. The following year Croghan, now quite edgy, still had little but rumors and promises to go on. He was forced to borrow heavily to finance a meeting with the Indians, who had come to meet the still nonexistent new governor of the upper Ohio Valley settlements.[41] Something more definite than rumor, something that would substantiate land titles, was necessary. "For tho' the people coming into this Country for Lands are anxious to settle," a surveyor associated with Croghan reported in 1772, "and would willingly pay at the rate of £10 Sterlg. per

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hundred Acres, yet they are causious least they should risk their property in disputes with the proprietors of pennsylvania."[42]

It was within this context that Cresap and Croghan counseled the restless settlers of the Monongahela watershed to resist the Pennsylvania government's entry into the region. The settlers were certainly aware of the "new colony," for they made some reference to it, and to the longstanding grants made by Virginia's council decades earlier, as rival claimants to Pennsylvania for the western lands.[43] Experienced hands at the game, the two old "colonels" doubtless made sure that the inhabitants' unrest did not appear too closely associated with their own personal claims or those of the Walpole group.

Croghan and Cresap had been considerably less than friends for a long while, and had opposed one another in similar situations in the past. In this instance, however, they were bound by a common interest. George Mercer, as custodian of the original Ohio Company's interests, at first opposed Samuel Wharton's schemes, since they conflicted with those of Mercer's syndicate, which still hoped to make good its claims to the Ohio forks. Wharton convinced him to merge the Ohio Company's claims into those of the Walpole group. This alliance, probably sweetened further by a hint that the new

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government would recognize some of Cresap's irregular land claims, brought the Marylander to cooperate with Croghan.[44]

The two were active and useful agents of Wharton's plans. It was to them that Wharton sent copies of a petition that would, when signed by several hundred westerners, appear to be a spontaneous call for what the Walpole company had to offer, and could be used as a weapon in Wharton's arsenal as he fought for official approval of the new government. They also gathered "sundry Letters . . . which are for the use of the Company" in its argument for the necessity of a new provincial government centered on the Ohio River. "They will appear as if they came from Indifferent persons unconcerned," Cresap wrote.[45]

As for their efforts in the resistance to Pennsylvania authority, Arthur St. Clair on the Pennsylvania side correctly perceived that something rotten was afoot, but guessed wrong as to what the agitators' ultimate goal might be. St. Clair knew that "some People in Philadelphia" must be concerned in the affair, because "certain I am messengers and Expresses, Pass and repass betwixt Philadelphia and Fort Pitt, too frequently for any private Transaction to bear the Expence." What he concluded, however, was that "a certain ambitious set" was still bent on discrediting the proprietary government in favor of a royal one, and

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hoped to throw the province into turmoil to achieve their aims.[46] There is no indication that the western troubles of 1771 and 1772 were intended to precipitate the downfall of Pennsylvania's proprietary government. In a sense, however, St. Clair was not too far wrong, for there was an "ambitious set" in Philadelphia -- the Vandalia backers -- tied to the actions of Cresap and Croghan, and some of its membership, such as Benjamin Franklin, included people who had been agitating against the proprietary government for years.

There was considerable competition for the territory lying between the Allegheny ridges and the Ohio River, and another group bent on acquiring large tracts in the same area as the Walpole company consisted of Virginia veterans. In 1770, after receiving the application for the proposed new colony, the British government instructed Virginia not to make any new grants beyond the old 1763 line until further notice. The response from William Nelson, president of the Virginia Council and acting governor after the death of Lord Botetourt, pointed out that there were interests in Virginia who felt that their own claims in the upper Ohio Valley had some priority over the Walpole group's.[47] Meanwhile George Washington and others from the old Virginia regiment took steps to secure lands under Governor Dinwiddie's 1754 proclamation, which had promised every man enlisting to help secure the Ohio

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forks a share in a 200,000 acre tract to be laid off in the vicinity. By the spring of 1771 William Crawford, himself a former Virginia officer who now lived at the Youghiogheny River, was surveying tracts for Washington and others along the south bank of the Ohio some distance downriver from Fort Pitt. The Virginians were well aware of the rival claims of the Vandalia project; Washington wrote Botetourt in 1770 that the new colony would "give a fatal blow to the Interests of this Country." Washington approached the whole matter of land acquisition in the west rather differently than did, say, Samuel Wharton and his associates. In contrast to the subterfuges and aggressive tactics of Wharton, Washington tended to avoid dispute whenever possible, choosing to invest in a relatively sure title rather than fight for an easily contested one. It was this caution that made him pass up lands near Fort Pitt, "where they are of some value," and locate his military surveys between two and three hundred miles downstream. He still expected "plague and trouble" from the new colony, but downstream lands were a brighter prospect than at the Ohio forks, where a survey of large tracts would have to contend with the claims of the Penns, the Walpole associates, Croghan, and countless settlers already on the spot.[48]

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The whole business was, as Washington put it, "a kind of a lottery," and the surveys down the Ohio, while not free from disputed title, were the best chance the Virginia soldiers had of making good on Dinwiddie's proclamation. Aware of the need for swift action to fend off the claims both of the new government's sponsors and of squatters who might claim improvement rights, Washington pressed Lord Dunmore, Virginia's new governor, to grant formally the lands surveyed by Crawford. Dunmore obliged by granting deeds to some lands on the Ohio surveyed by authority of the 1754 proclamation. And when the crown again forbade western grants in the spring of 1773, Dunmore proved amenable to using the one loophole in that restriction: lands could still be granted to military officers under provisions of the king's 1763 proclamation. While it was uncertain that the crown would validate any such grant to the former officer of a provincial regiment, veterans from Virginia, Pennsylvania, and other colonies jumped at the opportunity and sent surveying parties downriver in 1773 even before they knew for certain that Dunmore would make grants under the 1763 proviso.[49]

George Washington is probably the most substantial illustration of the great interest the Ohio Valley had for ambitious people, and the opportunity it pre-

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sented once the restrictions of 1763 fell away. Washington acquired thousands of acres of land along the Ohio, especially in the vicinity of the Kanawha River, both through his own military grants and by purchasing the rights of other officers. As early as 1770 he supported plans to improve the navigation of the Potomac River in hopes that it would become the major economic artery connecting the transmontane country with the seaboard. He financed a mill at the Youghiogheny, considered a project to import farmers from the Palatine in Europe as tenants for his western lands, and in 1775 even expressed a desire to raise bison at the Kanawha.[50] Yet for all its vision, his experience also illuminates the kind of local situation that could result from such a large influx of settlers and the ambitions of such highly competitive speculative interests. Even before the Stanwix cessions, as soon as the Mason and Dixon survey gave some indication of where Pennsylvania's south line would fall, Washington put William Crawford to work scouting for good lands in the Youghiogheny-Monongahela region, or if possible near Pittsburgh, that might be taken up under Pennsylvania entries. He also asked Crawford to investigate lands that looked as if they would prove beyond the Pennsylvania lines. "I woud recommend it to you to keep this whole matter a profound Secret," he advised, and he suggested

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that the investigation might be "snugly carried on by you under the pretence of hunting other Game."[51]

Over the next several years Crawford found for Washington several pieces of land in what is now southwestern Pennsylvania. Locating soil good enough to suit his friend was difficult, but Crawford learned that finding and surveying a tract was only the beginning. The two Virginians earned George Croghan's disfavor when they declined buying from him and instead took up land outside his claims. To retaliate, Croghan spread word that Crawford's surveying of Washington's military claims "was only a skeem" and would never result in a trustworthy title. Edward Ward, Croghan's half brother, was also behind the encroachment of a band of interlopers who went onto Washington's land at Chartiers Creek, "and there is no geting them of[f] without by Force of Arms," Crawford reported.[52]

Crawford inquired about officially entering Washington's claims at Chartiers and Ten Mile Creeks with the Pennsylvania land office, but he could not get a guarantee that the entry fees would be refunded if the land proved to be outside the province. As a result Washington took out a patent for his tract at Great Meadows, which lay a bit west of the Youghiogheny, but ordered Crawford in December 1771 just to hold on to the more questionable tracts west of the Monongahela

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until they could see if the new government scheme would be successful.[53] Definite word on the new colony remained elusive, and holding the claims required tremendous effort. Crawford built cabins and cleared a bit of land around each, but that did not deter interlopers who had to be bought off or driven away. "Nothing will do now but possision," he wrote, and he hired men to stay on the tracts and hold them. He could not get Washington any land close to Pittsburgh, "as there is Such numbers of People out now Looking for Land and one takeing Each other's Land from him[;] as soon as a man's back is turnd. an other is on his Land." He added: "the man that is strong and able to make others Afraid of him seems to have the best Chance as times go now."[54] To cover his bets, Washington even investigated the possibility of buying a share in the new colony scheme. He certainly had foreseen the kinds of problems to come when he traveled through the region in 1770. "Note the unsettled state of this Country renders any purchase dangerous," he wrote in his diary then. Circumstances were no more settled in December 1773 when Crawford, reporting Ward's tactics against Washington's land, noted sadly: "I think such Proceeding as those if not stopd. will soon set the Hole Country in ruin."[55]

Certainly the crux of the matter was the Penns'

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unsurveyed western boundary. Earnest speculation about where it would fall began as soon as the survey of the Pennsylvania-Maryland line was completed by Jeremiah Dixon and Charles Mason in the autumn of 1767. "When is the Boundary to be run?" George Morgan asked his company's agent in Pittsburgh in November 1768. "Do you think Fort Pitt will fall into Pennsylvania by a Line from the SW Corner, parallel with the Delaware? If [it] is How will this affect Mr. Croghan?"[56] By the charter granted to William Penn in the seventeenth century, his province was to extend for five degrees of longitude west of the Delaware River. The precise configuration of the west line was not specified by the charter. If it was to parallel the Delaware River at a constant distance of five degrees, running that twisting line on the terrain of western Pennsylvania would be a surveyor's nightmare. Furthermore, the Delaware makes a gigantic double bend in its course north of Philadelphia; in the west a parallel line would mean that a corresponding wedge of thousands of acres, perhaps including Pittsburgh and much land west of the Monongahela River, would fall outside Pennsylvania. There was also speculation about what constituted, in miles on the ground, a degree of longitude at the latitude of Pennsylvania's southern boundary. Moreover, the Penns claimed, despite a con-

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trary settlement with Maryland, that the fortieth degree of latitude began at the thirty-ninth parallel -- an interpretation that placed a sizable chunk of what is now West Virginia within the chartered limits of Pennsylvania.

George Croghan staunchly maintained, and continually assured the backers of the new colony venture, "that the Westren bounds of pensylvaine will fall farr Short of Fort pitt." During the outbreak of resistance to the Penns' authority in 1771, he advocated a measure of forty-eight miles to the degree of longitude, since that, he claimed, was the accepted measure when Penn received his charter.[57] Fifteen months later, after having surveys made of the Monongahela, the Youghiogheny, and part of the Ohio, he was willing to concede a measure of almost fifty-four miles to a degree of longitude at the latitude of Pennsylvania's southern border. Even at that rate, he continued to declare, Pittsburgh was thirteen to twenty miles outside Pennsylvania, presuming that the border would parallel the windings of the Delaware.[58]

George Morgan, rather uncomfortably associated with the Vandalia project through his business ties with John Baynton and the Wharton family, was distressed by the efforts of the new colony's advocates regarding the boundary. "For you, your Brothers, and Colonel

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Croghan to talk of having Fort Pitt left out of Pennsylvania 20, 30 or 40 Miles is in my Opinion highly preposterous," he informed Samuel Wharton. Morgan's own information from scientist David Rittenhouse was that Pittsburgh was in Pennsylvania, though not by much: "5 Miles and 21 Perches in a West Course -- but in a S West Direction, not quite three Miles," should the line parallel the Delaware's curves.[59] No matter what the location and shape of the border, the most unfortunate fact was that it remained officially undetermined for so long. "Let the Western Boundary fall where it may," a surveyor wrote Benjamin Franklin's son William, a Vandalia shareholder, "it is absolutely necessary for the Proprietors in the New Colony to insist on Messrs. Penns establishing it as soon as possible." Or as the acting governor of Virginia put it to Lord Hillsborough early in 1771: "Permit me, my lord, to observe that the line between His Majesty and Mr Penn seems to be an object worthy of consideration."[60]

The determination of contested intercolonial boundaries usually progressed at a glacial pace: some border agreements took years to be decided, others went on literally for decades. The proprietary government of Pennsylvania was not necessarily slow in taking

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steps to resolve this matter so important to its own interests, although the Penns certainly took time to collect their information before taking any steps. As early as the summer of 1769 James Tilghman, a member of the governor's council and secretary of the Pennsylvania land office, began gathering intelligence concerning the probable location of the boundary.[61] An important development then came in 1770 with the printing of William Scull's map of the province. This map became a prominent source of information and was a major influence on judgments regarding both the course of the Delaware River and Pittsburgh's location. William Crawford saw it by early May of 1770, and advised Washington that after some surveys on his own along the Monongahela he thought he could say with some certainty where a line conforming to the Delaware's wanderings would run. As far as a furious George Croghan was concerned, the map was "a Masterly [piece] of Deception Intenshonally Don," propaganda meant to mislead everyone and further Pennsylvania's interest in the boundary matter. On the basis of his own surveys Croghan was certain that the map located Pittsburgh thirteen miles too far north in order to put it within the appropriate curve of the border.[62] In October 1771 Tilghman stressed to John Penn the importance of fixing the western boundary, "as there will always be in new and remote settlements,

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many People who would willingly be out of all Jurisdiction that their own Delinquencies may go unpunished." Tilghman also tried to confront the problem of a boundary twisting with every bend in the Delaware River, and suggested that Penn consider reducing the border to a series of straight lines that would approximate the river's course but be considerably easier to survey.[63]

Another year passed before the proprietary government initiated the collection of what was undoubtedly the most accurate contemporary information regarding Fort Pitt's location relative to the Delaware's bends. This action was spurred by the impending formation of a new county in the west, which occurred with the erection of Westmoreland County early in 1773, and by the proprietors' belief that Pittsburgh, if definitely within the province, would be the best choice for a county seat. The Penns turned to William Smith, provost of the College of Philadelphia, and David Rittenhouse, astronomer and instrument-maker. These two suggested that speculation be abandoned in favor of astronomical observation: if an accurate clock and other instruments were taken to Pittsburgh, then observations of the movements of Jupiter's moons could be made which would give the most accurate possible measure of Pittsburgh's longitude and posi-

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tion relative to the Delaware River.

Whether any astronomical observations were made is uncertain; it seems that the information subsequently given the proprietors about Pittsburgh's location came primarily from surveys run on the ground. Late in 1772 Arthur St. Clair, who was then a prominent magistrate in Bedford County, along with the county sheriff, another justice of the peace, and Alexander McClean, a surveyor soon to become a Pennsylvania magistrate, quietly surveyed a north-south meridian from a milepost on the Mason-Dixon line to the Ohio River, then determined the courses of the river from where this meridian struck it to Pittsburgh. Within a few months Rittenhouse made surveys in the east to determine the precise configuration of the Delaware River's contortions relative to the eastern end of the Mason-Dixon survey.[64] He informed Tilghman that Pittsburgh was the Penns', by about six miles. If only ground surveys were used to reach this conclusion, they were carefully done, for Pennsylvania's official version of Pittsburgh's latitude and longitude during the mid-1770s was very accurate.[65] Although these measurements were carried out quietly and the results not publicized, the new colony's promoters, by way of George Morgan, at least became aware that Rittenhouse had developed specific figures relative to

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Pittsburgh and the boundary. Tilghman, who reminded Thomas Penn that "the People on the Western Frontier will pay neither taxes nor Rents nor purchase money" in the absence of a firm border, wrote in March 1773 that he expected to see a boundary surveyed "sometime next summer."[66]

That same month Thomas and John Penn petitioned the crown requesting that commissioners be appointed to determine the northern and western bounds of their province. The petition noted that conflicts might arise between Pennsylvanians and New Yorkers, or between the former and residents of any new colonies to be formed, if the borders remained indefinite. It also suggested that a straight meridian would be easier to mark off than a border paralleling the ramblings of the Delaware. Unfortunately events made the petition of little value in the final resolution of the boundary issue. Seen first by a committee, the Penns' petition was not taken up for the consideration of the Lords of Trade until January 1774. The board agreed in principle that fixing Pennsylvania's borders was desirable, but required the consent of New York and Virginia before any action could be taken. By that time Virginia and Pennsylvania were tangled in open contention for the Ohio forks territory. The Penns revived the petition in 1775, but it had become, in

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expanded form, primarily a brief to help support the proprietors' case against the action of Lord Dunmore and the Virginians. And with the start of the Revolutionary War the dispute ceased to be a matter for the crown to solve.[67]

Without a sanctioned boundary line actually surveyed on the ground, there could be nothing but confusion for inhabitants of the Monongahela-Ohio forks region, who were caught in the midst of a contested jurisdiction and could not be certain of the validity of land titles, taxation, or court actions. It was also fertile ground for anyone interested in inciting a resistance to authority for personal advantage. As the events of 1774 and after would show, there were ways to cast doubt on the Penns' charter claims to the area and make the political stability of the region a more important issue than longitude or the meanders of the Delaware River. Once Pennsylvania was forced to negotiate to resolve the jurisdictional issue and restore order, its opponents could hope to bring about a settlement more favorable to them than would have been possible if the matter were allowed to run its course unaltered. The 1771-1772 opposition to Pennsylvania's authority only foreshadowed what was to come by 1774, when the Virginia government entered the scene more forcefully and the Penns saw an even more

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direct attack on their province's jurisdiction in the Ohio Valley.

A new aspect came to the problem of local authority with the entry of Virginia into the contest as a direct participant. Although from the start it provided a legitimate avenue of local leadership and politics in addition to that furnished by Pennsylvania county government, in its inception the implementation of local jurisdiction by Virginia was a clear tactic on the part of people who were interested, as were the Walpole company and the Penns, in controlling the disposition of lands in the upper Ohio Valley. Virginia claims and interests had been around for years, but were relatively passive until Lord Dunmore and his associates began actively to employ the resources available to them to press the colony's claims. The precise authorship of the tactics used is uncertain, but two men, the earl of Dunmore and John Connolly, played crucial roles in shaping the course of Virginia government at the Ohio.

John Murray, the fourth earl of Dunmore, assumed the governorship of Virginia in September 1771 after a brief stint as governor of New York. A Scottish

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nobleman about forty years of age, Dunmore had relied on alliances with the earl of Shelburne, Lord Bute, and associates of the duke of Bedford to advance himself in a political career. His service as governor was intended to further that career and to augment his estate, and he took an open interest in the acquisition of lands for himself and his family even during his months in New York. As a politician he was marked by his ambition, his aggressiveness, and his great forcefulness much more than by any fine subtlety of mind. In his position as governor of Virginia he knew, because of his experience and personality, how to use his office to best advantage: how to wield royal authority as a weapon; how to stall, pretend to misunderstand, or misrepresent the situation in communications with the home government.[68]

Dunmore petitioned the king for a 100,000 acre personal grant in the west of Virginia as early as March 1772, commenting to Hillsborough at the time that "I have thought that I could not find a better occupation for my leisure hours than applying myself to the settling of some of the vacant lands." He began also in 1772 to grant deeds for the military surveys made under Dinwiddie's 1754 proclamation, and during 1773 favored using the 1763 proclamation as a means of avoiding the crown's restrictions on grants, although he

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was -- in keeping with his style -- a bit coy about making the former officers any big promises early on. And in August 1773 he visited the transmontane country himself, stopping at Pittsburgh for a few days. George Washington, prevented from going along by the death of his stepdaughter, wished he could have been there "to have lent every assistance I could towards facilitating any Schemes your Lordship might have of procuring Lands to the Westward of us, for yourself."[69] The governor undoubtedly had plenty of help hatching "Schemes" on his journey without Washington's aid.

"It's thought here that 'tis all Colonel Croghan's intrigues," a Pennsylvania magistrate reported from Pittsburgh at the beginning of the dispute with Virginia. Although it no doubt seemed probable to many of its hearers, this rumor was at bottom incorrect. A letter from Croghan to Dunmore in spring 1774 indicates that the former was probably not the original designer of the Virginia maneuvers.[70] However, no matter what their role in planning the course of events, Croghan -- whose antipathy to Pennsylvania authority at the upper Ohio was certainly no secret -- and a small brood of his associates were among the earliest participants on the Virginia side of the dispute. As usual, Croghan was alert to any opportunity to take advantage of shifting affairs at the Ohio forks.

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A year earlier the new colony project had looked very bright, for during the summer of 1772 Samuel Wharton and Thomas Walpole seemed to win the fight for the new government, Lord Hillsborough, its main obstructor, resigned, and the Privy Council approved the project. Things moved slowly, however; it took time to draft the form of government for the new colony, and in summer 1773 the attorney general and crown solicitor, certainly for political reasons, raised objections to the scheme that would prove to delay it until the impending war with the colonies finally killed it. In the meantime Croghan suffered through delay after delay in the formal implementation of the new colony, and he was far too shrewd to limit his options under the present circumstances. The immediate task for him was to impede any strong establishment of Pennsylvania's jurisdiction in the region, and Virginia was the entity immediately available to do that. When he allied himself with the Virginians Croghan did not abandon Vandalia any more than he had dropped his shares in the old "suffering traders" claim. If the Vandalia project came through after all, then one could argue that its crown grant superceded any custodial occupation by Virginia. Croghan covered himself regardless, for he obtained from Dunmore a promise that his Indian purchase claims would be validated by

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Virginia.[71]

Croghan's associates in the new colony were by no means party to any alliance with the Virginians. Samuel Wharton and William Trent, fearful of their competition, had been careful to warn Croghan not to let the Virginians catch any hint of the Vandalia plotters' attempts to create petitions and letters supporting the new government project. The Virginians' aggressiveness at Pittsburgh in 1774, in conjunction with the new delays in clearing the Vandalia grant, convinced Thomas Wharton in Philadelphia that there was an orchestrated attempt, perhaps set afoot by Hillsborough or some other strong opponent, to muscle the new colony's proprietors out of their grant.[72]

The man who played the most active local role in asserting Virginia's authority was John Connolly, who may have been Croghan's nephew and had been aided by Croghan in overcoming some problems with debt.[73] It would not do to presume that Connolly was Croghan's puppet, however, for the younger man had a very strong character of his own, loved intrigue, and was capable of brewing any number of "Schemes" with Dunmore on his own initiative. Connolly was no more than thirty years old in 1773. Born in Pennsylvania, he studied medicine while still young, tagged along with the British army at Martinique, went as a volunteer on

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Bouquet's campaign in 1764, and stayed in the west thereafter. He spent time at Fort Pitt and in the Illinois settlements, became involved in the peltry trade and on occasion used his training as a physician. By every indication he cherished military rank -- "It was my ambition to be a soldier," he wrote of his youth -- and he had an ambition "to be at the head of a new settlement."[74]

By 1772 Connolly had gotten himself into a substantial mess, apparently due to his debts. George Morgan believed these problems "have rather proceeded from the warmth of youth than the Love of doing that which is wrong." "You have been an abused Person," Morgan advised him, set upon by those "who cannot pretend to a 1000th. Part of your Knowledge [,] Abilities or Genius. . . . You have my Dear Sir purchased, and dearly too, much Experience."[75] It was a worldly John Connolly indeed who told the Reverend David McClure during a casual walk in 1773 "that religion was all a piece of policy." Whatever the nature of the experience so dearly bought, Connolly could be, as an Englishman meeting him in 1775 declared, "a haughty, imperious man."[76]

As early as 1770, when George Washington met him, Connolly had dreams of a new colony that could be formed below the falls of the Ohio River. Almost two

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years later Connolly wrote Washington stressing that in his opinion Virginians had fallen far short of the potential of what they might accomplish in the continent's interior. Washington, who thought highly of the younger man's abilities and judgment, took Connolly's advice and dispatched an agent to investigate lands on the Mississippi near Natchez.[77] If one believes Connolly, he had an equal sway with Lord Dunmore and initiated the strategy of bringing Virginia's jurisdiction actively to the Ohio forks.[78] An element of boastful exaggeration tinges his comments on the subject, but there is no reason to believe that his role in the formation of Dunmore's plans was inconsequential. He had, after all, a freewheeling, aggressive ambition that struck a sympathetic chord in the governor. Dunmore saw Connolly during his trip to Pittsburgh in August 1773, and in a move that created "a great deal of Noise" and was thought by many to be "altogether illegal," authorized a grant to him of 2000 acres far down the Ohio at its falls, a choice site for future development.[79]

Dunmore required little prompting in deciding on an aggressive course of action in the upper Ohio Valley; as Patrick Henry told Thomas Wharton in reference to the governor's war with the Shawnee in 1774, the earl did not hesitate to employ the most inflammatory of tac-

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tics in his efforts to gain control over the region's lands.[80] Ostensibly the governor's actions were all motivated by a groundswell of sentiment on the part of the local inhabitants. As Dunmore reported it, he found the Pittsburgh vicinity occupied by a large number of settlers lacking any visible government, who "flocked about me and beseeched me . . . to appoint magistrates and officers of militia to remove these grievous inconveniences under which they laboured." A supposed four hundred people met at a "grand meeting" at the mouth of the Redstone after Dunmore left to return to Williamsburg and sent after him a petition requesting him to take them under his government and guard them from the "great injustice" of Pennsylvania rule. Early in 1774 Connolly also forwarded to Williamsburg a similar petition, this one with a reported 584 signers, complaining of Pennsylvania officers' and attorneys' fees, the extension of Pennsylvania authority far to the west of any conceivable western limit of the province, poor defense, and the "heavy" burden of Pennsylvania taxes. Most of the petitioners were Virginians by origin, the document claimed, and favored Virginia's "mild, easy, and equitable Government." Unfortunately there do not seem to be any extant copies of these petitions bearing the signatures, or even the names, of these hundreds of signers.[81] Given the manufacture and the

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use of similar memorials by the Vandalia claimants, who also wanted to depict an Ohio forks region crying out for their government, it is very difficult to take these petitions at face value. Dunmore himself, during his short involvement with the dispute between New York and New Hampshire over the Vermont region, had quickly learned the utility of such devices as petitions and popular affidavits when presenting one's case to the British government.[82] Some of the grievances mentioned in the 1773-1774 petitions, as well as a general preference for one colony over the other, no doubt appealed to many of the region's settlers and may have motivated them to sympathize with the actions that were now afoot, but the spontaneity and public initiative implicit in these documents are most suspect.

These appeals were intended as justification for the instigation of direct authority by Virginia at the Ohio forks, which was the heart of the Dunmore-Connolly strategy. "His Lordship thinks with you, that there is a necessity for the Pennsylvanians closing their Western Bounds," Connolly wrote Washington in December 1773. "I should conceive no means so effectual to that purpose could be devised, as the striking off a new County including Pittsburgh, and at least two miles to the East, and up the Monongehela to the enterance of Buffaloe Creek." This action, Connolly asserted,

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would force the issue: "if the Proprietaries conceive themselves really agrieved by these means, they will then close their Lines, and you will find no other Step will answer."[83] Unfortunately Dunmore had been sharply rebuked by the Lords of Trade a few months earlier for allowing the creation of two new counties. Since new counties increased the size of the House of Burgesses, his instructions specifically forbade him from approving them. He found a partial solution to this problem, however, and when Connolly made a visit to Williamsburg late in 1773 Dunmore issued commissions for him, George Croghan, and five other residents of the Pittsburgh region to serve as magistrates in Augusta County, the existing county on Virginia's northwest flank.[84] Connolly insisted that to have real effectiveness the local government must have its seat west of the mountains, not at Staunton, and an expedient was found to meet this requirement also: the Pittsburgh territory became the "District of West Augusta" and the Augusta County justices could sit regularly at Pittsburgh by adjournment from Stanton. This measure was not implemented until the beginning of 1775, however, and no regular Virginia county court sat at Pittsburgh until then. For a year, then -- through all of 1774 -- the local Virginia justices'

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commissions had considerably less impact on the situation around Pittsburgh than did Dunmore's additional appointment of Connolly as "Captain Commandant of the Militia of Pittsburgh and its Dependencies," with the power to appoint other officers.[85] This step not only allowed Connolly to act at will as a Virginia officer without a court sitting locally; it also gave him the power to muster and command a technically legitimate body of armed men to enforce Virginia's authority.

In justifying Virginia's establishment of local government in the area, Dunmore thrust the issue of Pennsylvania's boundary and jurisdiction into a new channel of argument. Dunmore refused to let the quarrel become a legalistic discussion of whose seventeenth-century charter took precedence, which grants superceded others, or how the crown originally intended to delineate the provinces. From the outset of the dispute he and Connolly cited a 1761 opinion by Attorney General Charles Pratt (Lord Camden) in reference to the Pennsylvania-Connecticut fight over the Wyoming district. This opinion held that a number of factors -- actual possession, special conditions, later agreements -- could alter the "Parchment Boundary" of a colony as prescribed by its charter. With this statement as his foundation, Dunmore argued that Pennsylvania had failed to take effective possession of the Ohio forks

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region even if the territory should fall within William Penn's original charter limits. In specific terms, Pennsylvania's assembly had refused to supply funds to defend the future site of Pittsburgh at the beginning of the last French war, and had expressed doubts that the spot was within the province. Virginia had not shrunk from defending the western country, Dunmore pointed out. Of course the governor's argument neglected the fact that Virginia's assembly, too, had declined to consider the Ohio forks part of their province when they were called on to send militia during the 1763-1764 Indian troubles. Dunmore's argument did not rest on possession of the spot by Virginia, however, but on the fact that it was the crown's. The French conquest of the area, followed by British reconquest, the formal French cession of the continent's interior to Great Britain, and the maintenance of a royal garrison at Fort Pitt to defend the region, all meant that the Pittsburgh region was the king's, not the Penns' -- and Dunmore as a royal governor was simply protecting the crown's interests by taking it under his administration.[86]

Virginia did not deny that Pennsylvania had established regular county governments encompassing the disputed area west of the mountains. Instead both Dunmore in Williamsburg and Connolly in Pittsburgh

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pointed to the Penns' exercise of jurisdiction as a blatantly illegal usurpation of government. In a proclamation against the "wild Claim" of Pennsylvania in September 1774, the governor called public notice to the fact that Pennsylvania's executive "has most arbitrarily and unwarrantably proceeded to abuse the laudable Advancements in this Part of his Majesty's Dominions, by many oppressive and illegal Methods in the Discharge of this [the Penns'] imaginary Authority."[87] When Governor John Penn played one of his best cards and informed Dunmore that the finest available measurements showed Pittsburgh to lie six miles within the western boundary, Dunmore quickly turned the argument against him. Virginia had not participated in the surveys and could not accede to their results; but if Pennsylvania accepted its own figures, then the exertion of its authority more than six miles west of Pittsburgh, and anywhere else past that sinewy and still imaginary line, had been "a wilful encroachment." By Dunmore's own interpretation of the Penn's "Parchment Boundary," the border should be determined by marking off five degrees of longitude west of the Delaware River along Pennsylvania's northern boundary, then dropping a straight meridian to the southern border. Due to a misconception that the Delaware was farther east at the forty-second parallel than is actually the

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case, Pennsylvania's adversaries incorrectly believed that this configuration of the boundary would place the Penns' western border as far east as Laurel Hill.[88]

Dunmore's arguments were calculated to have a favorable effect on the home government. As a royal governor he acted as the agent of the crown, and in this case his actions were interpreted to uphold the greater interests of Britain against the encroachments of an interested group of proprietors, the Penn family. The crown liked the argument that whatever territory was not demonstrably part of a proprietary grant belonged to the king, especially in the interior where imperial authority had been the ruling principle since the war with France. Dunmore had adopted a technique used with success by leaders in New York during that colony's boundary conflicts. The crown, after all, was the final arbiter of intercolonial disputes, and royal colonies such as New York and Virginia, as protectors of his majesty's interests in America, could rely on a certain privileged status to give them an advantage in land disputes with the private colonies.[89]

At the outset of the dispute the British government was inclined to approve Dunmore's interpretation and tactics. Hillsborough's successor Lord Dartmouth, always favorable toward the Wharton-Walpole new colony scheme, liked the idea of a kind of custodial royal

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administration of the forks by Virginia until Vandalia could get going on its own. Dartmouth in fact scolded General Gage early in 1773 for consenting so readily to John Penn's request to put a Pennsylvania garrison at Fort Pitt after the British army's withdrawal. The secretary feared that such a move would give Pennsylvania a perhaps undue claim at the Ohio forks which might then prove difficult to dislodge. The question lost any real significance when the provincial assembly refused to furnish any men for the fort.[90] The ministry's initial response to Dunmore's assertion of Virginia authority west of Laurel Hill was an approval of the governor's measures to quiet what he depicted as a chaotic situation in the absence of a legal government that had the inhabitants' support. Yet Dartmouth soon found that he had to keep repeating the government's wishes that Dunmore not grant any lands within the limits of the proposed new colony, "nor exercise any other jurisdiction than what shall be absolutely necessary to preserve the public peace and prevent violence and bloodshed." As 1774 wore on, the home government came more and more to the realization that what they had in Dunmore was no reflexively obedient agent of the crown's will but an independent operator swathed in royal authority and concerned largely with his own interests. Dunmore claimed for months that he had no

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official notice of Vandalia's proposed bounds; he fussed and argued over restrictions on land grants; he approved, on the basis of a contrived interpretation of a ruling by crown lawyers, illegal purchases from Indians; he carried out his own independent, swaggering policy toward the Shawnee. As for the dispute with Pennsylvania, before it had advanced very far Dartmouth noted that one of Dunmore's proclamations "implies too strongly the necessity of exerting a military force and breathes too much a spirit of hostility that ought not to be encouraged in matters of civil dispute between the subjects of the same state."[91] Despite the problems inherent in trying to work with the governor, the ministry never became frustrated enough with Dunmore to recall him from Virgina. And with his talents for evasive navigation, reining him in from Whitehall meant months of correspondence, repeated orders, and clarifications. In the meantime a lot was happening in the west.

Connolly took steps to assert Virginia's authority at Pittsburgh as soon as he returned from seeing Dunmore in Williamsburg late in 1773. On the first day of the new year he issued a public notice -- a kind of pronunciamento, in effect -- announcing that Lord Dunmore intended to form the region into a new county and ordering "all Persons in the Dependency of Pittsburgh"

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to attend a militia muster on January 25. The justices of the peace of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania's judicial officers west of the mountains, had no forewarning of Connolly's action. However, conditions during 1773 may have been unsettled, for some steps had been taken to add both justices and constables to the Westmoreland ranks near Pittsburgh.[92] Now, under the leadership of Arthur St. Clair at Ligonier, the justices moved to curtail Virginia jurisdiction before it could take effect. Connolly was arrested and jailed at the Westmoreland county seat at Hannastown, to be kept there if necessary by an excessive bail demand and a sufficient party of guards. On the twenty-fifth about eighty men mustered at Pittsburgh, held a makeshift parade and "a kind of feu de joy," and stopped in the old Fort Pitt parade ground to drink rum, but they were addressed there not by Connolly but by St. Clair and a group of Westmoreland magistrates. The officials read a long statement intended to mollify the crowd and to keep everything orderly and quiet under the present situation until the king could decide the jurisdictional question. Any efforts to subvert the standing authority of Pennsylvania or to erect a contending jurisdiction would, the justices opined, create something akin to "a state of Anarchy and confusion, and total subversion of Property." Later in the day

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the militiamen considered taking some action against St. Clair, but instead dispersed, some releasing their frustrations by shooting at the huts of Indians living on the Allegheny's far shore.[93]

After a brief confinement Connolly obtained his release by promising the Westmoreland County sheriff that he would attend the April session of the county court. He then traveled to Staunton to be officially sworn as a local militia officer, stopping on the way at musters in the Redstone and Monongahela country. By late March he was back in Pittsburgh, where on the thirtieth there was another muster of about twenty men from the Chartiers Creek settlements. During the next few days in Pittsburgh there were several confrontations between Connolly and his subordinate officers on the one hand and those Pennyslvania county officers who were present in the town on the other. "Our village is become the scene of anarchy and Confusion," Westmoreland justice Aeneas Mackay reported on April 4. Connolly had established his headquarters within the old fort's works, and by appealing to "the giddy headed mobs" with offers of land and officers' commissions, had raised a sizable contingent of militia. "Matters are Carried to a very Dangerous lengths already, and are likely to become more so every day."[94] Two days after Mackay wrote of his concern, Connolly made his greatest show

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of strength. He attended the Westmoreland court at Hannastown as promised, but he was accompanied by what under the circumstances was a considerable army, 150 to 200 militiamen "with Colours flying," the officers' swords drawn. This group took control of the proceedings, and in a tense but orderly exchange Connolly explained that he had brought his friends to prevent any attempts to spirit him off as a prisoner to Philadelphia. He denied the authority of the Pennsylvania justices but allowed them to continue sitting to hear whatever disputes the people might voluntarily bring to them. The judges tendered a reply that reiterated their authority and disavowed, as had Connolly, any desire to foment havoc. Connolly and his troops then withdrew without further incident, their point made. Back in Pittsburgh, however, he continued to pressure his opponents. Two days after his appearance at Hannastown he arrested three of the Westmoreland justices, Devereux Smith, Andrew McFarlane, and Aeneas Mackay, all residents of Pittsburgh, and packed them off to Staunton to stand trial.[95]

The three justices were released later in April after Mackay rode to Williamsburg to see Dunmore, where "his Lordship and I spoke our minds very free to each other, Relating Connelly, Claims and Lines." Dunmore also scolded Connolly a bit over "the length

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to which you Suffered your intemperate heat to carry you." Yet the governor admitted that "I cannot wholly condemn" Connolly's behavior. Dunmore also ordered Connolly to allow the Pennsylvania officials to serve no processes, collect no taxes, take no action at all under Penn's authority. At the same time he issued a proclamation reiterating the Virginia militia's authority to oppose the Pennsylvania government around Pittsburgh.[96]

While there would be no further incidents of a scale to match Connolly's performance at the Westmoreland court, the contention between the two jurisdictions continued, with sporadic confrontations, through 1774, 1775, and on into the Revolution. Each colony's officers remained open to arrest by the other faction. Connolly's militia, who began pressing livestock that first spring in addition to harrassing Pennsylvania's adherents at Pittsburgh, left little doubt who was in charge there. The Pennsylvania court continued to sit regularly at Hannastown, and Westmoreland County made regular election returns for its sheriff, coroner, and commissioners in October of 1774 and 1775. However, Pennsylvania's tax collection ceased altogether: in April 1774 and again in February 1775 the county's commissioners and tax assessors reported that most people in the region refused outright either to pay

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taxes or to act as collectors.[97]

The conflict continued largely because its final resolution could only come at a higher level, through an agreement between the two provincial governments and, in terms of any permanent location of the boundary, by the king's assent. With the Vandalia grant still alive but unconsummated, it is not at all certain that the home government wanted to expedite any settlement of the issue. The Penns' petition of 1773 praying for a decision on the boundary was, after all, still floating somewhere in Whitehall in 1774. Lord Dunmore for his part was not about to turn the whole matter over to the crown and await the ministry's decision. His immediate program was aimed at de facto possession of, and control over, Pittsburgh and as much of the upper Ohio as possible: his intention, it appears, was to take the region, hold it, and wait to see what might develop from the circumstances.

The instigation of direct authority by Virginia, as Connolly had anticipated when he wrote Washington in December 1773, forced a response from the Pennsylvania proprietors. Connolly's actions of the first several months of 1774, even without a local court sitting for Virginia, saw to that. Governor John Penn first wrote Dunmore on the matter at the end of January, but received in reply a justification of

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Connolly's institution of Virginia authority with no hint of retreat on Dunmore's part. Receiving no satisfaction by letter, even after spelling out Pennsylvania's claims at some length, Penn dispatched James Tilghman and Andrew Allen, members of his council, to deal with Dunmore. However, Penn's willingness to negotiate was not a willingness to yield. The commissioners first proposed a temporary boundary that would follow the meanders of the Delaware River exactly five degrees west of it. When Dunmore dismissed this proposal, they moved to what by Penn's command was their final offer: the Monongahela River would be the temporary boundary of jurisdiction, with no prejudice to either side's claims pending final settlement. To this Dunmore replied that "your Resolution with respect to Fort-Pitt (the Jurisdiction over which Place I must tell you, at all Events, will not be relinquished by this Government, without his Majesty's Order) puts an entire Stop to further Treaty."[98] Tilghman and Allen returned to Philadelphia. By the time the Board of Trade finally proposed a temporary line to dampen the crisis, the colonies' revolt against Britain was under way, Lord Dunmore had taken refuge on a British warship, and Governor Penn showed little enthusiasm for the measure.[99]

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The one thing the commissioners brought back to Philadelphia in the spring of 1774 was a better understanding of the motivation behind the efforts of Dunmore and Connolly to exert militant control over the upper Ohio watershed. For what Allen and Tilghman heard at Williamsburg, and it corroborated rumors in Pennsylvania, was "that Lord Dunmore has interested himself in the lands about Pittsburgh." "This may in some measure account for his extraordinary conduct, which is neither that of a man of Honor nor a Gentleman," Penn fumed.[100]

In the Pennsylvanians' view what rendered the situation on the Ohio most critical from spring through autumn 1774 was the effect of the Virginians' aggressive posture on Indian affairs. The Fort Stanwix cessions had never set well with the Ohio Valley nations; from 1769 onward they became increasingly incensed over settlement by whites west of the mountains. By 1773 the Shawnee and the Mingo, and the Cherokee to the south, were alarmed to see parties of surveyors marking out tracts along the south bank of the Ohio into the Kentucky country west of the Kanawha River. Despite warnings of the growing tension, Virginia surveyors made another trip downriver in spring 1774 to survey warrants issued by Dunmore under the 1763 proclamation. Connolly's embodiment of many of the region's male settlers into

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an official militia did nothing to ease the Indians' apprehension. Conflict broke out in April, and was marked by some especially blatant attacks against small groups of Indians, including women and children, by whites downriver from Pittsburgh, along the stretch of the Ohio above and below the little Wheeling settlement. Through May and June the western territory was in a panic the likes of which had not been seen for over a decade. Thousands of people, especially settlers from west of the Monongahela, fled temporarily to safer ground to the east and southeast. A great part of those who remained in the vulnerable territory holed up in hastily built stockades or fortified farmhouses, and a project was set on foot to stockade the town at Pittsburgh.[101]

It is impossible to say whether war with the Shawnee was part of the strategy for the region mapped out by Connolly and Dunmore during their conversations in 1773. In an effusive moment Patrick Henry later confided to Thomas Wharton that Connolly, "a chatty, sensible man," had fired the earl's interest in the Ohio Valley's land during those meetings. The war with the Shawnee had been pursued, according to Henry, in order to eliminate Indian claims on the north side of the Ohio in case Vandalia received control of its intended grant on the south side. Dunmore's primary

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goal actually may have been the south bank of the river.[102] Whether north bank or south really matters very little; the governor's policy toward the Indians smacked of the same open, aggressive, freehand style that marked his actions toward Pennsylvania: to bully one's way into physical control of the situation, then see what developed. Connolly and Dunmore may well have decided in December 1773 that Connolly would push the Indians just as he would push the Pennsylvanians, and with roughly the same goal in mind -- to force the issue of control over the upper Ohio Valley. Even if they in no wise conspired to incite the crisis, their mutual bellicosity and opportunism largely determined its outcome. Neither man held much regard either for the Indians or for any pacifying aims of government Indian policies, and it is most doubtful that either would have willingly passed up a chance to lead troops in the field.

At the outset of the crisis, there were even many Virginians who thought that the whites were at least as much to blame for the conflict as the Shawnee, the Cherokee, or the Mingo, if not much more so.[103] Very early on Connolly issued orders to the militia that indicated a general Shawnee attack on the frontiers was likely. These statements fueled the panic of the settlers and were taken up as motivation or justification by those whites who murdered Indians downriver

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from Pittsburgh. Moreover, after the initial murders and the retributions exacted for them, further hostilities probably could have been avoided. Connolly, however, refused to mollify anyone, especially the Shawnee, "a haughty, violent and unthinking tribe" who must realize "their insignifacancy" and learn obedience. Even though the victims of the early murders were Mingo, Connolly focused attention almost solely on the Shawnee. He passed the word to his militia officers that an early encounter and victory over the Shawnee would do more than anything else to keep the region's Indian nations in line. The Shawnee and Mingo were just as selective in return. Even before the tension broke into violence in April they had come to distinguish between Pennsylvanians and Virginians -- the latter called "Big Knives" -- and would continue to concentrate their discontent on the Virginians as the conflict wore on.[104]

As many of the region's white inhabitants scurried in panic during May and June Connolly put his men to work restoring Fort Pitt, which he called Fort Dunmore, to a more warlike state, and began marshaling his forces to secure the frontier between the Monongahela and the Ohio. In very short order -- by mid-May -- Dunmore appealed to the House of Burgesses to authorize the raising of a corps of provincial troops to march against

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the Indians, but the assembly was unresponsive.[105] This left Dunmore the less desirable course of using only the frontier militia to strike the Shawnee and Mingo. The fact that there was no certainty that the assembly would ever pay for the campaign hampered recruiting, but over 2500 men were raised from the frontier counties and formed into three columns, one of them under the command of Dunmore himself. In the summer the smallest of these units struck into the Indian country on a brief raid. During the fall a larger column under Colonel Andrew Lewis managed to extricate itself from what could have been a devastating surprise attack at the mouth of the Kanawha, and Dunmore marched the third column to the Indians' towns over the Ohio. There he imposed a peace and exacted Shawnee and Mingo hostages to ensure their compliance.[106]

The conflict remained confined to the Shawnee and Mingo on the one side and the Virginians on the other. Dunmore carried out his campaign, which goes by the name Dunmore's War, without consulting British military or Indian affairs officials. General Gage only learned of the events and outcome of the Virginia campaigns "by the Public Prints." Yet it was through the diplomatic efforts of Sir William Johnson, his successor Guy Johnson, and their Iroquois agent

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Guyasuta, coupled with the pacific attitudes of the Pennsylvanians, that the other nations of the region were dissuaded from joining the Shawnee and the Mingo in the war against the militant "Big Knives," especially after the militia marched toward the Ohio in strength. These efforts prevented the outbreak of a much wider war, and allowed Dunmore and Connolly to bluster their way through the affair. "The Virginians having lands for their object neither consider their own frontiers or the state of their neighbours," Guy Johnson wrote Lord Dartmouth.[107] In his own reports to Dartmouth the governor called the conflict "this most horrid cruel war in which there is neither honour, pleasure nor profit." A different impression is left by a verse recorded by a member of Colonel Lewis' wing of the militia: "The land it is good, it is just to our mind, / Each will have his part if his Lordship be kind. / The Ohio once ours, we'll live at our ease, / With a Bottle and glass to drink when we please."[108]

Locally during 1774 both politics and Indian affairs were affected by the brash aggressiveness of the Virginia militia. Connolly's use of his local militia as a posse or constabulary force was an impor-

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tant feature of his conflict with the Pennsylvania authorities. The official embodiment of these men as militia under the authority of the governor of Virginia gave a legitimacy to actions against persons and property that under other circumstances, or by someone else's definition, violated the rules of a stable, ordered society. This question was largely a matter of opinion, for what Virginia's adherents referred to as a militia often seemed a mob to its opponents. However, there was also the matter of just how a militia force was supposed to comport itself, what rules governed its behavior, even if one accepted its legitimacy. Under Connolly's authority the Virginia militia seemed to flirt with the limits of what eighteenth-century Americans -- Connolly's adversaries, at least -- considered to be normal, well-regulated behavior in society. In large measure this was what the "captain commandant" wanted, to make life as uncomfortable as possible for those who stubbornly maintained Pennsylvania's authority in the region and challenged his own. And for the most part Connolly's little army at least retained its own kind of internal order as militia that worked against any wholesale degeneration into anarchy or mob rule in the region.

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Connolly set the tone for his militia's conduct. The "captain commandant," armed with an imaginative interpretation of his legal powers as a militia officer, employed his militiamen as a means of chipping away at his opposition. A handful of prominent residents of Pittsburgh, where Connolly's center of power lay and a place which both sides valued, were the particular objects of his attention. These men were Devereux Smith, Aeneas Mackay, and Joseph Spear, all Westmoreland County justices of the peace, and two brothers important in the Indian trade, William and Richard Butler. Mackay was one of those arrested by the Virginians and sent to Staunton in April 1774. Several of his horses and as many as eleven of his sheep were pressed by the militia during 1774 and early 1775, and his stable and sheep house were dismembered in late May 1774, their materials pressed for use in the repair of Fort Dunmore. On another occasion Mackay's house was searched by militia bearing a general warrant authorizing them to search every house in Pittsburgh for a missing gun.[109] In early May, while Devereux Smith was still detained in Staunton, a militia squad appeared to press blankets and bags at his house in Pittsburgh but was stopped by Mrs. Smith and William Butler. Soon Connolly himself appeared, and in Smith's words, "began to abuse Mr.

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Butler and my Wife; he also Threatned to send Mr. Butler to Virginia in Irons, and take every Farthings worth of his Property from him, Damned my wife telling her the same, and that he would let her know that he Commanded here, etc., etc., etc." The Butlers came into further conflict with Connolly during the summer; in August a quantity of their trading goods was impounded, some employees taken, and one of the brothers arrested, to be released only after a hearing before Lord Dunmore in September. Joseph Spear, whose goods were taken up in August as well, had a canoe pressed by the militia earlier and an employee arrested in April.[110]

Permeating these incidents was the obvious fact that it was the Virginia group's force, rather than any nominal legal authority derived from Dunmore's proclamations, which gave them the power to act, and at times the situation seemed to teeter on the brink of uncontrolled violence. One evening in February 1775 a dozen or so militiamen surrounded Smith's house in Pittsburgh, "telling him that they would shew him what Virginia Boys could do," and pelted the shuttered house with stones for three to four hours. That night and the next a similar group tarried at Richard Butler's house waving bayonets and clubs. No one was hurt at either house.[111]

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Connolly's own behavior in confrontations with his adversaries was often marked by a violent temper and an openly abusive manner. The most notable public display of this militancy came in May 1774 when he and Mackay confronted one another in the street as the Virginia militia tore apart Mackay's outbuildings. Connolly, "in a great rage," threatened to send Mackay to Virginia in irons and berated him "with every gross kind of insult and outrage." When Mackay's wife protested the destruction of the stables, "the said Connolly replied, God damn me . . . Madam, I will pull down the very house you live in if I have occasion for it." Not long afterward, enraged by the Pennsylvanians' raising of a troop of rangers to protect them from the Indians riled by the Virginians, Connolly again came to Mackay's house, accosted him "in a most Blasphemous and Outrageous manner," and said that if the rangers did not abandon their post east of Pittsburgh "he would not suffer one Pennsylvanian to live on this Side the Laurel Hill."[112]

As the local Pennsylvania leaders saw the matter, the men led by this hotheaded captain were less a militia than a mob. When Connolly issued his call for militia in January 1774 Aeneas Mackay, no doubt recalling the troubles of 1771 and 1772, predicted that the respondents would be "all the disaffected and vagabonds

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that before evaded law and justice with so much art." "Men without Character and without Fortune," another magistrate called them. "Tis very certain," Arthur St. Clair summarized in December 1774, "the People Lord Dunmore has cloathed with Authority, pay little regard to the Rules of Law or the Dictates of Reason."[113] Augustine Prevost, George Croghan's son-in-law and a Swiss-born officer in the British service, reinforced these views. Prevost thought the region to be "in the greatest anarchy imaginable" by the end of the summer of 1774, and referred to Connolly's followers as "lawless vagabonds," "ruffians and plunderers." These opinions were not without foundation. On the day after Christmas 1774 a group of militiamen stopped at a house or tavern on the road back to Pittsburgh after raiding the Pennsylvania jail in Hannastown. They demanded refreshment, then "Drew their Bayonets and swore there would be [a] Corpse on the Green if they did not get what the[y] wanted."[114]

Many of the men serving with the local militia may have been of the type referred to by recruiting officers elsewhere on the Virginia frontier in 1774 as "Hulking younge dogs": men without families to raise, prone to spend much of their time hunting deer rather than farming. The Pennsylvania officials reported that a number of those attending the first two musters

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at Pittsburgh were from the relatively young settlements of Chartiers Creek and elsewhere west of the Monongahela River.[115] Connolly could arouse some support from those people who, often for reasons concerning contested land titles, were willing to oppose Pennsylvania's jurisdiction with vigor. Their actions also suggest that some of the militiamen simply enjoyed throwing their weight around as part of a quasilegal armed force. Without the direct inducement of pay, however, Connolly would not have been able to muster the strength that he did. He feared that his militia ranks, along with those of the rest of the frontier counties during Dunmore's War, would be depleted by the news that the House of Burgesses had not agreed in advance to pay the militia for the frontier campaigns.[116] Nor were Connolly's militiamen otherwise active in local government. Nine-tenths of the enlisted men and sergeants serving at Fort Dunmore in the spring of 1774 have no record of any other service or appointment, including jury duty, road viewing, or constable's positions, with either county government through 1776.[117]

Despite what their opponents thought, these men were in a very real sense militia and not an ungoverned mob, for they were under the command of officers and sergeants. On occasions when no officer was present with a militia squad attempting to carry out an arrest

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or press goods, the militiamen, if challenged, cited specific verbal or even written orders for their actions. Judging from a deponent's correct identification of two officers "from their Dress," the militia officers wore some sort of uniform when acting in an official capacity. Some of the officers -- William Christy and Simon Girty, for example -- had been in the Pittsburgh vicinity for at least a decade, and had served with the local militia raised to defend the town during the 1763 Indian uprising.[118]

It is important to note, however, that Connolly's militia displayed an attitude toward command that was typical of the militia elsewhere on the Virginia frontier as well. If service became too arduous or did not suit them, they could be most uncooperative. Connolly learned this fact when he dispatched militiamen to bring settlers to the protection of Fort Dunmore in case of an Indian outbreak in spring 1774, and the militiamen "fled down the country" without carrying out the assignment. Furthermore, the local militia did not see themselves as part of a larger system in which a stranger, simply because of his formal rank, could expect to exact obedience from them. In September 1774 Major Angus McDonald of the Frederick County militia was in Pittsburgh because of the campaigns against the Shawnee. While Connolly was temporarily away to meet

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Lord Dunmore, McDonald attempted to find out who had ambushed and murdered two Delaware Indians not far from Pittsburgh, and also sought to intervene in the case of the jailed Richard Butler. He found that the local militia simply would not obey him.[119] The discipline of the militia drawn up by Connolly was no looser, and no tighter, than that of many other frontier militia companies; the important difference was that Connolly used his men so frequently as a political force in a local civil dispute.

Despite the savage, volatile image that Connolly and his militia conveyed to their opponents, and despite the length of the conflict and the important stakes involved, there was relatively little bloodshed associated with the Virginia-Pennsylvania dispute. Violence was mitigated to a degree because the balance of force in many confrontations overwhelmingly favored one faction over the other. Virginia's partisans had an advantage since there was no miltia law in Pennsylvania. Connolly's mustering of 150 or more men to accompany him to Hannastown in April 1774 was a unique and ephemeral mobilization of his forces. The rest of the time his militia operated in considerably smaller groups, but they usually got what they wanted.

However, the primary factor limiting personal violence was not the lopsided balance of force but the

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deliberate avoidance of violence by those involved in the struggle. To put the matter differently, there were notions present on both sides that governed their behavior in the conflict and kept it from becoming an open war. The edge that Connolly had by his superiority in force was an advantage in the contest simply because it allowed him to impose his will at a very low cost. Bullying, actions against property rather than persons, and harassment by arrest or other means were all effective under those circumstances. If the dispute had devolved into a shooting war, Connolly might have lost many of his followers, for some of his men showed a decided reluctance to shed their blood for the cause. When a half-dozen armed militiamen tried to detain Westmoreland County deputy sheriff Ephraim Hunter outside Pittsburgh in April 1774, Hunter boldly drew a pair of pistols and ordered them away from his horse. All but one complied. Hunter fired, wounding the stubborn militiaman, and galloped away. On another occasion three armed Virginians were sent to arrest Richard Butler on the road outside Pittsburgh. When the Pennsylvanian drew his own arms they hesitated, despite their numerical advantage, and rode with him for a mile, cursing and demanding that he stop the entire way, until they finally blocked his path and made him accompany them. Twice, in July 1774 and again a year later, the Pennsylvania faction antic-

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ipated an interruption of the Westmoreland court by their opponents and prepared themselves with a guard of armed men at Hannastown. No militant Virginians appeared at either session.[120] Connolly was outraged when, late in May 1774, the local Pennsylvania leaders took steps to raise one hundred rangers to protect their settlements in case the Virginians' conflict with the Shawnee should become an unlimited war between Indians and whites. Connolly saw, with some reason, that these troopers could be used to give Pennsylvania more strength in the boundary controversy. He blustered and threatened to march his men against the rangers stationed at the "Bullock Penns" east of Pittsburgh, but he never did so.[121]

Lord Dunmore, perhaps worried about the kind of official attention that might come to focus on the conflict, reminded Connolly after the latter's dramatic appearance at Hannastown in spring 1774 that there were certain limits to conduct within which provincial officials must act. It would not do to promote disorder "or to give encouragement to those People, of which there are always too many, who on such occasions, only support one Government because they have rendered themselves obnoxious to the other."[122] Governor Penn, too, warned his local magistrates not to take any steps which "may tend to widen the present unhappy Breach." As soon as the dispute broke out he forwarded

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to Westmoreland County a copy of a recently passed riot act, aimed primarily at the Connecticut interlopers in the Wyoming country, which required the dispersal of large bodies of men. Penn ordered St. Clair to employ the riot law only within what he was certain was Pennsylvania's jurisdiction, for it could bring "the most serious Consequences" and must be used "with the utmost Caution."[123]

St. Clair, as Penn's majordomo in Westmoreland County, was himself cautious about these matters and constantly sought to ensure that his actions against the Virginians had the proprietary government's support. Throughout the dispute St. Clair considered Pittsburgh to be the strategic key, the place where authority should be centered, and he would have liked to supplant Virginia's de facto superiority there. In fact there can be little doubt that the efforts to make Fort Pitt a manned Pennsylvania outpost after its abandonment by the British army in 1772 -- efforts spearheaded by St. Clair -- were as much intended to give proprietary authority an early foothold there, after the resistance of 1771 and 1772, as to provide the ostensible function of defense against the Indians. St. Clair was also sorry to see Hannastown appointed as the temporary county seat for Westmoreland County in 1773. As soon as Connolly proclaimed Virginia authority

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at Pittsburgh, St. Clair began planning to sell his farm at Ligonier and move to the Ohio forks, although he never carried out these plans. He did, however, consider methods of contesting the Virginians' control of Pittsburgh. When he notified the governor that he and some others had undertaken to raise defensive troops in spring 1774 and that the residents of Pittsburgh intended to stockade the town, he hinted that a few Pennsylvania rangers placed inside the fenced town, presumably with Connolly's militia outside in Fort Dunmore, "would recover the Country the Virginias have usurped." A year later, after hearing a rumor that the Virginia militia would be pulled out of Pittsburgh, he notified Penn that they should be prepared to destroy the fort or occupy it with Pennsylvania men just as soon as the Virginians left.[124]

Yet without explicit approval from Penn, St. Clair would take no offensive action against Connolly's people that might result in bloodshed. Penn's authorization was not to come. What Pennsylvania required of its magistrates and sheriff in Westmoreland County was a holding action: the maintenance of Pennsylvania authority and the impeding of the exercise of Virginia authority if possible, but nothing overtly violent that could jeopardize the Penns' case before the crown.

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After all, as Pennsylvania represented the matter, Dunmore and the Virginia contingent were the usurpers whose aggressive demeanor brought instability to the region. So the Pennsylvania officials did not risk armed conflict with Connolly's militia. On two occasions, in January 1774 and again in the spring of 1775, the Westmorelanders succeeded in abducting Connolly himself, although to little real end either time. In each case surprise allowed them to take Connolly without brushing with his retainers. In May 1775 St. Clair was faced with the prospect of using force effectively, and possibly without bloodshed, but he still refused to take the step. Two of his fellow magistrates had been jailed by the new district of West Augusta court, their confinement now running into several months, and two others had been confined recently. From the guardhouse at Fort Dunmore they informed St. Clair that the usual militia detachment at the fort was only eighteen men, and they begged him to send the Westmoreland sheriff with a posse of fifty men to force their release. With such a superior force little resistance could be expected. St. Clair agreed that the scheme would in all likelihood succeed, yet since "serious Consequences" might result, he would do nothing without the governor's "positive directions."

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He anticipated, correctly, that Penn would allow no measure "that might have a tendency to embroil the Provinces," and the raid was not carried out.[125]

Despite the fact that they resided in young settlements on the frontier, most of the leaders in the dispute were no more anxious for the conflict to erupt into a scene of widespread chaos and violence than their counterparts along the seaboard would have been. Like county-level officials elsewhere in British America, they were loathe to jeopardize their property, their position, and what they saw as a stable social order. It was for this reason that the Virginia militia was so frightening to the Pennsylvania magistrates. It was as if "the Peace and Welfare of a Whole County" could be "Destroy'd by such a handfull of Villains."[126] Everyone involved was aware of the conflict in the Wyoming district, where people claiming Connecticut authority for their settlements engaged in vicious gun battles with Pennsylvania posses. The situation around Pittsburgh never took on that demeanor. The leaders of the contending factions in the upper Ohio Valley were not strangers to one another, and as the next chapter will show, allegiance in the controversy was far from absolute. The Pennsylvania-Virginia dispute was in many respects simply another form of the competitive relationships that were and would continue

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to be characteristic of the region. While the competition could get rough, that was not untypical of such contentions in the Pittsburgh vicinity. It was to no one's advantage, as far as these men were concerned, to let the situation become, through violent conflict, entirely anarchical.

Still, the situation was almost desperately tense at times, especially in Pittsburgh where Connolly carried out a campaign of attrition against the Pennsylvania adherents living there. In one very notable case the tension resulted in personal violence. George Aston, Connolly's second-in-command and a captain in the local militia, was of all the Virginia militia officers the harshest and most abusive toward the Pennsylvania faction. Devereux Smith and his next-door neighbor Aeneas Mackay were among the victims of Aston's conduct. Early in May 1774 Aston wounded Mackay's wife in the arm with his sword as she resisted the attempts of a party under his command to enter her house. Later the same month, during the street fracas that grew out of the destruction of Mackay's outbuildings, Aston threatened Mackay with his rifle, then attempted to strike Mrs. Mackay in the head with the weapon. Another time he "beat and Insolently abused" one of Joseph Spear's employees.[127] It was Devereux Smith, however, whom the West Augusta magistrates

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charged in November 1775 with the murder of George Aston. Almost nothing is known of the incident itself; Aston struck Smith during an altercation and was stabbed in what Smith's defenders called a justifiable killing. Somehow Smith also suffered a badly broken leg that took a long while to mend and still gave him trouble almost two years later. The local Virginia court remanded him to Williamsburg for trial by the General Court, but this never took place and he was acquitted by Pennsylvania in 1784.[128]

The conflict also very quickly took on a serious economic aspect. Impressment, begun by Connolly's orders in the spring of 1774, was a means of raising provisions for the militia regiments mustering for the campaign against the Shawnee, but it also provided a method of striking at the property of Virginia's opponents. "The Militia are plundering the People within the neighbourhood of Pittsburgh of the very subsistance for their Families," according to St. Clair.[129] Connolly increased the pressure at the end of 1774 by proclaiming that any person could legally seize anyone acting as a tax collector under Pennsylvania authority. During the next several months the Virginians' economic warfare showed its effect, and resolve and morale on the Pennsylvania side began to ebb. Early in 1775 Virginia surveyors were taking

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official entries for lands in the area, and before long Connolly's people were forcefully turning over Pennsylvania adherents' land claims to friends of Virginia authority. Intimidation of anyone paying heed to the authority of the Westmoreland County court appeared to be working, and the new district of West Augusta's Virginia court sitting at Pittsburgh arrested local Pennsylvania officers and saddled them with fines and bail demands. "The People in general hath already given up," Westmoreland's justices declared.[130] In fact Pennsylvania's government in the west was not doomed by the early months of 1775, but Connolly's tactics were proving effective.

Connolly also worked to break some economic patterns centered on Pittsburgh and install new ones. John Campbell had much to do with this effort. Campbell was associated with Connolly in Dunmore's granting of lands at the falls of the Ohio in 1773, and was one of those appointed an Augusta County justice of the peace in December of that year. He was the Pittsburgh end of a trading partnership with Joseph Simon of Lancaster. It was from Simon and Campbell that George Croghan borrowed the goods he needed to make a present to the Indians who had gathered to meet Vandalia's governor in autumn 1773. The company also forwarded the

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pay for Connolly's militia in spring 1774, furnished their ammunition, and paid for the artisans, laborers, transport, and materials needed to turn the old Fort Pitt into a refurbished Fort Dunmore. More precisely, the firm petitioned the Virginia Convention late in 1775 for reimbursement of these expenses; although certificates were submitted showing the value of the labor and materials used on the fort, these things were commandeered by the militia and it is not certain that the persons furnishing them were ever paid a penny.[131] Campbell's firm was also expected to be the greatest benefactor of Connolly's efforts to manipulate the peltry trade at Pittsburgh.

In mid-June 1774 Connolly issued an official order forbidding trade with the Shawnee, and by the first of July required all peltry moving through Pittsburgh to pay a Virginia duty of four pence per hide. At this time also the earl of Dunmore indicated that a peace settlement with the Indians might include a provision that future trade be conducted only with Virginia's traders. As the Pennsylvanians learned from a temporarily disaffected George Croghan, the plan was for Simon and Campbell, apparently with Connolly included for part of the take, to establish themselves in a favored position dominating the Pittsburgh trade.[132]

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Connolly rapidly dispatched parties of militia to intercept traders on the roads and paths in enforcement of his two orders. Rather than see their business stopped entirely, which seemed clearly to be Connolly's intention, the Pennsylvania traders took steps to leave Pittsburgh to the Virginians and set up a new trading town. There was talk of staying relatively close to Pittsburgh, but Arthur St. Clair, ever the guardian of the proprietors' interest, lobbied instead for a site at the proprietary manor of Kittanning up the Allegheny River. The site did have fairly direct access to the Indians by way of the Kuskuskies villages on the Beaver River, and was connected to southeastern Pennsylvania by way of paths to the Juniata River and the west branch of the Susquehanna. It was also well away from the Virginia militia at Pittsburgh, which suited the Indians, who had learned that as far as Connolly's men were concerned they all seemed to fall into the category of "enemy" Indians. By the latter part of August traders began to move goods, supplies, and cattle to Kittanning, where the governor had authorized St. Clair to lay out a town. The Pennsylvania rangers raised at the outset of the Indian crisis protected the spot from the Virginians. The move was interrupted when the Virginia militia arrested Richard Butler and waylaid his pack train of goods en route.

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"It seems this is the act of Captain Aston, Conolly being gone to meet Lord Dunmore," St. Clair reported to Penn; "but, in truth, it is the act of Mr. Campbell, who is their Counsel-General, and whose plan the removing any of the trade from Pittsburgh broke in upon." St. Clair intended to continue with the plan to construct the new trading station, although there never was a complete abandonment of Pittsburgh by the Pennsylvania element.[133]

What Connolly did at Pittsburgh in 1774 was to tap into a disputatious situation that existed before he ever called that first militia muster. Well before January 1774 the Pittsburgh region was marked by a competitive, rough-and-tumble situation regarding the possession of land. There were also, as there had been for over a decade, questions about which civil government held power in the area. Before Connolly took any steps to initiate Virginia authority, there was a desire by some people to block the implementation of local Pennsylvania government, along with a realization that doing so required the establishment of an alternative -- be it Vandalia, Virginia, or something else.

Connolly, with Dunmore's support, was the agent who gave a particular form to the situation by initiating Virginia government at Pittsburgh, thereby giving Pennsylvania's county government an active, working

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competitor on the scene. He gave the dispute its shape as an outright contest for local power, something less than a civil war but more than just an abstract legal quarrel between two governments. The conflict continued and developed further as the Virginia group began to operate its own county court on the upper Ohio, and as Connolly's associates took full advantage of the opportunity to hold positions in local government.

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CHAPTER 5

PARTISANSHIP AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH 1776

By the end of 1774 Governor Dunmore reported to the British government that local and higher courts in Virginia, as a result of the growing split between the colonies and the home government, had virtually ceased to sit. Yet for Virgnians living west of the Appalachians on the colony's nothwestern frontier, this statement could not be any more false. The court for the district of West Augusta, ostensibly an administrative division of Augusta County, only began to sit at Pittsburgh early in 1775. Its promoters were far more interested in forwarding than in impeding the regular operation of a Virginia court in the region.[1]

A Virginia county court sitting west of the mountains brought a new dimension to the jurisdictional dispute in the area. For one thing, it gave the Virginia faction a new set of tools to use in the struggle with the Pennsylvania group. Moreover, it provided an alternative to Pennsylvania county government, furnishing another avenue of local leadership and political participation. This aspect of the West Augusta court was apparent even as John Connolly departed from the local

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scene in 1775.

Through 1775 and most of 1776, two local courts, those of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, and the district of West Augusta, Virginia, claimed jurisdiction over virtually the same territory. Not even a temporary boundary between the two governments would be forthcoming for some years. Furthermore, local politics consisted of far more than simply the Pennsylvania-Virgnia contention; the situation was complex and fluid, and the boundary issue was only one matter around which factional alignments formed. The region provides a rather curious case study of the role of government in local inhabitants' lives, particularly since there were two county governments in the Pittsburgh region, each claiming a legitimate authority for its actions.

Such was the local situation as the dispute between the American colonies and Great Britain grew into war. As the region's idiosyncratic situation in regard to local Virginia courts illustrates, people of the upper Ohio River country made their own peculiar kind of entry into the American Revolution. Local attention was primarily fixed on local issues as the political breach between colonies and empire widened. Local politics also continued to be marked by dispute, competition, and factionalism, and there was still no

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clear and effective means of exerting centralized authority as the United States supplanted Great Britain in the transmontane west. These circumstances affected the upper Ohio Valley's experience during the Anglo-American conflict and influenced local interaction with the young national government.

Political participation, both in the boundary dispute and in local politics in general, is most visible on the part of the justices of the peace commissioned by the rival colonies. Numerically Pennsylvania had the advantage here. Sixteen men were appointed magistrates of Westmoreland County at its creation in February 1773. Additions made as Connolly asserted Virginia authority in January 1774 brought the number to twenty-four. In contrast, Dunmore commissioned only seven westerners as Augusta County magistrates late in 1773; in December 1774 eight more were appointed, then four more in April 1775. Two of these Virginia justices were members of the original Westmoreland magistracy of 1773.[2] In addition, unlike Virginia counties, which placed almost all county administrative and judicial powers in the hands of the county court, Pennsylvania's system provided for

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county commissioners, in charge of financial administration, and a coroner and a sheriff who were not justices of the peace. These positions were not appointive as were the justiceships. While the Pennsylvania county government was not by design the tight and cohesive unit that the Virginia county court was, the five men who served in these positions in Westmoreland County before 1776 without attaining magistrates' positions were part of the county's important political leadership.

Despite their numerical advantage, not all of the Westmoreland County justices played active roles in the jurisdictional conflict. Seven or eight of them had very little or nothing to do with the border squabble, and two of these were recommended by the Virginia court in 1775 and 1776 as likely additions to the West Augusta commission. Of the active partisans on the Pennsylvania side, some, including Arthur St. Clair, Aeneas Mackay, Devereux Smith, Robert Hanna, John Carnahan, and a few others, were, through choice or circumstance, much more involved in the dispute than others. There was some latitude in the degree of participation by a magistrate in county government anyway; one might quietly fulfill his commission as a justice of the peace in his neighborhood with only an occasional appearance at the county court and much less

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activity in countywide affairs than a peer might display. Although a smaller group overall than the Pennsylvanians, the Virginia judges in the region were recruited primarily as activists in the border dispute, although six of the twelve appointed in late 1774 and spring 1775 may never have sat with the West Augusta court and some may not have even sworn into office.[3]

Many of the Westmoreland magistrates lived east of Pittsburgh in the settlements of people who had migrated, as the judges themselves had, along the Pennsylvania road from the east. No Virginia justices of the peace resided in this zone. However, the boundary dispute cannot be generalized as a simple matter of "Pennsylvanians" against "Virginians," especially in terms of the membership of the original Virginia party. Of the seven men commissioned as justices by Dunmore in December 1773, six had their strongest business connections with the Pennsylvania-based hide trade; some were Pennsylvanians by birth; and although they had come to oppose Pennsylvania government at the forks, none of the six was a Virginian in background. The seventh man, Dorsey Pentecost, was born in Virginia, but is probably the region's most striking illustration of the flexibility of allegiance under changing local political conditions. In 1770

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Map 5.
Justices of the Peace, 1773-1776

Westmoreland County		Dist. of West Augusta	
William Crawford	P-V 1	William Crawford	P-V 1
Alexander McKee	P-V 2	Alexander McKee	P-V 2
William Bracken	P 3	John Campbell	V 3
John Carnahan	P 4	John Canon	V 4
James Cavet	P 5	John Connolly	V 5
Thomas Gist	P 6	George Croghan	V 6
Robert Hanna	P 7	Thomas Galbreath	V 7
William Lochry	P 8	John Gibson	V 8
Alexander McClean	P 9	William Goe	V 9
Andrew McFarlane	P 10	William Harrison	V 10
Aeneas Mackay	P 11	Silas Hedge	V 11
Oliver Miller	P 12	James Innes	V 12
James Pollock	P 13	John McColloch	V 13
Alexander Ross	P 14	Dorsey Pentecost	V 14
Michael Rough	P 15	David Shepherd	V 15
Arthur St. Clair	P 16	Thomas Smallman	V 16
Thomas Scott	P 17	John Stephenson	V 17
John Shepherd	P 18	George Vallandigham	V 18
Samuel Sloan	P 19	Edward Ward	V 19
Devereux Smith	P 20		
Joseph Spear	P 21		
Van Swearingen	P 22		
William Thompson	P 23		
George Wilson	P 24		

Justices' residences during the 1773-1776 period are shown on map; some residence locations on map are approximate.

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

Map 5. Justices of the Peace, 1773-1776

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and 1771 Pentecost held commissions as a justice of the peace in Cumberland County and then Bedford County, Pennsylvania. Then from 1771 to 1773 he did surveying work for George Croghan and was not reappointed a magistrate by Governor Penn. During the boundary controversy he acted as a Virginia justice and as a commissary gathering supplies for the militia during Dunmore's War. During the early 1780s Pentecost was rumored to be the leader of an effort to break off a new state in the upper Ohio Valley; during the same period, as the border issue finally came to some resolution through a temporary, then a permanent, boundary, he came full circle and sat on Pennsylvania's Supreme Executive Council.[4]

Nor did the Westmoreland County group consist exclusively of Pennsylvanians. George Wilson, who lived on the Monongahela River not far north of the Mason and Dixon survey line, was originally from Virginia and was still called "colonel" on the basis of his military service to that colony, but as early as 1771 proved himself a vocal adherent to Pennsylvania authority in the area. In 1773 he was appointed a Westmoreland County justice of the peace. Wilson's allegiance was founded on the simple fact that he believed that he lived within Pennsylvania's jurisdiction: "I allways look on it as the Duty of

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Christians and good Subjects to obey, and the Privilege and right of the Legislative powers to dictate."[5]

Two other Westmoreland County justices with strong ties to Maryland and Virginia were Thomas Gist and Van Swearingen, but they may not have been partisans in the boundary conflict to the degree that Wilson was. Gist was the son of the old Ohio Company scout Christopher Gist, a Marylander. He lived on lands his father had claimed at the western foot of Laurel Hill, and had been a Pennsylvania magistrate since his appointment for Cumberland County in 1770. Swearingen, along with other members of his paternal family, served on the commissions of Frederick and Berkeley counties in Virginia before his appointment as a Westmoreland County justice in January 1774. Swearingen may not have been particularly active as a Westmoreland magistrate, although he was energetic as a captain of Pennsylvania troops raised in the area in 1776. Gist, inactive during the early years of the boundary dispute, later accepted a commission in Yohogania County, one of three Virginia counties formed out of the district of West Augusta in 1776.[6]

It is worth noting also that slaveholding was not confined to the Virginia group. In addition to Van Swearingen and Thomas Gist, at least five other Westmoreland County justices owned slaves, including

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Aeneas Mackay and Devereux Smith. Since the main records of slaveholding in the area date from the 1780s and 1790s, others of the Pennsylvania group may also have owned black slaves in the 1770s. Most slaveowners in both groups of magistrates owned, when the lists were made in 1780 and after, only one or a small handful of blacks apiece.[7]

Although in many instances the reasons for an individual magistrate's partisanship on one side or the other in the jurisdictional contest are obscure, there seem to have been two primary forms of incentive motivating many of the activists to participate. Some probably expected to attain something fairly specific in nature: a valid land title, perhaps. The other kind of incentive was not dissimilar, but broader: for many what was at stake was a position of power in the local descision-making structure. The border dispute meant, for the Virginia element, the opportunity to establish themselves in leadership positions, and the situation required action on the part of those in the Pennsylvania group who were interested in maintaining the influence promised by their commissions from Governor Penn.

Arthur St. Clair, forty years of age in 1774, was a Scot who had come to America as an officer with the 60th Regiment during the last war with France. He

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married Phoebe Bayard of Boston and with her £14,000 dowry and money from his own family established himself at Ligonier during the 1760s. There he held land and built a flour mill. His political power in the region was the result of his firm attachment to the proprietary interest. St. Clair was one of the westernmost magistrates appointed in Cumberland County in 1770. The following year he was commissioned a justice in the new county of Bedford and also became its recorder of deeds, clerk of the orphans' court, and prothonotary (clerk of the court of common pleas), influential positions which he subsequently held in Westmoreland County upon its formation early in 1773. He was also the only person to hold justice's commissions in both Bedford and Westmoreland counties after the creation of the latter.[8] It is little wonder that St. Clair was both incensed and spurred to action by Connolly's challenge to Pennsylvania's authority in 1774. It was, after all, a challenge to St. Clair's position of leadership in the region.

St. Clair may in fact have had too strong a monopoly on the advantages befalling the loyal servants of Pennsylvania in the west. Of the other Westmoreland County magistrates holding commissions in Cumberland or Bedford County prior to 1773, only William Lochry remained actively faithful through the conflict with

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Virginia: William Crawford became a Virginia magistrate; Gist laid low, then drifted into the Virginia ranks; Alexander McKee, whose commissions from both Pennsylvania and Virginia were due to his position as the British Indian agent at Pittsburgh, could really be considered an activist for neither province during the dispute.[9] St. Clair, schooled at Edinburgh, well-to-do, with good social and political connections on the seaboard through his wife's family, really thought of himself as a cut above his fellow magistrates. He described Lochry as "intelligent" in a letter to Joseph Shippen, Jr., but noted that if Lochry, "a plain, honest Man," chose to wait on the governor, "allowances must be made for his Address." Shippen received a similar warning when Aeneas Mackay carried dispatches to the governor in October 1774. Mackay also was "an upright, honest Man," and "a warm Friend to this Government," but he "has some Idea of his own Importance." "Let him tell his Story," St. Clair advised; "I need not tell you how far a little attention will go with People of a certain Character." It is revealing that St. Clair chose to refer to Mackay in this fashion to the proprietary government, for the two men's acquaintance went back several years. Mackay, too, had been with the Royal American Regiment, al-

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though as a sergeant rather than an officer, and had spent time at Ligonier as an army storekeeper during the 1760s.[10]

Not only were the Westmoreland justices not monolithic in their response to the boundary dispute; there was also at least one major factional split within the group. Contesting factions could be considered an attribute of local government in the region at least through the Revolution. The issues fostering the splits were, if considered specifically, various, but in general all related to the question of who would exercise power and have influence within the local political structure. The breach in the early Westmoreland County leadership pitted St. Clair, Mackay, and George Wilson against a group including justice Robert Hanna, and an issue that separated these groups from the very inception of Westmoreland County was the location of the seat of county government. The proprietary government and St. Clair considered Pittsburgh the best site by far, but Penn and his advisors were hesitant to establish courts there before the western boundary was officially established. They presumed that if necessary they could fall back on the proprietary manor on Sewickly Creek southeast of Pittsburgh as a second choice. So when the act appeared creating the new

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county in February 1773, it did not specify a permanent seat of government. Through Robert Hanna's efforts the temporary site for courts and elections was fixed at the small settlement where he lived on the main Pennsylvania road east of Pittsburgh, a place called Hannastown or just "Hanna's." He and two neighbors were among the five trustees named in the bill to select a permanent site for the county government.[11]

As Mackay and St. Clair saw it, Hanna and "Joe Irwin" -- trustee Joseph Erwin -- were simply trying to cash in on the economic benefits accruing to a county seat. Exaggerating a bit, Mackay wondered how courts could be held at Hanna's village: "Where is the conveniency for transacting business on these occasions, as there is neither houses, tables, nor chairs?" By October 1773, probably due to the Hanna group's efforts, there was "a Goale and a Sort of Courthows" there. At that time Hanna, Erwin, and fellow trustees John Cavet and Samuel Sloan (the latter, like Hanna, also a justice of the peace) submitted a report to Penn suggesting that Hannastown be fixed as the permanent county seat. The fifth trustee was George Wilson, who refused to sign the report. The governor had the final say in the matter, so the courts were left at Hannastown but the seat retained its temporary status. The issue remained a major factor in county politics into the 1780s.[12]

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Location of the county seat was not the only issue splitting Hanna and St. Clair, either. In the summer of 1774 they again clashed, this time over control of the rangers enlisted to protect the county in case an Indian war broke out.[13]

Westmoreland County also saw the defection of one of its premier magistrates, William Crawford, to the Virginia side early in the interprovincial dispute. Crawford, who lived at the Youghiogheny River opposite the present city of Connellsville, was commissioned a justice of the peace in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, in May 1770. He then held a commission for Bedford County after its formation, and was the presiding judge of the Westmoreland court beginning with its first session in April 1773. As the president of the court he wrote the governor in April 1774, informing Penn of Connolly's appearance at the court with his contingent of militia. By the end of the year, however, he was commissioned an Augusta County, Virginia, justice of the peace. Penn booted him from the Westmoreland County court in January 1775, and in May Crawford took his oath and sat with the Virginia court at Pittsburgh.[14]

Actually Crawford's defection is not difficult to explain. For Crawford as well as others, close attention to one's self-interest and a pragmatic evaluation of the local political situation were of

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far greater importance than any ideological understandings in the contest between the two factions. Crawford, unlike St. Clair, was not a child of the proprietary interests in Pennsylvania. His early service to the province was more perfunctory than that: a former officer in the Virginia service, an associate of influential men such as George Washington, he was obviously considered by Penn's advisers to be a man of some local importance. He accepted the early commissions as a matter of course, but maintained his ties to Virginia, and probably did not feel particularly inclined either for or against Pennsylvania.

What finally turned his head, simply enough, was an official surveyor's position -- an office of considerable influence and, due to the fees involved, of very lucrative promise. For example, Nicholas Cresswell, an English traveler with no surveying experience, was given the chance to act as surveyor for a land venture in the Illinois territory in 1775. "If I can by any means make Friends sufficient to get their interest," Cresswell wrote, "the place of Surveyor will be worth some hundreds a year, exclusive of the opportunities a Surveyor has of taking up lands for himself."[15] Crawford, knowledgeable in surveying and in all facets of the acquisition of Ohio Valley lands, could hope to

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do even better. As early as 1770 he had George Washington fishing for a surveyor's post for him in the proposed Vandalia province. That prospect was dim by late 1773, but then the earl of Dunmore visited the west and promised to do what he could to land Crawford an appointment as an official Virginia surveyor along the Ohio. Early in 1774, when he heard from Connolly that Virginia intended to form new county governments in the region, Crawford wrote Washington: "if so I hop I may have a Chance for a County to survey." Washington's letters to Thomas Lewis, the surveyor of Augusta County, helped win Crawford an appointment as deputy surveyor. He hurried to Staunton to attend the April 1774 court session, "wase verey frendley treated" there, took the oath of office, and returned to the Youghiogheny.[16] Over the next several months, although his Pennsylvania magistrate's commission was not revoked until January, he commanded Virginia militia in the field in the campaigns against the Shawnee. St. Clair, reporting Crawford's activity to Governor Penn, snarled, "I dont know how Gentlemen account for these things to themselves."[17]

The original set of Virginia justices in the area, those added to the Augusta County list in December 1773, were a smaller, but in some respects,

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a more closely knit group than the Pennsylvania contingent they challenged. They shared, after all, a common interest in opposing Pennsylvania's jurisdiction. They were tied in other ways as well: Thomas Smallman and Edward Ward were relatives of Croghan's; Ward and John Connolly were married to sisters; Dorsey Pentecost had worked as a land surveyor for Croghan; Croghan had business dealings with John Campbell and was well acquainted with Connolly; John Gibson, like Croghan, maintained a strong interest in the validation of the "suffering trader" grant from the Indians. The closeness of the group can be overestimated, however, and they were in many ways simply a working coalition. After all, Campbell was Croghan's creditor for the goods he supplied for the meeting with the Indians on the Vandalia matter, and Connolly's, in a sense, for bankrolling the latter's militia. Pentecost and Campbell were both certainly looking out for their own interests. Croghan thought little of his cousin Smallman's abilities. Connolly's and Ward's wives, though sisters, may not have been on the best of terms. And Gibson, in September 1775, tried to prevent Croghan from recording one of his Indian purchase titles in the West Augusta court.[18]

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By the time this little group ever sat as a Virginia court at Pittsburgh, their ranks had been more than doubled by the addition of eight more justices late in 1774. The new members included William Crawford, who until recently had been, on his own and George Washington's behalf, an undisguised competitor of Croghan's for lands in the area, and Crawford's half-brother John Stephenson. Still, common interests -- in forestalling Pennsylvania's authority and in consolidating their own political power -- worked to overrule breaches within the group. There was disaffection, but no permanent splits from the group. For example, an Indian wife of John Gibson was one of the victims of a vicious murder of several Indians on the Ohio by white settlers in April 1774, in one of the incidents that brought war between the Virginians and the Shawnee and Mingo. Several months later there was a rumor that Gibson, who had lived as a captive with the Delaware and was highly respected by many Indians, warned the Shawnee of the advance of the Virginia militia toward their towns. If Gibson was distressed by Connolly's Indian policy in 1774, he never broke from the Virginia faction and sat with the West Augusta court during 1775 and 1776.[19]

Croghan made a definite break from the Virginia group in 1774, but his disaffection proved temporary.

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While it lasted, however, the friction between him and Connolly was almost vicious. The disagreement between the two centered on the Indian situation during 1774. Croghan was still the most influential white man involved in Indian affairs in the entire Ohio Valley; McKee, his former aide, was now the official agent at Pittsburgh, but he took his cues from Croghan. The Irishman did not like Connolly's rough policy from the beginning, and as early as May 1774 he joined St. Clair and other prominent Pennsylvanians in the association they formed to raise a protective body of rangers. He also advised St. Clair about the sort of restrained, nonthreatening Indian policy he thought Pennsylvania should maintain to counteract Connolly's aggressiveness, passed along information about Campbell's and Connolly's intentions regarding the peltry trade, and suggested that the Pennsylvania traders relocate away from Pittsburgh, as they did at Kittanning. St. Clair was, Croghan declared, "the only person in Westmoreland County that Dose any thing or is Capable for the publick Tranquility," "the only prudent Man on this ocation in those parts." For his part St. Clair was hesitant to place too much stock in Croghan's conversion to the Pennsylvania side, but was certainly not going to brush him aside. "Real Friendship you must not expect, for by his Interest

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alone he is regulated. Yet he may be useful," St. Clair wrote Governor Penn.[20]

As befitted the personalities involved, the split between Connolly and Corghan quickly became personal. Croghan left Pittsburgh for Williamsburg in June to lay the true nature of the western situation between Dunmore and the government, and thereby to discredit Connolly. Connolly immediately sent letters to Virginia to thwart this effort. "You must well know how specious He is," Connolly wrote of Croghan to George Washington; "but you may be assured that His business there is not for the publick good." Croghan never made it to Williamsburg, turning back when he saw that his leaving Pittsburgh was misinterpreted by the settlers and fed the panic of those who feared a war with the Indian nations. Croghan's home outside Pittsburgh continued to be a safe stopping place for Delaware and other Indians who maintained their friendly posture toward the whites but were in danger whenever they crossed paths with the Virginia militia. When Croghan's son-in-law, Augustine Prevost, visited Pittsburgh in September 1774 he was appalled by the state of relations between the two men. "I by no means think Mr. Cro... safe from the malignity of the poeple under Conoly," he wrote. "He runs more risks of his life from these ruffians and plunderers then

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from the natives." Some of the men from Croghan's farmstead had been among those at the first muster called by Connolly in January; this little band of armed men now stayed close at hand, Croghan's retainers in case of trouble.[21]

After Dunmore's arrival en route to chastise the Shawnee, Prevost, with some effort, patched up the rift. Through Prevost's persistent mediation, the governor, whose attitude toward Croghan had been soured by Connolly, relented and took the old trader back into his good graces. At bottom what mattered was that each had something to offer the other: Croghan would tender Dunmore his "assistance in managing the Indians," and Dunmore guaranteed Croghan's land titles. Then "they drank one botle hand to fist" and "parted good friends." Croghan and Connolly may not have warmed again to one another quite so easily, but the former was back in the Virginia fold and was influential in West Augusta's affairs even after Connolly left Pittsburgh in 1775.[22]

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The court for the district of West Augusta first sat at Pittsburgh in February of 1775, and it furnished the Virginia faction new kinds of weapons to use against their opponents. There had been no relief from the dispute during 1774, and if anything it hardened during the last several months of the year. In mid-September Lord Dunmore issued an unequivocal proclamation declaring Virginia's authority west of the Laurel Hill ridge. Governor Penn, who by this point was certain that the crown had been misled by Dunmore, countered during October with his own proclamation requiring the inhabitants of the region to ignore Virginia's presumed nullification of Pennsylvania's jurisdiction there.[23] The Westmoreland County officers began to feel new pressure from the Virginians before the year ended. Around Christmas Connolly and a party of militia forced the release of two men being held in the jail at Hannastown. More prisoners were released in a similar raid early in February, and this time the jail's doors were smashed from their hinges with a sledge hammer. "What we have done we have done by authority, and we are not afraid of Damage," the militamen told the Pennsylvania officers present. One of the raiders informed John Carnahan, the Westmoreland sheriff, that he "had positive Orders that if any Pennsylvania Officer would offer to take

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him or any of them with Precepts under the Government of Pennsylvania to shoot them and that he would do it."[24]

Concurrent with these actions was the issuance by Virginia magistrates of warrants for the arrest of specified Westmoreland County officers. In November 1774 Thomas Scott was arrested, under a criminal warrant and four civil writs, for acting as a Pennsylvania justice of the peace "in Contempt of the Earl of Dunmore's late Proclamation." At a hearing at Redstone before Dunmore, Campbell, and Pentecost, Scott was forced to enter a bond for his appearance at the pending session of the West Augusta court at Pittsburgh, which was expected to take place the next month. The court did not sit until February, at which time Pennsylvania justices Robert Hanna and James Cavet were brought in. They challenged the proceedings, entering pleas "to the Jurisdiction of the Court," but these motions were ignored and each was required to post £1000 bond, with two sureties of £500 each, to ensure that they would not act as Pennsylvania magistrates for a year and a day. Refusing, they were jailed. Scott joined them there in May when he refused to put up £500 bond with sureties of £250 each. Devereux Smith was also taken up in May on an assault complaint demanding £100,000 in damages, but the suit was dismissed, as was a complaint lodged by Connolly against

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George Wilson for disturbing the peace. Three other Westmoreland officials, a county commissioner and two tax assessors, were also brought before the February court session for acting under an illegal authority.[25]

As a "district" of an existing county, the West Augusta court had only limited powers in some areas of county government. The Pittsburgh district had no separate county clerk or high sheriff, for example, and the Augusta County clerk and sheriff retained control over the appointment of their deputies in the western country. The West Augusta magistrates made the most of what powers they did have. In the February 1775 session at Pittsburgh they appointed thirty-five men to be constables, and appointed eighteen more by the fall of 1776. Since a constable could be sworn in by a single justice of the peace, there is no way of knowing how many of these people accepted their posts and served as Virginia constables. It is clear, however, that these appointments were a means of broadening Virginia's authority in the region, and possibly an attraction to draw active support to the Virginia side of the conflict. Constables' positions and militia appointments were offices the West Augusta justices could dispense rather freely. Recommendations of people to be added to the roster of

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Virginia justices were probably made with those same goals in mind, except in this case the magistrates could only recommend names to the provincial executive and could not make the actual appointment. This limitation did not curb their ambitions. Twenty-eight men were recommended by the court as new magistrates at that first session in February 1775, but only four of them were added to the Augusta commission in April. Over fifty more names were suggested to the province as suitable justices of the peace in August and September 1776, when the district of West Augusta court hoped finally to consolidate its status as a separate county.[26]

An active county court for Virginia also gave new dimension to the economic side of the conflict with the Pennsylvanians. Among the deeds and sales recorded by the West Augusta court, for example, was one of Croghan's private purchases from the Six Nations, and in the spring of 1776 the "suffering traders" or Indiana Company deed was officially entered in the books. The court's licensing of ferries and ordinaries also played a direct role in the dispute with Pennsylvania. John Ormsby and Jacob Bousman were already competitors for the ferrying trade across the Monongahela at Pittsburgh when the jurisdictional conflict broke out in 1774. Bousman became an ensign in the local Virginia militia and John Connolly stood be-

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hind his claims for an exclusive ferrying privilege. Connolly -- Lord Dunmore's "Inquisitor General," Ormsby later called him -- went so far as to dispatch some of his "Banditti" to tear down a building associated with Ormsby's ferry. In February 1775 the West Augusta magistrates gave Ormsby a license to sell liquor at the Pittsburgh ferry landing, and let Bousman keep an ordinary on the south bank, but the court refused to authorize Ormsby's ferry and gave those rights to Bousman alone. Bousman's ferry was recognized by Virginia statute the following year, while Ormsby continued to hold the Pennsylvania government's authorization to operate his boats. Meanwhile a lawsuit instigated by Ormsby in Westmoreland County in 1774 dragged on, and Bousman countered in the Virginia courts with fifty charges of trespass against Ormsby in 1779. The matter was not officially resolved until August 1782, when the two competitors reached an "amicable agreement": they would continue to ferry over the same water, Ormsby operating from the Pittsburgh side and Bousman from the opposite shore.[27]

Jacob Bousman and John Ormsby probably would have tangled even without the boundary dispute, and might well have taken their differences to court. Their dispute, however, was marked by the peculiar situation of local government in and around Pittsburgh beginning

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in 1775. There were two courts operating on a regular basis, one at Pittsburgh, one at Hannastown, each claiming a legitimate authority to do its business while denying the right of the other to sit. Each man had a "legal" right to operate a ferry on the river to the exclusion of his competitor, but, in this case as in all others it was several years before the issue was resolved.

This circumstance could foster a significant devaluation of the "legitimacy" or "authority" of government. Governments normally operate with more of a monopoly on claims to legal right and power: the citizens might chafe under the authority of government, and tension can develop between different levels of government, but rarely is there a directly competing authority claiming a virtually identical right to operate without challenge. Jurisdiction west of Laurel Hill was open to challenge; county officers were subject to arrest and civil suits; jails might be raided with "legal" justification. These conditions gave the county officers involved a sensitivity about their own legitimacy, and the judges' pride was not something to be trifled with even before the dispute progressed very far. In January of 1774 the Westmoreland court reprimanded Francis Dade, an attorney licensed to practice before the court, for appearing

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"at divers times and places within the Jurisdiction of this Court" in an intoxicated state, where Dade "did publish several malicious Passages highly reflecting on several Magistrates of this County." The justices thought Dade guilty also of "other mischiefs . . . unbecoming the Character Duty and office of an attorney of this Court" and revoked his license to practice before the court.[28] From the citizen's point of view the competition between the two counties meant that a degree of selectivity was possible, or even required, in the individual's relationship to local government: which government's "authority" -- if either -- should one accept, to what extent would one participate in government under these circumstances, and to whom did the individual owe obedience?

The two courts were not only instruments employed in the jurisdictional dispute, for each carried out a full range of activities associated with county government. Each heard, from its earliest sessions, a large and diverse number of civil and criminal actions. As might be expected, many cases involved land, but there were also cases involving indentured servants' terms of service, theft, assault, riot, and other matters. The records do not give enough information to say how many of these court actions were directly or indirectly

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connected to the Pennsylvania-Virginia dispute. Both local courts sent cases involving capital offenses to higher courts, although the West Augusta judges heard evidence in a few cases of murder to determine whether the evidence warranted sending the defendants to the General Court for trial. The strongest punishment meted out by the courts was public whipping. From 1773 through 1775 the Westmoreland Court sentenced eight convicted thieves, including one female servant, to from ten to thirty-nine lashes apiece, plus fines, costs, and restitution of the stolen property. One of these people also had to stand in "the Common Pillory" for one hour. The West Augusta court sentenced two people to be whipped, one to receive twenty-five lashes, and the other -- convicted of deserting the militia, apparently during Dunmore's War -- to receive five hundred. During their first session the Virginia justices also ordered the construction of a ducking stool at the confluence of the Allegheny and the Monongahela, but there is no evidence that this was actually done. Usually the Virginia court handled minor criminal cases by requiring the guilty person to enter a bond for his or her good behavior during the ensuing year.[29]

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The two county governments also brought the opportunity, or in some instances the obligation, of county-level service to a number of men. Information on those serving on juries for the district of West Augusta is lacking, but 195 men sat on Westmoreland County's grand juries and traverse juries from April 1773 through April 1776. Forty-three others were called and fined for their nonattendance, but never sat on a jury. Each of Westmoreland County's townships had a constable, a road supervisor, and two overseers of the poor, and the town of Pittsburgh also had its own constable. Allowing for those holding more than one of these posts, 61 people served in these positions during that same period, and 30 were elected county commissioners, tax assessors, or inspectors of elections.[30] Forty-three men, some of whom performed one or more of the above services as well, were appointed viewers of proposed roads by the Pennsylvania court; 117 men were appointed road viewers or estate appraisers by the West Augusta judges, and 16 others were appointed road viewers by both counties.

A large proportion of the appointments went to men with no record of any other service or appointment from either county during the 1773-1776 period. Two-fifths of those assigned to be road viewers in Westmoreland County, half the Pennsylvania constables, three-fifths of those appointed constables by the West Augusta district,

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and three-fifths of the West Augusta road viewers and estate appraisers fell into this category. Over half of those serving on Westmoreland's grand and petty juries did jury duty only once and received no other appointments, not even a liquor license, from either county. Even three-fifths of those the West Augusta judges recommended as new justices of the peace held no other position from either jurisdiction through 1776. The total of the one-time-only appointees in these positions runs to 320, out of some 503 men appointed to or recommended for them. Of course there were other men who performed more than one service, perhaps combining such things as jury duty and road viewing with a position as constable, tax assessor, or township overseer of the poor. Nor was there constant turnover in office: Westmoreland's Springhill Township had only one constable from the county's beginning through mid-1776, and some of the county's overseers of the poor and highway supervisors apparently retained their posts through the period also. Still, the large proportion of once-only appointments means that direct participation in government in both counties was widespread and not limited to a smaller pool of appointees for which repeated service to the county was more the norm.[31]

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These figures also mean that involvement with government on the part of many individuals was very limited. Dozens of men sat once on a jury when called to do so, or helped as a road viewer, and then had no other contact with the county government. Just as there were justices of the peace who were more active in office than some of their peers, inhabitants west of Laurel Hill could be very active in government or could choose not to be. What may have been operative for many was a notion that government was not to expect a long term investment from the citizen, or make too many demands, but was at times a useful tool to be employed to achieve relatively specific goals.

There is the example of Paul Froman. Captain Froman, as he was sometimes called, must have been a man of no mean significance, for he owned two mills in the region, one on the east side of the Monongahela River and one on Chartiers Creek, representing a considerable investment. Yet Froman was not among those recommended as a justice of the peace for West Augusta, and may never have so much as sat on a jury. He was, however, appointed one of the viewers of five roads under consideration by the Virginia court during the first half of 1775. Each of the proposed roads was to connect to one of Froman's mills, and he initiated

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the request for another highway that would run from one of his mills to the other.[32]

Froman's case illustrates the fact that for many people the chief utility of local government was the performance of some specific task of an economic nature. During 1775 and 1776, the West Augusta magistrates considered requests for twenty-two roads and ordered the official establishment of nine, tying settlements along the Youghiogheny and the Monongahela to Fort Dunmore (Pittsburgh), sites on Chartiers Creek, and the mouth of Wheeling Creek on the Ohio. The Westmoreland County court received thirteen petitions for roads from April 1773 through April 1776, a few of which were identical to routes proposed to the Virginia court.[33] In many, perhaps all, of the instances of requests for roads in both counties, paths or roads of a sort already existed. The idea was for the county government to take the path into its official recognition as a highway so that public funds could be used to widen, improve, and maintain the route. By the same token the district of West Augusta authorized seven ferries to operate, but the court's minutes regarding roads show that there were at least six others in operation along the Monongahela and the Youghiogheny.[34] For some people one of the government's most important functions was the sanction to sell liquor. The

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Virginia justices licensed eleven ordinary keepers through 1776. Five of these had previously held the same privilege under Westmoreland's authority, and besides them thirty-two people were authorized by the Pennsylvania county to sell liquor from 1773 through 1775. Despite this number of licenses issued, the county's grand juries returned eleven indictments for keeping "tippling houses" from 1774 through mid-1776.[35]

A portion of those serving as constables, road viewers, jurors, or in similar positions in one county also appear in the records of the other jurisdiction. This evidence is impossible to interpret with any great certainty, and generalizations are difficult. For example, eleven of the names of those appointed constables by the West Augusta court also appear as appointees or officeholders in the other county's records. The appointment of these men to the office does not mean that they served, and the nomination could have been intended as a deliberate lure to enlist support in the dispute between the provinces. The same holds true for the men recommended as justices by the Virginia court, and in most cases it is impossible even to say whether road viewers and estate appraisers actually served. There is no evidence to indicate how pejorative duty as a juror or a road viewer under one

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jurisdiction was in the eyes of the activists in the other. In addition, a number of the men appearing in both courts' minutes saw service or received an appointment under Pennsylvania authority before the West Augusta court began to sit. For example, Jacob Bousman and John Ormsby were on opposite sides in the boundary dispute and in the ferrying business, but in 1773 the two of them were appointed the overseers of the poor in Pitt Township, Westmoreland County. Of the eleven appointed as Virginia constables who also appear in Westmoreland's records, some were no doubt like Christopher Truby, who lived in the heart of the Pennsylvania settlements east of Pittsburgh and probably never took the Virginia oath of office. Others were probably similar to Philip Bailey, who was named a Westmoreland constable in January 1774 but almost immediately became a Virginia militiaman and constable, so militant in his support of West Augusta that the Pennsylvania justices considered him a "Forsworn Rascal." Unfortunately for the historian it is simply impossible to say how many people in the region considered the jurisdictional dispute to be of paramount importance in their political lives.[36]

The territory over which the two counties nominally exercised jurisdiction was extensive. Parts or all of eight present counties in southwestern Pennsylvania lie

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in the area west of Laurel Hill and south of the Ohio and Allegheny Rivers as far north as Kittanning. For the West Augusta court, though less so for Westmoreland's officials, the county's purview extended to the Ohio River on the west, including what today is the northern panhandle of West Virginia. Settlements in the watersheds of the Monongahela's upper tributaries, scattered over a large chunk of northern West Virginia, also fell under the jurisdiction of the district of West Augusta during 1775 and 1776. Much of this vast country claimed by one or both counties was still very thinly inhabited, but the population was scattered widely over a good deal of the region and, at least until Dunmore's War and the Revolution, was growing at a very rapid rate.

County government probably intruded very little into the lives of many of the inhabitants of the region. Those who lived away from the county seats at Pittsburgh and Hannastown and did not travel to the court sessions were not likely to be tapped for jury duty or other service. Through a combination of frontier conditions and the boundary squabble, the effect of taxation was also limited. If the memory of Joseph Doddridge was correct, isolated settlers had almost no contact with government during the period of the boundary dispute.

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Doddridge spent part of his childhood during the years just before the Revolution on his father's farm just within the present western border of Pennsylvania, about as "frontier" a spot as one could find. He later described the society of that locale as one far removed from any centers of government or commerce, its location relative to provincial bounds undetermined. "Thus it happened that during a long period of time we knew nothing of courts, lawyers, magistrates, sheriffs, or constables," he wrote. In this society, with "no civil, military or ecclesiastical laws, at least none that were enforced," social behavior was controlled by public opinion within the immediate neighborhood. Those who did not conform to the generally accepted norms of conduct were disgraced, shunned, or, in serious instances such as theft, taken before "a kind of jury of the neighborhood," which might prescribe whipping and banishment from the vicinity. The "neighborhood" made its own decisions regarding defense during periods of threat from the Indians, and land was settled, claimed -- often on the basis of "tomahawk claims" marked by blazed tree trunks -- and transferred without benefit of formal deeds. In some areas, at least, settlers appear to have subsisted, as the illegal settlements on the Redstone, the Cheat, and the Monongahela

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did during the 1760s, without the structure of formal government.[37]

County government, for those who chose to use it, could perform certain useful functions. It could help clear a roadway, punish thieves, settle a variety of disputes, and aid against encroachers on a tract of land, if a person chose to associate with others through the medium of government to accomplish these tasks. For many, however, involvement with local government was but slight and not of continuous duration, and obligations often asked of citizens by governments, such as taxes and military service, did not really exist. As for the obligation to recognize the sole authority of the government to rule, the contested nature of that issue may, if anything, have encouraged a conscious nonparticipation in government by much of the citizenry.

Judging from the surviving, readily available correspondence, the issues and events leading to the American Revolution were not of overwhelming importance to the local politics of the upper Ohio Valley prior to 1775. Regional concerns such as the boundary controversy absorbed much more attention. It seems as though British

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Americans in the west had little to do with bringing the split with England, and stumbled into a situation that had been shaped by others. The ranking office-holders in the area, the justices of the peace, were all relatively recent appointments to their posts and held them largely because of their attachment to, or at least their lack of any outright opposition to, either the proprietary interests in Pennsylvania or Lord Dunmore in Virginia. Some of these men, such as Arthur St. Clair, were prone to a particularly sluggish moderation regarding the Anglo-American conflict.

The Revolution quickly became important to the area, however. The rapidity with which it became a political issue during 1775 indicates that there may have been more formation of opinion on the matter prior to that year than is visible in the surviving correspondence. It also demonstrates that the people west of Laurel Hill easily adapted to changing political circumstances.

At Hannastown in July 1774 there was a gathering of "a very respectable Body of People" in response to a call from the Philadelphia committees. This meeting

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chose Westmoreland County justices Robert Hanna and James Cavet, soon to clash with St. Clair over the command of the local ranger force, as its delegates to the provincial convention. By the following spring Englishman Nicholas Cresswell, traveling in the upper Ohio River region, found himself in occasional arguments with what he called "red-hot liberty men."[38] It was the news of armed conflict between colonials and British troops near Boston that brought the Revolution fully into the realm of local politics, and in the middle of May 1775 there were meetings both at Hannastown and at Pittsburgh to coordinate local action.

The Westmoreland County meeting at Hannastown resolved to join other counties in the province in the formation of an Association, or miltia-type armed force. Details were to be worked out at township meetings. As for constitutional matters, the county's inhabitants declared their "unshaken loyalty and fidelity to His Majesty, King George the Third, whom we acknowledge to be our lawful and rightful King." The problem at hand was the treatment of Massachusetts by Parliament and the king's ministers; once Parliament backed down and relations were restored to "the same way as before the era of the Stamp Act, when Boston grew great, and America was happy," the county's military association

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would disband. The published notice of the Hannastown meeting reports only the decision to form the Association in response to these constitutional issues. However, either at the meeting or at sometime before or soon after, a local committee was formed to supervise Westmoreland County's activities.[39]

The Hannastown meeting's interpretation of the trouble with Great Britain was a relatively conservative one for the time, not at all on the radical forefront of revolutionary opinion. For one thing, by the spring of 1775 many American publicists had begun to view King George himself as an active party, along with Parliament and the ministry, in the infringement of colonial liberty. Radical theorists would have been amazed also at the expectation that a pre-Stamp Act state of affairs could be blithely restored after Lexington and Concord and all that had transpired in the previous several years. Taken as a body, the revolutionaries west of the mountains in 1775 and 1776 were not innovators or leaders in the resistance to Britain. Rather, they drifted with the tide, responding to the growing crisis in ways similar to those of numerous moderates elsewhere in the colonies. For many, however, the adjustment to the changing situation was relatively facile, and their commitment to the new cause

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was not weak. St. Clair provides an example: his response to the formation of local revolutionary committees was quite timid, and he fretted about the crisis while maintaining his correspondence with Governor John Penn; yet by July 1775, in an argument with John Connolly, he was unequivocal in his willingness to fight on the American side.[40]

Either on the same day as the Westmoreland County gathering or on the day before, a meeting for the district of West Augusta was held at Pittsburgh. Twenty-eight men were named a committee for the district, thirteen of them Virginia justices of the peace, including every justice who actually sat with the West Augusta court during 1775 or 1776 except John Connolly. Pennsylvania justices Devereux Smith and George Wilson, along with John Ormsby and at least one other possible adherent to Pennsylvania authority, were chosen for the committee, and Ormsby and Smith were members of the standing committee of seven chosen by the larger group. The reason for the selection of these Pennsylvania supporters is unknown; the Virginia faction possibly sought to win support for its side. The West Augusta committee was never a bipartisan affair, and there is no evidence that the Pennsylvania men ever participated in the committee's business. Smith and Wilson were not on good terms with the West Augusta leadership in the

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spring of 1775, and in June both were arrested by the Virginia militia in retribution for the Westmoreland group's kidnapping of John Connolly.

The Pittsburgh meeting, like its counterpart at Hannastown, was neither expansive nor radical in its expressions concerning the constitutional situation. It called for the preparation of the local militia to meet the threat brought by the ministry's "open acts of unprovoked hostilities in our sister colony of Massachusetts." There was danger also from the Indian nations and from "a domestic enemy, said to be prompted by the wicked minions of power to execute our ruin" -- this last a reference to Dunmore's recent statement that he would mobilize Virginia's slaves if necessary to suppress the revolt against Great Britain. In accordance with authority from the Virginia convention, the committee called for the collection of two shillings and six pence from every tithable in the district to buy ammunition for the militia, a tax they knew would not go down well with many of the inhabitants. An immediate subscription by the committee on the day of the meeting raised another fifteen pounds to go for the support of Virginia's delegation to the Continental Congress.

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The committee also approved a set of grievances that would serve as instructions to John Harvie and George Rootes, West Augusta's delegates to the Virginia convention. John Campbell, the Virginia magistrate and Pittsburgh merchant who a year earlier had supplied and paid Connolly's militia and -- theoretically, at least -- paid for the refurbishment of Fort Dunmore, chaired the group that drew up these instructions. The first grievance listed was that of locals who "have expended large sums of money, and supplied the soldiers in the last Indian war with provisions and other necessaries"; Harvie and Rootes were instructed, in effect, to promote Campbell's efforts for reimbursement by the convention. The delegates' instructions also pointed out local desires for provincial assistance in defense and reminded the provincial government of the continuing lack of any resolution of the disputed boundary with Pennsylvania. In a confession that their economic tactics against the Pennsylvanians were now turning against them, the committee also noted that the continued collection of Virginia's duties on peltry, a task now assumed by provincial commissioners, would simply drive the trade from Virginia's orbit.[41]

Connolly's absence from the committee is indicative of a shift occurring in the Virginia faction during 1775. Dunmore's popularity everywhere in Virginia

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was at its summit in late 1774 and early 1775 after his return to Williamsburg from the campaigns against the Shawnee. The governor's popularity then plummeted in the spring with his efforts to secure the powder in the provincial magazine at Williamsburg and with the revelation that Dunmore harbored very hostile attitudes toward those Virginians supporting the resistance to Great Britain.[42] Connolly maintained the attachment of his interests to Dunmore's. Others in the West Augusta leadership, while careful not to burn their bridges to Dunmore prematurely, were more interested in maintaining the position they had been given by the formation of quasi-county government in the area. For these men local Virginia government had always been an alternative to Westmoreland County as a means for them to hold power and exert influence in the Pittsburgh territory. The revolutionary committees performed the same function. So during the spring and summer months of 1775, as Connolly prepared to continue his commitment to Lord Dunmore as a kind of counterrevolutionary agent in the west, George Croghan and his kinsmen Edward Ward and Thomas Smallman assumed positions of influence on the local committee. So did John Campbell and the other magistrates such as John Gibson, Dorsey Pentecost, John Canon, and David Shepherd, men who would also move into key local militia commands in West

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Augusta and its successor counties as the war progressed. Connolly had dominated the first year of the dispute with Pennsylvania, and had not suddenly lost his influence in the area, but his course and that of many of the men who had allied with him and Dunmore for practical considerations in 1774 had begun to diverge.[43]

The revolutionary crisis in Virginia, coming so soon after the court at Pittsburgh even began to sit, also gave the West Augusta group a chance to try to elevate the district's status into that of a true county. Without full status as a county there would always be limits to what the district's leadership could do. The regular Augusta County magistrates sitting at Staunton, to whom the western justices had been appended in Dunmore's ploy to avoid royal restrictions against new counties, showed little interest in the Pittsburgh region but continued to guard their power over the county's clerkship and sheriff's office.[44] The western district struck out on its own in March 1775 when it selected its own delegates to the Virginia convention and sent them to Richmond with a petition asking that they be seated. In July West Augusta's right to send two delegates to the Virginia convention, and to have its own revolutionary committee, was recognized by statute. Then in August 1775 a

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resolution of the convention allowed the West Augusta court to sit without the usual writs of adjournment from Staunton, "in all Matters relating to keeping the peace and good Behaviour and in all criminal Matters."[45]

Recognition as a separate county was still only partial, however, and was a mixed blessing. The May 1775 instructions to the district's convention delegates had complained that "for want of freeholders we cannot get legal grand jurors." The July law allowing the district to choose its own delegates corrected this problem. Anyone holding twenty-five acres with a house or one hundred acres without, "claiming an estate for life at least" and in actual possession of the land for a year, was to be a legal freeholder and could vote even if there was no finished title to the property. The catch, revealed immediately in another statute, was that these new freeholders were now expected to pay the land taxes levied by Virginia to pay its military expenses, taxes that otherwise would not apply to unpatented lands.[46]

Nor was Staunton's power completely severed yet. In September 1775 two attorneys tried to block the session of the West Augusta court at which the convention's resolution allowing the court to sit without writs of adjournment from Staunton was officially read. This maneuver was checked, however, and in the spring of 1776 a Virginia law authorized the officers of the West

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Augusta district to continue in office and hold monthly courts, and the state's new constitution recognized the district's right to continue sending delegates to the legislature. Not long after, in August and September 1776, the West Augusta magistrates made their final push for de facto status, if not formal recognition, as a distinct county. John Madison, Jr., serving as deputy clerk for West Augusta under the appointment of Augusta County's clerk, John Madison, Sr., was brusquely ordered to turn the western district's records over to Dorsey Pentecost, the newly appointed clerk of court. Recommendations for sheriff, coroner, and a host of new justices of the peace were sent to the state government. The West Augusta court moved from Pittsburgh to its new county seat at Augusta Town, near the present city of Washington, Pennsylvania, on Chartiers Creek southwest of Pittsburgh. The justices' presumptuousness was not misguided, for in the autumn of 1776 full county status was granted. However, the district of West Augusta -- so much larger than the usual run of counties that it constituted a single district for the raising of militiamen in 1775 and for the election of senators in 1776 -- was made into not one but three new counties, called Yohogania, Ohio, and Monongalia.[47]

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Beginning in the spring of 1775 Virginia's convention government showed an active interest in the disposition of the Pittsburgh region. Dunmore's peace with the Shawnee and the Mingo had not been cast into final form, a task that Connolly assumed at a conference at Pittsburgh in June. Since the earl of Dunmore had fallen from grace in Virginia, there was apprehension within the province that Connolly, as the earl's agent west of the mountains, would use the meeting to turn the Ohio Valley nations against the Americans. The conference was attended by well over a dozen of the West Augusta committee members, justices, and "principal Inhabitants of the Country." Their presence reassured a Virginia emissary, James Wood, who told the government that "the Committee as well as Major Connollys most inveterate Enemies all agree that he Conducted this Affair in the Most Open and Candid Manner."[48]

Wood also called the convention government's attention to the situation of the militia garrison at Pittsburgh. Another who did so was John Campbell, whose primary concern was the dispute with Pennsylvania. At Dunmore's orders seventy-five men had been maintained at Fort Dunmore at the Ohio forks after the war with the Indians, along with one hundred men at the mouth of the Kanawha River and another twenty-five at Fort Fincastle (Wheeling). By early June 1775 the

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governor ordered these garrisons abandoned, but the convention stepped in and assumed control of them. During the summer a company of one hundred men, most of them from Frederick County, was sent to garrison Fort Dunmore, which with the obvious change in political circumstances was once again known as Fort Pitt by its possessors. The company's commander was John Neville, who had served as a justice of the peace for several years in Frederick County, moved to Chartiers Creek in 1772, and was chosen a West Augusta delegate to the convention in March 1775 but did not attend due to illness. He commanded at Fort Pitt from August 1775 until he turned the post over to General Edward Hand of the Continental army in spring 1777.[49]

Virginia also began immediately to draw on the West Augusta district for manpower. Neville's Frederick County men were to be supplemented by another company of one hundred, and a company of twenty-five was to go to the post at Wheeling. These companies were to be raised within West Augusta. The district was also expected to enlist a minuteman battalion of five hundred men in addition to its militia. By the beginning of 1776 West Augusta was designated part of the recruiting area of the 8th Virginia regiment, called the "German regiment" because it was expected to consist mostly of Germans from the frontier counties.[50]

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The arrival of Neville and his men at Pittsburgh in August 1775 served to maintain a kind of Virginia superiority within the town. Arthur St. Clair had expected the fort's abandonment in June on Dunmore's orders, and entertained hopes that Pennsylvania could use the opportunity to gain a better foothold in Pittsburgh. He was more than a little surprised when Neville's company marched in from Winchester to garrison Fort Pitt.[51] With Virginia troops at Pittsburgh and other posts down the Ohio to the Kanawha River, the Pennsylvanians again turned to Kittanning on the Allegheny as a base of operations and as a post to help cover the northern flank of the settlements west of the mountains. When Westmoreland County justice of the peace Van Swearingen raised a company early in 1776 to protect the county, the men were stationed at Kittanning.[52] Later in the year the outpost was where Aeneas Mackay's regiment, recruited in Westmoreland and Bedford counties, was based before it was transferred east to join the American armies.

Where before there had been two county courts claiming jurisdiction over the region, by the spring of 1775 each province was represented by both a county court and a local committee. In both cases membership of the court and the committee overlapped a great deal, and the leaders of the two committees were no strangers to the boundary controversy. George Croghan was the chairman

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of the West Augusta committee, but gout and other ailments often limited his active participation. John Campbell chaired the group during Croghan's absences in 1775. The following spring Croghan's cousin Thomas Smallman, another West Augusta magistrate, acted as chairman of the committee of inspection in Croghan's absence; Campbell and John Gibson were also members. On the Pennsylvania side, the committee leaders in the summer of 1775 were justice William Lochry and John Proctor, a former Bedford County sheriff and Westmoreland's sheriff during the early part of the jurisdictional conflict. By the following spring Proctor was in the Pennsylvania assembly and the Westmoreland County committee was headed by John Carnahan, a magistrate who had also succeeded Proctor as sheriff late in 1774 and as such was well known to the Virginia partisans. The multiplication of local entities was nearly too much for the cautious, almost frightened, Arthur St. Clair, who reported soon after the May 1775 meetings at Hannastown and Pittsburgh that "we have nothing but Musters and Committees all over the Country, and every thing seems to be running into the greatest Confusion."[53] Very soon after St. Clair wrote, there was conflict between the Pennsylvania and Virginia committees as the new active groups in the jurisdictional dispute.

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Trouble between the two groups came as early as June 1775. On the eve of his treaty meeting with the Mingo and the Shawnee, Connolly was abducted during the night by Westmoreland County sheriff John Carnahan and a posse of men who took Connolly to Ligonier. This move may have been the first step of a plan to remove Connolly and install Pennsylvania authority at Pittsburgh. In response a company of men from the Chartiers Creek settlements, under the leadership of John Gibson's brother but acting without any orders from the West Augusta committee or court, secured Fort Pitt, swept up Pennsylvania justices Wilson, Smith, and Spear, and sent them to Wheeling "in an old Leakey Boat."[54] Each side soon released its hostages, but a very spirited constitutional debate ensued between the two committees.

The exchange began about a week after Connolly was snatched by the Pennsylvanians, when the Westmoreland committee sent a member to the Virginians to negotiate "a Treaty of Peace and Reconciliation" based on a temporary boundary. The West Augusta committee, or "Committee of the Western Waters," as it sometimes called itself, rejoined that fixing temporary borders "far exceeds the power of a Committee" and insisted that a joint petition to both governors signed by all the region's inhabitants was the only possible solution. The Virginia men also explained that Pennsylvania authority had no weight until

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the Penns proved their claim against the crown's; in the meantime, "as no community can subsist without a due submission to the civil Laws," everyone must submit to Virginia law and authority. The Pennsylvanians presented a rather different view of the situation. Unlike the Virginia committee, which insisted that it represented everyone in the region, they presumed that each committee represented those people who acknowledged themselves to be under that government, and that the two committees could work out some temporary solution to the problem.

The argument became a dead end with the initial exchange of letters, but the Westmorelanders fired a final salvo. They insisted that Pennsylvania authority had not transgressed beyond its chartered limits, and that it was up to the crown to lodge any complaint about possible encroachments onto its lands. And the West Augustans, who had alluded to Lord Dunmore's proclamations affirming Virginia's jurisdiction in the region, found the earl's "authority" thrown back into their faces. The Pennsylvania committee charged that the entire border controversy was "owing to the Avarice of some Individuals and to the Villiany of others with which we make no doubt some of your Committee are very well acquainted." These people's ambitions "unhappily coincided" with Dunmore's "passions and prejudices" and with "the vices of an inciduous and wicked Ministry"

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to pit the two provinces against one another and distract them from the growing Anglo-American rift. Dunmore's pretended authority amounted to an "intrusion," "seizing the Government of a Society which never made any compact with him nor owes him obedience," and "Ten Thousand Proclamations" could not render Virginia authority legitimate in the region. The Westmoreland committee reminded their counterparts that the present crisis with Britain was due to "the wanton abrogation of Established constitutions that had been entered into by the mutual consent of the crown and the People," and stated their willingness to resist any government imposed on them in violation of the same natural rights.[55]

Campbell acted as chairman of the West Augusta committee during this elaborate but ultimately useless exchange of views, and that same summer he made the mistake of accepting a consignment of tea for his company's store in Pittsburgh. Two Pennsylvania captains led a company of twenty men from Hannastown into Pittsburgh. After a night's delay this insistent group forced the West Augusta committee, no doubt to its chagrin, to call on Campbell, who claimed that he had not ordered the tea but turned over the unsold portions to be burned at the town's liberty pole.[56]

The gulf between the two parties remained unbridged as the colonies' dispute with Britain progressed.

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A visitor to Pittsburgh in September 1775 remarked that "colonial disputes are very high between Virginia and Pensylvania and if not timely suppressed will end in tragical consequences. . . . Nothing but quarrelling and fighting in every part of the town."[57] That autumn, despite the congressional and Virginia Indian commissioners' efforts to convince the Indian delegates gathered at Pittsburgh that the American colonies "are as one Man" in the war with Britain, the Ohio Valley nations continued to characterize Virginia as the "Big Knife" people and Pennsylvania as "Brother Onas." Any image of unity was belied by the two factions' behavior toward one another. "I am sory to Inform you that Party Spirit Prevails here as much as Ever and indeed through the Country in General," a Pittsburgher wrote Pennsylvania's James Wilson in April 1776.[58]

By the spring and summer of 1776 at least some local inhabitants were ready for a cessation of the interprovincial hostilities. Over 175 people, including John Neville and attorney James Berwick, the clerk of the West Augusta committee, signed a petition to the Virginia convention praying that some action be taken in a final resolution of the boundary. "While both Governments claim a Jurisdiction in the same place, the Laws of neither can be enforced," the petition stated, and the present situation fostered only "animosities and

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dissentions among the People" at a time when harmony and "the stricktest union" were needed. The convention approved a resolution calling for a temporary boundary that would have put the zone east of Pittsburgh along the Pennsylvania road under Pennsylvania authority, but granted Pittsburgh itself and the entirety of the Youghiogheny and Monongahela settlements to Virginia. The Virginia convention claimed that this line was the most natural boundary between two zones of settlement. A committee of the Pennsylvania convention agreed that a temporary boundary was necessary, but rejected Virginia's proposal as "very wide from the true limits of Pennsylvania according to the charter."[59] Not long after the petition was presented to the Virginia convention someone drafted what was to be a joint and unanimous memorial from the West Augusta and Westmoreland committees to Congress, asking for a solution to the dispute, but the document is critical of some Virginia land claims and probably never advanced beyond the draft stage.[60]

It was during this period, in June 1776, that Dorsey Pentecost of the West Augusta group blamed a new wave of friction on the aggressive efforts of Pennsylvania's civil and militia officers to enforce their authority. "The neighborhood that I live in (which a few weeks ago were in perfect unity and peace) are now in the utmost Confusion," he reported. Shortly after

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Pentecost wrote, John Neville at Fort Pitt informed the Virginia committee of safety of a new challenge to the state's authority in the area. "There has been a Petition to the Congress privately set on Foot and carried on by some of our first men to have this the West Side of the Allegeny [Mountains] struck off into a new and seperate Government," Neville wrote; "what may be their intent I cannot suggest." Neville, Campbell, and Gibson "suppressed" the petition "with some difficulty."[61]

There is a surviving copy of an unsigned draft memorial to Congress that may have been related to the new-state movement squashed by Neville and his associates. It is a wordy document calling for a new province in the American union. This state, "Westsylvania," was to include everything west of the mountains and east of the Ohio and Allegheny rivers, from Kittanning in the north to opposite the mouth of the Scioto River in the south. The petition listed the negative effects of the boundary controversy, predicted a complete collapse of law and order should it continue, and criticized the actions of both sides in their attempts to enforce provincial claims. The speculative claims of George Croghan, the "suffering traders," and the Vandalia associates were labeled "embarrasing and Perplexing." The thrust of the memorial was that those people --

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25,000 families since 1768, the document claimed -- who had migrated into the area to take up lands and had labored hard "to secure an Assylum [,] a safe retreat from threatening penury," ought to be allowed to form their own government, free from existing provincial claims and "the Ambition of some and Avarice of others" that so far had marked the settlers' lives in the west. The petitioners argued that they were worse off now than they had been "in their various respective provinces below," for they were overwhelmed by powerful and contending claimants to the land and, they argued, were without the protection of regular laws and courts. The settlers, "tho neither politicians . . . nor Orators are at least a rational and Social People inur'd to Hardships and Fatigue."[62]

The memorial was a kind of preemptioners' manifesto in its argument and language. What it called for was a sweeping away of all the big claims to the Stanwix cession lands -- provincial, proprietary, and private -- and the formation of an undefined government that somehow would favor those settlers in actual possession of the soil. If the Westsylvania petition was that suppressed by Neville, then there is no evidence of who were the "first men" of the region he said were behind the venture, nor of what their ultimate goal might have been. Perhaps it was a cleverly disguised attempt by

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speculative interests in the region to instigate a new government which they might then expect to control to their advantage. The movement did not succeed in any event, although there were serious efforts to mobilize popular support for it later in the summer.[63] One can argue that in the form presented by the surviving Westsylvania memorial, it could never have hoped to succeed: the petition sought to influence the entire course of the Ohio Valley region but lacked the focus needed to attract the powerful political interests whose support was necessary for any such attempt. Stripped of its excess verbiage, however, and regardless of its origins or intent, it could appeal to the frustrations caused by the political circumstances of the region and might evoke a very favorable response from many of the upper Ohio Valley's inhabitants.

As the new-state movement demonstrates, the Revolution introduced the American Congress as a new factor in the question of control over the trans-montane territories. As early as the spring of 1775 the West Augusta committee petitioned the Continental Congress to ask that Virginia and Pennsylvania be moved to prompt action regarding Indian affairs in order to counter any British efforts to turn the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes nations against the American settlements. At the same time Congress' attention was drawn

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to the jurisdictional disputes in the Pittsburgh region. The boundary matter was referred to the Pennsylvania and Virginia delegations in Congress. In July 1775 they issued a joint statement calling for the disbanding of any armed groups on either side in the dispute, the release of anyone held in jail as a result of the conflict, and the restoration of peace to the western country: "by observing these directions the public tranquility will be secured without injury to the titles on either side."[64] In September Congress debated, without result, a proposal that they step in to affix a temporary boundary. Over the next six months Congress received at least three missives from the region.[65]

Congress' most direct involvement in the Pittsburgh vicinity during 1775 and 1776 came by way of its commissioners of Indian affairs in the middle department. The three Indian departments were established in July 1775; the middle department was to deal with the nations north of the Cherokee but south of the Iroquois confederacy. The congressional commissioners attended a conference with Shawnee, Delaware, and Six Nations representatives at Pittsburgh in fall 1775. Their first agent at Pittsburgh was Richard Butler, the same who had come into heated conflict with Connolly, and who was replaced by trading entrepreneur George Morgan in

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the spring of 1776.[66]

During 1776 the congressional authorities did not resolve the competitive political situation around Pittsburgh, but adapted to it. Supplies of ammunition furnished by Congress were carefully portioned: some went to the West Augusta officials for use by their militia, some to Westmoreland County for its Associator battalions, and the rest stayed at Fort Pitt under the watchful eye of the Continental Indian agent. The powder, lead, and flints at Pittsburgh were available for use in case of an emergency -- and an emergency existed only if Indian agent Morgan, Virginia's Major John Neville, and Pennsylvania's Colonel Aeneas Mackay, or any two of them, said so.[67]

Four congressional Indian commissioners, Thomas Walker and John Harvie of Virginia and John Montgomery and Jasper Yeates of Pennsylvania, were at Pittsburgh during the summer and fall of 1776 to organize and attend a conference with the Indians. On several occasions they played a direct role in local affairs. Aware of the jurisdictional dispute and that the Pennsylvania traders might be attempting "to poison the minds" of the Indians against Virginia, the commissioners may have drafted a proposal for the adoption of the Youghiogheny River as a temporary boundary, but nothing came of it. Devereux Smith referred to them as "the only arbiter

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At Present that Precide over the Publick affairs of this Distracted Country," but the congressional Indian affairs commissioners' power to govern affairs around Pittsburgh was actually very weak.[68]

In late August and September of 1776 the commissioners decided that Pittsburgh was in some danger of an Indian attack. Congress gave them operational control over Aeneas Mackay's battalion of Pennsylvanians, recruited for the Continental service and forming at Kittanning. The commissioners also asked the commanders of the Westmoreland and West Augusta militias to send men to help protect Pittsburgh. Yet the limits of congressional authority were obvious. The commissioners could only "recommend" action to the Virginia militia stationed along the upper Ohio; once, when the temporary commander at Fort Pitt cosigned the order, they grew bold enough to "recommend and direct" that the militia keep its scouts off the northwest side of the Ohio to avoid inciting the Delaware or Shawnee. In August the commissioners forbade the sale of liquor to Indians in Pittsburgh without "special Licence," but it is unclear how they expected to enforce this edict. Even the distribution of authority among the congressional officers was uncertain or confused at times. During the fall George Morgan as Indian agent chastised Dorsey Pentecost, commander of the West Augusta militia, for

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circulating what Morgan considered an inflammatory report of possible attacks from Niagara and Detroit. Pentecost, jealous of his authority as a Virginia official in any event, chagrined Morgan with a smug reply that his letter to the militia was sent with the approval of the congressional commissioners.[69]

Nor could the commissioners do much to help Aeneas Mackay. In July 1776 Mackay was named colonel of a battalion to be raised in Westmoreland and Bedford counties, placed on the Continental payroll, and stationed at Kittanning, Presque Isle, and Le Boeuf. By the time the battalion, the 8th Pennsylvania, started to form up, it was placed under the temporary command of the Indian commissioners, and it already suffered from tremendous difficulties.

Many of these problems were the result of internal dissension. The Westmoreland County leadership was no more joined in consensus after the beginning of the war with England than it had been when Hanna and St. Clair fought over the location of the county seat and for control over the local ranger force. Hanna, in fact, came into conflict with the Westmoreland County committee in the spring of 1776 when he "in a very surly Manner" refused to turn over ammunition placed in his hands by the congressional Indian commissioners.[70] Mackay's corps of officers, which included his fellow

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magistrate George Wilson as lieutenant colonel and Richard Butler as major, as well as eight captains and a host of lieutenants and ensigns, was rent by vicious conflicts. Some officers finally refused outright to serve with others. Mackay blamed much of the dissension on a faction led by John Proctor, who according to Mackay had wanted command of the battalion.

Moreover, the troops gathered at Kittanning, where there was no fort or barracks sufficient to protect them, and faced the approach of cold weather short of clothing and blankets, their morale and obedience both near rock bottom. The expected flow of provisions failed when Mackay balked at the prices demanded by two Westmoreland County residents who had earlier supplied Pennsylvania troops in the region. Many of the men were sent miles from Kittanning to mills and taverns where they could hope to find some food and shelter. The Indian affairs commissioners commiserated with Mackay and gave advice, but their temporary command over the disposition of his battalion gave them neither the authority nor the real power to solve his problems of supply, housing, and morale.[71]

Mackay's troops were never posted to Le Boeuf and Presque Isle. In November 1776 Congress ordered the battalion to march "with all possible expedition" to join Washington's forces in New Jersey. The battalion

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made a tough winter march through the Appalachians that brought the unit to the main army but may have caused Mackay's death early in 1777. George Wilson died not long after Mackay.[72]

The departure of Mackay and Wilson from the local leadership group was only one of the changes brought by the American Revolution. George Croghan's personal influence faded a bit, and he left Pittsburgh in 1777. Arthur St. Clair left Westmoreland County as a field officer in the Coninental army. His quiet accretion of local poltiical power disrupted by the jurisdictional contest, St. Clair now found a new route for his political career. During and after the Revolution he held a series of military and administrative positions under the U.S. government, including the governorship of the Northwest Territory. Other local political leaders also accepted Continental or state commissions, although some, such as John Gibson and William Crawford, did not permanently leave the area. Newcomers also entered positions of influence, some of them recently arrived men of experience, some of them part of a rising group of locals who would become prominent in the region. Some of the officeholders of the 1773-1776 period, including Dorsey Pentecost and people on both sides of the jurisdictional issue, maintained or improved their political positions through service at the county level.

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They, along with the regular institutions of government established on both sides at the county level, furnished continuity and perhaps some stability to a local political system characterized by fluidity, change, and shifting alliances to achieve specific goals.

John Connolly was one of the first to leave the Pittsburgh territories as a result of the Revolution. During the first half of 1775 he was not silent about his opposition to the local revolutionary committees and his support of Dunmore, King George, and Parliament. His servant later said Connolly left Pittsburgh "fearing some Injury from the Inhabitants, who suspected him of being an Enemy."[73] Connolly's departure was not flight, however, but the first step in a new plot he was hatching. He visited Dunmore, who had removed to a British ship near Norfolk, and General Gage in Boston. His plan was to advance on the Pittsburgh region from Detroit, backed by troops from the Illinois garrison; seize the upper Ohio Valley for Britain; then advance down the Potomac to join Dunmore, who would drive up from the Tidewater. Together they would split the rebellious colonies. Connolly claimed that he had prepared the way around Fort Pitt by sounding out the sentiments of a number of men of "influence and wealth" in the area, primarily militia officers and justices of the peace, who had given him their assurances of sup-

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port before he left the Ohio. He expected to gain even wider support by offering a confirmation of land titles and an additional three hundred acres to anyone joining him.[74]

Things did not work out as planned. John Gibson turned a letter he received from Connolly over to the West Augusta committee and Virginia's provincial Indian commissioners; Connolly's servant reported the whole scheme to revolutionary authorities in Massachusetts; and Connolly and two companions were arrested in Maryland in November 1775 on their way west. Connolly may not have realized just how frightening his proposed adventure was to the Americans, who saw in the plot an effort to turn the Native Americans, the French settlers in the Illinois country, servants along the Potomac, and every disaffected element in the western settlements against the colonies. He was jailed at Philadelphia, where the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety declared him "a person inimical to the Liberties and dangerous to the safety of these Colonies."[75] Despite his demands to be exchanged as a British officer, the Americans kept him for five years. When he was finally exchanged late in 1780 he was anxious to implement a new scheme to seize Pittsburgh and the transmontane west. He was captured near Yorktown in 1781 and spent the last part of the war in American hands. After the war he remained

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a schemer and maintained his connection with British military and Indian affairs officers in Canada. Later in the 1780s he appeared in Kentucky as a British agent and attempted to agitate the inhabitants' discontent over the Mississippi River navigation issue.[76]

The dispute that he had helped foster did not leave Pittsburgh when Connolly did in 1775. Through most of the Revolution it and other factional conflicts continued to mark, if not dominate, many of the relationships among the men holding civil and military posts in the transmontane country. Pennsylvania and Virginia did not agree on the boundary lines to be run until 1780, and it was 1782 before even a temporary line was actually surveyed. It was during 1784 and 1785 that the lines delineating Pennsylvania's southwest corner were officially marked out by commissioners from the two states. As was usual in these cases the surveying crews chopped a swath a dozen or more yards wide through the trees along the course of the line as they surveyed; after they had finished, this "most magnificent gang way" left no doubt about where Pennsylvania left off and Virginia began. That point was still years away as the country west of Laurel Hill tumbled into the Revolutionary War.[77]

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CHAPTER 6

WAR AND POLITICS, 1776-1784

Two decades after the close of the Revolutionary War Edward Cook, who had been county lieutenant of the Westmoreland militia for part of the war, stated that "those who have arived to manhood since the revolution know little of the dificualties of those who had to wade through it."[1] From the perspective of Cook and many others, "to wade through it" was an apt characterization of the sense of their experience in the Ohio forks country during the war with Britain. The region was subject to the attacks of British-allied Indians for the entire course of the war. Much of the burden of defense fell on the inhabitants themselves. Moreover, at the onset of war the residents of the upper Ohio Valley had not yet resolved the question of how they would respond to higher political authority, and the local political situation was marked by considerable discord. A society in which uncontested political power and clear lines of authority were yet to be established faced the stresses imposed by a long war; Cook's statement reflects the nature of that experience for many residents of the region.

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The degree to which the Continental government became involved with affairs along the upper Ohio during the course of the war was determined by early strategic decisions and by Congress' limited ability to commit its resources to the area. During the latter half of 1776 and the early part of 1777, the Continental government's understanding of strategic requirements in the Ohio forks country was shaped largely by two sources: the Indian affairs commissioners who were at Pittsburgh to hold conferences with the Indian nations, and Indian agent George Morgan. As early as August 1776 the commissioners informed Congress that the existing Virginia forts on the Ohio, as well as others planned by Congress along the Allegheny watershed, were "of the utmost consequence" to the defense of the district. Also, they wrote, "we conceive it indispensibly necessary for the common Safety, some experienced General Officer will be wanted to Superintend and direct the movements of the Army, in this Quarter and carry the Resolves of Congress into execution should an Indian War take place." Morgan concurred in the belief that a Continental officer should be sent to take command of the region.[2]

For two reasons, however, Congress did not receive strong advice in 1776 to send a large contingent of regular Continental troops to Fort Pitt and the other posts in the region. The first of these reasons was the influence of Indian agent Morgan, who discouraged offensive operations

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in the district. In late 1776 the only Indians actively hostile against the settlements in the upper Ohio watershed were a relatively small group of Mingo and other "banditti" who based their raiding activities at "Pluggy's Town" on a tributary of the upper Scioto River. Morgan believed that the chief result of a campaign against these raiders, or through the Ohio country to Detroit, would be the alienation of powerful nations such as the Shawnee, the Seneca, and the Delaware, whose neutrality he strove to maintain during the early part of the war. Morgan quashed plans for a Virginia expedition against Pluggy's Town, and when the congressional commissioners asked for his advice about an American campaign against the British post at Detroit he was not particularly supportive. He emphasized the possible negative results of any such venture and enumerated the difficulties involved in mounting a campaign. The Ohio Valley nations had avowed their resolution to keep the country between Fort Pitt and Detroit free of the armies of either combatant in the British-American quarrel. Morgan's western strategy placed the highest emphasis on honoring that intention and using it to American advantage to shield against attacks from the northwest. Under such a policy, with its emphasis on diplomacy and strictly defensive measures, there was little call for the deployment of large numbers of Continental soldiers to the western frontiers.[3]

The congressional commissioners' own optimistic assessment of the western settlements' capacity for self-

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defense was the second reason for their not pressing Congress to send regular troops. When the commissioners feared an attack on Pittsburgh in late summer 1776 they requested aid from local county officers and were delighted by the "chearfulness" of the militia's response. The commissioners assured Congress that the Ohio forks territory was peopled by "a race of hardy experienced Woodsmen whom it will be no easy task to overcome," and "in case an Indian War breaks out . . . the back Inhabitants properly supported would form an effectual Barrier against the Indian depredations."[4]

This evaluation was not displeasing to the Continental government in the closing months of 1776. A regional commander, which both Morgan and the commissioners urged as a necessary measure, could certainly be sent to Fort Pitt. Troops were another matter: in late 1776 and early 1777 Congress was drawing men from the transmontane settlements to increase the ranks of Washington's army on the seaboard. Since neither the Indian agent at Pittsburgh nor the congressional emissaries made any forceful argument to reverse that policy, the Continental government did not feel compelled to send precious resources west.

Beginning in 1777 the situation changed, and there were arguments that Continental involvement in the Pittsburgh country must be increased. Hopes that the Indian nations to the west and north would remain neutral began to dissolve in 1777. In that year British officers at Detroit

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began actively to encourage the Indians to attack the Ohio Valley settlements. The St. Lawrence River-Great Lakes route, crucial for the support of posts such as Detroit and to supply western Indians with ammunition and other goods, had been threatened by the Americans early in the war but was now relatively secure. Officers at Detroit also received orders to encourage Indian raiding to divert American attention and resources away from British campaigns in the east. For their part the American states could offer little to entice the Indian nations to ally with them rather than with Britain. White settlers continued to move into Kentucky, and even attempted to settle northwest of the Ohio River, during the war. There were also instances in which unarmed Indians were murdered by American militiamen. Nor could the United States demonstrate any consistent military superiority in the region or supply its allies with much in the way of gifts, ammunition, or military aid to resist the pressures of nations allied with Britain. In 1776 George Morgan hoped the Shawnee and the Seneca would remain neutral and help control such militants as the Mingo; by 1778 these powerful nations were for the most part actively hostile toward the United States. The neutrality of most of the Delaware was longer-lived, but by 1781 most warriors of that nation decided that it was in their best interest to abandon neutrality and join the war against the American settlements.

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In these nations, along with the Wyandot and other British-allied groups farther to the west and northwest, the white occupants of the upper Ohio Valley faced some very powerful and aggressive enemies, and there was no year during the course of the Revolutionary War in which the region's settlements were free from raids by enemy Indians. Respites from attack, brought by winter weather or American campaigns which put the Indians on the defensive, were temporary. Attacks varied in scale from raids by small parties against isolated families to major efforts, sometimes involving a hundred or more warriors, against targets such as the post at Wheeling, which was attacked more than once by enemy raiders. Raiding was heaviest on the flanks of settlement: in the Westmoreland County settlements north of the Pennsylvania road toward the Conemaugh River and Kittanning, a sector vulnerable to attack by Seneca and Munsee from the north; and in the country west of the Monongahela, open to raiding parties from the west and northwest. Within these zones there were times when entire neighborhoods of settlers abandoned their farms for safety elsewhere or moved into local blockhouses and stockades for protection against repeated attacks. Yet Indian warriors were mobile enough to strike areas less overtly vulnerable to attacks, as when parts of Bedford County to the east of Westmoreland were struck in 1779. Such was the condition of seemingly unrelenting pressure by the enemy with which

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inhabitants of the region had to deal through the course of the war.[5]

As the neutrality of the powerful Indian nations on the region's flanks dissolved after 1776, so too did the notion that offensive campaigns would be unnecessary and unsound in terms of relations with the Indians. Detroit quickly came to dominate American strategic considerations in the region, and its conquest, or any major expedition against enemy Indians, required numbers of men and substantial recourses. It also became evident as time passed that the commissioners' reports of 1776 were much too optimistic. For a variety of reasons it became less and less certain that the supposed population of "hardy experienced Woodsmen" was sufficient to protect that portion of the frontier. Yet despite all these changes, the ability of Congress and the states to send aid across the mountains did not increase as the war dragged on in the east. Protection of the area remained largely a matter of what the inhabitants could do for themselves under the direction of a Continental army commander at Pittsburgh and with some Continental and state assistance.

Beginning with General Edward Hand, who came to the forks of the Ohio in the spring of 1777, a succession of Continental officers commanded the region's military affairs. These commanders all learned that military problems of strategy, troop deployment, and supply were also political problems in the context of the upper Ohio Valley.

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None had as many men or supplies as he would have liked in order to carry out effective campaigns against the British at Detroit and Niagara or their Indian allies. Each became frustrated by the problems of managing the factious and decentralized region's self-defense and of drawing on local resources for men, horses, and provisions. None of them felt particularly successful about his tenure in command at Pittsburgh; disillusionment, in some instances even bitterness, was a common product of their service at Fort Pitt.

General Hand, Irish-born, practiced medicine in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, at the beginning of the Revolution but had been at Fort Pitt before the war as a surgeon's mate in the British army and owned a farm nearby. In keeping with the recommendations to Congress in 1776, he brought some military stores but no troops west with him in 1777. He was expected to draw entirely from the militia or local volunteers for manpower, along with some Continental troops in the district who had been raised specifically for the protection of the area. During the autumn of 1777, the heavy enemy raiding of that year inciting him to depart from a strictly defensive strategy, Hand attempted to gather two thousand men for a campaign against the Wyandot towns along the Sandusky River. The expedition was cancelled when no more than eight hundred men, including the few regulars stationed at garrisons on the Ohio, could be gathered in time. "I was much deceived in the real Strength and Spirit of this part of the Country," the

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general confided to his wife. Before the year was out Hand asked for a transfer back to "the Grand Army": "I had rather resign my Office than continue here in Command of Militia."[6] During the winter Hand led several hundred militia against a supposed British supply magazine on Lake Erie, but weather prevented the group from reaching the goal. Hand had to content himself with authorizing the embodiment of militia to guard the frontiers.

The settlements suffered enough from enemy Indians' attacks in 1777 to induce Congress to send a new group of commissioners to Pittsburgh. These envoys were to view the situation and confer with General Hand about what course of action would best protect the district. In the spring of 1778 commissioners George Clymer and Sampson Mathews sent Congress an assessment of the frontiers' strength very different from that of the prior set of commissioners. Clymer and Mathews considered the area to be in a "weak and disjointed state"; the residents were more likely to flee than to withstand heavy raiding against their settlements. The commissioners recommended the conquest of Detroit as the best means of relieving the distress of the area, but believed that three thousand militiamen from Pennsylvania and Virginia could be found to do the job supported by only a few hundred regulars.[7] The Continental government agreed that Detroit must be taken and that enough regular troops must be sent west to stiffen the resolve of the local inhabitants and prevent their disaffection from the

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American cause. It was also evident by this time that Pennsylvania's treasury was so depleted that any aid to its western settlements would have to come from another source.[8]

On the basis of these new evaluations Hand was replaced in 1778 by General Lachlan McIntosh of Georgia, who was to command an expedition against Detroit. The 8th Pennsylvania Regiment (Aeneas Mackay's regiment) and the 13th Virginia Regiment, also recruited on the frontier, were sent back to the Ohio Valley from the east, but other expected reinforcements for the western sector could not be spared, and in July Congress decided to defer the Detroit campaign. McIntosh was ordered to use his men against the towns of hostile Indians instead. In an effort to establish advanced posts in the Indian country, McIntosh built Fort McIntosh at the mouth of the Beaver River down the Ohio from Pittsburgh, and Fort Laurens on the Tuscarawas River in Delaware territory. McIntosh, whose prior military experience was perhaps too limited to prepare him for the problems he faced in the west, exceeded the logistical resources at his command, and the discipline of both militia and regulars cracked from the shortage of provisions. Fort Laurens, whose garrison came close to starving, accomplished nothing. By early 1779 McIntosh's second-in-command reported that the general "is unfortunate enough to be almost universally Hated by every man in this department both Civil and Military." McIntosh blamed his troubles on the quartermasters and commissaries responsible

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for securing him provisions and transport. They in turn decried his "ignorant, absurd, and contradictory Conduct and Orders."[9]

It was during McIntosh's command that the American commander-in-chief first took serious notice of the western country in his strategic thinking. George Washington was not closely involved in military planning for the Ohio Valley in the early part of the war, when the emphasis was on Indian diplomacy and local defense and decisions were made by the boards and committees of Congress. The expedition to Detroit that McIntosh was originally to have led was formulated by Congress without prior consultation with Washington; the commander-in-chief was at first ignorant of the details of the plan and pronounced himself "in a great measure a stranger to the expedition against Detroit."[10] Washington was asked to select an available officer as the expedition's commander, however, and had to part with some Continental troops he could ill spare. After considering Congress' plans for Detroit and Niagara he agreed that taking Detroit was probably the only truly effective means of disrupting Britain's use of Indian allies against the Ohio Valley settlements. Beginning in 1778 Washington kept in close touch with the Continental commander at Fort Pitt regarding the possibility of a campaign against Detroit, gave a good bit of consideration to the course of action the western commanders should pursue, and thought about coordinating expeditions in the

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region with other campaigns. The few hundred Continentals he released for western service in 1778 were all that could be spared, however. Washington wanted to see Detroit taken, but refused to chance a campaign against it unless the attacking force was strong enough to be sure of success. So Washington encouraged McIntosh's successors to move if they could against enemy Indians and to gather intelligence for a possible strike against Detroit or Niagara, but any operation in the region would still have to depend heavily on what local resources and manpower the commanders could find.[11]

When McIntosh left Fort Pitt in the spring of 1779 Washington gave command to Colonel Daniel Brodhead, the ranking officer of the Pennsylvania regiment stationed in the Ohio Valley. Brodhead grew up in a frontier district of Bucks County and understood the foundations of relations with Indians, and the fundamentals of war against them, as well as or probably better than any of the other Continental commanders at Fort Pitt. He led campaigns against the Seneca and the Delaware and used his limited men and resources to screen the frontiers with patrols of regulars and mobile parties of Indian and white "partizans." Yet as John Campbell noted after McIntosh's recall, "the West Country is under a bad Character of Quarreling with the Generals sent to command them." By impressing provisions, antagonizing some powerful local citizens, and disputing with his subordinate officers over his right to command,

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Brodhead ensured that his command of the western region was marked by even more widespread ill feeling than McIntosh's had been. After less than a year in command Brodhead declared that the problems of Indian affairs, relations with "a rascally set of Inhabitants at this place," and supply procurement were together "sufficient to destroy the patience of Job."[12]

Raids against the settlements by British-allied Indians did not cease with Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown, and a Continental army garrison was maintained at Pittsburgh until 1783. General William Irvine, who took command of Fort Pitt after Brodhead's recall late in 1781, found things in "so wretched a state" that he was despondent from the very beginning of his service at Fort Pitt. The fort itself was in such bad condition that Irvine suggested, as others had many years earlier, that the post be abandoned and a new one built at the site near the mouth of Chartiers Creek. The suggestion was vetoed by General Washington and the secretary of war. Irvine also found the post's troops, who had endured tremendous shortages of provisions and pay, grossly lacking in discipline and of a "Mutinous disposition." "I never saw Troops cut so truly a deplorable, and at the same time despicable a figure," he informed the commander-in-chief.[13] Irvine repaired the fort, pulled the garrison into better shape, did what he could to answer the appeals for protection that streamed in to him, and stayed clear of a resurgent boundary controversy

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and other bitter disputes that plagued the area during the early 1780s. "I hear nothing of what is going on in any other part of the world," he wrote his wife; "there never was nor I hope will there ever be such a wretched Villainous place as this -- I do not remember any part of my life spent to so little purpose as at present, and exceeding disagreeably to myself -- perhaps it may turn out to be well spent -- but I can not yet conceive how."[14]

Much of the frustration faced by all of the regional commanders at Pittsburgh was inherent in the fact that they represented a centralized decision-making process in a territory in which there was no longstanding political authority, where independence of action often marked political behavior, dispute over political decisions was not uncommon, and local power was widely diffused. Those people managing the defense of the region also had to confront a variety of choices: whether to consolidate limited resources to make an offensive strike against the enemy, for example, or keep the men in garrisons to protect the settlements; where to place forts; how best to obtain food, ammunition, horses and men. The situation could be both puzzling and distressing to regular army officers. Military command was founded on discipline, obedience, and a clear hierarchy of power. Decisions made by a ranking officer were, in theory at least, implemented by a structured system of command. In the Pittsburgh region, on the other hand, the Continental commanders dealt primarily with

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a civilian population, not an army. Moreover, it was a population in which individuals and interest groups, as their experience before the war had demonstrated, were very cautious about yielding up any of their power. Then too, as the army commanders quickly learned, the problem of defense was one of fundamental importance to the inhabitants of the upper Ohio Valley.

Since the number of Continental regulars in the region was always limited, militia and locally raised volunteers were to provide the lion's share of the manpower needed to protect the trans-Appalachian area during the war. Control of these forces frequently put the commanders at Fort Pitt in conflict with local and state authorities. "The authority for drawing out the neighbouring militia on an emergency must come from the States to which they belong," Washington reminded Brodhead in 1779. Virginia gave General Hand the power to call on certain counties' militia, but retained ultimate control and once countermanded what appeared to be a wasted draft of militia by McIntosh.[15] The Pennsylvania government also ordered county officials to comply with the commandants' requests for militia, but had to refresh the order several times when county lieutenants needed reminding. Pennsylvania in fact gave the regional commander only limited powers to call on special ranger companies raised for the defense of Westmoreland County.[16] A fundamental problem, one that British and provincial officials bickered over during the

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colonial wars with France, was the question of what a militia should be -- a highly localized and almost exclusively defensive force, or a readily available force to be employed as a wing of the regular army in campaigning and other operations. Continental officials soon came to prefer volunteers to militia, since the former usually began a campaign or term of service with more enthusiasm than drafted militia and could be enrolled for longer periods than the militiamen's short stints.[17]

For the drafting of militia or the enlisting of volunteers the commanding officer had to rely on local officers, a county lieutenant in charge of the county's militia, his sublieutenants, and the field and company officers of the militia battalions. When Hand arrived at Fort Pitt he found he had to deal with the officers of one Pennsylvania county (Westmoreland) and the three counties formed from the West Augusta district late in 1776 (Monongalia, Yohogania, and Ohio) to call up men and supplies from the area west of Laurel Hill.[18] None of these counties held its courts at Pittsburgh, and only one of the county seats was closer than thirty miles from the military headquarters. These were only the closest counties. To mount expeditions and to protect the settlements under his responsibility, which extended well to the south along the Virginia frontier, General Hand had occasion to call for militia from Bedford County, Pennsylvania, and from over a

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

Map 6.

Virginia Counties,
1777 to Resolution of Boundary Dispute

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

Map 7.

Westmoreland County (Penna.),
before Resolution of Boundary Dispute

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dozen Virginia counties besides the three closest to Pittsburgh.[19]

The commandant's task was to superintend the military affairs of the region as a whole, to draw on the entire area for resources and deploy force as necessary for its protection. The region was not highly centralized and decisions affecting defense, a matter of very immediate concern to the inhabitants, were subject to a number of local pressures. Sectors vulnerable to attack, which due to the mobility of enemy raiding parties included a very large portion of the region, were reluctant to furnish men or provisions for general regional defense or campaigning. Many of the exposed clusters of settlement petitioned the regional commander for aid: "I am heartily tired and almost worn down with people coming dayly for protection and assistance," Irvine wrote.[20] Defense for these people was not a distinct arena in which a centralized government authority could presume to make all decisions. It was instead an integral and very important aspect of life involving the protection of life and property. It was very difficult to impose a plan of action on such constituents if it did not coincide with their own notions of what needed to be done.

One of McIntosh's transport and supply officials lamented that the general had alienated the region's militia officers, "which I am very sorry for as theay are the only Peopel that we have to Depend upon to Do any thing

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in this Department."[21] Only by working through the diffused local decision-making system could the regional commanders accomplish anything at all. Local defense decisions were often made by conferences, sometimes called "councils of war," of the county's militia officers and "Other Respectable Inhabitants." These were the groups that determined how best to call up the required number of militiamen, took action against the recalcitrant, decided where little pockets of men should be stationed to protect the county's settlements, and often initiated plans for volunteer expeditions against the enemy.[22] The independence of these groups could provide considerable frustration for the Pittsburgh commandants. "Perhaps you conceive that the resolves made by you and the field Officers of your County are Sufficient and your Condescension to consult with me on the Military Operations in this Dept., a Compliment," an angry Daniel Brodhead fumed to Colonel John Evans of Monongalia County. "As the Commanding Officer of this Department," Brodhead maintained on another occasion, "I conceive it to be my right to be consulted on every military plan which can be conceived and that my assent is necessary to the execution." To coordinate their activities with local officers, and simply to learn what was going on out in the counties, the regional commanders occasionally called their own conferences at Fort Pitt to consult the county lieutenants and other officers. General Hand also made the effort to confer with local leaders on

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their home turf -- "the Weather is very warm Yet I am Obliged to travel into the Country, To Stir up the People," he wrote in August 1777.[23]

None of the Continental officers commanding at Pittsburgh would have disagreed with George Washington's description of the militia as "exceedingly capricious."[24] During the summer of 1777 numerous little parties of militia drew rations but never reported for duty anywhere; one band of rangers "went Down the River Bosting that the[y] were Not Under Any Directions but their Own . . . [and] saying if the[y] han'd Liberty to Range where the[y] pleas'd the[y] would go home." More than one officer used men on the public payroll to work his own farm or to protect his private property.[25] On several occasions county officers confessed that they were simply unable to get the militia into service or raise any volunteers. Colonel Daniel McFarland reported to Hand from Monongalia County early in 1778: "Would to God, I Could Inform Your Honour of any thing Relating this County but Disobedience and the greatest Contempt of all Authority."[26] Sometimes a quarrel among the officers of a county exacerbated the problem. At times militiamen agreed to serve, but only in their own neighborhoods to protect their homes and the immediate settlements.[27]

Even while in active service local troops, both militiamen and volunteers, could prove impossible to command. General Hand learned this fact when militia at

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Wheeling "absolutely refused" to obey his orders to return some boats to Fort Pitt. Some weeks later the Westmoreland County militia accompanying Hand on his aborted raid to the Cuyahoga River were "so impetuous" that they attacked parties of Indian women and children on the return march. In the spring of 1781 Brodhead led a mixed force of regulars and volunteers against Coshocton and other Delaware towns on the Muskingum. After striking the towns Brodhead wanted to cross the river and pursue a party of warriors -- "but when I proposed my plan to the Volunteers, I found they conceived they had done enough, and were determined to return."[28]

Persuasion, good will, and the building of trust could partially overcome the regional commandants' inability to exact total obedience from the area's inhabitants. The Continental officers used exhortation -- appeals to pride and patriotism, assurances that the interests of the army and of the populace closely coincided -- to try to generate enthusiasm and participation.[29] Hand and Brodhead in particular also acknowledged a degree of local autonomy, which allowed them to work within the diffused local decision-making process rather than against it. They did this by applauding local initiative and by striving to overcome the counties' mutual jealousy. Hand also gave the local citizenry the power to decide where small defensive garrisons should be located; Brodhead yielded much of his control over the region's ammunition

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supply by distributing it to the local militia so they would not have to beg it of him during an emergency. When they sent patrols of Continental soldiers out to protect harvesters or to intercept raiding parties, both officers ordered their men to consult with the county lieutenants for advice regarding their deployment.[30] Neither Brodhead nor Hand was always on the best of terms with county officials or content with their performance. Nevertheless, Hand was willing to acknowledge the limits of his own authority over the militia, and both he and Brodhead supported the county lieutenants against the interference or faulty cooperation of other locals.[31] Such actions were not lost on county officials. Thus when relations between them were amicable the commander and the local militia officers had a kind of alliance. Under those circumstances county officers worked very hard to get the commandant the men and materiel he needed.

In return the commanders did what they could to use Continental resources to protect the settlements. Militia called into service to guard the frontiers might receive Continental pay and rations. Commanders strove to get more arms and equipment as well. "If their is not a possibility of obtaining Lead," a sarcastic Edward Hand wrote the Board of War in 1778, "I wish we might be indulged with a Cargo of Bows and arrows, as our People are not yet expert enough at the sling to kill Indians with Pebbles."[32] There was only so much the commanders could do, however, given the

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condition of state and Continental treasuries and the need for men and resources elsewhere. Still, Hand and his successors all believed that a greater investment by Congress would improve the situation on the frontier. Stronger military operations, Daniel Brodhead maintained, would allow the local people to concentrate on raising the food so essential for troops to operate and for the settlers themselves to hold their ground.[33]

General William Irvine, who succeeded Brodhead at Fort Pitt in 1781, understood the importance of cordial relations with county militia officers, but he was cynical about what could be expected from the population even under the best conditions. For example, when there was local enthusiasm for offensive expeditions, Irvine said that it was "all talk." Bewildered, Irvine carefully avoided alienating the region's militia officers, but confided to his wife: "It is the most unaccountable country and Inhabitants in the World."[34] None of Irvine's predecessors was much better at solving the puzzle of the western district. Neither side of the partnership could really satisfy the other by giving them what they wanted. Local circumstances fouled any attempt to consistently mobilize the populace for its own defense for the duration of the war, and the centralized command was unable to provide all the settlements with the sort of effortless and effective protection they wanted. Higher enlistment bounties and prompt, non-depreciating pay might have attracted the

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number of volunteers necessary to overcome the manpower problem, but regional defense still would not have been free of tension even if state and Continental governments could have found the money to make service more attractive.

For many of the region's citizens there was little in the wartime experience to give them a positive or enthusiastic view of government above the local level. Inhabitants of the upper Ohio Valley during the Revolution saw state and national governments that were chronically short of resources, demanding, and frequently unable to carry out plans intended to hurt the enemy. Conversely, a ready response to centralized authority brought only limited reward. The morale of those men who did work hard to prepare for campaigns, only to have the operations called off when their fellows made too few men or supplies available in time, could only suffer. Even when expeditions materialized, they produced mostly scalps and plunder and gave the participants little of the kind of honor or identification with army and government that regular military service might provide. By the same token local requirements for defense always held a kind of primacy over any concerns for the national fight against the British east of the mountains. During the Revolution the inhabitants west of Laurel Hill continued the distinctive brand of political education that they had begun before the war.

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The patterns of local political behavior that formed in the Pittsburgh region before the Revolution continued through the war: these included a tendency toward competition and contentiousness, the development of personal and factional friction over many issues, and continuing dispute over governmental authority in the form of the jurisdictional contest between Virginia and Pennsylvania. The Revolutionary War also brought new problems to the region. Simply dealing with these problems would have been fairly difficult; the conflict that was often generated by the question of who would solve them, and by what means, drew a substantial portion of the local leadership's energies during the war years. The combination of this internal tension with the strain of external attack gave the region a particularly distraught character by the early 1780s.

With the war came changes in leadership and county-level power. For example, splitting the West Augusta district into the three counties of Ohio, Monongalia, and Yohogania diffused Virginia's political power in the region and drew it away from Pittsburgh since none of the new counties held courts there. Yet the split also increased by roughly threefold the number of offices that were available through Virginia authority at the county level. The former West Augusta justices of the peace were well represented in the new counties' commissions: fourteen West Augusta magistrates found places on the original Ohio or

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Yohogania commissions, and another was later recommended as an addition to the Yohogania County court. Thus three quarters of the West Augusta court of 1776 continued to serve as Virginia justices of the peace, particularly in Yohogania County.[35] These men had all entered Virginia's county service in the Pittsburgh territory as activists interested in utilizing county government to effect local power. The new counties encountered some problems -- Yohogania County, the judicial successor to West Augusta, had trouble obtaining the district's records from the Augusta clerks, for example, and due to the dispute with Pennsylvania the county almost could not find a justice willing to serve as sheriff.[36] However, these difficulties did nothing to prevent the smooth integration of most of the West Augusta magistrates into the new county governments along with a number of newcomers to the Virginia courts in the area. And in the 1780s, as the boundary issue was finally resolved, several of these men survived politically and attained important county positions in the local Pennsylvania governments.

A smaller proportion -- about half -- of the Westmoreland County magistracy of 1776 continued to hold county office after that year, and not all of these were in offices comparable to the justiceships they had held before the Revolution. Early in the war the Pennsylvania court lost some of its most active leaders through death (Mackay and Wilson) or entry into the Continental service

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(St. Clair). Oliver Miller, who had been appointed a Westmoreland justice of the peace but was always more attached to the Virginia faction in 1775 and 1776, joined the new Yohogania County court in December 1776.[37] Others on the Pennsylvania side may have had less stomach for the contested jurisdictional situation than the activists of the West Augusta group, and proprietary patronage, the primary adhesive of the Westmoreland group before the war, was gone by 1776. Too, county-level power on the Pennsylvania side had always been more diffused than in Virginia counties, where a single commission of justices performed all judicial and administrative functions for the county and even selected a sheriff from their group. Although Pennsylvania magistrates had an administrative role, before the war many important functions of county government were performed by a sheriff, county commissioners, and tax assessors who were elected by the county's freemen and were not members of the county court. The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 diffused county power among even more offices: under the new scheme two local justices of the peace were elected in each township, while the Supreme Executive Council appointed the county's judges of common pleas.[38]

The new constitution was also an issue of sharp dispute within state politics after 1776, and the conflict between the new government's adherents and its opponents had an effect on local politics in the western reaches of

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the state. In 1777 Michael Huffnagle, who was Arthur St. Clair's deputy as prothonotary of Westmoreland County and held the office after St. Clair entered the Continental army, apparently hid the court records in his possession outside the county to keep them from his successor under the new constitution.[39] John Carnahan, also of Westmoreland County, protested to General Hand that "we have a set of low malicious scoundrels here, who have taken the lead of public affairs" to the exclusion of "men of virtue and integrity." Among the upstarts it was "common to rank those with tories that they think stand in their way of advancement."[40]

There were, however, many other sources of dispute among the region's political leaders, especially as the war with Britain brought new strains to the local situation, and local power was already subject to open contention before 1776. The friction brought by the new constitution was only one factor within local politics. Quarrels such as those reported by Carnahan, along with mutual accusations of impropriety in office, continued among local Pennsylvania militia and civil officers for the rest of the war. "The fact is Commission Hunters abound amongst us so much that unless you have armfulls to throw to each of us you will never content us all," a cynical local officer reported to the state's president in 1781.[41] Nor were such disputes between local officers over rank, precedence, authority, or other matters confined to the Pennsylvanians;

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Virginia's county officers demonstrated many of the same traits.[42] Local officials for both states showed that they were not afraid to confront one another in this fashion. In neither county system did the possession of an office immunize the holder from attacks by his peers or guarantee that others would respect the officer's authority to act. As a result people in official positions came into conflict at times, and these contests not infrequently began as, or quickly became, personal quarrels with a vindictive edge.

The Pennsylvania-Virginia jurisdictional dispute remained also. With the departure of Connolly, who had been so important in shaping the conflict during 1774 and much of 1775, the dispute lost much of its focus on Pittsburgh as a center of contention, along with the tendency toward open confrontation that so marked the quarrel before 1776. Yet even without Connolly and Dunmore there were men in the Virginia government who were loathe to see the commonwealth lose any transmontane lands and advocated a tough response to Pennsylvania's charter claims.[43] On the local level, moreover, the dispute never ceased to be a matter of concern. The territory to the south and southeast of the Ohio forks -- including some of the country to the northeast of the Youghiogheny and the area from that river westward across the Monongahela -- was the zone in which people of Pennsylvania and Virginia origin were most intermixed. In that sector officers from the two states competed to enroll militiamen, to enlist volunteers for

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expeditions, and to recruit soldiers for the states' Continental regiments. Each set of officers found its efforts hindered by people claiming allegiance to the other state, and resentments ran high.[44] There were other indications of friction as well; in particular John Campbell, called "Lord North of the Western Department" by an opponent, continued to assert Virginia authority against the Pennsylvanians during the early years of the war.[45]

Continental authorities understood how volatile the matter still was. Before Edward Hand's appointment as commander at Fort Pitt, Indian agent Morgan stressed that in order for him to be effective the commandant "should be utterly free from all Prejudices or Interest in the Disputes between Pennsylvania and Virginia." This official neutrality was reiterated by the regional commanders and by General Washington. To discourage open conflict Hand let it be known that he would consider anyone inclined to "abet or in any wise foment" the dispute as "dangerous and disaffected to the American Cause."[46]

By about 1780, and for the next several years, society in the upper Ohio Valley showed the effects of these disputes and other strains. During the early 1780s there was not only a lack of consensus but also a vein of uncertainty, even despondency, marking the area: the social fabric did not disintegrate, but it was considerably stretched during that time. This situation resulted both from the factious internal climate of the society and from

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the stress induced by the continued attrition of Indian war. "Our country is worse depopulated than ever it has been," was the report from Westmoreland County in the spring of 1780. Three years later the situation was no more reassuring; the southwest corner of Pennsylvania was reported then to be in the "utmost consternation" and approaching a "truly deplorable" situation.[47]

The last half of the war was punctuated by a distinct series of events in the upper Ohio settlements: all but a fragment of the Delaware nation finally committed themselves to opposing the Americans along with the region's other Indians; George Rogers Clark encountered great difficulties, and engendered much dispute, in his efforts to launch a western campaign from the region in 1781; one hundred men from the area were ambushed on their way down the Ohio to join Clark, and the entire group killed or captured; a number of peaceful Indians were attacked and killed by whites in what a shocked General Irvine called a "fit of phrensy" early in 1782; soon thereafter a volunteer campaign to the Sandusky River ended in a rout and its leader, William Crawford, died of his captors' tortures; and in July 1782 Hannastown, still the Westmoreland County seat, was almost completely destroyed by enemy Indians.[48] Running throughout the period was a newly invigorated boundary dispute that alienated much of the population, rendered government almost totally ineffective in a portion of the territory, and gave birth to a new

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

Map 8.
Revolutionary War

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series of plans for new states in the region. These factors combined to give the Pittsburgh region the factious, melancholy aspect it bore during the early 1780s.

The command of Colonel Daniel Brodhead at Fort Pitt from the spring of 1779 until the autumn of 1781 showed the effects of some of these strains on the region. Brodhead was in fact expelled from command by the actions of irate local inhabitants. A Pittsburgh resident described the scene there in September 1781 after Brodhead received final orders to leave the post: "In the evening the Rabble met upon Grant's hill to have a rejoicing and bon-fire -- they made his [Brodhead's] representation in straw to burn -- but upon Mr. Irvine's coming up and a council being held it was determined to be put off."[49] Despite strict notions of his own authority to command, Brodhead understood the requirements for productive relations with the local population and made a sincere effort to defend the settlements. For example, he tangled with Westmoreland's county lieutenant over the control of two ranging companies raised at Continental expense for the county's protection, but he maintained that his working relationship with the local officer was not impaired by the dispute.[50] Brodhead's removal came about primarily because he put himself on the wrong side of influential people who then generated complaints capable of removing him from Fort Pitt. His tenure as commander was frustrating in several respects and

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reflected some of the internal tensions that marked the area's wartime experience.

In the fall of 1780 Brodhead came to the necessity of using companies of soldiers to extract provisions from farmers in order to feed his troops. Provisioning the troops on the frontiers was one of the greatest problems confronting the commanders at Fort Pitt throughout the Revolution. Failures of transport and supply were the ruination of McIntosh's advance into the Delaware territory in 1778 and 1779, and brought a quick end to that officer's service in the west. By the second half of the 1770s the country lying between the Appalachian ranges and the upper Ohio was certainly capable of the production of food supplies: there were farms raising livestock and grain, and a growing number of mills to grind meal and flour. Yet it was a large territory "thinly inhabited with new Settlers" living on "new improved Farms, widely scatter'd."[51] Low water in the millstreams, a lack of the transport or management needed to consolidate the supplies, and the flight of people from their farmsteads all worked at times to interrupt or diminish the production or the gathering of food supplies. Waste, profiteering, conflict among commissary and quartermaster officers, and the increase in prices during periods of heavy demand all contributed to the problem of feeding the troops; as the war progressed the depreciation of Continental and state currencies and the wholesale distrust of public credit made

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it almost impossible to secure provisions for the public's use even when surpluses were available in the region.[52]

During 1780 flour was short due to low water, and parasites killed most of the region's swine, but Brodhead believed that supplies were obtainable if only cash could be made available to buy them. During the summer the situation grew critical and the Pittsburgh garrison showed dangerous signs of discontent as their daily supply of food continued to be both erratic and inadequate.[53] There was some precedent for impressment, since both Hand and McIntosh had used it to a limited degree to obtain food and blankets.[54] What Brodhead required was of a larger scale, and he considered it to be a last resort. By autumn General Washington and the executives of both Pennsylvania and Virginia had assured Brodhead that there was no money immediately available to purchase foodstuffs for his men, and they authorized him to use impressment as a temporary measure.[55]

Brodhead sent companies out to secure grain and livestock, with orders that only surpluses above the needs of the farmers' families be taken, that receipts be issued, and that the troops not be allowed to use the situation as a license to plunder. Believing that his authority to impress derived from an order of the Executive Council of Pennsylvania, the colonel at first ordered his officers "to consider these Instructions as confined to those Inhabitants only who have uniformly considered themselves as

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Citizens of Pensylva.," and not "to such as in the unsettled state of the boundaries have acknowledged another Jurisdiction." The political problems inherent in such a policy, plus the need to scour as wide an area as possible, soon induced Brodhead to order that this portion of his instructions "be disregarded for expediency sake," and he dispatched parties as far south as Tygart Valley, well below the Mason-Dixon survey line.[56]

Scorning the government's promises of payment, many inhabitants secreted their cattle in the mountains as Brodhead's men approached. The impressing parties were threatened with talk both of legal action and of armed resistance. "It is but too likely that the prosecution of Compulsary means, will be productive of Bloodshed amongst our own Citizens," the commandant reported. Another observer wrote that the measure "has created a general disgust among the Inhabitants."[57] Brodhead recalled the parties and tried other means to secure a winter's supply of meat, such as having his men fish and hunt, but these measures did not furnish enough meat to free the troops at Fort Pitt from their hand-to-mouth existence.[58]

Nor did the situation ease during 1781 as Brodhead hoped it would. Paper money and the public's credit remained worthless, a dry summer again hindered the grinding of grain, and from early in the year Brodhead had to compete with Virginia commissaries who were gathering provisions for George Rogers Clark's expedition down the Ohio.

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More than a tinge of ill feeling colored the relations between the two officers while Clark was in the area. Clark was frustrated by obstacles and failures in his efforts to draw men and supplies from the weary and divided region, and in the end was unable to march against Detroit; Brodhead, hardly able to keep his garrison fed and clothed, resented the Virginian's competition for the area's resources and wished that he, not Clark, could be the one to take the fight to the enemy. The entire region was fractured by the question of whether to support Clark's campaign or not, and Brodhead's position on the matter could not serve him well with Clark's (and Virginia's) supporters as opposition to his command at Fort Pitt mounted.[59]

The active local opposition that finally cost Brodhead his position at Fort Pitt actually started during his first year of command after McIntosh's departure. It began due to his regulation of the garrison and town at Pittsburgh, a matter that brought him into conflict with a group of influential residents who led the effort to have him removed. During the Revolution Pittsburth reverted to a condition similar to what had existed in the 1760s: there was little civil government in evidence, and the commandants assumed a policing role to control the garrison itself and even to enforce civil laws when prompted to do so by citizens' complaints. Justices of the peace were to be elected in each Pennsylvania township, but political

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squabbling of one sort or another rendered this measure ineffective in Pittsburgh during the war. "It may justly be reckoned a strange Circumstance, indeed," wrote a resident in 1784, "that since the beginning of our Revolution the Town and Township of Pittsburgh have been untill very lately, unfortunately deprived of the services of the Civil Magistracy -- and I may say with propriety, that we yet remain almost intire Strangers to the advantages Commonly derived from that very essential part of Government."[60] In the fall of 1779 Brodhead, acting on his authority as commandant, evicted Edward Ward and Thomas Smallman, both of them influential Pittsburghers from the early years, from a house near the fort, and quartered troops there. The colonel believed that for the best defense of his post he could control all buildings within artillery range of the fort. Ward's claim to the property, which included the British army's old orchard, garden, and other land adjacent to the fort, rested ultimately on military permits that other people had obtained from the last British commandant; although such a claim might be vulnerable to legal challenge, Ward had entered the documents with the West Augusta court in 1775 to validate his "title," and he now began legal action against Brodhead in the county courts.[61]

The matter continued unresolved until 1781. Then Alexander Fowler, a former British officer living at Pittsburgh and acting as a government auditor, lodged

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charges against Brodhead and the assistant deputy quartermaster general at Fort Pitt, David Duncan. Fowler's own motives are unclear, but it was not the first controversy of the sort in which he had become involved.[62] Fowler, Ward, Smallman, and some others organized petitions against Duncan and Brodhead, charging them with "uncommon Stretches of power" and the instigation of "military Tyranny." Over four hundred names appeared on the larger of two petitions sent to the Pennsylvania government. The charges against Brodhead and Duncan consisted primarily of an attack on military authority cast in very large rhetorical terms, along with some indications of malfeasance and misuse of office that are vague and difficult to evaluate. It would seem that both Duncan and Brodhead had alienated locally influential men who now joined the effort to displace them. Eventually a court martial acquitted Brodhead of all charges, but the accusations and the turmoil were enough to bring about his recall from Pittsburgh. Brodhead compounded the problem by refusing to give the command over to the next ranking officer while evidence in the case was gathered. This caused a fissure among the garrison's officers and in effect created two competing hierarchies of command at Fort Pitt until Washington gave Brodhead unmistakable orders to step down.[63] Legal suits against Brodhead, as well as forgery indictments against Duncan and his clerk, continued for some time. Meanwhile Ward and Fowler were elected as Pennsylvania magistrates for the

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town of Pittsburgh in summer 1782. The circumstances of the election were so irregular that some of the people who had backed their campaign against Brodhead now were among those who petitioned to overturn the election results.[64]

Brodhead was not the only Continental commander to feel the wrath of local inhabitants. Even those who petitioned against him confessed that a "partial Clamour" had arisen during each of his predecessors' tenures at Fort Pitt.[65] Yet not even McIntosh, whose period of command ended in an acrimonious exchange of accusations among military officers, commissaries, and quartermasters, could elicit the sort of discontent focused on Brodhead by his accusers in 1781. The explanation lies partly in Brodhead's own stubbornness, but also in the fact that his actions tapped at several points the sources of the tension that marked society in the region during these years.

It was during Brodhead's command also that efforts to resolve the Virginia-Pennsylvania boundary conflict brought new friction to that dispute. Late in 1778 Virginia showed a willingness to give up some western land claims as a compromise to speed the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, and by 1779 a majority of the state's legislators, along with Thomas Jefferson as the state's new governor, wanted to see Virginia's situation regarding western lands straightened out. As a result, in 1779 Virginia denied the Indiana Company's claim to lands by way of its grant from the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix

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in 1768, provided for commissioners to resolve existing land claims in the western parts of the state, established a land office for new claims, and appointed commissioners to meet with a panel from Pennsylvania and resolve the boundary issue. Each state's boundary commissioners proved amenable to compromise in order to reach some agreement on the matter, and their negotiations yielded an expedient solution to the issue in 1779. The Mason-Dixon survey line was to be extended to a point five degrees of longitude west of the Delaware River, then a straight meridian would run north to form Pennsylvania's western border. Before ratifying the agreement the Virginia legislature added stipulations providing that inhabitants of the disputed zone should not pay taxes to Pennsylvania before the end of 1780, that they never would be liable to pay arrearages of taxes previously levied by Pennsylvania, and that land claims entered with Virginia but now falling within Pennsylvania should be honored if they antedated any conflicting claims made under Pennsylvania authority. In accordance with its decision to clarify all of its transmontane land entries, including those of people in the contested zone who might be covered by the last of these conditions, Virginia sent special land commissioners over the mountains. This step caused some consternation among Pennsylvania officials who viewed it as a disruptive measure intended to supplant many legitimate Pennsylvania land rights. Governor Jefferson assured both Pennsylvania and Congress

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that his state wanted to solve rather than exacerbate the boundary dispute, and by September 1780 both states' legislatures had ratified the agreement with Virginia's added stipulations.[66]

Although the agreement between the states spelled out just where the border would run, it was some time yet before the matter could be considered closed. In 1781 the states agreed, on Jefferson's suggestion, that the corner point five degrees from the Delaware should be determined by astronomical observation. However, the British army's entry into Virginia and the need to gather the proper instruments meant delay; in the meantime a temporary boundary was to be surveyed "to quiet the minds of the People, and compel Militia Service."[67] When his Virginia counterpart failed to appear, the surveyor for Pennsylvania tried to run the extension of the Mason-Dixon survey on his own in June 1782. He was stopped at the Monongahela River by a party of armed men, and it was later that year before surveyors from each state, escorted by militia from outside the disputed sector, could finish the temporary boundary to the corner point and north to the Ohio.[68] It was only during 1784 and 1785 that the corner point was determined by celestial observations and the boundaries from the western end of Maryland to the Ohio River below Pittsburgh were officially marked.[69]

Late in 1779 Pennsylvania's Executive Council published the terms of the original agreement concerning

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the boundary and warned Virginia's advocates against any attempts to reassert the Old Dominion's right to the zone included within the agreed-upon boundaries. And in 1781, on the basis of petitions received as early as 1780, Pennsylvania established Washington County, which consisted of that portion of the state lying west of the Monongahela. In addition the Pennsylvania assembly passed bills to allow the registration of black slaves in the southwestern corner of the state according to Pennsylvania's gradual abolition act and to provide for the certification of oaths of allegiance to Virginia so that former Virginians could assume full rights of citizenship in Pennsylvania. Another new county, Fayette, was formed in the area between the Youghiogheny and the Monongahela during 1783.[70]

These measures did not, however, guarantee Pennsylvania the unruffled jurisdiction of the territory included within its new bounds. The 1779 agreement let it be known where the lines would run, but their final establishment, as well as the evaporation of any practical hope on their opponents' part to change them, took some time. Meanwhile the announcement of the boundary agreement gave new energy to Pennsylvania's adherents. "I have maid several new frends to pennsylvania," one of them wrote in 1780, "by teling the People in the Desputed Part that the [Virginia land title] Comisionors only want'd to fill there own Pockets with money . . . and that Pennsylvania will not pay aney regard to aney thing Don by them."[71] As for

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Virginia's supporters, Colonel Brodhead reported that the state assembly's approval of the boundary agreement, even with the appended conditions, "has greatly disturbed their Adherents, and I am afraid it will injure our Military affairs untill the line is fully run."[72] A number of Virginians felt betrayed by the boundary agreed to by the state government, which in order to have a smooth working relationship with other states felt some need to be conciliatory regarding its western lands. Through the early 1780s the staunchest of Pennsylvania's opponents in the border zone continued to insist that a boundary running parallel to the Delaware River, or some other arrangement more favorable to Virginia's claims than that of 1779-1780, must be used as the final settlement of the issue. "For let it be remembered," a Virginian wrote, that under the 1779 agreement "that part of the country that rendred the whole worth contending for is ceded to Pensilvania."[73] The settlement worked out by the state governments in 1779 and 1780 did not end conflict over the boundary, it invigorated it.

"Without Law to protect me," an officer of the now officially defunct Yohogania County signed himself in October 1780.[74] It was a sentiment shared in one way or another by a number of local leaders from both sides of the jurisdictional issue. In a sense Virginia authority by fall 1780 was officially dead inside the limits granted to Pennsylvania, but until those limits were marked off the

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transition was uncertain, the dismantling of Virginia authority was incomplete, and the effective implementation of Pennsylvania authority near the border was stalled. Completion of even a temporary boundary came only in November of 1782. General Irvine at Fort Pitt reported the situation some months before that: "Civil authority is by no means properly established in this Country which I [do not] doubt proceeds in some degree from inattention in the Executives of Virginia and Pennsylvania[;] not running the boundary line is I think a proof of this, which is at present an excuse for neglect of duty of all kinds, for at least twenty miles on each side the line -- more evils will arise from this neglect than people are aware of."[75] Although a defensive Pennsylvania council denied all such hints that the delays were the result of neglect, at least on its own part, people in the uncertain zone felt as if they had fallen into a jurisdictional void. The situation was further muddled by the fact that congressional policy regarding the trans-Allegheny west was still indeterminate, and it was thought that Congress might create new states in the west. Frustrated by all the uncertainty, one Pennsylvania county official did not see that it would make much difference how the affair was settled as long as some determination was made: "I wish to god it was done," he wrote. "I have not the least doubt but the people will Generally be good and faithfull subjects if properly managed and supported," he added later.[76]

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This disrupted state of affairs was more than a minor inconvenience for the Continental commanders at Pittsburgh and for militia officers of the Pennsylvania counties. As early as April 1780 Brodhead complained that "the unhappy dispute of Jurisdiction" had made the region's militia almost useless. Two years later there was still no boundary and General Irvine was in the same predicament.[77] The officers of Westmoreland and Washington counties made efforts to organize the Pennsylvania militia west of the Youghiogheny, something they had been unable to do before the two states agreed on the boundary. There were people in that sector who willingly, even eagerly, enrolled themselves as Pennsylvania militiamen, but by 1782 the opposition to such a measure, especially west of the Monongahela in Washington County, was considerable. Numbers refused to pay fines for not serving, would not take the Pennsylvania oath, and disrupted battalion elections of officers. "They are associating to oppose taxation and prevent the Sheriff Collecting any more Delinqt. fines in that Quarter," wrote the county lieutenant of Washington about a part of that county in July 1782; "they have Caused some of their officers to resign their Commissions and threaten those who Continue to act, with tarring and Feathering if they Call upon them for any more Militia duty."[78] The county officials asked General Irvine to use Continental authority to influence the recalcitrant and if necessary to protect officers collecting militia fines, but Irvine would not

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budge from his position of strict noninvolvement in the local quarrels.[79]

The militia issue was a particular source of contention during 1781 when George Rogers Clark came to the region to launch a Virginia-sponsored expedition against Detroit. Clark's original aim was to make his strike very early in the year, before the British could expect him to be campaigning. Those plans changed when the militia of Frederick, Berkeley, and Hampshire counties in Virginia refused to turn out for the expedition and when Clark proved unable to get the 13th Virginia Regiment detached from Brodhead's command. Clark spent a frantic spring and summer in the country west of Laurel Hill trying to drum up enough men to make a march against Detroit, or even against any enemy Indians, possible.[80]

It did not take Clark long to decide that "the greatest part of this country is in subordination to neither Pensylvania or Virga.," and that because of the disputed jurisdiction "no method I doubt can be taken to force them to war."[81] His persistence in trying to overcome this problem only made it worse. He ordered the county lieutenants of Ohio, Monongalia, and Yohogania to meet certain quotas by way of volunteers or militia drafts, ignoring the fact that portions of the first two counties and practically all of Yohogania fell within Pennsylvania by the border agreement; his headquarters for much of his stay was the Yohogania County courthouse, nearly forty

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miles north of where the Mason and Dixon survey line struck the Monongahela. At the same time he received the Pennsylvania council's sanction to raise volunteers within that state. Circumstances having all but ruined any chance to take Detroit, Clark announced that the towns of enemy Indians were his goal, and he won the support of a council of Westmoreland County officers by suggesting that his attack on the Shawnee and the Delaware could be coordinated with a concurrent expedition from Westmoreland to the Wyandot and hostile Delaware towns on the Sandusky River.[82]

The apparent concurrence of the Westmoreland leaders, however, was the approval only of "a Majority of a small Number of Men at Said Meetings."[83] Clark had the avid support of Archibald Lochry, the lieutenant of Westmoreland County, but not that of James Marshal, the county lieutenant of Washington, or of several other powerful county officers, including some of the Westmoreland militia officers ranking just under Lochry. These men maintained that Clark and his subordinates, with no actual authority from the Virginia government to do so, wielded "a strange, very extraordinary and most arbitrary Jurisdiction over these who have formerly been subject to Virginia."[84] Indeed Clark and the Virginia county officers simply turned a blind eye to the boundary. Armed parties moved through the area to enforce drafts into the Virginia militia. One such patrol under Colonel Gabriel Cox of

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Yohogania County made a "Tumultious" demonstration and tore down a portion of the building in which Washington County held its courts. At Harden's Mill -- a spot defined as within either Monongalia County, Virginia, or Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, depending on the report -- Brigadier Clark himself put on a similar show and forced twenty-two men to sign a pledge recanting their opposition to his draft. According to his Pennsylvania opponents, Clark's people helped themselves to the grain and livestock of the recalcitrant and seized or threatened to hang those who challenged the draft.[85]

Desperate for men, Clark had little reason to tread softly around the boundary matter. His own interpretation of the matter was that a small group of cunning men -- specifically James Marshal and other members of the Pennsylvania county leadership -- sought to undermine his efforts to promote the common good, and that without their sabotage most people in the region would have willingly assisted him. Clark in fact had a very difficult time coming to terms with the failure he experienced in the upper Ohio Valley in 1781. "Whoever undertakes to Raise an army in this Quarter will find himself disappointed Except the laws was of greater force and not depending on the wills of the populace," he mused. "This country calls aloud for an Expedition wishing me to put it into Execution but [is] so strangely Infatuated that all the methods I have been able to persue will not draw them into the

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field."[86] The tragic finale of Clark's troubles in the region came in August when his ally Archibald Lochry led a mixed force of Westmoreland County rangers and volunteers down the Ohio to join him. Unable to catch up with the main force, which Clark kept on the move because of the terrible rate of desertion, Lochry and his men were attacked by a large enemy force. Lochry and thirty-six others died; the remaining sixty-four were all captured. They were "all the best men" of the county, General Irvine lamented.[87]

Militia service was only one aspect of county government strained by the boundary situation after 1780. Thomas Scott, the prothonotary of the new county of Washington, met resistance from both parties in 1781 when he insisted that voters and jurors take the test oath required by Pennsylvania. The Virginia group of course considered the oath a tactic to block their participation in government. Some of those attached to Pennsylvania claimed religious reasons for not taking the oath, while others protested that their attachment to the state should not be questioned -- probably an indication that the oath itself, instituted by the supporters of the state's 1776 constitution and deeply resented by their opponents throughout Pennsylvania, was simply not popular in the region. There seemed to be a general notion that the matter could not be pressed until the boundary was marked. Scott noted that things were further complicated by people who had acceded

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to Virginia authority in the course of the jurisdictional conflict, perhaps even swearing an oath to that state, and now said they were really Pennsylvania adherents who had cooperated with the Virginia party "for fear of A Greater Evil."[88] A 1782 law was meant to solve part of the problem by allowing an oath of allegiance to Virginia taken prior to the boundary agreement to stand in place of the oath to Pennsylvania. This measure was in keeping with the spirit of the 1779 agreement, which stated that the rights of citizens would not be prejudiced by the delineation of the boundary. Scott's experience in Washington County, however, indicated that the notion of the test oath itself, as was the case also in other parts of Pennsylvania, was not viewed with particular favor. Oaths of allegiance were an especially touchy matter in a zone that had witnessed such bouts between contending governments as the Ohio forks area had. Oaths represented a commitment that many in the region did not care to make, at least not until the borders were irrevocably established, and perhaps not even then.[89]

Tax collection was a similar problem. It was a primary factor in the disgruntlement associated with the boundary issue in the early 1780s. There was opposition to Pennsylvania's collection of any taxes in the western corner of the state as long as there was some expectation that the 1779 agreement might be laid aside and a new boundary drawn.[90] This resistance only compounded what was already a difficult problem west of Laurel Hill. Revenue

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collection was troublesome for Pennsylvania's western counties even before the Revolution, and Virginia's counties in the region had their difficulties as well. In 1778 the Yohogania County magistrates, probably because of the continuing jurisdictional conflict, asked to be allowed to meet county expenses with fines rather than the standard county levies, which "Will (from the perticular Situation of this County) be attended with evil Consequences and great difficulty in the Collection."[91] Laws passed by Pennsylvania during the war allowed county officials to defer the collection of taxes from those people on the frontiers who had been driven from their property by the enemy and, by December 1781, from those who did not flee but stayed with their homes "at the hazard of their lives." Nevertheless, two matters gave Pennsylvania's taxation of the region an onerous image by the early eighties: the question of whether the inhabitants would be required to pay the arrears of taxes that had gone unpaid due to the exigencies of the war, and the policy requiring tax payments to be in cash.[92]

The opposition to Pennsylvania's tax collection was closely related to the resistance to militia duty and ran a similar course. The Westmoreland County commissioners found that in the spring of 1781 some tax assessors would not serve "and great numbers of the Inhabitants refuse to give their Returns." Without returns from the entire county Westmoreland's officials could not levy the taxes,

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which were based on a proportional distribution of the county's quota among its propertyholders.[93] In 1782 the efforts to mark a temporary boundary led to open resistance to tax collection as well as to militia service. Armed men repelled Westmoreland County's assessors, "Fired Guns at them and say they will not Pay any Taxes nor be Obedient to our Laws."[94] General Irvine at Fort Pitt and others in the territory maintained that this resistance was nourished at meetings addressed by "some of the first People of the Country." Government financial advisor Robert Morris was amenable at first to the payment of taxes in flour to ease the burden, but he became less flexible in the face of continuing opposition to taxation. Dorsey Pentecost, one of the "first People" accused of inciting the resistance, reportedly told a crowd "that Bob. Morris knew his own Ends . . . and meant only to serve himself."[95] In 1783 armed inhabitants in one Westmoreland County township chased away the assessor and again prevented the apportionment of the county's taxes. Meanwhile Washington County's commissioners reported that the shortage of specie made it extremely difficult to collect taxes.[96]

Hope for a new state in the western territory is what gave most of Pennsylvania's opponents during the early 1780s some expectation of success. The situation was not unlike that of the previous decade, when the most energetic opponents of Pennsylvania authority west of the mountains took active steps to block the regular implementation of

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Pennsylvania government by challenging its jurisdiction, supporting alternatives to it, and attempting to alter the anticipated configuration of the border. Vandalia and then Virginia had been possible alternatives to government by Pennsylvania in the 1770s. By 1780 the Virginia government was willing to yield its claims to the country north of the Mason-Dixon line westward almost to the Ohio. In the face of this flagging interest on Virginia's part, Pennsylvania's opponents worked to keep that state at bay as they explored the possibilities of a new government as an alternative to Pennsylvania's control of the region.[97]

The actions of individuals who made the switch from attachment to Virginia to support for a new state illustrate the steps of the process. In June 1782 a party of armed men prevented Alexander McClean, the Pennsylvanian attempting to survey the temporary boundary without his Virginia counterpart, from crossing the Monongahela River to extend the Mason and Dixon line to the west. A committee of three men, Henry Vanmeter, Jesse Pigman, and George Newland, informed McClean that the survey was not to proceed "untill finally Determined or Proclaimed to be agreeable to the State of Virginia."[98] Newland remains obscure. Vanmeter had served as a Hampshire County, Virginia, justice, had been recommended as an addition to the West Augusta court, and was part of a very large family that had migrated from the Valley of Virginia to the transmontane country. Pigman was a Monongalia County

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militia captain during the Revolution, and earlier in 1782 had opposed the formation of a Pennsylvania militia battalion in his locale: "He has always been a factious Troublesom man."[99]

Shortly after the confrontation at the Monongahela these three men and about five hundred others signed petitions to the Virginia governor praying some notice of their status in light of the Pennsylvania advance. The Pennsylvanians "pretend" to have authority north of the Mason-Dixon line and west of the Monongahela, the petitioners wrote, "Which we Could not Believe, because we have been So Long under your Jurisdiction, and have took the Oath to the State, and has had your Civil authority Extended amongst us, and you have not By Proclamation or otherwise Given us Publick Notice that you have Cast us off and Given us up to Pennsylvania." The memorialists asked the governor "to Let us know to whom we do belong that we may not Stand against their Law; or impower us otherwise to act as usual." By the beginning of 1783 the doubts were gone, the petitioners knew they were "cast off" and "given up" by Virginia, and Newland, Vanmeter, and Pigman were among the more than two thousand people who subscribed their names to a petition to Congress asking for a new state.[100] Alexander McClean understood the strength of this movement months before he even began his attempt to lay off the temporary boundary: "their Situations are desperate, they have no Other Refuge to fly to, but that of unwarranted opposition,

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their Wonted assylum which I am afraid will have too much Weight with the mislead, unguarded, unhappy Inhabitants of this State."[101]

There is no evidence of any projects for new states between 1776 and 1780. The idea resurfaced in the latter year, when a petition to Congress was circulated in draft form among some members of the Yohogania County court and meetings were called to discuss the possibility of a new state. One of the memorial's promoters wrote that it was "the Golden oppertunity" for such an effort "as there Still remains Some Doubt about the Line." The memorial, which was never presented to Congress, argued that the western region was geographically separated from the seats of state governments, that trade connections between west and east were weak, which made the payment of taxes very difficult, and that as a distinct state with its trade oriented to "the Western Waters" the territory would be able to make a satisfying contribution to the national war effort.[102] It is not certain how many similar projects for new states followed this one during the early 1780s. Nor is it possible to determine exactly how much of this activity was a coordinated effort and whether the people named as instigators really incited the movement or were only well-known and influential participants in a phenomenon with diffused origins.

Opposition to Pennsylvania and support for a new state were both fed by general feelings of discontent

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toward the demands made by governments -- demands including militia service and taxation. Pennsylvania's policies regarding these matters became the focus of ire in the disputed area as the prospect of the regular establishment of Pennsylvania county government grew. During the course of the war many people in the western settlements came to believe that governments asked much but gave little, that western citizens were pressed hard for taxes and other support for the common cause but did not receive adequate protection from government in return. By late in the war these notions grew into a developed rhetoric that appeared in some of the petitions to government for aid.[103] The new-state movements drew upon these attitudes. The petition to Congress in January 1783 was naturally enough intended to convince the national government of the benefits of a new state in the west, but its arguments that the region had contributed strongly to the national cause, had earned its right to a separate government by toil and blood, and had suffered at the hands of provincial governments appealed to the dissatisfaction that many locals felt toward government.[104] The petition's argument that the internecine quarrel between Virginia and Pennsylvania had brought nothing but trouble to the region was no doubt intended to win Congress' support for a new government. Yet it had considerable appeal also with those westerners who believed that the states' "procrastinated quarrel about

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our country hath hung us, our wives, Children and Living up an easy pray to the savages these so many years."[105]

Land, for several reasons, was one of the factors that militated against a quiet acquiescence to Pennsylvania authority. Despite the provisions Virginia attached to the 1779 agreement with Pennsylvania, many settlers still felt uncomfortable about their land titles or feared that Pennsylvania would force them to pay additional fees for their property. The resolution of land titles was indeed a difficult problem, and there was justification for the fear that not everyone would be happy with the final result.[106] Even those sympathetic to Pennsylvania authority felt pinched by the problem of completing the purchase of their lands. Toward the end of the war and into the middle 1780s the state took steps to have outstanding purchases finished so that untitled lands could be sold. There were a number of remonstrances to the legislature to the effect that wartime hardship and loss, along with a general shortage of money in the region, made payments of purchase money and interest extremely difficult for many settlers. Early in 1781 a Pennsylvanian feared that the state's land prices might drive people of the Ohio forks territory into opposition and that there would be "perhaps not ten men on this side the mountains, that would not lift arms against the state."[107]

In addition at least some of the new-state effort sprang from a desire to take up new lands in the territory

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beyond the Ohio. Efforts to secure unclaimed lands in the Ohio Valley did not cease during the war years. "The emigration down the Ohio from this quarter I fear will depopulate its altogether," General McIntosh reported from Fort Pitt in March 1779. "Their design of securing land is so great, notwithstanding the danger of this country, they will go."[108] That fall Colonel Brodhead learned that an indefinite number of people from Yohogania and Ohio counties had crossed the Ohio at Wheeling to settle in the country east of the Muskingum. Brodhead understood the effects such an encroachment would have on relations with the Delaware, and he quickly sent troops to seize the interlopers, who left before the soldiers arrived.[109] Beginning that same fall and continuing into 1780 the Virginia county courts in the region also began to record proofs of prerevolutionary military service. Apparently the claimants expected to enter for land grants under the auspices of the old 1763 proclamation.[110]

Emigration provided one solution to those dissatisfied with the impending jurisdictional arrangements in southwest Pennsylvania. From Pittsburgh early in 1781 Brodhead reported "multitudes of emigrants arrived and expected in this District (Chiefly to avoid militia Duty and Taxes)."[111] For the next three years there were reports of groups intending to cross the Ohio and establish themselves on the lands not yet purchased from the Indian

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nations. Some, perhaps all, of these projects included plans to establish a separate state.[112]

There were social and political motives for the support of a new state, too. For years there had been two factions in active opposition to one another over the jurisdictional question. Perhaps not everyone in the region identified himself with either of these groups, but for many of those who did, the feelings of hostility toward the other party were strong. Virginia's adherents, moreover, felt abandoned and humiliated by their own government, which they felt had "Cast us off and Given us up."[113] Association with a new-state venture could bolster sagging pride and offer an alternative to surrender to Pennsylvania rule. As for those of the Virginia county leadership living within the tract ceded to Pennsylvania, the boundary agreement meant a potential loss of office and power. Transition into the Pennsylvania system -- or back into it in some cases -- was a possibility, one accomplished by a number of the Virginia leadership group during the 1780s. However, such a transfer could require some energetic politicking and contacts with sources of political power in eastern Pennsylvania, not Virginia. A new state offered the local Virginia leadership the prospect not only of continuing in power under the present circumstances, but also of increasing one's power by moving into state-level positions in a new government.

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Several local Virginia leaders may have been involved in direct agitation against Pennsylvania authority. Accusations of such activity were particularly strong against Benjamin Johnston, John Canon, and Dorsey Pentecost. Johnston was probably the author of the draft memorial proposing a new state which he circulated among members of the Yohogania County court in the fall of 1780. Earlier that year he was recommended as an addition to that county's commission and was appointed one of Yohogania's deputy surveyors.[114] He seems also to have been the "Certain Mr. Johnson" that General Irvine believed to be the instigator of, and the author of a constitution for, a new state to be located on the Muskingum River in the Ohio country in 1782. "He is Ambitious, restless, and some say disaffected," Irvine reported; "most people however agree he is open to corruption."[115] Johnston was also one of the first signers of the mammoth petition presented to Congress in January 1783. An unrepentant and strident opponent of what he considered to be an encroachment by Pennsylvania beyond its chartered bounds, he continued to pen letters and memorials to that effect through 1783 and 1784.[116]

"In a word Mr. Penticost and Mr. Cannon are ringleaders of Sedition, and are doeing every thing in their power to revive the Jurisdiction of Virginia, in order to keep this Country in Confusion" -- thus did James Marshal, militia commander of the new Pennsylvania county of Washington, depict Dorsey Pentecost and John Canon in 1781.[117]

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There was at least some truth to the charge. However, the accusations against the pair were almost certainly tinctured by personal animosity, political jealousy, and competition, and by the fact that the region's factious political climate often led to the interpretation of political disagreements in the most extreme of terms. Yet politically both men were also very light on their feet. As a result it is difficult to determine just what they were up to in the opening years of the decade.

John Canon served with the West Augusta court before the war, then after 1776 was both a magistrate and a field officer of militia in Yohogania County. In the spring of 1781 he received an appointment as one of Marshal's sublieutenants of militia in the new Pennsylvania county, and the friction soon began. Both militia service and the Virginia-Pennsylvania split were hot issues as George Rogers Clark recruited in the area that summer. Canon "publickly declares that government have Infringed upon the Rights of the people in appointing officers for them before they were represented," Marshall declared two months after Canon's appointment, "and instead of assisting me in Organizing the Militia, is using all his Influence to prevent it."[118] That November Canon was elected to be one of Washington County's representatives to the Pennsylvania legislature, an event which probably did little to lessen his friction with Marshal. At a conference of the county's militia officers in 1782 Marshal laid out his

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plans to raise men for an expedition, and received the group's approval -- "Except for the Infamous Cannon who laboured all his might to Set aside all law and goverment and depend wholy upon the Virtue of the people for Raising and Equiping this Countys Quota of men."[119] These instances are informative because they indicate that the real dispute between the two men concerned the means by which Marshal would exert his authority. Canon was uncooperative, but so were sublieutenants in other counties at times. Marshal's primary complaint seems to have been that he and Canon held differing opinions of the means by which government should exert power, and Canon did not keep quiet about it. Marshal evidently believed that Canon's rhetoric was merely a tool he employed to hinder Pennsylvania's government in the region, and Marshal's reactions indicate the degree to which he felt threatened by the situation.

According to Thomas Scott, an associate of Marshal's in the Washington County government, Dorsey Pentecost was "that artch apostite," a man "who invegled and fritned hundreds into subjection" to Virginia during the 1770s, and was "the second, and next to Conely [Connolly], in all the mischiefs that hath befalen this country."[120] Scott claimed that Pentecost had used the Virginia courts as a means of forwarding his own land acquisition schemes. Other reports linked Pentecost both to the open resistance to Pennsylvania authority and to new-state schemes. In the summer of 1782, for example, witnesses heard him express

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his opposition to Pennsylvania's taxation and his expectation that a new government would be formed. At the same time "anonymous notes . . . in Mr. Pentecoast's handwriting" were circulated to call meetings "where matters of a seditious nature were proposed."[121] That Pentecost was attached to the Virginia party is without question: he was a surveyor for George Croghan and for the West Augusta district before the Revolution, a magistrate for West Augusta, and a magistrate, clerk of court, and county lieutenant of Yohogania. In the last capacity he acted as a county lieutenant during George Rogers Clark's recruitment efforts in 1781, one of the actions that earned him James Marshal's enmity.[122] Yet in November 1781 Pentecost was elected Washington County's representative in the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, a position he held for two years. As a councillor he was one of the people who, between stints in Philadelphia, reported to the council about the region's discontent concerning taxes and military service.[123]

Pentecost was not slow to defend himself against the charges and insinuations made by Marshal and others. He did not deny that he acted as a Yohogania officer in 1781; the pressing need to support Clark's campaign was his justification: "I beg Leave to inform you, Sir . . . that Commissions and Command were never Objects that gave me one moment's Uneasiness, and it's a matter of total Indifference to me who doth the Public Business, so it is well done, and

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a man in office acquainted with the Bonum Publicum." In addition, the need for defensive measures and the lack of any effective steps by government had led early in 1781 to "a meeting of the Principal People" and the formation of "a General Committee" to take the necessary measures by way of subscription. Marshal did not understand these things, Pentecost maintained, because he was an upstart newcomer, "a Man that came among us but the other Day." Moreover, Pentecost added, instead of aiding in the solution of important local problems Marshal had used his influence to win himself appointments as the new county's register of wills, recorder of deeds, and militia lieutenant. "The bestowing so many offices on one man, though he was the best in Christendom, is a great Defect. . . . The Welfare of the Community requires that Places of Preferment should be as much as possible distributed."[124]

In mid-1782 Marshal began a serious effort to collect evidence against those he considered "the principal Ringleaders" of the opposition to Pennsylvania government. Early the next year Pentecost and Canon demanded that the legislature investigate the accusations that Marshal had made against them. Special commissioners took evidence on the matter and filed a report with the state House of Representatives, but no other action was taken. In 1784 Pentecost and Canon again demanded a resolution of the issue, but the legislature was busy with other affairs and a final report was never rendered.[125]

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Coursing through the entire affair was the friction generated by competition for the influential offices in Washington County. Pentecost saw nothing wrong with switching governments as the boundary situation changed: he had done it during the early 1770s, after all, and he thought that his long service with local courts (despite their allegiance to Virginia) made him the logical choice for an important position in the new Pennsylvania county. His aversion to Marshal's multiple officeholding was founded less on political theory, perhaps, than on the fear that Marshal had locked up some of the key clerkships that Pentecost wanted for himself. He also coveted the prothonotary position held by Thomas Scott, another of his accusers and a longtime Pennsylvania adherent.[126] At the end of his service on the Executive Council Pentecost was appointed president of the Washington County court of common pleas, and Canon joined him on the court the next year. Scott held onto the prothonotary's office. Marshal resigned from his recorder's and register's posts in 1784 and was succeeded by a former captain of the Westmoreland County rangers. Canon continued to play an important role in local politics during the 1780s, but Pentecost apparently turned most of his energies to land speculation.[127]

The open resistance to Pennsylvania's authority and the many reports of plans for a new state were enough to elicit decisive action from the Pennsylvania government.

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Westerners might argue, as many did, that they had contributed a great deal to the common cause but received little help in return; yet as far as a majority of those in the Pennsylvania government were concerned the state had given the frontiers precious aid at times of great hardship throughout the commonwealth. Government could argue that if anything the westerners had allowed important resources and funds to be wasted through carelessness, and simply demanded more than the state could give.[128] In addition, lands in the west were needed by the state to pay off its debts to its soldiery and to the proprietary family, so the government was anxious not to lose any of the commonwealth's transmontane territory. As a result the legislature moved quickly in the autumn of 1782 to stop any seditious activity in the western sector. Under the new law it was high treason to attempt to form a new government within the state's limits as agreed upon with Virginia. It was also declared high treason to post a notice for, or to attend, any meeting at which new states were to be discussed, or to advocate a new government or read a draft constitution for one to a gathering. Conviction meant death and the loss of one's property to the state. The council was also authorized to call out the militia to suppress new-state projects.[129]

The legislature also authorized the council to send a secret envoy to the west "to bring over the deluded to a

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proper sense of their Duty." The Reverend James Finley, a Presbyterian minister from Chester County, was selected as the government's agent. In his instructions to Finley in February 1783, John Dickinson, president of the council, spelled out Pennsylvania's reasons for opposing new state efforts. Dickinson was careful to point out that people moved into the western country by "their own voluntary act -- done under public authority," and therefore the settlers must follow the accepted channels of government to redress any grievances. "If arguments of this sort are not duly regarded," he wrote in conclusion, "it may be added with the utmost Calmness and Firmness, that Pennsylvania knows her Rights, the world acknowledges them, and she is resolved at every Hazard to maintain them."[130]

Finley spent six weeks in Westmoreland and Washington counties posing as a prospective immigrant disturbed by the talk of a new state. Finding little support for new governments east of the Youghiogheny, he concentrated his efforts west of that stream and west of the Monongahela in Washington County. In conferences with clergymen "and other Gentlemen," in admonitions given after his own sermons, and in letters that could be circulated, Finley pointed out the costs and problems of founding a new state, the justice of Pennsylvania's claim, the financial debt owed the state by the western counties, and the prospect that continued resistance could bring the combined strength of the United States against the westerners. The country was,

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Finley reported to Dickinson, "misled by a few aspiring, and I suspect ill designing men, or by men who had not thorowly considered the whole matter; which lat[t]er was the case of some of the Clergy." To counter this influence he warned his listeners that ambitious and greedy leaders could turn the settlements into "a New Germany, a Seat of Contention and field of blood," that their present resistance would "gender animosities, contentions, and many evil works; and may end in confiscations, banishment, and blood." When Finley left the region in April 1783 he was satisfied that the new-state movement "is over at present." This quietude was due largely to the assembly's treason act, he reported, which had "quite intimidated and discouraged the populace." "Yet the people seemed rather hushed than convinced," he warned. The tax problem, Finley cautioned Dickinson, was one matter about which he could not assuage the inhabitants. It would continue to elicit resistance unless some provision were made for payment in kind rather than in specie, "as those Settlements are nearly destitute of cash."[131]

Dickinson knew even by the time he drafted Finley's instructions that Congress had turned a deaf ear to the pleas for a new state government. The memorial presented to Congress in January 1783 was the culmination of the new-state movement. The petition did not specify any geographic limits for the requested state -- the memorialists

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were "the Inhabitants on the West side of the Laurel Hill and Western Waters" -- but it did endorse Congress' right to establish a new western jurisdiction in the area. The two major grievances expressed in the document were the several difficulties arising out of the Pennsylvania-Virginia contention and the lives, effort, and money that had been expended for the settlers to maintain their homes and contribute to the national cause during the war. Congress was not receptive: after its presentation "the petition lay on the table without a single motion or remark relative to it." This icy response from Congress probably did as much as anything else to quell hopes for a new state. The memorial was, however, a singularly large expression of discontent. Over two thousand names were on the document, including those of almost twenty former Virginia magistrates, men recommended as such by the local Virginia courts, or field officers of the Virginia militia.[132]

By the middle 1780s the Pennsylvania government could feel some assurance of its jurisdiction in the south-western corner of the state: the border was finally marked and ratified and Congress had demonstrated that it would not condone any efforts to form a new government within Pennsylvania's bounds. As the Reverend Finley noticed, however, many people in the region were "hushed," not "convinced," and opposition to the government's policies did

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not die. The technical problems of the boundary settlement, particularly in regard to land ownership, also took some time to resolve, and Pennsylvania's gradual abolition act made some of the region's inhabitants unhappy. Virginia also had to make some adjustments in the area since the boundary placed virtually all of Yohogania County, part of Ohio County, and a large portion of Monongalia, including its county seat, in Pennsylvania.[133]

The transition to an unchallenged Pennsylvania county government west of the Monongahela River and north of the new southern border was not without other problems. There was considerable protest over Washington County's elections of local justices in 1781 and 1782, for example.[134] Contested magistrates' elections were certainly not unknown to the region, however, and the Pennsylvanians continued to have their own internecine quarrels -- witness the dispute over Westmoreland's county seat, which dragged through the middle 'eighties and did not completely disappear even with the designation of Greensburg as the county town in 1786.[135] Over a dozen former civil and militia officers of the Virginia counties found places in Washington County as members of the state's Executive Council and the Council of Censors, as judges of the county court of common pleas, as representatives to the assembly, and in several other important positions.[136] Some of these men made bitter enemies during the boundary troubles. Others, despite their service with Virginia's counties

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during the war, seem not to have estranged themselves from their colleagues in Westmoreland County to the same degree. In addition, there is no denying the popularity of many of these men with the electorate of the territory so recently in dispute between the two states.

In reference to a disputed Washington County election in 1781, Thomas Scott reported to President Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania that even the worthiest of men elected to office there would suffer a storm of protest from dissatisfied inhabitants. "This county is just like other parts of the world," Scott wrote. "Let a petition be formed to burn the church and Some signers may be got to it."[137] Scott's own position as prothonotary of the county was not elective, and disgust or trepidation may well have colored his attitudes toward any form of open political contention. Still, his comment suggests that in his world one must be resigned to a certain level of political combativeness as a fact of life; nor could even the most extreme instance of disputatiousness seem entirely beyond the realm of possibility.

In terms of its internal disputes and relationships to governmental authority the upper Ohio Valley's experience during the Revolution served as a continuation of the

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political atmosphere that existed there before the war with Great Britain. There was still, through the 1770s and into the 1780s, competition among those men who sought local power. Centralized political authority in its various forms continued to have problems with some of the most fundamental aspects of a government's relationship with a populace: taxation, the quiet transition of men into and out of office, military service. In the view of those seeking to impose authority on the region as a whole, its inhabitants could appear excessively independent, even blatantly disobedient, at times. In numerous instances the people's response to signals from Continental or state governments did not meet the governments' expectations either in form or degree.

The alacrity with which many locals seemed willing to ignore or resist centralized authority was a product of their understanding of their relationship with government. There were two major features of this attitude: the absence of any notion that government must be reflexively obeyed, and the frequent desire of the people to take action for themselves without the coordinating channels of centralized decision making. In a region where groups claiming government authority openly challenged one another, and where officers of the same county government not infrequently squabbled to the point of ignoring one another's official instructions, any authority that could be presumed

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to be inherent within the structures of government was considerably debased. Moreover, inhabitants frequently took action by means of relatively decentralized groups such as associations, councils of war, conferences and meetings. The understanding of one's relationship with government, taken as a whole, seems to have depended on the particular circumstances at hand. Government had the power to assist the individual at times. If government's decisions did not accord with one's own, however, a substantial flexibility of response to the strictures of authority was permissible. The individual, in effect, had power to effect actions just as government did, including the power to pursue whatever approach to a problem seemed appropriate. This attitude did not constitute an opposition to government in principle. It was, rather, a form of activism that could seem, if viewed from the outside, to lie dormant at times and to flare up with certain issues; it also accounts for some of the apparent inconsistencies in different individuals' or groups' responses to authority.

There was a lack of consensus and unanimity on this matter as on most others in the region. This lack of uniformity of response to authority was one of the things that made it difficult for the representatives of centralized authority to deal with the upper Ohio Valley region. There were residents, for example, who unequivocally

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divorced themselves from the opponents of governmental authority and declared their willingness to adhere faithfully "to the Lawful Authority of the State."[138] Yet even this opinion had as much a pragmatic as an ideological foundation since those who expressed it expected the government's military assistance in exchange for their fealty. The situation was further complicated by the fact that those who held openly pragmatic views of authority did not always agree as to the nature or style of the individual's response to government, and often were in direct competition with one another. The important point is that there was just such a range of opinions and patterns of behavior, and, at least on the part of many people, a lack of any understanding that it was the citizen's unshakable duty to conform to the wishes of centralized authority. There was little of a cleanly articulated political philosophy to these notions, but they fit hand-in-glove with the region's political experience -- its political socialization, in effect -- of many years.

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CHAPTER 7

"PISMIRES DESTROYED BY THE PLOUGH": THE WAR AS HUMAN EXPERIENCE

To comprehend the upper Ohio Valley's experience in the Revolutionary War at its most fundamental level, as a personal and social experience, requires some understanding of the ways in which the region's inhabitants perceived the war and reacted to it. This aspect of the Revolution was closely related to the more overtly political side of the conflict: in each case it is important to examine the internal dynamics of the local society and the means by which the population met the stresses of war. Some notion of what kind of an experience war in general, and the Revolutionary War in particular, actually was for the region's population is necessary in order to understand the nature of the society itself during the early decades of white settlement.

"The King of Britain's health is often drunk in Companies," Daniel Brodhead reported from Fort Pitt late in 1780. This was only one of several comments Brodhead made

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about what appeared to be widespread disaffection among the transmontane settlers. Some of his advisers informed the colonel that "should the Enemy reach the Frontier in force, a very considerable part of the Inhabitants would join them, provided they have a promise of protection." By the spring of 1781 Brodhead wrote that "it is doubtful whether the well affected or disaffected Inhabitants . . . are most numerous."[1]

Since a British army never entered the settlements in force, Brodhead's information about the local population was never put to the test, and it is impossible to gauge the precise extent of support for Great Britain in the region during the war. The strength of loyalism to Britain could be exaggerated fairly easily. The word "tory" was a handy barb that could be wielded against one's political opponents whether or not it had any basis in fact.[2] Some Continental officials' attitudes about the backcountry also gave them a particularly fearful view of disaffection: "the inhabitants appear, many of them, to be a wild ungovernable race, little less savage than their tawny neighbours," wrote Timothy Pickering, a member of the Board of War, in 1778. It was largely a matter of interpretation as well. In contrast to Brodhead's reports, George Rogers Clark maintained that the territory was not truly "Disaffected" in 1781, but reflected the disruptions of an unresolved boundary conflict.[3]

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Clark's opinion illustrates the major problem in evaluating disaffection and loyalty to Britain as factors in the backcountry west of Laurel Hill. There was, after all, a type of disaffection from the American cause inherent within the deep dissatisfaction with government harbored by many people in the region. This discontent is illustrated by the general malaise about the conduct of the war as well as by the open resistance to tax collectors and militia officers. There can be little doubt that many of the people in the area had a relatively weak attachment to the American cause in principle, and desired above all else to have an end to the terrible effects of the war on their own lives and property. Whether this unhappiness and distrust of government constituted loyalty to England is another matter. It would appear that there was a range of attitudes that could justly be termed "disaffection," each of them a bit different from the others. At one end of the spectrum were the true loyalists who actively worked to undermine the whig effort and promote the British interest. At the other end were those people whose discontent sprang from the inadequacies of their immediate surroundings -- perhaps something as basic as food or physical security -- but who may have had little or no ideological attachment to the British interest itself. Clark was right, to a degree: the region as a whole was probably not tory in any real political sense. But Brodhead was probably right also, for under the right

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conditions, and especially if the British army had moved into the territory, the entire spectrum of discontent in the region might have come to play against the American cause.

It was largely for this reason that the congressional commissioners who visited the Pittsburgh country in 1778 recommended a stronger military effort against the British at Detroit. The inhabitants were frightened and on the defensive; if they had to abandon their settlements, even if only temporarily, "it may produce in many an aversion to the cause, an attachment to which has occasioned their sufferings." The commissioners recommended a stronger Continental involvement in the region to help bolster the resolve of the citizenry and to thwart the effects of disaffection.[4]

Some high-ranking British officials believed that there was a core of loyalist support among the local leadership of the Ohio forks region. It was an ill-founded assumption, based largely on an "Address of the Inhabitants of Transmontane Augusta County" sent to Lord Dunmore in 1775. This memorial thanked Dunmore profusely for his aggressiveness against the Shawnee the previous year. Then, with reference to the governor's seizing of the powder in the magazine at Williamsburg and rumors that he would turn the Indian nations against the frontiers, the memorialists went on to say that they would not believe "such conjectural insinuations and probably misinterpreted

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actions . . . without Reasons much more cogent" than had appeared so far, and the signers professed their continued loyalty to Dunmore. Twenty men, all of them benefactors of Virginia authority at Pittsburgh, subscribed their names to the document on behalf of "Several hundred" others.[5]

John Connolly, one of the signers, could point to the list of memorialists as evidence of the influential support he said he could count on to help bring about British control of the Ohio Valley.[6] He was certainly correct to a degree, for the three most noted tories of the region, Alexander McKee, Simon Girty, and Alexander Ross, were among the signers. Perhaps others on the list were covert loyalists, but if so they left behind no real evidence to justify such a statement.[7] The great majority of the signers adapted to the new circumstances brought by the Revolution and stayed within the local Virginia power structure. Some, including John Gibson and William Crawford, attained relatively high rank on the American side during the war. In any event the memorial to Dunmore was not the loyalist oath of allegiance that Connolly probably touted it as to the British, even if he had engineered it to be such. For men such as William Crawford and John Campbell, the document was primarily an expression of warm good feeling, and even of personal fealty of a sort, for the aggressive Scots earl who had marched against the Shawnee when other officials fretted over the niceties of policy, and who had supported them decisively in their

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efforts to block Pennsylvania's jurisdiction in the western country. Connolly may have thought that he could slyly manipulate the westerners' political naivete regarding the extent and nature of the colonies' quarrel with Great Britain. His experience at Pittsburgh should have taught him better. Connolly's associates in the West Augusta leadership might support Britain if doing so would further their own interests, and the affection for Dunmore reflected in the memorial might under the right circumstances have brought them to the British standard. Few of them, however, felt any overwhelming ideological commitment to the mother country.

The westerners' attention to their own interests meant that the British could not rely absolutely on the area's rumored disaffection. When he was released by the rebels late in the war Connolly went straight to Sir Henry Clinton and argued that he could now do what he had been prevented from doing in 1775. By moving down from Canada with some British regulars and Indians, Connolly maintained, he could capitalize on the Ohio Valley's latent toryism to win the region for the British. Not a chance, General Frederick Haldimand, an old crony of Henry Bouquet's in the Royal American Regiment, declared from Quebec: Connolly "may be a clever man, but certainly is not possessed of the abilities or the knowledge necessary to judge of any other than the speculative part of the undertaking." Furthermore, Haldimand argued, "we have daily experience that the

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disposition of the inhabitants upon the Ohio is by no means so yielding to [British] government as is represented." The western settlers, including the many immigrants to Kentucky, may have demonstrated a distaste for the American governments, and often if captured protested their loyalty to Britain. Yet the hatred inspired by British-instigated raids against the settlements was tremendous, the inhabitants were eager to resist encroachments against their property, and Haldimand did not believe that Clinton should put much store in Connolly's assessments of the region's loyalism.[8] Haldimand probably erred in dismissing as perfunctorily as he did the region's supposed disaffection, for as his opponents on the American side saw, that discontent was of very real potential benefit to the British. However, the general was more alert than others to the fact that the disaffection for the American cause demonstrated by some of the Ohio Valley's residents was not to be equated with affection for Britannia. Nor were the men who signed the declaration to Dunmore in 1775 quite the loyalist cadre that Connolly presented them as.

There was, however, enough loyalist activity in the area to fuel the concerns of patriot authorities. The exposure of Connolly's original scheme in 1775 of course put rebel officers on their guard against subversion in the west. The following year Alexander Ross was stopped after making an unauthorized visit to Lord Dunmore on the Virginia coast, and letters from the British government to Maryland's

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royal governor were in his possession. Congress released Ross after an investigation, and there is no evidence that he was involved in any conspiracy involving the backcountry. Yet before long he received permission to travel into the Indian territory and never returned to Pittsburgh, alighting instead at the British settlement at Natchez on the lower Mississippi. A prominent trader, creditor, and land speculator at Pittsburgh before the Revolution, Ross left behind thousands of pounds' worth of land and other assets, all of which forfeited to Pennsylvania when the state proclaimed him a traitor in 1781.[9]

Beginning early in 1777 British officers at Detroit waged a propaganda campaign against the upper Ohio Valley settlements. During that year and early in 1778 Indian raiders left behind copies of proclamations or open letters at farmsteads they attacked. One sort of proclamation, originating with the British Indian department at Niagara, was intended primarily to intimidate the settlers. One version of this document purportedly emanated from the councils of the Six Nations. It warned the inhabitants to withdraw immediately from their settlements since, the proclamation declared, the Indian nations still claimed the land. War parties from the north distributed this sort of proclamation especially among the northernmost settlements of Westmoreland County in the Kittanning vicinity. Another type of propaganda came from Henry Hamilton, the commander at Detroit, and it offered incentives for defection to the

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British. Hamilton offered pay and a land bounty to anyone who would come to a British post and join the fight against the American rebels. Copies of Hamilton's proclamation appeared among the upper Ohio River settlements during the summer of 1777. When a packet with ten copies of the proclamation was found near Wheeling, Ohio County's militia officers swore one another to secrecy lest the contents leak to the public, then hurried the packet to General Hand at Fort Pitt.

In January 1778 Hamilton penned a new letter. This time he appealed to those who viewed themselves as neutral victims of the war. Hamilton indicated that the only way one could be safe from British-allied Indian raiders was to move to Detroit, and he assured his readers that provisions could be made to have them escorted safely through the Indian country to the British post. These measures, Hamilton averred, were "to save from ruin those innocent people who are unhappily involved in distresses they have no ways merited." To assuage his readers' fears Hamilton also used the letter as a testimonial signed by several people who had been captured in the Ohio Valley and were willing to certify their good treatment at the hands of the British and the Indians.[10]

In August of 1777, as the British saturated the frontiers with their propaganda, a "most horrid conspiracy" appeared in Monongalia County. The county lieutenant,

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Zackwell Morgan, and two of his militia colonels learned of a loyalist plan to rise in arms, seize American guns and supplies at the mouth of Redstone Creek, and effect the capture of Pittsburgh. Using men already mobilized for a campaign against the enemy, Morgan and his officers took to the field and swiftly overpowered "numbers" of loyalists who had sworn an oath to Britain and taken up arms.[11] Although quickly suppressed, the conspiracy had far-reaching effects. One of the captured loyalist leaders, heavily manacled and with balls and chains on his ankles, tumbled from a boat into the Monongahela River and drowned. Zackwell Morgan was with the guards transporting the prisoner across the river, and the coroner and magistrates of Monongalia County, perhaps because of some internal conflict within the county's leadership, remanded Morgan to Williamsburg for trial on a charge of murder. Morgan was so popular, and the outcry against the defeated tories so strong, that the majority of the county's militia captains and their men simply refused to serve until Morgan was released. In time Morgan was acquitted, but for months the county's militia was in chaos.[12]

As the captured Monongalia County loyalists were questioned they made some reference to a plot to take Pittsburgh. Alexander McKee and Simon Girty, both former employees of the British Indian service, John Campbell, the local Virginia officer, Continental Indian agent George

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Morgan, and even General Hand were mentioned as possible members of the conspiracy. McKee and Girty were already under the watchful eye of the American authorities. Hand traveled to Monongalia County to hear the formal examination of witnesses and decided that the charges against all the supposed conspirators had their basis in vague presumption or personal animosity.[13] George Morgan was investigated by a congressional committee and a panel of commissioners sent to Pittsburgh. John Campbell and others were displeased with Morgan's cautious policies intended to preserve the neutrality of the Delaware, and used the opportunity to criticize Morgan and link him through innuendo to Alexander McKee and the Girty brothers. Apart from his nonaggressive policies the only evidence against Morgan was a letter he had written to the commandant at Detroit, but this proved to be a cover for an agent Morgan had sent to gather intelligence from the British post. The congressional investigators cleared Morgan of all charges.[14]

The threat of loyalist subterfuge was with General Hand at Fort Pitt continuously from the latter part of summer 1777 through the spring of 1778. In August, just before the Monongalia County episode, a drunken Virginia soldier babbled something to his sergeant about a plot to seize Hand, but officers found no indication of a wider conspiracy.[15] In the wake of the Monongalia affair,

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however, Hand faced some real problems at Pittsburgh. Late in 1777 he had one Eleazar Davis confined at the fort on the suspicion that he was a British spy from West Florida. A number of soldiers of the garrison fell under Davis' influence; discontent at the post was so rife that twenty-six men deserted from Fort Pitt between mid-January and mid-April 1778.[16] There were imaginative rumors of secret tory musters at McKee's house near Pittsburgh, of hidden scaling ladders ready for an assault on the fort, of covert messages to and from Detroit, and of British-instigated plans for the seizure of Pittsburgh and other sites. One night in April Davis, his servant, a dozen soldiers, two sergeants, and a couple of townspeople stole a boat and fled down the Ohio. A party dispatched by Hand pursued them relentlessly, ran them to ground at the mouth of the Muskingum, and captured about half the group. The subsequent court martials resulted in at least three executions.[17]

By this time Hand had reason to feel beleaguered by the loyalist problem. While Davis was still in the guardhouse Alexander McKee slipped his parole and joined the British at Detroit. The son of a frontier trader and a Shawnee woman, McKee had served as George Croghan's protege and assistance in the British Indian department and succeeded his mentor as the crown's Indian agent at Pittsburgh in the years preceding the Revolution. McKee was to

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have held an officer's commission in Connolly's aborted plot to seize the region early in the war. His examination by the West Augusta committee in 1776, prompted by a letter he received from Niagara, may not have been too thorough -- the committee was, after all, run by Croghan, Smallman, Campbell, and other old friends of McKee. He was allowed to stay in the Ohio forks vicinity after pledging not to communicate with the enemy or use his influence with the Indians in Britain's favor. Late in 1777 Hand made McKee give up his parole to the local committee in favor of one made directly to the Continental government, and the Board of War asked him to wait on them at York. McKee dragged his feet, delayed the journey, and one night at the end of March 1778 left for Detroit.[18] With him went Matthew Elliott, a trader, and Simon Girty. Girty was a product of the Pennsylvania frontiers, had been a captive of the Seneca while young, and had been in and around Pittsburgh since the 1760s as a trading company employee, guide, hunter, and government interpreter. In the mid-1770s he held an officer's commission in Connolly's militia. Later two of his brothers also joined the British.[19]

These three experienced men were of considerable utility to the British at Detroit. Girty earned the undying rancor of American literature and folklore by aiding the Indians in their warfare against the frontiers. McKee and Elliott were the most influential officers of the Indian service at Detroit during the Revolution and

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through the 1790s. Hand and other officials in the Pittsburgh region understood that this would be the consequence of the trio's defection to Detroit. Hand immediately canceled an intended expedition up the Allegheny and feared a terrible onslaught on the settlements once McKee and his fellows, who had not only great influence with the Indian nations but accurate information about the rebel situation as well, settled into British employ at Detroit.[20] Aided by the local courts, the general also continued to ferret out inhabitants implicated as loyalists and those who aided deserting soldiers. "I believe the Devil has possessed both Country People and the Garrison," Hand wrote the day after Eleazar Davis and the soldiers he had enticed to desert escaped from Fort Pitt. It was within this context that Hand and the congressional commissioners who visited the area that spring encouraged the Continental government to send more regulars to the region. "Indeed it is my sincere Beleif," Hand wrote, "that if a few Men are not sent here immediately, to encourage the timorous tho well affected, and overawe the Tory faction, this whole Country will be abandoned or over run by the Enemy in a short time."[21]

Hand was through the worst after the spring of 1778, however. The region had faced an especially intense flurry of concern over conspiratorial activity, and there was nothing else quite like it for the duration of the war.

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There is no knowing just how widespread and strong the loyalist conspiracies of 1777 and 1778 really were; the Eleazar Davis episode, for example, was almost certainly more smoke than fire, although it served as a tremendous spur to the discontent simmering among Hand's troops. As for Alexander McKee, he himself no doubt understood that politically he was no Croghan or Connolly. His reputation in the region was based only on his association with Croghan and his very able service as an agent of the British Indian department. McKee could be really effective for the British cause only after he left Pittsburgh and devoted his complete attention to what he did best, acting as a very capable intermediary between the British of his father's culture and the Indians of his mother's. While he remained in the Pittsburgh vicinity the threat he posed to the Americans derived primarily from his ability to serve as a source of intelligence for the British and as an influence on the region's Indians, not from any ability to lead a tory uprising. With him or without him loyalism in the upper Ohio Valley may have been incapable of consolidating a movement powerful enough to overthrow the existing power structure in the region. Given the government's inability to exert effective centralized control within the region, there is little to indicate that the friends of the crown could have drawn together the disparate elements of discontent to effect a tory revolt. Moreover, those in local positions of power, no matter what their ultimate

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ideological beliefs, would fight to block any challenge to their leadership. The presence of a British army might have drawn out many of the disaffected, but even then there could be no guarantee that the inhabitants would feel quietly content about British authority.

There was still direct evidence of attachment to the crown by some people in the region after mid-1778, but most of it was relatively small in magnitude -- people evincing some affection for Britain through their statements to others, for instance.[22] Colonel Brodhead also learned that disaffected persons in the upper Ohio Valley settlements were corresponding with the British at Detroit. Migration to Detroit, rather than any plot to seize the Ohio forks region, seemed to be the primary aim of the authors of these letters. Still, this and other evidence convinced Brodhead by early 1781 that disaffection was chronic and potentially crippling to the American cause in the west. He began to order those people he considered most dangerous to leave the vicinity.[23] Simultaneously, American intelligence sources informed George Washington of Connolly's new plan to move down the Allegheny from Canada to capture Fort Pitt, and word was "that there are several hundred persons now in the neighbourhood of Fort Pitt who are to join him." Washington ordered Brodhead to "secure or remove every suspected character from about you."[24] It is not known precisely what steps Brodhead took or how many

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people fell under his scrutiny during this period. Connolly's expedition failed to materialize.

Army commanders also faced a chronic problem of discontent and disaffection among their own soldiery, both militiamen and regulars. Desertion and absence from duty were chronic at Fort Pitt and the smaller posts throughout the war. A number of the deserters headed for Detroit, some with the intention of aiding the British, others simply because it seemed a likely place to go. Others hoped to travel downriver, and some re-enlisted again after deserting.[25] The soldiers' discontent arose almost exclusively from the immediate conditions of their service: lack of pay, insufficient clothing, inadequate food.[26] There was, on occasion, almost complete disobedience of orders, even mutiny. Brodhead's regulars were extremely discontented over their inadequate food and clothing and he had difficulty keeping the bulk of them in service. Early in 1782 General Irvine learned that the entire garrison at Fort Pitt intended to mutiny because their pay was so far in arrears.[27]

The majority of the troops serving in the region, even the Continentals, were local men. Their discontent and the general malaise of the civilian population fed on one another. "We have been Upbraided by the Country Inhabitan[ts] for our Fidelity," the Virginia soldiers at Pittsburgh declared near the end of the war. "They Call us

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fools, Cowards, and a set of Mean fellows for staying without our pay, and Just dues."[28] Of course during the war many of the "Country Inhabitants" of the region also periodically begged for increased aid from government, particularly in the form of more troops. That paradox was one of the reasons why Continental authorities felt such terrible unease about the region's chronic discontent and were so troubled by the disaffection that reared its head around Pittsburgh. Outright toryism or an unshakable devotion to the whig cause would have been much easier to comprehend.

That there was a feeling of dissatisfaction with one's circumstances on the part of many people in the upper Ohio watershed during the Revolution would be difficult to dispute. And a good bit of that discontent can honestly bear the label of disaffection because of the way in which it framed the individual's relationship with the American governments. Whether most of this disaffection was a treasonous rejection of those governments is much more difficult to say. So much of the discontent of both soldiers and civilians was founded, after all, on immediate concerns of safety, comfort, and well being, not on ideology -- at least not on the ideology that separated the American cause from the British. In that sense the disaffection was not irreversible. Political allegiance was simply not a matter of absolutes for many of the region's

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inhabitants; permanent commitment and abject, mechanical devotion were too much for government to expect. Six months after independence members of the Westmoreland battalion were outraged to learn that they were not to receive the regimental garments and full cash bounty they had been led to expect at enlistment, and might be asked to serve outside their home county: "We are Willing to s[t]and for our Country till Death But Not to [be] imposed on."[29] It was an attitude in keeping with the transmontane country's young but active political tradition, one based on pragmatic standards and a view of government as a tool. The genuinely ideological whigs in the region represented one end of a wide spectrum of "affection" for the American cause just as the true political loyalists were but one end of a range of behavior that constituted "disaffection." The two spectra were contiguous, and in assessing the region as a whole, as well as in many individual cases, it becomes impossible to see where the one left off and the other began, or to explain attitudes in terms bearing any strict reference to an attachment to either of the contending nations.

During the Revolution, as in the earlier wars with France and its Indian allies, the white inhabitants of the

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frontiers found that their own settlements were the primary scene of conflict. Every resident of the vulnerable settlements, regardless of age or sex, faced the prospect of becoming a direct participant in the conflict, even if as an unwilling victim. It was the Indians who determined the form of this warfare, which was a continuation of the kind of combat that Indian groups had long engaged in against one another. Cultural strangers to war as waged by Indians, the white Americans of the new settlements were forced to react to it and to develop means of surviving it. The war brought to the settlers by their Native American enemies, along with the methods by which the whites coped with the situation, had very profound effects on the form of society in the upper Ohio Valley, the way in which the area's inhabitants viewed themselves, and their relationships with one another. The region's wartime experience also reveals a dark, unhappy, distasteful side of the advance of white settlement into the interior.

Whites who came into contact with Indian war lacked the cultural fabric that made it comprehensible and was necessary in order to make its participants truly effective. War was an integral element of the culture of the woodland Indian groups of eastern North America. This was true during the American Revolution despite the Indian nations' long involvement with the European powers and their conflicts in America. War as the Algonquin and Iroquoian

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peoples practiced it was related to all aspects of the participants' lives, was part of the very structure of their culture, and was a factor of fundamental importance in defining the individual male's role in society. Warfare performed certain important functions within the society; in return the culture gave both support and meaning to the kind of behavior necessary to participate in such a personally violent form of war.

The Indians' raiding techniques, which had smoothly incorporated the technology of European firearms, were the product of generations of development within the woodland societies. Members of war parties were capable of traveling far afield with practically no equipment other than their weapons and with only the lightest supply of rations. Unencumbered with supplies, it was usually necessary for the warriors to find or borrow food in route, and they had to be able to move or fight with little food if necessary. Yet the mobility of raiding parties was such that warriors of the Iroquois nations east of Lake Erie could, in feuds of long standing, exchange raids with the men of the Cherokee, the Catawba, and other nations a great distance to the south. The warfare of the Indians also required swift, and if possible undetected, movement into and out of the enemy's territory, as well as the mastery of the actual tactics of forest combat that so impressed white observers. Most of the skills necessary for war were crucial also to the

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successful hunter, and males began to learn the techniques of both hunting and war at a very early age. From adolescence through the active years of adulthood the majority of men performed the dual role of the hunter-warrior. Not only were the necessary skills learned in childhood; hunting, sports, games, and a ceremonial "mimic" warfare in times of peace kept bodies and skills in fighting shape and transmitted some of the techniques of war to the young.[30]

Equally important, however, was the cultural context of war and the rites and ceremonies associated with it. Ability in war brought prestige to the warrior, for example, and for many men warfare was the "road to honour and authority." War leaders -- those men the whites often called "captains" -- earned their position through prowess in the field.[31] Songs, dances, stories, and the relation of dreams helped the warrior and his listeners measure his place in society by his exploits against the enemy. Traditionally, but with decreasing frequency by the middle eighteenth century, tattoos on the body served as a similar record of the warrior's achievements. Dreams, visions, and rituals tied both hunting and warfare to the Indians' spiritual world. The hunter-warrior's responsibilities and duties were also well defined. His was to be the realm of the chase, of weapons, of long absences from home and fields while the women maintained the stable domestic and

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agricultural side of life. He was, moreover, expected to exert control over his emotions, and his society honored him for the stoic infliction or reception of pain in the course of war.[32]

There was formalized ceremonial behavior associated with every major aspect of war. The diplomacy which formally began or ended war was governed by the protocol of the council, and strict attention was paid to the symbolic meanings assigned to such things as wampum belts and war hatchets. There were songs, dances, and rituals associated with the formation of a war party, its departure, its return, and its passage through villages on the way to and from war. In a fashion these ceremonies involved the entire community in the business of waging war and reinforced the status of the warrior within the society.

Revenge was usually the warrior's expressed motivation for going to war. The fact that status was achieved through prowess in war gave combat an important cultural function, served in itself as a reason for warring on others, and helped fuel the long-running friction that existed between some Indian nations. Notions of encroachment by others could also bring conflict. However, the individual's reason for going to war at a particular time was usually revenge, to exact retribution for the loss of a relative, a friend, or some revered person.[33] The exaction of revenge was very specific and formalized. It

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took two forms: the killing of an enemy to exchange life for life and the capture of prisoners to replace those lost during war. The captives might be adopted into the society to replace lost relatives, or they might be tortured to death. Either case involved rituals in which the entire community could participate. The adoption ceremony helped resolve the bereaved ones' sense of loss and in a fashion helped them complete their mourning for the person they had lost. The torture of a courageous enemy could serve a similar function, and also reinforced the notions of stoic resoluteness and strength expected of warriors. If grief for the lost loved one was particularly strong or of recent origin then the tortures could be especially cruel. Traditionally there had been ritual cannibalism as well, although this practice had become much less common by the time of the Revolution than it had been a century earlier.[34]

The scalping of an enemy and the triumphant cry that followed the killing or capture of an enemy -- often called the "scalp yell" or "death halloo" -- were also elements of the ritual component of Indian warfare. They were marks of the achievements that a woodland fighter used to gauge his prowess and accomplishments. Furthermore, they touched at the very personal and individualized form of Indian warfare. The warrior engaged the enemy with no defensive accoutrements, physically vulnerable, only his skill and courage standing between him and dishonor or

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death. By tradition the only hair he wore on his own head was the scalplock, which might someday become the trophy of a smarter or braver enemy. Scalping the fallen victim and shouting in triumph registered the warrior's personal victory. It allowed him as well to release some of the tension and energy that were inherent within woodland combat but which the warrior could only expel under certain prescribed, often ritualized circumstances.[35]

Warfare was, for the Indians, a special part of life with its own cultural meanings. A warrior's personal appearance signaled his business to the world and was expected to fill any enemy with fear. The traditional practices, some of which had fallen into decline by the middle-to-late eighteenth century, included the plucking of all hair on the head except the scalplock, tattooing, and the cutting of the fleshy rim of each ear to form a pendant loop of skin weighted with metal ornaments. Members of a war party also painted their faces in a fashion denoting their purpose; red and black were often the colors of war. And when on the march warriors enforced a particular discipline, and in at least some instances employed a special vocabulary, that helped give special importance to the venture and distinguished it from other kinds of activity.[36]

As part of the entire pattern of life within the Indians' cultural systems, warfare served important functions within the society, and its activities were in turn

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reinforced by the culture as a whole. The woodland Indians engaged in a warfare that was terribly violent on a personal level, yet they were able by ritualized and prescribed behavior patterns to channel that violence and keep it in a very real sense under control. There was a tension between the violence of the warrior's role and the unemotional visage so often required of him. Through a variety of mechanisms the Native American societies patterned the warrior's behavior to allow him certain channels for the expression of emotion and the release of tension while at the same time preparing him to be an honorably stoic representative of his people in the giving and receiving of pain. For the society as a whole war was a very important, and a very structured, activity, and its role as an integral element of culture allowed Indian societies to wage, and to cope with the effects of, a type of conflict that Europeans considered the ultimate in savagery.[37]

Warfare between Indians and whites meant warfare according to the Indians' pattern. The Indian warriors could easily adapt to a European enemy; white settlers were certainly a suitable target for raiding parties of the traditional pattern. Yet for their part the whites encountered a mode of warfare that was culturally quite alien to them. They were not equipped with a social system that explained this form of violent conflict or made it really understandable, that reinforced and channeled the kind of

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behavior it demanded, or that prepared "warriors" and non-combatants for their respective roles in war. White Americans could make their most effective responses to Indian hostility through diplomacy or by putting the Indians on the defensive by moving an army against them. The latter course of action required a strong body of trained and disciplined troops, supported with all necessary food and equipment, marched into the enemy's country in a manner that guarded against ambush. Otherwise the people in the western districts had to cope as best they could. Little if anything about British-American society gave its members the ability to counter Indian warfare as equals, or even to cope with it as victims.

Despite the image preserved by the mythology of the frontier, the great majority of the settlers in the upper Ohio Valley were not particularly good at fighting Indians. After a strike against another Indian nation, warriors often could expect enemy warriors to pursue them doggedly until they reached safer ground close to home. White settlers, on the other hand, might not mobilize to pursue a war party and usually abandoned the chase sooner than Indian warriors would have done. "It appears a little odd that people should be missing and no body sent out after them," Colonel Brodhead caustically replied to a report of the capture of some Westmoreland County residents in 1779. After Hannastown was destroyed by Indians from the north in

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July 1782 a resident of the town reported that "we need not put any dependance on" a general mobilization and pursuit by area inhabitants. Several groups of armed settlers, some as strong as fifty men, came to the scene of destruction only to "stay about one hour and pitty our situation" before returning to their homes.[38]

White farmers and laborers simply had not been prepared by their society to serve as hunter-warriors able and willing to make lengthy sorties against the enemy with very little equipment and provision. They were, for one thing, very much homebound compared to Indian males. Indian society did not expect its men to stay close to their families and crops year-round since hunting and war both demanded mobility. The division of labor in white society did not allow most men to act as mobile warriors while the women, the young, and the aged tended the crops and gathered other foodstuffs. Indian males were not always away from their families, but they had the capability to leave them if necessary to go raiding against an ememy. Nor were they as bound as white yeomen were to individual holdings of land with buildings and appurtenances that represented considerable capital investment and were vulnerable to physical decay, attack, and possibly legal encroachment by one's fellows if left unattended. Equally important is the fact that most white settlers lacked the skills necessary to be good at Indian-style combat since they had not been trained as warriors from an early age.

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There was some adoption of the appearance, the accoutrements, and the tactics of Indian warriors by whites. Intelligent military commanders both in the French wars and during the Revolution recognized that "the Shadow may be often taken for the reality" and dressed, even painted, the members of some of their scouting parties and patrols to look like Indians. These men often worked in conjunction with groups of allied Indian warriors.[39] In 1758 and 1764 there was a shortage of European-style military garb at Fort Pitt and entire units of provincial troops were dressed in leggings, blankets, and shirts readily available from traders' supplies of goods. The availability of such items and their suitability for hunting influenced the white frontiersman's dress, which adopted some elements from the Indians' garments. Shoes and boots were more difficult to obtain in the Pittsburgh country than moccasins, for instance, and were less practical for some activities. Some woodsmen and hunters also abandoned their breeches for breechclouts and leggings. The fringed "hunting shirt" of white hunters on the frontiers, however, differed from the calico shirts favored by the region's Indians, and whites did not generally adopt the matchcoat, the multipurpose outer garment and blanket of the Indian.[40] Even those whites who for military reasons took on the appearance of Indians generally did not assume the complete physical attributes of a warrior. For example, most whites saw no

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appeal in "Ears slit into Strips and Chitterlings, and twisted about with more silver Clasps than a Dutch family Bible." When a Maryland soldier at Fort Pitt in 1779 slit one ear and painted his face, his superiors presumed that he intended to desert, but a court martial concluded that the man's actions were motivated solely by "wantonness."[41]

Those whites who adopted not just the warrior's general appearance but his method of warfare, and who could fight effectively as genuine raiders within the enemy's territory, were very few in number. Most, however, became the stuff of legends. Such was Captain Samuel Brady, an officer of the Pennsylvania line serving under Brodhead at Fort Pitt. Soldiers on scouting forays with Brady dressed as Indian warriors, wore full-face red and black war paint, and even stained the exposed skin showing between breechclout and leggings a darker hue. Brady, usually in command of a mixed party of whites and friendly Delaware warriors, made sweeping patrols in the country to the north and west of Pittsburgh and was most effective in intercepting enemy war parties. There was even an element of the warrior's revenge motivation in Brady, whose brother and father were killed by Indians on the West Branch of the Susquehanna in 1778 and 1779.[42]

Brady's mastery of the form of Indian warfare was unusual, and even more so was his military discipline. Some who have lived in legend as able and heroic white warriors

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-- the Wetzel family, for example -- marked their careers by what could be thought of chiefly as brutally racist, homicidal behavior. Indian warriors understood implicitly the purpose of their method of warfare; even its most violent elements served some cultural function; and violent behavior was rigidly structured and channeled, condoned only under prescribed circumstances. Whites on the frontier, no matter how attired, lacked this cultural foundation: they did not understand the rules. Some whites interpreted the Indians' violent mode of war as a license for conduct on their own part that in other circumstances would have been thought deviant and criminal. As a result they did not honor the distinction Indians made between the justifiable violence accompanying war against enemies and the unjustified violence of murder, nor were they quick to distinguish hostile Indians from those who were neutral or even friendly. The men of this ilk might have been capable murderers but they were poor warriors, and in the long run their violence did little to help the settlements ward off Indian attackers.[43]

Unable for the most part to take the fight to the enemy's own ground and put hostile Indians on the defensive, there was very little the western inhabitants could do to defend themselves. The usual technique during both the Seven Years War and the Revolution was to establish a series of posts with small patrols, or even just pairs of "spies,"

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moving between them. In theory this system allowed the whites to hold a firm frontier, and the scouts could intercept raiding parties passing around the forts. In practice, as some military officers realized long before the Revolution, the method had very limited effectiveness against swift, mobile, quiet war parties. The system did have the advantage of keeping men under arms at dispersed sites, ready in case of trouble, but most of the time the men in this service had no contact at all with the enemy and they could rarely be of much help to one another if separated by much distance. The whites' collective frontier experience had revealed no better mode of defense, however, and it was employed in the upper Ohio Valley during the Revolution. One modification favored by some inhabitants, in recognition of the Indians' ability to filter past the defensive line, was to place little garrisons of men not beyond the settlements as a false protective shield but rather among the settled areas where they could be of some use during an actual incursion.[44]

With no entirely effective means to stop enemy raiding parties, a very wide zone of the western settlements was open to attack. A particularly ominous threat to any portion of the settlements -- repeated attacks, for instance, or one very devastating raid -- could put the neighborhood into alarm and cause the local inhabitants either to flee to a safer district, perhaps even east of

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the mountains, or to cluster into small defensive stockades or fortified mills and houses. Sectors of the frontier "broke up" or "gave way" in this fashion a number of times during the Revolution and the earlier Indian wars; withdrawing or "forting" were the backcountry residents' only real options at those times when danger seemed imminent. In most cases either alternative meant at least a temporary abandonment, and possibly the destruction, of one's farm, crops, livestock, buildings, and personal property. Nor could either recourse guarantee personal safety.

Outright fear motivated the people in these situations. Terror was an intentional component of woodland Indian warfare, but Indians raiding against one another at least had a cultural context that helped them understand war as a complete system with important ritual elements. For white settlers of British or German background, scalping, torture, the "War Hallow," the warriors' physical appearance, the taking of captives for permanent adoption, and the ability to raid almost anywhere, even within sight of forts, with seeming impunity, all had a ghastly, alien quality that compounded the settlers' feelings of physical vulnerability. Under this stress the settlements could crumble into a bedlam of panic, which is what Henry Bouquet witnessed at Carlisle during the Indian uprising of 1763, but the rippling effects of fear could be less dramatic, if no less potent. A Moravian missionary traveling to

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Pittsburgh from Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, in 1778 was struck by "the sight of so many deserted houses along the glades, on the doors of which was written, either with chalk or coal, 'good people, avoid this road, for the Indians are out murdering us.'" Even where the people had not abandoned their farms, "the gloomy countenances of all men, women and children, that we passed, bespoke fear."[45]

At times fear was so potent that it prompted families to flee their homes even though cooler heads believed the actual peril to be slight. "There appears to be few Savages yet on these frontiers," Bouquet remarked dryly as a wide belt of settlement melted away in 1763; "but every Tree is become an Indian for the terrified Inhabitant."[46] During the Revolution the examples of respected men who stood firm could help forestall the complete abandonment of settlements in their vicinity. However, at times the process worked the other way, and even the resolute ones could be forced to leave if the rest of the inhabitants fled and left them alone and vulnerable.[47]

No matter whether they continued working on their farms, fled, or took refuge in a local fort, the settlers' mood in the face of the Indians' threat was one of fearfulness, impotence, and abject vulnerability. Michel St. John de Crèvecoeur, who visited the Susquehanna frontiers during the Revolution, assumed the persona of "a Frontier Man" in order to describe this psychology of victimization in the

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closing essay of his Letters from an American Farmer. "We never go to our fields but we are seized with an involuntary fear, which lessens our strength, and weakens our labour," he wrote, and within the household "the least noise spreads a general alarm." Crèvecoeur took pains to depict the intense strain that grew from the constant expectation of attack. He noted as well the helplessness stemming from the inability to take action to eliminate the threat; one could do little more than wait, worry, and prepare as best able, an impotent victim of seemingly irresistible forces. "If we stay, we are sure to perish at one time or another; no vigilance on our part can save us; if we retire, we know not where to go; every house is filled with refugees, as wretched as ourselves; and if we remove, we become beggars." Nor did ideological attachments or political understandings make the slightest difference -- all, even those with little commitment to the American cause, were liable to suffer, a circumstance that could impel many who before had felt an affection for Britain to side now with the rebels. Crèvecoeur personally despised being forced into any commitment: "Alas, how should I unravel an argument, in which reason herself hath given way to brutality and bloodshed!" The "Frontier Man" in fact believed himself and his fellow sufferers to be victims not simply of Great Britain's Indian allies but of the governments that continued the war for their own political ends.

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"What are we, in the great scale of events, we poor defenceless frontier inhabitants? What is it to the gazing world, whether we breathe or whether we die?" Crèvecoeur answered himself: "we are like the pismires destroyed by the plough; whose destruction prevents not the future crop."[48]

"Self-preservation is above all political precepts and rules," Crèvecoeur wrote, and he argued strenuously that under the conditions imposed by war on the frontiers, the victim's dominating concern must inevitably be for oneself and one's own family.[49] So appalled was he over the effects of frontier war on what he believed would otherwise be a peaceful, happy, and rational society, and so strongly did he blame British and American leadership for the situation, that for his "Frontier Man" he posited the unlikely recourse of taking up residence with a nation of peaceful Indian farmers. That recourse was an intellectual ideal that helped Crèvecoeur make his point, but it was not an option open to those people in the Ohio Valley during the Revolutionary War who suffered from the kinds of fears and stress that Crèvecoeur articulated. For those people "self-preservation" had to take some other form.

For most white inhabitants of the transmontane country, personal security in times of Indian war came through a form of defensive localism in which groups of neighboring settlers looked to their own resources for

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survival. The foci of these enclaves were the "private" forts. Stockaded enclosures, blockhouses, or fortified mills built through private initiative, frequently bearing the name of the owner of the farmstead or mill site, these structures were scattered throughout the region. A person's immediate society consisted of those others who lived close enough, usually just a few miles away at most, to take refuge at the same spot in case of danger. These "forts" might be unimpressive -- one was described as "an assemblage of small hovels" -- but particularly in the scattered, newer settlements they and not church buildings, commercial centers, or county seats served as foci of activity. A limited, usually fairly informal, notion of collective action was operative within these enclaves, although in some instances there was a more formal "association" of inhabitants for specific military purposes. The best the local fort could offer was some increase in personal safety; crops, homes, and most livestock remained vulnerable. One was not obligated to join those who fled to the fort, and those who were "captains" by common agreement "could advise but not command." A visitor to the Virginia and North Carolina backcountry commented that "in any of their forts it was all anarchy and confusion, and you could not discover what person commanded, for in fact no person did actually command entirely."[50] The system provided the inhabitants with some of the benefits of collective action, but did so

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at a very localized level, so the individual's fears that his own self-interest would be sacrificed to some greater good were minimized. Despite their lack of formal structure these little societies found ways, if necessary, to regulate the conduct of anyone in the vicinity whose behavior drew notice as antisocial. Their very function gave these groups something of an inwardly-oriented, enclave mentality, and in isolated newer settlements a person might have almost no social contact at all outside his or her immediate neighborhood of settlement.[51]

During periods of threatened attack, when the inhabitants took to their forts, "the whole population of the frontiers huddled together in their little forts left the country with every appearance of a deserted region."[52] As Crèvecoeur's distraught "Frontier Man" would have understood, self-preservation was the primary object of each of those units. At times the inhabitants of relatively secure districts would not come to the aid of those in other zones who had moved into forts for protection. Geographic dispersal could make such aid difficult in any event. Self-interest and concern for one's own property and family were continual impediments to collective action.[53] Trust might extend no farther than the walls of one's little fort, if that. The experience of a traveler bound from North Carolina to Kentucky in the early 1770s is instructive. Due to an apparently exaggerated fear of an Indian assault, the

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settlers in one area had all abandoned their farms and fled to the safety of the local fort. This "abandoned set of miscreants," as the traveler described them, "void of shame, but abounding with fear," were so suspicious that they refused to open their gate to the lone wanderer until he threatened to set the fort walls on fire. Inside, the traveler found "no subordination, no regularity, no propriety, no good conduct, not a single good word, . . . but all was confusion, nastiness, and the most abominable wickedness."[54]

In a sense the settlers' localism and distrustful self-reliance were appropriate to the political climate of the Ohio forks country during the 1770s and 1780s. State jurisdictions were unresolved and confused. Many people came to believe that government at both the state and the national levels could be unreliable and disappointing in the matter of basic protection. The militia, so fundamental to the region's defense, was always a very localized affair, its companies comprised of groups of men from the same immediate locales. Furthermore, decisions made for the region as a whole meant the subordination of individual self-interest to some reputedly greater good, a situation which people concerned for the immediate physical safety of themselves and their property did not accept eagerly. Decentralized control of defense and military matters had considerable appeal, and during the Revolution inhabitants

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often expressed their concern over the regional commander's disposition of forces. After ruminating on the matter, a portion of Monongalia County, "heartily sorry that there should be the least seeming Jarr or descenting Voice from the orders of Colonel Brodhead," decided in the fall of 1780 that it would be wasteful to send men to the rendezvous for what promised to be another aborted campaign. Instead the immediate demand for local protection "obliges them to throw off all dependence on any natural aid on this side of the Mountains this fall, but that of themselves for their relief, and therefore they mean to embody, and take the most plausible methods for their defense."[55] In this as in many other instances local action has the appearance of a measure forced by absolute necessity, and the modicum of mutual cooperation represented by the local forts and defensive alliances could only accomplish so much. A great many people would have gladly accepted outside aid for the protection of their locales. The petitions that governments received during wars with the Indians came largely from neighborhoods of settlement within the region pleading for assistance, perhaps only in the form of a few arms or an exemption from militia drafts.[56] Association with one's neighbors for defensive purposes could be marked by some of the same distrust that hampered larger collective efforts and was by no means an abandonment of the individual's self-interest. Still, necessity made the practice so pervasive

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that under the stress of war the region was in effect just a collection of many local enclaves.

During the Revolution, despite efforts to furnish rangers, protective garrisons, harvest guards, and places of refuge in case of attack, it was impossible through either government action or the association of private individuals to protect everyone in the western country and eliminate the threat of attack. Inhabitants usually stayed scattered about on individual farmsteads, vulnerable to mobile raiding parties, and flight to any form of protection still left one's property open to destruction. The whites' best defensive efforts could not eliminate the intense feelings of vulnerability and fear, and the psychological strains associated with the constant expectation of attack, described by Crèvecoeur. Inherent within the inhabitants' sense of victimization was their frustration over their inability to take effective action against the sources of their troubles. Individually or collectively, they seemed unable to capture the British centers at Detroit and Niagara and unable for the most part to stop or punish the warriors who inflicted destruction on the settlements. Nor, if they considered themselves victims as well of the American government, could they take decisive action to strike at that source of their dismay. The tension created by this sense of frustration and impotence may have found an outlet in the form of internal dispute among the inhabitants. The

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intense whig-tory factionalization depicted by Crèvecoeur's "Frontier Man," for example, as well as much of the internal friction that marked the upper Ohio Valley settlements, may have resulted in part from the settlers' inability to harm the real targets of their rage. And attacks against those Indians the transmontane whites could destroy -- Indians who in most cases were not engaged in raids against the American frontiers -- were even more clearly products of the settlers' frustration and attempts to deny the terrible sense of impotence that beset them as victims of Indian warfare.

The Continental government's cautious Indian affairs agent at Pittsburgh, George Morgan, recognized early in the Revolution that it was very difficult to make frontiersmen channel their aggression against only those Indians who were known to have committed hostilities against the settlements. Reports of Indian hostility usually grew far out of proportion, Morgan argued, which increased the whites' aggressiveness while lessening their discrimination of friends from enemies among the Native Americans. Morgan believed that the state and national governments must show considerable restraint so as not to give the undisciplined westerners an excuse to make war against any Indians they could reach.[57]

The military and political circumstances of the region contributed to the kind of situation Morgan dreaded. Independence of action characterized volunteer and militia

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units. Local companies often did not respond to the direction of officers unfamiliar to them, and even their own officers could not by dint of authority alone expect to control them. Violence, moreover, was a sanctioned part of military activity, so men embodied as a volunteer or militia company could feel that there was a certain legitimacy or propriety to their actions if taken in the name of protecting the exposed settlements. As Morgan realized, it was in the state and national governments' interest not to make such legitimacy of action too easy to claim. It was in the same vein also that Colonel Brodhead at Fort Pitt was apprehensive of the bounty that Pennsylvania agreed to pay for the scalps of enemy Indians in 1780.[58] Unfortunately, the military authorities themselves often promoted a violently racist attitude toward Native Americans. Brodhead, for example, referred to enemy Indians as "black Villains," "Caitiffs," and "Yellow Boys"; to some of the locals with whom he dealt, the careful distinctions that Brodhead made between friendly and enemy Indians may have been lost behind this strong vocabulary.[59]

Morgan was right to fear that armed and angry whites could be impervious to even the most reasoned and energetic arguments concerning diplomacy, relations with friendly Indian groups, or the larger effects of aggression against innocent Indians. Attacks on defenseless Indians served largely as vents for the frustration stewing within many

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frontier inhabitants. The friendly or unarmed Indians who suffered at the hands of whites were easy targets and convenient substitutes for the elusive, seemingly almost invincible, enemy warriors. The destruction of innocent Indians was largely an effort on their killers' part to negate feelings of almost total impotence against the enemy. The white who killed an Indian was no longer a helpless victim, a "pismire destroyed by the plough," but a creature able to take some action on its own behalf, powerful enough to inflict harm and to place someone else in the victim's role.

The war with Britain was marked by a number of assaults against innocent Indians, and each incident worsened relations with those Native Americans who remained friendly or neutral to the United States. In 1777 Virginia militiamen stationed at the mouth of the Kanawha, enraged when one of their number was killed near the fort, murdered the Shawnee leader Cornstalk, his son, and a companion who were being held at the fort. Cornstalk had been the most pro-American Shawnee leader in the region. About the time of his murder General Hand complained that the region's inhabitants were reluctant to pursue organized campaigns against the enemy but were "well Disposed, savage like, to Murder a defenceless unsuspecting Indian."[60] White Eyes, a Delaware clan chief who pursued an openly pro-American policy after the outbreak of war, was also murdered by white

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militiamen, a fact that Continental officials concealed from the Delaware.[61] Other Indians of neutral or friendly disposition were attacked at or near Pittsburgh. Soon their leaders demonstrated a reluctance "to put themselves in the power of our frontier people," and avoided conferences with American officials at Fort Pitt. It was a good place to avoid: a Moravian missionary later claimed that during the Revolution whites in the Pittsburgh area made razor strops from the skin of dead Indians. Even those few faithful Delaware who stoutly refused for the entire duration of the conflict to join Britain's allies were, by the war's end, huddled under the protection of the Continental commander at Fort Pitt and "could not for two days outlive the removal of the Garrison."[62]

In the spring of 1782 the local people's distress over their plight at the hands of enemy Indians burst into what General William Irvine called "a fit of phrensy." Within a period of weeks, militiamen killed a large group of Christianized Delaware at mission villages in the Ohio country, several other friendly Delaware Indians staying on an island "at the very nose of the Garrison" of Fort Pitt were murdered, and Colonel John Gibson, a longtime Pittsburgh resident and politician with business and marital ties to the Indians, was threatened with scalping. "These transactions added to the then Mutinous disposition of the Regular Troops had nearly brought on the loss of this whole

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Country," Irvine confided to General Washington.[63] Irvine's own troops itched to move against the enemy during the "phrensy." He allowed Captain Uriah Springer, an experienced Virginia officer, to lead a scouting party into the enemy country to gather information. Springer, not unlike Captain Samuel Brady, was not only an able woodsman but a disciplined officer who confined his attentions to known enemies. Soon after his party left Fort Pitt a group of Pennsylvania regulars asked permission to enter "The Indaian Cuntry" and promised "to prequre as Meney Sculps from our Enemy and Make Sutch Discuverys as can Be Maid in Wich We think We are capable of going through With." "We Want Revenge appon the Savage For the Engury the[y] Dun unto our Brother Soldiers hare of let," they declared. Whether Irvine granted their request is not known.[64]

The most striking incident of that spring of 1782, and the most notorious single instance of violence by whites against noncombatant Indians, was the killing of ninety Christianized Delaware at the Moravian towns on the Tuscarawas River. Moravian clergymen such as David Zeisberger, John Heckewelder, and others had been active beyond the Pennsylvania frontiers for some years, and by the middle 1770s they had a number of Delaware converts settled at villages the ministers called Schönbrunn, Gnadenhütten, and Lichtenau.[65] During the Revolution the missionaries and their converts adhered to an official policy of pacifism

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and neutrality, but their location in the Tuscarawas-Muskingum country put them between the various British-allied groups to the west and northwest and the American settlements east of the Ohio. War parties used the Moravian towns as a way station on their raids against the white settlements, but Heckewelder and Zeisberger quietly furnished the Continental officials at Pittsburgh with intelligence concerning the warriors' movements and intentions. There were partisans on each side of the conflict who distrusted the missionaries and their converts or wanted them moved elsewhere. Some officers of the British Indian service, including Simon Girty and Matthew Elliott, argued that the Moravians were a force impeding the conversion of many Delaware to active support for Britain. In 1781 the British finally used their Indian allies to move the missionaries and their flock to the Sandusky River, leaving their towns on the Tuscarawas empty.[66] For their part many on the American side of the conflict viewed the Christianized Delaware as at least passive supporters of the enemy warriors, if not active participants in the raiding. During 1781 there was talk of forming a punitive expedition against the Moravian towns. A militia expedition entered the Muskingum area that fall but found no Indians.[67]

Enemy raiding in the Ohio River settlements west of Pittsburgh in February 1782, raiding which came very early in the year and at a time when apprehension in the settle-

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ments was extremely strong, brought the militia back to the Moravian villages. This time they found just under one hundred Delaware Christians, of both sexes and all ages, who had returned from the Sandusky to retrieve corn they had left behind at the time of their removal. The whites found evidence that the recent war parties had passed through the converts' towns. Ignoring the German missionaries' influence on the Christianized Indians' material culture, the militiamen also noted what they took to be plunder from raids against the settlements: "Cloths, Childrens Caps, Tea-Kettles, Potts, cups and saucers . . . Saws, Axes, Chissels, Pewter Basons Porrengers etc. -- which were all such Things as were only made use of by White People and not by Indians."[68] Converts from two of the Moravian towns were gathered at Gnadenhütten and killed; others at Schönbrunn learned of the massacre and fled before the whites arrived there.

The group responsible for the murder of the Moravian converts consisted of at least 150 men and youths, most of them apparently from what today is the western portion of Washington County, Pennsylvania, and the adjacent part of West Virginia's panhandle. Their ranking officer was Lieutenant Colonel David Williamson of Washington County's militia, but the little expedition seems not to have received any prior sanction from General Irvine, who was away from Fort Pitt at the time. The unit may have

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consisted largely of Williamson's militia battalion, but it could best be described as an independent, semiformal, self-governing group of volunteers. The group held a conference at Gnadenhütten to decide the fate of their compliant prisoners, and an unknown but large proportion, apparently including Colonel Williamson, did not condone the killings and did not participate in them. Details are sketchy, but this dissident number did not, perhaps could not, prevent the killings.[69] In effect it would seem that each member of the party was an independent actor who could choose either to participate or not to do so. The group as a body gave sanction to the event, however. After their return to the settlements none of the party seems to have made any public statements regarding the guilt or innocence of any others, and details of how many men were at Gnadenhütten, who they were, and who really did or did not help kill the Christian Indians there are very sparse. There were people in the region who openly condemned the murders and called for government action, but it seemed unlikely to some that any clearly damning evidence could ever be drawn from those who were present.[70]

General Irvine refused to condone the affair but also believed that "the general and common Opinion of the people of this Country is that all Continental officers are too fond of Indians." To ensure the continued cooperation of the region's militia officers Irvine not only declined

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to use his position as Continental commander to condemn the affair or punish those responsible; he publicly ignored the entire incident and in fact took pains to demonstrate his own eagerness to deal forcefully with the Indian threat to the frontiers. "No Man knows whether I approve or disapprove of killing the Moravians," he confided to his wife, and he firmly instructed her to express no opinion on the matter to any of their acquaintances in eastern Pennsylvania. Irvine reasoned himself into a state of conscious uncertainty: "Whether this [affair] was right or wrong I do not pretend to determin."[71] Personally horrified by the massacre itself, he distrusted the frontier inhabitants' views of the matter and considered the political and military consequences of a moral stance too risky. Since the members of the party did not appear likely to give any evidence, Irvine informed the Pennsylvania government that "further inquiry into the matter will not only be fruitless, but, in the end, may be attended with disagreeable consequences."[72]

The murder of the Christianized Delaware at Gnadenhütten did nothing to solve the settlers' defense problems. The succession of attacks suffered by the settlements during the previous raiding seasons did not abate after the Moravian affair. Four months after the Gnadenhütten incident a large enemy party from the Niagara vicinity burned Hannastown and terrified Westmoreland County, and smaller raids

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continued as well. Moreover, the slaughter at Gnadenhütten drew from the pro-British Delaware a wrath to match any that the whites of the upper Ohio Valley had ever witnessed. When an expedition of several hundred mounted Pennsylvania and Virginia volunteers was formed in May 1782, less than three months after the killings, General Irvine made some efforts to see that William Crawford, experienced as a Continental army officer, was elected to command rather than David Williamson. Early in June the little army approached the Sandusky River towns of Britain's allies, was attacked and surrounded by a large number of enemy Indians, and with difficulty extricated itself to make a broken and disorganized retreat. Williamson and a number of others made it safely back over the Ohio. Crawford, who had not been present at Gnadenhütten, was captured and killed by excruciatingly slow and agonizing tortures in what the pro-British Delaware considered to be a kind of national retribution for the massacre of their Christian fellows. That summer the Shawnee and the militant Delaware were so vicious in their retaliation that the British commandant at Detroit had to ask Alexander McKee to use his influence to prevent them from torturing all their white prisoners to death. General Washington advised Irvine that none of his men should allow themselves to be taken alive by enemy Indians.[73]

Nor did the Moravian incident do much to erase the emotional frustration that helped bring it about. Within

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the Indians' culture the ritualized destruction of captives served a function and helped release the anguish of the bereaved. In contrast the Gnadenhütten killings could not really resolve the whites' feelings of helplessness against the enemy, and at least for some there was almost no real release of the frustrations that tormented them. According to the grandnephew of one of Williamson's men, "one member of the expedition . . . killed sixteen of the Moravian Indians, as he claimed, and then desisted only because his arm was wearied to a standstill: and he sat down and cried because he found in it no satisfaction for his murdered wife and children."[74]

The attitudes characterizing the Pittsburgh country just before the outbreak of the "phrensy" of the spring of 1782 were expressed cogently in a memorial addressed to General Irvine after his appointment to the command at Fort Pitt late in 1781. The petitioners, "a Number of the Inhabitants of the Western Country," informed Irvine that none of the defensive measures pursued in the region thus far had prevented the strikes of enemy raiding parties against the settlements. They asked Irvine to solicit the massive state or national aid necessary to build a wall of blockhouses west of the Ohio and Allegheny Rivers, each

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station to be occupied by twenty-five men, and with no more than ten miles between blockhouses so that the frontiers could be totally screened against incursion. Or, they proposed, give us an offensive campaign, but one powerful enough to break the power of Great Britain and its allies from the Ohio River to the Great Lakes. Without such measures the western settlements would continue to be subject to "the most unparalled Miseries." The raiding of the past several seasons had been so destructive that the memorialists expressed little confidence that they would be able, without a great deal of assistance very soon, to withstand the attacks expected in 1782. People along the seaboard could not comprehend the effects of Indian warfare, the petitioners asserted -- it was "more severe" than the war with the British army in the east and was marked by "Savage Barbarity"; "Murder and Butchery," even of "helpless Women and Children," characterized it, and no one was safe from death or captivity; farms had been abandoned or so neglected that they were now "grown up with Bushes and Briars"; and a once expansive zone of settlement had contracted into a "lamentable Compass." Through Irvine the memorialists implored eastern residents of the states to think about what it meant to find loved ones "lying hackt by the Tomahawk, scalped and . . . their Throats cut by the Knife of the Savage," or to live continually "under Apprehension of this cruel Kind of Death." It is as if we live,

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the memorialists wrote, "on [the] Ends of the American Earth." "Hardy and determined" by experience, still "We seem to have been in a great Degree neglected by our Brethren beyond the Mountains, who have left us exposed to the merciless Savages [of] the Wilderness."[75]

Theirs was a special plight, these westerners felt. Subject to a kind of war that could not have been designed to be much more horrifying or disrupting to them, they considered themselves victims of an especially harsh fate. There was a notion, expressed both in the memorial to Irvine and by Crèvecoeur's "Frontier Man," that other white Americans simply could not fully comprehend an existence subject to the destruction and the gnawing fears and apprehension of Indian war without experiencing it. Paralleling this belief was the opinion held by trans-Appalachian inhabitants that simply maintaining one's residence on the frontiers under such conditions was in itself a form of service to the American cause. Extensive demands on them by government were unreasonable, they argued, and government should if anything give them more assistance to help hold the western marches against the enemy. To the bewilderment of Continental and Pennsylvania officials, the residents of Westmoreland County requested during the war that the entire county, every inhabitant, be given military pay and rations, even when not engaged in what the government liked to call "actual service" with the military. As far as the

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Westmorelanders were concerned their very maintenance of a portion of the exposed frontiers was a form of public service.[76] The fact that government could not or would not relieve them of their problems led some residents of the upper Ohio Valley to see themselves as the victims of their own governments as much as of Britain or of Wyandot, Shawnee, Iroquois, and other warriors. Some weeks before Hannastown was attacked in 1782 a resident of the village complained that the concentration of militiamen and regulars close to Pittsburgh "Gives us a Reason to think that we are Left to fall a Sacrafice to the Enemy," and it was more than just an idle expression.[77]

Indian war put particular strains on the relationship between government and governed. Whites on the frontier could only with great difficulty confront the stresses it created. It drove them into a kind of defensive localism, affected their views of government and centralized decision making, and gave the western settlements a depressed, unhappy aura as the physical, social, and psychological attrition of the war wore on and on. Under the conditions of frontier war, self-preservation, as Crèvecoeur argued, came to supercede other considerations and pulled at the very fabric of British-American society.

The disaffection so prevalent during the Revolution was in the majority of cases seated in the individual's discontent with the immediate circumstances caused by the

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war. There came to be on the part of many a deficit of any sense of physical or emotional well-being. Their petitions indicate that many of the area's residents would have welcomed an expanded role for government in the region if it had meant the alleviation of the problems that most dismayed them. The experience of the Revolution reinforced the opinion of many residents west of Laurel Hill that government could not be trusted completely, not so much because of any inherent powers on its part but because of its unreliability in the solution of problems its constituents considered vital, or because its goals were often at variance with the individual's. And the person's own obligation to government in turn was limited. This was a negative form of democracy, founded not on positive ideologies but on disappointment, distrust, and compelling requirements of self-interest. It was a situation also in which violence, extreme localism, an almost paranoid concern for personal security, and action outside what much of the rest of American society might consider to be acceptable social and legal channels all found some place.

It is easy to exaggerate or oversimplify the political differences between newer frontier areas and more settled districts. Newly settled regions were not as united politically as one might presume, there could be strong commonalities of interest between east and west, issues and alliances could be complex, and what might appear to be

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differences rooted in sectional interest were often the result of factors such as religion and ethnic background. The upper Ohio River country was clearly not a monolithic political entity at the end of the Revolution. There was considerable difference of opinion within the region, and the experience of war fostered internal conflict and in practical terms encouraged political and social fragmentation.

Still, expressions of a collective sense of victimization and suffering, coupled with very strong opinions concerning the region's relations with eastern governments in matters of defense and of western contributions to the national effort, could offer at least a vague kind of political identity to the upper Ohio Valley region at the close of the war with Britain. Attitudes and perceptions were always more important to the definition of the area as a distinct region than were any physical facts of topography. The country west of Laurel Hill was distinct when it was viewed as such, and the region's boundaries were always rather vague and flexible. In the earliest years of white settlement, notions of a distinctive quality centered on the region's exotic image in some minds and the perceptions of isolation associated with it. Now by the close of the Revolution there were expressions of a comparable set of attitudes that centered on the western country's wartime experience. The expressions of opinion such as the petition

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to Irvine were in a sense contrived, designed to wrest something concrete from government or to establish a kind of special relationship in the area's continued dealings with government. No doubt some of the grumbling was fostered by politicians seeking to exploit dissatisfaction with government to their own advantage. Nevertheless there was an expressed feeling on the part of many people that the war had been a very frustrating experience and that the Ohio forks region's relations with higher government in confronting the problems of war had been disappointing.

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THE ENDS OF THE AMERICAN EARTH:

PITTSBURGH AND THE UPPER OHIO VALLEY TO 1795

Volume II

by
James Patrick McClure

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PART III:

TO MAKE A COMMON CAUSE

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CHAPTER 8

BURGHERS, FARMERS, AND THE POSTWAR WORLD

In some respects the American Revolution was a watershed where one period ended and another began in the upper Ohio Valley. During the war a solution was imposed on the Virginia-Pennsylvania dispute and the jurisdictional problem was resolved. New sets of problems inherent in the formation of the republic faced the nation after the peace. In economic terms the region's postwar experience forecast its later industrial development and stood in some contrast to the earlier years. In most respects, however, the area's development after the war, including its great population growth, reflected trends that began before the Revolution, and much of the region's distinctive texture remained with little change.

A substantial population increase marked the upper Ohio Valley region during the years following the Revolutionary War. This increase was the continuation of the growth that began by 1770. It is impossible to determine precisely the effects of the war itself on the area's population growth: many people were displaced from their homes by enemy raiding, but only temporarily, and others moved into the region during the war years despite

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the dangers. Once the war was over the population grew by many thousands through both immigration and natural increase. The taxable population of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, in 1779, when it was the state's only county west of Laurel Hill, was 2,111, reflecting a total population of perhaps 10,000. Due to the unresolved state boundary, the inability of local officials even to assess taxes in large portions of the county, and the displacement caused by the war, that figure must certainly be too low, but by an unknown amount. During the middle 1780s tax lists from Pennsylvania's counties west of Laurel Hill indicate a total population of about 35,000 or perhaps 40,000 individuals.[1] By the time of the national census of 1790 the total rose to 63,566 persons. Another 9,980 lived in the adjacent Virginia counties of Ohio and Monongalia. Southwestern Pennsylvania's population growth continued into the 1790s, but at a lesser rate than had marked the expansive 1780s.[2] Nearly half (47%) of the white population of Pennsylvania west of Laurel Hill in 1790 was female. Less than a thousand of the people in the southwest corner of the state at the time of the first census were black, most of them slaves.[3]

The tremendous population growth of the postwar years is but one indication of the movement of people into, out of, and through the upper Ohio country in the

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1780s and early 1790s. After the Revolution Pennsylvania surveyed the western sections of its boundaries and opened the northwestern portion of the state to buyers. Although the bulk of Pennsylvania's western population remained concentrated in the southwestern part of the state, settlers began to move into the country north of the Ohio forks during the later 1780s and the 1790s.[4] Pennsylvania's veterans were to have first claim to portions of the country west of the Allegheny River as part of their compensation for service during the war. In March 1785, before the surveying of the military tracts began, a former officer complained from Pittsburgh that "the Damnd. People of this Country is flocking over the Rivers by hundreds, taking up and setling our lands."[5] Other eager people moved over the Ohio River into the Northwest Territory before its lands were opened for sale. In 1785 U.S. troops evicted a number of these settlers and destroyed their improvements.[6]

In addition, large numbers of people boarded flatboats on the upper Ohio or its tributaries and floated downstream to take up lands in Kentucky or, by the later 1780s, the Ohio country. "It seems as if people were mad to git afloat on the Ohio," one observer reported late in 1789.[7] During spring and fall, when the water

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of the upper Ohio was at its highest, dozens of "Kentucky boats" embarked downriver. In November 1787 over 120 boats passed Pittsburgh for points downstream in less than a week; from October 1786 to December 1788, some 16,203 people in 857 boats passed Fort Harmar at the mouth of the Muskingum, and others floated past at night without stopping to report to the army. In May 1789 a traveler claimed that over 15,000 people had embarked "this season" from the mouth of Redstone Creek.[8] Some of the emigrants were residents of the upper Ohio Valley who chose to relocate further west in newly opened districts, while considerable numbers came from east of the mountains and only lingered in southwest Pennsylvania long enough to find transport down the Ohio.[9]

The upper Ohio country reaped some economic benefit as the embarkation district for thousands of migrants traveling downstream in the 1780s and 1790s, although it seems that this trade had only a limited effect on the supply of cash in the region. Migrants needing boats and provisions procured them at Pittsburgh, Wheeling, or towns on the Monongahela and the Youghiogheny. This was but one element of the region's economy during the postwar period. Trade in deerskins and beaver pelts still played some part in the area's commerce, but no longer dominated the economy as it had in the early years. Land, through its sale or rental, continued to be a source

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of income for those who could acquire more acreage than they needed for their own use. Circumstances had changed since the early 1770s, however. By the 1780s it was impossible to acquire any great speculative tracts in the country to the south or east of Pittsburgh, although the new lands west of the Allegheny attracted a number of speculative concerns. Town lots in Pittsburgh or the area's other developing towns became an attractive investment for some people after the Revolution. Due to the great downriver migration, however, some found that the selling price of their lands in the region did not rise to the degree they had hoped.[10] The limited supply of money after the war also hurt the land market. Perhaps more striking than these developments were the increase in commercial activity, the great diversification of the local economy, and the beginnings of manufacturing in the area during the 1780s and 1790s.

This diversification certainly had its beginnings in the region even before the Revolution. Its development after the war was dependent upon the growing population and the movement of so many people through the area, but it is important to note that those people investing in the area after the war assessed the region rather differently than they or others like them had done in the 1760s or early 1770s. The Ohio forks country of the 1780s was in a fashion similar to what it had been

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two decades or more previously: it presented a fluid situation, a field of opportunity in which an assertive man might, by early, aggressive, and intelligent action, garner a large share of the region's economic promise for himself. For those evaluating the situation at the close of the war the way to go about that task was a bit different than it had been earlier.

George Washington helps illustrate the changing assessments of the Ohio forks country. In the first several years of his experience with the area, Washington, the provincial military officer, viewed the region within the strategic context of French and British competition for control over the interior of the continent. Yet he was also attuned to the region's economic potential, especially in terms of the peltry trade, and considered ways in which Virginians could compete successfully with Pennsylvanians in that sphere. By 1770 land played the largest role in Washington's vision of the upper Ohio Valley; his own investments of energy and capital in the region at that time were concentrated on the acquisition of land and its development as a source of income through mill construction, general agricultural improvement, and leasing to tenants. After the war he viewed things differently. By the middle eighties Washington was disillusioned with his absentee landholding west of the mountains. Disputed land claims, something for which

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he had never had much taste, continued to be a problem, and finding efficient managers for his western properties proved extremely difficult. The entire project never developed as he had hoped it would. His lands in western Pennsylvania "unproductive of every thing but vexation and trouble," he took steps to rid himself of them during the latter half of the 1780s and the 1790s.[11]

By the 1780s Washington had also revised his notions of the course of economic development for the Ohio Valley. He had always seen commerce and transportation links between east and west as important, and had believed in the west's potential as an agriculturally productive region. At the close of the Revolution he believed that Virginia could capture the western country's potentially vast trade for itself. To do so meant directing the flow of commerce, and in 1784 Washington traveled over the mountains and quizzed everyone he saw about the navigability of the tributary creeks of the Monongahela, the Youghiogheny, and the Kanawha, and their proximity to improvable upper tributaries of the James and the Potomac. The ambitious transportation system Washington envisioned did not develop during the eighteenth century, although his recommendations to Virginia's governor in 1784 did result in state charters for two companies that began to improve the navigation of the James and the Potomac above those rivers' falls.[12]

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Even as Washington developed his plans for Virginia it was clear to many Pennsylvanians that their own highway to the west, the road connecting Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, was not the ideal commercial link between east and west. Even after alternate routes were built around some of the worst sections of the road, portions of it through the mountains remained very thinly inhabited, maintenance was always a terrible problem, and stones, rutting, mud, and steepness remained nuisances in spots. Packhorse trains continued to be a common mode of transport over the mountains. Transport costs remained very high.[13] During the 1780s and 1790s Pennsylvania improved the Forbes route, opened new roads through the mountains, and developed its own plans for the improvement of waterways.[14]

Such grand visions as Washington's were motivated largely by the longstanding Pennsylvania-Virginia competition for the economic benefits of the west, and by the realization that the Ohio-Mississippi river system gave the newly developing region a natural transport system that could pull commerce away from the seaboard. By no means did all other entrepreneurs share Washington's plans for the transmontane country or move through the same progression of assessments of the region that he did. Yet Washington is the best example of the ways in which people interested in shaping a course of action for themselves in the region responded to the changing

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situation there as they made their decisions. Some people took part in the increased commercial activity and diversification with a less clear notion than Washington's of their own role in larger economic developments; but many perceived the region after the Revolution as a flexible, growing system offering opportunity to the ambitious person with access to capital or credit. Just as there were prominent hide traders and land speculators who stood out in the 1760s and early 1770s, so were there entrepreneurs whose activities illustrate postwar developments in the Pittsburgh country. Isaac Craig and James O'Hara are among the most obvious examples, and their diverse ventures help characterize the new trend.

Craig, an Ulster carpenter, emigrated to Philadelphia about 1765, when he was in his mid-twenties. He spent the latter portion of the Revolution at Fort Pitt as an artillery officer. After peace was declared he stayed at Pittsburgh and entered into a partnership with Stephen Bayard, another officer brought west by the war.[15] They soon associated themselves with the Philadelphia firm of William Turnbull and Peter Marmie. As the Philadelphia side of the partnership, Turnbull and Marmie gave Craig and Bayard access to development capital, found them necessary equipment and craftsmen, and gave shrewd directions for the combined firms' Pittsburgh ventures. During 1784 the partners bought from the Penn family, which had

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retained its ownership of the Pittsburgh manor lands, the point area in Pittsburgh where the fort stood, plus as much of "Coal Hill" on the south side of the Monongahela as they could acquire. They had to contend with others for the rights to each location, but considered the control of such important real estate to be well worth the fight. It was "for our Interest to secure the whole of the Coal hill," Turnbull and Marmie advised. "We hope you will constantly keep in view that this is the moment to secure such valuable places."[16] At the Philadelphians' urging Craig and his partner quickly built a sawmill to furnish lumber for their own operations and to take advantage of the expected demand for wood. On the Fort Pitt premises they erected a 1500-gallon commercial distillery.[17]

This activity all began during 1784 and 1785. Within another two or three years the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia concerns dissolved their ties. During the late 1780s Turnbull and Marmie came west and built an iron furnace on Jacob's Creek in Fayette County, the first of its kind in the region.[18] Bayard went his own way and laid out a town site up the Monongahela. Craig's activities both during and after the connection with Turnbull's company demonstrate the wide diversity of his endeavors. During the 1780s he acquired real estate and employed traders who traveled to the Indians to sell

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goods for hides and furs. Soon after the Revolution he and Bayard also joined General William Irvine and three other partners to build salt works on the Mahoning River in the northeastern part of what is now Ohio. The spot proved to lie within the Northwest Territory, and so was off limits to any permanent intrusion by whites at the time. It had long been known as a salt lick, however, and salt, necessary for the preservation of meat and other food, was a scarce, coveted, and very expensive commodity in the Ohio forks region.[19] Irvine -- who during his command at Fort Pitt had predicted that with peace "Vast numbers of people will come into and travel through this Country" -- and his partners first sent people to the Mahoning with the ostensible purpose of trading with Indians, but they quickly brought in kettles and established a salt boiling operation. In 1785, when Congress proved unhappy about the violation of its policies, the venturers gathered a set of petitions bearing the signatures of dozens of the upper Ohio Valley's most prominent citizens, asking that the salt boilers not be evicted. During 1787 and after, Craig sold salt, possibly from the Mahoning, at the distillery in Pittsburgh.[20] During the 1790s Craig went into partnership with James O'Hara to operate a glassworks at Pittsburgh, and was a quartermaster and superintendent of the federal government's military stores at the Ohio forks.[21]

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James O'Hara was no more than twenty when he arrived in Philadelphia in 1772. Irish-born, he brought with him a good basic education, possibly obtained in France, and some experience as a clerk in a Liverpool maritime brokerage. O'Hara located in Pittsburgh and with the aid of an inheritance entered into peltry trading ventures with established traders such as John Campbell and Devereux Smith. During the Revolutionary War he raised an independent company in the Virginia service, but he spent most of the war in various quartermaster and commissary positions. He continued to trade in furs and hides during the war, maintained a general mercantile business at Pittsburgh, loaned out cash, and acted as a financial broker by exchanging paper money and certificates for cash for his customers. He also hoarded salt and demanded $80 per bushel when the Continental government was desperate for that article at Pittsburgh in 1778.[22] After the Revolution he continued his mercantile business and peltry trading, acquired a sawmill, bought a number of lots in Pittsburgh as well as tracts in the Northwest Territory, built the region's first glass factory at Pittsburgh beginning in 1795, and purchased, built, or foreclosed on several other businesses during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He also continued to act as a government contractor, selling supplies to the army and furnishing goods to be

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used as gifts at treaties with the Indian nations.[23] In addition, he contrived to take advantage of the demand for salt better than anyone else in the region in the eighteenth century. As an army contractor for the United States in 1796 and 1797, O'Hara developed a series of land and water transport links that brought salt from the Onondaga works in New York to Pittsburgh by way of Lake Ontario, Lake Erie, and the Allegheny. O'Hara's system utilized barrels and transport he needed for his military supply business anyway; although the route required at least a half-dozen transshipments of the load between wagons and boats, his salt sold at Pittsburgh for half the price of that brought over the mountains by land, the means by which most salt still came into the region. Onondaga salt by O'Hara's route dominated the Pittsburgh market until the Kanawha works in western Virginia began to produce salt on a large scale in the nineteenth century.[24]

Between them Craig and O'Hara illustrate the major factors important to the postwar economics of the country west of Laurel Hill. They and others like them worked to locate, secure, and develop sources of certain key resources, including coal, stone, salt, iron ore, and minerals.[25] Land, too, was a resource, particularly town lots. Town lots and "out lots" in Pittsburgh and the region's other

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developing towns were an attractive investment.[26] Another element was the production of goods and materials on a commercial scale within the region -- the beginnings of manufacturing. In the immediate postwar period this generally consisted of an expansion of activities present before the war with Britain: sawmills, gristmills, boatbuilding, brewing and distilling. During the 1790s and after came the iron furnaces, glass factories, and other industrial ventures.[27] As the careers of O'Hara and Craig demonstrate, diversity of activity and an involvement in several different sorts of endeavors were common.

In several respects the entrepreneurial climate after 1783 was not much different from that of the prewar days. In each case there was a wide range of participants involved, from those who engaged in commerce with only a few goods to those with enough capital or influence to contemplate seriously the domination of a major sector of the economy. In both periods business activities were "ventures." Partnerships and companies formed to engage in a particular activity, then dissolved as needs changed; there was, as well, the venturer's competitive notion that success might hinge on the gaining of advantage over one's fellows in the quest for control over resources or markets. And in the 1780s and 1790s, as in the 1760s, ventures required capital or some

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access to credit. Craig and Bayard helped solve this problem through their early association with Turnbull and Marmie of Philadelphia. O'Hara apparently employed his continuing mercantile activities and his government contracts to the same end, while Isaac Meason used land deals to help obtain the capital necessary to build a blast furnace.[28] It would appear from these cases that diversified endeavors helped cushion against possible failures. It was a competitive situation, capital could be difficult to obtain, and not all ventures were successful.

Craig and O'Hara also illustrate the importance of a continuing link with the national government for some men in postwar Pittsburgh. Both men held influential positions overseeing transport and stores for the army in the 1790s. Both before and after such service O'Hara was a private supply contractor; his salt venture demonstrates one advantage of such a position. It also gave him access to cash in a specie-poor economy, and not just through his supply contracts. In 1786 O'Hara, who had brought the army's payroll downriver with some presents for an Indian treaty, was present when the soldiers stationed on the Great Miami River received several months' pay in cash and notes. "Captain O'Hara opened a cheap assortment of goods, which he disposed of to the soldiers as quick as they received their money,"

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an officer wrote. O'Hara sold the isolated soldiers both dry goods and liquor, garnering virtually all but the officers' pay.[29] As supply commissaries and quartermasters O'Hara and Craig also had the power, if they chose to use it, to favor their friends and snub their enemies as they contracted for wood, boats, and other materials, hired teams, and purchased foodstuffs and forage. The economic importance of the United States military to the region as a buyer of goods and services, much as that of the British army before 1772, was considerable.[30]

It is significant also that Major Craig and Captain O'Hara were among the region's former army officers, men who were frequently referred to by rank long after the war: General John Wilkins, General John Gibson, General Richard Butler, Colonel William Butler, and others. These men, most of them members of the Order of the Cincinnati, comprised a kind of elite. Craig and O'Hara were the group's notable economic venturers; some others continued to rely primarily on land and trading as sources of wealth. Some were active in politics. As a group they shared certain values and attitudes, generally conservative in the context of postwar politics. Those who took different sides in the Virginia-Pennsylvania conflict, and subsequently served different states in the war,

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tended to be moderate, not violent, in their involvement in the dispute. All of them maintained ties with their fellows in state and national governments, so when there were appointments to be given out -- as commissaries, quartermasters, envoys to Indian treaties, militia district officers, or revenue officers -- the posts often went to these men, their families or associates. The "Neville connection," a group tied by blood, marriage, and business to John Neville, was the most noticeable recipient of what patronage the federal government had to offer in the region. The Cincinnati by no means controlled the region: a number of economic and political leaders of the 1780s and 1790s were not of the clique, nor did the former officers think and act as a welded unit. As a group, however, they were one of the features of the region's social landscape in the years following the Revolution.

Larger-scale entrepreneurs such as O'Hara, Craig, Turnbull, and others were among the more prominent participants in the economic expansion and diversification of the region, a process involving a large segment of the population. Commercialism at a relatively low level had always been present. The numbers of people attracted by the mercantile prospects of the British army's initial establishment of Fort Pitt attest to that fact. And before the Revolution even isolated settlers might go together to send an annual load of peltry to

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the Potomac in exchange for salt and iron.[31] At the same time in Pittsburgh there were merchants who stocked or could obtain a wide range of imported and domestic foodstuffs, household goods, and apparel. This continued to be the case, and on a greater scale, after the war. Town merchants' inventories by the late 1780s and 1790s were vast and diverse.[32] Most of the merchants took "country produce" in exchange for their wares. Passing migrants and the newer settlements downriver provided another, although limited, market for farm surpluses. In addition, the New Orleans trade, only beginning to develop in the 1780s, promised an outlet for bulky products such as flour, barrelled meat, and whiskey. Some cattle were driven to Detroit or to the east.[33] Also, through the 1780s ginseng, which grew wild, was one of the most valued commodities in the region.[34]

A great surge of population was already underway in the 1770s, and by that decade there were artisans in the region concerned with the shaping of materials (carpenters, furniture makers, metalsmiths), as well as entrepreneurs engaged in the processing of goods (especially grain and lumber milling). By the end of the 1780s there were at Pittsburgh a stone quarry, a brickyard, distilleries, breweries, sawmills, gristmills, boatyards, a ropewalk, and an earthenware pottery,

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while at Washington, the seat of Washington County, there was a nailery.[35] Before 1790 there were hatters, shoemakers, clock repairers, bakers, gold- and silversmiths, saddlers and other leatherworkers, joiners and cabinetmakers, carpenters, fullers, and dyers working in the region. The "Mechanics of Pittsburgh" formed a society in 1788, and the next year an "Invitation to Emigrants" in the Pittsburgh Gazette declared that there were bright prospects for artisans and tradesmen.[36]

According to an observant German traveler, the town of Pittsburgh in 1783 contained "perhaps 60 wooden houses and cabins, in which live something more than 100 families, for by the outbreak of the last war the growth of the place, beginning to be rapid, was hindered." There was one new stone house and only two water wells, and "the best inn" was "a small wooden cabin."[37] The following year the American agents of the Penn family, who had retained ownership of the proprietary manors, laid out an expanded street plan for the town. The plan consisted of two rectangular grids of streets; a narrow grid paralleled the Allegheny while a larger one ran back from the Monongahela shore, incorporating the existing town. The grids met at an angle along Liberty Street. Postwar development was concentrated in the broader section aligning with the Monongahela, where

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the 1784 plan left a public square frequently referred to as the Diamond.[38]

According to visitors' estimates, in the later 1780s and early 1790s the town had about 150 houses, some of brick or stone, most of log or frame construction.[39] The federal census of 1790 records the population as 376, but this figure is vastly misleading at best and may simply be incorrect. Although population across the Allegheny River was still sparse, Pitt Township, which adjoined the town on the east, had over 1,400 residents and another 5,850 lived in the large section of Allegheny County lying across the Monongahela from Pittsburgh. Thus several thousand people lived within just a few miles of the rivers' confluence at Pittsburgh, some of them quite close to the town proper, either in Pitt Township or on the opposite banks of the rivers. In addition, a number of Pittsburgh's most prominent residents were recorded not on the town's census list but on Pitt Township's, so the township's figure of 1,477 actually includes an unknown number of the town's residents.[40] Some contemporary statements indicate that the entity thought of as the town of Pittsburgh by people at the time probably had over a thousand residents in 1790.[41] The census figure for the town proper in 1800 was 1,565. Comparison of that figure with the too-low figure of 376 for 1790 would lead to the incorrect

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presumption that Pittsburgh grew very slowly before 1790 and then increased by over four-fold during the 1790s. The more reasonable total of a thousand or more residents in the town in 1790 indicates that Pittsburgh grew rapidly during the 1780s, then slowed in the 1790s, a pattern in accord with that of the region as a whole.[42]

Pittsburgh remained the largest town in the upper Ohio River country in this period, but much of the economic development of the 1780s and 1790 was decentralized through the region. Mills and the blasting furnaces that began about 1790 required water power, and most were located away from Pittsburgh. In addition there were, by the late 1780s and early 1790s, a number of small towns scattered in the settled country to the east and south of Pittsburgh, interconnected by a network of roads. Among the older and larger of these towns were Washington and Uniontown (or Beeson's Town), located on sites where there was settlement beginning in the late 1760s. Both were county seats by the middle 1780s and had strong surges of growth at that time, so that by 1790 they had populations in the several hundreds.[43] During the expansive period from the middle 1780s into the 1790s owners of land at existing centers of settlement marked out formal town plans with streets and alleys, while other speculators promoted towns at spots where there had been little or no concentration of settlement before.[44]

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

Map 9.
Southwestern Pennsylvania,
1790

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Even the small town of only a dozen or two houses might be the site of a gristmill, a sawmill, a distillery, or a store, and acted as a kind of service center for its immediate area. Settlements the size of Uniontown or Washington were not unlike Pittsburgh in the development of a diversified economy and an occupational structure that included mechanics, attorneys, and other specialists. River towns, especially on the Monongahela, were able to compete quite successfully with Pittsburgh in the business of boat construction and the general outfitting of westbound migrants. Brownsville, Elizabeth, and McKeesport, as well as Wheeling to the west, all benefitted by the emigrants' trade and were known as embarkation points. In 1796 a traveler wrote that "the banks of the Monongahela are almost every where inhabited." The occupants of one spot on the Youghiogheny also tried to entice migrants to begin their river journeys there; "but they are Irish Palaverers," a cautious traveler noted.[45]

Outside the towns and along the roads connecting them the major feature of the human landscape was the farm or "plantation," as improved tracts were often called. Agriculture continued to play a key role in the region's economy. Visitors still marveled at the quality of the soil, especially in the Monongahela-Youghiogheny country. They faulted the land only for

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the sometimes hilly terrain, the lack of springs or other water in spots, and the fact that in places the land remained "so monstoriously timbered that it wou'd make ones hart ake to think of Clearing it."[46] Grains, particularly wheat, corn, rye, oats, and barley, comprised the greatest share of the crops grown on the region's farms. Farmers also raised livestock, poultry, and a variety of field and garden crops.[47]

A clearly progressive element is not hard to find in the population growth and economic development of the postwar years. The region's first newspaper, the Pittsburgh Gazette, started in 1786. During the 1780s regular postal routes were established between Pittsburgh and Virginia and Philadelphia.[48] Early in 1787 the Pittsburgh citizenry met on the Diamond to plan a "public Market House" for the town. One of the printers of the Gazette announced plans for a subscription library in 1788, and beginning the following year gentlemen with the urge to feel like Philadelphians or Londoners could drop by the Ohio Coffee House to scan the stock of newspapers kept on hand or to talk business. Horse races -- a three-day affair in fall 1786 -- were a very popular attraction at Pittsburgh, and beginning in 1788 one could take the waters at a medicinal spring only ten miles from the town.[49] There were some elementary schools, run mostly by ministers or lone in-

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structors, in the region before the mid-1780s. There were schools of this kind, including one for girls, at Pittsburgh in the second half of the decade. By 1790 formal "academies" opened at Washington and Pittsburgh. Within the next couple of years another academy opened at Canonsburg and a Methodist academy was built in Uniontown.[50] Astute visitors noted Pittsburgh's location along the great Ohio-Mississippi river system that traversed the continent's interior and predicted that its site would someday make the town "one of the first inland cities of the United States."[51]

That potential was far from realization, however, and in fact many writers' assessments of Pittsburgh as a functioning society in the 1780s and early 1790s were unabashedly negative. There was, it seems, an ugly side to the flush times. A traveler at Pittsburgh in 1783 lamented "that the people here do not grow rich by industry and fair prices but prefer rather to deal extortionately with strangers and travellers; and shunning work charge the more for it, their comfortable sloth being interrupted."[52] Later visitors reinforced the image. "Pittsburgh is inhabited almost entirely by Scots and Irish, who live in paltry log-houses, and are as dirty as in the north of Ireland, or even Scotland," commented Arthur Lee, the Virginia gentleman, late in 1784. Two years later an army officer noted that the town was "a very dissipated place as usual" due to the

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transience of the people there. "The lower class of people in this place scarcely does any thing else but drink whisky. No dependence to be put on any tradesmen."[53] Cynical visitors late in the 1780s still characterized Pittsburghers as lazy sorts who made their way in life not by hard work but by exploiting those who passed by. These bitter observers claimed that prices for goods and services were several times higher in Pittsburgh than they were just outside the town, and higher even than prices in Kentucky -- "which I attribute to a Combination of pensioned Scoundrels who infest the Place." "The Town at present, is inhabited with only some few Exceptions, by Mortals who act as if possessed of a Charter of Exclusive Privilege to filch from, annoy and harrass her Fellow Creatures, particularly the incautious and necessitous."[54] Nor did those outside Pittsburgh fare much better at such caustic visitors' hands. The inhabitants along the Monongahela and Youghiogheny where emigrants embarked were "Rooks and Harpies," people who "do not live so rationally as the brute Creation" and "had rather Live like hogs than take a little pains to Live otherwise."[55]

Economic circumstances helped give the Ohio forks country, and especially Pittsburgh, its bad image. The cost of transporting goods from Philadelphia or Baltimore by wagon or packhorse was high, over £2 (Pa.) per

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hundredweight in 1783 and 1784 -- "a vast expense," one outsider noted.[56] Wood was so much in demand for boats, fences, and buildings during the 1780s, and the labor needed to obtain it so scarce and expensive, that in the late 1780s there was a rash of thefts of unguarded fences, boards, building lumber, and standing timber in and around Pittsburgh. Such growing pains led one Moravian visitor to Pittsburgh in 1789 to state that "beautiful though the situation is, the town itself is wretched. Disorder reigns in the streets."[57]

One of the most prominent features of the postwar economy was the absence of cash. "Business is only middling because there is no money in circulation," noted a traveler in Pittsburgh in April 1789.[58] Landlords who preferred rents in cash had to settle for produce, and land sales could be slow. Merchants sold on credit or took furs, deerhides, cattle, ginseng, and "country produce" instead of cash. In 1789 John May brought a supply of goods west to sell at the new Marietta settlement on the Ohio, and since he heard sales were slow there he tried to dispose of some of his merchandise before moving downriver. May attempted to sell what he could from his flatboat as he moved slowly downstream from Brownsville through the Monongahela settlements. "Money terrible scarce yett the people want every thing and cannot pay for them," he wrote. Once May

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took what little cash the people had, further sales were "Like stripping the Cow after milking." "O that my goods were again in Boston, or any where else but on this Monongahela River," he lamented.[59]

Much of the region's commerce apparently took place as exchanges of goods and services with little or no money involved. Bartering in kind had real limits, however, since the seller might have little use for the proffered item and no way of disposing of it in the marketplace.[60] The extension of credit played a crucial role in the local economy, but created its own set of problems. By the later 1780s notices in the Pittsburgh Gazette by merchants and tradesmen calling for the payment of outstanding debts to them, and sometimes threatening lawsuits, were common. Several businesses, frustrated by the difficulty of collecting what was owed, ceased to give further credit and would sell only for cash or produce.[61] Even men with sizable holdings of real property might not have much "cash at command," and those with debts might see some of their lands sold to meet creditors' demands.[62]

Tax lists have been studied by historians and indicate some of the consequences as the region's economy diversified and an increasingly complex occupational structure took form in the 1780s and 1790s. A growing proportion of the population did not own land.

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The average size of landholdings declined from the 1780s into the 1790s as well, although town property, in small but valuable plots, became increasingly important. These trends were strongest in those sections along the rivers where settlement had begun early, population was dense, and the pressures on a finite supply of land were greatest. The rapidly increasing population, the growth of nonagricultural occupations, and the increasing concentration of landed property into fewer hands help account for these tendencies. Of those amassing the largest holdings of land by the mid-1790s, almost two-fifths were newcomers who had come to the region since the middle eighties. They brought with them the wherewithal to acquire hundreds of acres of land, competing successfully with large landholders already on the scene.[63]

Information on tenancy is sparse, but perhaps one-fourth or one-fifth of the taxable male population in the region were tenants who farmed other people's land. Many of these were "croppers" who paid their rents in produce. And despite the increasing population and the growing percentage of men who owned no land, labor was in short supply. "Hirelings and Servants in this Country is very scarce," a Fayette County resident wrote in 1791.[64] There continued to be slaveholding in the region, but certainly in terms of numbers

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it was a minor factor. There were 282 black slaves in Fayette County in 1790, 263 in Washington, 159 in Allegheny, and 128 in Westmoreland. Ohio County, Virginia, reported 281 slaves in the first census, and Monongalia had 154. Of the 343 heads of household owning slaves in southwestern Pennsylvania at the time of the census, four-fifths owned three or less.[65]

The postwar economy of the region was in some ways like, and in other respects increasingly unlike, the economy of the 1760s and early 1770s. In both cases the situation seemed fluid enough to offer an attractive opportunity for ambitious entrepreneurs. In both cases also, commercialism and the desire to take advantage of the region's potential motivated both large-scale entrepreneurs and those with but a modest surplus of something to sell. Credit was a key factor in much of the economic activity throughout the region's early decades. Both periods also bore the marks of a transient, competitive, "boom" economy that gave the region something of a nasty image.

Yet the economic climate of the postwar years presented less and less of a wide-open field for entrepreneurial endeavor. One had to go further afield to find large speculative tracts of land. Entrepreneurial activity such as that of a Craig or an O'Hara required

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more permanent investment than earlier trade ventures, especially as commercial distilling and milling, iron casting, and glassmaking became more and more important. There had always been a "town" culture at Pittsburgh, centered on merchants, clerks, and military officers, but the increasing specialization of the occupational structure and the growth of a nascent "urban" culture were increasingly noticeable during the 1780s and 1790s. There had been differences in occupation, wealth, background, and attitudes in 1770, but by 1790 some of these differences were more pronounced and the population was considerably larger. And in the 1780s many inhabitants of the region could well doubt that their propsects were improving or their opportunities expanding; in economic terms a sense of foreboding or even failure was not unknown.

During the 1770s and 1780s, as settlement west of Laurel Hill grew, organized religion became important as one of the region's social elements. Within four denominations by the mid-1780s there was some form of official regional organization above the congregation level: the Redstone Baptist Association (1776), the

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Redstone Presbytery (1781), the Methodists' Redstone Circuit (1784), and the Westland Monthly Meeting of the Society of Friends (1785). Each of these conferences or associations took as its official base the Redstone country, that sector between the Youghiogheny and the Monongahela that was the area of some of the earliest settlement in the region and was occupied by a mixture of people of diverse geographic origins. Organized religion was not a factor of great importance in every inhabitant's life, and some denominations were stronger than others. Religion was, however, one of the factors that influenced people's behavior within society.

Presbyterianism, the church of the Scotch Irish and other Scots Protestants, was numerically the strongest denomination in the Ohio forks country. Through the early 1770s the only Presbyterian ministers in the region were intinerants, some of them en route as missionaries to the Indian nations. Clergymen who visited the region in the three or four years before the war with Britain preached to groups of Presbyterians throughout the settlements west of Laurel Hill, from the Westmoreland County settlements in the zone between Ligonier and Pittsburgh down through the Youghiogheny and Monongahela valleys and in the settlements of Chartiers Creek and elsewhere west of the Monongahela River. Services were often held at the houses of locally prominent men, some of whom gave the preachers very active encouragement and support.

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Arthur St. Clair, Robert Hanna, Aeneas Mackay, and Edward Cook were of this group. St. Clair and his neighbors in the Ligonier Valley had bought a parsonage and begun collecting subscriptions for a preacher's salary by August 1772 in hopes of getting a minister to settle, and Presbyterians in other locales had taken similar steps to form themselves into the beginnings of congregations.[66]

Some meeting houses were built by 1775, but the first settled Presbyterian clergymen came to the region from 1776 to 1780. During that period John McMillan and three other ministers joined congregations at Dunlap's Creek in the Redstone district and at Chartiers, Ten Mile, Buffalo, and Cross Creeks in the country west of the Monongahela. These preachers formed the basis for the Redstone Presbytery. During the Revolution there were several localized revivals in the area beyond the Monongahela, some of them centering on private forts where people clustered for protection in the exposed settlements. After the war other clergymen came west of the mountains and joined the Presbytery. At schools in Washington County McMillan and his associates also began to educate young men from the region to prepare them for ordination as ministers.[67]

There were also active Baptists in the region before the American Revolution. By 1770 there was a group in the Redstone Creek area that had migrated from

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Virginia, and one of their number was ordained by a traveling minister. When David Jones, a Baptist preacher, passed through in 1772 there were a number of Baptists in the Monongahela and Redstone country forming themselves into congregations and starting to build meeting houses. He also learned that Baptists in the vicinity of Grave Creek near the Ohio River intended to erect a meeting house. Jones preached one Sunday to an audience of "about two hundred hearers" on the Monongahela near Georges Creek, although not all his hearers were necessarily Baptists. In 1776 the area's congregations formed the Redstone Association.[68]

Germans in the area, concentrated especially in the zone from what is now central Westmoreland County southwest to the Jacobs Creek-Redstone Creek area, also formed into congregations during the early 1770s. It was usual in this period for the Lutheran and the Reformed congregations in a neighborhood to associate together and share the same meeting house. None of the German groups west of Laurel Hill had pastors before the Revolution, and trained clergy came only slowly and in limited numbers after the war, but many congregations carried on under the guidance of lay readers and exhorters.[69]

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From the late 1760s on, a number of those people from Virginia and Maryland who settled in the area between the Youghiogheny and the Monongahela rivers, particularly at the present sites of Brownsville and Uniontown, were Quakers. Among them were the Beeson family, who settled early at the site of Uniontown. When John Lacey traveled through the area in 1773 he stayed at the homes of a half-dozen Friends and attended several worship meetings. Prior to the establishment of the Westland Monthly Meeting in the 1780s the area's Quakers were technically affiliated with the Hopewell Monthly Meeting and the Fairfax Quarterly Meeting of Virginia.[70]

There were also some Methodists in the region before the Revolution, but their numbers were not large. After the war Methodist circuit riders were active, particularly in the Redstone district. Several hundred, or during a quarterly meeting at Uniontown as many as a thousand, people gathered to hear some of their sermons. Nevertheless, their success for the rest of the century tended to ebb and flow; at times the Methodist leader Francis Asbury felt bouyed by progress and revival in the Redstone district, while on other occasions he was much less optimistic.[71] It was late in the century also, particularly in the last decade, before Episcopal churches formed in any number in the region. Apparently the only early Church of England group in the region was one

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formed under the sponsorship of John Neville at his home on Chartiers Creek before the Revolution.[72]

There is limited evidence concerning the role of religion in the lives of individuals. Conclusions are also hampered by the fact that the region's population was fairly diverse in background. Certainly not everyone who attended a sermon or worship meeting, especially in the years when clergy were scarce, considered himself or herself to be of the preacher's denomination. A Methodist minister reported in 1784 that "at Cheat River we had a mixed congregation of sinners, Presbyterians, Baptists, and it may be, of saints: I had liberty, and gave it to them as the Lord gave it to me -- plain enough." Even Quaker meetings could draw non-Friends.[73] People who did not have regular access to church services might take advantage of any opportunity that offered itself. Nor should the attraction of sermons and worship services as a form of entertainment and a chance for social interaction be ignored. Services given during court time in a county seat, when poeple from the locale congregated, might draw audiences of several hundred.[74]

Despite the mixed nature of many audiences, the distinctions between sects were clear. At times one denomination borrowed another group's meeting house, but friendly coexistence was often not the rule. A Methodist leader reported that his denomination's use

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of a Baptist meeting house in Clarksburg, Virginia, "it seems gave offence." In Pittsburgh in 1796 Presbyterian elders locked a Methodist society out of the town's church and forced the Methodists to meet elsewhere.[75] Presbyterian and Methodist clergymen found themselves at odds over a number of doctrinal issues, the most fundamental of which was the incompatibility of Presbyterian Calvinism and the Methodists' Arminianism. In 1793 two Presbyterian ministers and a Methodist preacher took the dispute between the denominations to the pages of the Pittsburgh Gazette in a sharp, almost hostile exchange, and a public debate on the question of free will and predestination was held that June near Greensburg in Westmoreland County.[76] Clergymen privately referred to their counterparts in other sects with such terms as "bigot" or "illiterate."[77] In the case of the Methodists and the Baptists in particular, there were also social presumptions that set them off in some laymen's eyes. In 1785 Richard Butler, as a congressional Indian envoy, passed through the Cross Creeks settlement on the Ohio River. "The people of this country," he noted, "appear to be very much imposed on by a religious sect called Methodist, and are become great fanatics. They say they have paid taxes which were too heavy." An army officer traveling between Danville and Lexington in Kentucky in 1787 wrote that

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"a greater part" of the inhabitants there were Baptists "and opposed to the other part of the community, which has no religion at all, and am informed that these Baptists are a very superstious, hypocritical set, leading away all the lower class of people, Negroes, Servants. etc."[78]

People's attitudes toward Sunday as a special day with religious significance give some indication of the role played by Christianity in individual lives. Evidence on the matter is sparse but informative. Missionaries among the Indian nations before the war with Britain found that some peltry traders were interested in attending Sunday services, although in at least one case the isolated traders' reckoning of the days of the week differed from the missionaries' by two days.[79] The observance of Sunday was particularly strict among staunch Presbyterians. The Moravian missionary John Heckewelder was willing to travel on a Sunday in 1786, but his Presbyterian guide was not. In 1794 a Swiss-born friend of Albert Gallatin, John Badollet, was associated with Alexander McClean on a road survey and found McClean's insistence that the Sabbath be devoted exclusively to Bible reading excruciating. McClean was a "Presbiterian Bigot," Badollet confided to his journal, and such Sundays were the product of "gloomy zeal." Badollet much preferred the "decent but short family

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worship" of another road commissioner. As a Virginia militia colonel in the Revolutionary War, John Canon, a Presbyterian, ordered Captain William Harrod to protect the Sabbath: "As the Dutey we ow to our Creator Should never be neglected I hope Sir you will not Sufer men to Practice of prefain Swareing or Brackng the Sabat Day by hunting or other wise."[80]

Not all were so strict about Sunday. Shopkeepers in Pittsburgh in the early 1760s did as much business on Sundays as any other day. In 1785 two men were fined "for breaking Sunday by following their Ordinary employment by driving pack Horses through Hanna's Town on Sunday loaded" -- a verdict which does indicate, however, that the packers' conduct was offensive to at least a portion of the community.[81] For some people Sunday was different from other days, but not in the same way that it was for the staunchly religious. Joseph Doddridge remembered from his boyhood in a young settlement of the trans-Monongahela country that "among the people with whom I was most conversant, there was no other vestige of the Christian religion than a faint observation of Sunday, and that merely as a day of rest for the aged, and a play day for the young." Doddridge recalled that many men acknowledged the Sabbath by refraining from hunting game. Some did so "from a motive of piety" while others believed only that Sunday hunting

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brought bad luck "all the rest of the week." A Baptist preacher linked luck and piety as he chided some members of his traveling party who hunted on a Sunday but killed nothing. The minister tried to convince the hunters "that Providence prevented success," but in this case "all that was said seemed only like darting straws against the wind, for sense of duty was lost."[82]

Weddings and funerals went on without clergymen if none was around. Sometimes a substitute was found. In 1775 a visiting Englishman "performed the part of a Clergyman at the funeral of an infant" in a Youghiogheny River settlement. On other occasions the absence of a minister went unnoticed. When John Wrenshall, a Methodist preacher, first arrived in Pittsburgh in 1796 there was no resident clergyman in the town. At a funeral he came upon soon after his arrival, Wrenshall was shocked to see "that nothing was said to impress the minds of the liveing with the awfullness of this solemn change. . . . One of the bystanders instantly reply'd, in the scotch, or broad Irish dialect, 'we never use any seremoney here.'"[83]

Some clergymen and pious laymen believed that formal religion had a fundamental role to play in the improvement of moral conduct on the frontiers. Without religion "the Restraints of Conscience must wear off, and evil appetites gather Strength in an imperfect and Scattered

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Society."[84] David McClure, a New England Congregational minister licensed to preach by the Donegal Presbytery during a trip west in the early 1770s, believed that the Virginia settlements along the Youghiogheny were among the most "imperfect." McClure blushed at the dancing and "wild merriment" of a wedding party near the Youghiogheny and at the drinking, "wild mirth and disorder" associated with the Christmas and New Year season. Others noticed that for some people liquor was important both at weddings and at funerals. Nicholas Cresswell, the visitor who read the services at the child's funeral on the Youghiogheny, wrote that "at the Grave the parents and friends Wept and drank Whiskey alternately."[85] Methodist clergymen of the 1780s were frustrated by the drinking and lack of attention to religion they found in western Maryland and Virginia. One preacher finally declared of Morgantown that "the People seem somewhat Gospel-Harden'd in this Town."[86]

It would be an error to attribute a lack of religious fervor solely to those from Virginia and Maryland, however, just as the fact that settlers from these states were among the more active Baptists, Methodists, and Quakers should not be overlooked. Not even the elders of the Pittsburgh Presbyterian congregation were willing to give up all drinking and card playing to satisfy the clergy. And James Girty was born on the Pennsylvania

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frontier but spent so much of his early life among Indians and traders beyond the settlements that he was "a stranger to religion" and had "no fear of God before his eyes."[87] Perhaps the important point is not that many people in the transmontane settlements lacked a selfless dedication to religion, but that Presbyterianism was as strong as it was among the Scotch Irish.

Only a small portion of the support for Presbyterianism could have come from evangelical recruitment. Preachers certainly made the effort to win souls for the denomination. John McMillan and the other Presbyterian clergymen who settled in Washington County and elsewhere in the region during the Revolution and after were active preachers, but the demand for their services both preceded and exceeded their attempts to meet it. The Calvinist tenet of predestination and the Presbyterian emphasis on education may have been real disadvantages in any popular competition for souls against the evangelical Baptists and Methodists. The Redstone Presbytery's strict insistence on its own rigorous doctrinal and moral standards actually alienated some area Presbyterians and led to comments about the "bigoted, narrow-hearted McMillanites" in Washington County.[88] The ministry's sermons may have done more to keep those who were culturally reared within the church active within it than to convert outsiders.[89] Presbyterianism was the established church of Protestant

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Scots in the British Isles, but its importance to the Scotch Irish in America, even in the absence of clergymen, indicates that it was deeply integrated within their culture. The Pennsylvania government always understood that fact, and when disorder threatened on the frontiers Presbyterian ministers were sent to the scene to use their influence on the side of government.[90] Even those who despised John McMillan's influence recognized its power in political terms.[91]

The reasons for the church's strong integration within its bearers' culture seem partly doctrinal, but certainly were not completely so. David McClure, whose first contact with Scotch-Irish Presbyterians came during his western trip in 1772 and 1773, gave credit to the church's strong emphasis on education and religious indoctrination, and to the "zealous and pious persons, who came forward, and willingly devoted their time and labours to form the people into society, for the purpose of the public worship of God."[92] As McClure saw, the lay elders played an important leadership role. To a degree the denomination had a certain inherent appeal for social leaders who liked life to be stable, ordered, and predictable. Yet the fact that they actively promoted it so strongly in a place where it never had the advantage of legal establishment -- and that others so readily joined them to form "societies" even in the absence of clergymen

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-- indicates the degree to which it was almost inseparable from their social and cultural identification.[93]

The integration of religion and society was particularly strong among the dissenting sects of Presbyterians. There were two major groups of these dissenters, and the issues that split them from the Church of Scotland primarily concerned not doctrine but the church's relations with civil government. The Reformed Presbyterians got their nickname -- "Covenanters" -- because of their staunch allegiance to the seventeenth-century convenants of the Scottish Church during the reigns of the later Stuarts, when Presbyterianism was not the country's established form of church. During the last quarter of the seventeenth century they maintained their illegal church through armed militancy and by means of local "societies" and general meetings, a system that allowed them to maintain their group identity for long periods with few or no ordained clergymen among them. They felt so betrayed by their national church in the reigns of Charles II and James II, and had been dealt with so harshly by government, that they maintained their separation from the established fold when the Act of Settlement in 1690 once again established a Presbyterian system in Scotland. In Ulster and then in America, Convenanters often settled near one another and, through their local "societies," maintained their identity as a group separate from the

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far more numerous Presbyterians of the established church. More numerous than the Covenanters in America were the "Seceders" or Associate Presbyterians, whose split from the Church of Scotland stemmed from a clerical dispute of the 1730s. Again there was a shortage of clergy, but Associate Presbyterians, like the Reformed element, maintained their group identity through local societies. In the mid-eighteenth century the greatest concentration of both sects in America was in what was then Pennyslvania's frontier zone in the Cumberland and Susquehanna Valleys. A series of presbyteries and synods linked each group to its original element in Scotland.[94]

Observers at the time did not always distinguish Covenanters and Seceders from other Presbyterians, and the genealogy of the sects became more complex in the 1780s when most but not all Associate and Reformed congregations affiliated with a merged Associate Reformed church in America. There were also individuals and congregations that hovered on the fringe of dissent and seem to be sometimes within and at other times outside the mainstream Presbyterian church. But there were clusters of Seceders and Covenanters with very strong group identity in the Ohio forks region from at least the 1770s. In the 1770s and 1780s there were societies of one or the other sect, and sometimes of a blend of

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both types, at Chartiers Creek, Buffalo Creek, Redstone and Dunlap Creeks, the "forks of Yough" area in the neck of land between the Youghiogheny and Monongahela, the Conemaugh River, Mingo Creek, Hannastown, Brush Creek, Robinson's Run, and near Laurel Hill. In 1780 the region's Covenanter societies began sending delegates to regular general meetings in the "forks of Yough." Even after the Revolution there were far more local societies of these dissenters than there were clergymen to serve them.[95]

The distinction of these dissenters from the mainstream Presbyterian Church centered on matters of religious and secular government; the Covenanters in particular maintained the belief that moral government was unassailable but that immoral government, since it was not ordained by God, did not have to be obeyed. Attachment to the group was strong for these dissenters, and membership in the group did a great deal to define the individual's relationship with society as a whole. In 1784 George Washington visited lands he owned on Miller's Run near Chartiers Creek, land for which he had struggled to assert his claim against that of George Croghan a decade before. Washington found thirteen men, claimants by way of Croghan, occupying the tract. They were, the Virginian learned, members of "a society of Cecederes," and they told him of their "unwillingness to

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seperate or remove." When the two parties could reach no agreement for a sale or lease that would allow Washington uncontested title, he announced his intention to lodge ejectment suits against them. To ensure that none of the group wanted to settle the dispute with him individually, Washington called out each man's name in turn. Each responded that he would stick with the group and take his chances in court with his fellows.[96]

Presbyterianism's general success is important because the Scotch Irish were such a significant portion of the region's population. For the Germans also, religion was part of the cultural package they brought with them into the area, a necessary component of society. And as the Presbyterian dissenters demonstrated, the identification of the individual with the group was important for the active members of religious groups. Church membership distinguished Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, and other groups both from one another and from the unchurched part of society. The religious group was in fact one of the most important social groups for its members. In some instances families of the same denomination and from the same place moved into the upper Ohio River country as a group and settled in one locale. Other families of the same religion and from the same place in the east might join them later. Thus in the Redstone area there

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were Baptists from Virginia and Methodists from Maryland who came originally as groups of several families. The same locale was a magnet area for Quakers also.[97] A cluster of about ten Presbyterian families from the same part of New Jersey settled on Ten Mile Creek west of the Monongahela in the 1770s, and in 1777 Thaddeus Dod, a Princeton-trained minister from the same New Jersey county, joined them as their pastor.[98] During the next decade there was another concentration of New Jersey people, apparently also Presbyterian, in the "forks of Yough" neighborhood of what are now Elizabeth and Forward townships, Allegheny County.[99] In the 1780s Presbyterians who had settled over a large part of western Washington County signed written pledges to affirm their mutual adherence to their religious and moral principles, and they may have made a similar affirmation before they left eastern Pennsylvania to migrate west.[100]

While it is impossible to determine the number of people affiliated with all the region's churches, certainly a majority of the population before 1795 were not members of any congregation.[101] Many had little contact with formal religion. In 1772 there were some people near the mouth of the Youghiogheny who had not heard a sermon for fourteen years. Joseph Doddridge, whose family lived in what is now western Washington County, was about ten years old before he saw his first actual

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church service while on a trip to Maryland. Even in 1790 Francis Asbury reported that in the upper Monongahela and Cheat River settlements of western Virginia "many careless people do not hear a sermon more than once in one or two years."[102] Some pious people of course filled the gap by meeting with neighbors for study and worship, or maintained forms of family worship or individual observance of Sunday to keep touch with a church tradition. Yet for a large portion of the population the formal doctrine and practice of a Christian denomination were far less important to the person's daily spiritual life than was a mixed lot of beliefs in folk cures, curses, "charms and incantations," and witchcraft. Lack of an opportunity kept Doddridge from being baptized as a young child, but he "learned, while young, the incantation in German for the cure of burns, stopping blood, for the toothache, and the charm against bullets in battle." His neighbors knew they could be harmed by the spells of witches but trusted "witch masters" to counter the evil. Others on the frontiers believed that certain procedures could locate a drowned man's body, cure disease, find stolen goods, or identify a murderer. Christianity touched these people's lives, but did so largely outside the walls of churches, in very general terms, and alongside or blended within a strong tradition of folk beliefs.[103]

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Nor did organized religion fare well in the larger population centers. Through the 1770s Pittsburgh had occasional visits from traveling clergymen, but no organized congregation until a German congregation was organized in the early 1780s. There was no church building in the town at that time, however, and the group's minister also served other German congregations in Westmoreland County, so when Arthur Lee of Virginia passed through in 1784 he declared that the town had "not a priest of any persuasion, nor church, nor chapel; so that they are likely to be damned, without the benefit of clergy."[104] In 1785 Samuel Barr, an Ulster-born Presbyterian minister, came to preach at Pittsburgh and nearby. Two years later Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a local representative to the legislature, helped secure a state charter for a congregation at Pittsburgh, a step which brought the church a free town lot as a grant from the Penns. However, Brackenridge -- educated, witty, sharp-tongued -- favored a general "Christian Society" while Barr insisted that the Pittsburgh church be chartered explicitly as a Presbyterian congregation. The two conducted their quarrel in the pages of the Pittsburgh Gazette.[105]

Barr got his Presbyterian church, but still found himself caught. On the one hand he faced a strict Redstone Presbytery interested in denominational discipline

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and expecting to see some churchly influence on the town. On the other hand he had a set of church trustees and lay leaders, some of whom were not Presbyterians, who favored organized religion for its social benefits and the improvement it brought to society but preferred a broad-based church and were not inclined to be too petty about religious matters. By the spring of 1789 Barr and his trustees had had enough of one another. The matter was investigated by both the Redstone Presbytery and the Synod of Virginia and became something of an event. Church finances, the drinking and gambling of some lay leaders, and Barr's failure to run the kind of church his adversaries wanted all figured in the mutual accusations. The synod finally vindicated Barr and strongly rebuked three prominent members of the congregation, John Wilkins, George Wallace, and Robert Galbreath, accusing them of slandering Barr and using the affair to avoid paying the minister's salary.[106]

After Samuel Barr's departure the Pittsburgh Presbyterians begged supply preachers from the Redstone Presbytery as best they could. In July 1789 the Methodist Francis Asbury preached in the town and wrote: "had some zeal, and the people were very attentive; but alas! they are far from God, and too near the savages in situation and manners."[107] Seven years later another Methodist, John Wrenshall, found the log church built in

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1787 empty, dirty, and a home to spiders, swallows, and during bad weather, sheep. The Presbyterian congregation was still organized, however, for its elders locked Wrenshall and his Methodists out of the meeting house and forced them to find another place to meet. There was also a German congregation in the town in 1796, with an unfinished brick church at the time of Wrenshall's arrival. Wrenshall declared that "prejudice, bigotry, and sensuality" were so prevalent that Pittsburgh "was call'd 'A Sodom in miniature.'"[108] Formal religion was slow to arrive in Washington as well, and there was no Presbyterian church in that town until 1793.[109]

Although only a portion of the region's population actively participated in it, formal religion was an important component of society. For church members the religious group or local "society," as several denominations aptly called it, was one of the most influential associations of which the individual might consider herself or himself a member. The attachment to one's fellow Baptists or Quakers or Covenanters could easily be stronger than one's attachment to the larger collective society of heterogeneous elements. It was common for the religious group to assert a thoroughgoing regulation over the individual's moral conduct and behavior toward others, in some respects supplanting a part of civil

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government's role.[110] To a great extent the local church groups with their bonds of association reinforced the region's tendency to act socially and politically as a collection of disparate groups, special interests, and local enclaves rather than as a homogeneous society responsive to a single central authority.[111]

There were new faces in the region's politics after the Revolution, newcomers who held important elective and appointive offices in the 1780s and after. Hugh Henry Brackenridge, a Princeton-educated editor and attorney, moved to western Pennsylvania from Philadelphia in 1781. In the early 1780s also, John Smilie moved from Lancaster County to what would become Fayette County and William Findley came to Westmoreland County from the Cumberland Valley. A young James Ross opened his law office in Washington in 1784. The following year Alexander Addison, a Scot, went to Washington intending to preach but due to friction with the Redstone Presbytery began to read law instead. Albert Gallatin took up residence on the Monongahela not far from the Virginia border at about the same time, and John B.C. Lucas, an attorney from Normandy who later became an adversary of

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Addison on the judicial bench, began to farm near Pittsburgh. Other men such as Nathaniel Breading, William Todd, and James Edgar, less reknowned than Brackenridge or Gallatin but important within regional politics, also moved into the western part of Pennsylvania by the middle 1780s.[112] Although these newcomers attained notoriety in politics, a number of those who had moved to the region before the Revolutionary War remained active in politics during the postwar years, including Edward Cook, Thomas Scott, John Canon, John Neville, John Gibson, and others.

Politics absorbed a considerable amount of the energy and time of some of these men, so much so that they could be considered professional politicians. Brackenridge honed his skills as a political publicist while attending Princeton in the early 1770s with the likes of James Madison and Philip Freneau, and then as an editor and author in Philadelphia during the war with Britain. He later admitted that one reason he moved west was because he thought he could "emerge" there as a politician more easily than he could among the many established political leaders of the seaboard.[113] Thus he was the political counterpart of the entrepreneurs who sensed economic opportunity in the transmontane country. Brackenridge's service in elected office proved brief. He was never far removed from politics in

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western Pennsylvania, however, serving as organizer, strategist, and propagandist, and he attained a judgeship late in the century. As a political observer he gave the world his interpretation of the society and politics of late eighteenth-century western Pennsylvania in Modern Chivalry, his long satirical novel depicting the adventures of a gentlemanly hero, Captain John Farrago.[114] Both William Findley and John Smilie began their political careers as local committeemen and in other posts before moving west. After the war they were political fixtures of the western counties, serving in the Council of Censors, the state legislature, the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, the Supreme Executive Council, the convention to revise Pennsylvania's constitution, and in other posts through the 1780s.[115]

While these men and some others devoted a large portion of their careers to politics in one way or another, a great many other people in the region gave keen attention to public issues in the 1780s. When the Pittsburgh Gazette appeared in 1786 it instantly became a part of the political forum. The newspaper was a new element in the region's politics. It came at a time when public affairs were widely discussed throughout the country and electoral politics offered the chance to influence decisions at the state and

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even national level. From its beginning the Gazette reprinted items from foreign and American papers to keep its readers informed of national and international affairs. The press also provided a tool for those interested in reaching public opinion. For example, during the Gazette's initial months of publication in 1786, candidates for the Westmoreland County sheriff's office took out advertisements to solicit openly "the Votes and Interest" of the "Free and Candid Electors" of the county.[116]

Brackenridge, a seasoned publicist and often a ruthless satirist, was an active promoter of the Gazette and a frequent and versatile contributor to its pages. It was his arena; in it he published philosophical discourses, biting Hudibrastic poetry, and satirical letters to the editor from a variety of fictional inhabitants of the region.[117] He used a letter to the newspaper in September 1786 to detail his opinions on current local issues and to announce that "it may be convenient for him" to represent Westmoreland County in the state legislature. Acknowledging that this was "a mode not usual" for announcing a candidacy, Brackenridge recognized the newspaper's ability to reach far more voters than he could contact personally or by private letter.[118]

Brackenridge won his seat in the assembly, and in January 1787 he published another letter in the Gazette

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relating the legislature's actions on a number of matters important to the western counties. The next month William Findley, also a Westmoreland County assemblyman, sent the paper a long response to what he termed Brackenridge's "pompous account." The two were on opposite sides of several issues before the house, including in particular the Bank of North America charter and the question of whether certificates should be accepted in payment for land rights obtained before 1776. Various sorts of certificates had been issued during the Revolution in payment for services and supplies, to pay troops, and as part of the U.S. loan office program to raise money for the war effort. The state accepted any of these notes in at least partial payment for recent land entries and for settlement (pre-emption) claims, but not for arrearages due on prewar land patents. Accepting the certificates for all land payments would ease the strain on those who had certificates but little specie. The measure would, however, tend to raise the depreciated market value of the bonds; the matter was entangled with highly charged political issues concerning the eventual retirement of the public debt and speculation in the wartime certificates by people who bought them at depreciated rates in hopes of eventually redeeming them at full value. Findley accused Brackenridge, who originally supported the use of certificates for all land

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entries but then changed his mind, of reneging on his campaign promises and of holding the public in a kind of contempt. The issue was now joined. Brackenridge answered Findley with a response that took up portions of eight consecutive issues of the weekly Gazette; Findley returned fire with a set of "Observations" that appeared in eight issues during July, August, and September; Brackenridge countered in August with a set of "Notes" before Findley's "Observations" were even finished.[119]

This exchange, which occupied column after column of the Gazette's space through 1787, delved at length into the issues of the day as each of the adversaries tried to leave the public with his version of what was happening in Philadelphia regarding the Mississippi River navigation issue, the public debts, the resolution of western land titles, the eternal matter of Westmoreland's county seat, the intended academy for Pittsburgh, road projects to connect east with west, and other issues. The verbal combat between Findley and Brackenridge also helped set a caustic tone for political exchanges in the Pittsburgh Gazette. Neither author was shy about taking the other to task, and the conflict was intensely personal. Brackenridge mocked

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Findley's Ulster accent and derided his previous occupations of "school keeping and weaving in Conococheague." Brackenridge, a Princetonian and an attorney, thought it "preposterous" that a man who could sing "a drizling weaver's song" for his fellow legislators at the Indian Queen tavern could attain high office. Brackenridge's ruthless pen transformed Findley into Traddle the weaver, an unschooled simpleton with grandiose political ambitions. Findley, less of a satirist, dubbed Brackenridge's involved responses "wire-drawn criticism" and declared that his opponent was both "destitute of moral principles" and "swallowed up with duplicity."[120]

The fray between Brackenridge and Findley in 1787 involved much more than just the antagonists' own long essays. In January 1787 a letter to the Gazette from "A Farmer" criticized Brackenridge's reversal of position on the issue of whether to allow certificates for payment of prewar land patents, and suggested that Brackenridge "perhaps sold the good will of his country for a dinner of some stockholders fat beef."[121] Letters soon appeared in support of Brackenridge, including one bearing the name of James Chambers as high constable of Westmoreland County. "My good Farmer if I can find you out I will gag you with my constable staff," Chambers' letter warned. "Let me never hear you write against the civil officers of this town or state or fish in troubled waters

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or you will surely sink to the bottom where you will never rise until the day of judgment."[122] After a published exchange with the "Farmer," Brackenridge demanded to know the author's name so he could sue for libel. During the spring of 1787 another "Farmer," this one from the Conemaugh River, wrote in praise of Brackenridge. He was answered by "A Real Farmer," who suggested that the sly attorney was himself the "Conemaugh Farmer." Brackenridge retaliated with a claim that the "Real Farmer" was Findley.[123] Brackenridge's clever writing failed, however, to win him back the hearts of enough of his constituents, and he was not re-elected in 1787. He ran for office on other occasions but was not successful; Traddle the weaver's rustic sincerity found more popular approval than did the caustic elitism of the Princeton-educated member of the bar. Brackenridge continued to be active in local politics, however, and his bout with Findley in 1787 helped nudge him to begin work on Modern Chivalry.

Still, the Brackenridge-Findley quarrel was but one aspect of the political discussion that appeared in the early Gazette. Before the two assemblymen even began their combat in the paper early in 1787, local inhabitants showed a readiness to take their thoughts on political matters to the public by means of the press. There were a number of things that troubled the

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Gazette's readers in the late 1780s.

Much of what concerned the contributors to the newspaper was economic in nature. There were severe problems created by a shortage of circulating money, and with but limited prospects for new commerce the future had a foreboding cast for many people. "The people of this country are just emerging from distress and difficulties peculiar to their local situation," wrote "A Friend to the Country" in the autumn of 1786. "Friend" noted that the western territory was finally showing signs of recovery from "the calamaties of war, and the jarring of governments for many years past." Yet "never have we beheld a crisis that wore such a gloomy aspect as the present." Taxes simply could not be paid, declared "Friend" and other authors, not because of any "aversion" to them but because there was no cash with which to pay.[124] Long lists of property to be sold for delinquent taxes appeared in the Gazette.[125]

Moreover, many residents could not make their land payments. Some favored a state loan office as a solution, but during the later 1780s county sheriffs announced sales of lands mortgaged to the loan office and in arrears in payments.[126] During the middle 'eighties westerners also petitioned the state asking for some special consideration in the payment of pur-

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chase money and interest. The issue took on special urgency as the April 1787 deadline for payment for prewar land rights approached. It was the approach of that deadline that made the issue of whether the state would accept those payments in its own depreciated certificates, as was done for newer patents, so important. The "Farmer" who in January 1787 criticized Hugh Henry Brackenridge for reversing his stand on this matter felt that all his investment of time, labor, and money into his lands could be lost, "and all to satisfy the voracious maw of some greasy broker." "In the name of wonder then," the "Farmer" asked, "what is to be done?" The legislature eased the crisis by extending the deadline.[127]

The shortage of money also made the fees charged by county officials a subject of concern. Without money, noted a contributor to the Gazette in December 1786, it was impossible to pay "land-office fees, surveyors fees, and prothonotors and lawyers fees, which are the worst of all." Two years later John Irwin, a longtime resident of the Ohio forks region, called Westmoreland County's attention to the bills of costs charged by the county prothonotary, Michael Huffnagle. These fees went to the officeholder, not the state, and a sheriff's sale could be ordered to exact their payment. The state appointed commissioners

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to investigate Irwin's charges of fraud on Huffnagle's part both as prothonotary and as the county agent for estates forfeited by loyalists during the Revolution. Huffnagle was still in office over three years after Irwin's initial complaint in the Gazette. "It is but too well known that delinquency, fraud and abouse have long prevaild in most of the Public offices in the Western Country," a bitter Irwin wrote, "and it was high time that examples Should have been made."[128] In 1789 another Westmoreland County resident claimed that an avaricious deputy sheriff was putting his land up for sale, nominally to satisfy a debt that the land-owner insisted had already been paid, just so the deputy could collect his fees on the transaction. The deputy denied the charge in the newspaper and declared that "it is well known that I have often forgiven my fees to the poor, and that I never have been rigorous with the rich."[129] In August 1789 an enterprising Charles Mathews declared his candidacy as sheriff of Allegheny County. Mathews promised to perform the office for half the fee rates allowed by law, and even published fixed rates at which he would accept produce in lieu of cash for the fees. "These proposals being much more advantageous than any that have been yet offered, I cannot doubt but that they will meet with the approbation of the public," Mathews wrote.[130]

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Contributors to the Pittsburgh newspaper differed in their opinions of the cause of the hard economic times. One line of reasoning placed the blame on the region's inhabitants themselves. This argument was presented by "A Farmer" -- one of several who used that pseudonym in the Gazette -- late in 1786. "Farmer," who was sixty-five when he wrote, noted that in years past his family had worked hard and sustained a resolute self-sufficiency that required them to buy only a few necessities, such as salt and iron, from outside the region. With time "Farmer" and his family had gone soft, however, and had grown used to a cornucopia of luxuries. Soon he would be at the brink of ruin and could lose his land. "Farmer" determined to harden himself again and stop buying the clothing, household goods, and imported foodstuffs that had crept into his life. "The tea kettle shall be sold," he declared.[131] Others followed a similar line of reasoning. There was too much "voluptuous folly" and too little "industry and frugality," asserted "G." "The fault is certainly our own, if we complain of hard times," wrote "T."[132]

Other authors of letters to the Gazette did not necessarily disagree with the proponents of frugality, but concentrated much more on the measures government could take to alleviate the economic problems. The

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acceptance of certificates for all land payments, for example, would ease pressure on a severely limited supply of cash. In addition, many believed that the Mississippi River trade, the shipment of flour, barrelled meat, whiskey, and other products of the western country to New Orleans, was the one means by which the region's commerce could blossom and bring cash into the upper Ohio Valley. Spanish restrictions, however, were a check on the growth of that trade, and in 1786 and 1787 there were rumors that Congress would accede to a long-term Spanish closure of the Mississippi to American navigation in return for a freer trade with other Spanish ports. During his year in the state assembly Brackenridge focused a good bit of attention on the issue; without free downriver navigation, he warned, the Ohio forks country "must remain a miserable out-spot of the creation."[133] In September 1786 "Monitor" joined Brackenridge in alerting the region to the danger that Spain might "padlock" the Mississippi for twenty or thirty years with U.S. approval. "A Son of Freedom" followed with an "Alarm" in December.[134]

William Findley charged that Brackenridge used the Mississippi question "as a popular lure" to win election to the assembly in 1786 and then exploited the issue to enhance his image as a legislator. The "Monitor"

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essay also drew some criticism.[135] In the end Congress did not approve the Mississippi closure treaty with a sufficient majority, but the navigation issue continued to be a matter of concern in the west.[136] The essays on the subject in 1786, during the rumored secret negotiations and discussions by Congress, limned an interpretation of the region's political situation that harkened back to that expressed at the end of the war with Britain. We have suffered great hardship, "Monitor" declared, in settling "this wild and uncultivated desart" and defending ourselves against "a savage enemy." Now we cannot pay our due share of taxes because our potential avenue for commerce is blocked. "A Son of Freedom" echoed the sentiment, and gave it a hard edge. The western country had withstood terrible war and had contributed to the national cause; now "must our reward be eternal chains?" "Where, my fellow-citizens, is that liberty for which we bled?" the author queried. "Son of Freedom" urged his readers to press their legislators with petitions, to act "like sons of freedom" but "with prudence and caution." Should Congress ignore the western voice, however, "the prize is worthy the contending for: our lives, our liberty, our wives and children are at stake." "I know the spirit of the people," "Son" wrote. "I know they cannot submit. . . . The very moment the navigation of the

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Ohio is shut up, is the point of time which will alienate the affections of the western inhabitants and rouse every honest heart in defence of his rights and liberties as a citizen of the independent states of America." The "Farmer" essay of January 1787 was equally resolute in reference to the issue of accepting certificates in payment for old land rights. Work patiently to convince the assemblymen of the importance of this measure, "Farmer" advised. "And if they will not be admonished by gentle measures, treat them in the manner they deserve."[137]

Constitutional matters absorbed a good bit of the region's political attention during the late 1780s. Hugh Henry Brackenridge supported the new federal constitution at its appearance in October 1787; William Findley, on the other hand, was one of the dissident assemblymen who attempted to prevent the authorization for a state ratifying convention. Discussion of the proposed government in the pages of the Pittsburgh Gazette was sharp. Brackenridge energetically countered the dissidents' appeals to public opinion with prose and satirical verse, some of it bearing his name, some not. In the Pennsylvania ratifying convention early in 1788 Findley was again of the dissenting minority opposed to the constitution, along with John Smilie, James Edgar, Nathaniel Breading, and others from the

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western counties. Brackenridge, with some aid from others, continued to promote ratification and attacked his opponents through a series of anonymous "sermons" in the Gazette.[138] In November 1787 a meeting in Pittsburgh chaired by longtime resident John Gibson declared its approval of the proposed constitution on the grounds that a stronger national government could better deal with the problems caused by Spain and Great Britain on the frontier. When ratification by nine states appeared certain in June 1788 there was a celebratory gathering of a reported 1500 people on Grant's Hill behind Pittsburgh.[139]

Nevertheless, the salvos from Brackenridge's pen had not silenced all those with reservations about the new constitution. In early 1788 "Hampden" and "Sommers" -- names borrowed from seventeenth-century English politics -- addressed the Gazette's readers on the subject of the new frame of government. Both essays argued that the constitution by its design tended dangerously toward aristocracy and gave too little emphasis to popular representation in government.[140] According to Brackenridge and his allies John Smilie in Fayette County went so far as to advocate armed resistance to the new constitution.[141] In August, after ratification was certain, a meeting at Greensburg chose a committee of correspondence for Westmoreland

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County. The next month the committee, which consisted of seven of the county's political leaders and militia officers, suggested that the constitution should have certain amendments and safeguards added to it. The committee did not object to a federal system in theory, and agreed that powers to make treaties, levy imposts, regulate commerce, and provide defense belonged to Congress. What bothered the Westmoreland committee were the "extensive local powers" given to the central government by the constitution, the lack of any explicit protection of individual rights, the federal government's power to levy internal taxes and maintain a standing army, and what the committee thought was too little popular representation in Congress.[142] In September 1788 John Smilie, Albert Gallatin, and James Marshal were among the delegates to the Harrisburg Convention, called to propose amendments to the federal constitution.[143]

There was dissent in the region also the following spring as efforts to draft a new state constitution got underway. Debates on this issue were but another round in the continuing quarrel between the supporters and the opponents of the 1776 constitution, and the essential terms of the discussion were set long before, when factions formed for and against the revolutionary frame of government. This time the opponents of the 1776 constitution had sufficient political power to supplant it

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with a new one.[144]

Although southwestern Pennsylvania was free from war with Indians for several years after the Revolution, the issues of defense and Indian policy that shaped the region's relationships with the state and national governments during the war with Britain did not disappear. There continued to be some Delaware and Mingo living near Pittsburgh into the later 1780s, some of them just across the Allegheny, and others continued to bring peltry to the town to trade.[145] Indian groups living north of the Ohio, however, were alarmed by the rapid advance of settlement after the war, and many became militantly committed to the previously agreed boundary of the Ohio River as a separation of white and Indian territories. Their resistance was supported by British Indian affairs officers operating from posts that were to have been ceded to the United States by the terms of the peace treaty. In the last three or four years of the 1780s there was increasing friction as Indians threatened to kill or capture any surveyors caught in the Northwest Territory and as there were more and more raids by small horse-stealing or scalping parties, especially in the settlements along the stretch of the Ohio River flanking Ohio County, Virginia. In May 1789 the Pittsburgh Gazette reported the murder of

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some whites in Washington County and declared that "it is unnecessary to make any comment on the impropriety of wasting time and money in holding treaties with the savages, as long experience has shewn us the futility of such measures."[146] The federal government agreed that force was necessary and sent two expeditions against the Indians collected in the general Maumee-Wabash section of the Northwest. The 1790 campaign under Josiah Harmar was not an American victory; that under Arthur St. Clair, then governor of the Northwest Territory, ended in a terrible defeat in November 1791, when the army of about 1400 men suffered over 900 casualties in a surprise attack. Among the dead was General Richard Butler of Pittsburgh. "The horror the inhabitants of this place has been thrown into is not to be discribed," William Turnbull wrote from Pittsburgh soon after St. Clair's defeat.[147]

After the Harmar and St. Clair campaigns the power of the Indian nations of the Northwest was superior to what the United States had yet mustered against them. During those first years of the 1790s the Pittsburgh country once more experienced wartime conditions, at least of a sort. Indian raiding parties struck into western Pennsylvania, some within several miles of Pittsburgh, raising the inhabitants' collective appre-

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hensions. Fort Pitt was defunct, so the U.S. quickly built a modest stockaded post, Fort Fayette, on the Allegheny shore on the northeastern side of the town.[148] Defense was difficult to mobilize; counties quarrelled over the fairest distribution of arms and government aid, and parts of Ohio County felt they were inadequately protected by either Virginia or Pennsylvania. There was a shortage of weapons because the generally peaceful interlude of the middle 1780s had enticed many residents of the upper Ohio River country to sell their guns to migrants headed downriver. Inhabitants of some locales abandoned their farms and fled. Others pleaded for government aid. The Westmoreland County lieutenant alluded to the Revolution when he reported that it "is Very Distressing to Our County to Guard It self and Stand As a Barier for the Interior Parts of the State, when we Were Allways Willing to give Our Assistance when Required."[149] In March 1791, months before the St. Clair disaster spurred the construction of Fort Fayette, raids near Pittsburgh led the town's citizens to believe that immediate defensive measures were required. After a town meeting "the Principle Men of the Town" called on Isaac Craig, then in charge of federal military stores at Pittsburgh, and requested the loan of one hundred muskets, bayonets and cartouche boxes. When Craig, worried about his own position, insisted that

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he write the War Department first for instructions, his visitors made it clear that "in Case of my Refusal to Comply with their Requisition, it was Resolved to Break open the Stores and take such A Number as they might think Propper." Craig believed them and quickly issued the arms, taking the signatures of "ten of the Most Respectable Carracters" as his receipt.[150] Until Anthony Wayne advanced successfully against the Indians in the Northwest in 1794 the distraught conditions of frontier war again plagued the Ohio forks country and cast their shadow on the inhabitants' relations with both state and national governments.[151]

The disposition of county-level power also continued to engender local disputes in the region. By early 1787 Hannastown's supporters barraged the state legislature with petitions calling for the reinstatement of that village as the Westmoreland County seat. They were opposed by Greensburg's supporters and by people who had grown weary of the issue, saw little difference in the two sites, and wanted the county seat left where it had finally alighted. There was much discussion and a "pitched battle" fought with petitions, but no further change was made and Greensburg remained the seat of government.[152] Adjoining counties had similar conflicts. When Fayette County was formed in

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1784, factions at opposite ends of Uniontown struggled to influence the precise location of the county buildings and to gain superiority in the election of justices. During the 1780s groups in Washington County bitterly contested the size and location of the county's townships, and in the early 1790s John Canon and others made some extremely aggressive efforts to make Canonsburg rather than Washington the seat of county political power.[153]

In the postwar years also, Pittsburgh finally became a county seat. In 1785 the Pennsylvania legislature received a petition asking that portions of Westmoreland and Washington counties be made into a new county centering on Pittsburgh. The advocates of the new county, among the most active of which was Hugh Henry Brackenridge, argued that Pittsburgh was a local market center and "the capital of the western country, . . . intended by nature for a public good," and therefore must be a seat of government.[154] Such boosterism was countered in the legislature by members from Washington and Westmoreland who were unenthusiastic about a diminution of their own counties. Early in 1787, during Brackenridge's term in the assembly, the supporters of the new county presented the legislature with a petition bearing over 800 signatures. It was not until the fall of 1788, however, that the bill creating

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Allegheny County passed.[155]

The mere presence of disagreement and contention was perhaps less important to the local political system than were the specific means by which discontent and frustration found expression and dissatisfied citizens sought relief. There were several options available to unhappy participants within the political system. Those able to write could present their views in the columns of the region's newspaper. Essays and letters could only influence others through suasion, however -- not a disagreeable course of action in a republic but certainly one without sure guarantees of result. Opponents' replies, moreover, could diffuse an argument into a satirical contest of wit or a pointless quibble. One local resident noted that "it is dangerous to become a newspaper contender, whereby reputation is often easily lost, but very seldom can be gained."[156] Writing of another kind, in the form of private letters to influential contacts in or near government, remained a viable course of action. One could also associate with others of like mind to approach a problem. The result could be a local meeting calling for certain action, a petition to the legislature, or a committee of correspondence such as that formed by the antifederalists of Westmoreland County in 1788. At about the same time, by 1788 and 1789, people with similar

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political views began to hold meetings to agree on tickets of candidates for the state assembly and Congress.[157]

Yet despite the legal channels available for the redress of grievances, the threat of direct extra-legal force remained a part of the local political repertoire. In the spring of 1785 a Delaware man who had murdered two whites in an Indian encampment near Pittsburgh was arrested and confined at Fort Pitt. On two occasions within less than two days, armed parties of Washington County militiamen came to seize the Indian and administer their own form of punishment. The captain and half-dozen soldiers that comprised the "garrison" at Fort Pitt at the time were no match for thirty to fifty belligerent militiamen, who cocked their rifles and refused to disperse when a magistrate read them the riot act. Somehow with the aid of Pittsburgh's inhabitants the local authorities managed to avert violence, disperse the intruders, and keep custody of their prisoner, who was quickly moved to Greensburg, tried, and hanged.[158]

Force was mentioned on other occasions as well. The citizens of Pittsburgh never blinked when they informed Craig that they would break open the government's stores to defend themselves in 1791. The essays of "Farmer" in January 1787 and "Son of Freedom" in

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December 1786, although vague about what the ultimate course of action might be, clearly implied that there was a limit to submission and that unresponsive governments must be on their guard. And whether or not John Smilie, an elected official at the time, really advocated armed resistance to the new federal government, his opponents announced openly in the press that he had done so. In addition, in May 1789 Brackenridge, signing himself "Germanicus," wrote the Pittsburgh Gazette concerning the growing efforts for a new state constitutional convention. He noted that he "must disapprove, and highly reprobate the measure on foot amongst us, in this country, to seize the interval between the existence of the old and the new government, to separate from Pennsylvania."[159] For some people, if Brackenridge's statement may be taken at face value, the notion of radically altering the region's governance was still alive.

Brackenridge's comment also calls attention to the sectional element in politics after the Revolution. Brackenridge himself claimed that eastern commercial interests in the Pennsylvania legislature were "much disgusted" with the western representatives. "They say that we come down like Huns, Goths and Vandals upon them, and join with those who tear up charters, and the most sacred engagements of government."

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William Findley, who was certainly more closely identified with a radical western element in the assembly than Brackenridge, called Brackenridge's characterization of the eastern members' attitudes "an invention of his own imagination."[160] Yet the perception that there could be differences of interest between east and west was certainly there. Originally the "interior" of the continent meant the part away from the seaboard; by the time of William Irvine's service at Fort Pitt during the Revolution, however, he could comfortably refer to the older settled areas east of the mountains as the "interior" of the continent -- the part to the westerner's back. A visitor to America in the 1790s noted the same thing: on the coast the "Back Country" lay west of the mountains, but in the transmontane region the "Back Country" was the seaboard.[161] It did not take a particularly keen observer to see that some people west of the mountains, although by no means all of them, chafed at demands made by government, or that the policies of government regarding Indian affairs, taxation, defense, land, and the Mississippi navigation issue could do much either to win or to alienate the affections of many westerners. There was a strong element of implied threat in the westerners' lament that they had sacrificed so much, and received so little in return, in their relations with the general

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government, but the details of how the threat would be carried out were not articulated. In 1784 George Washington looked at the west and at Spain and Britain on its flanks and concluded that "the Western Settlers . . . stand as it were on a pivet -- the touch of a feather would almost incline them any way." Washington erred if he believed that westerners were unanimously on that "pivet," but he correctly saw that among some the "disposition" to sever ties with the Pennsylvania government was "not wanting."[162]

Despite the differing interests that distinguished it from the seaboard, the transmontane country was in very many respects nothing close to a unified political entity. The opposite tendency was in fact one of the region's political characteristics. Ephraim Douglass, the cynical new prothonotary of Fayette County in 1784, reported from Uniontown that "the general curse of the country, disunion, rages in this little mud-hole. . . . The animosities which have at different periods arisen among them still subsist when the original causes have been long since removed." Douglass claimed, perhaps too facilely, that there were four major factions in the area at war's end: the advocates of Pennsylvania government, the advocates of Virginia government, the advocates of a new state government,

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"and the enemies to all, the tories." He maintained that "each of these descriptions abhore each other as heartily as ever did Guelph and Ghibellines, or any other descriptions of men in the world."[163] Four years later a contributor to the Pittsburgh Gazette referred to the region as "these fractured counties." Another contributor blamed the region's lack of unity on the transience of so much of the population. "They take this for a resting place or half way house," wrote "Censor," and that situation was not conducive to the moral or economic improvement of the region. "Let every man in this country think its property connected with his own, and each dependent upon the other. . . . Let him not consider this country as a thoroughfare to a better; but as itself one of the best."[164]

The appeal to a common good may have been but wishful thinking. Commissioners surveying routes for new public roads soon learned that a host of nearby residents would try to influence the selection of the route, each person claiming to know the best route for the public good but each pointing out a route "to answer some particular purpose."[165] A related characteristic on the part of some people was a form of individualized understanding of what a fair and proper relationship between the person and his or her government should be.

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Hugh Ross provides an example. In advertisements for his new ferry service at Pittsburgh, Ross alluded to reports that someone else claimed an "exclusive privilege" from the state to operate a ferry there. Ross deemed such thinking "absurd." "It would be utterly repugnant to the liberty of this state" for the assembly to do such a thing, he declared, a violation of the state constitution and of the ideals of the Revolution. Ross believed an exclusive ferry charter to be "so hurtful to the rights of individuals, and so injurious to the public at large, that he is in no fear the honorable assembly will ever grant it to any person, even if they had the power to do it."[166]

Postwar society in the region differed from that of the prerevolutionary years in certain ways. These were most noticeable in terms of the increasing population density and the associated development of the social, political, and economic structures characteristic of longer-settled areas. Most of this development, however, continued trends that were present from the early years of British-American settlement in the transmontane region. From the beginning there was commercialism

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in the region, a desire to engage in more than subsistance farming and to find markets in which to trade. Both large-scale entrepreneurs and those of more limited assets sought ways, even in the early 1760s, to exploit the Ohio forks country's economic opportunities. The military was an important part of the local economy both before and after the Revolution. Even the infrastructure of roads, ferries, saw- and gristmills, smiths' shops, boatyards, and towns began its growth before the war and continued to develop with the increasing population.

Moreover, for at least a decade after the end of the Revolutionary War the Pittsburgh district was marked by much of the same fluidity that characterized it earlier. There was a continuing mobility and transience of population; some residents of 1790 had lived in the region for two decades or more, but a great many more were relative newcomers. Thousands of others moved through the region toward Kentucky or the Northwest, and they were joined by inhabitants who moved out of the region to the newer areas. This movement and lack of rigidity gave the region an "unsettled" aspect for some years after the war with Britain.

Politically both Pennsylvania and the nation as a whole were in a state of flux in the 1780s and early 1790s. Constitutional issues of who would hold political

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power and the means by which decisions would be made and implemented were important and fundamental questions, widely discussed and disputed. Within that larger context local politics in the trans-Appalachian country remained combative. While it was not a universal characteristic shared by all local inhabitants, many participants in the political system, office-holders and constituents alike, did not shrink from conflict and engaged actively in public dispute. The resolution of the competition between Virginia and Pennsylvania for jurisdiction over the territory removed one element of political contention, but the question of who would hold local power remained.

While there were certain issues that could draw relatively wide support within the region -- the Mississippi navigation question and Indian affairs and defense are examples -- there were a number of strong factors working against homogeneity. The region's inhabitants were of varying geographic origins and different religious denominations. Local affiliations such as militia companies, church congregations, and "neighborhoods" of settlement worked against any general uniformity of response to centralized authority, as could individual interest. It is not difficult, either, to find contrasts of wealth, economic interests, social interaction, attitudes, or lifestyle within the upper

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Ohio Valley. For example, at Pittsburgh, Washington, and Uniontown, there were "gentlemen" and their families who were relatively well traveled and educated, held influential political or military positions, maintained close contacts with friends and powerful acquaintances east of the mountains, kept abreast of current national issues, and entertained themselves and visitors with teas, social calls, dances, and gatherings for events such as Independence Day.[167] In contrast there were thinly settled sections of Washington County that a weary traveler might describe as "Desert" or "Wilderness" even in the late 1780s. Along Laurel Hill in 1793 a road commissioner encountered "the scattered remnants of the most compleat human wretchedness I had ever any idea off": people living in rugged country away from the region's thoroughfares, isolated socially and materially from the world of Pittsburgh's burghers.[168] Traveling from the upper tributaries of the Youghiogheny and Monongahela to the upper Potomac in 1784, George Washington encountered families who lived twenty miles from their neighbors and lived primarily as hunters. The year before, a traveler going westward down Laurel Hill spoke with a resident who complained of the increasing population. "'It spoils the hunting,' he said, 'makes quarrels; and then they come and want to collect taxes; it is time some of us were leaving and getting

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deeper into the country.'"[169]

A similar contrast could be found in the 1760s, and it was not the only such difference visible in the region. Social and economic differences do not explain the political contests of the region, however, any more than one can presume that a homogeneously agricultural and "democratic" west opposed a commercial and aristocratic east. The society did not cleave along class lines. Freemen tended to elect men of property to office.[170] "Gentlemen" in and out of office tended often to enter into disputes with their peers. Politically the region remained, in large measure, a conglomerate of individual and group interests that allied or split according to the particular issue at hand. That essential lack of consensus, of common goals and mutually agreed means of attaining them, played an important part in the region's confrontation with federal authority in 1794.

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CHAPTER 9

"THIS UNHAPPY AND DISTRACTED COUNTRY"

When John Gibson, long a resident of the Ohio forks country, informed Governor Thomas Mifflin of the outbreak of what is known as the Whiskey Insurrection, he wrote from Pittsburgh: "I am sorry to have to inform your Excellency that a civil War has taken place in this County." Others used the term "civil war" also during the succeeding weeks, although more as something that seemed likely rather than as something that had already begun.[1] It is uncertain whether those who used the phrase "civil war" in the troubled summer and fall of 1794 saw the society torn by civil conflict as the United States or western Pennsylvania, for the term could really apply in either case. The "insurrection" was an internal crisis within the region at least as much as it was a confrontation between the U.S. government and irate whiskey distillers.

The troubles of 1794 were in part a product of that element in the region's political style whereby the dissatisfied, the frustrated, or the ambitious might take direct and aggressive action to satisfy their perceived interests and needs. There apparently was continuity into the 1790s of the notion that the

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political system was relatively malleable -- that government's authority was not absolute and that a lack of rigidity in the system invited an assertive course of individual action to achieve one's ends. And there were certainly frustrations in the post-revolutionary world: economic changes, a growing population, a feeling perhaps that opportunity was lessening and that an expansive, relatively open system was beginning to tighten and harden. Within this context there was also unhappiness over the region's relationship with the state and national governments.

Others, however, were less discontented with their situations and appreciated social order and the status quo. While perhaps not perfectly happy in all regards these people were nonetheless resistant to any genuinely radical course of action. The tensions between order and disorder, stability and instability, intense political frustration and the desire only to be left alone comprised a large part of the upper Ohio Valley's social and political crisis of 1794. There was no clean split between two camps, however, but rather the region's now-characteristic plethora of individuals, groups, locales and interests all pulling in different directions. The resolution of such contrary interests in a mutually satisfactory

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course of action without resort to overt conflict was a recurring political problem in the region. "In a regular republican government it is part of the fundamental compact that the minority shall submit to the majority," wrote the commissioners sent west by President George Washington to negotiate with the insurgents of 1794; ". . . but the people here have shewn that they disregard that great principle of social order -- they have no compact among themselves that the will of the majority shall prevail."[2] As in the case of the term "civil war," the meaning here is ambiguous since it could refer either to the region's relations to the larger society of the nation or to its own internal situation; again, both meanings have some validity.

The Whiskey Insurrection was on the whole a confused and chaotic situation with a great deal of local variation and differing individual perceptions of what was occurring and how best to respond. It was also, for many, a very distressing set of circumstances in which accepted, stable patterns of behavior seemed about to crumble into complete disorder and civil disruption. The acute period of disruption was, however, very brief, lasting not even the entire second half of 1794. The region had seen similar troubles before.

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Factions and power shifted as situations changed, and the region's diversity of interests and strong tendencies away from conformity helped prevent the fissuring of the society into permanently warring divisions. What the federal government saw as the immediate problem, the reassertion of political order and its own authority in the region, it solved rather quickly in very basic terms through the imposition of its will by military power.

The opposition to the federal liquor excise can be fully understood only within the context of the political and economic discontent that had begun to find expression in the pages of the Pittsburgh Gazette during the latter half of the 1780s. Committeemen who met with government commissioners in the midst of the crisis in 1794 expressed a variety of grievances, some of which had been around for some time: state land policies favoring speculative interests over actual settlers; burdensome militia duty; federal interference with Pennsylvania's efforts to develop Presque Isle and the far northwestern corner of the state; and the failure of the United States to take effective measures regarding the navigation of the Mississippi,

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the continued British occupation of Detroit and other western posts, or the Indians of the Northwest.[3] Another grievance that drew a good bit of attention in the early 1790s and during 1794 concerned the salaries of congressmen, state legislators, militia brigade inspectors, and other government officers. Dissatisfaction on this point was both economic and political. Locals argued that excessive salaries and expense allowances increased the expense of government, which led to further taxation and increased government revenue systems. Salaried officials were also considered insulated from the people and lacking accountability. Related to the salary issue was the discontent caused by Pennsylvania's institution of a system of salaried, trained associate judges who assumed the most important judicial powers of the local justices of the peace. This measure drew the ire of those who thought the new system was expensive and unnecessary, of those who feared the removal of much of the elected township justices' power in favor of salaried professionals, and of some of the justices who lacked the legal training or political influence necessary to become county judges. Issues such as the use of professional judges and the salaries given to state and federal officials were thought more important than the excise by many of those expressing their political dissatisfaction before and

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during the "insurrection" of 1794.[4]

It is also significant that some of those who felt aggrieved in the 1780s developed a system of organization (and nominally of popular representation) that played a very important role in the excise resistance of the 1790s. Although some links in the genealogy are now obscure, a conference held in Washington County in 1787 was almost certainly the ancestor of associations that opposed the federal excise in 1791 and after. During the January 1787 term of the Washington County court there was a meeting of county magistrates, attorneys, the sheriff, the prothonotary, and other "reputable inhabitants" of the county along with "some gentlemen" of Ohio County, Virginia. The meeting's sole concern was the importation of liquor into the transmontane country from the east, which "tends to the prejudice and impoverishing of the western inhabitants." The group resolved to buy and drink only western-made liquor beginning in March and called on the region's inhabitants to join them in "this association." They also suggested that county courts use their authority to regulate tavern rates as a weapon against liquor brought over the mountains. To help carry out their resolves they called for a meeting at the county seat of two elected delegates from each Washington County township.[5]

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Accordingly a conference which styled itself "a general Patriotic Convention" for the county met at the end of January 1787 in the town of Washington. There the pledge to use only liquor of local manufacture, and to encourage the use of tavern rates to favor local spirits, was repeated, but the convention went on to address a much broader range of concerns. Resolutions addressed the problem of the region's lack of specie and expressed dissatisfaction with the state and national governments' policies regarding taxation, the navigation of the Mississippi, the state liquor excise, and restrictions on the use of certificates for land payments. Concerns about local power were reflected in resolutions opposing the formation of Allegheny County, supporting the idea of an academy in Washington to match Pittsburgh's, and praying a revision of the county's election districts. Furthermore, the convention considered itself "intrusted with the general interest of this country" and declared that its opinion regarding any bills pending before the state assembly "shall be considered as instructions to our representatives."[6]

The convention's proceedings were published in the Pittsburgh newspaper, and the meeting's presumption that it represented Washington County's sentiments

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quickly drew criticism. The "general Patriotic Convention" officially consisted of only eleven men selected from seven townships and the town of Washington. More than half the county's townships were unrepresented, and the time provided for the election of delegates was so short that those who did attend almost certainly represented only the interested parties who called the convention. "A Mechanic" sent a satirical essay to the Gazette, deriding the conference as the work of a small group concerned only for its own "self-interest." "Publicus" rose to the convention's defense as such criticism appeared. An author calling himself "Censor" was more cautious. He suggested that the convention could be a useful means of expressing public opinion on current problems. Yet "it is influence, and not authority that they can possess," and should the convention members betray the public's guarded confidence, "they return back to themselves, a few unsupported individuals, incapable of trust, and meriting neglect."[7] Before adjourning, the convention appointed two of its members to draft "an instrument of association" and called a meeting for the next court term, but there is no record of any continuation of the body. Directly or indirectly, however, it was a precursor of later organizations that focused their complaints on the federal excise.

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Excises on liquor drew open opposition in western Pennsylvania well before Congress instituted the federal excise in 1791. Collectors of the state excise in the western counties had a difficult time in the 1780s. One collector found advertisements in Westmoreland County offering a reward for his scalp. When he entered Washington County to make collections a large mob stopped him, destroyed his pistols and official papers, cut off half his hair and queued the remainder, performed similar artistry on his horse's mane and tail, and escorted him to the edge of the county "with Threats of utter Desolution should he dare to return." A dozen people were fined for this incident and held accountable for damages to the collector, but he resigned anyway and his successors either did little or, if assiduous in their duties, found themselves so disliked that they gave up.[8]

Dorsey Pentecost, who informed the Supreme Executive Council of the Washington County mob's treatment of the excise collector, added that "this Banditti I am told denounces distruction, vengence against all manner of People who dare to oppose, or even ganesay this their unparrelled behaviour, and that they will support every Person concerned against every opposition. . . . I am told the Combination is large." Furthermore, "it was not done in a Gust of

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Passion, but cooly, deliberately, and Prosecuted from day to day," and, in Pentecost's opinion, demonstrated "a desolute, and refractory spirit" among "a Certain class of People" in the county.[9]

Not all opposition to the Pennsylvania liquor excise took the form of mob action. In 1790, for example, printed petitions asking for the law's repeal were circulated in Westmoreland County and presented to the legislature. Abandoning the excise meant finding revenues from other sources, but sentiment against the tax was strong and the state's collections were erratic and ineffectual in many counties, so the state House of Representatives passed a resolution opposing the proposed federal excise in 1791. The state excise was repealed later that year.[10]

Opponents of the liquor excise invoked a variety of arguments and complaints against the tax. In his Incidents of the Insurrection, written in 1795, Hugh Henry Brackenridge noted that a historic opposition to excises and the "gaugers" who collected them had been brought to the region from Ireland and Britain. Alexander Hamilton and his subordinates in the Treasury were aware of this traditional resistance to excise taxes, but they insisted that the federal tax placed on liquors in 1791 was not an excise at all. They in fact never referred to it as such, adhering instead to the

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terms "duty" and "revenue" in accordance with the language of the act establishing the tax.[11] Both in historic terms and in reference to the contemporary political context, opponents of the tax feared the power it gave the government. According to this argument enforcement of the law meant creating a system of revenue officers and giving them dangerous powers to search, to investigate, to seize, and to interfere with daily lives and the normal course of business. If an article of regular consumption such as domestically produced spirits could be taxed, moreover, then so in theory could all other items of local production and use. The system, argued its opponents, tended inexorably to abuse, to the aggrandizement of funding systems, revenue projects, and salaried officials. It was "dangerous to liberty."[12] There was also a set of arguments that maintained the tax was especially unfair to the western country. These complaints were economic: there were more stills in western Pennsylvania than in any comparable sector of the country; there was less cash available to pay the duty; whiskey sold for a lower price in the west than in the east but the tax was the same; whiskey was a more important article of consumption and trade west of the mountains, as fundamental an item to the economy as flour was to the east. William Findley maintained that a direct tax on land,

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something which Alexander Hamilton believed was far more undesirable in political terms than the excise, would be preferred in the west.[13] Finally, there were objections to specific aspects of the enforcement of the federal law. One of the westerners' strongest complaints was against the requirement that prosecutions for non-compliance with the federal excise be heard only by the U.S. courts at Philadelphia. Some people believed that a prosecution under the excise law would absolutely ruin them financially, a fear that helped goad some of them into desperate measures in July 1794.[14] The requirement that distant courts hear all revenue cases was modified too late to show full effect before the outbreak of violence. Some distillers also found the specific details of entering stills, certifying the payment of duties, and simply handling liquor as a taxed product troublesome and confusing at times. There were also very strong objections to some revenue officers in the region because of their character or behavior in office.[15]

The federal law taxing liquors was unpopular from its inception. Beginning as early as the summer of 1791, within months of the passage of the act, there were meetings held in western Pennsylvania to remonstrate against the act. Some of these gatherings were akin to the Washington County "convention" of 1787, for

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they acknowledged a nominal system of representation whereby local administrative units sent delegates to a general meeting. In theory this system could organize the four counties from the township or district level all the way to the regional level in a stepped hierarchy of representative committees. In practice the system was not so complete, but in a rough fashion, and particularly in some areas, it did operate. An advertisement called a meeting at "Redstone Old Fort" (Brownsville) in July 1791. There it was recommended that the voters of each election district meet to select three representatives to a county committee; these county committees were to meet in August, when each would "collect the sense of the people" on the excise tax and choose delegates to represent the county at a general committee of the four counties at Pittsburgh in September. Representatives from Washington County's election districts met as a county committee according to plan in August. It is not clear whether the other counties also followed the exact procedure laid down at Redstone, but in September Allegheny, Westmoreland, and Fayette counties were also represented at Pittsburgh. In August 1792 there was another conference at Pittsburgh. According to the published advertisements this meeting was to be a conference of delegates chosen for the purpose at the election dis-

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trict level. Westmoreland County was not represented at this meeting, and the delegates of the other three counties styled themselves "a meeting of sundry Inhabitants of the Western Counties of Pennsylvania" rather than an explicitly representative committee of delegates as the September 1791 meeting had been.[16]

Among the prominent politicians who attended one or more of these meetings were William Findley, John Smilie, Albert Gallatin, James Edgar, who had served as an assemblyman, a member of the Council of Censors, and an associate judge in Washington County, James Marshal, who was so active in suppressing new-state schemes in the latter part of the Revolution, and Edward Cook, the former Westmoreland justice of the peace and county lieutenant whose residence now fell within Fayette County. Later, in response to Alexander Hamilton's claim that the 1791-1792 meetings were gatherings of "malcontent persons who entered into resolutions calculated at once to confirm inflame and systematize the spirit of opposition," Gallatin and Findley carefully pointed out that there was nothing insidious about meetings called to discuss government policies and draw up remonstrances against them.[17] For the most part the meetings did little more than pass resolutions complaining of the excise and draw up petitions to Congress. The 1792 meeting at Pittsburgh

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also appointed committees of correspondence for the three counties represented there and called for a similar committee in Westmoreland County. The one resolution that drew particular attention as the opposition to the law increased was passed at the Washington County meeting in August 1791 and again in similar form at Pittsburgh a year later. That resolution called on the region's citizens to treat excise officers "with that contempt they deserve," to have no dealings with excise collectors, even "to withhold all the comforts of life which depend upon those duties that as men and fellow citizens we owe to each other." Gallatin later agonized over his approbation of this resolve at the Pittsburgh meetings; it was his "only political sin." "The sentiments thus expressed were not illegal or criminal," he explained, "yet I will freely acknowledge that they were violent, intemperate, and reprehensible." At the same time Gallatin was quick to point out that the Pittsburgh conference of 1792 "did not call themselves delegates of the people, but individuals voluntarily assembled." Findley maintained that the resolution had little real effect on the people at large, which may have been true in most of the region; some locals, as will be seen, took the resolution very much to heart.[18]

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Looking back on the period preceding the Whiskey Insurrection, William Findley acknowledged that "there was a disposition prevailing with a few people to have the country organized into committees, but not exclusively to oppose the excise."[19] In August 1793 a "general committee" of Fayette County, consisting presumably of two elected delegates from each township, met at Uniontown to remonstrate against recent "oppressive" and "unconstitutional" acts increasing the pay of legislators and judges, to complain about militia brigade inspectors' pay and the state's loan office law, and to suggest that the voters choose a new set of legislators. There was a similar meeting in Washington County at about the same time. Soon "Fair Play" wrote the Pittsburgh Gazette about "all this business of committeeing." He suggested that such committees actually expressed the views of just a few people and were less representative of public opinion than they pretended. It was all "rather under the hatches," wrote "Fair Play" -- "let the committee men deliver their opinions to the world as their own only."[20]

At Greensburg in February 1794 "a number of respectable inhabitants" of Westmoreland County gathered and appointed a committee to meet in nine days "in order to consult whether a new constitution was necessary, or that our grievances could be remedied

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otherwise." It is not certain precisely what "grievances" were under consideration, but they appear to have concerned high government salaries and the use of trained associate judges on the county bench. Some of the men appointed to the committee may not have attended the original meeting or agreed with its sentiments. In fact the chairman of the first meeting at Greensburg quickly disavowed the whole affair and the special committee may never have met. However, the energetic secretary of the original meeting, Terence Campbell, did have a prepared set of resolutions on the issues of the county judiciary system and high official salaries which he wanted to introduce at one of the major regional meetings held during the Whiskey Insurrection.[21]

These county committee meetings of 1793 and early 1794 appear to have been largely unrelated to the 1791-1792 meetings that were concerned primarily with the federal excise. The notion of organizing the entire region from the township or district level on up was not abandoned, however. While the four-county region as a whole was never organized into a complete system of local and county committees, in at least one area -- the general area, in fact, in which the "insurrection" of 1794 broke out -- local organization along those lines was fairly advanced by early 1794. In this instance the occasional meeting of political grievance committees

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

Map 10.
The Whiskey Insurrection

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was replaced by what in theory was a broad association encompassing the local citizenry, with a written constitution and a permanent structure of organization.

This organization was the Hamilton's District society, more commonly called the Mingo Creek society or association.[22] The name "Hamilton's District" referred to the Washington County election district which had its polling place at the house of David Hamilton, a Nottingham Township justice of the peace. The district included the northeastern part of Washington County around Mingo Creek.[23] In his published account of the excise troubles Hugh Henry Brackenridge referred to Hamilton's District as the "hot bed" and the "cradle" of the forcible excise resistance. William Findley called that sector of Washington County "the seat of the insurrection," "the center of opposition, and . . . undoubtedly the cradle of the insurrection."[24] The area was also the home of the first regiment of the first brigade of the Washington County militia, called "Hamilton's" regiment because its commander was David Hamilton's cousin, Colonel John Hamilton. By early 1794, if not sooner, the framers of the Hamilton's District society realized that the militia system, which already encompassed most of the adult male population in an organizational structure from the local level on up to the county level, could play a key role in the

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organization of the region's population along the lines suggested by earlier committees. The constitution adopted by the society in February 1794, which gave the association its formal structure and was theoretically to link it to other district societies similarly organized, used the eight companies of Colonel Hamilton's regiment as the district's subunits. Each militia company would send a delegate to the regular meetings of the society's council or committee. A few of the regiment's officers were among the moving forces of the society, but most, including Colonel Hamilton, do not appear in the surviving minutes of the society. Nevertheless the society's leadership seems to have concluded that the militia regiment or battalion and its companies provided a better means than townships and election districts of organizing the local population.[25]

The origins of what took formal shape as the Hamilton's District association early in 1794 are obscure. There were residents of the district at the antiexcise meetings of August 1791 in Washington and August 1792 in Pittsburgh.[26] It would seem also that excise resisters in northeast Washington County took very seriously the county committee's 1791 resolve to treat excisemen "with that contempt they deserve." Two weeks after the county committee adopted the resolution, a party of disguised men confronted excise collector Robert Johnson

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at Pigeon Creek, tarred and feathered him, cut his hair, and took his horse. Several of the men that the government thought were responsible for the incident were later involved in the Hamilton's District society. When a messenger went into the area with writs requiring the appearance of some of the mob in court, he too was tarred and feathered.[27]

In the summer of 1792 Captain William Faulkner, an officer in the federal army, announced that he would allow his tavern in the town of Washington to be used as an excise inspection office, but "was advised by a Number of the Gentlemen of Washington in a friendly way" not to do so. When Faulkner came upon Benjamin Parkinson, with whom he had been on friendly terms, Parkinson pronounced him "a Damnd Rascal" and declared that "you must never come into my Company." Parkinson then took Faulkner to the house of "Squire Hamilton" -- David Hamilton, called "squire" because he was a local magistrate -- where Hamilton read to Faulkner the county committee's 1791 resolution concerning the treatment of those connected with excise enforcement. Faulkner also learned that Parkinson, who later served as the president of the Hamilton's District society, belonged to an "association" of almost five hundred members formed "to Oppose the Excise Law." When Faulkner refused to believe that anyone would actually tar and feather him or destroy his property merely for allowing

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the use of his tavérn as an inspection office, Hamilton "replied they were oblidged to doe so, by the terms of the association." Then Daniel Hamilton, apparently a kinsman of David and John and one of those the government believed was involved in the assaults on collector Johnson and the writ-bearer, arrived to punctuate the statement: he took Faulkner by the hair and gave a scalp whoop.[28] After he left Hamilton's, Faulkner continued to receive advice that he should remove the excise office from his property, and he was told that men from Mingo Creek intended to burn the building. One day while Faulkner was away an ill-mannered crowd disguised as Indians came into Washington and made their intentions against Faulkner clear in a loud and threatening display. Faulkner chose to heed the threats and within weeks of his allowing the excise office to open in his tavern he publicly rescinded the permission.[29]

Faulkner's reports of an antiexcise "association" in the northeastern townships of Washington County are virtually the only early evidence of the Mingo Creek or Hamilton's District association. It was perhaps during 1793 or very early 1794 that a form of manifesto of the group's aims was drafted. "We are ruled by eastrern america," the declaration stated, "and by men whose object, is the interest of another Country" -- an apparent

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reference to pro-British interests in government. Such people, "whose instrument is Corruption, and whose Strength is the weakniss of our Country, . . . have the whole of the power and patronage of the Country as means to seduce and to subdue the Honesty and spirit of her representatives in the Legislature." As specific grievances the document's anonymous authors referred to "the unequal method of raising revenue," the little attention paid by Congress to western remonstrances, the increasing number of "Courts and Civil officers with their Enormus Salaries," and the requirement that federal excise cases be tried in courts east of the mountains. These grievances were thought at least equal to those of the colonies in 1774 and 1775, and were "but symptoms of that mortal disease which Corrodes the vitals of our Constitutions, and Leaves to the people in their own government, but the Shadow of a name." "A Complete and radical reform of the representation of the People in the legislature" was "the sole Constitutional mode" of correcting the problem. Therefore "we have agreed to form an association to be Called the society of united freemen of Hamiltons district of Washington County Pennsylvania." And since "a Cordial union" of everyone in the region was necessary to make such changes, the authors "most earnestly exhort

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our fellow Citizens in general to follow our example and to form Similar Societies in every district of their Counties for the Promotion of Constitutional Knowledge." In conclusion the declaration proposed a schedule of district and county meetings to culminate in a conference of the four-county region at a well-known Presbyterian meeting house in the "forks of Yough" area across the Monongahela from Hamilton's District.[30]

In February 1794 a group of Hamilton's District residents met and formed a committee with one representative from each of the eight companies of Colonel John Hamilton's regiment. At the end of the month five of these men and three delegates from Allegheny County met "in Convention" and gave "the unanimous Consent of all the districts of Hameltons" to a formal constitution. The constitution provided for a district "society," its primary element to consist of a president and a council of elected delegates, one from each militia company, who would meet at least once a month. The constitution included specific requirements regarding the age, residence, term, and replacement of the president and council members. The local militia companies, via their captains, were "from time to time" to receive copies of the council's journal and accounts of expenditures of money. The distributed copies of the journal could be edited at the council's discretion to exclude "such

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parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy," and the councilmen and other officers "for any Speech or debate in their Society . . . shall not be questioned in any other place." The specific duties, powers, and functions of the council and president were not detailed. They could recommend candidates for legislative office. The group was also authorized "to encourage able teachers for the instructions of youth," "to examine into the Conduct of their teachers," and, interestingly, "to introduce the bible and religious books into their schools." There was also an expectation that people would bring their disputes to the society rather than enter into litigation in court. The society was to formulate whatever "by Laws" it needed to carry out the powers granted by the constitution; the constitution itself could be amended by a convention, but no rules for calling such a body appear in the document.[31] The militia companies of Hamilton's regiment met to cast their votes in March 1794. Benjamin Parkinson was elected president of the society, and he and the new council began regular monthly meetings in April.[32]

There continued to be an expectation that the Hamilton's District or Mingo Creek association would be but one unit of a multilevel regional system of district and county organizations; the society's constitution provided for the appointment of "deputies" to

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act as envoys to any county or regional meetings. There is little evidence of similarly well-developed organizations in other locales, however. During February 1794 a few men from Allegheny County, a large portion of which had been part of northern Washington County until the late 1780s, sat with the Hamilton's District committee that organized the district by means of militia companies and adopted the district constitution. Whether these men represented a similar organization in Allegheny County or joined their Washington County neighbors because there was no comparable association in Allegheny is unknown.[33] They may have been representatives of the "Republican Society in the Forks of Yough," which met several times from fall 1793 to spring 1794 in that part of Allegheny County lying just east over the Monongahela River from Hamilton's District. The number of people at those meetings and where they were from are a mystery, but the "forks of Yough" meetings purported to be gatherings of representatives from throughout the four-county region. Despite these pretensions, the meetings may have been largely or exclusively local affairs. The April 1794 meeting published the form of constitution adopted by the Hamilton's District society in the Pittsburgh Gazette and encouraged its adoption by militia districts throughout the region.[34] Apart

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from such activity in the adjacent portions of Allegheny County there is no evidence that any area outside Hamilton's District organized itself in the same way or attempted to link itself with the proposed system of regional organization. William Findley asserted that he and other Westmoreland and Fayette county political leaders such as Gallatin and Smilie were unaware of the existence of the "Mingo Creek association" prior to the outbreak of the "insurrection" in mid-1794.[35]

From what he learned of the society Brackenridge wrote that the political motivations of its instigators varied. Some had been frustrated in attempts to acquire county-level judicial office; some saw the organization "as an engine of election;" some participated "from a desire natural to men, of being conspicuous." Practical motives perhaps led some, "harrassed with suits from justices and courts," to advocate the settlement of disputes within the association as "a less expensive tribunal."[36] There are hints in its constitution that some of the group's members wanted to see the association involved not just in the settlement of disputes but in areas such as the education of youth as well, apparently in a desire to exert stronger local control over teachers and instruction.

Despite the evident interest of some in a broad association that would deal with such matters as civil

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litigation and schools, in practical terms the Hamilton's District society acted chiefly as a means of overcoming the sporadic nature of most local political committees. The society's structure allowed the Mingo Creek area's version of such a local committee to go about its business in a more or less continuous and regular fashion, and provided, through the militia system, a means of reaching and perhaps mobilizing the population. The local committee's business, true to its origins in the "association" that Faulkner learned of in 1792, was excise resistance. There was no mention of the liquor excise in the society's constitution, but it was prohibited for the president or councilmen to hold "any office of trust or profit" in the state or federal government during their terms as society officers. Yet the document also stated, vaguely, that "nothing in this Constitution shall be so Construed as to prejudice any Claims of this State, or the united States." The committee meetings that preceded the adoption of the constitution were directed exclusively at the excise problem, and undertook to address it in two ways: by sending petitions to Congress and by furnishing a support system that could collect funds and instigate lawsuits to aid those whose whiskey was seized by excise officers for nonpayment of the duty.[37]

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It is impossible to determine precisely what the Hamilton's District society was about by the summer of 1794, or the degree to which its members were united in their sentiments and intentions. John McDonald, the secretary of the society, told H.H. Brackenridge that "moderate persons" hoped to use the society to forestall violent actions by militant excise resisters. According to McDonald "the people had been all running wild" with violent schemes, and the moderates hoped "to turn the people off to remonstrating and petitioning, and giving them something to do that way, to keep them quiet."[38] And both Brackenridge and Findley asserted that John Hamilton, who was both the colonel of the district regiment and the sheriff of Washington County in 1794, did what he could to prevent violence and to keep his regiment from marching when called into action by the insurgent leadership at the beginning of the crisis that summer.[39]

Others, far less moderate, used the militia and the political organization of the district society to inflame opinion on the eve of the "insurrection" and to mobilize men once the crisis began. Hamilton's militia regiment held a muster on July 4, 1794, less than two weeks before a battle at the house of John Neville, the region's federal inspector of revenue, precipitated the series of events known as the Whiskey Insurrection. At the muster several speeches against

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the excise were given, including an address by Benjamin Parkinson which according to one witness "openly proposed an opposition to the laws by force." There seems also to have been talk of a scheme to gather several hundred men to suppress for good the execution of the federal liquor excise, and to march on Neville's house on Chartiers Creek in Allegheny County if necessary.[40] Then in the middle of July Neville and U.S. Marshal David Lenox tried to serve a writ on a recalcitrant distiller in Allegheny County perhaps three miles from the edge of Hamilton's election district, and the district society's leaders moved immediately to orchestrate the mobilization that ended in conflict at Neville's.

The nature of the area's mobilization during mid-July 1794 was shaped by a mixture of the district committee's prior success at political organization, a series of rapid decisions made by leaders of the society, and a keen popular resentment of the excise in the area. Expresses quickly spread the word of the marshal's and Neville's actions, alerting among others a number of militiamen of Hamilton's regiment gathered for a hearing at the Mingo Creek meeting house, a Presbyterian church which had become the district council's regular place of meeting. There was a quick "council," then

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thirty to forty men moved out and were at Neville's house at "Bower Hill" by daybreak of the day after Neville and Lenox attempted to serve the troublesome writ. The party's leader was John Holcroft, a councilman of the Hamilton's District society. Holcroft and his men withdrew after one of the group died in an exchange of gunfire with Neville and his servants. Meanwhile word had gone out, and late in the afternoon of the next day, the second after the initial alarm, several hundred men drew up around Bower Hill. The decisions and orders that brought this rapid mustering of force came from a committee consisting of Benjamin Parkinson, the president of the district society, and at least three members of the society's council.[41] The staging area where the plans were made and the men gathered was Couch's fort, a spot in Allegheny County between Neville's and the Hamilton District of Washington County. Parkinson was offered the command of the second approach on Neville's. He declined due to a lack of military experience, and James McFarlane, a Revolutionary veteran, an officer in Hamilton's militia regiment, and a member of the district council, was appointed commander. At least two militia majors accompanied the force that McFarlane led to Neville's, and the men were organized by a general system of military control; one veteran was offered the post of "brigade major" of the investing

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force, and Neville noted that the militiamen approached the house "in regular order." McFarlane died in the battle between his men and a squad of U.S. soldiers that had been hurried from Fort Fayette in Pittsburgh to protect Neville's property. Neville escaped to Pittsburgh, then to Philadelphia, but his house and outbuildings all burned during the skirmish.[42] During the succeeding days a local committee, sitting at least part of the time at Mingo Creek, continued to direct the insurgents' course of action.[43]

Within the national political context of 1794 the Mingo Creek or Hamilton's District society was understood by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton to be a "Democratic Society," one of the democratic-republican associations that President Washington scorned so thoroughly as "self-created" fomenters of instability.[44] The Mingo Creek group, however, developed out of the region's experience with political grievance committees and had little if anything to do with the national party politics and excitement over the French Revolution that produced such democratic-republican clubs as that in Philadelphia. The "Democratic Society of Pennsylvania in Washington County," which met in the town of Washington, was much more of the true breed of democratic-republican associations. The group first

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met in March 1794 and held only one other meeting before the trouble began in July. Yet because some of its members was involved in the excise resistance as it developed, including its president, James Marshal, and its vice president, David Bradford, and because of strong political statements critical of national policies issued during its early meetings, this society too helped shape the Washington administration's condemnatory attitude toward all republican clubs. At its first meeting the Washington society adopted a remonstrance, originating with the Democratic Society of Kentucky, complaining that the west received short shrift in the protection of its natural rights and praying that a more assertive claim to American navigation rights on the Mississippi be made. The same petition was adopted by the Hamilton's District society, and an Allegheny County meeting at Pittsburgh in April, consisting of delegates from the county's election districts, responded to the Kentucky initiative with its own statement criticizing national policies toward Britain, France, and the Mississippi issue. The Allegheny resolutions declared that the "councils" of government, due to "the pernicious influence of stockholders or their subordinates," lacked "the integrity or spirit of republicans." "We are almost ready to wish for a state

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of revolution and the guillotine of France for a short space in order to inflict punishment on the miscreants that enervate and disgrace our government," the Allegheny delegates declared.[45]

Although the remonstrance adopted by the Washington County society in March 1794 originated verbatim with the Kentucky Democratic Society, when George Washington and his cabinet first saw the petition in April 1794 it was as a remonstrance from the Washington County group and bore no mention of its Kentucky origins. The petition's strong opinions did much to sour the administration's attitude toward western Pennsylvania's political societies.[46] At its second meeting in June the Washington County association drafted its own resolutions criticizing the president's policies toward Great Britain. By all evidence this group and the single meeting of Allegheny delegates only discussed politics and expressed opinions. While their strongly worded comments, which appeared in the Pittsburgh Gazette, may have reinforced some local disposition to resist unpopular government policies, there is nothing to indicate that these groups -- as groups, at least -- worked to mobilize active opposition to the whiskey tax. The Democratic Society in Washington, whose leading members were residents of the town itself, was largely what it presented itself to be: a club for political discussion

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modeled after the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia.[47]

As Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton compiled information about the resistance to the liquor duty and advised President Washington about a suitable course of action in response. Hamilton interpreted the events of 1791 through 1794 in western Pennsylvania as a systematic effort to mobilize opposition to the U.S. government. This attitude was shaped by several factors. Hamilton put great store in the fact that there were antiexcise meetings in 1791 and 1792 attended by a few of the region's prominent politicians; he also saw the Mingo Creek association and the Washington Democratic Society as effective engines of insurrection. The attitudes of many within the administration were also keenly affected by the political climate of the early 1790s, in which national policies toward Great Britain and France, as well as federal programs such as the funding and revenue system, engendered great divisions in American society. Some within the executive branch in the early 1790s had a strong but misplaced notion that William Findley, John Smilie, and Albert Gallatin, western Pennsylvania's prominent critics of the Federalist course of action, were the fathers and instigators of the region's excise resistance.[48]

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By the summer of 1794 Hamilton could also point to a number of instances in the western counties of Pennsylvania in which disguised parties had bullied, threatened, or tarred and feathered federal excise officers, intimidated or attacked the property of distillers who chose to comply with the law, and interfered with efforts to prosecute those indicted for such offenses. Despite the fact that convictions in such cases were very difficult to obtain because both witnesses and the definite identification of wrongdoers were elusive, Hamilton believed that local civil authorities did not act with sufficient vigor and were accomplices in the efforts to hamstring federal authority. In September 1792 Hamilton sent George Clymer, the U.S. Supervisor of the Revenue for Pennsylvania, to investigate the opposition to the liquor excise in the western part of the state, and Clymer's reports tended to confirm the secretary's view that collusion or weakness kept the local leadership from controlling the problem. Clymer -- who during a 1778 stint as a U.S. Indian affairs commissioner described Pittsburgh as an "excellent" place "to do pennance in" -- gave Hamilton his explanation for what he took to be a lack of support for the government in the west: "individuals there are, undoubtedly, who think rightly, but all their men of distinction are either sordid shopkeepers, crafty lawyers or candidates

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for office, not inclined to make personal sacrifices to truth or honour. . . . It may be said too, in general, that the duties of Citizenship are but poorly understood, or regarded where the moral sense is so greatly depraved as it is in this Country, by the intemperate use of the favourite drink."[49] During September 1792 Washington and his cabinet also contemplated the use of federal military power to enforce the excise. Hamilton believed that "moderation enough has been shewn -- 'tis time to assume a different tone."[50] Reluctant to turn too quickly to force, Washington issued a proclamation decrying "certain violent and unwarrantable proceedings," urging the civil authorities to enforce the revenue laws and the citizenry "to refrain and desist from all unlawful combinations and proceedings whatsoever, having for object or tending to obstruct the operation of the laws aforesaid." The president acknowledged to Hamilton that the use of troops to enforce law and order in western Pennsylvania must be considered as a "dernier resort" if other measures failed.[51] The enforcement problems continued. By the beginning of summer 1794 the guerrilla actions of excise opponents prevented revenue officers from even maintaining an office for the entry of stills in Washington County; the building in which the Westmoreland County office was kept had come under attack by armed men; and in

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Allegheny County the entry of stills as required by law was very much retarded.[52]

Hamilton's definitive brief on the excise resistance in western Pennsylvania was his report to the president of August 5, 1794. In Hamilton's view there was a pattern, even a system, to the region's succession of antiexcise meetings and assaults on revenue officers. In a very firm, thorough, and lawyerlike argument the secretary maintained that resistance began with the expression of opinions, then moved to a decision by many not to comply with the excise law, then developed into efforts to block the execution of the law and to intimidate those who enforced it and those who complied with it. Hamilton wrote of an "enmity" which, by 1792, "certain active and designing leaders had industriously infused into a large proportion of the inhabitants, not against the particular laws, in question, only, but of a more antient date, against the Government of the UStates itself." "There is just cause to believe," he declared, that the opposition to the liquor duty "is connected with an indisposition too general in that quarter to share in the common burthens of the community -- and with a wish among some persons of influence to embarrass the Government."[53]

In their accounts of the excise troubles Brackenridge, Findley, and Gallatin pointed out that real evidence of a

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preconcerted insurrectionary scheme just was not there; that the excise affair taken as a whole was the result of a complex interplay of widespread and deep antipathy to the excise law, notions of political grievance on several fronts, and the unpredictable accident of events.[54] Disgruntlement about the excise was not limited to a single area, and it is unlikely that there was a single conspiratorial group behind the diverse succession of meetings and incidents in several counties cataloged by Hamilton as evidence of a program of excise resistance running through the years preceding July 1794. Evidence tends to indicate that even the leadership of the Hamilton's District society, some of the best organized and for that reason most powerful opponents of the excise, largely reacted to events as they occurred in mid-July 1794. The society certainly utilized its political and paramilitary foundation in northern Washington and southern Allegheny counties to good end, but there are indications that they made their decisions in those critical days largely as they went along, responding to circumstances as they developed, with only a rough idea of what would come of their actions.[55]

No one will ever know, however, just how far the most militant excise resisters may have expected, before mid-July 1794, ultimately to carry their opposition to the law. The use of direct force to resist government

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authority was not habitual in the upper Ohio River country and not condoned by a majority of the region's inhabitants, but it was not an element foreign to the region's political rhetoric and experience. In the case of the Hamilton's District society, what evidence there is relates primarily to the formal structure of the organization as it was in 1794, and the attitudes, aims, and intentions of its most belligerent opponents to the whiskey tax are a mystery. An anonymous tipster hinted at clandestine activities when he or she suggested that the federal district attorney for Pennsylvania investigate the comings and going of certain Hamilton's District residents "in the Clouds of the Night" during and preceding the troubles of summer 1794. "This association was the more dangerous that it was secret," William Findley wrote of the district's society, and he called it a kind of "disciplined phalanx" that mobilized the area in mid-July 1794. Findley, Gallatin, and Brackenridge, each of whom stood up in a fashion to rescue western Pennsylvania from the negative image it acquired from the Whiskey Insurrection, all were willing to concede that northern Washington and southern Allegheny counties -- an area of which none of the three was a resident -- was an especially problematic zone in terms of the excise opposition, a "cradle of insurrection," singularly tough and resistant.[56]

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The actual "insurrection" was not a prolonged affair; events transpired rapidly after the second fight at Neville's on July 17, and by the end of October the first troops of the government's expeditionary force were west of Laurel Hill. A handful of important meetings and gatherings were the major features of the crisis. These conferences were an important forum for insurgents wishing to tap the region's discontent and unite the western country in a political, perhaps even a military, stand against the government. It was through these meetings also that the moderate and "well disposed" portions of the population endeavored to reassert control over the situation.

The committee sitting in the Mingo Creek area in the aftermath of the battles at Neville's, a group that more than likely had some roots in the Hamilton's District society, called the first of the public meetings of the insurrection. This conference was held on July 23 at the Mingo Creek meeting house, where it became clear that there were firm advocates of a continuation or an expansion of armed resistance. Within several days of this meeting an ad hoc committee meeting at Canonsburg, including Benjamin Parkinson but also David

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Bradford, James Marshal, and John Canon -- Washington County men who took on considerable notoriety for their roles in the excise resistance -- issued an "order" for a general militia muster at Braddock's Field. Militant insurgents hoped this muster would result in the seizing of Fort Fayette in Pittsburgh, but through the efforts of more moderate individuals the gathering, which attracted several thousand men on the first two days in August, ended with a peaceful march through Pittsburgh and some limited attacks on property. On August 14 a regional meeting, called by the Mingo Creek gathering of July 23, was held at Parkinson's Ferry, a site on the Monongahela within the Mingo Creek-Pigeon Creek area of Washington County. Each township in the four western counties was to send delegates to this meeting, which was advertised in the Pittsburgh Gazette, and apparently all but a handful did so. Over two hundred delegates and a large crowd of interested observers gathered for the meeting. In the drafting of its resolutions and the formation of a large standing committee the Parkinson's Ferry meeting was a sparring ground where moderates and radicals struggled for political control. By the time of this meeting commissioners from both the United States and Pennsylvania were in the region and preparations to use a substantial force of eastern militia to restore the authority of

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government were well along. There continued to be discontent in the region, and no excise office was in operation by mid-August, but no unified, general insurgency had materialized. Conferences between local representatives and the government commissioners dealt with the formalities of the region's submission to government during September; there were other meetings at Parkinson's Ferry and Brownsville to contend with the problem of submission; and during the autumn the government forces, some 15,000 strong, occupied a generally quiescent western Pennsylvania.[57]

The period was one of crisis for the region's political leadership. There was, to begin with, a splintering of the leadership group as a whole. Some local- and county-level political leaders were, or at times appeared to be, of the insurgents' camp. Others were clearly identified with the government's side of the issue. A great many others fell into a broad continuum somewhere in between and differed over what course of action to follow. The consensual understandings that allowed them all to operate as a leadership group were weakened or disappeared; there was limited communication and limited mutual trust among local leaders within the region during the crisis. The regional political leadership did not act as a coherent group during the disruption and did not send a consistent message

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either to higher government or to the people they presumably led. The leadership's troubles were an important factor contributing to the chaos and disruption. Moreover, some officers might wonder if the entire basis of their political influence was in jeopardy. When a frustrated judge of the Allegheny County court personally horsewhipped a Pittsburgher of insurgent sympathies, he reasserted with his arm the authority that seemed not to be guaranteed him by virtue of his office.[58] In addition, the question of what role should be played by local leadership in such a situation, especially in the face of a seeming torrent of popular opinion and real or inferred threats to one's person or property, received different answers from different individuals. Some clearly doubted their own power or ability to exert influence, not just by means of formal office but by means of earned respect and trust or the wielding of reason. Even some of those politicians with the greatest trust in the democratic system were a little shaken by the experience.

The dominant figure among the insurgents during the months following the destruction of Neville's house at Bower Hill was David Bradford. None of his contemporaries left an entirely satisfactory explanation of Bradford's behavior during the excise crisis, and it is impossible to say precisely why he acted as he did.

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Maryland-born, in his mid-thirties in 1794, Bradford owned a fine stone house in the town of Washington and a set of mills on Chartiers Creek. A member of the bar, he had served a term in the Pennsylvania legislature and was a state district attorney for Washington County. According to William Findley he had supported the adoption of the new federal constitution.[59] Bradford attended the Washington County antiexcise committee meeting of August 1791 as well as the Pittsburgh meetings of September 1791 and August 1792, and he drafted some initial resolutions for consideration by one of these conferences. In his assessment of the situation in the western counties in 1792 Supervisor of the Revenue Clymer called Bradford and James Marshal "the great leaders" of the opposition to the whiskey tax in Washington County.[60]

Bradford was vice president of the Democratic Society formed in Washington early in 1794. There is no evidence that he either did or did not have any connection with the leadership of the Mingo Creek association or any of those people involved in mob actions against revenue officers in the region before July 1794. From the time of the frays at Bower Hill, however, he was heavily involved with the rioters. Apparently it was his idea to rob the postrider of his mail pouch in July to intercept letters to the govern-

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ment, and he was the moving force behind the Braddock's Field muster. If anyone advocated something akin to real insurrection in 1794 it was Bradford. At the public meetings during the crisis it was he who urged preparation for an armed contest with government; at a late August meeting called to discuss the government's proposals regarding submission, he delivered an "extravagant harangue" in which he spoke against submission "in direct and violent terms," argued that the region could successfully repel any government troops, and "urged the propriety of erecting an independent government."[61] He was once referred to half in jest as "Dagon" -- the Old Testament god of the Philistines.[62] With the entry of the government's forces into the region Bradford fled down the Ohio to Spanish territory on the lower Mississippi, where he lived for the rest of his life.

Bradford himself claimed that his actions were "greatly misconstrued." Although he never gave a complete explanation of his conduct, he and his wife both hinted in autumn 1794 that he was caught in the thrust of popular opinion and could not take a stand favoring acquiescence to the law without real danger to himself or his property.[63] As Hugh Henry Brackenridge saw the matter, Bradford was "a weak man," initially bullied

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into participation in July by radicals who appreciated his early public stand against the liquor excise and threatened to put his house to the torch if he did not join them. Brackenridge argued that Bradford lacked the foresight to comprehend what the ultimate result of an insurgent policy would be, and mistakenly believed that he could control the "mob" when in fact it controlled him.[64] The fact that Bradford radically shifted his stance on the submission question in September, and did so more than once, argues in a way that he may have been such a victim of the insurgent wave.[65]

Brackenridge's account, however, written very quickly after the events of 1794, does not give a full and coherent explanation of Bradford's behavior and intentions through the course of the excise troubles. Conceit also taints Brackenridge's interpretation, for he was at some pains to demonstrate that Bradford was a man of limited talents and could not "manage" the insurgent mob whereas he, Brackenridge, could rather easily "manage" Bradford.[66] By the time Bradford hinted that he was a victim of intimidation, moreover, it was growing late, and the claim that one had been either threatened or unwittingly swept up in a popular movement without foreseeing the consequences -- a claim that certainly appears to have been valid in some cases -- was becoming pretty common currency. Brackenridge's

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portrait of a cowardly man of some ambition but with limited talents and a myopic comprehension of the events that surrounded him, the virtual pawn at times of a savage mob, may well be grossly misleading. It is quite plausible, although impossible to prove, that Bradford understood very well what he was about and joined the forces of disorder as a deliberate political choice. To say this is simply to put Bradford in company with John Connolly, George Croghan, Dorsey Pentecost, and several others: men who instead of shrinking away from political instability viewed it quite rationally, at least under certain circumstances, as an opportunity to make political capital, and were willing to gamble that assertive action in such a flexible system could enhance their power. Bradford did not necessarily possess a clear sense of what the ultimate result might be when he chose to assume a role of insurgent leadership in 1794. There may well have been nuances of county-level politics in Washington County that largely escape modern notice but were bitterly frustrating to ambitious politicians.[67] What Bradford -- "Dagon" -- opted for in 1794 was a line of conduct that held, despite the risks, at least a blush of promise for an ambitious man seeking position and influence. Brackenridge of course was right in that Bradford was ultimately unable to control the situation to the degree he wished. In the end the scenario did not develop in any of the ways

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Bradford might have hoped it would, and his shifting position on the submission question likely reflected a very real quandary as to which course of action to follow as the crisis moved into its final stages.

John Canon provides an example of one who seems to have judged every situation in terms of what it meant for him personally in political terms. A decade before the Whiskey Insurrection Canon's name was tied with Dorsey Pentecost's regarding the schemes for a new state government in the west. Canon remained in politics; he also promoted the town of Canonsburg, encouraged the formation of a secondary school or "academy" there, and may have tried to pull the county's political power away from Washington to Canonsburg.[68] During the latter part of the 1780s he was the agent for George Washington's properties in western Pennsylvania. Washington became terribly dissatisfied with Canon's performance as agent and claimed that Canon did not press Washington's tenants for their rent because he coveted elective office and feared a loss of popularity. He also made a fruitless attempt to exploit his contact with Washington as a means of attaining a county judgeship.[69]

Canon kept a much lower profile during the excise troubles than did Bradford. He was chairman of the August 1792 meeting at Pittsburgh, which drew some govern-

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ment attention to him, and was one of the half-dozen men who met with Bradford at Canonsburg in July to plan the massive gathering of militia at Braddock's Field. He never stepped to the fore as a vocal leader of the insurrectionary element, however. In 1792, George Clymer was given to understand that Canon "was not a man of the strongest mind." When Canon refused to disavow the resolutions of the August 1792 antiexcise meeting, Clymer presumed that he had fallen into "bad hands." Canon may have been weak, or he may have been, after years of experience, very shrewd, knowing exactly when to take action and when to stand quiet. In his own explanation (to George Washington) of his conduct during the whiskey troubles Canon wrote that "I Have been led fare Astray To my Grate mortification." Canon, as had Bradford, claimed there was an element of intimidation involved. He blamed his conduct on "Various Raisons Such as mistake Bad Council and dread of my own Safety both in person and Property."[70]

The political motivations of James Marshal, Bradford's lieutenant through much of the crisis, are not at all clear. According to Brackenridge Marshal was not gullible and weak, as Brackenridge believed Bradford was, but rather "a man of good sense, cool and deliberate." "Moderation was thought to have been a leading trait in his character," wrote William Findley; he was "an

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industrious man."[71] He had served as county lieutenant, sheriff, recorder of deeds, and register of wills. It was Marshal who had presented himself so firmly as the friend of order during the new-state agitation of the 1780s. On the excise question, however, he was aligned on the side of disorder with John Canon, his political enemy during the new-state affair, and David Bradford, who according to Findley had also been a supporter of the new-state movement.

Marshal was not the public firebrand of the militant cause that Bradford was. His actions were more moderate, and Findley believed that Marshal spent much of the crisis waiting for the right opportunity to step out of the insurgent movement. When he had second thoughts about his approbation of the radical course of action in July, the door of his house was tarred and feathered to threaten him. Yet in Marshal's case as in Bradford's it is difficult to attribute his behavior through the excise crisis primarily to intimidation. He was no stranger to political agitation by July 1794, for he had attended the important antiexcise meetings of 1791 and 1792 and was the president of the Washington Democratic Society. Marshal seems to have taken an active interest in his prominent role during the crisis, proposing resolutions and working to shape the course of events. He advocated a course of action rather milder

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than Bradford's, but his active participation in committees and meetings during the summer and fall of 1794 seems to have been largely a matter of choice.[72]

The opposite of David Bradford on the excise issue was John Neville. If Bradford and his associates sought to build a popular base and change their own political situations through the excise opposition, Neville and those close to him felt their own positions assailed, craved the maintenance of order, and saw themselves at war with the militant resisters. As a state legislator Neville had spoken out against the Pennsylvania excise. When he then accepted the position of U.S. Inspector of the Revenue for western Pennsylvania, and so became the region's chief advocate and enforcer of the federal liquor tax, he alienated himself from many of his constituents in Allegheny County. To many it looked as if Neville had been insincere earlier, courting popular favor with antiexcise statements, or had simply sold his principles for a lucrative salaried position. Neville's new zealous attachment to the revenue inspector's position and his apparent change of heart brought him fierce enmity from some quarters.[73]

The aristocratic pretensions and strong attachment to the federal government of the so-called "Neville connection" did little to narrow the breach between the inspector and those opposed to the excise duty. The re-

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sponse of Neville, his son Presley Neville, his son-in-law Isaac Craig, and his other close associates to the excise resistance was disdainful, defensive, and inflexible. By the end of 1791, only months after the implementation of the federal excise, Neville decided to arm his slaves in case a mob came to subject him or his property to any indignity. By July 1794 he had been burned in effigy in the "forks of Yough" and accosted on the road. On receiving information that some of the Mingo Creek men might be planning to pay him a visit, he covered windows in his house with thick boards and again made sure that his slaves were armed. It was Neville, fearful of some "extreeme Insult," who fired first when Holcroft's party approached the house on July 16. Hugh Henry Brackenridge, who was not on good terms with the "Neville connection," later insisted that Neville's resort to resistance by arms was too quick and did much to precipitate the troubles that followed.[74] In the days after the destruction of Neville's handsomely furnished house and his own flight from the region, his son-in-law, Isaac Craig, referred to the excise resisters who had participated in the Bower Hill melees as "insurgents," "the enemy," even "those savages." Craig called those people unhappy with the whiskey tax a "deluded multitude" and did not trust them even after the arrival of the government's troops.[75]

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A very great number of political leaders in the region fell somewhere between Neville and Bradford in their response to the excise resistance crisis. Many did not care for the liquor excise and wanted it changed or repealed but did not condone armed opposition to the law. By their own admission, however, many became more the victims than the shapers of events for a period after mid-July 1794. The fact that some chose to temporize rather than take a strong principled stand on the issue of opposition to government says something about their power as leaders, their perceptions of their role in society, and perhaps the place of ideology and principle in their politics. That the conduct of some county-level political leaders could be shaped primarily by intimidation, by a furtive desire to stay within perceived currents of popular opinion, or by the perception that one could not -- by any means of office, reasoned argument, or example -- muster enough constituent support for an unpopular stand indicates the seeming fragility and insecurity of their leadership positions. It also attests to the degree of local disruption during the weeks after mid-July 1794.

In part because he published an extensive account of the whiskey troubles from his own point of view, H. H. Brackenridge provides the fullest example of the

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temporizing approach. Brackenridge argued that sentiment against the excise was so strong in the early 1790s that one's public opinion on the subject could determine the success or failure of a career in politics, law, medicine, business, or the clergy. "A breath in favour of the law, was sufficient to ruin any man;" to speak out against the law "was the shibboleth of safety, and the ladder of ambition."[76] William Findley contended that this was an exaggerated interpretation of the situation. Brackenridge, who was deeply stung by his loss of popularity during his 1786-1787 term in the assembly and was running for Congress during the excise crisis, was by his own admission extremely sensitive to the pressures of popular opinion.[77]

Brackenridge also insisted that the propensity to violence during the crisis of 1794 was so strong, and the collapse of all order so near, that anyone who spoke against the insurgent tide was in very real physical danger. "The idea of the people, at the time, was, that law was dissolved, and that the people themselves, in their collective capacity, were the only tribunal," he argued. While there seemed to be no definite plan to overthrow the government or establish a new one, "yet the people acted and spoke as if we were in a state of revolution. They threatened life and property familiarly."[78] Brackenridge and other prominent

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townsmen also believed that Pittsburgh, as the site of a U.S. garrison and the place where several members of the "Neville connection" and other officers who supported the excise lived or did business, was in real danger of harm or even destruction at the hands of aggrieved country distillers. To avert this threat the town's leadership adopted a dissembling policy. They formed a town committee, exiled those people most offensive to the excise resisters, and through their delegations to the Braddock's Field muster and other gatherings worked hard to convince the rioters that Pittsburgh was not their enemy.[79]

As the leading advocate and practitioner of Pittsburgh's dissembling course, Brackenridge believed that he could not only save himself and Pittsburgh but could, by taking an active role at the region's meetings during the crisis, begin to manage the insurgents, moderate their course of action, and bring the affair to some conclusion short of real insurrection and war.[80] He found that there were dangers in trying to please everyone, however. His statements in favor of opposition to the law, which he later justified as clever attempts to win the rioters' confidence or to demonstrate subtly the folly of their actions, seemed to place him in the insurgents' camp, an image reinforced by his adversaries in the "Neville connection." As a result Brackenridge found himself in a very uncomfortable position when

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Alexander Hamilton and the government's militia army came west in search of prominent insurgent leaders. His long account of the whiskey troubles, written very quickly after their conclusion, was Brackenridge's attempt to explain and justify his shifting, temporizing course of action in 1794.

William Findley later argued that the appearance of Brackenridge and other prominent men at such gatherings as the Braddock's Field muster in apparent concord with the insurgents gave the militant excise resistance a false image of legitimacy that ultimately harmed the cause of order. "However necessary this temporizing conduct was on the occasion, it had a very bad effect on the country at large," Findley wrote. Brackenridge looked back on the earliest phases of the excise resistance and acknowledged that some of the region's "leading men" should have done and said less to contribute to the antipathy for the excise and done more to discredit armed opposition to the law. Without expressing any personal guilt on this score, Brackenridge acknowledged that the public conduct of "leading men" made a difference in the course of the excise resistance crisis.[81] Ambitious, his own political position insecure, anxious to win popular favor and alienate none, perhaps genuinely fearful of the insurgent masses, and unsure of his base of support should he take an unpopular stance,

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Brackenridge, for all that was distinctive about him, serves as an illustration of those leaders who chose to temporize or lay low during the initial stages of the crisis. Brackenridge contended that "many" political leaders acted as they did during the crisis out of direct intimidation or because popular opinion favoring opposition to the law seemed so overwhelming.[82]

Albert Gallatin provides a significant contrast to Brackenridge. Gallatin refused to allow the exigencies of the situation to negate the responsibilities he believed were his, as a political leader in a republican society, to provide a reasoning voice and a clear example to others. At the Parkinson's Ferry meeting in August, Gallatin, the meeting's secretary, did not hesitate to speak in opposition to resolutions calling for preparations "to repel any hostile attempts that may be made against the rights of the citizen or of the body of the people." Brackenridge, afraid that such a direct contradiction of the insurgents' resolutions would shatter the illusion of consensus and ruin his own plans to control affairs through smaller committees, and fearful also for the safety of anyone who would publicly take such a stand, twice rose and "affected to oppose" Gallatin's comments. Brackenridge presumed that Gallatin would understand that such ploys were to serve their common interest of moderation; Gallatin did

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not understand until he was told and even then was probably none too happy about what Brackenridge had done.[83]

Gallatin knew as well as Brackenridge that the crowds at such gatherings as the Parkinson's Ferry meeting probably contained some of the most militant and dangerous opponents of the excise. Yet he avowed that "the duty of good citizens" demanded that he attend such meetings and take as forthright a role as possible. "I do not claim any greater share of political or physical courage than other men," he insisted. When Brackenridge hesitated to attend the Brownsville meeting in August, Gallatin reminded him that they were "bound . . . in honour" to present to the region's standing committee the submission terms they had accepted as conferees from the government's commissioners. Brackenridge, unconvinced that he was honor-bound "to run a risk of life, or even indignities," went to the meeting largely because of Gallatin's example.[84]

Gallatin's more resolute attitude was reinforced by his confidence that his own moderate sentiments represented those of Fayette County. Fayette's distillers had their share of complaints against the excise system and received their share of writs from Marshal Lenox early in July 1794. They held county-level meetings to decide how best to respond to the excise problem,

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but the emphasis was always on nonviolent means. There was no strong sentiment in the county to join the armed opposition to the law after trouble broke out at Neville's in mid-July, and little real disruption within the county. It was perhaps not done without considerable effort, but Gallatin and other moderates in Fayette County were able to maintain order while still allowing a channel for the continuing frustration about the excise. Working through a county committee consisting of the townships' delegates to the first Parkinson's Ferry meeting, Gallatin and others strove to school Fayette's citizens as to the dangers presented to the nation's republican system by armed opposition to any law. Equally important were the committee's reassurances to the disgruntled that they need not pin their hopes to violent measures or watch them die: nonviolent means such as legal actions and remonstrances could still be effective. In addition, when the federal commissioners decided in September that only individually signed submissions to the law would be suitable, the Fayette committee was confident enough to resist while continuing to send a message of internal order and control. The committee declared that Fayette County's people were not responsible for the mob actions against the excise; order had been maintained in the county, and its reaffirmation of

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obedience to the law would come by voluntary local balloting and a declaration by the county committee as originally agreed to by the commissioners. At the same time the committee "candidly and openly declare our intention to persist in every legal and constitutional measure that may tend to obtain a repeal of the Excise law, nor shall we think ourselves bound to give it any further support and countenance than what is required by the laws."[85] In a fashion, then, Fayette County publicly steered a moderate course between the demands of the politically aggrieved and the system's requirement that political conduct be orderly. Gallatin certainly realized that the maintenance of the county's ability to control itself in that manner was the key that would protect Fayette County from anarchy and at the same time give it the political autonomy to withstand another threat, that of a powerful and at times unresponsive higher government.

The region's ability to govern itself was of crucial import. In his justification of federal intervention in western Pennsylvania, Alexander Hamilton argued that the local civil and militia leadership, traditionally the first line of defense against disorder, had as a group failed to ensure enforcement of the law and in several instances had participated in the resistance. Hamilton's accusations were too strong: he considered any

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civil or militia officer present at the antiexcise meetings of 1791 and 1792 to be guilty of "opposition and discountenance to the Laws," he blamed judges in cases when the lack of good evidence was really at fault, and he tended to condemn those whose interpretations of federal powers differed from his own.[86] Yet the idea that local government had failed to deal with the situation was bolstered by the opinion of locals such as Isaac Craig, who wrote after the disturbances at Neville's house that "the Civil Officers and officers of the Militia are either unwilling to incur the displeasure of the insurgents or afraid to do their duty." There was no denying that the region was in "considerable confusion" by August.[87] For example, local government in Pittsburgh, which had been incorporated as a borough with a formal town government in the spring of 1794, was taken over by a committee. The group consisted of the town's established leadership, and the "committee" assumed powers of "police" and "management" to guarantee the continuity of legal order.[88] It was all part of the town's efforts to appear cooperative to the excise resisters. Some other locales suffered a much greater jumbling or disruption of local government.

The federal commissioners appointed by President Washington (U.S. Attorney General William Bradford,

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Jasper Yeates of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and Senator James Ross of Washington County) were anxious to see that the "moderate Party," the "friends of order," received whatever support was necessary to restore them to an active role as supporters of government. "We know, with certainty, that many reputable citizens have been obliged to turn hypocrites, and even to appear as the leaders of these enragees," the commissioners wrote from Pittsburgh in mid-August. "The Civil authority affords them no protection, as they dare not trust each other they have no point where they can rally in their own defence." "If we can but inspire the moderate men with firmness and decision I hope all will be well," William Bradford wrote Alexander Hamilton.[89] Hamilton and Secretary of War Henry Knox both assured Isaac Craig that "the friends of Government" would receive the full support of the federal government.[90]

That support was to include force in the form of militia drawn from outside the upper Ohio River region. Craig, who was John Neville's son-in-law and himself held an important civilian position in the federal army's transport and supply system, urged that the occupation of the region by government military forces was "Essentially necessary" for the restoration of order, even after the insurgent movement began to dissolve.[91]

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The federal commissioners agreed "that some more competent force is necessary to cause the laws to be duly executed, and to ensure to the officers and well-disposed citizens that protection which it is the duty of Government to afford."[92] There were, however, other voices that argued an army was not necessary for the reinstatement of normalcy and order. There were prominent locals who advised that troops were unnecessary; some who advised the use of force changed their minds by mid-October as militant opposition to the law faded.[93] In October David Redick of Washington County and William Findley traveled to Carlisle to see President Washington, who was then with the assembling government forces, in an effort to convince him not to send the troops farther west. They conceded that there had been a period of disruption but argued that the moderate local leadership, many of whom had actually remained uninvolved in the events so far, were in the process of reasserting control and would with but a little time restore full order through persuasion and their own example. Washington believed that a definite assertion of federal authority was necessary and did not halt the militia.[94]

According to Washington's record of the visit even Redick and Findley were disquieted by the disorder in western Pennsylvania. Findley confessed, Washington

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wrote in his diary, "That the ignorance, and general want of information among the people far exceeded any thing he had any conception of; That is was not merely the excise law their opposition was aimed at, but to all law, and Government; . . . and that the situation in which he had been, and the life he had led for sometime, was such, that rather than go through it again, he would prefer quitting this scene altogether." Redick reported that for a time those not opposed to government had had to stay constantly armed and "the distrust of one another was such, that even friends were affraid to communicate their sentiments to each other."[95] Findley later claimed that Alexander Hamilton and the administration exaggerated his pessimism. But in mid-September Findley had been dejected at the success of armed "Banditti" in disrupting the signing of the submission to law and had conceded that "a very small force" of government troops would be necessary to suppress the most militant core of insurgents. He admitted the possibility that "by the conduct of our people Republican government has been disgraced." Although he was more confident of the region's return to normalcy by the time he saw Washington in October, he had been shaken by the degree of local disorder and it showed during his interview with the president.[96]

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In fact the region was disordered and confused enough, especially during August and September, to rattle the confidence even of one such as Findley who placed considerable trust in the democratic process. Despite the regional meetings at Parkinson's Ferry and elsewhere, the "insurrection" was very localized and chaotic, and was not a unified or ordered regional process under central planning or control. No one could comprehend the situation in its entirety, particularly since it developed and changed so rapidly. Individuals saw pieces of it and interpreted the whole accordingly. Thus Brackenridge saw and interpreted the crisis from the vantage of Pittsburgh and its burghers, Findley saw the situation in central Westmoreland County, Gallatin viewed it from the perspective of a relatively well-ordered Fayette County, and others saw other segments of the whole. Many people were also leery to express their opinions openly. Alexander Addison, the presiding judge of the county courts in the region, lamented that "every neighbourhood, considering itself as the people, thought it had a right to do as it pleased." "We find it impossible to ascertain the public Opinion," the United States commissioners reported from Pittsburgh near the end of August.[97] This general confusion contributed to the view of many that the republic's bounds of allowable "licentiousness"

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were severely tested by the Whiskey Insurrection.

At its height the militant fervor was aimed in several different directions. At the time of the first Parkinson's Ferry conference in mid-August the federal commissioners believed the insurgent movement had three components despite "an apparent unanimity of sentiment." There was a "moderate party" of "men of property," anxious to avoid "the convulsions of a civil contest" but lacking as yet the confidence to oppose the militants. There was another element uninterested in separating from the union but ready "to resist at all hazards the execution of the excise acts." The most extreme group seemed "disposed to renounce all connection with the Government" in its resistance to the excise.[98] There was certainly some talk of separating the region from the United States, possibly to ally with or join Great Britain, Spain, or even the Indian nations. There is no real evidence of any firm plans to secede.[99] The suggestions of alliance in fact ran contrary to very strong sentiments against the British, the Spanish, and the Indians. A successful attempt at separation was more plausible with such an ally, however, and the obnoxious policies of Britain and Spain regarding the Northwest and navigation of the Mississippi might be expected to disappear with an alliance. There were reports of British agents in Washington County and of

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"emissaries from places at a distance" visiting locals who had remained disaffected from the American cause since the Revolution.[100]

Some advocated broad political reforms to correct such grievances as high official salaries, the professionalization of the county-level judiciary, and land policies that seemed to favor speculators over individual settlers. When the militia that had gathered at Braddock's Field paraded through Pittsburgh on August 2 they were accompanied by a mounted man "of some note" who brandished a tomahawk and cried out about judges and government salaries. "A great deal more is to be done; I am but beginning yet," he said. Some people, especially "the uninformed Germans" of Westmoreland County according to William Findley, came to believe that government would soon impose tithes, as well as taxes on any number of essential items, "even children." "Therefore like an Hypochondric person they really groan under evils that have no existence," Findley wrote, and they were among the most recalcitrant people regarding formal submission to the law.[101]

To some observers it could seem as if the constraints that normally kept society orderly had fallen away and direct action by the frustrated and the ambitious was the new scheme of politics. In reporting that there was talk of separation from the United States,

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Pennsylvania commissioner Thomas McKean added that "indeed, their speeches and actions have been most extravagant; a frenzy seemed to be diffused thro' the country, the still voice of reason drowned, and the wildest chimeras to have taken possession of men's minds. One might be led to think it was the work of magic, or owing to some physical cause." John Wilkins, Jr., a prominent Pittsburgh resident, reported that violence had supplanted "the cool voice of reason." The impression given by one Pittsburgher to U.S. Attorney General William Bradford in August was "that at present there is a species of frenzy that sets al reasoning at defiance." Isaac Craig referred to "this unhappy and distracted Country."[102] There was a persistant notion held by many locals that one obnoxious law such as the excise could be forcibly resisted without rending the nation's political fabric; yet politicians such as Findley, Brackenridge, and Gallatin believed, and labored to convince their neighbors, that forcible opposition to a single law meant, in both theory and practical result, opposition to all law and possibly the collapse of the republic. Alexander Addison insisted that once people crossed "the bounds of civil obligation" they left all social limits behind and were on their way to anarchy.[103]

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Tench Coxe, a member of the federal administration, declared that to oppose an act of Congress by force of arms was to "sin in the midst of perfect light."[104] Many of those local leaders who found the excise distasteful agreed in principle with Coxe's statement and were alarmed by the extralegal course its opposition seemed to be taking. Even Gallatin and Findley, although they held government largely at fault for the excise troubles, were rattled a bit by the region's apparent journey to the bounds of licentiousness. In the end, however, both retained their confidence in the essential healthiness of American democracy. For Alexander Addison the disorders of 1794 were more difficult to forgive. As the presiding judge of the western counties he had since 1791 attempted through his charges to grand juries to instruct the region's inhabitants both as to their duties and responsibilities as citizens of a republican system and as to the blessings they would derive from it. Now he could almost consider his efforts at the reasoned political education of the region wasted; some people, at least, had looked elsewhere for their political understandings. After the Whiskey Insurrection Addison showed an increased concern for the problem of control in a democracy, and by the end of the decade he had become almost the archetype of a staunchly conservative Federalist politician.[105]

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There was no general conspiracy or consensus of feeling uniting the region in a movement of excise resistance at the beginning of July 1794. After the destruction of Neville's house at Bower Hill the insurgents attempted to mobilize the entire region in opposition to the excise. There were two motivations to do so: first, to blur the distinction between those involved in the incidents at Neville's and those who were not, perhaps in hopes of an eventual blanket amnesty rather than individual prosecutions; second, for those committed to militant resistance to the excise, to make it as powerful and as effective as possible. The insurgents' task beginning in the latter part of July was to overcome the upper Ohio Valley's strong tendencies away from conformity and, in the phrase used by several people at the time, to unite the region in a "common cause."[106]

Finding the means of reaching, swaying, and mobilizing a diversified population spread over such a large area was not easy. Churches did not provide an answer, at least not on a regional scale. Both the Redstone Presbytery and the Synod of the Associate Reformed Presbyterian churches in the area advocated submission to the law. Gatherings of individual congregations provided a way to address groups of people, but were probably used for this purpose by clergymen

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and laymen who advocated obedience as much as or more than by insurgents. The region's great religious diversity probably worked against rather than for any new union of interests.[107] Nor did the militant excise resisters control the press. The Pittsburgh Gazette was so reserved in its coverage that a reader would need information from another source in order to comprehend the extent of the crisis during the summer and fall of 1794. Much of the news of the events of July and early August filtered through the region by word of mouth.[108] The insurgents managed to force a couple of polemical pieces into the Gazette, and the paper did print such things as the resolutions of the first Parkinson's Ferry meeting, but in its columns readers also saw the government's proclamations, news of the progress of the official commissioners and of the militia army, and Judge Addison's long charge to the Allegheny County grand jury in September arguing in favor of order and obedience to law.[109]

As excise resisters in Hamilton's District and adjacent areas knew, the militia provided a mechanism useful for reaching and mobilizing the population. Discrimination between "legal" and "extralegal" calls to muster rested with the individual officer; whether or not he called out his men probably depended on his

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personal knowledge of the person issuing the instruction and the circumstances behind the order. Addison argued that men were too quick to muster "without enquiring into the authority or object of the call," then when assembled could be swayed by harangues and peer pressure.[110] In some instances the militia unit worked well as a machine to bring out support for the resistance. Some radical officers browbeat their men or threatened them if they were reluctant to turn out; militants within a company sometimes grouped together to threaten moderate or timid men, including their officers on occasion; some officers who failed to dissuade their men from attending the Braddock's Field muster accompanied them anyway in hopes of steering them clear of serious trouble.[111] It was an imperfect, voluntary system of moblization, and many areas had few or no men in attendance at Braddock's Field. Others went out of curiosity and were not rebels. While it helped muster strength for the fights at Neville's and for the gathering at Braddock's Field, the militia organization did not provide a sustained means of radicalizing the western country during the resistance crisis. Although it had serious limitations in providing an insurgent army, the militia system was probably the most useful of the region's existing social organizations for militant opponents of the excise attempting to build

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a regional base of support.

Direct correspondence was another method available to the excise opponents. Early in August David Bradford sent letters into the nearby Virginia counties inviting them to send delegates to the "Grand Council" at Parkinson's Ferry. Other letters of unknown authorship attempted to arouse sentiment in Westmoreland and Fayette Counties. "We are joined as a band of brothers," Bradford wrote the Virginians. "We have fully deliberated and have determined with head, heart, hand and voice that we will support the opposition to the excise law. . . . We are determined in future to act agreeably to system, to form arrangements, guided by reason, prudence, fortitude and spirited conduct."[112] During the early 1790s there had been strong antiexcise sentiment through much of central Pennsylvania, and after the outbreak of trouble in the western counties gatherings of opponents to the tax erected liberty poles in Northumberland County, at Carlisle, and elsewhere in Pennsylvania.[113] There was a similar swelling of "insurgent" activity in Maryland, especially in the Hagerstown vicinity, in September 1794.[114] The excise collector at Morgantown, Virginia, was forced to flee, and Ohio County sent delegates to the Parkinson's Ferry meeting and to the conferences with the federal government's commissioners.

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The western settlements of Virginia were by no means united in feeling against the excise, however, at least not to the point of supporting armed insurrection, and many inhabitants there were much more concerned with the continuing problem of Indian raids.[115] The extent of contact between western Pennsylvania and these other areas of strong discontent is unknown; opponents of the excise were never able to link their farflung areas into a unified movement against the tax.

The emblem of the insurgents' "band of brothers" was the liberty pole. Countless poles were erected by sympathizers of the excise resistance in the region, even one briefly at Pittsburgh. The liberty pole was also the insurgent symbol elsewhere in Pennsylvania and Maryland. It was a revived technique of arousing popular support through slogans and symbols that Americans knew from their colonial revolt against England. "Liberty, and no excise" was a slogan frequently tacked to the liberty poles of 1794; "equal taxation" and "no asylum for traitors or cowards" appeared also. At times the pole was accompanied by another symbol, a flag bearing six stripes, one for each of the counties represented at the Parkinson's Ferry meeting in August: the four western counties of Pennsylvania, plus Bedford (part of which exhibited opposition to the law) and, from Virginia, Ohio County. According to Gallatin

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the liberty poles did not uniformly convey a truly insurrectionary message; some indeed were "tokens of sedition" but others were erected as "a harmless frolic."[116]

The militants also enlarged their ranks by direct intimidation and peer pressure. "They say many have been compelled against their Inclination by Force, Threats, Insinuations, and Persuasion to Join and meet the Insurgents," a member of the government's forces reported from Westmoreland County in November.[117] Intimidation and threat were familiar techniques to those excise resisters who had tarred and feathered revenue collectors, forced collectors to surrender their official papers, or attacked excise officers in the years before 1794. Militant opponents of the tax had also begun before July 1794 to destroy or threaten the property of those who entered their stills and paid the duty as required by the law. Threats of violence became even more general in July and created a distinct climate of fear. When one man was reluctant to turn out for the second confrontation at Neville's house, an angry group told him that if he did not go "it Would Be Better for me to be in Hell and I Must Go if I Should go on My knees."[118] "I had heard the word of terror pronounced in such loud accents," William Findley later wrote, "as that like a magic spell it

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chilled the blood and petrified the spirits." Findley acknowledged that there were numbers of threats made, even a "latent predisposition to violence" in some quarters, but he contended that there was much more talk than action and that people's fears exceeded the actual danger.[119] The climate of fear and distrust was more than strong enough to give an advocate of obedience to government pause, however. Moreover, threats of violence were only one of several factors that pushed or pulled men into the insurgent ranks. Some people, having perhaps a general sense of frustration but no articulated ideological commitment and little comprehension of the greater political moment of the events around them, may have been drawn along by the mixed influences of intimidation, peer pressure, alcoholic intoxication, and a sense of importance derived from participation in a social movement.[120]

The excise resisters' efforts to bully the region into action took on personality and even a name in the form of Tom the Tinker. This was the public signature of someone who even before the outbreak of trouble at Bower Hill sought to intimidate distillers near the Monongahela River who complied with the excise law; Tom was a "tinker" because he would mend -- that is, damage or destroy -- the metal stills of any complying distillers. By outright threats Tom managed to place

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two intimidating notices in the Pittsburgh Gazette in July and September 1794. These were undisguised efforts to mobilize the reluctant. The notices had the foreboding tone of a powerful, other-worldly force demanding obedience. There were similar instances involving mob action on the Pennsylvania frontiers in which the commanding voice came from Hell or identified itself as some aspect of the Devil, as though a supernatural force had superceded the normal rules of human social conduct.[121] Tom the Tinker also took on the aura of military command: he referred to "the troops under my direction," "my commission," and "this my district," and demanded the military service of all men in the area. Those who refused were "enemies" to the "virtuous principles of republican liberty." Tom made no secret of his goal. He hoped after his first published notice, which was drafted only two days after Neville's house burned, "that we had got the country so well united that there would have been no more need for me in that line." When zeal seemed to falter in September he issued a second proclamation. "I would have all my friends keep up their spirits and stand to their integrity for their rights and liberty. . . . This is fair warning, traitors take care for my hammer is up and my ladel is hot, I cannot travel the country for nothing."[122]

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The insurgents and the government sought essentially the same end: control over the region. The area's population was faced with a situation in which two opposed parties firmly demanded the citizen's full allegiance. "To lie by was impossible," as Brackenridge put it; "no man would be suffered to remain neutral." The insurgents insisted on separating "the whigs from the tories," and the government demanded no lesser commitment. When Andrew Boggs attended the muster of John Hamilton's militia battalion on July 4, 1794, and heard the talk there of armed resistance to the excise, he was uncertain what course to take. So Boggs "asked a gentleman, whom I thought a friend, what was best for me to do, as the people had thrown out threats against me." The man responded, according to Boggs, that "he had been my friend; but it was time for me to say something for myself; that the crisis was come when they would have no such people, and I must be one way or the other."[123]

Neutrality and noncommitment were probably what much of the population wanted, however. Albert Gallatin asserted that "timid characters were equally afraid of personal insult from the rioters should they thwart their designs, and of the resentment of government should they not oppose them."[124] The region had had more than its share of experience with competing factions demanding allegiance. Total commitment to either extreme in the

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excise conflict put one at risk, and so required a trust and dedication that few may have been willing to offer. And many of those who did take action in some fashion may have had a very limited sense of commitment that tethered their involvement. When a crowd gathered in September 1794 to throw stones and taunts at the building in Greensburg in which the government commissioners had stopped for the night, no one was bold enough to step forward and risk identification as the leader of the mob. Finally a member of the group agreed to be the leader; "'I will undertake it,' said he, 'I have nothing to lose.'"[125]

It is for this reason difficult to judge the actual strength of the insurgents. Washington's advisors, basing their estimates on the supposed militia strength of southwestern Pennsylvania, the probable number of available guns, and the possible effects of dissension among the insurgents, anticipated that the government might have to face as many as 7,000 to 9,000 armed rebels in the region.[126] Some estimates of the attendance at the Braddock's Field muster, the largest gathering of the "insurrection," ran to 7,000. It was to the insurgents' advantage to inflate the number, however, and other estimates placed the count at 5,000 or even as low as 2,000; many were thought to be there due to compulsion or curiosity.[127] Brackenridge claimed, "on the best

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calculation, by enquiries from officers of the militia," that around 2,000 insurgents fled the region at least temporarily on the approach of the government's troops. Some who fled or hid, however, did so not because of insurrectionary activity but because they had not subscribed to the specific form of submission prescribed by the government and feared the consequences.[128] In the broadest sense, in terms of those discontented enough with the liquor excise to contemplate some form of action against it, the "insurgents" surely numbered in the thousands. More narrowly, in terms of those willing to engage in combat with government forces, the number was much, much smaller; in fact the government's troops found virtually no insurgents embodied under arms on their arrival. The militant faction did not succeed in its efforts to generate a regional uprising, but succeeded so far as to involve a lot of people in questionable activity, which brought something of a general amnesty from the federal government.

The formula for the region's submission to the law was worked out during the latter part of August and the beginning of September in meetings between the government's commissioners and a conference committee of three members from each of Pennsylvania's four western counties, chosen at the Parkinson's Ferry meeting in mid-August.[129] The federal commissioners listened to the

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locals' complaints about the excise and other matters, but impressed on the committee the fact that the president could not repeal the excise law and was obliged to enforce it, and that preparations for possible military action against the insurgents had already begun. The commissioners required that the "standing committee" of sixty men established by the Parkinson's Ferry meeting -- essentially a pared-down version of that meeting's township representation -- declare its willingness to submit to all federal laws, discountenance opposition to the excise, recommend a like compliance to the people at large, and provide for township or district meetings to determine the public's willingness to submit. In return the commissioners promised that there would be no prosecutions before July 10, 1795, for treason or other offenses committed against the U.S. before August 22, 1794; that those displaying proper submission and obedience could expect a general pardon by July 1795; that the federal government would try the experiment of allowing state courts to hear all actions concerning the revenue law; and that some compromise could be worked out regarding outstanding arrearages of excise payments. Pennsylvania's commissioners, Thomas McKean and William Irvine, also were prepared to offer a pardon for any state offenses arising from the excise disturbances in return for declarations of

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submission.[130]

As a group the conference committee, which included among others Brackenridge, Gallatin, Marshal, and David Bradford, was uncertain as to how the public would react to these terms, but agreed to present them to the standing committee at Brownsville on August 28. There the atmosphere was very tense. Gallatin, Brackenridge, and James Edgar of Washington County all spoke in favor of submission but Bradford advocated continued resistance. A straw vote, conducted with safeguards to ensure that no man's vote could be traced to him, indicated that a majority of the sixty-member standing committee did favor acceptance of the government's terms. It was agreed to put the submission question before the people in each county, but no date was set, and a new conference committee was appointed to meet the commissioners in hopes of obtaining more time for the submission program.[131]

The federal commissioners did not consider the Brownsville meeting's resolutions to be a sufficiently explicit acceptance of the proposed terms, and so laid down new terms on September 1. Under the new plan the region's men aged eighteen and older were to meet at their township polling places on September 11, where they would vote on the question of submission to the law. Those agreeing to submit would then sign an agreement to obey the law, to support civil officers in their protection of the citizenry "as far as the law requires," and

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to refrain from opposing the liquor excise law "directly or indirectly." The government's amnesty terms remained the same as in the original plan. Under the new program the commissioners would no longer exact submission through the committees established at Parkinson's Ferry but would go directly to the people for their assurances. The question of whether to delay the government's troops or not was no longer an issue; the commissioners advised that the militia army advance toward the region. The new submission program, the commissioners believed, would help force the issue of allegiance. The well-disposed could now identify themselves to government and to one another. Since the offer of pardon was held out only to those who signed the affirmation, the government could expect by mid-September to have gleaned the militantly unrepentent from their less dedicated fellows and to know the exact size and membership of the recalcitrant portion of the population.[132]

It would not be so easy to separate the region's sheep from its goats, however. There was to begin with a problem of time. By the time the official submission forms were printed there was less than a week for their distribution to the townships. Then the commissioners agreed that the words "solemnly" and "henceforth" could be deleted from the statement to be signed, and placed a notice to that effect in the Pittsburgh Gazette, but

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not in time for it to reach all townships. Moderate leaders also lamented that they had insufficient time to inform the inhabitants about the submission and to stress the importance of turning out to sign it. The commissioners were aware of the short time allowed but insisted that the situation must be resolved without further delays.[133] There were other problems as well. Despite the deletion of the word "solemnly," the statement appeared too much as an oath to some of those whose religious tenets forbade swearing an oath, including some of the Covenanter and Seceder Presbyterians. Others did not sign because they had done nothing illegal, had had no contact with the excise or the resistance to it, and saw no need to enroll themselves for an amnesty.[134]

Intimidation or force disrupted the signing process in some locales on September 11. In some cases armed groups threatened those who were inclined to sign, or destroyed the signed submission papers. The well-disposed of a few of these townships met again after dark to sign the submission. Some of those who threatened the signers later came forward privately and asked to sign; publicly they supported resistance but privately they craved the proffered amnesty. A few of the signed lists were smuggled to the commissioners in saddle pads or by other means to prevent their interception.[135]

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The results of the submission program were marked by significant local variation, undermining the theoretical uniformity of response imposed by the prescribed form of submission. Fayette County's committee refused to agree to the new terms and asserted the county's obedience to law by general declaration.[136] A few townships in other counties acted similarly, declaring either that they preferred the original submission program or that they had engaged in no riotous activity and thus had nothing to recant.[137] Some townships did not have the printed form in hand by September 11 and improvised a substitute. Others had the prescribed form but altered it to suit their tastes. Wary of the wording of the official submission form, signers in some locales added a sentence to it or wrote their own submission statements explicitly reserving their rights as citizens to oppose the excise by constitutional means.[138] One Allegheny County township forwarded three different versions of the submission to the commissioners. One group of signers used the officially prescribed version; a second group signed a statement declaring that "we have no disposition to take any unconstitutional Measures to obstruct or any way impade any Law;" a third group promised to submit to all laws "as far as is Consistant with the rights of a free and Independent People," each signer affirming "that

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I will Directly or Indirectly Oppose all Laws to the Contrary." The Pennsylvania Constitution secured the citizen's right to hold property, declared this last group, and "that moment I am constrained to pay for making use of my property at pleasure I am no longer a free man but a slave."[139] Derry Township, in Westmoreland County, simply voted "on the Important question of Peace to the Western Country, or a Civil War," and forwarded the tally of votes -- 140 to 3 in favor of submission -- with no signatures.[140] A few other townships used a simple vote and came out overwhelmingly against submission. Inhabitants of some townships were afraid or unable to declare their sentiments in favor of submission and went to safer ground such as Pittsburgh to register their acquiescence to the government's terms.[141]

According to the commissioners' stipulations the voting and signing in each township was to be supervised and certified either by a township justice of the peace or by at least two of the township's delegates to the Parkinson's Ferry meeting. These men were then to meet at their county seats on September 13, tally the results for the county as a whole, and form an opinion as to the general state of submission of the county and whether or not an office of revenue inspection could be reopened in the county. These county meetings again failed to

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adhere to the precise format laid down by the commissioners, but none certified that an excise office could be reopened without trouble. From the lists they could assemble the commissioners informed the president that just over 2,700 men in Allegheny, Westmoreland, and Washington Counties had signed the submission, from a population of over 11,000 taxable adults over twenty-one. "A very considerable part" of those who did sign did so on the wrong day, without the required certification, or on a form that "wilfully varied" from the prescribed wording. Nevertheless the commissioners asserted their belief that "a considerable majority" of the residents of the region would submit to the laws; the liquor tax could not, however, be enforced without some force strong enough to suppress those who stubbornly maintained their opposition to it.[142]

To a degree, however, the commissioners were correct in their belief that their submission plan -- coupled with the government's relentless preparations for military action -- would help force the issue of regional control. David Bradford, in an address at Washington town, acknowledged that his base of support was too thin and that the western country would not unite in forcible resistance to the law. He advised his hearers to sign the submission and did so himself.[143]

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In some locales the "well-disposed" citizens formed themselves into associations -- or, perhaps ironically, used the militia -- to reassert themselves against those recalcitrants who were still inclined to use intimidation and threats of force to continue their opposition to the law.[144]

Findley and others asserted that much of the continuing resistance to submission came from German settlements and from what Gallatin called "the youngest and most ignorant class of the people."[145] Some of the Germans, culturally cohesive and linguistically distinct from the society around them, perceived the situation in a way that made them most apprehensive about the government's intentions and very resolute in their resistance. The other element Findley and Gallatin referred to were people who took advantage of the disrupted situation to wield power they otherwise would not have, and to assert themselves against those to whom they would otherwise have to defer. "It is known," Findley wrote, "that to all new settlements there is a constant ingress of the most indolent people, who are not only slothful, but ignorant and obstinate, and who having nothing to lose and little expectation of bettering their condition by industry, delight in promoting confusion. This description of people was become bold

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and dangerous at this period." These people were ordinarily not politically active during more stable times, Findley added.[146]

During October Findley and others labored to show the government that such disruptive elements had become inconsequential, the open, confused situation in which each individual or locale went its own way was over, and a working consensus in favor of orderly conduct and obedience to law had returned to the region. Several efforts were made in local and regional meetings and at militia musters to demonstrate that western Pennsylvania was indeed submissive.[147] There was of course no complete political consensus that now embraced the region, for dissent, dissatisfaction, and disagreement remained. Much of the region's growing quiescence was due to the advance of the government's militia forces -- which some westerners had asserted would never march for such service -- and the government's evident intention to use force if necessary to restore its authority.[148] Power, which for a time had appeared to favor the forces of disruption, now seemed to rest more heavily on the side of order. Perhaps for its own sake as much as to avert the effects of a federal occupation, however, the region's moderate leadership tried hard to demonstrate that the basic majority agreement whereby a society's members mutually

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consented to channel political conduct within certain limits, and to abide by certain established patterns of authority and decision making even in cases of strong disputation, was still alive in western Pennsylvania.

As a deterrent to the movement of the government's troops into the region these efforts were too little, too late. As Governor Henry Lee of Virginia, the commander of the government's forces, asserted on his entry into the region, the government would "hold the army in this country until daily practice shall convince all that the sovereignty of the constitution and laws is unalterably established."[149] The task was not as ominous as Lee's statement hinted it might be. The government's superiority in the contest for power was sealed with the arrival of its 15,000 militiamen. There was no insurgent army to oppose them. Apart from assisting the judiciary in making arrests there was little for them to do other than prove the point that the federal government was willing to use its power to cut through the muddle of authority and control in the region. The bulk of the militia withdrew before winter set in for good, leaving only 1500 men under General Daniel Morgan to ensure the continuation of order and obedience.

In terms of sheer power it seemed very easy for the federal government to assert a clear authority in

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western Pennsylvania late in 1794. In legal terms it was much more difficult to untangle the situation and demonstrate an overwhelming sovereignty. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, the administration's representative with the troops, was eager to punish those insurgents who would best serve as "examples" to others.[150] Finding and prosecuting such "examples" proved difficult. David Bradford left the region for Spanish territory; he surely understood that he topped the government's list of those fit for prosecution and that his fiery speech at the Brownsville meeting, since it came after August 22, put him outside the terms of the proferred amnesty even though he had signed the submission. Others were elusive also, although some returned to give themselves up. Hamilton found that the evidence against some of those he had come to believe were ringleaders of a revolt was much less clear and damning than he had supposed. Some of those on whom the government's attention came to focus were obviously very minor figures in the events of July and August. On the night of November 12-13 the government's troops swept up and confined a number of people from several locales; due to bad communication between judicial and military officers some of those who were very harshly treated by the militia actually had complied fully with the government's submission terms in September or were

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intended as witnesses, not subjects of prosecution. Most of those who finally reached trial were prosecuted for treason rather than some lesser offense, and the government found treason very difficult to prove in this case. Only two men, both of them relatively minor actors in the excise opposition, were convicted, and Washington pardoned both.[151]

In its accumulation of evidence and attempts to isolate "examples" fit for prosecution the administration learned just how complex a matter the excise resistance crisis had been. The distinction between guilt and innocence, between loyalty and disaffection, was not as clear as the government had hoped. One of those specifically excluded from Henry Lee's initial proclamation of pardon in November 1794 was Edward Cook. Cook, who had held important positions in Westmoreland and Fayette counties, was a government target apparently because he had chaired the September 1791 antiexcise meeting at Pittsburgh, attended the August 1792 meeting, was given a nominal position of leadership at the Braddock's Field muster, and chaired the Parkinson's Ferry meeting in August 1794. Cook submitted tamely to judicial authority after the arrival of the government's forces. It became increasingly apparent that he had worked very hard for moderation and to avoid violence, had in fact, despite his own firm dislike of the liquor excise, entered his

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own stills according to law, advocated only constitutional protests to it, and urged compliance with the government's submission terms in September. Nor could the government continue to be certain that the Parkinson's Ferry meeting was a treasonable gathering despite the advocacy by some people there of preparations to resist the government by armed force. Finally in May 1795, after consultation with President Washington, Attorney General William Bradford conceded "that the case of Col. Cook cannot be substantially distinguished from that of many other citizens of the Western Counties against whom no prosecutions have been commenced."[152]

In dealing with Edward Cook's case and all the others similar to it, the federal executive branch came to realize, at least after a fashion, that the local situation during the height of the excise resistance had been much more confused and muddled, and considerably harder to straighten out, than had been supposed from the vantage of Philadelphia. The interaction of citizens in the region with their government was also far more complex than Alexander Hamilton and George Washington may have cared to admit. Sovereignty was not a simple matter in western Pennsylvania.

As they planned and implemented their response to the overt excise resistance in 1794, Washington and

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his advisors tended to refer to a set of "Insurgent Counties" that had set themselves in opposition to the law.[153] Clearly this was a misunderstanding of the situation. Certainly there were people in the region who were willing to engage in mob action against the excise, and apparently there were some who were giving armed opposition to the liquor tax a more systematic foundation. The troubles of the summer and autumn of 1794, however, resulted from the action of this militancy not just upon the widespread dissatisfaction with the excise, but also upon broader discontent centered on other political grievances. The region's tendencies toward instability -- its localism, the tensions and frustrations that underlay so much of the political interaction between people -- contributed to the confusion and disruption, as did the aggressive actions of those who saw opportunity or sought relief of their frustrations in times of political disorder. Society in the region did not suffer a collapse into complete anarchy; it did experience a brief but acute crisis of leadership and order as the existing patterns of political authority were disrupted. The situation was so confused and so tense that not even the best-informed locals could see or understand it as a whole. The federal government's direct intervention and exercise of power played a significant role in the

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restoration of order, but the federal whiskey tax was only a part of the political disruption of 1794.

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CHAPTER 10

EPILOGUE

"Peace now reigns triumphant in this country," proclaimed John Scull, the editor of the Pittsburgh Gazette, in January 1795. The citizens of western Pennsylvania "have seen their folly, and it is hoped will profit by experience -- they have discovered those to be their enemies whom they considered as friends." Scull was sure that the lesson would be properly instilled in the region's youth, "that it may be handed from one generation to another, to think and speak with horror of those who were the beginners of the late unfortunate calamity."[1]

The Washington administration's response to the excise resistance was by far the strongest and clearest exercise of power ever displayed by a government in enforcement of a claim to authority in the upper Ohio River country. The assertion of federal power had some distinct effects. Hugh Henry Brackenridge insisted that "the public mind" was in a "prostrate state" in the months following the arrival of the government's troops. One of Brackenridge's clients was afraid to oppose a rival claim to his land because it might "bring the militia upon us." Another of the attorney's acquaintances thought that Brackenridge's

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continued political opposition to Presley Neville would get him indicted for treason. No, replied Brackenridge, "I know what is treason, and what is not. 'It is well for you,' said he, 'that you do; for our part that do not, we are afraid to say any thing.'"[2] The government's use of troops even startled the political societies in Kentucky, which had been at least as vociferous as western Pennsylvania in criticism of federal policies, into silence.[3]

Political extremism also had been discredited. It had failed to bring solutions to the grievances that spawned it and instead brought real distress to many who had attached themselves to it. During the summer of 1795 President Washington and Governor Mifflin, as promised by the terms of submission, formally pardoned all wrongdoers except those currently under indictment for extraordinary acts. David Bradford and "A Wretched few" others remained in exile to avoid prosecution.[4] The lives of others who had been associated in some fashion with the insurgent movement were less drastically disrupted, but they no doubt comprehended that openly insurrectionary politics was now a very dangerous course of action. The lesson was surely not lost on those who had temporized through the crisis, awaiting the outcome of events before committing themselves one way or another. The eyes of the nation were fixed on southwestern Pennsylvania following the events of 1794: no misstep would be tolerated from those who, according to

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many, had challenged the very existence of the nation's republican government.[5] Moreover, much of the area's rumbling political frustration may have been vented during the turbulence of the excise troubles. Finally, although the federal liquor duty survived until Jefferson's presidency, some of the other major grievances of the western country -- the problem of war with the western Indians, the continued British occupation of military posts in the Northwest, and the Mississippi navigation issue -- did find partial or complete resolution through the federal government's actions in the mid-1790s. Rebellion, even near-rebellion, was not to be a fixed part of the region's political repertoire after 1794.

The effects of the federal intervention had their limits, however. "It has frequently been declared by men of respectability in this country that their sentiments respecting the excise law are the same they ever were, and that their submission to it is involuntary," wrote a contributor to the Gazette in April 1795.[6] Although violent opposition to the liquor excise had been suppressed, revenue collectors found that many distillers were something less than eager to cooperate. Settling all the arrearages of duties required several years, the seizure of some stills, and a number of lawsuits, and the process did not engender warm feelings between revenue officers and those distillers of whom they demanded back payments.[7] John Neville, who

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had been burned in effigy and "the Ashes scattered abroad" in the "forks of Yough" area in September 1794, continued as inspector of revenues in the region. "I really fear that our People will again be troublesome," his son Presley wrote from Philadelphia in March 1795 after reading Neville's reports of attitudes in the west. "I am afraid they will never do right untill some examples are made."[8]

In some respects the federal government's measures to restore order brought new tensions to its relations with its citizens in the Ohio forks country. William Findley -- whose History of the Insurrection was largely critical of the federal executive's handling of the entire excise matter -- claimed that there was a residue of "much heart burning" in those areas where the government's forces had swept up, and in some cases mistreated, numbers of suspects and witnesses in November 1794. "I have conversed with some men of influence," Findley wrote, "who were at all times the warmest friends of government, who acknowledge that their confidence in, and love of, the government, is much abated."[9]

The attitudes of western inhabitants and eastern militia toward one another were already soured before the government's forces even arrived in the western counties. An anonymous and satirical contribution to the Pittsburgh Gazette in August 1794 poked fun at the government's "watermellon armies from the Jersey shores; they would cut a much

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better figure in warring with the crabs and oysters about the Capes of Delaware." This jab drew an unexpectedly bellicose response from the New Jersey militia, the "Jersey Blues." Governor Richard Howell, who led the state's militia on the march to the west, was the reputed author of a new battle song that encouraged the Jersey Blues to "dash to the mountains" and "push home your steel": "To arms once more, our hero cries, / Sedition lives and order dies; . . . And fly to crush the rebel crew, / Or die in the mountains, Jersey Blue."[10]

Nor was this aggressive attitude confined to the New Jersey troops. A number of the members of the militia corps were either gentleman volunteers, many of whom had no love for western "rebels," or hired substitutes enlisted to compensate for militiamen reluctant to turn out for such service. While the aggressive sentiments were not universal among the government's troops, there was considerable talk by some officers and men of skewering insurgents on their swords and exacting some "atonement" for the bother of the long march west. Local political leaders who tried to forestall the advance of the militia in September and October feared that the government would not be able to control the troops. George Washington, intensely aware of the political consequences and dangers of employing military forces against the nation's own citizens, shared that concern and worked to see that commanders kept their men under control.

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Two people died at the hands of jumpy militiamen on the journey west, and the president made sure that the cases were investigated by state judges to allay any criticism. Most of the troops were kept under reasonable order on the marches west and back, but their route was marked by noticeable property damage and loss.[11]

There were several instances of direct conflict between local civilians and the officers of the custodial force retained in the region through the spring of 1795 under the command of General Daniel Morgan of Virginia. This corps, stationed on the Monongahela River about fourteen miles from Pittsburgh, had little to do to occupy its time, and some of its officers displayed a particularly swaggering and arrogant attitude toward the local population. H. H. Brackenridge made an obnoxious reputation for himself among the officers by handling several cases filed against them in local courts for personal assault, trespass, and property damage.[12]

In some respects the most striking instance of conflict between local civilians and Morgan's officers involved one William Nailor of Washington County. In May 1795 Nailor entered the encampment on the Monongahela to collect an account for some whiskey, bringing with him a constable bearing a warrant. Nailor confronted two of the militia officers, a Lieutenant Salmon and a Captain Bullet, each of whom denied having anything to do with the debt and scorned

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the power of local civil authority even to bring them into court to answer Nailor. At least one of the officers (and perhaps both) used his drawn cutlass to threaten and fend off the hapless constable. Nailor was enraged. He called the officers "Robbers and Insurgents" of the same caliber as the excise rioters of 1794; they were in the region to enforce the law, not to defy it, and if they "did not Submit to the Civil Laws he swore he woud raise his Company of Minute Men and take them and the whole Garrison as he was determined to have order and Support the Laws."[13] Here, ironically, was a citizen of the "insurgent" territory lecturing the government's police force on the primacy of the law. Clearly not all inhabitants of the region had fallen into an awed, unquestioning fear of the federal government's power. Equally striking is Nailor's threat to resort to the local militia if necessary: it demonstrated that the lines separating the realms of "legitimate" authority claimed by different sectors of government could still be fuzzy at times, and it harkened to that element of local politics whereby one could take direct action and employ whatever real power was at his disposal to exert influence.

The region's internal politics also remained very competitive. When both houses of the Pennsylvania legislature refused to seat the members elected in the western counties in the fall of 1794 because of the region's presumed state of insurrection at the time, it meant new

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elections and an extra round of electioneering in February 1795.[14] Letters to the Pittsburgh Gazette groaned at "the busy tribe of electioneerers" that was now so active in the region. Aspirants for office, wrote one observer, "will sneak, cring[e], and in fact commit any meanness to carry their point -- they will swear that their only motive is the public good; but as soon as they accomplish their ends, they immediately fall too and make public good subservient to private interest."[15] There also continued to be visible friction within local politics. During the fall of 1794 Germans in Westmoreland County warned that they were inadequately represented on tickets of candidates for office; in 1795 a Westmoreland resident complained publicly about the county's financial procedures; and an Allegheny County politician, accused of sharp practices during an election in 1795, decried his anonymous accuser's "littleness of soul" and "serpent-like tongue" in the pages of the Gazette.[16]

The Whiskey Insurrection and the state and national governments' responses to it also served to punctuate some of the existing notions that the western country was in many ways politically distinct from the seaboard. Furthermore, even politicians who were opposed to the federal administration on other issues were reluctant to appear too supportive of insurgents. As a result William Findley, sitting in Congress during the great national debate over

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John Jay's treaty with Britain, advised his constituents not to petition the government either for or against the treaty so as not to draw attention to the region. Despite Findley's efforts the sectional question arose during the discussions of the treaty. "I did not sit very easy in hearing dancing round whiskey pales and sneaking into Swamps when danger appeared Vociferated on the floor," he winced.[17] Yet in terms of state and national politics western Pennsylvania was hardly more consensual after 1794 than it had been before. Politicians such as James Ross and Albert Gallatin often found themselves on opposite sides of an issue. Party alignment in the region, as in the nation as a whole, was also an increasingly important factor, for it was obvious that cooperation among those of similar interest was a crucial factor in electoral and legislative power.[18] But as a resident of western Pennsylvania conceded in the spring of 1795, "self-interest" seemed to be the "ruling principle in Man."[19] There was in the western Pennsylvania of 1795 neither political homogeneity nor a neat alignment into two simple parties. Political interests still pulled in a variety of individual directions.[20]

The region's political character was not completely transformed by the events of 1794, yet the excise

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"insurrection" was the last major social and political disruption in the area in the eighteenth century and the last instance in which extraregional government felt its authority was so directly challenged. The events of 1794 were a coda to the area's development and political experience over the previous decades. Regional society from the 1750s into the 1790s was not a static system in most regards; political interactions could also be quite complicated and are often not clearly visible to modern observers. There are, however, important elements that stand out and help shape an understanding of the region during the second half of the eighteenth century.

One of the most important aspects of the region's politics was the role played by "self-interest" or "private interest." From the earliest British-American involvement in the Ohio forks country, the ability to control the region's resources and guide its development was very attractive to aggressive entrepreneurs who perceived an opportunity for considerable gain in the region. There were individuals and groups willing to compete actively for the power to make those decisions. "I plainly see that ambition will make men Drunke as well as Liquer," observed George Wilson, a magistrate in the Monongahela Valley, in reference to the opposition to Pennsylvania's authority in the early 1770s.[21]

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It would be an error, however, to see "self-interest" as a matter only of crass economic greed or ambition for power. These motivations certainly applied in a number of instances. Yet judging from such evidence as the local experience during the Revolutionary War and the responses to the perceived economic difficulties of the postwar years, there was also a broader notion of "self-interest" that valued personal autonomy and power not for their own sakes but because of the individual's desire to influence the decisions that seemed fundamentally important to his or her own life -- to exert some control over one's personal situation rather than be continually subject to other forces. Thus "private interest" moved both the grasping entrepreneur bent on riches or office and the less ambitious farmer concerned primarily with the economic and physical security of himself and his family. The distinction made here between two sorts of self-interest is actually a bit artificial. They were very closely related and can be difficult or impossible to distinguish from one another even in the behavior of a single individual.

The role of ideology within such a system is a complex question. It seems clear that the factional splits and political contests of the region's initial decades of white settlement did not represent longstanding divisions based on fundamental differences of ideology or principle. Most disputes were essentially very pragmatic, often relating

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very directly to economic competition, the disposition of local political power, or similar matters. Factions shifted as situations changed or new issues arose; active participants in local politics often changed "sides," appeared or disappeared from the scene as new disputes grew up. It would in fact seem important for many of the region's political activists to stay as unencumbered as possible by the baggage of ideology. Commitment and obligation, whether to a set of ideological concepts or to other individuals, could be liabilities to the politically ambitious in a system of such pragmatic adaptability to changing circumstances.

It is best not to become too cynical about the apparent weakness of political ideology in the region, however. The region's inhabitants, political leaders and political nonparticipants alike, certainly brought to the western country notions of how a society and a political system should operate, and conducted themselves accordingly. These "ideologies" may be very difficult to reconstruct historically, but that is not to say that they were nonexistent or subordinate to personal ambition. Men such as Thomas Scott and Arthur St. Clair showed signs of very distinct notions regarding such things as political order and duty, yet both were politically ambitious. Dorsey Pentecost and William Crawford were obviously ambitious, but did not necessarily lack a coherent "ideology" of

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concepts of government, politics, and citizenship. The Revolution and its political aftermath also did a great deal to infuse ideological content into much of American politics. The language of that new republican ideology was evident in western Pennsylvania as elsewhere; it apparently played a role, as yet not fully understood, in the formulation of political attitudes and conduct in the region.

The emphasis placed on self-interest and limited commitment to others also had an effect on associations among people. There could be advantages to association with others, but locals were at times very wary of yielding their private interest to larger group interests. Thus in the competitive realm of business, traders or land speculators might unite in partnerships or companies, but the relationships within such associations were not always comfortable. These business relationships were frequently subject to internal friction, dissolution, and a shuffling about of members. Another sort of example is provided by the associations for local defense which grew up out of necessity during the Revolution; individuals were typically very protective of their private interests under the stresses of war and did not freely surrender any portion of their personal autonomy.

Nor was extraregional government a strong force in the region during the decades after mid-century. From the period of the Seven Years' War until the Revolution, Great

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Britain's planners were a bit befuddled and divided about what to do with the North American interior. Policies were worked out as the needs for them arose; meanwhile Britain was willing to assert nominal control through its military and Indian affairs establishments, but made no deep commitment regarding civil authority in the west. The United States government that became a factor after the outbreak of war with Britain had very limited resources to commit to the region and in practice had to adapt to meet local circumstances. Even those inhabitants who attempted to work closely with the Continental government during the war could become frustrated by the relationship. As for Virginia and Pennsylvania as provincial, then state, entities, their governments were subject to a multiplicity of private interests and political concerns regarding economic development, trade, and land acquisition in the western country. The states were, moreover, in direct competition, each challenging the authority of the other, until the jurisdictional issue was resolved in the 1780s.

There were also social and geographic conditions that made it difficult for any government to make and carry out centralized decisions for the entire region. The population underwent rapid surges of growth and was marked by considerable mobility and transience. There were economic factors behind much of this movement. War, in addition, worked more than once to disrupt settlement as well as to bring

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in newcomers attached to the military, some of whom stayed in the region, others of whom did not. In terms of the inhabitants' national origins, the provinces or states from which they came to the region, and their religious and cultural backgrounds, the population was diverse. Nor was the upper Ohio River territory small in its extent, or its terrain always conducive to close contacts among inhabitants. The region consisted largely of a host of little societies, pockets or neighborhoods of settlement. Early on, these settlements were physically distinct and at times genuinely isolated from one another, and even as the region's population grew denser and filled in many of the gaps, this sense of locale remained. Thus there were the Redstone settlements, the Chartiers Creek settlements, the Ten Mile Creek settlements, the "forks of Yough" settlements, the people of Buffalo Creek, Jacobs Creek, Unity Township, the Conemaugh River area, the Wheeling neighborhood, the Ligonier Valley, those who lived near such-and-such mill, road, tavern, or ferry, and on and on in an almost endless list of local identities. These centrifugal tendencies, coupled as they were with the many competing economic and political interests in the region, made a difficult problem for any outside authority hoping to exert its influence over the region as a whole.

As a result of these factors, of the various governments' own decisions and the limits on their abilities to

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commit resources to the region, there was an extended period during which the presence of higher government in the area was relatively weak and impermanent. What government there was usually found its authority subject to question or outright challenge of one form or another. There was in consequence little close regulation by government as settlement, trade, and other activity proceeded in the early years, and the system in that sense was relatively loose, unstructured, and open, conducive to individual autonomy of action. That situation was one which the most aggressive locals were willing to use to their advantage, often in an intelligently cautious fashion that tested the limits of the system's allowance for assertive behavior as they exploited its tendencies toward laxity and away from close regulation.

Yet government could be quite useful in the pragmatic world of the transmontane settlements. Government could tap the society's resources to construct roads of considerable private benefit, grant the right to sell liquor or operate a ferry while excluding others from the privilege, enforce claims to land, punish dangerously antisocial behavior and preserve order, and perform a number of other functions. Government provided, in effect, a system that could, under the right circumstances, help a person achieve and wield that precious influence over his surroundings, a power by which one might partially control one's personal

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situation and even advance one's private interest.

As a result government became very intimately entangled within the competition among differing interests. Efforts by various parties to exploit the potentials offered by government made the problems of who would hold power and influence within local government, and the processes by which decisions would be made and power would flow through the system, crucial. An obvious example is the jurisdictional dispute between Virginia and Pennsylvania, in which an aggregate of interests used Virginia's claims to authority in the region as a device to block Pennsylvania authority and promote their own ends, creating a situation in which county governments battled for influence. What under other circumstances might be just technicalities -- matters of political boundaries, jurisdiction, and government "authority" -- became issues of vast importance and bitter controversy. There was the accompanying development of a local political technique in which government was actively employed as a weapon. Some politicians became very adept at using the local political system to good advantage and developed sophisticated instincts about when to push aggressively for what they wanted and when to be passive. Some were more successful at this business than others: David Bradford apparently committed himself too far to recover in 1794, for example, and so set himself apart from the Pentecosts, the Canons, the Croghans, the

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Crawfords, and the others who shifted over a great deal of political ground without ever losing their footing. Not all who tried played the game equally well or reaped the same gains or losses from fate, but as a group these political activists brought a distinctive style to local politics.

As for much of the population -- especially those who were not so aggressive about pursuing their interests within the political system -- their relations with higher government suffered some particular strains due to the region's experience. During the jurisdictional dispute, for example, there were two competing governments in the area, each demanding allegiance. While a fairly broad segment of the population was touched by one or both county governments, the involvement of these people was shallow, limited, and brief. Also, in theory government could help overcome such mammoth problems as war with the Indians; in practice, as during the American Revolution, many citizens came to believe that higher government was not responsive to their needs and that they got back much less from their relations with it than they contributed. Cooperation with the Continental government demanded the surrender of portions of one's autonomy and even livelihood, only to find one's concerns thrown into a tremendous stew of considerations facing government as it allocated its precious resources. Far better for government to lend support but leave to us

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the decisions crucial to our own safety, locals believed. As the society suffered the physical and psychological effects of war and self-preservation became the watchword, inhabitants of the region often were very reluctant to give their trust or yield their autonomy even in defensive associations with their close neighbors, let alone to a government that simply did not seem responsive. By the end of the Revolution there were distinct expressions of this frustration.

When divergent interests fought for supremacy in the region, commitment could get one hurt; trust was in short supply. Allegiance, therefore, could be indistinct and impermanent. It was partly for this reason that the Continental government was never absolutely sure of the region's attachments or loyalties one way or another during the war with Great Britain. The 1794 battle between government and insurgents vying for the region's loyalty was fought within the same context. Whether the competing parties took the form of "legitimate" governments or factions of private interest, no matter how dearly they wanted the mass of the region's population to dedicate itself to the cause at hand, many people were not going to be quick to side one way or another. Many people in the region did not want to be activists, were cautious about involvement in any cause despite the fact that they had some grievances or problems needing solution, were concerned about preserving the

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stability of their immediate situations and personal autonomy, and believed commitment could be dangerous. Activists such as George Croghan and Thomas Cresap during the early 1770s, the agitators promoting new-state schemes a decade later, and the excise resisters of the 1790s could easily tap into a layer of widespread frustration and dissatisfaction, but it was difficult to mobilize that discontent into a unified popular wave.

It is important not to forget that there were elements of stability within the society despite the potential for disorder. There were some mechanisms that gave at least partial cohesion within the region: church organizations that tied scattered groups of the same denomination together; the militia, which despite its close association with localism did connect men in a wider system and could be a force for stability as well as for disorder; and certain common political and other interests which, if general enough, could be shared by many of the region's inhabitants. There were also individuals who valued order and stability and actively labored to maintain them. For some the maintenance of the status quo, rather than any aggressive measures to disturb it, was the best means of forwarding their self-interest. Several of the Pennsylvania justices of the peace on the eve of the controversy with Virginia provide an example: they had found their way into positions of influence and could justly view disorder as a threat.

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There was also, despite the looseness of the local system and the friction that arose within it, a kind of unexpressed consensus whereby there would be certain "rules" to the game. The fact that there would be civil government in the region as it was settled, and that it would be of a form familiar to them, was accepted even by those who openly bickered over the disposition of power within the system; they were not revolutionaries eager to seize the opportunity to recast society anew in this fresh country. There were in addition some general understandings about limits on conduct, even during periods of instability. Most political leaders, even those who operated most aggressively within the system, seem to have understood that a complete breakdown of social order into an unpredictable situation under no one's control would not be in their best interest. Threats of violence and martial displays were always more readily turned to than was actual force of arms with bloodshed. And because there were such limits, assertive people could press against them to help achieve their goals. Thus John Connolly's forceful use of the local Virginia militia, even his own swaggering, violent demeanor during the conflict over jurisdiction, were potent weapons in his efforts to rattle the Pennsylvania justices' confidence and challenge their control over the Ohio forks country.

Unfortunately it was not always a very finely tuned means of achieving political ends. There was the problem

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of what to do, whether to go home or make good the threat, if the threat alone did not work. It was a potentially disruptive and dangerous political technique no matter how well done. At Neville's house on Bower Hill in July 1794 the excise resisters made an extraordinary display of force, amassing perhaps five hundred men, but it neither achieved them their goals nor averted violence. Frustrated people, moreover, tended to turn to direct action and aggressive conduct when other avenues seemed fruitless. It was the politics of Tom the Tinker, of barnburning and tarring and feathering, of men with blackened faces and sharp demands, of direct recourse to force, mob and bluster.

A complex mixture of factors gave the region its social and political character. There were clearly tensions within the society, between elements of stability and instability, order and disruption, between sly political buccaneers taking bold action to get what they wanted and quiet people who wanted only to be left alone with a reasonably secure living. There were strong elements of individualism and concern for private self-interest. There was also, however, the attraction of the group: the association to seek political redress; the church that offered identity, security, and cohesion to some; the local neighborhood of settlement with its bonds of social custom and common experience, perhaps even of common origin; the social intercourse, business and commercial ties, kinship and other

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links connecting the individual to others. Differences and tensions also existed between town and hinterland, between the region's cosmopolites and its unschooled, isolated settlers, and within a number of other social, political, and economic elements of the society.

In 1792 William Findley implied that western Pennsylvania's strong diversity of opinion was a major factor behind the region's excise troubles: if there had been a stronger unanimity of sentiment, even against the law, there would have been less friction, because then no one would have accepted an excise position and set the stage for confrontation.[22] Strong diversity of opinion was of itself only partly to blame for the region's internal frictions, however. Perhaps more important was the absence of reliable processes whereby peaceful political means could resolve divergences of interest. Local politics in the region placed a heavy emphasis on conflict. It was not always a system conducive to mutual agreement on a common course of action, harmonious coexistence of varying interests, avoidance of political frustration, or subordination of dissent to majority views. In a way the diversity of interests that helped foster the crisis of 1794 also helped prevent the development of a true civil war between large, consolidated factions -- thus confirming in a sense the argument of James Madison in the tenth Federalist essay. Madison had suggested that a great diversity of interests,

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decentralized communications, and a wide geographical area would tend to protect a republican system from domination by a single faction, and extremism certainly failed in the end to gain control over western Pennsylvania during the excise crisis. However, the region was still faced with the problem of how to allow variance of interest without developing such dangerous internal friction, how to channel discontent to avoid self-destruction. The federal government's reaction to the situation may have played an important role in the region's political self-definition, for the sharp federal response laid down clearer and stiffer limits on acceptable political behavior and made the region's inhabitants confront the problems of government authority, majority rule, the redress of grievances in a republican system, and the requirements for a stable and orderly society.

The degree to which the inhabitants of the upper Ohio Valley underwent a developmental process of collective political "education" during the first several decades of white settlement is an unanswered question. There was significant change during the period in political terms as well as in economic activity, white population density, and the transformation of the strong and immediate presence of the Indian nations in the early years into something much more remote. In practical terms such political questions as how much latitude the more aggressive and speculative

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interests would have, the degree of independence allowed the individual, the solution of internal problems, the nature and extent of the citizen's identification with locale, region, state, and nation, the structuring of power, the handling of disagreement, and so on had to be readdressed continually as the circumstances and character of regional society changed.

That process of change and adaptation was an inherent part of the area's transformation from a "frontier" zone into a "settled" one, and so raises the questions of what the "frontier" meant in political terms and how it was distinct from "settled" American society of the second half of the eighteenth century. There were the facts of physical and human geography: the broad belt of mountain ridges separating east from west, the distance of the transmontane country from important commercial and political centers in the east, the thinness of settlement in the early years. Equally important, however, was the perceptual element, the ways in which people saw and reacted to the environment. In the early years perceptions shaped strong images of the region's isolation and its exotic nature as a wilderness. As activity continued there were experiences that gave the region distinctive qualities -- particularly the conflicts with Indians and the concurrent notion by western inhabitants that they had suffered unduly at the hands of government in terms of defense and other matters, that they were

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victims of Indians and government alike. The notion that the Ohio forks territory constituted "the Ends of the American Earth" was partly real and partly created, a political identity coined by people angry over a particular set of grievances. Such issues touched broad commonalities of interest within the region and could tie it to the larger "western country." The Ohio forks country, while the particular circumstances and events of its development were unique, had something in common especially with those contemporary frontier districts, such as Vermont and the Carolina backcountry, that also strained at times over problems of social order and political authority. Because of the Pittsburgh region's great diversity of interests, however, and because its interests often did not mirror in all respects those of other "western" or "frontier" areas such as Kentucky, there was a broad "western" identity only in very general respects. The lack of firm, well-defined concepts on the matter is illustrated by the frequent use of such terms as "this country" to refer to the territory west of Laurel Hill, or to some part of it. The phrase reflects some idea of distinctive place, but the limits and scope of the word "country" used in this regard seem to have varied with the speaker and with circumstances. The term apparently could refer to anything from a fairly limited locale to the entire trans-Appalachian zone. There was no single "West" in the late eighteenth century any

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more than there was a single homogeneous and uniform "East."

Thus distinctions between east and west, "frontier" and "civilization," are not simple or clear and can be quite misleading. Nor should one presume that the occupants of areas with low densities of white population were fundamentally different from their contemporaries elsewhere. Residents of more settled parts of the American states could be ambitious, contentious, violent, and interested in their own gain or personal welfare. During the initial period of white occupation in the upper Ohio Valley the society was characterized by considerable physical mobility and transience, cultural diversity, strong tendencies toward localism, expectations of very great economic gain on the part of some people, violence and war as almost inherent elements of the relations between Indians and whites, and, for many years, an amorphous, loosely defined governmental system. As a result certain behaviors and traits which were present elsewhere in American society played a highly noticeable role around the Ohio forks. The area was a segment of the American experience in the latter decades of the eighteenth century, just as New England's towns, the southern plantations, and the coastal cities were. It was a complex society with patterns of human interaction that say a great deal about the behavior of Americans under certain circumstances.

In a way the Whiskey Insurrection signalled the end

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of the first major phase of permanent European settlement in the Pittsburgh country. The regional society and its economic basis were undergoing continual change, and by the 1790s the area had already begun to differ from the early 1760s in some important respects. Yet the Whiskey Insurrection belonged to the preceding decades and not to the society that had begun to take shape by 1794. The liquor excise troubles were the last product of a society marked by few restraints, ambitious personal politics, and the kind of political confusion and flailing public action that was spawned by frustration, fears for personal security, and murky lines of allegiance. The confused outburst of 1794 and its results demonstrated that the earlier, looser system was no longer effective and could not bring political satisfaction. The "insurrection" was an end and not a beginning, and in terms of political interactions, relationships with governmental authority, even notions of what the regional society was all about, the decades before 1795 can be seen as a unit, distinct from what came after in the Ohio forks country.

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NOTES

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN CITATIONS

Col. Recs. -- Colonial Records, 16 vols. (Harrisburg, Penn., 1838-1853).

HSP -- Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

HSWP -- Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh.

LC -- Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Pa. Arch. -- Samuel Hazard et al., eds., Pennsylvania Archives, 9 series, 119 vols. (Harrisburg, Penn., 1852-1935).

Pa. Hist. -- Pennsylvania History.

PHMC -- Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Division of Archives and Manuscripts, Harrisburg.

PMHB -- Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography.

VSL -- Virginia State Library, Richmond.

WLCL -- William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

WPHM -- Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine.

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Notes to Chapter 1

[1]John W. Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny, 1761-1763," PMHB, 37 (1913), 45. Kenny's relation of the tale from trader Thomas Kinton does not specify the nation of Indians involved, but they were almost certainly of the linguistic and cultural group usually called Delaware. The published version of Kenny's journal is in two parts: the 1761-1763 journal, cited above, in PMHB, 37 (1913), 1-47, 152-201, and John W. Jordan, ed., "James Kenny's 'Journal to ye Westward,' 1758-59," ibid., 395-447. Since both journals are in one volume of PMHB and are distinguished by page numbers within the volume, both will hereafter be referred to by a single short citation: Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny."

[2]See Archer Butler Hulbert and William Nathaniel Schwarze, eds., "David Zeisberger's History of the Northern American Indians," Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, 19 (1910), 152, and Joseph Doddridge, Notes on the Settlement and Indian Wars of the Western Parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania from 1763 to 1783, inclusive, together with a Review of the State of Society and Manners of the First Settlers of the Western Country (Pittsburgh, 1912; orig. pub. 1824), 60. Doddridge also mentioned other animals and birds which accompanied or followed the movement of white farmers into the region. For the phrase "English flies" as a Native American term for bees see Peter Kalm, Travels into North America; Containing its Natural History, and a Circumstantial Account of its Plantations and Agriculture in General . . ., trans. John Reinhold Forster (Warrington and London, 1770-1771), I: 288-289. Kalm may have been the source for the use of the phrase by the author of Sylvester K. Stevens et al., eds., Travels in New France by J.C.B. (Harrisburg, Penn., 1941), 95, and by Thomas Anburey in Travels Through the Interior Parts of America; in a Series of Letters (London, 1789), II: 282. On the latter work see Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., "Thomas Anburey's 'Travels Through America': A Note on Eighteenth-Century Plagiarism," The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America, 37 (1943), 23-36.

[3]In the 18th century English observers were as likely to call these Six Nations residents of the area "Iroquois" or "Seneca" as Mingo, which derives from a general Algon-

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quian term for the Iroquois. To further confuse the matter, not all Iroquois in the upper Ohio Valley at any given time considered themselves independent of the Onondaga council's authority, as did those usually called Mingo.

[4]Concise treatments of the migrations of these groups and descriptions of their cultures can be found in three articles in William C. Sturtevant, gen. ed., Handbook of North American Indians (Washington, D.C., 1978-), vol. XV (Northeast, ed. Bruce G. Trigger): Ives Goddard, "Delaware," pp. 213-239; Charles Callender, "Shawnee," pp. 622-635; and William A. Hunter, "History of the Ohio Valley," pp. 588-593. Also, John Witthoft and William A. Hunter, "The Seventeenth-Century Origins of the Shawnee," Ethnohistory, 2 (1955), 42-57. Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795 (Pittsburgh, 1940), is a now-standard monograph dealing with the history of the region from the Native American point of view. Unfortunately Downes treated the region's Indians almost strictly as hunters and tended to ignore the role of horticulture in their society.

[5]See the 1731 reports of three traders to the Pennsylvania government, Pa. Arch., 1st ser., I: 298-302. Three major paths used by traders and Indians connected the "Allegheny" trading area to eastern Pennsylvania; see Paul F. Rizza et al., Pennsylvania Atlas: A Thematic Atlas of the Keystone State (Slippery Rock, Penn., 1975), 95; Col. Recs., VII: 444-446; and, for the early trade in general, Charles A. Hanna, The Wilderness Trail: or The Ventures and Adventures of the Pennsylvania Traders on the Allegheny Path, 2 vol. (New York, 1911).

[6]C. Hale Sipe, "The Principal Indian Towns of Western Pennsylvania," WPHM, 13 (1930), 104-122; Frederick Webb Hodge, ed., Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico (Washington, D.C., 1912), II: 526-527; Hanna, Wilderness Trail, I: 272-273, 289; Col. Recs., V: 691; Christopher Gist's journal of 1751 in Thomas Pownall, A Topographical Description of the Dominions of the United States of America, ed. Lois Mulkearn (Pittsburgh, 1949; orig. pub. 1776), 173-174; see also the maps in Lloyd A. Brown, Early Maps of the Ohio Valley: A Selection of Maps, Plans, and Views Made by Indians and Colonials from 1673 to 1783 (Pittsburgh, 1959), esp. plates 16, 17, 19, 30.

[7]Goddard, "Delaware," 222-223; Callender, "Shawnee," 624-625; Gist journal in Pownall, Topographical Description, 182. Goddard's article describes the groups usually brought under the common rubric "Delaware"; in the 18th

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century some white observers considered the Munsee to be part of the Unami-speaking Delaware, while others treated them as a distinct group.

[8]Brown, Early Maps of Ohio Valley; also plates of early maps in Louis C. Karpinski, Historical Atlas of the Great Lakes and Michigan (Lansing, Mich., 1931).

[9]Sir John St. Clair to Robert Napier, 13 June 1755, in Stanley Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle (New York, 1936), 94.

[10]Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution, rev. ed. (New York, 1958-1970), IV: 186-224; R. David Edmunds, "Pickawillany: French Military Power versus British Economics," WPHM, 58 (1975), 169-184; Wilbur R. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry Along the Ohio and Northwest Frontiers, 1748-1763 (Stanford, Cal., 1950), 108-110.

[11]Gist journal in Pownall, Topographical Description, 174; Hanna, Wilderness Trail, I: 358.

[12]Lois Mulkearn, "Half King, Seneca Diplomat of the Ohio Valley," WPHM, 37 (1954), 65-81; Hunter, "History of Ohio Valley," 592.

[13]Richard L. Morton, Colonial Virginia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1960), 570-615; Lois Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia (Pittsburgh, 1954), 273-284, 400-403, 417, 428-434. The Ohio Company's plans and activities may be followed in ibid. and in Alfred P. James, The Ohio Company: Its Inner History (Pittsburgh, 1959).

[14]Thomas Lee to Gov. James Hamilton, 22 Nov. 1749, Col. Recs., V: 422-423; Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, 142, 410-411, 618.

[15]Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, 144-150, 470, 624, and maps facing 72 and 226; Fernand Grenier, ed., Papiers Contrecoeur et Autres Documents Concernant le Conflit Anglo-Français sur L'Ohio de 1745 à 1756 (Quebec, 1952), 106-107.

[16]Gist journal in Pownall, Topographical Description, 173-174; Downes, Council Fires, 42-74; Anthony F. C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York, 1969), 111-114.

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[17]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., II: 47-49, 60-63, 119-120, 123-124, 132-136; 2nd ser., VI: 90; Col. Recs., V: 515, 547, 701, 707-708, 730-731, 747-751, 753-755; Lawrence Henry Gipson, Lewis Evans (Philadelphia, 1939), 24-40; Howard N. Eavenson, "Pattin's Map of the Road to Shannopintown," WPHM, 27 (1944), 21-28. The Ohio Company and Virginia accused Pennsylvania's government and traders of attempting to subvert the company's efforts in the west. Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, 415-417; Col. Recs., V: 422-423.

[18]See the French assessments of the situation, 1751-1752, in Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., VI: 123-138.

[19]"Pour barrer Le Passage Et s'opposer à Leur comerce." Duquesne to Contrecoeur, 27 Jan. 1754, in Grenier, ed., Papiers Contrecoeur, 93-94; see also ibid., 38, 99-101; Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Penn., 1941), 39-43. While the Monongahela watershed was the main Virginia access route to the area, Pennsylvania traders had long used other paths over the mountains.

[20]Stanley M. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America (New Haven, Conn., 1933), 19-23; Dinwiddie's alarms about the French threat are in R. A. Brock, ed., The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758, 2 vols., in Collections of the Virginia Historical Society, new ser., vols. 3-4 (Richmond, Va., 1883-1884), I: 22-24, 49, 73-75; Col. Recs., V: 687.

[21]Dinwiddie to John Hanbury of the Ohio Company, 12 Mar. 1754, in Brock, ed., Records of Dinwiddie, I: 101-104, quote from p. 102; also ibid., 93-98, 118; Col. Recs., V: 3-5, 7-9, 710. Dinwiddie's 1754 proclamation is printed in Kenneth P. Bailey, ed., The Ohio Company Papers, 1753-1817: Being Primarily Papers of the 'Suffering Traders' of Pennsylvania (Arcata, Cal., 1947), 25-26, which prints materials in the Etting Collection, HSP.

[22]Col. Recs., V: 8; VI: 32.

[23]Dinwiddie's orders to Trent, Washington, Col. James Patton, and Col. Joshua Fry indicate that the governor probably expected two structures to be built: a fortified company storehouse and a larger fort that Fry, arriving later with the main body of provincial forces, would select a site for and construct. Brock, ed., Records of Dinwiddie, I: 50, 55-57, 59, 75-76, 89, 145. To the earl of Holdernesse on 12 Mar. 1754 Dinwiddie wrote: "If we succeed in building the Forts on Monongahela, I propose building two other Forts on the Ohio." Ibid., 96.

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[24]Dinwiddie to earl of Holdernesse, 10 May 1754, ibid., 158-159; p. 25 of the facsimile of the Case of the Ohio Company, in Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers. James, Ohio Company: Inner History, 96-101, sees the fort as a company venture; Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, 622-623, 646, interprets it as Virginia's fort. It seems impossible to call it one but not the other.

[25]Trent to Dinwiddie, 11 Aug. 1753, in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 23-24, from a copy in the Etting Collection, HSP, I: 2; John Fraser to _____ Young, 27 Aug. 1753, Col. Recs., V: 660; Donald Jackson and Dorothy Twohig, eds., The Diaries of George Washington (Charlottesville, Va., 1976-1979), I: 123-133; and see Washington's memorandum on the map of his journey, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799 (Washington, D.C., 1931-1944), I, facing p. 31: "N.B. A Little below Shanapins Town in the Fork is the place where we are going immediately to Build a Fort as it commands the Ohio and the Monongahela."

[26]Brock, ed., Records of Dinwiddie, I: 50, 55, 59, 75-76, 85, 106-107, 118. To Dinwiddie the "Forks of Monongahela" and the forks of the Ohio were the same; see ibid., 83, 93.

[27]See the French correspondence in Grenier, ed., Papiers Contrecoeur, 103-109; Edward Ward's deposition in Etting Collection, HSP, I: 10 (printed in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 28-31); Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, I: 162-210. Ronald D. Martin, "Confrontation at the Monongahela: Climax of the French Drive into the Upper Ohio Region," Pa. Hist., 37 (1970), 133-150, offers a summary of French efforts to secure an Ohio River fort, and points out the logistical strain imposed by the establishment of Fort Duquesne, a point also made by W. J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760 (New York, 1969), 160-167.

[28]For Indian activities and locations during the war, see Downes, Council Fires, 70-82; Stevens et al., eds., Travels by J.C.B.; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 83, 560-563; and the many relevant documents in 2nd ser., VI (esp. 348, 359-363, for movements of Delaware into the region from the east). Indian encampments adjacent to Fort Duquesne are shown on map on plate 34 of Brown, Early Maps of Ohio Valley.

[29]Grenier, ed., Papiers Contrecoeur, 127-129, 275-278, 323. The functions of French posts are discussed in Willard B. Robinson, American Forts: Architectural Form

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and Function (Chicago, 1977), 31-35, and Gipson, British Empire before the American Revolution, V: 49-51. Fort Duquesne is described in Charles M. Stotz, "Defense in the Wilderness," in Drums in the Forest, a special issue of WPHM, 41 (1958), 130-140, which gives a detailed account of the successive forts on the site, especially Fort Pitt.

[30]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., VI: 258-262, 351, 353-356, 402.

[31]Ibid., 353, and see 402 also. Stevens et al., eds., Travels by J.C.B., 97-98, said the fort was built on a berm in anticipation of flooding, but cabins outside the works were carried away by a major flood in 1757.

[32]Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, I: 188; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 305; 2nd ser., VI: 253-255, 258-262, 346-347, 359-363, 402. As early as 1753 the French learned of the great difficulties inherent in the use of French Creek as a transport route from Presque Isle to the Allegheny River; Martin, "Confrontation at the Monongahela," 137-138, 147-148.

[33]Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America, 34-37; Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 45-48, 79 (quote is from p. 45). In Pargellis' opinion, "the taking of neither Fort Duquesne nor Niagara . . . was worth the labor and expense." Military Affairs in North America, xvii.

[34]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., II: 767-775; Col. Recs., VII: 230-231; James H. Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics, 1746-1770: The Movement for Royal Government and Its Consequences (Princeton, N.J., 1972), 17-27; William A. Hunter, "Victory at Kittanning," Pa. Hist., 23 (1956), 376-407; Morton, Colonial Virginia, 689.

[35]State of the British and French Colonies in North America, With Respect to Number of People, Forces, Forts, Indians, Trade, and other Advantages (New York, 1967; orig. pub. 1755); Lewis Evans, An Analysis of a General Map of the Middle Colonies in America (etc.) (Philadelphia, 1755), 31-32; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America, 19-21; James Sullivan et al., eds., The Papers of Sir William Johnson (Albany, N.Y., 1921-1962), I: 458-459; Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 40-41, 136; Gipson, British Empire before the American Revolution, VII: 277.

[36]Memo to Henry Bouquet, [Feb. 1757], in The Papers of Henry Bouquet, ed. Sylvester K. Stevens et al. (Harrisburg, Penn., 1951-1978), I: 49. Cited hereafter as Bouquet Papers (1951-1978) to distinguish this edition from The

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Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet, ed. Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent (Harrisburg, Penn., 1940-1943), a mimeographed version of Bouquet's papers that will also be cited here frequently, as Bouquet Papers (1940-1943).

[37]Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America, 228-232; Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, xix. Much information about the Forbes campaign is in Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II; the best succinct treatment of diplomatic measures to court the Indians is in Gipson, British Empire before the American Revolution, VII: 274-282.

[38]Major James Robertson to earl of Morton, 19 Dec. 1758, in Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 432; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 600-601.

[39]Frederick Post, "Two Journals of Western Tours," in Reuben G. Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels (Cleveland, Ohio, 1904-1907), I: 257; Forbes to Abercromby and Amherst, 26 Nov. 1758, in Alfred P. James, ed., Writings of General John Forbes, Relating to his Service in North America (Menasha, Wis., 1938), 263; Pitt to Gov. William Denny, 23 Jan. 1759, Col. Recs., VIII: 315-316; Pitt to Amherst, 23 Jan. 1759, in Gertrude Selwyn Kimball, ed., Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners in America (London, 1906), II: 12-14.

[40]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 194; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21654), 50 (citations to this edition of the Bouquet Papers will be to British Museum mss. series number and page number in the mimeo volumes); return of forces at Pittsburgh, July 1760, in Monckton Papers, v. 37, Canadian Archives (on microfilm at Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh), abstracted in Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 637.

[41]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 29, 603; Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania, 201-202; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 27. A thorough description of the fort is in Stotz, "Defense in the Wilderness," 152-184. Over 125 skilled laborers were on the site in fall 1760; list in Monckton Papers, v. 41, Canadian Archives (microfilm at Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh).

[42]Kimball, ed., Pitt Correspondence, II: 134; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 251-252, 273-274, 482, 498-500; Col. Recs., VIII: 392.

[43]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 579, 600-601, 642-644; III: 210-211, 251.

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[44]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 125-127, 153-155; (ser. 21653), 135; Frances R. Reece, ed., "Colonel Eyre's Journal of his Trip from New York to Pittsburgh, 1762," WPHM, 27 (1944), 49-50; Bouquet to Gen. Gage, 27 Dec. 1763, Gage Papers, WLCL. In 1765 the estimate for repairing the works, including costs of tools and pay for an assistant engineer, totaled £1885 3s.4d.(sterling). Bouquet to Gage, 4 March 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[45]Clarence E. Carter, ed., The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, and with the War Office and the Treasury, 1763-1775 (New Haven, Conn., 1931-1933), I: 166; II: 384; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 86-88, 93-94, 138, 199; and the following from the Gage Papers, WLCL: Bouquet to Gage, 27 Dec. 1763; William Grant to Gage, 2 Apr. 1764, 15 May 1764; Gage to John Reid, 14 July 1765; Harry Gordon to Gage, 22 Aug. 1767; Gage to Gordon, 5 Sept. 1767, 5 Oct. 1767; Gage to Charles Edmonstone, 6 Sept. 1767, 7 Feb. 1768, 15 Dec. 1768, 11 Oct. 1771; Edmonstone to Gage, 24 Jan. 1768, 1 Nov. 1771; John Wilkins to Gage, 18 July 1768; Gage warrants, 19:58, 26:3, 26:22, 27:40. The quote from Gage is in his letter to Bouquet, 5 July 1764.

[46]Eyre to William Johnson, 7 Jan. 1764, in Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 457-458; Edmonstone to Gage, 1 Nov. 1767, 2 Nov. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL; see also Bouquet to Gage, 4 March 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL; Reece, ed., "Colonel Eyre's Journal," 45-46; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 87-89. Eyre maintained that almost all posts in the interior were unnecessary and too expensive to maintain: Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 461-462.

[47]Gage to Edmonstone, 23 Nov. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL; Gage to Conway, 6 May 1766, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 90. In late 1764 the garrison of Fort Pitt consisted of five companies; this was pared to three within two years. Bouquet to Gage, 30 Nov. 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL; Gage to Shelburne, 10 Oct. 1766, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 110.

[48]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 35-39; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 54-56, 75; (ser. 21653), 101-108.

[49]Quoted material is from Simeon Ecuyer to Col. William Amherst, 11 March 1763, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 69; see also ibid., 62-63, 71-72, 84; Nicholas B. Wainwright, ed., "George Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," PMHB, 71 (1947), 437; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 189-190.

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[50]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 61-62, 148, 151; also Reece, ed., "Colonel Eyre's Journal," 49-50, for the chief engineer's assessment of Fort Pitt's location after the 1762 flood.

[51]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 294; (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 36-37; (ser. 21651), 117-118, 131, 173; (ser. 21653), 261; John Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 13 Mar. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg (cited hereafter as Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC); William Murray to Bouquet, 15 Feb. 1765 (in Bouquet to Gage, 16 Mar. 1765), and Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 3 Apr. 1771, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[52]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 602; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 121; (ser. 21654), 249; Reece, ed., "Colonel Eyre's Journal," 44; Anne Bezanson, Robert D. Gray, and Miriam Hussey, Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1935), 244-245.

[53]Forbes to Amherst, 26 Jan. 1759, in James, ed., Writings of Forbes, 283; see also ibid., 173; Kimball, ed., Pitt Correspondence, I: 294-297; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 179, 180, 234-246, 251, 264-265, 273-274, 277, 291, 298-303, 344; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, II: 230-232, 245, 249, 260-263, 268, 275-283, 295, 300, 303; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 489, 552; Marion Tinling, ed., The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of Westover, Virginia, 1684-1776 (Charlottesville, Va., 1977), II: 666; Gipson, British Empire before the American Revolution, VII: 249-252, 261-265.

[54]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 541-543; Gage to Bouquet, 7 Mar. 1965, and Bouquet to Gage, 16 Mar. 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[55]David Jones, A Journal of Two Visits Made to Some Nations of Indians on the West Side of the River Ohio, in the Years 1772 and 1773 (New York, 1865; orig. pub. 1774), 17; David McClure, Diary of David McClure, Doctor of Divinity, 1748-1820, with notes by Franklin B. Dexter (New York, 1899), 43-44; "[Matthew] Clarkson's Diary, August 6, 1766-April 16, 1767," in Clarence W. Alvord and Clarence E. Carter, eds., The New Regime, 1765-1767, vol. XI of Collections of the Illinois State Library (Springfield, Ill., 1916), 352. The army encouraged the establishment of private taverns at designated spots on the roads; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 408.

[56]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 393-394, 409, 462-463, 476-478, 590-591; IV: 141, 242, 251.

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[57]Paul A. W. Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with John Heckewelder (Pittsburgh, 1958), 221; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 39; Reece, ed., "Colonel Eyre's Journal," 44, 47-48; Tinling, ed., Byrd Correspondence, II: 690, 693; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 476-478; IV: 45-46, 88, 201, 520, 521; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 68; (ser. 21648, pt. 2), 65; John Campbell to George Morgan, 17 Apr. 1772, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC; Bouquet to Gage, 5 Jan. 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL. At times the roads were fine but transport was halted by farmers refusing to make wagons and teams available for the army's use; Wilkins to Gage, 11 June 1768, 3 July 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 395-401; ibid., 8th ser., VII: 6192, 6507-6508, 6537, 6573-6574.

[58]Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, I: 191; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, I: 52; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 69, 119, 231, 252, 320, 613-615; Evans, Analysis of a Map of the Middle Colonies, 27.

[59]Bouquet to Monckton, 20 Mar. 1761, Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 396; also ibid., 419-420; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 29: Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 184-187, 258-261, 647, 659; Kimball, ed., Pitt Correspondence, II: 242, 262; Peter D. Keyser, ed., "Memorials of Col. Jehu Eyre," PMHB, 3 (1879), 305; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 372.

[60]Stotz's conclusion that "the Ohio flowed in the wrong direction for the French, the right way for the English," is too simplistic and caught up in the idea of an inexorable westward advance of the Anglo-Americans; each nation needed ideally to move efficiently in both directions on the Allegheny and Ohio in order to support its posts and settlements. Stotz, "Defense in the Wilderness," 189. By early 1761 Fort Niagara, not Fort Pitt, was the usual British supply center for Presque Isle and Detroit; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 291, 405.

[61]Evans, Analysis of a Map of the Middle Colonies, 25-27; Neville B. Craig, ed., The Olden Time, 2 vols. (Cincinnati, 1876; orig. pub. 1846-1847), II: 434-453; Gage to Hillsborough, 5 Feb. 1772, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 317; Clarence W. Alvord and Clarence E. Carter, eds., Trade and Politics, 1767-1769, vol. XVI of Collections of the Illinois State Library (Springfield, Ill., 1921), 69-71, 140-141; and from the Gage Papers, WLCL: Bouquet to Gage, 27 May 1764; John Reid to Gage, 11 Aug. 1765; Gage to William Murray, 20 July 1767; Murray to Gage,

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8 Aug. 1767; Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 20 Sept. 1767; Gage to George Phyn, 20 July 1767; Isaac Hamilton to Gage, 18 Nov. 1771; Harry Gordon to Gage, 8 July 1766.

[62]John Wilkins to Gage, 15 Aug. 1768, Jonathan Reed to Gage, 5 Oct. 1767 and 3 Apr. 1767, Gage to Reed, 15 July 1767, Gage to Edmonstone, 27 Nov. 1769, all in Gage Papers, WLCL. The statements by George Croghan to Gage, 12 Jan. 1767, in Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 253-255, and of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan in Alvord and Carter, eds., New Regime, 473-476, must be discounted somewhat because the Baynton firm was seeking a contract to supply the Illinois forts and may have overemphasized the chronic failure of army boats to return upriver. There is also evidence of traders' boats returning upstream. Yet it is clear that the army, and large firms such as Baynton's, suffered an almost continual shortage of boats at Pittsburgh due to the difficulty of returning them upriver.

[63]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 529; John Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 26 July 1766, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC; and from Gage Papers, WLCL: Edmonstone to Gage, 29 Apr. 1769, 30 Dec. 1769, and articles of agreement enclosed in 16 July 1770; Bouquet to Gage, 27 May 1764.

[64]Gage to Isaac Hamilton, 30 Aug. 1772; Reed to Gage, 4 May 1768; and Gage Warrants, 21:66, all in Gage Papers, WLCL; Gage's statement is in his letter to Barrington, 13 July 1766, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, II: 360.

[65]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (Ser. 21653), 46-47.

[66]Ibid. (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 198, 203; (ser. 21650, pt. 2), 108; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 420-421, 444, 449; IV: 198, 331; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 420, 431; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, X: 131-132; Tinling, ed., Byrd Correspondence, II: 675; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 685-686.

[67]Gage to William Murray, 18 June 1766, and to Alexander McLellan, 21 July 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL; also Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 28; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, X: 377-379.

[68]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 610-612; see also ibid., 579, and III: 200; Col. Recs., VIII: 315-316; Forbes to Gov. William Denny, 26 Nov. 1758 (copy), Penn. Mss., Official Corres., vol. IX (1758-1764), HSP.

[69]Col. Recs., VIII: 297-299.

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[70]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 271. Information on this subject may be found in the published Bouquet Papers and in the Gage Papers, WLCL.

[71]Ibid. (ser. 21650, pt. 2), 32. Plus Bouquet to Gov. James Hamilton, 12 Sept. 1763, in Report on Canadian Archives, 1889 (Ottawa, 1890), Note E, "The Reservation of Indian Lands," 69.

[72]Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 90, 110; II: 318-324. For a thorough appraisal of the army's role in North America and the rationale behind its decisions, see John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, N.J., 1965). Amherst's comments before and after the outbreak of Pontiac's War may be found in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 165, and Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, IV: 201-202.

[73]Warrants, 23:157, and Gage to Charles Edmonstone, 22 Apr. 1769, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[74]Edmonstone to Gage, 23 Mar. 1772, 28 Sept. 1772, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[75]To Hillsborough, 16 June 1768, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 178. See also ibid., 274-281, 319, and II: 381, 601.

[76]The subject of the fort's evacuation will be discussed in later chapters also.

[77]Charles Edmonstone to Gen. Gage, 10 May 1771, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[78]Evarts B. Greene and Virginia Harrington, American Population before the Federal Census of 1790 (New York, 1932), 194-202; Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, I: 167-169; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, IV: 240-246, X: 544-546; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 405-408; Gist journal in Pownall, Topographical Description, 182. For the Mahican, see T. J. Brasser, "Mahican," in Sturtevant, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, XV: 198-212.

[79]Hodge, ed., Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico, I: 867; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 296; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 100; report of Alexander McKee, in Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 24 Aug. 1771, Gage Papers, WLCL; Greene and Harrington, American Population before 1790, 199-200; Alvord and Carter, eds., Trade and Politics, 71.

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[80]Through the 1760s this place was the residence of a leader called the White Mingo. Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 572; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 114; Wainwright, ed., "Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," 405; Guy Soulliard Klett, ed., Journals of Charles Beatty, 1762-1769 (University Park, Penn., 1962), 55; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 293n; George Croghan to Thomas Gage, 8 Aug. 1770, and his journal enclosed within, Gage Papers, WLCL. Also A. T. Volwiler, ed., "William Trent's Journal at Fort Pitt, 1763," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 11 (1924), 393, 395, 408; Trent used "Shanopins Town," the name of the old Delaware town near the forks, as either a general place name or a village name, perhaps in reference to this settlement. He also referred to a Munsee town seven miles up the Allegheny from Pittsburgh.

[81]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 560-563 (the journal is George Croghan's but is incorrectly identified in the volume as Frederick Post's); Col. Recs., VIII: 305, 309; Hanna, Wilderness Trail, I: 348; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 109.

[82]Hunter, "History of Ohio Valley," 591-592; Goddard, "Delaware," 223; Callender, "Shawnee," 631; C. A. Weslager, The Delaware Indians: A History (New Brunswick, N.J., 1972), 232, 243-244.

[83]The structure and diplomacy of the Iroquois confederacy itself are discussed in Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 39-44, 111-114; William N. Fenton, "The Iroquois in History," in E. B. Leacock and N. O. Lurie, eds., North American Indians in Historical Perspective (New York, 1971), 129-168; Wendell H. Oswalt, This Land Was Theirs: A Study of the North American Indian, 2nd ed. (New York, 1973), 460-465. See also Weslager, Delaware Indians, 179-184, 193-194, relative to the Iroquois claims and the Pennsylvania government's exploitation of them in relations with the Delaware.

[84]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 201; Col. Recs., IX: 413.

[85]See the case of B. Gratz and others, which, in an effort to argue the validity of a land conveyance from Croghan, denies the authority of every claim to the region except that of the Iroquois; Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 386-389. The so-called "suffering traders" grant at the Fort Stanwix conference of 1768 was also dependent upon the acceptance of the Iroquois claim as a valid title; in June 1769 William Trent wrote Croghan that the grant

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would be invalidated unless the British government could be convinced on this point. See ibid., 230-231.

[86]Sullivan et al., eds., Willian Johnson Papers, II: 681-682, IX: 310; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 23-24. For a view of the relationship with the Iroquois from the Algonquian nations' point of view, see John Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations Who Once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the Neighbouring States, vol. 12 of Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1881; orig. pub. 1818), esp. the introduction and first chapter.

[87]Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 13 (1905), 143-174, quotation from 166; Col. Recs., V: 438-439; Grenier, ed., Papiers Contrecoeur, 53-58; Hunter, "History of Ohio Valley," 592; Mulkearn, "Half King, Seneca Diplomat," 65-81; Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, 476; Downes, Council Fires, 42-74. The Pennsylvania government also (erroneously) thought of Shingas as a "king" who could control all the Delaware; Weslager, Delaware Indians, 207-210.

[88]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 399-403, 498; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21651), 69, 81; and George Croghan's 1768 address to the Iroquois living at "the two Creeks" [i.e., Mingo Town], in Provincial Record (Minutes of Provincial Council, in Record Group 21 at PHMC, Harrisburg), vol. T, 348-349. See also Bouquet to Gage, 30 Nov. 1764, WLCL, regarding the Mingo.

[89]Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations, ch. 1; Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Zeisberger's History," 34-35, 159-160 (eds.' note). As an example of a Delaware chief speaking for a collection of "Delaware" groups and affiliates such as the Munsee and Mahican, note the role of Teedyuscung at the Easton conference of 1758, Col. Recs., VIII: 174-223; these minutes also illustrate the tension that could arise between the Iroquois and their presumed vassals at such conferences. For resurgent "national" or tribal identity of Delaware and Shawnee, see Goddard, "Delaware," 222; Callender, "Shawnee," 622, 631; Hunter, "History of Ohio Valley," 592.

[90]For comments on the Shawnee see Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 482, 737; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21651), 49-50; (ser. 21653), 133; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 325; Henry Bouquet to Thomas Gage, 30 Nov. 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL.

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[91]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., I: 305-306.

[92]George Croghan to Thomas Gage, 1 Jan. 1770, Gage Papers, WLCL; Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations, 84; Archer Butler Hulbert and William Nathaniel Schwarze, eds., "The Moravian Records, Volume Two: The Diaries of Zeisberger Relating to the First Missions in the Ohio Basin," Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, 21 (1912), 93; Hunter, "History of Ohio Valley," 592; Goddard, "Delaware," 223. The Wyandot are often equated with the Huron. More precisely, they were Tionnontaté (Tobacco) Indians, originally neighbors of the Huron, who with some Huron refugees were displaced from their Ontario homeland by Iroquois aggression in the 17th century. After wandering through much of the Great Lakes region, they settled near Detroit in the very early 18th century, where they called themselves Wyandot. Bruce G. Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660 (Montreal, 1976), 91-94, 777-778, 789, 820-825; Elisabeth Tooker, "Wyandot," in Sturtevant, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, XV: 398-406. The Sandusky area became something of a Wyandot center. By the 1730s and 1740s some Wyandot favored trade connections with the British rather than with the French, and moved as far east as the Muskingum watershed and what is now eastern Ohio.

[93]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, X: 867; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 507-511. In 1767 Venango was a kind of separation point between Seneca lands to the northeast and the country of the "western Indians"; Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Moravian Records, Volume Two," 30.

[94]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 52, 513; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, X: 131-132; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 548-550; Post, "Two Journals," in Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, I: 272, 274-275, 278.

[95]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 160.

[96]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, III: 964. Downes, Council Fires, 93-122, gives a thorough and balanced account of the factors leading to the outbreak; see also Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 114-121. Amherst's policy of restricting presents to the Indians is given primacy in the works of Wilbur R. Jacobs: Diplomacy and Indian Gifts and Dispossessing the American Indian: Indians and Whites on the Colonial Frontier (New York, 1972).

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[97]The major sources of information on Pittsburgh's siege in 1763 are: Bouquet's correspondence; the orderly book in Mary Carson Darlington, ed., Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier (Pittsburgh, 1892), 148-199; and Volwiler, "Trent's Journal."

[98]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, X: 867; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 291; depositions of Gershom Hicks, in William Grant to Gen. Gage, 15 Apr. 1764, 26 Apr. 1764, and Grant to Bouquet, 1 June 1764 (in Bouquet to Gage, 12 June 1764), Gage Papers, WLCL.

[99]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, IV: 148-149, 189, 192-193; X: 133.

[100]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 251; (ser. 21649, pt. 2), 72.

[101]Ibid. (ser. 21634), 232.

[102]Although written originally to absolve the British army from blame in this incident, Bernhard Knollenberg, "General Amherst and Germ Warfare," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 41 (1954), 489-494, taken with the addendum on 762-763 of the same volume, cites the specific documents that make Bouquet's and Amherst's involvement apparent, although there seems to be no surviving written order to Ecuyer or information from him regarding action taken in this matter. Since Bouquet was cautious about letting Ecuyer include information on his garrison strength in their written correspondence during the siege, he clearly feared interception of their letters and may have transmitted the suggestion to Ecuyer orally via a courier. Bouquet's victory over the Indians at Bushy Run en route to Fort Pitt took the spotlight when the siege of Pittsburgh was lifted; smallpox as a factor was not discussed in official British army correspondence. In addition to what Knollenberg cites, see McClure, Diary of David McClure, 92-93; McClure was told in 1772 that the smallpox transfer had been a successful tactic and saved Pittsburgh in 1763. Also Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 2), 9, where Ecuyer makes cryptic reference to the Indians' families being "cut in pieces" in camp while the warriors vainly attacked the fort. The actual effect of the tactic is unknown. The Shawnee were badly hurt by some unidentified disease during 1762, before the outbreak of the war; in 1764 they suffered terribly from smallpox, and the Mingo and the Delaware also reportedly contracted the disease sometime around the "spring" of 1763, although the source for this last information is not entirely trustworthy. Downes, Council Fires, 115n; Sullivan et al., eds., William

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Johnson Papers, IV: 641; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21650, pt. 2), 127; deposition of Gershom Hicks, in William Grant to Gen. Gage, 15 Apr. 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL. It is even possible that the Indians had smallpox among them before Ecuyer tried to infect them.

[103]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 129, 154. (Translation from French by editors of Bouquet Papers.) Bouquet to Gage, 7 June 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[104]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 443; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 213-216.

[105]E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (Albany, 1856-1887), VII: 718-741, 750-758; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 737; Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 41, 114-116; Downes, Council Fires, 108. Guyasuta's name was spelled a variety of ways.

[106]O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, VII: 753-755; George Croghan to Thomas Gage (with enclosure), 12 May 1765, and William Murray to Gage, 12 May 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[107]Bouquet to Gage, 2 May 1764, 15 Nov. 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 516. There is no indication that the Turtle clan's actual leadership permanently changed hands as a result of Bouquet's action; Goddard, "Delaware," 223.

[108]Shawnee statements reported in Wainwright, ed., "Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," 439-444, and Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 4th ser., IX: 411. Wallace's discussion of Iroquois politics in Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 39-44, is particularly informative. John A. Jakle, Images of the Ohio Valley: A Historical Geography of Travel, 1740 to 1860 (New York, 1977), 68, 74, interprets this very loose grouping of largely autonomous units into national or tribal polities bound mostly by kinship lineages as part of a "general breakdown of the Indian's social fabric," "ineffectual," and a circumstance that "greatly contributed to the instability of Indian culture and economy" -- a view which I do not share.

[109]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 154.

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Notes to Chapter 2

[1]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 178-179.

[2]Ibid., 177.

[3]Lt. Col. John Reid's permit allowing John Gibson to settle in Pittsburgh in 1765 is in Misc. Mss., 1744-1859, Northern Interior and Western Counties, p. 163, HSP. See also an example of the renunciation of property rights (1761) printed in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21654), 109, and Bouquet's comments on the petition of John Metcalfe, in Alfred P. James, ed., "The Early Property and Land Title Situation in Western Pennsylvania," WPHM, 16 (1933), 203-204.

[4]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 430-431.

[5]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 54-56; (ser. 21646), 103-108; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 46; Volwiler, ed., "Trent's Journal," 397-399, 403, 411. Stotz, "Defense in the Wilderness," 112, maintains that the lower town was within the fort's outworks, but doubt may be cast on this by Trent's entry of 11 June 1763 (Volwiler, ed., "Trent's Journal," 398). However, Gen. Stanwix mentioned trading houses "within the works" in late 1759; Kimball, ed., Pitt Correspondence, II: 211. See also Brown, Early Maps of Ohio Valley, plate 36, and Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Gazette Publications (Carlisle, Penn., 1806), 12-13.

[6]Bouquet in James, ed., "Early Property Situation," 204; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 126; Volwiler, ed., "Trent's Journal," 397-398; Darlington, ed., Fort Pitt and the Frontier, 155.

[7]Reid to Gage, 24 Aug. 1765, and memorial of John Campbell et al. to Gage, in George Croghan to Gage, 24 Nov. 1772, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[8]Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 21 Dec. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 292; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 45; Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 20. Maps of the site drawn in the 1760s are

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engineers' drawings showing the fort in detail without so much as mentioning the existence of the town, but they do give some information on the topography of the site. See especially those in Stotz, "Defense in the Wilderness," facing 143, 157, 158, and Brown, Early Maps of Ohio Valley, plate 36.

[9]William Murray to Gage, 16 July 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 277, 564; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 6-7, 439; Brackenridge, Gazette Publications, 11.

[10]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 6, 46; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 251; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21646), 56; (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 36-37; Klett, ed., Journals of Charles Beatty, 55-56; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 45-46, 100-101. See also the maps in Stotz, "Defense in the Wilderness," facing 157, 158, 160.

[11]PMHB, 2 (1878), 303-305; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., VII: 422. My comparisons of surnames do not include three men and three female children whose names are largely or totally illegible as printed in the list. Two men each bore the names Sinnott, Reed, Boyle, and Byerly (Biarly); three women had the surname Reed. Of the six women not sharing surnames with any men on the list, some may have been wives or companions of soldiers; for example, Lenora Rogers on the 1760 list could be the spouse of Samuel Rogers, a soldier living outside the fort and listed on the 1761 census discussed below. A statement by Kenny, in Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 28, is ambiguous, but may indicate that there were either 78 inhabitants or 78 houses in the town in 1759.

[12]Versions of this population/house count are in PMHB, 6 (1882), 344-347, and Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21646), 103-108; my statements about the population are based on the latter. The 66 households with women could be counted as 67 if the two females listed under Hugh Crawford's name each occupied one of his two houses. Besides Crawford eleven men were listed as owners of two houses each, while three men were owners of three houses each. Two houses on the list were army hospitals, one was an officers' mess, and another was "the Generals house." In June 1761 Bouquet wrote that he had armed "about 120" inhabitants at Pittsburgh against possible Indian attack; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 430.

[13]Ecuyer's correspondence to Bouquet, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 117, 125-127, 153-155, 175-176; for evidence of "country people," transients, and

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soldiers from other posts, see also ibid. (ser. 21654), 131, 217, and Volwiler, ed., "Trent's Journal." The same difficulty applies to the list of 116 men and officers serving as "militia" in defense of the fort during the crisis, found in Bouquet to Gage, 17 Feb. 1765, and warrants, 11:6, both in Gage Papers, WLCL.

[14]Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 12 Feb. 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 292; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 45; Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 20.

[15]Harry Gordon to Gage, 15 June 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[16]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 168.

[17]In addition to the sources cited in notes 11-13 above, see the list of the lower town's militia in summer 1761, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21645), 265, and petition of inhabitants of Pittsburgh to Gage, 20 Dec. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[18]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 16, 190-191, 200; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 96; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 121. John Campbell reported to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan that he had eighteen whites and three blacks ready to work on a downriver trip for the company; 8 Apr. 1768, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC.

[19]John Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 2 Sept. 1767, 20 Sept. 1767, 5 Oct. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC; John Baynton to _____ Ramsey, 1 Mar. 1768, Etting Collection, I: 49, HSP (printed in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 388-389); Gist journal in Pownall, Topographical Description, 181; Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 87; Col. Recs., VIII: 306; Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Moravian Records, Volume Two," 83; Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Zeisberger's History," 124; Robert L. Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia: The Road to Independence (Charlottesville, Va., 1973-), IV: 189, 195, 209, 218, 222-224.

[20]Theft from stores is mentioned in John Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 27 May 1767, and John Campbell to same, 17 Feb. 1768, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC. For Croghan and Trent's promotion of Bedford see: Penn Mss., Official Corres., vol. IX (1758-1764), p. 188, HSP; Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959), 192.

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[21]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 175-180; (ser. 21653), 260.

[22]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 28.

[23]Ibid., 8-9, 23; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21645), 265; (ser. 21646), 242; (ser. 21653), 372-373; Bouquet to Monckton, 30 June 1761, in Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 430.

[24]Ecuyer to Bouquet, 16 June 1763, Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 154; "Accompt of the Pay Due to the Militia at Fort Pitt," warrants 11:6, Gage Papers, WLCL; Volwiler, ed., "Trent's Journal." For Crawford, see list of traders cut off by the Indians, Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21654), 122-123, and ibid. (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 120-122.

[25]The memorial is dated 20 Dec. 1767, and see Gage to Charles Edmonstone, 16 Jan. 1768, and Edmonstone to Gage, 12 Feb. 1768, all in Gage Papers, WLCL; also John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 11 Nov. 1767 (15 Dec. addendum), Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC.

[26]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 29, 36, 163, 167.

[27]Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 20; Klett, ed., Journals of Charles Beatty, 55, 56, 72; also "Clarkson's Diary," in Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 358-359, mentions Beatty's visit.

[28]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 46, 53-54 (quotations are from 53); Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 45. See also the comments of Christian Frederick Post, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 2), 74. Wainwright, Croghan, 192-193, mentions some of Kenny's observations on the "dissolute" behavior of Pittsburghers that apparently were expunged from the published version of Kenny's diary.

[29]To William Pitt, 20 Nov. 1759, Kimball, ed., Pitt Correspondence, II: 211.

[30]Washington to Fauquier, 28 Nov. 1758, 2 Dec. 1758, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, II: 308-310, 312-315 (quotation from 313); Hugh Mercer to Denny, 8 Jan. 1759, 18 Mar. 1759, Penn Mss., Official Corres., IX: 65, 77, at HSP.

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[31]See the evidence Alfred P. James found in county records and printed in Ohio Company: Inner History; for example, pp. 36-39, 51-53, 61, 65-66, 81. In 1750 Thomas Cresap and others connected with the Ohio Company promised the Indians that they would sell goods cheaper than the Pennsylvanians. Col. Recs., V: 438-440.

[32]George Mercer to Bouquet, 8 Sept. 1759, and to Stanwix, 19 Sept. 1759, in Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 56, 125; see also pp. 75-76, 630, 637.

[33]See John Mercer to Gov. Fauquier, [1759], facsimile Case of Ohio Company, p. 22, in Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, and ibid., 447n. Colonel Bouquet, whom John Mercer accused of collusion with the Pennsylvanians, encouraged Fauquier to send Virginia traders to Pittsburgh: Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 614-615.

[34]Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 292-293. In 1764 Gen. Thomas Gage suggested that Virginians could undercut the Pennsylvanians' advantage by circumventing Pittsburgh with a James River-Kanawha River trade route. Gage to Fauquier, 10 Dec. 1764; to Bouquet, 20 Dec. 1764; Bouquet to Gage, 5 Jan. 1765, all in Gage Papers, WLCL. See also Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 497, 516, 623-626. Lewis Evans described the route as impassable even by horses; Sir William Johnson agreed with Gage's assessment, although neither had traveled the route. See ibid., 623-626, and Evans, Analysis of a Map of the Middle Colonies, 24. Some tentative steps to do as Gage suggested may have been taken late in the decade; John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 18 June 1769, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC.

[35]Two examples of this sort of agreement (from 1780-1781) between John Gibson and Bernard and Michael Gratz of Philadelphia are in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 467-470. The operation of the trade and the importance of credit are very well treated throughout Wainwright, Croghan.

[36]A summary of skins and pelts passing through Fort Pitt in 1767 is in Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, X: 396-397; see also Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 306; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21645), 270; and the Waste Book, 1759-1760, of the Pennsylvania provincial store at Pittsburgh, at Darlington Memorial Library, University of Pittsburgh. For quantities of deer shot by individual Indians or villages see: Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Zeisberger's History," 14; Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Moravian Records, Volume Two," 103; John Lacey,

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"Journal of a Mission to the Indians in Ohio, by Friends from Pennsylvania, July-September, 1773," The Historical Magazine, and Notes and Queries, concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, 2nd ser., 7 (1870), 106.

[37]Comparisons with the southern colonies are difficult since the readily available figures for the southern trade record only the hides shipped to England and do not report the number used within the colonies or shipped between provinces. Neither Georgia nor South Carolina, the major exporters of deer hides, seems to have exported over 100,000 or 150,000 skins in any year of the 1760s. These may have been mostly prime buck hides; the 1767 Pittsburgh total of 178,613 "fall" and 104,016 "summer" skins, cited at the beginning of the previous note, does not specify what proportion of the hides came from bucks. For figures relative to exports from colonies south of Virginia see: Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Durham, N.C., 1928), 109-112, 328-331; John R. Alden, John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier: A Study of Indian Relations, War, Trade, and Land Problems in the Southern Wilderness, 1754-1775 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1944), 17-18; and J. Leander Bishop, A History of American Manufactures from 1608 to 1860 (Philadelphia, 1864), I: 447-449. Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776 (New York, 1955), 75, indicates that Philadelphia had a very well developed leather craft industry by this time; a greater proportion of the Pennsylvania trade's skins may have been turned into finished goods within the colony than was the case in the southern colonies. For summary figures of the Canadian fur trade see Murray G. Lawson, Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775 (Toronto, 1943), 136, and Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (New Haven, Conn., 1930).

[38]C. Willett Cunnington and Phillis Cunnington, Handbook of English Costume in the Eighteenth Century (Boston, 1972), 18, 72, 103, 219, 232, 261; Edward Warwick et al., Early American Dress: The Colonial and Revolutionary Periods (New York, 1965), 83, 89, 214; [Thomas K. Ford], The Leatherworker in Eighteenth-Century Williamsburg, Williamsburg Craft Series (Williamsburg, Va., 1973), 11, 13, 27.

[39]Much information about the trade is in the Waste Book cited in note 36 above, and in the Fort Pitt Daybook, 1765-1767, at HSWP, described in Lawrence S. Thurman, "An Account Book of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan at Fort Pitt, 1765-1767," WPHM, 29 (1946), 141-146. Indians paying more

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than whites for goods is mentioned in Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 33-34, and John Campbell to George Morgan, 20 Mar. 1769, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC.

[40]Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 20 Sept. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC; Max Savelle, George Morgan: Colony Builder (New York, 1932), 37-41.

[41]Harry D. Berg, "Economic Consequences of the French and Indian War for the Philadelphia Merchants," Pa. Hist., 13 (1946), 185-193. Credit was a problem even before the 1760s; see Nicholas Wainwright's description of the early trade ventures of George Croghan and William Trent, in Croghan, 22-46.

[42]To Jno. Byrn, 6 Dec. 1769, in Neville Papers, Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh.

[43]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21648, pt. 2), 89-91; also (ser. 21646), 216; (ser. 21647), 59,61; (ser. 21651), 46; (ser. 21653), 154-155.

[44]William Thompson to Able James, 20 Aug. 1772, Darlington Memorial Library, University of Pittsburgh.

[45]See Wainwright, ed., "Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," 417; Netawelwelaman to commander of Fort Pitt, 24 Sept. 1766, in Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, V: 381-382.

[46]Bouquet to Monckton, 23 March 1761, in Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 401; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21654), 122-123, 125; (ser. 21655), 164-165, 221-222.

[47]Wayne E. Stevens, The Northwest Fur Trade, 1763-1800, vol. XIV, no. 3 of University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences (Urbana, Ill., 1928), 22-30; Jack M. Sosin, The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763-1783 (Albuquerque, N.M., 1967), 11-12; Wainwright, Croghan, 175-176, 182-183, 208-209.

[48]Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 66-67; William Murray to Gage, 28 July 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL; John Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 8 Aug. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC; Robert Callender to Bouquet, 28 Oct. 1761 and 17 Aug. 1762, Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21647), 177; (ser. 21648, pt. 2), 62. It should be noted that for some traders Pittsburgh was out of the way, and they preferred to ship their hides directly east; ibid. (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 17.

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[49]Gage to Murray, 15 July 1766, and Murray to Gage, 10 Nov. 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL. Traders could claim their Illinois peltry was destined for British ships at New Orleans or the British colony of West Florida, but Gage was certain that the skins were sold in New Orleans for attractive prices. Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 117, 119; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 226; E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., The Documentary History of the State of New York (Albany, N.Y., 1849-1851), II: 836-837.

[50]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, X: 396-397.

[51]These generalizations are based in large part on the extensive claims of the "suffering traders" printed in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers; see also Hanna, Wilderness Trail, II: 381-382, and Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21654), 122-123. Details of Thomas Calhoon's operation on the Muskingum in 1762 are in Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 40-41, 59, 64, 66-67.

[52]In 1767 the inhabitants of Pittsburgh estimated the cost of rebuilding the town since 1763 to have been "at least" £7000. While not insignificant, this figure seems a relatively modest fraction of the total value of the trade. See the inhabitants' petition to Gen. Gage, 20 Dec. 1767, in Gage Papers, WLCL.

[53]"Clarkson's Diary," in Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 353; Thurman, "Account Book of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan," 143-144.

[54]John Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 1 May 1767, 10 June 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC. For similar views of batteaumen and trading company laborers see "Clarkson's Diary," in Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 356, and William Murray to Michael Gratz, 15 May 1773, in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 461-462.

[55]G. Morgan to John Baynton, 23 Mar. 1770, and list of batteaumen in Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 1 May 1767 (enclosure), both in Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC; Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 218-219, 328-329.

[56]Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 26 June 1767, 26 July 1767, 8 Aug. 1767, and Abraham Wayne to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 3 July 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC. During the initial push to open the

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Illinois trade his employers pressed Irwin to "use all your address in animating the Men to Work, late and early and spare no proper Quantity of Rum for this End"; Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 384.

[57]Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 31 Aug. 1766, 2 Sept. 1766, 8 Aug. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC; "Clarkson's Diary," in Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 353.

[58]Alvord and Carter, eds., Trade and Politics, 68-69; Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 31 Dec. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC. Irwin maintained that "a Set of prejudiced Men, and Some Villians" were responsible for false accusations against him.

[59]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 26; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21647), 144-149.

[60]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 57; (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 43, 46; (ser. 21653), 44, 48-50; (ser. 21655), 175-180; Wainwright, ed., "Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," 405; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 44; and Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 397. Sir William Johnson's Sept. 1761 regulations for the trade at Fort Pitt are in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 164-165.

[61]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 151-152; (ser. 21653), 134; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 154-155.

[62]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 535-536; Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 11 Aug. 1770, Gage to Edmonstone, 10 Apr. 1771, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[63]Bouquet to Gen. Amherst, 24 May 1762, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 134.

[64]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 167-169, 175, 188, 194-196, 201, 425; Wainwright, ed., "Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," 427-428; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 160; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 468-469, 539-540; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 665-666; and see Wainwright, Croghan, an excellent biography that uses materials not seen by Albert T. Volwiler, George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 1741-1782 (Cleveland, 1926).

[65]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 665.

[66]Klett, ed., Journals of Charles Beatty, 63; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 175, 178; Hugh Mercer to

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Bouquet, 1 Aug. 1759, in Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 479. Croghan's efforts to supplant the Quakers as the long-standing friends of the Delaware were not as successful as he hoped; in 1766 the Delaware at Newcomerstown addressed visiting clergymen as "Dear Brothers the Quakers" in a continuation of the tradition that labeled all sincerely friendly whites from the east as "Quakers." Klett, ed., Journals of Charles Beatty, 69.

[67]Hanna, Wilderness Trail, II: 325-326; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21646), 46, 51-56; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 305-306, 314.

[68]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21646), 60; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 13-14, 18-19, 154, 162-163. Trent, like Croghan, reportedly hoped for "no more Quakerism on this side the Allegheny Mountains"; ibid., 152.

[69]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 2), 34.

[70]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 13, 47, 166, 438; Croghan to Bouquet, 20 Mar. 1762, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 182.

[71]Samuel Wharton to John Baynton, 30 May 1766, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC.

[72]See Gen. Gage's urgings to Gov. Penn, 2 June 1765 and 16 June 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[73]For the Sideling Hill incident see Stephen H. Cutcliffe, "Sideline Hill Affair: The Cumberland County Riots of 1765," WPHM, 59 (1976), 39-53; Wainwright, Croghan, 211-218 (and his citations to the William Johnson Papers), and Gen. Gage's correspondence with Croghan, Johnson, John Reid, Henry Bouquet, John Penn, and William Grant in spring 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL. The initial incident is described in Bouquet to Gage, with enclosures, 16 March 1765.

[74]Croghan to Gage, 6 July 1766; Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Gage, 10 Aug. 1766 (extract in Gage to Johnson, 18 Aug. 1766) and to Col. John Reid, 24 Oct. 1766, all in Gage Papers, WLCL; Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Johnson, 30 Sept. 1766, in Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 201-203 (quote is from p. 202).

[75]Joseph Spear, Daniel Elliot, Alexander Lowrey, John Gibson, Simon and Milligan, and John Boggs to Johnson, 4 Oct. 1766, Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, V: 384-385.

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[76]Gage to William Murray, 8 Mar. 1767, 5 May 1767, 8 June 1767; Murray to Gage, 7 Apr. 1767, 16 May 1767, 1 June 1767; all Gage Papers, WLCL. Sir William Johnson pointed out the difficulty of regulating traders to the earl of Shelburne, 1 Apr. 1767; O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, VII: 914-915.

[77]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, VI: 19-20; John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 11 Nov. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC; petition of inhabitants of Pittsburgh to Gen. Gage, 20 Dec. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[78]Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to John Wilkins, 3 Feb. 1768 (in Wilkins to Gage, 7 Feb. 1768), Gage Papers, WLCL.

[79]20 Mar. 1769, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC.

[80]Croghan to Gage, 26 Apr. 1766, 1 May 1766; Gage to Croghan, 3 May 1766; Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Gage, 26 Apr. 1766; Gage to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 28 Apr. 1766, 3 May 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[81]Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Gage, 7 Mar. 1766, 10 Sept. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[82]Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Gage, 5 July 1766; Gage to Charles Edmonstone, 10 Sept. 1769, and to John Wilkins, 5 May 1768, all in Gage Papers, WLCL. See also in the Gage Papers: Gage to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 28 Dec. 1765, 14 Mar. 1766, 21 Mar. 1766, 19 June 1766, 23 July 1766; Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Gage, 17 Mar. 1766, 22 June 1766, 5 July 1766, 22 Aug. 1766; Edmonstone to Gage, 24 Mar. 1770. And John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 7 Mar. 1769, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC.

[83]Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Gage, 26 Dec. 1765, and to Wilkins, 3 Feb. 1768 (in Wilkins to Gage, 7 Feb. 1768), Gage Papers, WLCL.

[84]George Ross to Bouquet, 6 Apr. 1761, Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21646), 92; Plumsted and Franks to Bouquet, 30 Aug. 1763, ibid., (ser. 21649, pt. 2), 35; William Trent to Bouquet, 30 June 1764, ibid. (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 205.

[85]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 656-657; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21645), 252-254; (ser. 21646), 176; (ser. 21653), 23-24, 60.

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[86]Ibid. (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 82, 88, 89; (ser. 21649, pt. 2), 86; (ser. 21651), 140-141; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, V: 196-198; XII: 107-108.

[87]Savelle, George Morgan, 55-72.

[88]For the "suffering traders" and the Indiana Company, see the Etting Collection, HSP, or Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, a printed version of the Etting manuscripts; also the Indiana Company's case against Virginia in William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts . . . preserved in the Capitol at Richmond . . . (Richmond, 1875-1893), VI: 1-36, and the preface to that volume.

[89]Col. Recs., V: 749.

[90]Hugh Mercer to Henry Bouquet, Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 93.

[91]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 438, 444; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 635-636; III: 9-10, 292-293, 537, 584, 597, 628-632; IV: 42, 70, 220, 254-255, 265; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 173-174; (ser. 21646), 40, 132; Tinling, ed., Byrd Correspondence, II: 694.

[92]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 43, 214; for Pennsylvanians carrying goods and supplies to Fort Pitt in 1759, see the journal of Ensign Caleb Graydon at Fort Littleton, scattered chronologically through the volume in ibid.

[93]Mercer's comment is in ibid., 305. Bouquet's regulation of local retailing is in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 44, and (ser. 21655), 175, 176, 178, 179. Bouquet's action, coupled perhaps with the punishment suffered by the colonial back country during Pontiac's War, may have curtailed the gaggle of independent, small-time enterprisers after 1762 and favored merchants operating more "legitimate" and permanent retail outlets. There is some evidence of "country people" bringing flour to Pittsburgh after 1763 but nothing to indicate there was the same flood of sutlers as in 1759-1762. See Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, II: 232, and John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 28 Oct. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC.

[94]The list is in Etting Collection, I: 36, HSP, and printed in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 167-173; see also Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 27, 39-40;

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John Metcalfe's inventory of losses in James, ed., "Early Property Situation," 201-203; and Fort Pitt Daybook, 1765-1767 (of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan), at HSWP.

[95]Jacob L. Grimm, "Archaeological Investigation of Fort Ligonier, 1960-1965," Annals of Carnegie Museum, 42 (1970), 5-186. Ivor Noël Hume, A Guide to Artifacts of Colonial America (New York, 1969), is a standard reference. The Ligonier information helps fill the void created by the lack of artifact recovery in excavations at Fort Pitt. See James L. Swauger, "Digging Up Fort Pitt," WPHM, 60 (1977), 189; Swauger and Arthur M. Hayes, "Historic Archeology at Fort Pitt, 1953," Annals of Carnegie Museum, 35 (1959), 253-254.

[96]John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 18 June 1769; Campbell reported a shortage of liquor and sugar in the town in his letter of 24 July 1768 and pointed out the seaboard supply connections of local traders on 7 Mar. 1769; all in Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC.

[97]The first quoted phrase is from Devereux Smith to Ephraim Douglass, 22 Feb. 1774, Neville Papers, Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh; the second from William Murray to Gage, 24 Aug. 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL. See also Harry Gordon to Bouquet, 15 Aug. 1759, in Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 564; William Grant to Henry Bouquet, 26 Apr. 1764, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 116; William Murray to Gage, 18 June 1766 and 10 Dec. 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL; John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 28 Oct. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC.

[98]John Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 2 Sept. 1766, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC. Also Ephraim Blaine's list of debts due, Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21654), 256 (and Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 159-160); Fort Pitt Daybook, 1765-1767 (of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan), at HSWP; Business Ledger [1769-1772] (possibly Joseph Douglass') at Darlington Memorial Library, University of Pittsburgh.

[99]Murray to Bouquet, 15 Feb. 1765 and 25 Feb. 1765, both in Bouquet to Gage, 16 Mar. 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL. See also in the Gage Papers: William Murray to Gage, 10 Nov. 1766; Gage to Murray, 18 June 1766, 20 July 1766; and Bouquet to William Grant, 5 Feb. 1764, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 261.

[100]Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 24 Apr. 1770, 11 Aug. 1770, Gage Papers, WLCL; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser.

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21650, pt. 1), 33-34; (ser. 21653), 132; (ser. 21654), 127-129. Thompson's license request was denied but he was allowed to farm as much land adjoining the tanyard as necessary to support his family; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., X: 574-575.

[101]See the ledger (attributed to Joseph Douglass) cited in note 98 above; for Smith's brewing and the presence of others with skilled trades see the Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan daybook cited in the same note.

[102]An example of an account for goods furnished the crown is that of Levy and Trent, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21654), 218-227. Other examples are in the published Bouquet Papers and the Gage Papers. In addition see warrants 11:264-265, 29:51, and 31:49-52, in the Gage Papers, WLCL; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, V: 246-261; XIII: 166.

[103]Ormsby's "Narrative," in Craig, ed., Olden Time, II: 1-5; Lt. Archibald Blane to Bouquet, 21 Apr. 1762, Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 80.

[104]Bouquet's quote is from ibid., (ser. 21653), 245; also see ibid., 220-221, 226, 232-234; and (ser. 21649, pt. 2), 56-57, 65-66; (ser. 21654), 114-121. This William Murray is not to be confused with William Murray, an officer of the 42nd Regiment who commanded at Fort Pitt in the middle 1760s.

[105]July 1760 abstract of return of forces, in Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 637; "Estimate of the Expence of providing the Kings Barracks in North America," [1766], Box 139, Gage Papers, WLCL; Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 512. Maps showing troop distribution in Shy, Toward Lexington, 97, 112, 238, are illustrative also.

[106]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 79; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 191; "Clarkson's Diary," in Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 355; Klett, ed., Journals of Charles Beatty, 54. The units of the Royal Irish Regiment serving on the frontier included a number of "drafts of Ireland," apparently Irish Protestants; John Wilkins to Gage, 16 June 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[107]Bouquet to Amherst, 26 Aug. 1763, Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 249. Also ibid., 99-100; (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 44; (ser. 21653), 89. In addition, Bouquet's letters of July 1761 to Monckton are illustrative of the desertion problem; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 432, 436-437.

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[108]For example, see: Edward G. Williams, ed., "Orderly Book I of Colonel Henry Bouquet's Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, 1764 (Carlisle to Fort Pitt)," WPHM, 57 (1974), 93-94, 96; Gage to Edmonstone, 16 Aug. 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL. To the captain of a detachment of Royal Americans preparing to escort a convoy to Fort Pitt in March 1764 Bouquet advised: "To prevent desertion you will do well to keep your destination a Secret." Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 271.

[109]John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 27 Apr. 1769, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC. See Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21645), 196-197; (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 31, 44; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 33, 42.

[110]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 69; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 418-422; Williams, ed., "Bouquet's Orderly Book, 1764," 84-85, 94-95; William Grant to Gage, 2 Apr. and 15 May 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 19, 28-29.

[111]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 690-691 (editors' note); Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21650, pt. 2), 118-119; (ser. 21654), 80-81, 84; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 164-165; and from the Gage Papers, WLCL: return of provisions, in Murray to Gage, 24 Aug. 1767; general account of provisions at North American posts, 30 Nov. 1763; Edmonstone to Gage, 14 Sept. 1767 and 16 July 1770.

[112]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 579; III: 210-211, 541-542, 590-591; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 138; Grant to Gage, 2 Apr. 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[113]In 1764 Captain William Grant reported that he had 10,000 cabbages planted; he then had to deploy his Highlanders into the garden daily to fend off locusts and grasshoppers. Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 199; (pt. 2), 16-17.

[114]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 186.

[115]See the 1761 population list in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21646), 103-108, and William Potts to Bouquet, 8 Jan. 1763, ibid., (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 4-5.

[116]Tinling, ed., Byrd Correspondence, II: 678. Also Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 665; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21647), 198; (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 103.

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[117]Wharton to John Baynton, 30 May 1766, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC.

[118]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 144; (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 72; (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 79.

[119]Charles Edmonstone to Gen. Gage, 24 Sept. 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL; John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 26 Sept. 1768, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC.

[120]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 4-5, 9, 23, 35, 79. Some officers kept mistresses or entered into some form of liaison with inhabitants' daughters. See ibid., (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 62; (pt. 2), 17; (ser. 21650, pt. 2), 120; (ser. 21651), 178-179. Bouquet considered the women clustered about the garrison "a Colony sprung from Hell for the Scourge of this Place." Ibid., (ser. 21653), 71; also 258-260; (ser. 21650, pt. 2), 156-157; and Williams, ed., "Bouquet's Orderly Book, 1764," 89, 99.

[121]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 96-97; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 15.

[122]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 104, 116; (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 11.

[123]Ibid., (ser. 21653), 92, 111, 124, 126-127. I have followed the editors' translations of those sections I quote which Bouquet wrote in French, as I have done with the Ecuyer quotes cited in the next note.

[124]James Dow to Bouquet, 7 Sept. 1759, in Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 47; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 104; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 8, 106; for Ecuyer's frustration with locals at the time of the 1763 flood, see ibid., 78-79.

[125]Ibid., (ser. 21651), 212; (ser. 21653), 92.

[126]Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 40. The travel time between Carlisle and Pittsburgh is from Heckewelder's journeys in 1789, 1792, and 1793, recorded in the same volume.

[127]A. Hughlett Mason, ed., The Journal of Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon (Philadelphia, 1969), 174; Tinling, ed., Byrd Correspondence, II: 678.

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[128]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 164; John Irwin to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 26 June 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC. The wife of the last royal commandant of Fort Pitt had, in 1772, a bobcat "which she had petted from a kitten," and a wolf and a bear were pets at the post in 1763. McClure, Diary of David McClure, 104, and Darlington, ed., Fort Pitt and the Frontier, 152.

[129]Supposedly burial parties were dispatched to Braddock's Field after the expulsion of the French from Fort Duquesne. Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 613-614; Stotz, "Defense in the Wilderness," 141; and Craig, ed., Olden Time, I: 186-188. According to Jasper Yeates' comments in 1776, some but not all remains were buried in 1758 and after. Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., II: 740-742.

[130]Peter D. Keyser, ed., "Memorials of Col. Jehu Eyre," PMHB, 3 (1879), 303; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 48. Visitors continued to make excursions to Braddock's Field and Grant's Hill to view the evidence of battle, including human remains, through the eighteenth and into the early nineteenth century. See: Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 8, 23, 160; "Clarkson's Diary," in Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 357; Samuel Thornely, ed., The Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774-1777 (London, 1925), 65; Lacey, "Journal of a Mission," 106; Brackenridge, Gazette Publications, 14; [Ebenezer Denny], Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny (New York, 1971; orig. pub. 1859), 117-118; John Hogg Clunn, "March on Pittsburgh, 1794," PMHB, 71 (1947), 61; F. A. Michaux, Travels to the Westward of the Allegany Mountains, in the States of the Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee . . . (London, 1805), 68-69; John Melish, Travels through the United States of America, in the Years 1806 and 1807, and 1809, 1810, and 1811; including an Account of the Passages betwixt America and Britain, and Travels through Various Parts of Britain, Ireland, and Canada (Philadelphia, 1815), II: 49.

[131]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 69-70, 102.

[132]Figures are from Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 698, and the conference minutes in George Croghan to Gen. Gage, 9 May 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[133]The requests of Shingas and Delaware George are in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 109, 261. The most often-quoted description of a syncretic Indian-white in race and appearance is that of Andrew Montour by Count Zinzendorf; see Hanna, Wilderness Trail, I: 223.

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[134]These Indians' names are from: enclosures in George Croghan to Gage, 12 May 1765, and Henry Bouquet to same, 15 Nov. 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 12-13; Volwiler, ed., "Trent's Journal," 399; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 221-222. Anglicized names seem to have been more common among the Delaware than among other prominent nations in the region. Inter-marriage is discussed briefly by Jacobs in Dispossessing the American Indian, 116-117. Information on Moravian activities is in Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder.

[135]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 648; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 87-88.

[136]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 17, 30, 157-158.

[137]See Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 52, 621-624; Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania, 134-138; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 548-550, 744-752; Post, "Two Journals," in Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, I: 272, 274-275, 278, 284-285; Wainwright, ed., "Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," 432-434.

[138]Lists of traders killed or captured are in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21654), 122-123; (ser. 21655), 221-222. Traders knew, as did British officials, of Indian dissatisfaction, but had no "inside" information regarding the real magnitude of the Indians' intentions, and could not be certain that war was imminent.

[139]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 17.

[140]William Murray to Michael Gratz, 15 Sept. 1773, in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 461.

[141]The quotation is from Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 182. For the progress of settlement westward from the Atlantic seaboard see: Herman R. Friis, A Series of Population Maps of the Colonies and the United States, 1625-1790, Mimeographed Publication no. 3 of American Geographical Society (New York, 1940); Fulmer Mood, "Studies in the History of American Settled Areas and Frontier Lines, 1625-1790," Agricultural History, 26 (1952), 16-34; John Florin, "The Advance of Frontier Settlement in Pennsylvania, 1638-1850: A Geographic Interpretation" (M.A. thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1966).

[142]Jakle, Images of the Ohio Valley, 8-9, 65, points out that most white observers of the late 18th century held

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a "utilitarian" view in which the region was "a vast untapped resource base." Jakle emphasizes the importance of contemporaries' perceptions, as does Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., in "Space, Time, Culture, and the New Frontier," Agricultural History, 38 (1964), 21-30.

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Notes to Chapter 3

[1]Post, "Two Journals," in Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, I: 272, 274-275, 278, 284-285; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 548-550.

[2]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 621-624; III: 52, 513; Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania, 134-138; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 27-32.

[3]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 744-752.

[4]By March 1761 Bouquet was refusing applications to settle, and believed that "a Proclamation in the three Provinces to forbid hunting or Settling beyond the Allegheny [Mountains]" was required; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 397. See also his orders regarding the reporting of travelers, the issuing of passes by the commandant, and the prohibition of unlicensed construction at Pittsburgh, May 1761, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 177.

[5]Bouquet's proclamation is in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21655), 178-179; for Treaty of Easton, Col. Recs., VIII: 174-223.

[6]Leonard W. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776 (New York, 1967; orig. pub. 1935), II: 476-478.

[7]My interpretation of British policy leading up to the Proclamation of 1763 follows that in the first three chapters of Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775 (Lincoln, Neb., 1961), which, in its emphasis on British views of security and the importance of the pragmatic measures taken during the war with France, takes issue with the general picture presented by Clarence W. Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics: A Study of the Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments in Imperialism Culminating in the American Revolution, 2 vols. (Cleveland, 1917). See these works for the ministerial politics involved in the formation of British policies also.

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[8]The text of the proclamation is in Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791, 2nd and rev. ed. (Ottawa, 1918), I: pt. 1, 163-168.

[9]Ibid., 131-157, for exchanges among the Lords of Trade and the earls of Egremont and Halifax antecedent to the proclamation; quotation from 139.

[10]Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, II: 94.

[11]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21650, pt. 2), 157; see also ibid., (ser. 21653), 258-260; (ser. 21655), 175-180.

[12]See the orderly book in Darlington, ed., Fort Pitt and the Frontier, 148-199.

[13]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21646), 46; Report on Canadian Archives, 1889 (Ottawa, 1890), Note E, "The Reservation of Indian Lands," 75.

[14]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 51; (ser. 21655), 175-180; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 393, 405; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 28, 47, 154-155. There is no evidence regarding the actual number of instances in which military jurisdiction was brought to bear on civilians, and almost none regarding the process by which it was done.

[15]Jeffery Amherst was particularly scrupulous in 1762 when as commander-in-chief he issued a special warrant allowing Detroit's commandant to try two Indian slaves for the murder of their white master. Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, IV: 95-96; X: 690. Regarding the distinctions in military and civil jurisdiction over spies and rebels, a point which arose at the end of the 1763-1764 Indian war, Gen. Gage relied on his observations of army practice during the suppression of the Jacobites in Scotland; Gage to Bouquet, 15 Oct. 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[16]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 2), 143; (ser. 21646), 216; (ser. 21647), 32, 55, 59; (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 119; (ser. 21648, pt. 2), 27, 89-90; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 170.

[17]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 197; for a marriage performed by the Fort Ligonier commandant, see Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 154.

[18]Darlington, ed., Fort Pitt and the Frontier, 183, 185. Clapham was called "Captain," but at the time of his death was a civilian.

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[19]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 74; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 406.

[20]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 2), 136; Darlington, ed., Fort Pitt and the Frontier, 155, 157.

[21]On the subject of this paragraph, see Frederick Bernays Wiener, Civilians Under Military Justice: The British Practice since 1689 Especially in North America (Chicago, 1967), 1-63, esp. 53-59. Shy, Toward Lexington, 191-231, studies the army's regulatory role in North America during the 1760s, dealing with this and other aspects of the subject. Peter Marshall, "Imperial Policy and the Government of Detroit: Projects and Problems 1760-1774," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2 (1974), 153-189, examines the matter in reference to another British post, and does a good job of assessing the importance of both local factors and imperial policies.

[22]Quotations are from Gage to Bouquet, 14 May 1764, and Bouquet to Gage, 20 May 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL. See also: Gage to Bouquet, 22 May 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL; Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 24-25; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, IV: 355, 425-426, 439; XI: 201.

[23]Gage to Bouquet, 23 Dec. 1763, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[24]Wiener, Civilians Under Military Justice, 66-68; Shy, Toward Lexington, 163-199. This rule expanded the provisions of the 1763 proclamation only in that it allowed officers to arrest those committing crimes in the reserved tract as well as criminals fleeing there from the colonies.

[25]Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 43-46.

[26]The Bouquet-Fauquier-Amherst correspondence on this subject, all of it from 1762, is in Report on Canadian Archives, 1889 (Ottawa, 1890), Note E, "The Reservation of Indians Lands," 73-77.

[27]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21645), 207, 215-216, 231, 249; (ser. 21653), 47; Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 389. Bouquet wanted the man taken to Bedford, where a sheriff could easily come for him, but apparently the creditors insisted on Ft. Cumberland instead.

[28]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21653), 148-149.

[29]Henry Bouquet to Thomas Gage, 22 Dec. 1764; Gov. Horatio Sharpe to Bouquet, 11 Jan. 1765 (copy in Bouquet to Gage, 22 Feb. 1765); Gage to Bouquet, 4 Mar. 1765; same

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to same, 21 Mar. 1765, all in Gage Papers, WLCL. Ironically, in Oct. 1764 Sharpe had written the Lords of Trade suggesting that provincial courts be empowered to deal with trade disputes of over £10 value and any capital offenses arising in the Indian reservation. William Hand Browne, ed., Correspondence of Governor Horatio Sharpe, vol. III, 1761-1771 (vol. 14 of Archives of Maryland) (Baltimore, 1895), 179-180.

[30]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: facing 958; XII: facing 38.

[31]Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 48-49.

[32]Fauquier to Gage, 28 Jan. 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21651), 17; Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 106-107.

[33]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21648, pt. 2), 144-145; also 102-103; (ser. 21634), 101, 112. Bouquet was likely urged on by George Croghan, who as Indian agent for the area worked hard to assert his own control over Indian affairs to the exclusion of any involvement by Pennsylvania.

[34]Bouquet to Gage, 20 May 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL. Indian department superintendent William Johnson also was reluctant to be too conservative about the probable extent of the Penn claims; see his to Gage of 3 May 1766 in Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, V: 198-200.

[35]Penn's proclamation opening trade is in Col. Recs., IX: 264-266.

[36]Gage to Hillsborough, 1 Apr. 1769, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 223; Gage to Charles Edmonstone, 25 Mar. 1769, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[37]Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 100.

[38]Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., IX: 397; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 66-67; (ser. 21646), 82; (ser. 21647), 175; (ser. 21648, pt. 1), 25, 66-67, 69-70, 75-76; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 152; Wainwright, ed., "Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," 423. The murder of two whites in 1762 exacerbated Bouquet's frustration over the Redstone situation.

[39]There is almost no evidence regarding the ease or difficulty of obtaining permission to settle. Sergeant Angus McDonald at Redstone reported to Col. Henry Bouquet in 1761: "There is Some People who wants to Plant Corn

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Some Says they had Leave from your honour Some from General monckton Some others from Sir Jno. St Clair If your honour have any orders In Reguard to that I Should be glad to Know." Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21646), 71. Military permits also became the basis for land claims later despite the army's disavowal that any title to the soil was transferred by such a permit; see James Veech, The Monongahela of Old; or, Historical Sketches of South-Western Pennsylvania to the Year 1800 (Pittsburgh, 1892), 81-82.

[40]Historians of the upper Ohio Valley treat the subject of early settlement: Solon J. Buck and Elizabeth H. Buck, The Planting of Civilization in Western Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh, 1939), 139-141; Alfred P. James, "The First English-Speaking Trans-Appalachian Frontier," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 17 (1930), 55-71; Veech, Monongahela of Old, 78-88, who continued a project begun by another researcher and left it unfinished himself; and Alexander Scott Withers, Chronicles of Border Warfare, or, a History of the Settlement by the Whites, of North-Western Virginia: and of the Indian Wars and Massacres, in that Section of the State, etc. (Cincinnati, 1895; orig. pub. 1831), which, judging from the corrections made in footnotes by Reuben G. Thwaites and Lyman Draper, contains many errors. Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 80, has settlement of the Monongahela Valley beginning too late (1772) and consequently developing too quickly. See also: Evans, Analysis of a Map of the Middle Colonies, 2; State of the British and French Colonies in North America, 37; and Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, I: 276-282.

[41]Croghan to Gage, 26 May 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL; Johnson to Gage, 24 Nov. 1767, in O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of New York, II: 886.

[42]William Murray to Gage, 24 June 1767; "List of inhabitants dweling at Redstone," in same to same, 27 Feb. 1767; Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 24 Jan. 1768, all Gage Papers, WLCL. Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VII: 6079; Col. Recs., IX: 509. Baynton and Wharton to Lauchlin Macleane, 9 Oct. 1767, in Alvord and Carter, eds., Trade and Politics, 85.

[43]Harry Gordon to Gage, 4 June 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[44]Gage to Charles Edmonstone, 24 Nov. 1767; Edmonstone to Gage, 24 Jan. 1768; Gage to Govs. Penn and Fauquier, 7 Dec. 1767; William Trent to George Croghan, 15 Mar. 1766 (in Croghan to Gage, 23 Mar. 1766), all in Gage Papers, WLCL; Alvord and Carter, eds., New Regime, 582; Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 142, 152. During a western

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trip in 1770 George Washington noted that Indians on the Ohio River used the term "Virginians" to refer to "all the People settled upon Redstone &ca.," Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 297.

[45]Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 44-45, provides an excellent and succinct summary of the role of revenge in Iroquois warfare that is generally applicable to all Indian nations in the upper Ohio watershed at the time.

[46]Wainwright, ed., "Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," 365; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, X: 135. Provincial soldiers and officers, through habitual use of "indiscreet Expressions concerng. Indians" and by taking scalps of Indians killed during war, demonstrated the attitudes that so easily led to personal violence between the two groups. See ibid., XI: 247, and Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 10.

[47]For some examples see: Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, III: 734; X: 452-453, 460, 543-544; Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 38, 160, 162.

[48]Bouquet to Gage, 22 Dec. 1764, same to same, 19 May 1765, Lt. Col. John Reid to Gage, 18 June 1765, all in Gage Papers, WLCL; also Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21651), 205; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 796-797, 833-834, 861-862.

[49]To Gage, 22 Dec. 1764, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[50]Charles Grant to Bouquet, 9 Mar. 1765, and Robert Callender to same, 11 Mar. 1765, in Bouquet to Gage, 16 Mar. 1765; Lt. Col. John Reid to Gage, 1 June 1765, with enclosure; same to same, 4 June 1765, all in Gage Papers, WLCL. Reid and other officers were particularly incensed at the army's treatment at the hands of the "Black Boys," and clamored for an opportunity to exact "satisfaction." See Reid's letters cited in this note, plus his to Gage of 7 June 1765, 9 July 1765, and 13 Sept. 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[51]Penn's letter to his uncle, 16 Mar. 1765, is in Penn Mss., Official Corres., vol. X (1765-1771), HSP; Gage to Penn, 13 Dec. 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL. See also in the Gage Papers: Gage to Penn, 16 June 1765, and Gage to Reid, 9 June 1765.

[52]Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan to Gage, 7 Mar. 1766, and Gage to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 10 Mar. 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL.

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[53]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 40; Wainwright, ed., "Croghan's Journal, 1759-1763," 420-421; and Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 82. Apparently this action was taken on the basis of complaints by the Shawnee and by William Clapham, who was overseeing and developing for George Croghan lands southeast of Pittsburgh claimed by Croghan by virtue of a private cession from the Iroquois in the 1740s.

[54]Thomas Rutherford to Henry Bouquet, 30 Apr. 1765, in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21651), 205; Gage to Johnson, 8 July, in Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 834.

[55]O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of New York, II: 890. See also ibid., 849; John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 10 Nov. 1767, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC; and from the Gage Papers, WLCL: Croghan to Gage, 16 Mar. 1766, 23 Mar. 1766 (with encl. of Wm. Trent to Croghan, 15 Mar.), 17 June 1766; Gage to Croghan, 21 Mar. 1766; William Murray to Gage, 27 Feb. 1767, 24 Apr. 1767.

[56]The path ran west of the Monongahela River at the present south border of Pennsylvania, and there Mason and Dixon ended their boundary survey in autumn 1767; Mason, ed., Journal of Mason and Dixon, 187. For friction along this path, see: Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 976, XII: 115-117; Murray to Gage, 24 Apr. 1767, 1 June 1767, proclamation of 10 June 1767 enclosed in same to same, 24 June 1767, Croghan to Gage, 26 May 1766, all in Gage Papers, WLCL.

[57]Gage's order to Murray was 13 Apr. 1767, in Gage Papers, WLCL. Transient hunters from the Virginia-Maryland frontiers increased the problem of enforcement.

[58]See Gage to Murray, 7 July 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL; Gage expressed these views elsewhere as well.

[59]William Murray to Gage, 24 June 1767, Murray's proclamation of 15 Feb. 1767, in same to same, 27 Feb. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 251-252.

[60]Murray's actions of June 1767 were the strongest to date, but settlers were returning to the area as soon as he turned his back and returned to Pittsburgh. Murray to Gage, 2 Aug. 1767; Gage to Charles Edmonstone, 24 Nov. 1767; Edmonstone to Gage, 24 Jan. 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[61]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, V: 201; XII: 112, 296.

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[62]Gage to Francis Fauquier, and to John Penn, 2 July 1766, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[63]Provincial Record (i.e., Minutes of Provincial Council), vol. T, 117 (in Record Group 21 at PHMC, Harrisburg, and available on microfilm; cited hereafter as Pa. Council Minutes); (also Col. Recs., IX: 324-325); Gage to Murray, 8 Mar. 1767, and Murray to Gage, 7 Apr. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[64]Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 163.

[65]Ibid., 142; Gage to John Wilkins, 22 Feb. 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL. In November 1767 Gage wrote Johnson that "those Lands I understand are claimed by Pensilvania and Virginia, or I should use less Ceremony with them [the squatters]." Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 380.

[66]Col. Recs., XI: 321, 327-328; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 255.

[67]Quote from Penn to Fauquier, 15 Nov. 1766, Col. Recs., IX: 344; also: ibid., 349-350; Pa. Arch., 4th ser., III: 329-332; Penn to Gage, 15 Dec. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[68]See his letter to both governors, 7 Dec. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL; also letters to Johnson, in Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 376-380, and to the earl of Shelburne, 22 Jan. 1768, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 157. Shelburne's 1766 instructions to Gage on the matter are in ibid., II: 45.

[69]Murray to Gage, 16 May 1767; Croghan to Gage, 3 June 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL. Also Croghan to Gage, 15 June 1766, Gage to Murray, 18 May 1766, 28 June 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XIII: 446.

[70]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 251-252; Murray to Gage, 24 June 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[71]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, VI: 5; XII: 277-278, 367; "Clarkson's Diary," in Alvord and Carter, eds., The New Regime, 357; O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of New York, II: 849; O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, VII: 895; Fauquier to Murray, 12 Apr. 1767 (in Murray to Gage, 16 May 1767), Gage Papers, WLCL; Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 213-214.

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[72]See n 8 above for 1763 proclamation. Also: Gipson, British Empire before the American Revolution, XI: 443-444, and particularly Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, ch. V and VI, esp. pp. 121-164.

[73]Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 31-32; Croghan to Gage, 18 Oct. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[74]Ironically, he expressed these views to Sir William Johnson: Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 376-380 (quote from 379). Gage also believed that there would be more friction with the Indians, no matter where the boundary of settlement nominally lay, unless statutory protection of Indians' rights to property and person was enacted by the provinces and strictly enforced in the west. Gage to Shelburne, 22 Jan. 1768, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 157.

[75]John Wilkins to Gage, 18 Feb. 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[76]John Pendleton Kennedy, ed., Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1766-1769 (Richmond, 1906), 69, 113, 123, 129; William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia (Richmond, 1809-1823), VIII: 252-253.

[77]John Blair to Gage, 25 Apr. 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL; Kennedy, ed., Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1766-1769, 149. Blair acted as governor following Fauquier's death. See also his address to the burgesses urging stronger enforcement of law against the "Banditti" in the west, ibid., 141-142. It should be noted also that in 1766 Fauquier claimed that he had issued not one but three proclamations against the squatters; Col. Recs., IX: 349.

[78]Thomas Penn to William Johnson, 7 Sept. 1764, in Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XI: 347-348; Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 116-117, 147-149. (The provincial council records may also be followed in Col. Recs., IX.)

[79]J. Penn to assembly, 5 Jan. 1768, Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 207-208.

[80]Gage to Penn, 7 Dec. 1767, ibid., 202-204.

[81]Regarding Galloway's strength in the house on this matter see his 9 Oct. 1767 letter to Benjamin Franklin in Leonard W. Labaree et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven, Conn., 1959-), XIV: 276. The outstanding study of the efforts to displace proprietary government is Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics, 1746-1770,

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which on 216-229 discusses the Galloway group's last efforts in this regard. However, Hutson's discussion of the events of 1768 focuses on the response to the Townshend Acts and does not cover the assembly's use of the western issue as a tactic; nor does Hutson recognize the importance of the western interests of Galloway, Franklin, and friends to their political actions in the late 1760s and early 1770s.

[82]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 209-213, 233-234, 277-286; Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VII: 6179-6180.

[83]Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, ch. VI, "Shelburne and the Lobbyists," points out the crucial role of these speculators in the change of royal policy that came in 1768. Galloway, Thomas Wharton, and Croghan pressed Franklin in fall 1767 to bring the "Indian boundary" issue to the ministry's attention; Labaree et al., eds., Papers of Franklin, XIV: 273-274, 324-326. Croghan explicitly pointed out the need for a new boundary before their western schemes could advance; ibid., XV: 42-44. Pennsylvania's assembly also instructed Franklin to pursue the matter; Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VII: 6104-6106.

[84]It is difficult to believe that Galloway's 10 Mar. 1768 letter to Franklin, decrying the situation and stating that he would remove from the colony if not for his property there, was meant as anything except propaganda for Franklin's use in his efforts with the ministry; Labaree et al., eds., Papers of Franklin, XV: 71-73, 99.

[85]21 Jan. 1768, Penn. Mss., Official Corres., vol. X (1765-1771), 126, HSP. Word of the Stump murders came to the governor and council on 19 Jan.: Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 215-221. The course of the affair and the government's actions may be followed in that volume or in the transcribed records as they appear in Col. Recs., IX.

[86]Charles Edmonstone to Thomas Gage, 12 Feb. 1768, George Croghan to Gage, 17 Feb. 1768 and 1 Mar. 1768 (with encl. of A. McKee to Croghan, 13 Feb.), in Gage Papers, WLCL. The word on the Ohio was that Stump scalped his victims; Croghan informed Gage that the soothing of Indian tempers, frequently possible in cases of drunken or accidental murder, would be virtually impossible in this instance since the Native Americans viewed scalping "as a Declaration of War."

[87]Details of the rescue are in Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 252-255; see also 245, 248-250.

[88]To Jno. Wilkins, 22 Feb. 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL.

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[89]The act, signed into law early in February 1768, is in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 283-285; discussions between governor and assembly regarding the bill are in Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 209-213, 229-230, 235-238. Penn mentioned his intention to seek such a bill in his letter to Gen. Gage, 15 Dec. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[90]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 287-290; proclamation and instructions to John Steel, John Allison, Christopher Lemes, and James Potter also printed in Pa. Arch., 4th ser., III: 383-386.

[91]The commissioners' report is in Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 316-319; the transcription in Col. Recs., IX: 506-510, differs from the original only in punctuation and capitalization.

[92]For reasons that are not clear the commissioners chosen by the assembly declined to serve, and Galloway told Penn to appoint his own, so the governor sent John Allen and Joseph Shippen, Jr., the provincial secretary, to the conference. See Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 270-271, 273-274, 299, 301-303. The region was aware of an impending conference by March--Croghan to Gage, 14 Apr. 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[93]Minutes of the Apr.-May 1768 conference at Fort Pitt are in Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 324-356; quotations from Tohonissahgarawa (of the Six Nations) and Nymwha (a Shawnee) are from 338, 339. Conference minutes also in: Col. Recs., IX: 514-543; Croghan to Gage, 9 May 1768 (encl.), Gage Papers, WLCL; and Penn. Mss., Indian Affairs, vol. III, at HSP. Downes, Council Fires, 139-141, discusses the conference and the differing attitudes of Iroquois and Ohio Valley Indians toward white incursion into the area.

[94]Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 7 May 1768, Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh; also to Gage, 9 May 1768, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[95]Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 165-180, particularly emphasizes the role of the prospective speculators in bringing about and shaping the consequences of the new cession made at Ft. Stanwix. Other important treatments of the subject: Gipson, British Empire before the American Revolution, XI: 443-449; Alvord, Mississippi Valley in British Politics, II: 64-78; Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Western Lands and the American Revolution (New York, 1959), 31-38.

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[96]Col. Recs., IX: 552-553, 555, 568-569; Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VII: 6362.

[97]Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VII: 6388.

[98]Enclosure in Edmonstone to Gage, 10 Sept. 1769, and Gage to Edmonstone, 8 Oct. 1769, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[99]Downes, Council Fires, 141-144.

[100]John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 1 Aug. 1769, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC: William Johnson to Lord Hillsborough, 26 Aug. 1769, in Alvord and Carter, eds., Trade and Politics, 590; Edmonstone to Gage, 15 Aug. 1769 and 20 Sept. 1769, and Gage to Edmonstone, 24 Aug. 1769 and 8 Oct. 1769, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[101]Croghan to Gage, 8 Aug. 1770 (with enclosure of Croghan's journal), and 20 Sept. 1770; Gage to Croghan, 22 Aug. 1770, Gage Papers, WLCL. Also Gage to Hillsborough, 8 Sept. 1770, in Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 268-269. Croghan blamed much of the immediate difficulty on the widespread circulation of liquor, the primary article traded for skins since the instigation of colonial non-importation policies. He suggested that the Indians not trade for liquor, but failed to suggest how they participate in the trade otherwise. Gage agreed that liquor was a factor contributing to the violence between whites and Indians. In August 1770 the Shawnee displayed for Croghan sixteen wampum belts -- most of them black, the color symbolizing war -- that they said they had received from the French and other Indian nations agitating against the English.

[102]Gage to Penn and Fauquier, 7 Dec. 1767, Gage Papers WLCL. Penn brought up some of the practical limitations to enforcing any such laws in his to Gage, 15 Dec. 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[103]Shy, Toward Lexington, 223-231. Gage doubted the ability of the provinces to regulate the west after the revision of the limits on settlement; in autumn 1767 he continued to believe that a royal colony with "a Military Government" was "the only Expedient of having either Laws or Rules and Regulations duely observed, or the King's orders obeyed." Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 376-377.

[104]The theft or taking up of some horses between Redstone Creek and the Cheat River by a group of Mingo hunters instigated this reaction: the attack did not materialize. William Murray to Gage, 16 May 1767, Gage Papers, WLCL.

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[105] Col. Recs., IX: 507 (Redstone sermon); William Murray to Gage, 27 Feb. 1767, and Charles Edmonstone to Gage, 10 Sept. and 20 Sept. 1769, Gage Papers, WLCL. It must be stressed that there is only scant evidence regarding the internal workings of society at Pittsburgh or elsewhere in the region during this period.

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Notes to Chapter 4

[1]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 412; Dunmore to Dartmouth, 18 Mar. 1774, in K. G. Davies, ed., Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series) (Shannon, Ireland, 1972-1981), VIII: 65; Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 203-204; Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 9 Dec. 1773, PMHB, 15 (1891), 437; memorial to Congress from "Inhabitants of the Country West of the Alleghenny Mountains," in Society Misc. Collec., Box 4 (Petitions), folder 4b-#2, HSP (printed in Boyd Crumrine, ed., History of Washington County, Pennsylvania, with Biographical Sketches of Many of its Pioneers and Prominent Men [Philadelphia, 1882], 187-188).

[2]Morgan to Abel James, 8 Nov. 1773, Robert Lettis Hooper, Jr., to John Baynton, 14 May 1772, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 119; Lacey, "Journal of a Mission," 107; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 323. A visitor to the region in the summer of 1772 recorded this comment: "At this time many of the inhabitants were near a famine, occasioned by the multitudes lately moved into this new country." Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 29.

[3]Charles Edmonstone to Gen. Gage, 17 May 1772, Gage Papers, WLCL; John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 27 Apr. 1769, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC.

[4]William Crawford to Washington, 29 Sept. 1767, George Washington Papers, Library of Congress (Presidential Papers Microfilm), ser. 4. (This collection will be cited hereafter as Washington Papers.) Much of the information about the region's settlements in the early-to-mid 1770s comes from the journals and travel accounts of itinerant clergymen: see McClure, Diary of David McClure, Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, and the copies of John McMillan's diary and journal at the library of Washington and Jefferson College, Washington, Pa., and of his journal and autobiography at HSP.

[5]William Crawford to George Washington, 1 May 1772, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 22, 29, 31; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with

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Heckewelder, 107-108; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 297; Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 97.

[6]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 112.

[7]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 152-155, report surname analysis based on the 1790 census; W. E. Mockler, "Surnames of Trans-Allegheny Virginia, 1750-1880," Names, 4 (1956), 1-17, 96-118, points out (pp. 9-13) the problems associated with distinguishing traditional English surnames from many lowland Scottish, anglicized Irish, and Welsh names, and gives his own figures for Monongalia County, Virginia, during the period of the Revolution.

[8]Buck and Buck, on the basis of the 1790 census, draw such a conclusion (Planting of Civilization, 152-155). See also Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 142-143. Yet, on the basis of points brought out by Mockler in his study of Monongalia County ("Surnames of Trans-Allegheny Virginia," 11-13), Pennsylvania and New Jersey may have outweighed Maryland and Virginia as origins for settlers of that county, most of which fell within what is now West Virginia. Mockler's conclusions show the difficulty of definitely separating a "Virginia" population from a "Pennsylvania" group in the region. There are arguably problems with both Mocker's and the Bucks' studies, which leaves the question an open one.

[9]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 105-107, 112 (quote from 106). Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 142-143, also stated that settlers from Maryland and Virginia, generally English in background, were more "rough and tumble" than the Scotch Irish.

[10]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 152, give a figure of 12% Germans for the region based on the 1790 census, but this includes Bedford County, Pa., which lies east of Laurel Hill and had an extremely high proportion of Germans (32%) compared to the figures for Allegheny (4%), Washington (5%), Fayette (11%), and Westmoreland (10%). Mockler found 9% Germans and 1% Dutch in Monongalia County during the Revolution; "Surnames of Trans-Allegheny Virginia," 11. For an example of concentrations of Germans --and of the retention of Germanic signatures -- see the 1774 petitions to Gov. Penn concerning defense, in Records of the Proprietary Government (Record Group 21), Exec. Corres., items 2900 and 2901, PHMC, printed in Pa. Arch., 6th ser., XIV: 296-298, 300-301. A summary based on county histories and similar works is Homer T. Rosenberger, "Migrations of the Pennsylvania Germans to Western Pennsylvania," WPHM, 53 (1970), 319-335, 54 (1971), 58-76.

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[11]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 146, 152, 279-280, report 880 slaves and 145 free blacks in Bedford, Westmoreland, Washington, Fayette, and Allegheny Counties in 1790, out of a total population of around 75,000. For an illustration of national and ethnic diversity in the region see also Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 87.

[12]For example, see maps in Friis, Series of Population Maps, fig. 2, and Henry Glassie, Pattern in the Material Folk Culture of the Eastern United States (Philadelphia, 1968), figs. 7-9 (pp. 37-39). Hans Kurath, A Word Geography of the Eastern United States (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1949), finds the upper Ohio Valley to be part of a "Midland" zone originating in Pennsylvania. The upper Ohio Valley was the first zone west of the mountains in which one could say a "southern" stream ran into a "middle colony" stream, a process that (for later years and with different areas of origin) is the subject of Richard Lyle Power, Planting Corn Belt Culture: The Impress of the Upland Southerner and Yankee in the Old Northwest, Indiana Historical Society Publications, vol. 17 (Indianapolis, 1953).

[13]Forty-eight privates worked on the demolition of the fort's works; warrants 34:76, Gage Papers, WLCL. The closing of the post is also covered in two works by John W. Huston: "The British Evacuation of Fort Pitt, 1772," WPHM, 48 (1965), 317-329, and the latter portions of "Fort Pitt, 1758-1772" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1957).

[14]Thomas Gage to Isaac Hamilton, 24 Feb. 1772; Gage to Charles Edmonstone, 10 May 1772 and 31 Aug. 1772; Edmonstone to Gage, 23 Mar. 1772, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[15]The commissary department first called Gage's attention to Ross' conduct as the contractors' agent in summer 1770; for details, including the 1772 attempt to dump excess supplies at Fort Pitt, see correspondence between Gage and Edmonstone beginning with Gage's of 24 Aug. 1770, plus: Gage to Isaac Hamilton, 22 Sept. 1771, 8 Dec. 1771, 14 Mar. 1772; Hamilton to Gage, 18 Nov. 1771; George Croghan to Gage, 29 Aug. 1771; and extract of letter from the deputy commissary at Pittsburgh to the commissary general, 3 Mar. 1772 (Box 139, Proclamations and Documents); all in Gage Papers, WLCL.

[16]Alexander Ross to William Thompson, 24 Nov. 1772, in WPHM, 5 (1922), 253; George Croghan to Gage, 24 Nov. 1772 (with enclosed petition), Gage to Edmonstone, 17 Dec. 1772, Edmonstone to Gage, 24 Dec. 1772, and Gage to Croghan, 13 Feb. 1773, all Gage Papers, WLCL. The warrants section

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of the Gage Papers contains records of the sales of engineers' and ordnance stores, which were public sales with a number of buyers present.

[17]Edmonstone to Gage, 24 Dec. 1772; warrants 34:72, 34:76, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[18]Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 341; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 457-458; ibid., 8th ser., VIII: 6914, 6918-6919, 6930-6931, 6936, 6941, 6956-6957; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 101; Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), 12 Nov. 1772; Gage to Edmonstone, 2 Nov. 1772, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[19]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. T, 184, vol. U, 122; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IX: 790-791. The five were Arthur St. Clair, William Crawford, Thomas Gist, Dorsey Pentecost, and James Milligan, who was the only one living at Pittsburgh. The others were scattered from the Monongahela to Ligonier.

[20]Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VII: 6319-6320, 6489, 6490, 6492-6493, 6499, 6505, VIII: 6623, 6664; James T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders, eds., The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801 (Harrisburg, 1896-1915), VIII: 46-52, 228-230.

[21]Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VIII: 6819, 6924, 6934, 6935, 6965-6966; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, VIII: 314-320. Hannastown was five miles northeast of Greensburg, the present seat of Westmoreland County.

[22]Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VIII: 6724, 6896, 7024, 7148, 7302.

[23]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 251-252; Charles Edmonstone to Gen. Gage, 11 Sept. 1771 (with enclosures), Gage Papers, WLCL.

[24]Pa. Arch., 3rd ser., III: 276-278; IV: drafts no. 5, 15, 30, 48, 50; William R. Shepherd, "The Land System of Provincial Pennsylvania," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1895 (Washington, D.C., 1896), 117-125; an overview of the Pittsburgh manor's history is Henry Oliver Evans, "The Penns' 'Manor of Pittsburgh,'" WPHM, 27 (1944), 116-128.

[25]Thomas Gage to Charles Edmonstone, 17 Apr. 1769, Gage Papers, WLCL.

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[26]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 435, 454-455, 560-561. (The item on 560-561 is misdated in the volume as 1774 -- it clearly belongs soon after Arthur St. Clair's letter to Joseph Shippen, Jr., of 18 July 1772, printed in ibid., 546-547, and which is also misplaced among documents of 1774.)

[27]Ibid., 424-427.

[28]An unsigned copy of the 23 June 1772 agreement is in Records of the Proprietary Government (Record Group 21), PHMC.

[29]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 546-547.

[30]Ibid., 435; Hooper to William Franklin, 15 Sept. 1772, Etting Papers, Misc. Mss., I: 145, HSP.

[31]The Jan. 1772 petition of some Bedford County inhabitants to the Pennsylvania assembly is illustrative of this sentiment. Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VIII: 6751-6752.

[32]Ibid., 6660, 6661, 6790, 6911, 7002, 7018, 7121, 7125, 7192-7193, 7277, 7279, 7281-7282, 7560, 7562-7563; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, VIII: 380. Northumberland County was on the northern frontier of the colony.

[33]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 424-425, 437, 546-547, 560-561.

[34]The vocal advocate of obedience to Pennsylvania authority was George Wilson, who lived near the mouth of the Cheat River; see ibid., 426-427, 546-547.

[35]Ibid., 452-453; Cresap to Thomas Wharton, 15 Nov. 1771, printed in Kenneth P. Bailey, Thomas Cresap, Maryland Frontiersman (Boston, 1944), 212-213.

[36]James, Ohio Company: Inner History, 122-123; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, VI: 18-20, XII: 277-278; O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of New York, II: 849; O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, VII: 895; Fauquier to Gage, 1 Sept. 1764, and to William Murray, 12 Apr. 1767 (in Murray to Gage, 16 May 1767), Gage Papers WLCL; Bailey, Cresap.

[37]Devereux Smith to Thomas Bond, Jr., 17 July 1769, in unbound Isaac Craig papers, Craig Collection, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; William Crawford to George Washington, 29 Dec. 1773 (with enclosed map), Washington Papers, ser. 4;

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a map showing the location and extent of Croghan's claims via Indian purchases is in Wainwright, Croghan, facing 281.

[38]Crawford to Washington, 15 Mar. 1772 and 1 May 1772, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 425. Also: Crawford to Washington, 2 Aug. 1771, 12 Nov. 1773, and Croghan to Washington, 18 Aug. 1771, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Washington to Croghan, 24 Nov. 1770, 21 Oct. 1771, and to Crawford, 24 Nov. 1770, Washington Papers, ser. 5, IV: 138-140, 146; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 295; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, VII: 1132; Wainwright, Croghan, 275-277.

[39]The best treatment of the Vandalia project as it relates to the controversy surrounding Pennsylvania's western boundary is Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 181-210.

[40]Wainwright, Croghan, 279.

[41]Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 7 June 1771, 29 July 1772, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Croghan to John Baynton, 29 July 1772, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, General Corres., PHMC; Croghan to George Washington, 18 Aug. 1771, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Alexander McKee to Thomas Gage, 26 Nov. 1772, Gage Papers, WLCL; Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 15 Oct. 1773, 9 Dec. 1773, in PMHB, 15 (1891), 434-437.

[42]Robert Lettis Hooper, Jr., to John Baynton, 14 May 1772, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC.

[43]See the agreement of the settlers west of Laurel Hill, 23 June 1772, in Records of the Proprietary Government (Record Group 21), PHMC; and Robert Lettis Hooper, Jr., to William Franklin, 15 Sept. 1772, Etting Collec., Misc. Mss., I: 145, HSP.

[44]Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 189-190, for the merger of the two companies' efforts. Cresap was in London in 1770 and was briefed on the Vandalia scheme then. Bailey, Cresap, erred in his contention that Cresap never really joined forces with the Walpole group, but coincidentally paralleled their efforts on his own behalf.

[45]Thomas Cresap to Thomas Wharton, 15 Nov. 1771, in Bailey, Cresap, 212-213; Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 196-198. Contrary to Sosin's conclusion, I think that it was Thomas Cresap and not his son Michael who helped Croghan with these measures, although Michael certainly may have been involved also.

[46]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 547.

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[47]Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, II: 156, 205-210.

[48]Washington to Lord Botetourt, 5 Oct. 1770, Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, III: 27; Washington to George Mercer, 7 Nov. 1771, and to Robert Stobo, 22 Nov. 1771, Washington Papers, ser. 5, IV: 65-67.

[49]Washington to John Armstrong, 10 Oct. 1773, Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, III: 155-156 (quote on 156); Washington to Lord Dunmore, 15 June 1772 (misdated 1771), Washington Papers, ser. 5, IV: 142-143; Dec. 1772 deeds to lands granted by Dunmore under the 1754 proclamation, in Washington Papers, ser. 4; John Armstrong to Washington, 17 Aug. 1773, ibid.; Washington to Crawford, 25 Sept. 1773, and to Dunmore, 2 Nov. 1773, Washington Papers, ser. 5, IV: 169-171, 210-211; Washington to Dunmore, 12 Sept. 1773, Dunmore Family Papers, Swem Library, College of William and Mary in Virginia, Williamsburg; Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, VI: 112-113, 118-119; Joseph Shippen, Jr., to James Burd, 13 Jan. 1774, 18 Feb. 1774, Burd-Shippen Papers, PHMC; Virginius C. Hall, ed., "Journal of Isaac Hite, 1773," Bulletin of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio, 12 (1954), 263-281.

[50]For his development of his various western properties and claims before the Revolution, see Washington's correspondence with Gilbert Simpson, Valentine Crawford, William Stevens, and James Cleveland from late 1772 through 1775, in Washington Papers; also Cecil E. Goode, "Gilbert Simpson: Washington's Partner in Settling his Western Pennsylvania Lands," WPHM, 62 (1979), 149-166. Regarding Potomac navigation: Washington to Thomas Johnson, 20 July 1770, 5 May 1772, Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, III: 17-21, 82-83; Palatine farmers: ibid., 185-190, 193-196, and James Tilghman, Jr., to Washington, 7 Apr. 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4; bison raising: Washington's instructions to James Cleveland, (Mar. 1775), ibid.

[51]To Crawford, 21 Sept. 1767, Washington Papers, ser. 5, IV: 14-15.

[52]Crawford to Washington, 12 Nov. 1773, 29 Dec. 1773, ibid., ser. 4.

[53]Crawford to Washington, 5 May 1770, ibid.; Washington to Crawford, 6 Dec. 1771, ibid., ser. 5, IV: 146-147.

[54]Crawford to Washington, 15 Mar. 1772, 1 May 1772, (fall 1773), Washington Papers, ser. 4 (see C. W. Butterfield, ed., The Washington-Crawford Letters [Cincinnati,

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1877], 36-37, for dating of the last letter). Washington's lands claimed by military surveys down the Ohio were also subject to encroachment.

[55]Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 295; Washington to George Mercer, 22 Nov. 1771, Washington Papers, ser. 5, IV: 68; Crawford to Washington, 29 Dec. 1773, ibid., ser. 4; see also Washington's memo to Crawford, 24 Nov. 1770, ibid., ser. 5, IV: 139-140.

[56]Morgan to John Campbell, 4 Nov. 1768, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC.

[57]Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 13 Nov. 1771, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 424.

[58]Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 12 Nov. 1772, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh (printed in PMHB, 15 [1891], 431-432); also William Murray to Michael Gratz, 15 May 1773, in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 461-462.

[59]Morgan to Samuel Wharton, 1 Feb. 1773, and to Croghan, 8 June 1773, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC. For some of the material collected by the Whartons relating to the various possible configurations of the boundary, see Etting Collec., I: 97-98, HSP.

[60]Robert Lettis Hooper, Jr., to William Franklin, 15 Sept. 1772, Etting Papers, Misc. Mss., I: 145, HSP; Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, III: 37.

[61]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 346; Penn Mss., XI: 118, HSP.

[62]Crawford to Washington, 5 May 1770, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 12 Nov. 1772, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh (a printed version of the bulk of this letter is in PMHB, 15 [1891], 431-432). The 1775 version of Scull's map is in Thomas Jefferys, The American Atlas, facsim. ed. with intro. by Walter W. Ristow (Amsterdam, 1974; orig. pub. 1776). This map locates Pittsburgh roughly 10 minutes of latitude too far north and 25 minutes of longitude too far east, but it is impossible to say whether this was a deliberate misrepresentation or the result of inadequate information at the time Scull drew the map.

[63]Penn Mss., Official Corres., X: 276, HSP.

[64]Brooke Hindle, David Rittenhouse (Princeton, 1964), 92-94; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 105; Col. Recs., X: 150.

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[65]In Jan. 1775, responding to a set of inquiries about the colony, the provincial government informed the crown that Pittsburgh was at lat. 40° 26' 22" N and long. 79° 59' 00" W; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 592-593. United States Geological Survey, Guide to U.S. Government Maps, reprinted from The National Atlas of the United States (McLean, Va., 1975), 211, gives figures of lat. 40° 26.2' N and long. 80° 00.5' W. A projection of the Delaware's courses 5° west on a modern map shows that Rittenhouse's estimates of where Pittsburgh would fall relative to such a border were fairly precise as well.

[66]James Tilghman to Thomas Penn, 30 Jan. 1773, 1 Mar. 1773, 15 May 1773, Penn Mss., Official Corres., XI: 61, 69, 85, HSP.

[67]The Penns' successive petitions are in Penn Mss., XI: 122-124, 132-139; Penn Mss., Penna. Misc. Papers, Penn and Baltimore, Penn Family (1768-1834), 67; Penn Papers, Indians Affairs, III: 116, all at HSP.

[68]The only full study of Dunmore is Percy B. Caley, "Dunmore: Colonial Governor of New York and Virginia, 1770-1782" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1939). The result of very thorough research, this work is a fruitful source of references to important documents and printed sources. A much briefer assessment, but an outstanding one that points out Dunmore's political experience and ambitions in Britain, is John E. Selby, Dunmore (Williamsburg, Va., 1977), published for the Virginia Independence Bicentennial Commission.

[69]Dunmore to Hillsborough in Davies, Documents of American Revolution, V: 53-54; Washington to Dunmore, 12 Sept. 1773, Dunmore Family Papers, Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va. Caley, "Dunmore," 35-37, notes the governor's efforts to acquire land while still in New York, and 145-209 deals with Dunmore's involvement in western speculation in Virginia.

[70]William Henry Smith, ed., The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair (Cincinnati, 1882), I: 273; Nicholas B. Wainwright, ed., "Turmoil at Pittsburgh: Diary of Augustine Prevost, 1774," PMHB, 85 (1961), 144-146.

[71]So reported William Crawford to Washington, 10 Jan. 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4. The approval of the Vandalia colony is covered by Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 200-210. Abernethy, Western Lands, 91-97, places perhaps undue stress on the role of the "Croghan faction" in the boundary controversy.

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[72]Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 198; PMHB, 33 (1909), 327, 331-332, 434.

[73]The question of a blood or marriage tie between the two men is still a bit muddled. Washington referred to Connolly as Croghan's nephew in 1770, and his comment appears to be the strongest direct evidence for such a relationship. Albert Volwiler, who examined Croghan's will, accepted Washington's statement at face value, but Nicholas Wainwright noted in his biography of Croghan that Washington "may have overemphasized the relationship" by using the word "nephew." Wainwright later pointed out that a statement by Augustine Prevost, Croghan's son-in-law, would seem to indicate that the two men were not relatives. Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 322; Volwiler, Croghan and Western Movement, 25; Wainwright, Croghan, 287; Wainwright, ed., "Turmoil at Pittsburgh," 134n.

[74]See John Connolly, "A Narrative of the Transactions, Imprisonment, and Sufferings of John Connolly, an American Loyalist and Lieut. Col. in His Majesty's Service," PMHB, 12 (1888), 310-324, 407-420; 13 (1889), 61-70, 153-167, 281-291 (quotations from 310, 311). Biographies are: Clarence M. Burton, "John Connolly, a Tory of the Revolution," American Antiquarian Society, Proceedings, new ser., 20 (1909), 70-105; Percy B. Caley, "The Life Adventures of Lieutenant-Colonel John Connolly: The Story of a Tory," WPHM, 11 (1928), 10-49, 76-111, 144-179, 225-259. Connolly's service as a volunteer with Bouquet is verified in Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21650, pt. 1), 117, 149. There are occasional references -- usually just a mention of "Doctor Connolly" -- in other sources pertaining to Pittsburgh and Illinois from about 1766 onward.

[75]Morgan to Connolly, 23 Jan. 1772, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC. This draft of a response to Connolly was penned on the backs of Connolly's letters to Morgan of 9 Aug. 1771 and 8 Jan. 1772; it is signed with a flourished "GM" that was misread as "Geble" by the compilers of the published guide to the microfilm of the Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers.

[76]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 122; Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 65.

[77]Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 322-323; Connolly to Washington, 18 Sept. 1772, 29 June 1773, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Washington to James Wood, 13 Mar. 1773, 30 Mar. 1773, and to governor of West Florida, 25 Mar. 1773, Washington Papers, ser. 5, IV: 92-94.

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[78]Connolly, "Narrative," 311-312; Connolly to Washington, 1 Feb. 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4.

[79]William Preston to Washington, 7 Mar. 1774, John Connolly to Washington, 29 Aug. 1773, and John Armstrong to Washington, 24 Dec. 1773, all in Washington Papers, ser. 4. A copy of the survey plat of the land is in Hall, ed., "Journal of Isaac Hite," 272.

[80]PMHB, 33 (1909), 444-446.

[81]Dunmore to Dartmouth, 18 Mar. 1774, in Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, VIII: 65-67; Redstone meeting reported in Rivington's New-York Gazetteer, 16 Sept. 1773; petition of early 1774, forwarded by Dunmore in the march letter to Dartmouth, is in C. O. 5/ 1352, fol. 24, Public Record Office, and Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), 8 Sept. 1774.

[82]Caley, "Dunmore," 27-28.

[83]Connolly to Washington, 23 Dec. 1773, Washington Papers, ser. 4.

[84]Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, VI: 91-92, 151; H. R. McIlwaine, ed., "Justices of the Peace of Colonial Virginia, 1757-1775," Bulletin of the Virginia State Library, 14 (1921), 124. The other appointees were John Campbell, Edward Ward, Thomas Smallman, Dorsey Pentecost, and John Gibson.

[85]The full title is quoted from Connolly's posted notice of 1 Jan. 1774, copy in Dreer Collec., HSP; also printed in Col. Recs., X: 141-142.

[86]Julian P. Boyd and Robert J. Taylor, eds., The Susquehannah Company Papers (Wilkes-Barre, Penn., and Ithaca, N.Y., 1930-1971), II: 64-66; Connolly to Washington, 1 Feb. 1774; Dunmore to Gov. John Penn, 3 Mar. 1774, Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 408-409; Dunmore to James Tilghman and Andrew Allen, 24 May 1774, ibid., 440-441; Dunmore to Dartmouth, 18 Mar. 1774, Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, VIII: 67. Items cited from Pa. Council Minutes may also be found in vol. X of the printed Col. Recs.

[87]Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), 17 Nov. 1774.

[88]Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, VIII: 66-67, IX: 80-81; Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 408-409, 439-442. The configuration of Pennsylvania's limits proposed by Dunmore had been around for some time: see John Campbell to George Morgan, 20 Mar. 1769, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC.

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[89]See Philip J. Schwarz, The Jarring Interests: New York's Boundary Makers, 1664-1776 (Albany, N.Y., 1979), particularly 222-235, for a summary of New York's status as a "residuary legatee" in disputes with private colonies. Schwarz's book is also the only recent, thorough treatment of boundaries as a political issue in the American colonies.

[90]Carter, ed., Gage Correspondence, I: 349, II: 155.

[91]Quotations are from Dartmouth to Dunmore, 6 July 1774 and 8 Sept. 1774, in Davies, ed., Documents on American Revolution, VIII: 145, 195. See also Dartmouth to Dunmore, 1 June 1774, summarized in ibid., VII: 113, and Dunmore to Dartmouth, 9 June 1774, 24 Dec. 1774, ibid., VIII: 130-131, 252-270. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 229-235, has a discussion of Dunmore's reliance on a doctored version of the Yorke-Camden ruling to justify the Illinois Company's Indian purchases.

[92]Connolly notice of 1 Jan. 1774, Dreer Collec., HSP, also in Col. Recs., X: 141-142. See Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 271, regarding possibility of an additional magistrate at Pittsburth in Aug. 1773; Westmoreland County Quarter Sessions Docket (1773-1783), (Clerk of Courts Office, Greensburg, Pa.), 25, for appointment of an extra constable for Pitt Township in Oct. 1773. The Westmoreland court records for 1773 mention several instances of riot and assault and battery which may or may not reflect a mounting tension over the problems of jurisdiction, land title, and related matters.

[93]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 389-391; Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 271-273; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 476-480, 528; Connolly to Dunmore, 23 Jan. 1774, C.O. 5/ 1352, fol. 21-23, Public Record Office. The bulk of the detail concerning the dispute at the local level comes from the Pennsylvanians' side of the affair, and is published in: Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV, esp. 476-583, 586-589, 600-612, 622-629, 637, 659-660; Col. Recs., X, passim (which prints the council records of Pa. Council Minutes); and the first volume of Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers. Later citations will indicate other sources as well. Historians' treatments include: Boyd Crumrine, "The Boundary Controversy between Pennsylvania and Virginia; 1748-1785," Annals of Carnegie Museum, 1 (1901-1902), 505-524; Abernethy, Western Lands, 91-97; Percy B. Caley, "Lord Dunmore and the Pennsylvania-Virginia Boundary Dispute," WPHM, 22 (1939), 87-100; John E. Potter, "The Pennsylvania and Virginia Boundary Controversy," PMHB, 38 (1914), 407-426; Russell J. Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics (Pittsburgh, 1938), 20-25; William Derrick Barns, "Southwestern

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Pennsylvania during the Pennsylvania-Virginia Boundary Controversy, 1763-1784" (M.A. thesis, Pennsylvania State College, 1940); Robert C. Noll, "The Boundary Dispute between Pennsylvania and Virginia" (M.A. thesis, Pennsylvania State College, 1936); Alfred P. James, "The Role of Virginia and Virginians in the Early History of Southwestern Pennsylvania," WPHM, 34 (1951), 51-63; W. Neil Franklin, "Pennsylvania-Virginia Rivalry for the Indian Trade of the Ohio Valley," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 20 (1934), 463-480.

[94]Mackay to Gov. John Penn, 4 Apr. 1774, Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 484-486; see also 481-483. Connolly's oath as a militia officer was recorded 15 Mar. 1774, in Augusta County Order Book, no. 15 (1773-1774), 308 (microfilm copy at VSL).

[95]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 418-423; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 487-489, 492-493, 567-568, 618-620. (The item on 618-620 is misdated 1775 instead of the correct year, 1774).

[96]Mackay to Penn, 5 May 1774, Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 494-495; copy of Dunmore proclamation of 25 Apr., ibid., 490-491; Dunmore to Connolly, 25 Apr. 1774, C.O. 5/ 1352, fol. 65, Public Record Office.

[97]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 487; 8th ser., VIII: 7185.

[98]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 399-401, 408-414, 427-431, 436-448 (quotation from 448).

[99]Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, XI: 102, 133.

[100]Tilghman to St. Clair, 20 June 1774, Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 313; Penn to Lady Juliana Penn, 24 June 1774, PMHB, 31 (1907), 236.

[101]O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, VIII: 459-467; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 1087-1100; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 495-504, 511-515, 630-632 (the last item is from June 1774 but is misdated as 1775 in the volume); Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds., Documentary History of Dunmore's War, 1774 (Madison, Wis., 1905), 9-16; Gilbert Simpson to George Washington, 4 May 1774, Valentine Crawford to Washington, 6 May 1774 and 7 May 1774, William Crawford to Washington, 8 May 1774, 8 June 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4.

[102]Thomas Wharton to Thomas Walpole, 23 Sept. 1774, PMHB, 33 (1909), 444-446, and see Abernethy, Western Lands, 114-115. Dunmore's motivations in pursuing war in the west are also treated by Caley, "Dunmore," 291-384, and by two

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articles by Richard Orr Curry: "Lord Dunmore and the West: A Re-evaluation," West Virginia History, 19 (1958), 231-243, and "Lord Dunmore -- Tool of Land Jobbers or Realistic Champion of Colonial 'Rights'?: An Inquiry," ibid., 24 (1963), 289-295.

[103]Gilbert Simpson to Washington, 4 May 1774, Valentine Crawford to Washington, 6 May 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4. The Virginia Gazette (Rind) of 26 May 1774 and 21 July 1774 confessed that the "extremely complicated" reports from the west did not absolve the whites from blame, although the paper held back from condemning Connolly himself.

[104][Connolly] to Washington, 28 May 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Jack M. Sosin, "The British Indian Department and Dunmore's War," VMHB, 74 (1966), 44; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 522; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Dunmore's War, 114-115. Valentine Crawford to George Washington, 25 May 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4, reports the inflammatory effect of one of Connolly's orders.

[105]John Pendleton Kennedy, ed., Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1773-1776 (Richmond, 1905), 90-93, 97. Dunmore also received the assembly's tacit approval of his actions against the Pennsylvanians. A letter to the Virginia papers from "A Virginian" early in March had called the public's attention to the boundary troubles and suggested that the burgesses consider prompt action to solidify Virginia's jurisdiction in the disputed zone. Connolly, who wrote Washington in February in a similar effort to mobilize active support, was in Staunton at the time and may have been behind the "Virginian" piece. Virginia Gazette (both the Purdie and Dixon and the Rind editions), 3 Mar. 1774; Connolly to Washington, 1 Feb. 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4. Landon Carter made a direct connection between Dunmore's appeals to the burgesses on the boundary and Indian issues: "Ld. Dunmore wants 1,200 men to fight the Pennsylvanians. I'd rather raise them for Boston a great deal." Jack P. Greene, ed., Diary of Colonel Landon Carter of Sabine Hall, 1752-1778 (Charlottesville, Va., 1965), II: 812.

[106]Considerable information concerning the months of conflict and the campaigns known as Dunmore's War may be found in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV; Col. Recs., X; Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I; the papers of Sir William Johnson and George Washington; and Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Dunmore's War.

[107]Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, VIII: 209; Gage to Guy Johnson, 28 Nov. 1774, in Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XIII: 698-699. Also see

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ibid., VIII: 1164-1165, 1182-1183; XII: 1113-1117; XIII: 640-643, 666-675, 687-689, 694-697, 700-703. Sosin, "British Indian Department and Dunmore's War," 34-50, treats this particular subject. On the matter of Dunmore's War see also Randolph C. Downes, "Dummore's War: An Interpretation," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 21 (1934), 311-330, and Downes, Council Fires, chap. 7.

[108]Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, VIII: 160; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Dunmore's War, 362.

[109]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 517, 529, 564, 565, 567, 568, 611, 630-631.

[110]Ibid., 529, 540-541, 567-568, 575, 630 (Smith quotation); Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 343-344; Wainwright, ed., "Turmoil at Pittsburgh," 133, 137; Col. Recs., X: 166, 168.

[111]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 606-607, 611.

[112]Ibid., 529, 564-566, 568, 630-632.

[113]Mackay to St. Clair, 11 Jan. 1774, Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 273; William Crawford to Gov. Penn, 8 Apr. 1774, Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 419 (Col. Recs., X: 165); St. Clair to Penn, 4 Dec. 1774, Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 587.

[114]Wainwright, ed., "Turmoil at Pittsburgh," 127-129, 142; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 608-609.

[115]Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Dunmore's War, 174-176; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 477, 484.

[116]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 630.

[117]The only actual roster of any of the militia involved in the dispute with Pennsylvania consists of a list submitted with the petition of Joseph Simon and John Campbell, 18 Dec. 1775, Virginia Conventions, 1774-1776, Convention Papers, VSL. This document lists the militia contingent at Fort Dunmore (Pittsburgh) during Apr. and May 1774, when Connolly was repairing the fort due to the Indian crisis, and includes 99 enlisted men (serving 3 to 25 days each), 3 sergeants, and 7 officers (including Connolly). Of the six officers other than Connolly, three had some county service other than with the militia, but only as estate appraisers or road viewers, and with only one such appointment apiece. For a discussion of officeholding and the county records for each side, see the next chapter. David

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Steel and Jacob Bousman, commissioned in 1775, had more county service during this period than any of the early group of officers except Connolly, who was a justice of the peace.

[118]Col. Recs., X: 227; warrants 11:6, Gage Papers, WLCL. Some of Connolly's officers are mentioned in depositions and reports of incidents of the boundary controversy printed in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV; see also the list cited in the previous note.

[119]O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, VIII: 463; Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 343-344; Wainwright, ed., "Turmoil at Pittsburgh," 127. For similar attitudes on the part of other militia see Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Dunmore's War, 99, 143, 159, 167-168.

[120]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 491-492, 543, 571, 637.

[121]Ibid., 503, 524, 631-632.

[122]Dunmore to Connolly, 25 Apr. 1774 (in Dunmore to Dartmouth, 2 May 1774), C.O. 5/ 1352, fol. 65-67, Public Record Office.

[123]Penn to St. Clair, 20 Jan. 1774, and to William Crawford, 22 Apr. 1774, Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 395-396, 425-426 (Col. Recs., X: 145-146, 171-172). The Westmoreland County officers read the riot act to assemblages of Virginia adherents on at least two occasions; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 484, 603, 605.

[124]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 471-472, 482, 503 (quotation), 619 (item misdated 1775, should be 1774), 629.

[125]Ibid., 622-629.

[126]Ibid., 623.

[127]Ibid., 528-529, 540-541, 565-566, 568, 571-573, 631; Col. Recs., X: 166; Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 343-344. The deposition in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 571-573 was quite mistakenly attributed to Aston by the volume's editors; it appears to be, instead, Richard Butler's account of his arrest by the Virginians.

[128]Boyd Crumrine, ed., "Minute Book of the Virginia Court Held at Fort Dunmore (Pittsburgh) for the District of West Augusta, 1775-1776," Annals of Carnegie Museum, 1 (1901-1902), 556-559; Margaret Pearson Bothwell, "Devereux Smith, Fearless Pioneer," WPHM, 40 (1957), 277-291; W. H. Egle, ed., Historical Register: Notes and Queries,

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Historical and Genealogical, Relating to Interior Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1883-1884), II: 58-61; Smith to commissioners for Indian affairs, 24 Oct. 1776, Yeates Papers, HSP; Smith to Edward Hand, 12 (June?) 1777, Force Collec., ser. VII-E, box 18 (Hand, vol. I), Library of Congress.

[129]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 589; also ibid., 529, 612, and Peter Force, ed., American Archives (Washington, D.C., 1837-1853), 4th ser., I: 449-450, for similar comments.

[130]Connolly's proclamation of 30 Dec. 1774, Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 487; for situation in 1775 see Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 606, 612, 623-629; Col. Recs., X: 234-235 (Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 494-495).

[131]Caley, "Life of Connolly," 95; John Armstrong to George Washington, 24 Dec. 1773, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 9 Dec. 1773, in PMHB, 15 (1891), 436; the Simon and Campbell petition of 18 Dec. 1775, with supporting materials, is in Virginia Conventions, 1774-1776, Convention Papers, VSL. The convention approved payment of the firm's claim in Jan. 1776; Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, V: 315. This John Campbell -- Simon's trading partner, a local Virginia JP, and the county lieutenant of Yohogania County early in the Revolution, -- was not the John Campbell identified as George Croghan's clerk in Wainwright, Croghan, 282, 301, 303. That the two men were not the same seems clear from Moses Rawlings to Edward Hand, 6 May 1778, and John Campbell to Hand, n.d., in Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC. References to John Campbell later in these pages are to Campbell of Simon and Campbell; I believe also that this John Campbell was the same man who succeeded John Irwin as the local agent of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan in the 1760s, mentioned in chapter 2 above. There may have been still other men of the same name in the region at various times.

[132]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 521, 522-523, 539, 541, 545, 559. Croghan's temporary split from the Virginia faction will be discussed more thoroughly in the following chapter.

[133]Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 343; Col. Recs., X: 202; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 543-545, 550, 551, 557, 571-575. The Kittanning site was at times referred to as "Appleby."

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Notes to Chapter 5

[1]Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, VIII: 266; IX: 82.

[2]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 320, 391-392; McIlwaine, "Virginia Justices," 124, 127-128, 129-130. Over two dozen other men were listed on the Augusta County commission in this period; the figures I have listed are for those who were added to the Augusta court as a means of appointing local justices in the Pittsburgh vicinity. Alexander McKee and William Crawford were the two commissioned by Pennsylvania in 1773 and later by Virginia; more on them below.

[3]Oliver Miller and Michael Rough were the Westmoreland magistrates recommended as justices by the West Augusta court, but not commissioned; Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 433, 566, 567. There is no indication that Silas Hedge, John Stephenson, Alexander McKee, James Innes, Thomas Galbreath, or William Harrison ever actually sat with the Virginia court; McKee and Harrison were recommended as West Augusta justices in 1776, so did not swear into their commissions of 1775. The Westmoreland County records of the period (described in note 29 below) name only the presiding judge at each session, so in most cases it is impossible to determine which JPs actually sat with the Pennsylvania court.

[4]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 122, 188; Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book"; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Dunmore's War, 101-102, 201-202; Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 147-148; Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 423; Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 282n; Abernethy, Western Lands, 254-268; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., III: 777.

[5]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 454; see also ibid., 426-427, 546-547; journal of George Croghan, July-Aug. 1770 (in Croghan to Gage, 8 Aug. 1770, Gage Papers, WLCL); Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Dunmore's War, 28n; Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 147.

[6]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 122, 188; Kenneth P. Bailey, Christopher Gist: Colonial Frontiersman, Explorer, and Indian Agent (Hamden, Conn., 1976), 14-15, 153-154n; McIlwaine, "Virginia Justices," 80-82, 92, 94-95, 114, 118;

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Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds., The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-1777 (Madison, Wis., 1908), 229-230n; William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., 13 (1904), 31, 33; VMHB, 6 (1898), 173; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, II: 358-359.

[7]Of the JPs commissioned by either colony through 1776, only Van Swearingen, Dorsey Pentecost, James Innes, and William Goe owned ten or more slaves apiece in the 1780s. Slave registration lists were compiled in accordance with Pennsylvania's gradual abolition acts. Westmoreland County's is printed in George Dallas Albert, ed., History of the County of Westmoreland, Pennsylvania, with Biographical Sketches of Many of its Pioneers and Prominent Men (Philadelphia, 1882), 447-450; that of Washington County, which was formed from part of the original Westmoreland, is at the Western Pennsylvania Historical Society as a typescript, "List of Negroes Registered persuant to the Late act of Assembly for the Redress of Certain Grievances in the Counties of Westmoreland and Washington," and is printed in a somewhat condensed format in Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 258-261. See also: Franklin Ellis, ed., History of Fayette County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1882), 128; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 121; and for slaveholding by George Croghan, Wainwright, Croghan, 10, 29, 44, 82, 160, 231, 264.

[8]Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 1-9; Ellis Beals, "Arthur St. Clair: Western Pennsylvania's Leading Citizen, 1764-1818," WPHM, 12 (1929), 75-96, 175-196; Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 122, 188, 319-320.

[9]St. Clair attached McKee's name to the statement that was read at the initial Virginia militia muster at Pittsburgh, 25 Jan. 1774; McKee was present and apparently did not object to this use of his name, but cannot be considered a Pennsylvania partisan in the dispute. Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 477, 480.

[10]Ibid., 561, 583; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 536-537, 553; deputy quartermaster general's accounts, Sept. 1764, warrants 9:13, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[11]James Tilghman, Jr., to Thomas Penn, 1 Mar. 1773, Penn Mss., Off. Corres., XI: 69, HSP; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 547; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, VIII: 314-320.

[12]Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 269-270; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 466-467, 471-472. The trustees' report in

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ibid., 579, is almost certainly from Oct. 1773, not 1774 as dated -- compare Wilson's letter on 466-467, which from his reference to Penn's return to the province must be correctly dated as Oct. 1773. The trustees' report in ibid., 449, cannot be from 1771 as dated in the volume because the county did not exist then; this report probably postdates the Oct. 1773 one, but had no effect on the permanent resolution of the issue. In 1775 the lack of a permanent county seat prevented the county from receiving a provincial loan of £800 for the construction of better public buildings; ibid., 8th ser., VIII: 7257-7258; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, VIII: 391-392. See also Roland M. Baumann, "The Removal of the Westmoreland County Seat to Newtown (Greensburg), 1784-1786," WPHM, 60 (1977), 277-289.

[13]Aeneas Mackay to _____ [probably St. Clair], 11 Aug. 1774, Misc. Mss. Collec., LC; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 559-560, 575.

[14]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 122, 188, 320, 391-392, 418-420, 487; Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 525, 537.

[15]Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 54.

[16]Valentine Crawford to Washington, 27 Apr. 1774, William Crawford to Washington, 12 Nov. 1773, 29 Dec. 1773, 10 Jan. 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Washington to George Croghan, 24 Nov. 1770, and to Thomas Lewis, 17 Feb. 1774, 5 May 1774, ibid., ser. 5, IV: 138-139, 185-187, 191-193.

[17]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 551.

[18]Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 554. A good source of information about the relationships among some of this group is Wainwright, ed., "Turmoil at Pittsburgh."

[19]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 499; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 1097-1098; Downes, Council Fires, 163-164; Aeneas Mackay to _____, 11 Aug. 1774, Misc. Mss. Collec., LC.

[20]Croghan to Thomas Wharton, 10 Aug. 1774, 12 Aug. 1774, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh (a printed version is in PMHB, 15 [1891], 437-439); Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 509, 523.

[21]Connolly to Washington, 7 June 1774, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 507-508, 510, 517,

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520, 523; Wainwright, ed., "Turmoil at Pittsburgh," 129, 131, 156-157.

[22]Wainwright, ed., "Turmoil at Pittsburgh," 133-139, 141, 158-161.

[23]Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), 17 Nov. 1774; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 580-582.

[24]Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 486-487, 494-497 (quotation from 496); Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 589, 603-606, 608 (quotation from 608); Force, ed., American Archives, 4th ser., I: 1226.

[25]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 587-588, 610, 622-629; Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 526-530, 538, 541-542.

[26]Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," esp. 532, 533, 565-567.

[27]Ibid., 528, 532, 534, 545, 554, 562-563; petition of John Ormsby, [7 Apr.] 1780, in Records of Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Governments, 1775-1790 (Record Group 27), PHMC (cited hereafter as Record Group 27, PHMC); Ormsby and Bousman petition of 1782, Genl. Assem. File, 6th Session - 3, Records of the General Assembly, 1776-1790 (Record Group 7), PHMC; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 518, 527; Col. Recs., XII: 317; Hening, ed., Virginia Statutes at Large, IX: 234; Westmoreland County Common Pleas Continuance Docket, vol. I, Jan. 1774 term, Office of the Prothonotary, Westmoreland County, Greensburg, Pa.; Boyd Crumrine, ed., "Minute Book of the Virginia Court Held for Yohogania County, First at Augusta Town (now Washington, Pa.), and afterwards on the Andrew Heath Farm near West Elizabeth; 1776-1780," Annals of Carnegie Museum, 2 (1903-1904), 305, 345, 385-386, 404; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, XI: 242-243, XII: 67. After the Revolution Ormsby twice petitioned the Pennsylvania legislature asking for the exclusive privilege of operating a ferry at the spot; see Minutes of the Eighth General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1783-1784), 100, and Minutes of the Ninth General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1784-1785), 368. These and other Pennsylvania assembly journals from 1776 to 1790 are available on microfilm in the Records of the States of the United States of America series directed by William Sumner Jenkins.

[28]Dade died not long afterward. Westmoreland County Common Pleas Continuance Docket, vol. I, Jan. and Apr. 1774 terms.

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[29]The records of the two courts are of course not entirely comparable; nor does either set of records give as full information as one might wish. For unknown reasons the West Augusta records show significantly less activity in 1776 than in 1775. There are no Westmoreland County court records for the second half of 1776 (or for any part of 1777), probably because of a dispute in which prothonotary Michael Huffnagle took the record books with him when he served in the Continental army. The records examined for this comparison of the courts' activities, and for the discussion of officeholding that follows, were: Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book"; Quarter Sessions Docket, Apr. 1773-Apr. 1783 (typescript copy) and Court of Common Pleas (mss. casebook or docket), Jan. 1775 (actually Oct. 1774)-1804, both at Clerk of Courts Office, Westmoreland County, Greensburg, Pa.; Court of Common Pleas, Continuance Docket, vol. I (July 1773-July 1784), and vol. II (July 1773-Oct. 1790), at office of the Prothonotary, Greensburg. Richard W. Loveless, ed., Records of the District of West Augusta, Ohio County, and Yohogania County, Virginia (Columbus, Ohio, 1980), reproduces the Virginia records from Crumrine's editions as published in the early volumes of the Annals of Carnegie Museum, but without attribution and minus Crumrine's introductory material, or any introductory material for that matter. It is far better to use these records as they were originally published by Crumrine in the Annals. For punishment by lashing: Westmoreland Quarter Sessions Docket (1773-1783), 20-21, 30, 34, 36, 41, 52, 55; Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 531, 542. Ibid., 530, for the ducking stool.

[30]The county was divided originally into eleven townships; only one additional township was created before Apr. 1776, Derry Township, laid off in Oct. 1775.

[31]The totals given in these paragraphs exclude the 41 men who were commissioned as justices of the peace in the two counties during the 1773-1776 period. Some of the magistrates performed services such as jury duty before they were commissioned, and road viewing or estate appraisal while in office. There are problems regarding the tally of other officeholders. One is duplicate names -- two or more men with the same first and last names. However, any error in this regard would not change the number of one-time-only officeholders. It is also important to remember the paucity of information about some of the county positions, such as jury duty for the West Augusta court. And it is probably unnecessary to mention the short span of time covered in this survey of officeholding, since many of these men may well have held similar appointments earlier, later, or elsewhere. Nevertheless, the results given here provide the

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only available indication of participation in local government below the level of the justices of the peace and county sheriffs, and therefore they are worth some attention.

[32]Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 526, 528, 532, 534, 537, 538, 561-562.

[33]Ibid., 526, 527, 528, 530, 531-532, 534, 535, 537, 538, 539, 541, 545, 551, 554, 556, 561-562, 564; Westmoreland Quarter Sessions Docket (1773-1783), 6, 7, 25-26, 31-32, 38, 54-55, 59, 66-68, 69.

[34]Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 526, 527, 531, 532, 534, 537, 539, 545, 554, 561.

[35]Authorizations to sell liquor are scattered through the minutes of ibid. and Westmoreland Quarter Sessions Docket (1773-1783). For the Westmoreland indictments see the Quarter Sessions Docket, 12, 27-29, 31, 36-37, 44, 52, 63.

[36]Ibid., 8, for Bousman's appointment as overseer of the poor. For Bailey, whose name, through a multitude of transcribers' variations, is also given as Reily, see ibid., 31, 38; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 485, 517, 528, 566, 631; Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 529; and the militia list accompanying the Simon and Campbell petition of 18 Dec. 1775, in Virginia Conventions, 1774-1776, Convention Papers, VSL.

[37]Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 110, 130-132 (quoted passages from 130 and 132).

[38]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 542; ibid., 2nd ser., III: 546, 675; Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 324-325; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 179; Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 74, 93.

[39]The published resolves of the meeting are in Force, ed., American Archives, 4th ser., II: 615-616. This report dates the meeting as 16 May, the same day as the meeting in Pittsburgh, but a letter of St. Clair's dates it indirectly as 17 May, so the relative timing of the two meetings is uncertain. Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 624. Westmoreland County sent delegates to the provincial convention and to the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety during 1775 and 1776, but the county was unrepresented in the convention during early 1775 and in the Committee of Safety from fall 1775 until July 1776. William Thompson, the same who had represented Bedford and then Westmoreland County in the provincial assembly before the Revolution, was Westmoreland's

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representative on the Committee of Safety from the end of July 1775 until 19 Oct. of that year. Ibid., 2nd ser., III: 637, 676-677, 679, 681, 682, 684, 686.

[40]For American attitudes toward the king by 1775, see Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York, 1972), 237-241; for St. Clair: Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 624, 628-629; deposition of Michael Huffnagle, 5 July 1775, Society Collec., HSP.

[41]The committee's resolutions and grievances are in Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, III: 137-140.

[42]Caley, "Dunmore," 455-460; Selby, Dunmore, 17-24.

[43]There is also the possibility that Connolly's brazen aggressiveness, hot temper, willingness to use the militia against opponents, and harsh tactics against the persons and property of his adversaries frightened some of his allies as much as it did his enemies.

[44]The court at Pittsburgh was held by a writ of adjournment from Staunton, but none of the Staunton group ever sat with the district of West Augusta court. Technically a county court could only sit if one of the justices present was "of the quorum." In Dec. 1773, when Croghan, Connolly, and others were first appointed Augusta magistrates, the commission for the quorum went to Michael Bowyer of the eastern group. In the Dec. 1774 county commission, on the eve of the actual sitting of a court at Pittsburgh, Edward Ward of the Pittsburgh group received this appointment, so legally he would have had to attend both the Staunton and the Pittsburgh court sessions. The requirement of the presence of the quorum was probably collapsing, however, because the revised commission of Apr. 1775 gave John Stephenson, William Crawford's neighbor and half-brother, the quorum, and the surviving West Augusta records give no sign that Stephenson ever sat with the court at Pittsburgh. McIlwaine, ed., "Virginia Justices," 51, 124, 127-128, 129-130; Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book."

[45]Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, II: 313-314; III: 478; Hening, ed., Virginia Statutes at Large, IX: 54, 57.

[46]Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, III: 140; Hening, ed., Virginia Statutes at Large, IX: 58-59, 66, 144.

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[47]Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 553-554, 564-568; Hening, ed., Virginia Statutes at Large, IX: 16, 114, 127-129, 221, 262-266. In the new counties as in the old district of West Augusta freeholders were recognized without legal title to their land, but even those without patents were expected to pay taxes.

[48]Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 37-38; Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, III: 238-240, 248-249, 257-266. Connolly later boasted that he had really duped his hostile observers at these conferences and had cemented the region's Indians to Great Britain as "most faithful friends and auxilliaries." The statement is laden with the exaggeration typical of Connolly's autobiographical comments. Connolly, "Narrative," 315-316.

[49]Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 66-67; Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, III: 292-294, 342-343, 404, 463; Kennedy, ed., Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1773-1776, 186-187; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 42, VII: 475, National Archives. For Neville see: McIlwaine, ed., "Virginia Justices," 80-82, 94-95; Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, IV: 205-206n; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 22n; VMHB, 16 (1908), 53n.

[50]Hening, ed., Virginia Statutes at Large, IX: 13, 16-17, 75-77, 135-138.

[51]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 629, 659-660.

[52]Ibid., 8th ser., VIII: 7535-7536; Col. Recs., XI: 46.

[53]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 628. For committee leadership see: Wainwright, George Croghan, 294-299; VMHB, 13 (1906), 419, 420; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 69, I: 119, 123, and item 78, II: 21, National Archives; Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, IV: 48, 50n; Carnahan to the assembly, 18 May 1776, in Genl. Assem. File, 1st session - 1, Records of the General Assembly, 1776-1790 (Record Group 7), PHMC; Pa. Council Minutes, vol. U, 240, 301, 354, 391-392, 471, 534; Pa. Arch., 8th ser., VIII: 7513-7514.

[54]Valentine Crawford to George Washington, 24 June 1775, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Connolly, "Narrative," 317-321; Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, III: 229-230, 292-294. The Virginia committee was a bit displeased that Capt. George Gibson had acted independently of them, or "without authority from the Civil Majestrates," but approved the result.

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[55]VMHB, 13 (1906), 418-423. The exchange is also printed in Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, III: 240-241, 249-252.

[56]Ibid., IV: 48, 50. (A negative photostat of this deposition is also at the Western Pennsylvania Historical Society.)

[57]Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 114-115.

[58]Richard Butler to Wilson, 8 Apr. 1776, in Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, II: 21, National Archives; Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, IV: 174-176, 186-187, 198; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 50-56, 129-130. The deposition of a Pennsylvanian who was forced into the Virginia militia in autumn 1775 is in VMHB, 14 (1907), 246.

[59]"Petition of the Inhabitants Westward of the Laurel Hill" (filed 1 June 1776), Virginia Convention Papers, 1774-1776, VSL; convention minutes 1 June and 15 June 1776, ibid.; VMHB, 18 (1910), 33-34.

[60]Journal of the Presbyterian Historical Society, 38 (1960), 191-192.

[61]VMHB, 16 (1908), 48-51, 55.

[62]The unsigned draft is in the HSP's Society Misc. Collec., Box 4 (Petitions), folder 4b-#2. It is addressed to Congress from "the Inhabitants of the Country West of the Alleghenny Mountains," and dates from sometime after 9 Oct. 1775. Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 185-188, has some discussion and a full transcription of the draft.

[63]See Abernethy's discussion of the petition in Western Lands, 176-177. Abernethy speculates that the Wharton interests were behind the scheme and hoped to use it to carry off the Vandalia scheme. I disagree with Abernethy's assessment that the Westsylvania petition treated the Walpole Company's claims "in the most favorable terms," and therefore I doubt the connection; but under the circumstances perhaps no scheme or plot can be entirely discounted. Edmund Pendleton of Virginia was told that the new-state petition was the tool of a "Party . . . formed on a junction of the Vandalia, Indiana, and Colo. Croghans Interests, who rather wish to have their claims to lands there settled in a New Government under their joint Influence, than to an Impartial Legislature at Wmsburg." Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, N.J., 1950-), I: 464. Both Abernethy and George Henry

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Allen, "New Governments West of the Alleghanies before 1780," University of Wisconsin Bulletin (Historical Series), 2 (1897), 64-68, attribute the new-state agitation of 1776 to a group led by one David Rogers of West Augusta. Frederick Jackson Turner, "Western State-Making in the Revolutionary Era," American Historical Review, 1 (1895-1896), 81-83, also mentions the Westsylvania petition.

[64]Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, III: 140-141, 344-345; Worthington Chauncey Ford et al., eds., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington, D.C., 1904-1937), II: 76. Within the next year leaders on each side of the dispute claimed that they had observed, and their opponents had violated, the spirit of the delegates' exhortation: Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 659-660; VMHB, 16 (1908), 48-49.

[65]"Diary of Richard Smith in the Continental Congress, 1775-1776," American Historical Review, 1 (1896), 290, 292; Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, II: 247, IV: 161-162, 184, 197.

[66]Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, II: 174-177; Edward G. Williams, ed., "The Journal of Richard Butler, 1775: Continental Congress' Envoy to the Western Indians," WPHM, 46 (1963), 381-395, 47 (1964), 31-46, 141-156; Downes, Council Fires, 183-184, 187.

[67]This trio was also to arbitrate a dispute between the Delaware leader White Eyes and the trading firm of Bernard and Michael Gratz. Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, IV: 266-270, 396; minutes of meeting of commissioners for Indian affairs, 8 Nov. 1776, in Letter Book II, Col. George Morgan Letter Books, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[68]Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, V: 669-670; Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 183; Smith to the commissioners, 24 Oct. 1776, Yeates Papers, HSP.

[69]Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, V: 752, 785-786, VI: 922; Morgan to Pentecost, 17 Nov. 1776, and Pentecost to Morgan, 19 Nov. 1776, Morgan Letter Book I, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; commissioners' order regarding liquor, 26 Aug. 1776, commissioners' circular letter, 29 Sept. 1776, and commissioners' recommendation concerning scouts on the Ohio, 1 Oct. 1776, Morgan Letter Book II, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; VMHB, 17 (1909), 260-261.

[70]John Carnahan to assembly, 18 May 1776, in Genl. Assem. File, 1st Session - 1, Records of the General

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Assembly, 1776-1790 (Record Group 7), PHMC; Col. Recs., X: 597.

[71]Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, V: 542, 562, 589-590, 596, 753, 759, VI: 1013; [George Morgan] to John Hancock, 8 Nov. 1776, Morgan Letter Book I, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; commissioners to Mackay, 13 Sept. 1776, and same to same, 10 Oct. 1776, Morgan Letter Book II, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., V: 59; "Queries proposed by Colonel Mackay to the Commissioners," 10 Oct. 1776, Darlington Memorial Library, Pittsburgh; Michael Huffnagle to commissioners for Indian affairs in middle department, 7 Nov. 1776, Society Misc. Collec., HSP; Mackay to the commissioners, 12 Sept., 24 Sept., 19 Oct., 26 Oct. 1776, Jasper Yeates Family Papers, Manuscript Group 137, PHMC; and two letters by Mackay in Egle, ed., Historical Register, II: 61-63, 65-66.

[72]Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, VI: 976; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 185; Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, I: 257n.

[73]Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, IV: 202-203; see also the deposition of Michael Huffnagle, 5 July 1775, Society Collec., HSP, which reports a spirited exchange between St. Clair and Connolly about the conflict with Great Britain.

[74]"Proposals from Major John Connelly to his Excelly. General Gage, with his Answers thereto, Sepr. 11th 1775," Gage Papers, WLCL; Connolly, "Narrative," 316-317; J. F. D. Smyth, A Tour in the United States of America: Containing an Account of the Present Situation of that Country . . . (London, 1784), II: 245-248; Gage to Alexander McKee, 12 Sept. 1775, and to Capt. Hugh Lord, 12 Sept. 1775, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[75]Col. Recs., X: 444-445, 472; Francis Lightfoot Lee to Landon Carter, 21 Oct. 1775, Lee Family Papers, section 112, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.

[76]Connolly, "Narrative," recounts his experiences to the end of the war; J. F. D. Smyth was one of those arrested with Connolly in 1775, and authored Tour in the United States (see note 74 above), which on II: 229-319 describes his association with Connolly. Burton, "John Connolly," and Caley, "Life of Connolly," give information about his career after the Revolution. See Abernethy, Western Lands, 357-359, for his appearance in Kentucky as a British agent late in the 1780s. Col. Recs., Pa. Arch., 1st ser., and Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia (vols. III

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and IV) contain information about Connolly's arrest in 1775 and subsequent imprisonment. A letter from Connolly to Lord Sydney, written not long after the war, proposed the development of British settlements in Ontario; Gratz Mss., British Army and American Loyalists, case 4, box 28, HSP.

[77]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 169-170; Dwight L. Smith, ed., The Western Journals of John May, Ohio Company Agent and Business Adventurer (Cincinnati, 1961), 71; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 223.

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Notes to Chapter 6

[1]Petition of Edward Cook to Gov. Thomas McKean, 8 Feb. 1803, Society Collec., HSP. For a biographical sketch of Cook, see PMHB, 3 (1879), 320.

[2]Commissioners of Indian Affairs, middle dept., to committee of Congress for Indian affairs, 18 Aug. 1776, Morgan Letter Book II, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; same to same, 31 Aug. 1776, and George Morgan to John Hancock, 15 Mar. 1777, Morgan Letter Book I, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[3]Commissioners' "Queries" to Morgan, 26 Oct. 1776, and his answers, dated (probably incorrectly) Jan. 1778, in George Morgan Papers, 1755-1822, LC; minutes of meeting between Guyasuta, Captain Pipe, The Shade, and Virginia officers, Fort Pitt, 6 July 1776, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Downes, Council Fires, 179-211; Savelle, George Morgan, ch. 6. For the planned Virginia expedition against Pluggy's Town see Dorsey Pentecost to Gov. Patrick Henry, 5 Nov. 1776, VMHB, 17 (1909), 161-163; Henry to George Morgan and Col. John Neville (enclosing council resolutions), 12 Mar. 1777, Morgan to John Hancock, 15 Mar. 1777, and Morgan and Neville to Henry, 1 Apr. 1777, Morgan Letter Book I, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[4]Commissioners of Indian affairs, middle dept., to committee of Congress for Indian affairs, 25 Sept. 1776, Morgan Letter Book II, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[5]The most thorough treatment of the Indians' aims, politics, diplomacy, and war in the region during the Revolution is Downes, Council Fires, 179-276. For the eventual failure of the American efforts toward Indian neutrality see also Weslager, Delaware Indians, 295-318. For the course of the war in the region and narrative summaries of enemy raiding see: Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 175-203; Jack M. Sosin, The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763-1783 (New York, 1967), esp. 89, 105-112, 120-123, 133-137; and Ray Allen Billington, Westward Expansion: A History of the American Frontier, 4th ed. (New York, 1974), 175-194. Edward G. Williams, "Fort Pitt and the Revolution on the Western Frontier," WPHM, 59 (1976), 1-37, 129-152, 251-287, 379-444, is a narrative of military activity.

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[6]Hand to Katharine Hand, 9 Nov. 1777, HSP; Hand to Richard Peters, 9 Nov. 1777, Hand to Patrick Henry, 9 Nov. 1777, Hand to Peters, 24 Dec. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC.

[7]Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, IX: 942-945, 1018, X: 9, 191; Clymer and Mathews to Henry Laurens, 27 Apr. 1778, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, V: 155, National Archives.

[8]Louise Phelps Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio, 1778-1779 (Madison, Wis., 1916), 55-59, 88-89, 293-294; [Thomas Wharton] to Archibald Lochry, to John Proctor, and to Henry Laurens, all 2 May 1778, in Record Group 27, PHMC.

[9]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 200, 230-231, 252-253, 327-331; George Morgan to court of inquiry, 25 Jan. 1779, Morgan Letter Book III, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; John Dodge to Congress, 25 Jan. 1779, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, VII: 235, National Archives. The material printed in Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, deals primarily with McIntosh's period of command in the district. See also Harvey H. Jackson, Lachlan McIntosh and the Politics of Revolutionary Georgia (Athens, Ga., 1979).

[10]Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, XII: 200-201; also XI: 460-461, XIII: 232-241. For Washington's opinion of McIntosh, see ibid., XIV: 262.

[11]Ibid., XIII: 486-487, 500-502; XIV: 58-62, 114-118, 194-196, 271, 278-281, 314-318, 421-422; XVI: 486; XVII: 158, 349; XIX: 119-120; XXIII: 396, 403; XXIV: 48.

[12]John Campbell to Edward Hand, 9 Mar. 1779, in Edward Hand Papers, 1777-1788 (Manuscript Group 66), PHMC; Brodhead to Joseph Reed, 13 Dec. 1779, in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 39-40; Dictionary of American Biography, s.v. "Brodhead, Daniel."

[13]Irvine to Washington, 2 Dec. 1781, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Washington to Irvine, 18 Dec. 1781, 21 Dec. 1781, and Irvine to Anne Irvine, 12 Apr. 1782, Irvine Papers, V: 22, 24, 76, HSP. See also the orderly book from Fort Pitt, Dec. 1781 to June 1782, Craig Collection, VIII-B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[14]Irvine to Anne Irvine, 29 May 1782, Irvine Papers, VI: 2, HSP; see also same to same, [7?] Oct. 1782, ibid., VII: 22.

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[15]Washington to Brodhead, 23 June 1774, in Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 372; ibid., 176; Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense on the Upper Ohio, 1777-1778 (Madison, Wis., 1912), 16-18, 43n, 74-76, 267-268; Irvine Papers, V: 117, 118, HSP.

[16][George Bryan] to Archibald Lochry, [5?] Aug. 1777, and [Thomas Wharton] to Hand, 22 Aug. 1777, Record Group 27, PHMC; Col. Recs., XIII: 531; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 28, 425; Brodhead to Joseph Reed, 10 Mar. 1781, Daniel Brodhead Letter Book, 1780-1781, HSP; Reed to Lochry, 21 May 1779, Gratz Mss. (Old Congress), case 1, box 10, HSP; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 384-385.

[17]Sampson Mathews, George Clymer, and Samuel McDowell (congressional commissioners) to Edward Hand, 21 Mar. 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 188-190; Lachlan McIntosh to Board of War, 11 Jan. 1779, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 162, p. 280, National Archives.

[18]The variable orthography of the time often did not distinguish between Yohogania County and the Youghiogheny River, or between Monongalia County and the Monongahela River, as blatantly as does standardized modern spelling. Each pair represents two of many variations of each of these place names.

[19]Hand to Patrick Henry, 9 Nov. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), and Mathews, Clymer, and McDowell to Hand, 21 Mar. 1778, ibid., box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC. When Colonel Brodhead inquired about the territorial extent of his authority, Washington replied simply "that your command is comprehended in the troops under your direction." Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 333.

[20]Irvine to Anne Irvine, 1 May 1782, Irvine Papers, V: 94, HSP.

[21]John Dodge to Congress, 25 Jan. 1779, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, VII: 235, National Archives.

[22]There are many references to such county conferences in the correspondence between county lieutenants and regional commandants; examples of minutes or records of such councils are: Irvine Papers, VI: 88, 103, HSP; "Council of War, Monongalia," 27 June 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC; Crumrine, Washington County, 185-186; Edward Hand Papers, I: 6, HSP; "At a Council of War held for the County of Monongalia," 10 Apr. 1777, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh. A 1777 council of

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Ohio County militia officers forthrightly overruled certain militia deployment instructions from the Virginia government and informed the governor of their reasons for doing so. Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 242-243.

[23]Brodhead to Evans, 3 May 1779, in Order Book of Daniel Brodhead, 1779-1781, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Brodhead to Samuel Irwin, 2 Feb. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; Hand to Katharine Hand, 15 Aug. 1777, HSP.

[24]Louise Phelps Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio, 1779-1781 (Madison, Wis., 1917), 208.

[25]Henry Taylor to Hand, 31 Aug. 1777, and Devereux Smith to Hand, 26 June 1777, 8 Aug. 1777, in Hand Papers (MG 66), PHMC; Hand to Archibald Lochry, 6 July 1777, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 210-211.

[26]McFarland to Hand, 5 Feb. 1778, Hand Papers (MG 66), PHMC; see also: Hand to Joshua Meeks, 13 Jan. 1778, and to McFarland, 17 Apr. 1778, ibid.; Edward Cook to Archibald Lochry, 12 Oct. 1778, in Letters of Members of the Pennsylvania Provincial Congress, III: 125, HSP; Irvine Papers, VI: 38, VII: 29, HSP; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 51, 52; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 46.

[27]Hand Papers, I: 9, 14, 17, HSP; Irvine Papers, VI: 38, HSP; Edward Cook to Hand, 6 May 1778, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh.

[28]Hand to Richard Peters, 24 Dec. 1777, and to Horatio Gates, 7 Mar. 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC; Brodhead to Reed, 22 May 1781, in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 161-162.

[29]Hand to William Crawford, 5 Feb. 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC; McIntosh to "Officers and other Principle Inhabitants of the County of Westmorland," 15 Aug. 1778, and to Archibald Lochry, 3 Mar. 1779, Gratz Collec., Generals of the Revolution, case 4, box 13, HSP; Brodhead to county lieutenants (circular), 24 Aug. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; Brodhead to Lochry, 12 Apr. 1779, in Archibald Lochry Letters, 1779-1780 (Manuscript Group 276), PHMC; Irvine Papers, VII: 89, HSP.

[30]Hand to Archibald Lochry, 5 Nov. 1777, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Henry Taylor to Hand, 17 Aug. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), and Hand to Capt. James Sullivan, 10 July 1778, ibid., box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC; Brodhead to Lochry, 16 Apr. 1779, Lochry

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Letters (MG 276), PHMC; William Irvine to George Washington, 2 Dec. 1781, Washington Papers, ser. 4.

[31]Hand to Archibald Lochry, 18 Oct. 1777, to Edward Cook, 6 May 1778, to William Minn et al., 12 May 1778, and to John Campbell, 27 June 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC; Brodhead to Lochry, 19 June 1780, Lochry Letters (MG 276), PHMC.

[32]Hand to Richard Peters, 10 July 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC.

[33]Brodhead to Samuel Irwin, 2 Feb. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP.

[34]10 Sept. 1782, Irvine Papers, VI: 123, HSP.

[35]Boyd Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 78, 224, 335, 417; Boyd Crumrine, ed., "Minute (or Order) Book of the Virginia Court Held for Ohio County, Virginia, at Black's Cabin (now West Liberty, W. Va.), from January 6, 1777, until September 4, 1780," Annals of Carnegie Museum, 3 (1905-1906), 8-9, 21. The early Monongalia County records have not survived. The act breaking West Augusta into three counties is in Hening, ed., Virginia Statutes at Large, IX: 262-266.

[36]Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 79, 80, 216, 257, 299-300; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 440-441.

[37]Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 78; see also Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 530, 537, 566, 567. Thomas Gist was recommended for the Yohogania court in 1780; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 417.

[38]J. Paul Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary Democracy (Philadelphia, 1936), 196-199; Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., County Government and Archives in Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1947).

[39]Col. Recs., XI: 252-253; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., V: 455-456; deposition of Jeremiah Lochry, 26 July 1777, Record Group 27, PHMC; Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 (Harrisburg, 1942), 35-36. For the role of the constitution of 1776 in state politics during the Revolution, see: Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution; Wayne L. Bockelman and Owen S. Ireland, "The Internal Revolution in Pennsylvania: An Ethnic-Religious Interpretation," Pa. Hist., 41 (1974), 125-159; David Hawke, In the Midst of a Revolution (Philadelphia, 1961); Selsam, Pennsylvania

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Constitution of 1776; Charles H. Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, 1760-1776, Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, Series in History, no. 1 (Philadelphia, 1901); Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776 (Harrisburg, 1953).

[40]Carnahan to Hand, 5 Jan. 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC. One of the men Carnahan named as a "scoundrel" was James Smith, a leader of the Sideling Hill affair in Cumberland County in the 1760s who had moved west and was a field officer of the Westmoreland militia during the Revolution. Another was "Mr. Perry," probably John Perry, who had succeeded Carnahan in the (elected) colonelcy of the 2nd Battalion of the county's militia; Pa. Arch., 6th ser., II: 275, 302, 309.

[41]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 440. For these disputes see also: ibid., VIII: 284, IX: 241; ibid., 2d ser., III: 328-329; John Moore to [Council of Safety], 15 Jan. 1777, Record Group 27, PHMC; Moore to John Proctor and James Smith, 22 Mar. 1777, Archibald Lochry to Joseph Reed, 26 Apr. 1781, and David Duncan to Reed, 9 June 1781, ibid.; Christopher Hays and Thomas Scott to Reed, 15 Aug. 1781, Gratz Mss., Pennsylvania Ser., Committee and Council of Safety, case 1, box 15, HSP; Irvine Papers, V: 120, HSP.

[42]Crumrine, ed., "Ohio Minute Book," 16-17; Henry Taylor to Edward Hand, 31 Aug. 1777, Hand Papers, I: 22, HSP; James Chew to Hand, 4 Apr. 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC.

[43]Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers, I: 244-245, 387-388, 462-465.

[44]John Carnahan to John Moore, 24 Dec. 1776, Record Group 27, PHMC; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 229; Hand Papers, I: 34, HSP; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 39; Thomas Gaddis to Edward Hand, 10 July 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC. Regarding Pennsylvania militia enrollment see also petition of Westmoreland County inhabitants west of Youghiogheny River, 20 Jan. 1778, Record Group 27, PHMC. Two sources (from 1776 and 1781) estimate the population in the zone between the "Yough" and the Monongahela; while they differ, both estimates indicate a considerable amount of mixture of Pennsylvanians and Virginians, with the latter predominant in the sector by at least a two to one ratio. Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers, I: 594; Edward Cook to John Shee and Jacob Morris, 6 Apr. 1781, Gratz Mss., Penna. Series, Provincial Conference, case 1, box 16, HSP.

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[45]John Boreman to George Morgan, 24 Sept. 1778, George Morgan Papers, LC; George Bryan to Archibald Lochry, 7 Nov. 1778, Record Group 27, PHMC; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VII: 79-80. Campbell was captured by Indians while returning upriver from the falls of the Ohio in autumn 1779 and spent most of the rest of the war in prison in Canada. After the Revolution he lived in Kentucky. Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 231-232n.

[46]Morgan's remarks on commissioners' queries of Oct. 1776, dated Jan. 1778 but probably written in late 1776 or early 1777, are in George Morgan Papers, LC; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 1; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XIV: 262, 281; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 188-190, 291.

[47]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 170-171; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 167.

[48]These incidents figure prominently in the source materials and secondary treatments of the period, and most of them will receive more attention elsewhere in these pages. For Irvine's term "fit of phrensy" see his letter to Washington, 20 Apr. 1782, Washington Papers, ser. 4.

[49]The anonymous note describing this event of 18 Sept. 1781 appears on a page of the memorandum book kept by Ephraim Douglass when he was quartermaster of the 8th Pennsylvania Regiment at Kittanning, Sept.-Dec. 1776, at Darlington Library, Pittsburgh. "Mr. Irvine" may have been John Irwin.

[50]Brodhead to Archibald Lochry, 20 Jan. 1780, Lochry Letters (MG 276), PHMC; Joseph Reed to Lochry, 10 Feb. 1780, Record Group 27, PHMC; and Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VII: 770-773, VIII: 42, 50-51, 77-80, 106-107, 109-110, 149, 197-199.

[51]George Morgan to Board of War, 23 Mar. 1779, Morgan Letter Book III, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[52]In the early part of 1779 there was an actual shortage of available foodstuffs: see George Morgan to Lachlan McIntosh, 7 Jan. and 13 Jan. 1779, Morgan Letter Book III, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; for evidence of surpluses at other times see Edward Hand to Katharine Hand, 28 June 1778, HSP, and William Irvine to George Washington, 29 Oct. 1782, Washington Papers, ser. 4. Information relative to the supply problem and the factors affecting it is spread throughout the published and manuscript papers of Hand, McIntosh, Brodhead, and Irvine, as well as the records of

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the Pennsylvania and Continental governments and the materials related to Morgan's work as a Continental commissary in his letterbooks at Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. See also Savelle, George Morgan, ch. 7.

[53]Brodhead to Lochry, 31 July 1780, Record Group 27, PHMC; Brodhead to Washington, 18 Aug. 1780, 14 Sept. 1780, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 120, 513-516, 536-537, 558-559. Brodhead also had a very difficult time keeping his regulars supplied with clothing during 1780 and 1781; for example see his to Joseph Reed, 22 Jan. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP.

[54]Hand to James Willing, 28 Dec. 1777, to Samuel Moorhead, 3 Jan. 1778, and to George Morgan, 7 Apr. 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 145-153, 165-166, 169-170.

[55]Brodhead to Archibald Lochry, 10 July 1780, 13 Sept. 1780, and to Capt. T. Stokeley, 3 Aug. 1780, Lochry Letters (MG 276), PHMC; Brodhead to Joseph Reed, 8 Dec. 1780, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 248, 282, 286-287; Reed to William Amberson, 5 Aug. 1780, Record Group 27, PHMC; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 641-642.

[56]Brodhead's orders of Sept. and Oct. to Capts. Brady and Springer and Majors Vernon and Taylor are in Brodhead Order Book, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh.

[57]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 588-589; John Boreman to George Morgan, 18 Oct. 1780, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 163, p. 357, National Archives; Brodhead to Washington, 17 Oct. 1780, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP.

[58]Brodhead to Ephraim Blaine, 3 Nov. 1780, 10 Dec. 1780; to Frederick Vernon, 7 Nov. 1780; to William Taylor, 28 Nov. 1780; to Richard Peters, 7 Dec. 1780; to David Zeisberger, 2 Dec. 1780, 21 Jan. 1781; and to Samuel Brady, 16 Dec. 1780, all from Brodhead Letter Book, HSP. Also Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 457.

[59]For relations between the two officers and Brodhead's view that Clark was pulling away vital provisions and men, see: Brodhead to Joseph Reed, 22 Jan. 1781, 25 Feb. 1781, 10 Mar. 1781, and Brodhead to George Washington, 23 Jan. 1781, 10 Mar. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; James Alton James, ed., George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781, vol. VIII of Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library (Springfield, Ill., 1912), 538, 547-548; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 133-134, 317-318, 340-341; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, II: 108-109; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 768-769, IX: 190, 200-201, 380-381.

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[60]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 289; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 332-333, 435; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 443-445; Brodhead to Washington, 13 May 1780, Washington Papers, ser. 4; orders to Serg. Robert Porter, 28 Sept. 1780, Brodhead Order Book, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Craig, ed., Olden Time, II: 326-329; Hand to Henry Heth, 17 July 1778, and to Tacitus Gaillard and Benjamin Farra, 8 Feb. 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC; Irvine Papers, VI: 7, VII: 53, HSP; Fort Pitt orderly book, Dec. 1781-June 1782, Craig Collec., VIII-B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[61]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 39-40, 119-120, 149-150, 218, 250; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 14, pp. 334-335, National Archives; ibid., item 42, VIII: 266, 270, 272, 274, 278, 282; ibid., item 78, III: 445; Irvine Papers, VI: 77, HSP; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 443; Boyd Crumrine, ed., "The Records of Deeds for the District of West Augusta, Virginia, for the Court held at Fort Dunmore (Pittsburgh, Pa.), 1775-1776," Annals of Carnegie Museum, 3 (1905-1906), 285-290; Brodhead to Frederick Muhlenberg, 28 Oct. 1781, and to Thomas McKean, 28 Oct. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, XVI: 373; C. W. Butterfield, ed., Washington-Irvine Correspondence (Madison, Wis., 1882), 170-173.

[62]During his service with the 18th Regiment in the Illinois country before the Revolution, Fowler was involved with a faction that challenged the command of Lt. Col. John Wilkins; Fowler recanted profusely but finally left the British army. During the Revolution Fowler exclaimed his devotion to the American cause, yet in Sept. 1774 he had written Gen. Gage that despite rheumatism in his legs he wished to stay in the British service to help suppress the American rebels: "if I cannot Serve on my Legs I will Serve my King on my Stumps should I be reduced to that extremity." See Fowler to Gage, 22 Sept. 1774, 12 Jan. 1775, 2 Feb. 1775, 2 June 1775, 15 June 1775, 12 July 1775, all in Gage Papers, WLCL; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 226; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 41, III: 282, National Archives; Fowler to Edward Hand, 18 Aug. 1779, Hand Papers (MG 66), PHMC.

[63]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 356-370, 387-388, 393-396, 410-412, 470-490; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, IV: 197, 201, National Archives; James, ed., Clark Papers, 591-592; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXII: 200-201, XXIV: 29-30; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 97; David Duncan to Joseph Reed, 9 June 1781, Record Group 27, PHMC; Samuel Huntington to Washington, 20 Apr. 1781, 2 June 1781, Washington Papers, ser. 4; and the

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relevant correspondence (esp. between 19 Aug. and 21 Oct. 1781) in Brodhead Letter Book, HSP. One of the charges against Brodhead was that he was interested in land speculation. It is clear from his statements that he did not believe his official position precluded him from taking advantage of such opportunities should they present themselves. Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 121, 150, 211. Many of Brodhead's contemporaries would have shared his opinion. His successor at Fort Pitt wrangled a special consideration from Pennsylvania regarding the title to McKee's or Montour's Island near the mouth of Chartiers Creek. Irvine Papers, VIII: 9, 26, 65, 84, 93, 100, 111. Irvine was also a silent member of the Indiana Company, which continued to seek a large grant of land on the basis of the old "suffering traders" claim. Abernethy, Western Lands, 269.

[64]Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas, Continuance Docket, vol. I, Jan., July, and Oct. 1781 sessions; Westmoreland Quarter Sessions Docket (Apr. 1773-Apr. 1783), Apr. 1782 session; Westmoreland Quarter Sessions Docket (July 1783-Oct. 1785), July 1784 session; Michael Huffnagle to William Moore, 31 July 1782, Record Group 27, PHMC; petition of Pittsburgh inhabitants, 1 Aug. 1782, ibid.; Irvine Papers, V: 49-50, HSP; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 606-607. As soon as he assumed the command Gen. Irvine had Fowler removed from his position as auditor; Irvine Papers, V: 25, HSP.

[65]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 365.

[66]Abernethy, Western Lands, 217-219; Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia, Anno Domini 1779 [May 3-June 26, 1779], (Williamsburg, 1779); Hindle, Rittenhouse, 215-218; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 46-47, 352-354, 570-571; ibid., 2nd ser., III: 425; Col. Recs., XII: 212-214; Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers, III: 206-208, 281, 286-289; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 118-119n; "List of land claimed by Settlers and Pre-emptioners [in the Districts of Kentucky; Monongalia, Yohogania, and Ohio; Augusta, Botetourt, and Greenbrier; Washington and Montgomery], for which Certificates by the Comsrs. have been granted," in Virginia Land Office Records, VSL. For reasons that remain obscure the county courts of Yohogania and Monongalia disagreed in their opinions of the land commissioners' actions; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 358.

[67]Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, II: 95-96; ibid., 11, 88; Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers, V: 303-304, 478, VI: 8, 74; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 506-507.

[68]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 518-519, 533, 549-550, 557, 562-566, 588-589, 607, X: 8-9; Col. Recs., XIII: 253,

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541-542; William Moore to Benjamin Harrison, 6 Apr. 1782, Record Group 27, PHMC; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, III: 283, 380, 459; Irvine Papers, V: 118, VI: 25, 102, HSP. The Pennsylvania surveyor, Alexander McClean, was escorted by a large party of Westmoreland militia during the June incident but chose to retire rather than risk bloodshed.

[69]Hindle, Rittenhouse, 250-270, describes the steps taken to run the final boundary. Regarding the actual boundary surveys, see the 1784 memorandum book of John Ewing, in the Diaries and Journals Collection (Manuscript Group 6) at PHMC; the journals and memorandum books, 1785-1787, of Andrew Porter, at HSP; and the papers of Andrew Ellicott at LC.

[70]Col. Recs., XII: 212-214; petitions from west of Monongahela in Genl. Assem. File, 5th session - 1, folder 2, Records of the General Assembly, 1776-1790 (Record Group 7), PHMC; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, X: 272-278, 462-464, XI: 196-203, 234-235, 383-384.

[71]John Proctor to Joseph Reed, 1 June 1780, in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 285.

[72]Ibid., 515.

[73]Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, III: 543; also ibid., 520-521; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 72; petition of Benjamin Johnston, 9 June 1783, Legislative Petitions, Monongalia Co., VCL; James, ed., Clark Papers, 589. Thomas Jefferson, Virginia's governor when the agreement was made, tried to soothe the discontent that he feared might "Shipwreck the general cause." Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers, III: 281.

[74]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 583-584.

[75]Irvine to George Washington, 20 Apr. 1782, Washington Papers, ser. 4. Brodhead observed the same lack of effective civil government; Brodhead to Samuel Irwin, 2 Feb. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP.

[76]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 714, IX: 439; see also ibid., IX: 374-375, for council's defensiveness about the delays.

[77]Brodhead to Washington, 24 Apr. 1780, Irvine to Washington, 2 Dec. 1781, 20 Apr. 1782 (enclosure), Washington Papers, ser. 4; Brodhead to Reed, 25 Feb. 1781, 3 Apr. 1781, and to Richard Peters, 10 Mar. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP.

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[78]James Marshal to William Irvine, 17 July 1782, Irvine Papers, VI: 57, HSP; also ibid., 38; petition of militia west of Monongahela, 25 Aug. 1780, and Charles Campbell to William Moore, 4 Sept. 1782, Record Group 27, PHMC; Edward Cook to Archibald Lochry, 27 Oct. 1780, Society Collection, HSP; Cook to John Shee and Jacob Morris, 6 Apr. 1781, Gratz Mss., Pennsylvania Series, Provincial Conference, case 1, box 16, HSP; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 484-485.

[79]Irvine Papers, V: 63, VI: 6, VII: 34, HSP.

[80]Jefferson's orders to Clark relative to this campaign are in James, ed., Clark Papers, 485-490; this volume contains Clark's papers relative to his experience in the upper Ohio Valley in 1781.

[81]Ibid., 559. Also Brodhead to Washington, 27 Mar. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP.

[82]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 23-24, 137, 189, 238-239, 247, 559-560; James, ed., Clark Papers, 565, 569-570; Clark to Archibald Lochry, [June or July 1781], Misc. Mss. (1744-1859), Northern Interior and Western Counties, HSP.

[83]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 369. When Clark moved down to Kentucky in August some of the Westmoreland leaders believed that they had been misled regarding his true goal and that "the Protection of the Frontiers of Virginia" was his only aim; ibid.

[84]Ibid., 325.

[85]Ibid., 343-345; ibid., X: 56-57, 80-82, 95-96, 125-126; Christopher Hays and Thomas Scott to Joseph Reed, 15 Aug. 1781, Gratz Mss., Pennsylvania Series, Committee and Council of Safety, case 1, box 15, HSP; James, ed., Clark Papers, 567-568. For other comments against Clark or his supporters by Pennsylvania officials, see: Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 233-234, 324-325, 352-353, 369-370, 444-445.

[86]James, ed., Clark Papers, 577-580 (quotation from 577).

[87]Irvine to Washington, 2 Dec. 1781, Washington Papers, ser. 4. A copy of Major A. De Peyster's roster of the casualties (orig. British Museum Add. Mss. 38,321, p. 125) is in Misc. Mss. Collec., LC, under Lochry's name.

[88]Scott to William Moore, 1 Feb. 1782, Record Group 27, PHMC; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 438-439.

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[89]Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, X: 462-464, XI: 383-384. For the larger issue of the oath as an issue in Pennsylvania politics during this period, see Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, esp. 16, 18-19, 21, 39-41, 49, 103-104, 154-155, 167-169, 179-181, 197-198.

[90]Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, III: 520-521.

[91]Yohogania County petition to House of Delegates, 3 Nov. 1778, Legislative Petitions, Yohogania Co., VSL; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 267-268.

[92]Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, IX: 325-326, X: 114-115, 373-376; Thomas Scott to William Moore, 1 Feb. 1782, Record Group 27, PHMC.

[93]Memorial of William Latta, William Todd, and Henry Westbay, [1 Mar.] 1781, and reply of council, 2 May 1781, Record Group 27, PHMC; also Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, 3 Apr. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP.

[94]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 637; also ibid., 546, 557; Irvine Papers, VI: 18, 57, HSP.

[95]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 572, 575; Irvine Papers, V: 69, VI: 4, 112, HSP.

[96]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 98-99, 136, 147-148; Minutes of the Eighth General Assembly, 130.

[97]Important treatments of the new-state agitation include Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, 112-115, 127-128; Abernethy, Western Lands, chap. 19-20; Turner, "Western State-Making in the Revolutionary Era." Turner and Abernethy also discuss other new-state movements elsewhere on the frontiers, which helps place the affairs at the Ohio forks into larger context. Abernethy is particularly useful in dealing with the speculative aims of ambitious men on the Virginia frontiers.

[98]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 564-567. According to the Pennsylvanians McClean's absent Virginia counterpart, the Rev. James Madison, had worked to delay the survey and incite resistance to Pennsylvania; see ibid., 402, and Dorsey Pentecost to William Moore, 25 Mar. 1782, Record Group 27, PHMC. Madison was replaced by Joseph Neville when the survey went ahead in the fall.

[99]Pentecost to Moore, 25 Mar. 1782, Record Group 27, PHMC; Pentecost's description of Pigman is interesting since Pentecost himself was thought equally "factious" and

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"Troblesom" to the Pennsylvania cause by some. For Pigman see also: Hand Papers, I: 6, 43, HSP; Monongalia Council of War, 27 June 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 235n. For Vanmeter: McIlwaine, ed., "Virginia Justices," 82, 116; Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 533, 564, 565, 567.

[100]Two petitions from west of Laurel Hill, 1782, are in Legislative Petitions, Ohio Co., VSL; petition read in Congress, 27 Jan. 1783, in Papers of the Continental Congress, item 48, p. 251, National Archives. See also Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 585. The Jesse Pigman who signed the Virginia petition designated himself "Jr."; Pigmans "Jr." and "Sr." signed the petition to Congress; I do not know whether the elder or the younger Pigman was the man present at the Monongahela with Vanmeter and Newland when McClean's survey was halted.

[101]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 402.

[102]Louise Phelps Kellogg, ed., "Petition for a Western State, 1780," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 1 (1914), 265-269. Kellogg is only guessing when she names some possible "joint authors" of the memorial in addition to Benjamin Johnston. See also Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 167; and Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 280.

[103]Compare petition from Westmoreland County, 19 Feb. 1779, in Genl. Assem. File, 3d Session, Records of the General Assembly, 1776-1790 (Record Group 7), PHMC, with petition of inhabitants of western country to Gen. Irvine, 1782, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 69, II: 401, National Archives.

[104]Papers of the Continental Congress, item 48, p. 251, National Archives. See also Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 546.

[105]Thomas Scott to Joseph Reed, 24 Jan. 1781, in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 714.

[106]For some fears and complaints on this score see Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, III: 133-136, 594-595, 630-631; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 56-57, 172.

[107]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 714; Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, 67; for some petitions on the land matter see Minutes of the Sixth General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1781-1782), 513; Minutes of the Ninth General Assembly, 58, 118, 146, 340-341, 369.

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[108]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 240. See also ibid., 307, 332; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 302, 391; and Daniel Brodhead to Col. Moses Rawlings, 16 Apr. 1779, Brodhead Order Book, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh. In 1780 the attraction of Kentucky lands was one of the factors that kept the 9th Virginia Regiment (formerly the 13th) from recruiting enough men in the area to maintain strength; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 149-150.

[109]Brodhead to John Jay, 26 Oct. 1779, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, III: 383-384, National Archives; Brodhead to Capt. Jno. Clark, 11 Oct. 1779, Brodhead Order Book, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 96-97. Some Westmoreland County people may have encroached onto Indian lands the following spring; Brodhead to Archibald Lochry, 13 Apr. 1780, Record Group 27, PHMC. In Oct. 1778 the men on McIntosh's campaign had to be ordered not to blaze trees to mark lands in the Indian country; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 437.

[110]The first of these depositions appear on p. 359 of Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," and p. 56 of Crumrine, ed., "Ohio Minute Book."

[111]Brodhead to Joseph Reed, 22 Jan. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP.

[112]S[amuel] W[harton] to William Trent, 13 Nov. 1782, Etting Collec., II: 62, HSP; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, III: 528; Irvine Papers, VII: 40, HSP; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 468, X: 168; William Irvine to George Washington, 20 Apr. 1782, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Irvine to president of Penna. (William Moore), 3 Dec. 1781, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh (printed in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 458-459).

[113]This language is from the 22 June 1782 petition to the Virginia governor, Legislative Petitions, Ohio Co., VSL.

[114]Kellogg, ed., "Petition for Western State," 265-267; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 417, 424; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 170n. One "George Roohs" was also named as the leader of a new-state movement in 1780; ibid., 167. This may be a misreading of George Rootes, who was a West Augusta representative to the Virginia convention in late 1775 and 1776; Scribner et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia, III: 142n, V: 26. Others mentioned in connection with new-state activity in the early 1780s were James Innes and Thomas Smallman, both long associated with local Virginia government in the region and with large speculative

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land ventures; Abernethy, Western Lands, 254, 268-269; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, 113.

[115]Irvine to George Washington, 20 Apr. 1782, Washington Papers, ser. 4. See also Irvine's comments to the governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania, in Butterfield, ed., Washington-Irvine Correspondence, 244-245, 267, and William Moore's reply, Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 552. Irvine made these statements about Johnston/Johnson despite the fact that (as Irvine confessed) he had "no personal knowledge of the man" and could not verify the information. I have found no evidence that Benjamin Johnston was in England for part of the war as Irvine reported of "Mr. Johnson."

[116]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 611; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, III: 520-521, 594-595. Johnston's petition of 9 June 1783, in Legislative Petitions, Monongalia Co., VSL, contains in brief form the argument on which the 1783 petition to Congress was founded: that the western region was separated by distance from the seats of state government, that the inhabitants had suffered much hardship, and that the jurisdictional dispute had had a detrimental effect on internal society as well as on defense against the enemy. The petition to Congress is in Papers of the Continental Congress, item 48, p. 251, National Archives.

[117]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 193.

[118]Ibid.; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 78, 83, 224; Pa. Arch., 2d ser., III: 780.

[119]Marshal to William Irvine, 26 Aug. 1782, Irvine Papers, VI: 108, HSP. A careful reading of this letter indicates that Canon was not the sole opponent of Marshal's plan. For Canon's entry into the Pennsylvania Assembly, see Minutes of the Sixth General Assembly, 501, 514.

[120]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 715.

[121]Ibid., IX: 572-573; also ibid., 233-234, 565 (reference to "a Gentleman lately admitted to some of the honours of this State"); and S[amuel] W[harton] to William Trent, 13 Nov. 1782, Etting Collec., II: 62, HSP, which is often quoted but may be only a very muddled account of rumors from the west. Note also that in June 1781 Marshal referred to "Col. Penticost Banditti and a new Government Party," which may mean the two groups were distinct; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 233 (emphasis added).

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[122]Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 423; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, I: 281-282; Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," passim; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 79, 353, 397; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 193. A 1775 deposition reporting some of Pentecost's opinions concerning the Virginia-Pennsylvania dispute is in ibid., IV: 610.

[123]Ibid., IX: 545-546, 557, X: 168; Pentecost to William Moore, 25 Mar. 1782, Record Group 27, PHMC. For his attendance at council see Col. Recs., XIII: 120-702, passim. Pentecost lived near the Youghiogheny River before the Revolution, but by this time had purchased from Paul Froman land and a mill on the eastern branch of Chartiers Creek. He lived, therefore, within the limits of the new Washington County. Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 147-148; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 116.

[124]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 315-319.

[125]Marshal to William Irvine, 21 June 1782, Irvine Papers, VI: 29, HSP; [Minutes of the Seventh General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania] (Philadelphia, 1782-1783), 821, 828, 834, 850, 862, 865, 878, 885, 933, 966; Minutes of the Eighth General Assembly, 32, 125, 188, 277; Minutes of the Ninth General Assembly, 74, 163, 294, 301. Hugh Henry Brackenridge, another newcomer to the region, also made accusations against Pentecost; see Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 572-573, 661-663.

[126]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 181-182.

[127]Col. Recs., XIII: 703, 732; Minutes of the Ninth General Assembly, 16, 24; Pa. Arch., 2d ser., III: 777-781; Pentecost to Levi Hollingsworth, 10 Feb. 1784, in Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 495-497; Otis K. Rice, The Allegheny Frontier: West Virginia Beginnings, 1730-1830 (Lexington, Kty., 1970), 140.

[128]Such were the concerns expressed by Joseph Reed as president of the council in 1781, for example. Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 290, IX: 18, 21, 406.

[129]Minutes of the Sixth General Assembly, 658; Minutes of the Seventh General Assembly, 740, 741, 744-745, 747, 756, 773; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, XI: 14-16. Under its original provisions the act allowed the offender's trial to take place in any county that the Executive Council chose; this section of the bill was repealed in 1785.

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[130]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 666-667, X: 163-165.

[131]Finley's report is in ibid., X: 40-44.

[132]Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, XXV: 866; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 48, p. 251, National Archives. The names were all written by the same hand. Among those prominent men with Virginia connections were Richard Yeates, William Goe, Thomas Gist, Thomas Freeman, James Innes, John Stephenson, Henry Taylor, Zachariah Connell, and Benjamin Johnston. A John Cannon appears on the petition but Dorsey Pentecost's name is not to be found.

[133]Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, III: 580; petition of 5 June 1783, Legislative Petitions, Monongalia Co., VSL. The only portion of Yohogania left to Virginia was in the northern section of what is today the panhandle of West Virginia lying between the Ohio River and Pennsylvania's western boundary. Regarding the gradual abolition act: Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, 80-81, 102, 112-113.

[134]Petition from Bethlehem Twp., Washington Co., 26 Oct. 1781; petition from _____ Twp., Washington Co., 27 Oct. 1781; William Moore to Thomas Scott, 26 Oct. 1782, all in Record Group 27, PHMC. Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 355-356, 374, 405, 439, 646-647; 2d ser., III: 529.

[135]Baumann, "Removal of the Westmoreland County Seat." There were also Westmoreland leaders who objected to the formation of Fayette County in 1783; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 637-638.

[136]Washington County's officers of the 1780s are listed in Pa. Arch., 2d ser., III: 777-781. Most information on Virginia service is from Crumrine, ed., "West August Minute Book," "Yohogania Minute Book," and "Ohio Minute Book," along with some references to militia officers from other sources.

[137]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 439. For a note on Scott's career see PMHB, 11 (1887), 263-264.

[138]Petition to William Irvine from some inhabitants of the headwaters of Ten Mile and Buffalo Creeks, Washington County, 7 Aug. 1782, Irvine Papers, VI: 88, HSP.

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Notes to Chapter 7

[1]Brodhead to Richard Peters, 7 Dec. 1780, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; Brodhead to Thomas Jefferson, 23 Sept. 1780, Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers, III: 657; Brodhead to Samuel Huntington, 30 May 1781, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, IV: 221, National Archives. Also Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 537; Brodhead to William Irvine, 14 Dec. 1780, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP.

[2]For examples, see John Carnahan to Edward Hand, 5 Jan. 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC, and Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 440.

[3]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 55-56; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 332.

[4]George Clymer and Sampson Mathews to Henry Laurens, 27 Apr. 1778, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, V: 155. Sosin, Revolutionary Frontier, ch. 6, is a good brief summary of the frontier as a whole which argues that backcountry loyalism depended on a number of factors and is very difficult to pin down into neat categories, particularly in terms of such notions as "disaffection." William H. Nelson, The American Tory (Oxford, 1961), ch. 5, does not adequately comprehend the situation on the frontier, but does bring out the feelings of insecurity or fear felt by many tories, an analysis which at least lends some understanding to the character of discontent and disaffection on the frontiers.

[5]Copies of the memorial and Dunmore's reply are enclosed in Dunmore to Gage, 22 Aug. 1775, Gage Papers, WLCL. The memorialists were: John Gibson, William Crawford, William Harrison, John Stephenson, John Campbell, John Canon, John Connolly, Edward Ward, Thomas Smallman, Alexander McKee, Paul Froman, George Aston, Simon Girty, William Christie, Jacob Bousman, Valentine Crawford, Benjamin Harrison, George Gibson, Caleb Graydon, and Alexander Ross.

[6]The list of signers received some circulation among British commanders. The commandant at Detroit in June 1778 referred to McKee as "the Indian agent mentioned in Lord Dunmore's list." Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, XV: 135.

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[7]George Croghan, who did not sign the memorial but was the West Augusta group's political mentor, was suspected of loyalism and moved nearer to Philadelphia early in the war. Some suspicion was cast on Thomas Smallman and John Campbell in 1777, but no evidence of tory activity was found against either. Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 73, and Edward Hand to Richard Henry Lee et al., 21 Dec. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC. Paradoxically, these three men dominated the activities of the local Virginia revolutionary committee in the very early portion of the war. Their example illustrates how difficult and dangerous it can be to assign the region's population -- including even those leaders whose activities are fairly well known -- neat labels as "whigs" or "tories."

[8]Haldimand to Clinton, 29 Sept. 1781, in Davies, ed., Documents of American Revolution, XX: 233-236. Haldimand also argued that the Indian nations of the Ohio country could not be counted on to support a campaign such as Connolly proposed. The general's criticisms of the logistical aspects of the plan were very strong as well.

[9]William Hand Browne, ed., Archives of Maryland (Baltimore, 1883-), XI: 185, 332, 339-340, 352-353, 358, 384, 385; Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, IV: 286, 316, 317, 347, V: 652, 740; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, VIII: 156-157; Pa. Arch., 3d ser., X: 541-543; ibid., 6th ser., XII: 3-13, XIII: 3-35, 333-334; report of meeting of commissioners of Indian affairs for middle dept., 29 Aug. 1776, Morgan Letter Book II, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, 22 Jan. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; Mary Mackay to William Moore, 3 May 1782, Record Group 27, PHMC; Abernethy, Western Lands, 313.

[10]Henry Hamilton, open letter, 5 Jan. 1778, Morgan Letter Book III, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Samuel Moorhead to George Morgan, 21 Mar. 1777, and Morgan to John Hancock, 24 Mar. 1777, in ibid., Letter Book I; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 14, 39; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., V: 402; Samuel Meason to Edward Hand, 12 Aug. 1777, and Devereux Smith to Hand, 2 Sept. 1777, both in Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC; Jasper Ewing to Jasper Yeates, 4 Aug. 1777, Yeates Papers, HSP; John C. Dann, ed., The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness Accounts of the War for Independence (Chicago, 1980), 263-264.

[11]Zackwell Morgan to Edward Hand, 29 Aug. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC: Thomas Gaddis to Thomas Brown, 26 Aug. 1777, ibid., box 18 (Hand vol. 1); Thomas Brown to Hand, 29 Aug. 1777, Hand Papers, I: 21, HSP; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier

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Defense, 142-143n. Sosin, Revolutionary Frontier, 94-96, links this loyalist uprising to a large covert organization of tories that had its nucleus within the whig association of Frederick County, Maryland, but Sosin misdates the Monongalia affair by two years.

[12]John Gibson to Hand, 22 Oct. 1777, and James Chew to Hand, 23 Oct. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC; petition to Monongalia Co. inhabitants to governor of Virginia, 2 Apr. 1778, copy in Hand Papers, I: 41, HSP. Gibson's and Chew's letters are printed in Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 142-145. A brief biographical note on Z. Morgan is in Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 230n.

[13]Hand to Richard Henry Lee, Richard Law, and Daniel Roberdeau, 21 Dec. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC.

[14]George Morgan to governor of Detroit, 31 May 1776, and Morgan to Richard Henry Lee et al., 11 Nov. 1777, Dreer Collec., Soldiers of the Revolution, HSP; John Campbell to Lee et al., 19 Nov. 1777, and Campbell information of 16 Mar. 1778, Dreer Collec., French Refugees, HSP; Jasper Yeates to Lee et al., 4 Nov. 1777, Gratz Collec., case 14, box 28, HSP; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 128; Sampson Mathews, George Clymer, and Samuel McDowell, report of 27 Mar. 1778, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, II: 433, National Archives; Savelle, George Morgan, 148-151.

[15]Jasper Ewing to Jasper Yeates, 4 Aug. 1777, Yeates Papers, HSP.

[16]Hand to Horatio Gates, 21 Apr. 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC. The total Hand gives is 40, but this figure apparently includes the 14 members of the garrison who deserted and fled with Davis the night of 20-21 April, as described below.

[17]Hand to Katharine Hand, 28 Apr. 1778, HSP; deposition of James Willing, 18 Dec. 1777, and deposition of John Green, 4 May 1778, copies in Record Group 27; reports of the guard, Fort Pitt, 11-13 May 1778, Hand Papers (MG 66), PHMC; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 240, 241; and from Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC: Hand to Richard Peters, 24 Dec. 1777; to Edward Cook, 6 May 1778; to William Crawford, 12 May 1778; to Matthew Arbuckle, 18 May 1778; to Horatio Gates, 21 Apr. 1778, 14 May 1778.

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[18]Papers of the Continental Congress, item 69, I: 199, 121, 123, National Archives; ibid., item 78, II: 21; Ford et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, IV: 308, 317; Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections, 10 (1886), 380, 420; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 695; and from Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC: Hand to Richard Peters, 9 Nov. 1777, to McKee, 29 Dec. 1777, 7 Feb. 1778, McKee's parole of 1 Nov. 1777. For McKee's personal background: Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 294n; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, VII: 182; Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 57.

[19]For the basic biographical information on Girty and Eliott, see Reginald Horsman, Matthew Elliott, British Indian Agent (Detroit, 1964); Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 172n, 249-250n; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Dunmore's War, 152n; and C. W. Butterfield, History of the Girtys (Cincinnati, 1890). Girty's name appears in the documents of the British army and Indian department, and of the Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan firm, of the 1760s and early 1770s, and in the West Augusta records of the middle 1770s.

[20]Hand to William Crawford, to David Shepherd, and to Horatio Gates, all 30 Mar. 1778, in Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 253; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 146-147; George Morgan to Henry Laurens, 31 Mar. 1778, Morgan Letter Book III, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. The defectors were so effective for the British that in Dec. 1780 Brodhead at Fort Pitt offered a bounty of sixty buckskins to any friendly Indian who would capture McKee, and twenty buckskins for any of the Girty brothers serving with the British; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 299. Pennsylvania declared McKee, Elliott, Simon Girty, and James Girty traitors in June 1778; Pa. Arch., 3d ser., X: 525-531.

[21]Hand to Horatio Gates, 21 Apr. 1778, 14 May 1778, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC. For the efforts of Hand and the civil courts to suppress disloyalty in the first half of 1778 see: deposition of James Wallas, 11 May 1778, in Misc. Mss. (1744-1859), Northern Interior and Western Counties, HSP; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 228, 233-234, 267; Crumrine, ed., "Ohio Minute Book," 25; Westmoreland County Quarter Sessions Docket (Apr. 1773-Apr. 1783), pp. 79, 83, 85, 89, 90, 97 (cases of McGrew, Brouster, Mitchell, Downward); and from Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC: Hand to John Nelson, 18 Jan. 1778; to Thomas Crooks, 18 Jan. 1778; to Jacob Gratz (Groats), 16 May 1778; to Richard

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Peters, 10 July 1778; to Horatio Gates, 14 May 1778; to Moses Rawlings, 18 May 1778; James McGrew to Mary Brouster, 20 June 1778; deposition of Jacob Groats (Gratz), 18 May 1778; Moses Rawlings to Hand, 6 May 1778; John Campbell to Hand, n.d.

[22]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 416-417; Westmoreland County Quarter Sessions Docket (Apr. 1773-Apr. 1783), pp. 99, 145, 156-158, 163.

[23]Brodhead to George Rogers Clark, 19 Mar. 1781, and to George Washington, 27 Mar. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 40; ibid., 2d ser., III: 306; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 491.

[24]Washington to George Rogers Clark, 25 Apr. 1781, Washington Papers, ser. 3B, XIII: 307-308; and to Brodhead, 25 Apr. 1781, in Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 388-389.

[25]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 425-430, 490; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 415-422; A. De Peyster to Alexander McKee, 23 Oct. 1782, in Claus Papers, Public Archives of Canada, available on microfilm at Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh; Brodhead to Washington, 18 Feb. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; Devereux Smith to Edward Hand, 13 July 1777, Hand Papers, I: 15, HSP; Hand to Washington, 9 Nov. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC; and from Darlington Library, Pittsburgh: William Jack to Hand, 8 Apr. 1778, Edward Cook to Hand, 4 May 1778, William Irvine to William Moore, 25 July 1782. For desertions and absences see the daybook of accounts kept by John Boreman, a Continental paymaster at Fort Pitt from Oct. 1779 through 1781, at HSWP.

[26]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 186, 190-191; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 41, III: 306, 308-310, item 78, IV: 37, item 165, p. 541, National Archives; Irvine Papers, VII: 114, VIII: 5, HSP.

[27]Brodhead to Reed, 23 Aug. and 29 Aug. 1781, and to Capt. J. Clarke, 28 Aug. 1781, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; John Finley to Irvine, 2 Feb. 1782, Irvine Papers, V: 46, HSP. Regarding discontent and mutinous behavior at Forts Pitt and McIntosh in 1782 and 1783, see also: Irvine Papers, V: 57, 90, VIII: 11, HSP; Irvine to Washington, 2 May 1782, in Washington Papers, ser 4.

[28]Irvine Papers, V: 64, HSP.

[29]Complaint of Westmoreland battalion, 23 Jan. 1777, Record Group 27, PHMC.

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[30]James Everett Seaver, ed., A Narrative of the Life of Mary Jemison, The White Woman of the Genesee, 20th ed., rev. by Charles Delamater Vail (New York, 1918; orig. pub. 1824), 63. The early portion of Jemison's narrative also gives information regarding the conduct and skills of war parties. On the subject of this paragraph and those which follow see also: James Smith, An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Col. James Smith . . . During his Captivity with the Indians . . . . (Lexington, Kty., 1799); C. A. Weslager, The Delaware Indian Westward Migration (Wallingford, Penn., 1978), which is an excellent source of information about Delaware ethnohistory despite its seemingly limited title; Oswalt, This Land Was Theirs, 465-468, which summarizes precontact Iroquois warfare; Goddard, "Delaware"; Callendar, "Shawnee"; Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations; Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Zeisberger's History," 101-108; Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca.

[31]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 94; Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Zeisberger's History," 101-102; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 995; Seaver, ed., Jemison Narrative, 63.

[32]Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 28-39; Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations, 205-207; Seaver, ed., Jemison Narrative, 105.

[33]Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Zeisberger's History," 102; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 94-96; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, XII: 995; Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 44-48, 101-102; Fenton, "The Iroquois in History"; Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations, 175-176.

[34]Seaver, ed., Jemison Narrative, 36-39; Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations, 217-219; Oswalt, This Land Was Theirs, 466-468; Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, 102-107.

[35]Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations, 215-217, for scalping and scalp yell.

[36]Ibid., 202-207; Goddard, "Delaware," 220; Smith, Account of Remarkable Occurrences, 6-7, 9-11, 44; Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 259.

[37]My notions on this subject have been greatly influenced by the excellent treatment of the Seneca by A. F. C. Wallace in Death and Rebirth of the Seneca.

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[38]Brodhead to Archibald Lochry, 28 Apr. 1779, Brodhead Order Book, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Michael Huffnagle to William Irvine, 17 July 1782, Irvine Papers, VI: 56, HSP; Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Zeisberger's History," 104. See also Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 167-168.

[39]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 124, 136; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 400.

[40]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21650, pt. 2), 142; ibid., (ser. 21654), 238-239; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, II: 229, 235, 240; Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), II: 582; Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 61, 83-84, 103; Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 91-93; Smyth, Tour in the United States, I: 179-183. Perhaps the "hunting shirt" was adapted by Virginia hunters from more southerly Indians such as the Cherokee.

[41]Letter of Alexander Mackrabie, 14 July 1770, in WPHM, 31 (1948), 113; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 419. Lewis Wetzel, a barbaric, legendary figure of the upper Ohio region, was an exception whose ears were slit and decorated. See Dictionary of American Biography, s.v. "Wetzel, Lewis."

[42]Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 202-208; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VII: 505-506, VIII: 301, 378-379; Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 258-261; Daniel Brodhead to Archibald Lochry, 23 June 1779, 21 July 1779, Lochry Letters (MG 276), PHMC; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 158-159n; biographical note in WPHM, 60 (1977), 269-270; Ralph Emmett Fall, "Captain Samuel Brady (1756-1795), Chief of the Rangers, and his Kin," West Virginia History, 29 (1968), 203-223. In 1793 Brady, then living in Ohio County, Virginia, was tried for murder in Pennsylvania for his role -- the precise nature of which is unclear -- in the 1791 killing of a party of Delaware Indians on the Beaver River by whites from Ohio County. Although Delaware women as well as men were killed in the incident, Brady was acquitted because the court determined that the Indian party had raided white settlements in Ohio County and had been overtaken at Beaver River by the pursuing whites. Pittsburgh Gazette, 25 May, 1 June 1793.

[43]For the Wetzels, see J. Gerald Kennedy, "Glimpses of the 'Heroic Age': William Darby's Letters to Lyman C. Draper," WPHM, 63 (1980), 37-48, and Rice, Allegheny Frontier, 168-169. Kennedy gives some insight into the factors that turned people such as the Wetzel brothers into heroes during the nineteenth century; on this matter, see also Arthur K. Moore, The Frontier Mind: A Cultural Analysis of the Kentucky Frontiersman ([Lexington, Kty.], 1957), and Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology

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of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 (Middletown, Conn., 1973). For the important distinction between warrior and murderer as the Indians saw it, see Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations, 192.

[44]James Burd (in 1757) and Sir William Johnson (in 1762) both criticized this form of defense. Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 99-104; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, III: 865-869, X: 460-465. The three veterans' accounts in Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 251-268, give a good idea of this form of defense, based on small forts and "rangers" and "spies," as it was practiced during the Revolution.

[45]Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 146; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser 21649, pt. 1), 227-229. See also the deposition in Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 139-140, which names some of the elements that could make Indian raids so terrifying to whites.

[46]Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21634), 205. For other examples of apparently unwarranted flight, see John Campbell to Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 1 Aug. 1769, in Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Papers, PHMC; and George Morgan to John Hancock, 8 Nov. 1776, Morgan Letter Book I, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[47]Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 273-274; David McKee to Edward Hand, 24 June 1777, Hand Papers (MG 66), PHMC; William Lochry and John Moore to Thomas Wharton, 26 Dec. 1776, Record Group 27, PHMC.

[48]All references to Crèvecoeur's essay are from his Letters from an American Farmer, Describing Certain Provincial Situations, Manners, and Customs, and Conveying Some Idea of the State of the People of the United States (Philadelphia, 1793), 205-240, Letter XII, "Distresses of a Frontier Man." The passages quoted here are from pp. 207, 210, 212, 215 of this edition. Crèvecoeur used the pseudonym "J. Hector St. John" on the title page of his Letters. For Crèvecoeur himself, see Thomas Philbrick, St. John de Crèvecoeur (New York, 1970).

[49]Crèvecoeur, Letters, 218.

[50]Smyth, Tour in the United States, I: 330; Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 83, 110.

[51]This description is based largely on the recollection of Joseph Doddridge in his Notes on Settlement, esp. 82-83, 94-96, 109-110, 130-133, 196. Also Smyth, Tour in the United States, I: 280-288, 313-314, 327-328.

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[52]Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 109.

[53]See Daniel McFarland to Edward Hand, 5 Feb. 1778, Hand Papers (MG 66), PHMC; same to same, 14 May 1778, and William Jack to Hand, 2 June 1778, Hand Papers, I: 43, 45, HSP; Edward Cook to Hand, 6 May 1778, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Irvine Papers, VI: 38, 39, HSP; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., III: 219, 448-449, IX: 52; Bouquet Papers (1940-1943) (ser. 21649, pt. 1), 136.

[54]Smyth, Tour in the United States, I: 280-288 (quoted passages from 283).

[55]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 584.

[56]See petitions from Westmoreland County to Gov. J. Penn, 1774, items #2899-2901 in Records of Provincial Council, Executive Corres., Record Group 21, PHMC; also Hand Papers, I: 26, HSP; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 224-225; Thomas McGuire and Edward Perrins to Hand, 13 Aug. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC; Irvine Papers, V: 71, 83-85, 98, 107-108, 111, VI: 12, 16, 30, 44, 53, VII: 62.

[57]Morgan and John Neville to Patrick Henry, 1 Apr. 1777, Morgan to Dorsey Pentecost, 16 Feb. 1777, Morgan to John Hancock, 15 Mar. 1777, Morgan Letter Book I, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[58]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VIII: 218, 250.

[59]Brodhead to Archibald Lochry, 16 Apr. 1779, Lochry Letters (MG 276), PHMC; and to Samuel Moorhead, 8 May 1779, Brodhead Order Book, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh. At times whites in the region used the term "blacks" to refer to Indians; examples are Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 596, and Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 99.

[60]Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 119-120; also ibid., 207-208, 224-225, 258-261; Hand to Patrick Henry, 9 Dec. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 19 (Hand vol. 4), LC; Downes, Council Fires, 204-207.

[61]Weslager, Delaware Indians, 305; Downes, Council Fires, 217; [George Morgan] to _____, 12 May 1784, George Morgan Papers, LC.

[62]George Clymer to president of Congress, 7 Mar. 1778, Papers of the Continental Congress, item 56, p. 93, National Archives; Ephraim Douglass to Benjamin Lincoln, 5 June 1783, ibid., item 149, III: 61-63; Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations, 342; Daniel Brodhead to

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Joseph Reed, 2 Nov. 1780, Brodhead Letter Book, HSP; Jasper Ewing to Jasper Yeates, 30 June 1777, Yeates Papers, HSP; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 219-220; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 306-307, 420, 465; Edward Cook to Capt. Teddy Kelley, n.d., George Morgan Papers, LC.

[63]Irvine to Washington, 20 Apr. 1782, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Irvine to Anne Irvine, 12 Apr. 1782, Irvine Papers, V: 76, HSP.

[64]Memorial of Capt. John Minture and five Pennsylvania soldiers to Gen. James Ervin (sic), 13 Apr. 1782, Irvine Papers, V: 77, HSP.

[65]Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 93-105. Lichtenau was abandoned in 1780 and another town, Salem, built; ibid., 159-160.

[66]Ibid., 133-134, 169-188. For the struggle among pro-British, pro-American, and neutral contingents of the Delaware nation as a whole during the war, see Weslager, Delaware Indians, 282-318, and Downes, Council Fires, 197-198, 215-217, 220-222, 241-243, 263-266.

[67]James, ed., Clark Papers, 559-560; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, II: 131; Downes, Council Fires, 271; Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 256.

[68]Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 193.

[69]Ibid., 189-200; Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 188-203; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, III: 122-124; Pa. Arch., 6th ser., II: 91-126, 257-258; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 130n.

[70]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 540-542, 629; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 241. Some participants later admitted, some of them apparently without much remorse, that they had been involved in the killings. Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 261; Craig, ed., Olden Time, II: 506.

[71]Irvine to Anne Irvine, 12 Apr. 1782, Irvine Papers, V: 76, HSP.

[72]Irvine to William Moore, 9 May 1782, in Butterfield, ed., Washington-Irvine Correspondence, 241-242. For Irvine's stand on the matter, see also Abernethy, Western Lands, 267-268.

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[73]A. De Peyster to McKee, 6 Aug. 1782 and 19 Aug. 1782, in Claus Papers, Public Archives of Canada, available on microfilm at the Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh; Irvine to Washington, 21 May 1782, 11 July 1782, Washington Papers, ser 4; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXIV: 474; Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations, 283-289. Regarding the Hannastown raid see also James B. Richardson III and Kirke C. Wilson, "Hannas Town and Charles Foreman: The Historical and Archeological Record, 1770-1806," WPHM, 59 (1976), 163-169.

[74]Information of J. T. Holmes, in Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 203.

[75]Memorial to Gen. Irvine, n.d. (read by Pennsylvania council and assembly, 26 Feb. 1782), Papers of the Continental Congress, item 69, II: 401-407, National Archives. One hundred sixty-seven people signed the memorial.

[76]Archibald Lochry to Thomas Wharton, 4 Nov. 1777, Record Group 27, PHMC; Lochry to Edward Hand, 6 Oct. 1777, Peter Force Papers, Series VII-E, box 18 (Hand vol. 1), LC; Joseph Reed to Lochry, 21 May 1779, Gratz Mss., Old Congress, case 1, box 10, HSP.

[77]Charles Foreman to William Irvine, 21 May 1782, Irvine Papers, V: 113, HSP. One complaint of people resisting taxation by Pennsylvania in the early 1780s was "that they are not assisted with either men or money to defend themselves agt. the savages"; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 546.

[78]On this question of sectionalism and politics, see Bockelman and Ireland, "Internal Revolution in Pennsylvania"; Hawke, In the Midst of a Revolution, esp. 59-86; Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics, 127-130; and for a view that stresses east-west conflict, W. Roy Smith, "Sectionalism in Pennsylvania during the Revolution," Political Science Quarterly, 24 (1909), 208-235. Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, 31-37, depicts an inherent conflict between western democrats and eastern conservatives in Pennsylvania during the Revolution, a sectional distinction that Ferguson argues was heightened by the problems of defense during the war.

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Notes to Chapter 8

[1]Samuel Hazard, ed., The Register of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1828-1835), IV: 12; Pittsburgh Gazette, 14 Oct. 1786; Robert Eugene Harper, "The Class Structure of Western Pennsylvania in the Late Eighteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1969), 10-19, 28-34. There were 7,693 taxables in these counties in 1783-1785 and 8,602 in 1786. Employing census data from three Westmoreland County townships in 1783, Harper uses a multiplier of 4.65 to estimate the total free population on the basis of numbers of taxables in the 1780s; in later years, for which fuller information is avilable, there was a higher ratio of total population to taxable population. It is for this reason that the estimate for the 1780s is given here as somewhere in the 35,000 to 40,000 range.

[2]U.S. Bureau of the Census, Heads of Families at the First Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1790: Pennsylvania (Washington, D.C., 1908), 9-11, 12-18, 104-112, 245-268; Return of the Whole Number of Persons within the Several Districts of the United States (Philadelphia, 1791), 49. Harper, "Class Structure of Western Pennsylvania," 29-30, computes a population increase of 87.3% from the mid-1780s to 1790 and 50.6% from 1790 to 1800. The population increase for the state as a whole during the 1790s was 39.5%. Harrison and Randolph counties were formed from the southern portions of Monongalia County, Virginia, in the 1780s.

[3]County summaries in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Heads of Families: Pennsylvania, 9-11, give a total of 834 slaves in Westmoreland, Washington, Fayette, and Allegheny Counties; the correct total from the county listings appears to be 832. The total of "other free" persons in the county summaries is 111. However, the Pittsburgh listing on ibid., 14, seems to indicate that the census taker recorded some free blacks in the "free white" columns rather than the "other free" column, so the 111 figure is a bit too low.

[4]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 204-212, 225; see also Florin, "Advance of Frontier Settlement in Pennsylvania"; Friis, Series of Population Maps.

[5]William Butler to Thomas Bowen and George Bush, 10 Mar. 1785, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; John E. Winner, "The Depreciation and Donation Lands," WPHM, 8 (1925), 1-11; Pa. Arch., 3rd ser., III: 575-771.

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[6]Robert Ayres journal, 20 July 1786, HWSP, Pittsburgh; Andrew Ellicott to his wife, 24 Aug. 1785, Andrew Ellicott Papers, LC; Craig, ed., Olden Time, II: 437-438, 442-443, 445, 447; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 163, pp. 416, 418, National Archives; Alan S. Brown, "The Role of the Army in Western Settlement: Josiah Harmar's Command, 1785-1790," PMHB, 93 (1969), 161-178.

[7]Israel Shreve, "Journal from Jersey to the Monongahela, August 11, 1788," PMHB, 52 (1928), 203.

[8]Pittsburgh Gazette, 2 June 1787, 24 Nov. 1787, 1 Nov. 1788, 24 Jan. 1789; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 39, 98. See also the observations in Robert Ayres journal, 25 Oct. 1787, HSWP, Pittsburgh; Craig, ed., Olden Time, II: 439, 499; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 226, 242, 244; Eugene F. Biss, ed., "Dr. Saugrain's Note-Books, 1788," American Antiquarian Society Proceedings, new ser., 19 (1909), 237.

[9]Historians have asserted that slaveholders in the region tended to move to Kentucky or western Virginia after the boundary settlement because of Pennsylvania's gradual abolition laws: Potter, "Pennsylvania and Virginia Boundary Controversy," 424-425; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 145. There is insufficient contemporary evidence to determine the extent to which any migration from the region for this particular reason actually took place. In 1787 residents of Monongalia County, Virginia, complained that Virginia's poll tax, and the lack of specie to pay it, caused numbers to migrate down the Ohio or into Pennsylvania, so for some people at least Pennsylvania was more attractive than Virginia. (See petition of "Inhabitants of the Western frontier," 26 Oct. 1787, Legislative Petitions, Monongalia Co., at VSL.) Not all slaveholders left the southwestern counties of Pennsylvania, nor would the state's gradual abolition laws necessarily be a slaveholder's sole motivation for moving to Kentucky.

[10]Shreve, "Journal," 203.

[11]To Charles Simms, 22 Sept. 1786, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXIX: 11; see also ibid., XXXIII: 405-409; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV: 57-58.

[12]William Irvine to Washington, 2 May 1782, 21 May 1782, 27 Jan. 1788, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV: 1-68; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXVII: 471-480, 482-484; Wayland Fuller Dunaway, History of the James River and Kanawha

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Company, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. 104, no. 2 (New York, 1922).

[13]Shreve, "Journal," 196-200; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 236, 240; Henry A. Muhlenberg, The Life of Major-General Peter Muhlenberg of the Revolutionary Army (Philadelphia, 1849), 427; Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, trans. and ed. by Alfred J. Morrison (Philadelphia, 1911), I: 235-240; Dr. John Ewing, Memorandum Book, 1784, PHMC, Harrisburg; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 96; Clunn, "March on Pittsburgh," 54, 55, 62-63; "Mrs. Mary Dewees's Journal from Philadelphia to Kentucky, 1787-1788," PMHB, 28 (1904), 184-188; and petitions in Minutes of the Ninth General Assembly, 57, 132, 153, 250, 340.

[14]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 232-238, 251; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 74; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 236-238.

[15]Biographical information about Craig may be found in the "Memorials" volume compiled by his son, in the Craig-Neville Papers, HSWP, Pittsburgh; for Bayard, see Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 139n.

[16]Turnbull, Marmie, and Co. to Craig, Bayard, and Co., 23 Sept. 1784, Craig Collection, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. Regarding these real estate acquisitions, see: Turnbull to Craig, 16 Dec. 1786, 19 July 1787, ibid., and [Craig] to [Secretary of War], 26 July 1784, Craig Collection, VIII-A, Carnegie Library; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 42, VII: 471, item 78, VIII: 131, item 78, XVI: 629-631, and item 163, pp. 443, 447, 452, 455, 459, National Archives; Pittsburgh Gazette, 12 Apr. 1788. For use of coal from the hill after the Revolution see: Gilbert Imlay, A Topographical Description of the Western Territory of North America; Containing a Succinct Account of its Climate, Natural History, Population, Agriculture, Manners, and Customs (London, 1792), 33-34; Richard Henry Lee, Life of Arthur Lee (Boston, 1829), II: 385; Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 253; Victor Collot, A Journey in North America (Florence, Italy, 1924; orig. pub. 1826), I: 38.

[17]Edward G. Williams, ed., "Samuel Vaughan's Journal or 'Minutes Made by S. V., from Stage to Stage, on a Tour to Fort Pitt,'" WPHM, 44 (1961), 266; Turnbull and Co. to Craig and Co., 23 Sept. 1784, Craig Collection, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; D. Bradford to Craig, 2 May 1787, ibid.; Craig to Turnbull and Co., 25 July 1784, 1 Sept. 1784, Craig Collection, VIII-A, Carnegie Library; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 78, VIII: 131, National Archives.

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[18]Information about this blast furnace is in the John Holker papers at HSWP, Pittsburgh. Regarding the dissolution of the connection between the two firms and their contention over some of the Pittsburgh real estate, see Turnbull, Marmie, and Co. to Craig, 9 Oct. 1787, Craig Collection, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh, and Craig to Henry Knox, 6 Oct. 1791, in Craig Transcripts, vol. 2A (part of the Craig correspondence was transcribed by Richard C. Knopf in 1953 and is available in bound typescript form at Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; citations to "Craig Transcripts" refer to this); also see the "Memorials" volume in the Craig-Neville Papers, HSWP, Pittsburgh.

[19]Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), III: 107, 109n; Hanna, Wilderness Trail, I: 349-351; Evans, Analysis of a Map of the Middle Colonies, 28; John A. Jakle, "Salt and the Initial Settlement of the Ohio Valley" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1967), esp. 71-72, 211-213; Isaac Lippincott, "The Early Salt Trade of the Ohio Valley," Journal of Political Economy, 20 (1912), 1029-1052; Mary Rinehart Hoge, "Salt on the Frontier" (M.A. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1931); Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 96-98; Stevenson Whitcomb Fletcher, Pennsylvania Agriculture and Country Life, 1640-1840 (Harrisburg, 1950), 67, 404-406. See Bouquet Papers (1951-1978), IV: 253, for the importance of salt during the British army's early occupation of the Ohio forks.

[20]William Irvine to Edward Cook, 18 Oct. 1782, Irvine Papers, VII: 30, HSP; Papers of the Continental Congress, item 42, IV: 78, and VI: 347-357, National Archives; Pittsburgh Gazette, 8 Sept. 1787, and other issues thereafter. For efforts by others to extract salt on the Youghiogheny River, see William A. Hunter, ed., "John Badollet's 'Journal of the time I spent in Stony creeck glades,' 1793-1794," PMHB, 104 (1980), 187-188, and Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 281 (Vaughan map).

[21]For Criag's various business ventures see the Craig Collection, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh, which contains account books and correspondence, and the Craig-Neville Papers, HSWP, Pittsburgh.

[22]George Morgan to Edward Hand, 6 Apr. 1778, Morgan Letter Book III, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[23]Eulalia Catherine Schramm, "General James O'Hara: Pittsburgh's First Captain of Industry" (M.A. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1931); Dorothy Daniel, "The First Glasshouse West of the Alleghenies," WPHM, 32 (1949), 97-113. O'Hara's commercial activities during the war are

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indicated by his daybooks in the Denny-O'Hara collection, HSWP, Pittsburgh. Schramm dates O'Hara's birth at about 1754; the Dictionary of American Biography puts it at 1752.

[24]Schramm, "James O'Hara," 64-67; Jakle, "Salt and the Ohio Valley," 134-137; Lippincott, "Early Salt Trade," 1047-1052.

[25]Irvine Papers, VI: 5, VII: 114, HSP; Hugh Henry Brackenridge to George Woods, 20 Nov. 1784, George Woods Papers (in Dr. John Anderson Papers, MG 147), PHMC; Pittsburgh Gazette, 22 Dec. 1787; Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville, New Travels in the United States of America, 1788, trans. Mara Soceanu Vamos and Durand Echeverria, ed. Durand Echeverria (Cambridge, Mass., 1964; orig. pub. 1791), 213; Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 165-166; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 243; Bliss, ed., "Saugrain's Note-Books," 223; Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 253-254.

[26]The Ross-Woods Papers at HSWP, Pittsburgh, contain information about the Penn family's sale of Pittsburgh and Coal Hill lots. Also at HSWP is a mss. list of those buying lots in the "reserved tract" across the Allegheny River from Pittsburgh, where a town was to be laid out in the late 1780s.

[27]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 299-315; Collot, Journal in North America, I: 39; Hunter, ed., "Badollet's Journal," 170.

[28]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 304.

[29]Denny, Military Journal, 78-79, 82.

[30]Extensive and detailed information about the business of military contracting in the Pittsburgh area is in the Craig Collection, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh, and the Denny-O'Hara Papers, HSWP, Pittsburgh.

[31]Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 96-98.

[32]For examples see advertisements of T. Campbell (Washington), 14 June 1788, and Elliot, Williams, and Co. (Pittsburgh), 19 July 1788, Pittsburgh Gazette; also the daybook for 1792-1794 in the Denny-O'Hara Papers, box 6, HSWP; Ormsby and McLaughlin accounts, 1794-1798, LC.

[33]Imlay, Topographical Description, 36, 88-89; Harry Toulmin, The Western Country in 1793: Reports on Kentucky and Virginia, ed. Marion Tinling and Godfrey Davies (San Marino, Calif., 1948), 124; Brissot de Warville, New

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Travels, 421; Thomas Irwin to [John Hoge?], 20 May 1789, Washington and Jefferson College Historical Collections; Pittsburgh Gazette, 24 Nov. 1787 (cattle to Detroit); Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 281-282.

[34]The ultimate market for ginseng was the Far East. Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 236-237; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV: 19; Pittsburgh Gazette, 5 May 1787, 15 Jan. 1788; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 118, 119n; Williams ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 166. Ginseng continued to be a product of the region into the early nineteenth century; Michaux, Travels to the Westward, 73-74.

[35]Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 42; Brackenridge, Gazette Publications, 15; Pittsburgh Gazette, 26 Aug. 1786, 9 Feb. 1788, 23 Feb. 1788, 19 Apr. 1788, 18 Oct. 1788, 8 Nov. 1788, 21 Mar. 1789, 20 June 1789, 11 July 1789. For mechanics' work at Pittsburgh earlier, see the (Douglass) Business Ledger, 1769-1772, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh.

[36]Pittsburgh Gazette, 22 Mar. 1788, 25 Apr. 1789. See also Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 284-286; Imlay, Topographical Description, 90; and Pittsburgh Gazette, 16 Sept. 1786, 30 Sept. 1786, 18 Nov. 1786, 12 Dec. 1786, 21 July 1787, 21 Oct. 1787, 19 Jan. 1788, 8 Mar. 1788, 10 May 1788, 14 June 1788, 19 July 1788, 6 Sept. 1788, 13 Dec. 1788.

[37]Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 242, 243, 248.

[38]WPHM, 7 (1924), 136-137, for George Woods' instructions to survey the town and manor into lots. An excellent plan of Pittsburgh in 1796 appears as plate 6 of the atlas volume of Collot, Journey in North America. Plate 5 in the same volume is a view of Pittsburgh. In the rear of Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, and of Leland D. Baldwin, Pittsburgh: The Story of a City, 1750-1865 (Pittsburgh, 1937), are maps showing the town's streets and locations of some businesses and residences to 1800.

[39]Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 264; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 243; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 37; and Collot, Journey in North America, I: 37, all give the same number of houses on the basis of personal visits in the 1787-1796 period. Brackenridge, Gazette Publications, 17, estimated that there were about 100 dwelling houses "with buildings appurtenant" in Pittsburgh in mid-1786. "More are daily added," Brackenridge wrote.

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[40]U.S. Bureau of the Census, Heads of Families: Pennsylvania, 9, 12-18. See also WPHM, 2 (1919), 161-173. Notable "Pittsburghers" listed under Pitt Township in the census include Nathaniel Bedford, H. H. Brackenridge, Josiah and Adamson Tannehill, John Scull, David Duncan, John Ormsby, Samuel Sample, William Amberson, and Abraham Kirkpatrick.

[41]In a promotive account of the town in 1786 Hugh Henry Brackenridge wrote that there were about 1500 residents and that the population was "doubling almost every year." Brackenridge, Gazette Publications, 17. (If Brackenridge was anywhere near correct about the growth rate, it rapidly tapered off and did not continue at that phenomenal rate for long.) Authors have tended to compare Brackenridge's estimate of 1500 with the census figures and to reject the former as a blatant case of boosterism. See Claude Milton Newlin, The Life and Writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge (Mamaroneck, N.Y., 1971, reprint of Princeton, N.J., edition of 1932), 72, and Virginia Beck, "The Evolution of Government in Allegheny County" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1941), 4. However, a 5 Sept. 1789 letter to the Pittsburgh Gazette stated that there were "upwards of 300 persons intitled to vote" in the town. In addition, in 1787 Samuel Vaughan wrote that there were "near 400 Men" living at Pittsburgh (Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 264). If by "men" Vaughan meant something close to the census category of free white males 16 years old and older, then the town's population would be at about Brackenridge's estimate of 1500. (The proportion of free white males 16 and over to total population for Allegheny County in 1790 was 1:3.9; the multiplier for Pitt Township is 3.8, as it is also for Pittsburgh in the census listings, and the county's other townships and districts varied from 3.4 to 4.4. Vaughan's 400 men multiplied by 3.8 yields 1520 total population.) Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 243, wrote that there were over a hundred families in Pittsburgh in 1783. General as they are, these estimates from the 1780s make it safe to say that the 376 figure for Pittsburgh in 1790 is too low, probably by a substantial amount. A comparison of these estimates with the 1800 census figures tends to indicate that the town grew very rapidly in the postwar years, then slowed during the 1790s (see text). One problem is what Brackenridge and other observers meant by "Pittsburgh" -- whether they included settlements on the opposite shores of the rivers and how far back from the point they meant.

[42]Return of the Whole Number of Persons within the Several Districts of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1801). For the region's rate of growth see n 2 above.

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[43]Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 208, 267-268; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 231, 261; John Ewing Memorandum Book, 1784, PHMC, Harrisburg; Robert Ayres journal, 30 Oct. 1786, HSWP, Pittsburgh; PMHB, 1 (1877), 50; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 148, 150. The 1790 census returns do not include separate returns for towns other than Pittsburgh, so only rough estimates of their populations are possible.

[44]Pittsburgh Gazette, 10 Nov. 1787, 22 Dec. 1787, 1 June 1788, 1 Nov. 1788, 19 Jan. 1793, 14 Mar. 1795; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 148.

[45]Collot, Journey in North America, I: 32; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 35. See also: Leland D. Baldwin, The Keelboat Age on Western Waters (Pittsburgh, 1941), 52, 136-137; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 99; Collot, Journey in North America, I: 23-24, 32-34; Imlay, Topographical Description, 33; Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, II: 386. For a detailed map of development along the edges of the Ohio River from Pittsburgh downriver beyond Wheeling in 1796, see Plate 8 of the atlas volume of Collot's work; also Collot, I: 50-55, for descriptions of those settlements. For the development of towns in the upper Ohio Valley see also: Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 148-150, 217-219; the Reading Howell map of Pennsylvania (1792), reproduced in reduced form in ibid., 562-563; and Harper, "Class Structure of Western Pennsylvania," 150-189. The interpretation of towns, commercialism, and economic diversification in Robert D. Mitchell, Commercialism and Frontier: Perspectives on the Early Shenandoah Valley (Charlottesville, Va., 1977), is very useful to the understanding of these factors in the upper Ohio Valley.

[46]Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 97. Also: Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 270-271; Elmer T. Clark, J. Manning Potts, and Jacob S. Payton, eds., The Journal and Letters of Francis Asbury, 3 vol. (Nashville, Tenn., 1958), II: 402; Imlay, Topographical Description, 34; Clunn, "March on Pittsburgh," 55; Collot, Journey in North America, I: 26, 31-32. For some earlier assessments of the land see: Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 19; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, II: 290-291; Lacey, "Journal of a Mission," 104, 106.

[47]John Ewing Memorandum Book, 1784, PHMC; Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 266; Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 95; Imlay, Topographical Description, 33-34, 88-89; Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 274; Pittsburgh Gazette, 16 Jan. 1790 ("Western Farmer"); Richardson and Wilson, "Hannas Town and Charles Foreman," 181-182.

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[48]Minutes of the Ninth General Assembly, 168, 294, 330; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, IV; 248; Pittsburgh Gazette, 24 Mar. 1787, 19 July 1788.

[49]Pittsburgh Gazette, 9 Sept. 1786, 17 Feb. 1787, 10 Mar. 1787, 26 July 1788, 9 Aug. 1788, 30 Aug. 1788, 6 Sept. 1788, 13 June 1789; Presley Neville to Isaac Craig, [1786?], Craig Collection, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 214. Baldwin, Pittsburgh, 103-116, is a breezy but very readable depiction of Pittsburgh in this period that mentions these and related matters.

[50]Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 211; Shreve, "Journal," 204; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, XI: 199; Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, I: 716; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 389-395; Pittsburgh Gazette, 4 Nov. 1786, 24 Mar. 1787, 5 Jan. 1788, 23 Feb. 1788, 7 Feb. 1789, 19 Jan. 1793.

[51]Collot, Journey in North America, I: 38; Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 244; Charles Nisbet to Alexander Addison, 5 Nov. 1790, Addison Papers, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; and Andrew Ellicott's "Reflections" on Pittsburgh in his journal of the survey of a road to Presque Isle (1794), Andrew Ellicott Papers, LC.

[52]Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 244.

[53]Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, II: 385; "Diary of Major Erkuries Beatty, Paymaster of the Western Army, May 15, 1786, to June 5, 1787," The Magazine of American History, 1 (1877), 314. See also extract of letter from Major William North, Pittsburgh, 26 July 1786, in Papers of the Continental Congress, item 150, I: 515, National Archives, and Andrew Ellicott's "Reflections," cited in n 51 above.

[54]John Pope, A Tour through the Southern and Western Territories of the United States of North America; the Spanish Dominions on the River Mississippi, and the Floridas; the Countries of the Creek Nations; and many Uninhabited Parts (New York, 1888; orig. pub. 1792), 17; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 37. Pope's visit was fall 1790; May's, spring 1789.

[55]Pope, A Tour, 12; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 97, 105.

[56]Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, II: 385; Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 245.

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[57]Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 243; reward notices regarding thefts of wood, Pittsburgh Gazette, 2 Feb. 1788, 29 Mar. 1788, 3 May 1788, 10 May 1788, 9 Aug. 1788, 27 Sept. 1788, 27 June 1789, 12 Dec. 1789. Ibid., 19 Jan. 1793, 23 Nov. 1793, and 15 Feb. 1794 regarding thefts of cord wood, fence rails, stone, bricks, mortar, and scaffolding in the early 1790s. Michaux, Travels to the Westward, 64, noted that the labor factor affected the use of wood even as a fuel.

[58]Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 243.

[59]Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 101-118 (quotations from 108, 111, 118). Merchants' ads in the Pittsburgh Gazette often offered to take produce, peltry, etc. instead of cash. For the effect of the cash situation on one absentee landlord see Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV: 23, and Washington to Thomas Freeman, 28 Nov. 1786, Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXIX: 92-93. On the lack of cash see also the comment on the proposed market house at Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh Gazette, 10 Mar. 1787.

[60]Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 291.

[61]From the Gazette: 29 Dec. 1787 (Blaine, Wilkins and Co.); 15 Nov. 1788 (O'Hara); 24 May 1788 (Irwin); 14 June 1788 (H. Rose); 6 Sept. 1788 (Beer); 25 Oct. 1788 (Bedford; McPherson); 25 Nov. 1788 (Huling; Gibson; several companies represented by W. Turnbull); 8 Aug. 1789 (Rohrer).

[62]Letter of Ephraim Douglass, in PMHB, 1 (1877), 51; Isaac Craig to Col. Thomas Forrest, 16 Mar. 1792, in Craig Transcripts, vol. 2A, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; and for the example of John and James Perry of Westmoreland County, some of whose property was auctioned in 1789, see Pittsburgh Gazette, 22 Dec. 1787, 29 Nov. 1788, 14 Feb. 1789, 19 Sept. 1789. On the basis of advertisements in the Gazette of 19 Jan. 1793 and 6 June 1795 it would appear that the Perrys' setback of the late 1780s was only partial or temporary.

[63]This paragraph is based on Robert Harper's study of the region's tax lists. The trends I mention here are discussed at length by Harper in his dissertation. See Harper, "Class Structure of Western Pennsylvania."

[64]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 672. For tenancy, see Harper, "Class Structure of Western Pennsylvania," 109-126, and also: Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 274; Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 268; Isaac Craig's orders regarding "Clover Hill," 5 Aug. 1781, Craig-Neville

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Papers, HSWP, Pittsburgh; John Irwin to Michael Gratz, 10 July 1793, Etting Collection, II: 95, HSP; Pittsburgh Gazette, 28 Mar. 1789 (Ormsby advertisement), 4 Apr. 1789 (Hutchins ad); Lee Soltow and Kenneth W. Keller, "Tenancy and Asset-Holding in Late Eighteenth-Century Washington County, Pennsylvania," WPHM, 65 (1982), 1-15.

[65]U.S. Bureau of the Census, Heads of Families, Pennsylvania, 12-18, 104-112, 245-258, 259-268; Return of the Whole Number of Persons within the Several Districts of the United States (1791), 49. See n 3 above regarding the number of slaves in Washington County.

[66]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 41, regarding Ligonier. The major sources of information on Presbyterianism in the region before the Revolution are clergymen's journals: McClure, Diary of David McClure; John McMillan, journal, 1774-1776, transcript at Washington and Jefferson College Historical Collections; McMillan, journal, another transcription at HSP. See also William Wilson McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism: Tracing the Development of the Presbyterian Church, United States of America in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania from 1758-1839 (Pittsburgh, 1938), 32-42; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 404-405.

[67]McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism, 43-61; "Memorandum of the Places where Dr. John McMillan preached from August 1776 to July 1791," transcript, Washington and Jefferson College Historical Collections; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 392-394, 425.

[68]Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 668-670; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 409-410; Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, esp. 18-19, 28, 37. See also Rice, Allegheny Frontier, 277-283.

[69]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 408-410, 416; Ellis B. Burgess, "The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Western Pennsylvania," WPHM, 26 (1943), 21-46.

[70]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 149-150, 410; Lacey, "Journal of a Mission," 106-107; Andrew Ellicott to Sally Ellicott, 9 Oct. 1784, Andrew Ellicott Papers, LC; Hunter, ed., "Badollet's Journal," 181.

[71]Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, esp. I: 264n, 463, 514-516, 606, 647, 716, II: 401, 404n, 464n, III: 142. Robert Ayres' journal at HSWP, esp. entries for 11 Jan. 1787, 23 May 1787, 28 May 1787, 22 July 1788. Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 410-411; Wallace Guy Smeltzer, "The Place of Methodism in the Religious Life of the Pittsburgh Region," WPHM, 23 (1940), 147-155; Kenneth

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Dann Magruder, "Methodism's Struggle for a Permanent Foothold in Pittsburgh," WPHM, 23 (1940), 156-162; Rice, Allegheny Frontier, 292-293.

[72]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 412; McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism, 65-66; [James Bowman], "An Old Letter on Episcopalianism in Early Western Pennsylvania," WPHM, 7 (1924), 24-28. For Episcopalian activity in the Brownsville and other areas see also the Robert Ayres journal, portions beginning 1789, at HSWP.

[73]Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, I: 462-463; Lacey, "Journal of a Mission," 106.

[74]Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, I: 514, II: 403.

[75]Ibid., I: 576-577; John Wrenshall, Memoirs, 1761-1817 (5 vols.), III: 35-38, at HSWP; John McMillan autobiography and journal, pp. 27-28, HSP.

[76]Charles Nisbet to Alexander Addison, 14 June 1793, Addison Papers, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; John Wrenshall Memoirs, III: 39-40, HSWP; Smeltzer, "Methodism in the Pittsburgh Region," 153; Pittsburgh Gazette, 2 Feb., 16 Feb., 2 Mar., 23 Mar., 13 Apr., 27 Apr., 4 May, 11 May, 25 May, 3 Aug. 1793.

[77]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 47; Robert Ayres journal, 29 Nov. 1786, HSWP. See also Ayres' entries of 14 Mar. and 16 Mar. 1789.

[78]Craig, ed., Olden Time, II: 438; "Diary of Major Beatty," 435.

[79]Hulbert and Schwarze, eds., "Moravian Records, Volume Two," 96; Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 58.

[80]Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 222; Hunter, ed., "Badollet's Journal," 180, 193-194, 196; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 216.

[81]Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenny," 45; Westmoreland County General Quarter Sessions records (spine title: "1776 to 1785 - Westmoreland County"), p. 145 (30 May 1785), at Clerk of Courts Office, Greensburg, Pennsylvania. For labor performed on Sunday see also the letter by "Sugar Boiler" in Pittsburgh Gazette, 27 Apr. 1793.

[82]Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 101, 134; Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 45.

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[83]Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 123; John Wrenshall Memoirs, III: 33, HSWP.

[84]Charles Nisbet to Alexander Addison, 26 Jan. 1786, 21 Oct. 1786, Addison Papers, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh. Also Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 150-151; Pittsburgh Gazette, 16 Aug. 1788. In its early years the Gazette carried miscelleneous pieces relating to general moral conduct, drinking, gambling, and so on, and even Hugh Henry Brackenridge, though not an advocate of denominational religion, believed that churches had a beneficial effect on moral behavior and social order. Religious subjects could draw a serious response from some of the Gazette's readers; see the essay by "Mentor," 28 Oct. 1786, responding to the probably satirical piece of "Johnny Honeycomb," 21 Oct. 1786, on the question of man's immortal soul; and the issues of 31 Jan., 14 Feb., and 21 Feb. 1789 regarding Indians, religion, and Christianity.

[85]Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 123; McClure, Diary of David McClure, 105-107; Robert Ayres journal, 23 Nov. 1786; Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 102-106. Cresswell, overtly not that religious a man, also shared the Rev. Mr. McClure's dismay at the morals of William Crawford, the political grandee of the Youghiogheny Valley. Crawford's mistress, Cresswell asserted, "is common to him, his brother, half brother, and his own Son, and is his wife's sister's daughter at the same time. A set of brutes." (Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 100.) Frustrated by his entire experience in Crawford's neighborhood, Cresswell at one point declared that there was "nothing but whores and rogues in this country" (ibid., 98). McClure disguised his own comments about Crawford's mistress, which are generally similar to Cresswell's, in Latin, and I am grateful to my fellow graduate student Gary Kwiatek for his translation of the passage for me (McClure, Diary of David McClure, 108). William Crawford's brother was Valentine Crawford; their half brother was John Stephenson, who like William was a Virginia JP and militia officer.

[86]Robert Ayres journal, 2 July 1786, HSWP; Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, I: 463, 577.

[87]Jones, A Journal of Two Visits, 60; Minutes of the Presbytery of Redstone, of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1781-1831 (Cincinnati, 1878), 51, 54-55.

[88]Minutes of the Presbytery of Redstone, 55; McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism, 72, 80-93, 100-110.

[89]A similar conclusion is reached by T. Scott Miyakawa, Protestants and Pioneers: Individualism and Conformity on the American Frontier (Chicago, 1964), 29.

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[90]In 1765 "Presbyterian Parsons" accompanied the Cumberland County sheriff to the scene of the Sideling Hill troubles (Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, IV: 713); John Steel, a clergyman, was one of the colony's envoys to warn away settlers west of the Proclamation Line in 1768 (Col. Recs., IX: 506-510); and in the early 1780s the Rev. James Finley, another Presbyterian minister, was the state's agent sent west to counter the influence of the new-state movement (Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IX: 666-667, X: 40-44, 163-165).

[91]See H. H. Brackenridge to Alexander Addison, 30 Apr. 1796 and 20 May 1796, Addison Papers, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh. Brackenridge referred to McMillan as "Cardinal McMillan" and "the Patriarch of the western Church," but recognized the minister's power to influence opinion in Brackenridge's political combat with Albert Gallatin and William Findley. For a strong assertion of community leadership by a clergyman, see also Samuel Porter's letter to the people of Westmoreland and Allegheny counties on the subject of defense against the Indians, Pittsburgh Gazette, 9 Mar. 1793.

[92]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 104; also 38, 112, 123-124, 127.

[93]The fact that Presbyterianism and the Scotch Irish were closely associated is easily recognized. See for example Robert D. Mitchell, "The Presbyterian Church as an Indicator of Westward Expansion in 18th Century America," Professional Geographer, 18 (1966), 293-299. The question of why Presbyterianism was such a strong part of Protestant Scots culture in America could use more study. James G. Leyburn, The Scotch-Irish: A Social History (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), is a good introduction to Scotch-Irish culture.

[94]James B. Scouller, "History of the United Presbyterian Church of North America," in Philip Schaff et al., eds., The American Church History Series, vol. 11 (New York, 1894), 143-255; Marybelle Pierce, "The Establishment of the Associate, Reformed and Associate Reformed Churches in Western Pennsylvania" (M.A. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1931).

[95]Pierce, "Associate Reformed Churches," passim, for societies in the region, and pp. 57-58 for the Covenanters' "general meetings"; also Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 407-408.

[96]Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV: 21, 27-30 (quotation from p. 28). Washington won his ejectment action. The "society of Ceceders" with which his

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opponents were affiliated was the Associate Presbyterian congregation of Chartiers Creek; two of the men who met with Washington were elders of that church in 1779. Pierce, "Associate Reformed Churches," 21-22.

[97]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 410-412; Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, I: 514; Brissot de Warville, New Travels, 319.

[98]McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism, 51-53. Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 166, reports that a Presbyterian congregation from Connecticut intended to move to the Illinois country in 1787.

[99]In 1788 Israel Shreve came with a group of families from Burlington County, New Jersey to the "forks of Yough" area. After crossing the Youghiogheny most of the group "turned off to the rite hand to or near the meeting house to Asher Williams." Shreve also stopped in the "forks of Yough" and reported that "as to the inhabitants they are most all from Jersey." Shreve, "Journal," 200-202. I do not know what meeting house attracted the members of Shreve's party, but the area where they stopped had a number of "Covenanter" Presbyterian dissenters, and there were other Presbyterians in the locale as well. I know of no non-Presbyterian meeting houses there in the 1780s. Pierce, "Associate Reformed Churches," 53-54; McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism, 55-57.

[100]Alfred Creigh, History of Washington County from its First Settlement to the Present Time (Washington, Penn., 1870), 47-50, prints the pledges of the 1780s but gives no source.

[101]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 427-428, used some rough information from 1812 and concluded that probably less than 1 in 6 of the population at that time were church members. The Methodists of the Redstone Circuit reported a membership of 756 in 1787; Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, I: 576n. In October 1780 the churches of the (Baptist) Redstone Association had a combined membership of 205; two years later the total was 438. Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 669-670.

[102]McClure, Diary of David McClure, 47; Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 134; Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, I: 646.

[103]Doddridge, Notes on Settlement, 120, 125-130; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 38; Sullivan et al., eds., William Johnson Papers, V: 52-54; Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry, ed. Claude M. Newlin (New York, 1937),

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18-19. For a general perspective on this subject, see Jon Butler, "Magic, Astrology, and the Early American Religious Heritage, 1600-1760," American Historical Review, 84 (1979), 317-346.

[104]Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, II: 385; Shoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 244; McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism, 68-69; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 414; and regarding Johann Wilhelm Weber, the German pastor, see also Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 215.

[105]Pittsburgh Gazette, 17 Mar. 1787, 16 June 1787, 23 June 1787, 30 June 1787; also Brackenridge's "Observations on the Country at the Head of the Ohio River," in the 26 Aug. 1786 Gazette; McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism, 70-78; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 243. The act incorporating the church as a Presbyterian congregation is in Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, XII: 591-593.

[106]McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism, 79-86, 91; Minutes of the Presbytery of Redstone, 50-58, 65, 69, 95-96; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 255. In this affair and in his earlier dispute with Brackenridge, Barr did have the support of some within the congregation. McKinney, Early Pittsburgh Presbyterianism, 83-84; Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 267. Vaughan, ibid., reported that 120 people attended one of Barr's sermons in Pittsburgh in 1787, and several had not come due to the minister's spat with Brackenridge, which gives some idea of the congregation's size.

[107]Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, I: 604.

[108]John Wrenshall Memoirs, III: 31-32, 35-39, 47 (quotation p. 39), HSWP. See the succeeding portions of Wrenshall's account for the progress of Methodism in Pittsburgh after his arrival.

[109]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 413-414.

[110]Marian Silveus, "Churches and Social Control on the Western Pennsylvania Frontier," WPHM, 19 (1936), 123-134; James A. Davidson, "Social Life and Church Discipline among Baptist Churches on the Western Pennsylvania Frontier," WPHM, 25 (1942), 47-60; Minutes of the Presbytery of Redstone; "Old Western Pennsylvania Documents of the Society of Friends: Westland Minutes," WPHM, 9 (1926), 53-59, 122-126, 202-205, 276-279; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 443-447.

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[111]My approach to the churches as associations or groups within society has been significantly influenced by Miyakawa, Protestants and Pioneers.

[112]Newlin, Brackenridge; Joseph J. Ellis, After the Revolution; Profiles of Early American Culture (New York, 1979), 73-110; Edward Everett, "John Smilie, Forgotten Champion of Early Western Pennsylvania," WPHM, 33 (1950), 77-89; autobiographical letter of William Findley, PMHB, 5 (1881), 440-450; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 373; John Robinson Wagner, "The Public Career of Alexander Addison" (M.A. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1951); G. S. Rowe, "Alexander Addison: The Disillusionment of a 'Republican Schoolmaster,'" WPHM, 62 (1979), 221-250; Hugh G. Cleland, "John B. C. Lucas, Physiocrat on the Frontier," WPHM, 36 (1953), 1-15, 87-100, 141-168; Creigh, Washington County, 47-48; Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, 39-44, 111-113, 115. See also biographical sketches in: PMHB, 3 (1879), 324-325; ibid., 10 (1886), 457-458; ibid., 11 (1887), 73-74, 75-76, 264-267.

[113]Newlin, Brackenridge, 57. Brackenridge was born in Scotland in 1748; his family moved to Pennsylvania in 1753.

[114]See Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry, ed. Newlin. The work originally appeared in a succession of volumes published between 1792 and 1815. The Newlin edition of 1937 includes all parts of the novel in their original texts.

[115]Everett, "John Smilie"; Findley, autobiographical letter, PMHB, 5 (1881), 440-450; Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, ch. 3-5.

[116]Pittsburgh Gazette, 26 Aug. 1786 (Samuel Sample), 30 Sept. 1786 (William Perry).

[117]For samples, see Daniel Marder, ed., A Hugh Henry Brackenridge Reader, 1770-1815 (Pittsburgh, 1970).

[118]Pittsburgh Gazette, 9 Sept. 1786.

[119]Ibid., 6 Jan., 10 Feb., 24 Mar., 21 Apr., 28 Apr., 5 May, 12 May, 19 May, 26 May, 2 June, 9 June, 21 July, 28 July, 4 Aug., 11 Aug., 18 Aug., 25 Aug., 1 Sept., 8 Sept., 15 Sept., 22 Sept. 1787.

[120]Ibid., 21 July, 28 July, 4 Aug. 1787. Brackenridge dubbed Findley "Traddle" and "Teague Regan" in a poem in the Gazette of 1 Dec. 1787; Traddle the weaver and Teague O'Regan, the Irish "bog-trotter," both appeared later in Brackenridge's Modern Chivalry.

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[121]Pittsburgh Gazette, 20 Jan. 1787.

[122]Ibid., 3 Feb. 1787; also response of "Q" to "Farmer," 27 Jan. 1787. For Chambers, see ibid., 31 Mar. 1787, 28 Apr. 1787, 29 Aug. 1789; and Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 41n.

[123]Pittsburgh Gazette, 17 Mar., 24 Mar., 14 Apr., 2 June, 9 June 1787. The editors agreed to release the name of the original "Farmer" to Brackenridge, but the results of that decision are unknown. During the 1789 church dispute two of the Rev. Samuel Barr's adversaries gave evidence to indicate that he once had authored a "Farmer" piece that appeared in the Gazette; Barr was certainly not on good terms with Brackenridge during 1787. Minutes of the Presbytery of Redstone, 53-54, 58.

[124]Pittsburgh Gazette, 16 Sept. 1786 ("Monitor"); 28 Oct. 1786 ("Friend"); 9 Dec. 1786 ("Farmer").

[125]Ibid., 6 Sept. 1786, 20 Jan. 1787, 8 Mar. 1788, for examples.

[126]"Petition from divers inhabitants of Westmoreland praying a Loan office may be opened," 1784, in Records of the General Assembly (Record Group 7), PHMC; Pittsburgh Gazette, 27 Dec. 1788, 17 Jan. 1789.

[127]Pittsburgh Gazette, 20 Jan. 1787; Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, 67. See Minutes of the Ninth General Assembly, 58, 118, 146, 185, 340-341, 369, for western petitions regarding the land payment issue; also Washington County petition read Feb. 1785, in General Assembly File, Records of the General Assembly (Record Group 7), PHMC.

[128]Pittsburgh Gazette, 9 Dec. 1786, 27 Dec. 1788, 28 Nov. 1789, 26 Apr. 1790; Pa. Arch., 6th ser., XIII: 334-337 (quotation p. 336).

[129]Pittsburgh Gazette, 13 June 1789, 5 Sept. 1789, 12 Sept. 1789.

[130]Ibid., 29 Aug. 1789.

[131]Ibid., 18 Nov. 1786.

[132]Ibid., 17 Feb. 1787, 25 Aug. 1787; see also the long essay of "Censor," 17 Mar. 1787, the "Agricola" letter, 27 Dec. 1788, the dialogue presented by "The Western Farmer" on 16 Jan. 1790, and items of similar nature printed in the Gazette of 3 Feb. 1787, 30 June 1787, 1 Mar. 1788.

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[133]Ibid., 28 Apr. 1787; also 9 Sept. 1786, 17 Mar. 1787, 5 May 1787; and regarding the Mississippi trade see also the "Western Farmer" piece, ibid., 16 Jan. 1790.

[134]Ibid., 16 Sept. 1786, 2 Dec. 1786.

[135]Ibid., 28 July 1787, 30 Sept. 1786, 7 Oct. 1786.

[136]Arthur Preston Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803: A Study in Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy (New York, 1934), 79-85; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, 188-190; Reginald Horsman, The Frontier in the Formative Years, 1783-1815 (Albuquerque, N.M., 1975), 14-15.

[137]Pittsburgh Gazette, 16 Sept. 1786 ("Monitor"), 2 Dec. 1786 ("Son of Freedom"), 20 Jan. 1787 ("Farmer").

[138]The "sermon" series began with the 22 Mar. 1788 issue of the Pittsburgh Gazette. Other contributions by Brackenridge promoting the constitution, some of them anonymous, appeared in issues of 27 Oct. 1787, 3 Nov. 1787, 1 Dec. 1787, 26 Jan. 1788, 23 Feb. 1788, 1 Mar. 1788, 8 Mar. 1788, 15 Mar. 1788. Other federalist arguments, some of which might be Brackenridge's, appeared 10 Nov. 1787, 17 Nov. 1787, 29 Mar. 1788, 3 May 1788, 10 May 1788, 17 May 1788. The addresses of the dissident segments of the assembly and the state convention appeared 21 Oct. 1787 and 26 Jan., 2 Feb., and 9 Feb. 1788.

[139]Ibid., 17 Nov. 1787, 28 June 1788.

[140]Ibid., 15 Feb. and 15 Mar. 1788; regarding "Sommers," see also 22 Mar., 19 Apr., 26 Apr. 1788. The pseudonyms appear to be in reference to John Hampden, a member of the Puritan opposition to Charles I, and John Somers, a prominent Whig during the reign of William III.

[141][Brackenridge], satirical remarks in ibid., 15 Mar. 1788, "Sermon" of 22 Mar. 1788, and piece signed "Neptune McBath," 11 Oct. 1788. Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, 212, quotes a letter from Thomas Scott to Benjamin Rush, 3 Mar. 1788, which states that Smilie worked "to stir the people up to arms." Brunhouse considers such assertions to have been "Federalist propaganda."

[142]Pittsburgh Gazette, 9 Aug. 1788, 20 Sept. 1788. The August meeting was chaired by John Moore. The committee of correspondence was: Capt. Thomas Morton; Christopher Truby, Esq.; William Jack, Esq.; Christopher Lobingier; Col. John Shields; Charles Campbell, Esq.; and James Brison (who became Allegheny County's first prothonotary).

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[143]Ibid., 4 Oct. 1788.

[144]Ibid., 9 May 1789, 16 May 1789, 23 May 1789, 20 June 1789. In reference to the constitutional issues see also: Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, ch. 4-5; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, ch. 7; Owen S. Ireland, "The Ratification of the Federal Constitution in Pennsylvania" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1966); Owen Ireland, "Partisanship and the Constitution: Pennsylvania 1787," Pa. Hist., 45 (1978), 315-332; Findley's autobiographical letter, PMHB, 5 (1881), 444-446.

[145]Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 214; Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 266-267; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 38; Thomas Hutchins to President of Congress, 15 Sept. 1785, in Papers of the Continental Congress, item 60, p. 189, National Archives; Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 275-277; Kaylalemont to Tamenand (George Morgan), 3 Aug. 1784, George Morgan Papers, LC; Pittsburgh Gazette, 6 Jan. 1787, 17 Mar. 1787, 21 July 1787; "Diary of Major Beatty," 383; Denny, Military Journal, 55; "The Trial of Mamachtaga," in Marder, ed., Brackenridge Reader, 355-364.

[146]Pittsburgh Gazette, 2 May 1789; also ibid., 7 Oct. 1786, 7 Apr. 1787, 3 Aug. 1787, 18 Aug. 1787, 27 Oct. 1787, 3 Nov. 1787, 13 June 1789, 12 Sept. 1789, 26 Sept. 1789, 14 Nov. 1789, 27 Mar. 1790, 19 Apr. 1790; "Diary of Major Beatty," 438; Josiah Harmar to Thomas Hutchins, 6 Nov. 1786, in George Morgan Papers, LC; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 242-246; Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 94, 104-105.

[147]Turnbull to John Holker, 12 Dec. 1791, Holker Papers, HSWP. For Indian-white relations and conflict in this period see: Downes, Council Fires, ch. 12-13; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York, 1975), 62-72, 91-127; Charles R. Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Toward the United States, 1783-1795 (Dallas, Tex., 1969); Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn., 1962); Brown, "Role of the Army in Western Settlement"; Denny, Military Journal.

[148]Isaac Craig supervised construction of the new fort; see correspondence between him and Secretary of War Henry Knox, Dec. 1791-Jan. 1792, in Craig Transcripts, vol. 1A and 2A, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. Regarding the fort, see Stotz, "Defense in the Wilderness," 185-188, and Collot, Journey in North America, I: 40-42.

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[149]Charles Campbell to Gov. Thomas Mifflin, 15 Jan. 1792, in Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 690.

[150]Craig to Henry Knox, 25 Mar. 1791, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2A, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[151]Detailed information regarding the defense situation of 1791-1793 is in the body of correspondence on the subject in Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV. Also Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, V: 489-490; John Gibson to Dunning MacNair, 21 Sept. 1793, Gratz Collec., Generals of the Revolution, case 4, box 11, HSP; petition of frontier inhabitants of Westmoreland County to Gov. Mifflin, 24 Feb. 1792, Dreer Mss., Large Misc. Mss., II: 26, HSP; petition of Pittsburgh inhabitants to General Anthony Wayne, [28 Apr. 1793?], Wayne Papers, XXVI: 56, HSP; Wallace, ed., Thirty Thousand Miles with Heckewelder, 260; Clark et al., eds., Journal and Letters of Asbury, I: 715; and materials in the Craig Collection, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh, which are concerned primarily with matters of military supply.

[152]Quoted phrase is from essay of "A Friend to Westmoreland," Pittsburgh Gazette, 10 Feb. 1787; see also Gazette issues of: 28 Oct. 1786; 13 Jan., 28 Apr., 5 May, 26 May, 9 June, 16 June, 1 Sept., and 22 Dec. 1787.

[153]PMHB, 1 (1877), 52-53; David Hoge to Jasper Yeates, 17 Apr. 1787, Jasper Yeates Family Papers (Mss. Group 137), PHMC; Alexander Addison to John Hoge, 17 Dec. 1791, Washington and Jefferson College Historical Collections; Pittsburgh Gazette, 25 May 1793; Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 464-466. The county courthouse burned during the winter of 1790-1791, and during the early 1790s the location of the new county buildings was an issue of bitter dispute. Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 393-394, relate Canon's efforts to use the Canonsburg Academy to gain educational superiority in the county at the same time. There were also some complaints of irregular elections: PMHB, 1 (1877), 52-53; George Hutchinson to Michael Huffnagle, 26 May 1790, in Westmoreland County Papers, box 1, HSWP.

[154]Letter of "A Friend to the Public," Pittsburgh Gazette, 3 Feb. 1787.

[155]Ibid., 26 Aug. 1786, 9 Sept. 1786, 6 Jan. 1787, 13 Jan. 1787, 9 June 1787, 13 Oct. 1787, 22 Dec. 1787, 4 Oct. 1788, 11 Oct. 1788; Minutes of the Ninth General Assembly, 185; 15 Feb. 1787 petition to Assembly, in General Assembly File, 11th Assembly (1787), Records of the General Assembly (Record Group 7), PHMC, printed in WPHM, 4 (1921), 84-93; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large,

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XIII: 84-89, 319-320. In Sept. 1789 an additional portion of northern Washington County was annexed to Allegheny County.

[156]William M. Sterret in Pittsburgh Gazette, 5 Sept. 1789.

[157]Ibid., 29 Nov. 1788, 29 Aug. 1789, 5 Sept. 1789.

[158]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 466-468; Denny, Military Journal, 55. Local civil authorities who reported the incidents identified the armed parties as Washington County militia, apparently mustered into service by an officer who went with them into Pittsburgh. It is not clear whether one party came to the fort twice or two separate groups were involved. The reports do not detail the means by which the militiamen were disarmed or dispersed with the aid of local inhabitants. Perhaps some of the militiamen went along for a show of force but had little desire for a genuinely violent confrontation. H. H. Brackenridge acted as defense attorney for the Indian; for his very striking account of the trial and last days of Mamachtaga (Mamachtagwin, Mamaughtaquie), see "The Trial of Mamachtaga," in Marder, ed., Brackenridge Reader, 355-364.

[159]Pittsburgh Gazette, 23 May 1789. For the identification of "Germanicus" as Brackenridge, see his Gazette Publications, 80-86.

[160]Ibid., 28 Apr. 1787, 28 July 1787.

[161]William Irvine to Anne Irvine, 12 Apr. 1782, Irvine Papers, V: 76, HSP; C. F. Volney, View of the Climate and Soil of the United States of America (London, 1804), 21. See also George Washington's 1784 reference to "the old and more interior government"; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV; 68.

[162]Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV: 66, 68. Washington wrote similarly to Gov. Benjamin Harrison; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXVII: 471-480. Regarding western political opinions see also the observations of Richard Butler on a trip down the Ohio in 1785, in Craig, ed., Olden Time, II: esp. 438, 440, 443-444, 499.

[163]PMHB, 1 (1877), 51-52 (reprinted from original in the Irvine Papers, HSP). In reference to a disputed election in Fayette County, Douglass stated that it "was as fair and regular as is possible for one to be here." Ibid., 53.

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[164]Pittsburgh Gazette, 17 Mar. 1787 ("Censor"), 12 Apr. 1788 ("A Washington County Farmer").

[165]Hunter, ed., "Badollet's Journal," 172, 175-176; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV: 47.

[166]Pittsburgh Gazette, 14 Oct. 1786, 24 Mar. 1787.

[167]For some of these genteel social gatherings see: Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 39, 42; "Mary Dewees's Journal," 189-193; Williams, ed., "Vaughan's Journal," 266; "Diary of Major Beatty," 383; Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 247; Pittsburgh Gazette, 14 July 1787; Andrew Ellicott to his wife, 25 May 1785, 31 May 1785, Andrew Ellicott Papers, LC.

[168]Smith, ed., Journals of John May, 157-158; Hunter, ed., "Badollet's Journal," 187-189.

[169]Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV: 46-48; Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation, I: 237-239 (quotation p. 237).

[170]Harper, "Class Structure of Western Pennsylvania," 236-292.

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Notes to Chapter 9

[1]Gibson to Mifflin, 18 July 1794, Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 69; Isaac Craig to Samuel Hodgdon, 22 Aug. 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Sept. 1794 submission return of Derry Twp., Westmoreland Co., in vol. 2 of Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion Collection, 1792-1796, LC (cited hereafter as Whiskey Rebellion Collection, LC).

[2]Undated and unsigned item, apparently the commissioners' draft of a response to the local committee of conference, ca. 1 Sept. 1794, in Wallace Papers, III: 42, HSP.

[3]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 350-351. For the Presque Isle project see Harry Marlin Tinkcom, The Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania, 1790-1801: A Study in National Stimulus and Local Response (Harrisburg, 1950), ch. 7, and the materials on the subject in: Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., VI: Irvine Papers, XII, HSP; Andrew Ellicott Papers, LC; Denny-O'Hara Collection, HSWP, Pittsburgh; Denny, Military Journal.

[4]Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Incidents of the Insurrection in the Western Part of Pennsylvania, in the Year 1794 (Philadelphia, 1795), I: 86-87, 99-100, III: 148; William Findley, History of the Insurrection, in the Four Western Counties of Pennsylvania: in the Year M. DCC. XCIV. With a Recital of the Circumstances Specially Connected Therewith: and an Historical Review of the Previous Situation of the Country (Philadelphia, 1796), 43-44, 45-46; Harold C. Syrett et al., eds., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1961-), XVII: 29; Pittsburgh Gazette, 7 Nov. 1789 ("Censor"), 3 Aug. and 10 Aug. 1793 (Littell letter), 17 Aug. 1793 ("William Tell"), 7 Sept. 1793, 26 Oct. 1793. Regarding the professionalization of the county judiciary, see also ibid., 31 Aug. 1793, 8 Feb. 1794, and Charles Biddle to David Redick, 12 Apr. 1791, in Washington and Jefferson College Historical Collections.

[5]Pittsburgh Gazette, 27 Jan. 1787.

[6]Ibid., 17 Feb. 1787.

[7]Ibid., 17 Feb., 24 Feb., 3 Mar., 17 Mar., 24 Mar. 1787.

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[8]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 757-758; Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 6-8; Findley, History, 26-35. These sources disagree as to the date of the collector's troubles in Washington County; the incident occurred in the mid-1780s.

[9]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., X: 757.

[10]Ibid., 1st ser., XI: 670-673; ibid., 2nd ser., IV: 19, 22; Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 8-11; Findley, History, 34-38; Tinkcom, Republicans and Federalists, 91.

[11]Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 6; Tench Coxe to Hamilton, 19 Oct. 1792; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII: 596.

[12]Henry Adams, ed., The Writings of Albert Gallatin (Philadelphia, 1879), I: 3.

[13]Findley to Alexander Addison, 30 Apr. 1794, Addison Papers, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Findley, History, 301. A printed petition, "To the Honorable the Congress of the United States," circulated in Washington County in September 1794 (copy from Cecil Twp. in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 2, LC), expressed a willingness to pay direct taxes rather than duties on articles of consumption such as liquor. For Hamilton's decision to avoid direct taxes in the initial formation of his revenue system, see William D. Barber, "'Among the Most Techy Articles of Civil Police': Federal Taxation and the Adoption of the Whiskey Excise," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 25 (1968), 58-84.

[14]Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 23-26, 122. For the distant-trials issue as a particularly strong grievance, see also Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 48, and Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 8-10.

[15]For the general attitudes and specific complaints summarized in this paragraph see: Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, I: 2-9, III: 1-67 (Gallatin's Jan. 1795 speech to the Pennsylvania House); Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 20-22, 29-31, 48-51, 63; ibid., 1st ser., XI: 670-673; Pittsburgh Gazette, 9 Feb. 1793, 23 Feb. 1793, 24 Aug. 1793, 8 Feb. 1794, 15 Feb. 1794, 22 Mar. 1794, 19 Apr. 1794, 10 May 1794; [William Irvine] to [A. J. Dallas], [20] Aug. 1794, Irvine Papers, XII: 84, HSP (printed version in Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 180-181); Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XI: 77-106, XII: 540-542, 592-602, XVI: 297-298n, XVII: 28-29n; Findley, History, 27, 35, 41. See also the summary in Leland D. Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels: The Story of a Frontier Uprising, rev. ed. (Pittsburgh, 1968), 23-28, 69-74. Baldwin's is the standard monograph on the Whiskey Insurrection, and is both thorough and handily written.

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[16]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 20-22, 29-31; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII: 307-309n, XVII: 27-32, 39-40; deposition of Josiah Tannehill, [n.d.], Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 2, LC; deposition of William Faulkner, 28 Sept. 1792, ibid., vol. 1; Findley, History, 42-45, 263-267; Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 16-21. There are no extant copies of the Pittsburgh Gazette for the period from spring 1790 to Jan. 1793, although some items from the newspaper were reprinted by other papers in Philadelphia for which there are copies.

[17]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 27.

[18]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 31; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 29n; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 7; Findley, History, 44-45.

[19]Findley, History, 45.

[20]Pittsburgh Gazette, 7 Sept., 30 Nov., 7 Dec. 1793.

[21]Ibid., 22 Feb., 1 Mar., 22 Mar., 10 May 1794; Findley, History, 45-46; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 99-100, III: 148. Brackenridge and others quietly dissuaded those such as Campbell who wanted to include these grievances in the discussions at the first Parkinson's Ferry meeting.

[22]Historians have tended to treat the Mingo Creek association primarily as a democratic-republican society akin to the Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) and Kentucky democratic societies of 1793-1794. While it shared some attributes with such associations, the Hamilton's District society was the product of the region's experiments with politically-oriented committees from the 1780s on, had its roots in the Washington County "convention" of 1787 and similar meetings, and was not in its origins or nature quite like the true democratic-republican societies. Baldwin probably did not see the papers relating to the Hamilton's District group in the Rawle Papers, HSP, or he certainly would have recognized it as the Mingo Creek society described by Brackenridge, for which Baldwin presumed there were no surviving papers; Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, 95-96, 282n. William Miller, "The Democratic Societies and the Whiskey Insurrection," PMHB, 62 (1938), 325-349, was also unaware of these materials at HSP and could do little regarding the Mingo Creek organization, although he concluded that it differed from the true democratic-republican societies of 1793-1794. Eugene Perry Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800 (Morningside Heights, N.Y., 1942), 14, 15-16, 61-62, 65, 85, 145-148, 166, did use the materials in the Rawle Papers; Link tended to refer to the association as "the Society of United Freemen" at Mingo

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Creek, a name used in some of the group's own papers, but which has tended to compound the confusion about the society. Link argued that the group was indeed of the ilk of the democratic-republican societies that appeared elsewhere in the U.S.

[23]Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, XII: 510-512, XIII: 90, 461-462, XIV: 55, 263; Pa. Arch., 9th ser., I: 331; see also Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 29, regarding the county's election districts. For the county's townships, see maps in Harper, "Class Structure of Western Pennsylvania," 320-321.

[24]Brackenridge, Incidents, II: 45, III: 25 (see also I: 120, 122, II: 15); Findley, History, 81, 280 (see also 268, 277-278).

[25]For the Feb. 1794 constitution of the society, see Rawle Papers, I: 18, 27, HSP. It is essentially the same constitution as that proposed as a means of organizing the four counties as a whole by battalion districts in spring 1794, printed in Pittsburgh Gazette, 26 Apr. 1794, and Philip S. Foner, ed., The Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800: A Documentary Sourcebook of Constitutions, Declarations, Addresses, Resolutions, and Toasts (Westport, Conn., 1976), 123-126. For the regiment's militia officers see Pa. Arch., 6th ser., III: 1364-1368, IV: 317-320, 329-330. The kinship connection of John and David Hamilton is noted by Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 58; their relationship to Daniel Hamilton, who was also involved in the excise resistance in the area, is not certain, although he may have been David's brother (see sketch of David Hamilton in Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 883-884).

[26]District residents at the 1791 county meeting were John Baldwin, who was later a councilman of the Hamilton's District society, and William Parker, who was among those accused of an attack on an exciseman not long after the meeting. At the 1792 Pittsburgh meeting were John Hamilton and Benjamin Parkinson, who became president of the district's society in 1794. At both meetings, and also at the September 1791 meeting at Pittsburgh, was David Philips. Unfortunately there may have been two men of that name from the northeastern Washington County-southern Allegheny County area, both involved in excise resistance and the Hamilton's District society. One of them (if there were two, which seems likely from Rawle Papers, I: 18, HSP) was a Baptist preacher. Peter Lisle (or Lyle) was also at the August 1792 Pittsburgh meeting and sat with the Hamilton's District society in Feb. 1794 as a member from Allegheny County. Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 29n, 33n; Rawle Papers, I: 15-16, 18, 27, HSP; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 20, 29.

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[27]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 29, 32-33; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 46-47; Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, 82-83. Compare list of sixteen of Johnson's assailants, in Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 33n, with names appearing in Rawle Papers, I: 15, HSP.

[28]The Hamiltons themselves, John, David, and Daniel, do not appear to have been active in the society that bore their name, at least not during the 1793-1794 period for which copies of some of the association's records have survived. All three were among those listed by the revenue officers as among the mob assaulting Johnson (see previous note). David and Daniel were among those present when John Neville's house was burned in July 1794, and David was an envoy from the local committee to Pittsburgh soon after. Daniel eventually fled the region to avoid prosecution. John, as will be mentioned below, appears to have been the least radical of the three.

[29]Faulkner's deposition, 28 Sept. 1792, is in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; see that volume also for several other depositions concerning the crowd at Faulkner's house. For the Faulkner episode see also Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII: 306n, XVII: 39; Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, 84-85.

[30]The unsigned and undated draft of this manifesto, which apparently survives in no other form, is in Rawle Papers, I: 138, HSP. For hints of committee meetings in the district see the undated tip to William Rawle which probably prompted him, as U.S. district attorney for Pennsylvania, to investigate the Hamilton's District activities and assemble documents about the group; Rawle Papers, I: 139, HSP. Also ibid., 67, regarding the chronology of the society's development. The association's reference to itself as a "society of united freemen" caught the attention of Eugene P. Link, who concluded that the name was derived from the Society of United Irishmen, the political organization founded in Ireland in 1791 (Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 15-16). I have found nothing yet to show any direct connection between the Hamilton's District group and Irish radicalism. Certainly any regular reader of the foreign news in the Pittsburgh Gazette was aware of Irish politics, efforts for parliamentary reform, and the United Irishmen; see for example the issues of 13 Apr., 11 May, 1 June, 24 Aug., and 7 Sept. 1793. Both St. Patrick's Day and St. Andrew's Day were celebrated at Pittsburgh (Gazette, 23 Nov. 1793, 14 Mar. 1795); the degree to which locals of Ulster or other Irish origins maintained a political affinity for, or connection with, their homeland is an intriguing but as yet unanswered question.

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[31]Rawle Papers, I: 18, 27, HSP, for two copies of the constitution. The constitution printed in Foner, ed., Democratic-Republican Societies: Sourcebook, 123-126, and Pittsburgh Gazette, 26 Apr. 1794, is the same constitution, proposed for use throughout the region. H. H. Brackenridge spoke with the society's secretary, John McDonald, and surely saw a written version of the constitution, for he gives a detailed account of the society's constitutional structure, including the date of the constitution (Feb. 1794); Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 77-78, 148-149.

[32]Rawle Papers, I: 19, 20, 27, 134, HSP. There is some information about Parkinson and other members of the family in the Parkinson's Ferry section of Washington County in Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 565-566, 883.

[33]Rawle Papers, I: 16, 18, 27, HSP.

[34]Pittsburgh Gazette, 8 Mar., 26 Apr., 28 June 1794; Foner, ed., Democratic-Republican Societies: Sourcebook, 123-126; Rawle Papers, I: 27, HSP; and for reference to a proposed Sept. [1793?] meeting in the "forks of Yough" area see Rawle Papers, I: 138, HSP.

[35]Findley, History, 280.

[36]Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 25.

[37]Rawle Papers, I: 15-16, 18, 27, HSP.

[38]Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 26, 77-78; also Findley, History, 57.

[39]Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 58; Findley, History, 98-99, 101, 103, 230-235. As the federal commissioners saw the matter in August, Col. Hamilton spoke as if personally "well disposed" to peace and order; he had, however, resolved to "stand by" his regiment, and so at an important meeting late in August he supported the idea of continued resistance to the law. Commissioners to secretary of state, 30 Aug. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC. Neither John, David, nor Daniel Hamilton held office in the district society in 1794. For biographical notes about John Hamilton see Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 694.

[40]Depositions of Daniel Depue (Depuy, Depew), 19 Nov. 1794, 23 Dec. 1794, Rawle Papers, I: 67, 88, HSP; Andrew Boggs' testimony in Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 132-133; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 50n; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 474. The testimony of James McAllister in Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 134, indicates that there may not have been any discussion of a march on Neville's this early. Such contradictions arise in large part because

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much of the evidence about such matters was given after the fact by people who felt pressed to justify or explain their own conduct. Therefore the "truth" of many events, including what was or was not said at the July 4 muster, is rather elusive.

[41]This statement requires some explanation. Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 133, prints testimony of one "James Therr." This seems likely to be a printer's misreading of Brackenridge's notorious scrawl and should be James Kerr. Kerr was a member of the society's council; he reported in his testimony that the committee consisted of himself, J. M'F., B. P., J. S., and J. B. "J.S." is difficult to identify, but could be John Scott, who attended a district society meeting in Feb. 1794 (Rawle Papers, I: 15, HSP). I presume the others are Benjamin Parkinson and council members James McFarlane and John Baldwin. These men, along with Kerr, were among the most active members of the district association.

[42]Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 18-19, III: 133-135; Findley, History, 86-87; Alexander Fulton to George Washington, [n.d.], in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; Thomas McKean and William Irvine to Gov. Mifflin, 22 Aug. 1794, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; "Statement of Thomas Williams as published in the Beaver Argus in 1855," and John Neville to Tench Coxe, 18 July 1794, Neville Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 69-70, 73-75, 181; David Lenox to Alexander Hamilton, 8 Sept. 1794, in Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 203-209; Isaac Craig to Samuel Hodgdon, 18 July 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, 113-128. From these accounts it seems that about 500 men, perhaps even more, gathered for the second confrontation at Neville's. See deposition of William McMillan, and order of Alexander Addison, both 21 Nov. 1794, in Neville Papers, Carnegie Library, regarding intimidation employed by some in northeastern Washington County to turn men out for the confrontation at Neville's; the man accused of the intimidation, Edward Magner (Magoner), may have been at a Hamilton's District society meeting in February (Rawle Papers, I: 15, HSP).

[43]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 206-207; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 22-26, 28; Findley, History, 91. An order of this committee was signed by Hugh Scott, Jr., as chairman. Scott was a resident of northeastern Washington County, and a meeting of the Hamilton's District society had been held at the house of his father, Hugh Scott Sr., earlier in the year (Rawle Papers, I: 15-16, HSP).

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[44]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 394; for Washington's views on the democratic-republican societies in connection with the excise resistance in the region see Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXXIII: 474-479, 505-507, XXXIV: 28-37; Washington to Edmund Randolph, 11 Apr. 1794, Washington Papers, ser. 2, XXX: 22; same to same, 16 Oct. 1794, Washington Papers, ser. 4.

[45]Pittsburgh Gazette, 26 Apr. 1794, in Foner, ed., Democratic-Republican Societies: Sourcebook, 131-133. See also Pittsburgh Gazette, 17 May 1794, regarding the Allegheny County resolutions and Rawle Papers, I: 12, 27, HSP, for the Hamilton's District's adoption of the remonstrance that originated in Kentucky and was also adopted by the Washington County society. For the Democratic Society in Washington County, its correspondence with the Democratic Societies of Kentucky and Pennsylvania, and its petitions to the federal government, see: Foner, ed., Democratic-Republican Societies: Sourcebook, 127-130, 133-139; correspondence between the Washington society and Democratic Society of Kentucky in vol. V of Harry Innes Papers, LC; Minutes of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, 1793-1794, pp. 88, 96, 134-138, 142, HSP; Miller, "Democratic Societies and Whiskey Insurrections"; Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 14, 16-17, 61-70, 139; E. Merton Coulter, "The Efforts of the Democratic Societies of the West to Open the Navigation of the Mississippi," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 11 (1924), 376-389.

[46]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVI: 258-260.

[47]See Miller, "Democratic Societies and Whiskey Insurrection"; Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 78-80, 92, 145-146. The Washington group's June resolutions concerning the administration's policies toward Britain are in Foner, ed., Democratic-Republican Societies: Sourcebook, 133-135.

[48]See George Clymer to A. Hamilton (10 Oct. 1792), in Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII: 540-541, and Edmund Randolph to George Washington, 10 Sept. 1792, Washington Papers, ser. 4. In his account of the insurrection Findley went to some pains to demonstrate that he, Gallatin, and Smilie played no such role, that Alexander Hamilton vindictively tried to build a case against them as the government's troops went west, and that Hamilton's own policies had, perhaps intentionally, worked to engender a crisis in the region. The last third of Findley, History, centers generally on these matters.

[49]George Clymer to Ann Clymer, 15 Apr. 1778 (modern transcription), at HSWP, Pittsburgh; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII: 541. For Clymer's trip, see ibid.,

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305-310, 495-497, 517-522; Clymer to U.S. attorney general, 4 Oct. 1792, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; Pittsburgh Gazette, 23 Feb., 2 Mar., 9 Mar. 1793; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 36-39. Clymer's views toward local authorities were no doubt influenced by his conflict with Alexander Addison, the presiding judge of the state's western judicial district. Addison, a strong advocate of state judicial authority, resisted when Clymer, a federal revenue officer, expected his aid during Clymer's investigations.

[50]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII: 312.

[51]Washington's proclamation of Sept. 1792 is in Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 32-33 (also in Pittsburgh Gazette beginning 19 Jan. 1793); Washington to Hamilton, 17 Sept. 1792, Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII: 390-391. For the government's consideration of the excise enforcement problem in western Pennsylvania in 1792, see Richard H. Kohn, "The Washington Administration's Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion," Journal of American History, 59 (1972), 567-584; the correspondence of Sept. 1792 in Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII; Hamilton's Mar. 1792 report, ibid., XI: 77-106; and Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 32-57.

[52]Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, ch. 6, esp. pp. 82-91, 98-104; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 24-58; Pittsburgh Gazette, 21 June 1794.

[53]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 42, 58. For Hamilton's full report, ibid., 24-58.

[54]Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 26, 140-141; Findley, History, vii, 17-25, 47, 105, 197-198, 296-298, 303-309; Gallatin's Jan. 1795 speech to the Pennsylvania House, in Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 1-52, esp. 7-13; also Findley to A. J. Dallas, 23 Aug. 1794, in Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 206-207.

[55]See Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 17, III: 133-135. Alexander Hamilton believed the attacks on Neville's house to be "in conformity with a plan which seems to have been for some time entertained." Pennsylvania's commissioners to the excise insurgents believed the attacks "were not owing to deliberate preconcerted measures, but originated in an unbridled gust of passion artfully raised among young men, who may have been at the time too much heated with strong drink." The truth may lie somewhere between these two interpretations. Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 53; Thos. McKean and Wm. Irvine to Gov. Mifflin, 22 Aug. 1794, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh.

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[56]Rawle Papers, I: 139, HSP; Findley, History, 57, 86. See ibid., 56-57, 81, 268, 277-278, 280; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 120, 122, II: 15, 45, III: 25; and Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 8, regarding the notion that this area was a particular center of riotous activity. Gallatin concluded at one point "that there was a general combination to expel the officers in that survey," something "more dangerous" than "mere riot," even if it did not constitute the seditious conspiracy Alexander Hamilton perhaps feared. Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 136, for Gallatin's comment.

[57]This is the briefest of surveys of a very eventful period. For details see Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, and the accounts by Brackenridge (Incidents), Findley (History), and Gallatin (Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 1-67). Other major sources of information are: Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 1-550; Whiskey Rebellion Collection, LC; items in the Irvine Papers and Rawle Papers, HSP; and some items in the Craig and Neville papers at Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. For the formation of the federal government's response to the crisis see the published papers of Alexander Hamilton; the published and manuscript papers of George Washington; Kohn, "Washington Administration's Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion"; and Jacob E. Cooke, "The Whiskey Insurrection: A Reevaluation," Pa. Hist., 30 (1963), 316-346. Alfred P. James, "A Political Interpretation of the Whiskey Insurrection," WPHM, 33 (1950), 90-101, and Bennett M. Rich, "Washington and the Whiskey Insurrection," PMHB, 65 (1941), 334-352, are less useful.

[58]Isaac Craig to John Neville, 12 Sept. 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[59]Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, 52; Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, 47, 120; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 111n; Westmoreland Co. Quarter Sessions Courts, docket, Apr. 1773-Apr. 1783 (typescript), Clerk of Courts Office, Greensburg, Pennsylvania, p. 168; Pittsburgh Gazette, 14 May 1793. Bradford was a member of the "Washington Society for the Relief of Free Negroes and others, unlawfully held in Bondage," formed in 1789 and modelled after the Philadelphia society of the same name: Pittsburgh Gazette, 14 Feb. 1789; Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., "Washington County, Pennsylvania, in the Eighteenth Century Antislavery Movement," WPHM, 25 (1942), 135-142.

[60]Clymer to A. Hamilton (10 Oct. 1792), Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII: 540; ibid., XVII: 29; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 20, 29; Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 18. According to one report Bradford was hospitable to the

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disguised party that raised a ruckus and made threats at William Faulkner's tavern in 1792; deposition of William Goudy, 29 Sept. 1792, in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC.

[61]Findley, History, 124-125; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 116; federal commissioners to Secretary of State Edmund Randolph, 30 Aug. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 390-391.

[62]Brackenridge, Incidents, II: 29.

[63]Bradford to Gov. Mifflin, 4 Oct. 1794, in Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 396-397; Elizabeth Bradford to George Washington, 10 Dec. 1794, in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 2, LC.

[64]Brackenridge, Incidents, esp. I: 30-32, 39, 42, 55, 63, 87, 105, 118, 119-120, III: 136, 150.

[65]Ibid., III: 139; Findley, History, 117-118, 124.

[66]See Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 87, 104, III: 150.

[67]There may have been a competitive tension between Washington interests and Canonsburg interests; there was resentment about Pittsburgh's importance and the excision of the northern part of the county when Allegheny County was formed; there was considerable friction between those at the southern end of the county who wanted to form a new county and those in the north who held most county power (see Pittsburgh Gazette, 15 Feb. 1794, for this conflict). Other possible sources of friction in the allocation of local- and county-level power were numerous. Bradford was a delegate at the county's "Patriotic Convention" of 1787, which hinted at some of the dissatisfaction and frustration that may have run through the county's politics (Pittsburgh Gazette, 17 Feb. 1787).

[68]Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 148, 393-394; Alexander Addison to John Hoge, 17 Dec. 1791, Washington and Jefferson College Historical Collections; Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 226n, 601, 603.

[69]Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXXI: 359, XXXII: 412. For Washington's frustrating relationship with Canon see also ibid., XXIX: 90-91, 95-98, XXX: 90, 172, 410-411, XXXI: 252, XXXII: 22, XXXIII: 409, XXXIV: 220, 298; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, IV: 25.

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[70]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XII: 495-497, 517-522 (quotations from 495, 517); Canon to Washington, 23 Nov. 1794, Washington Papers, ser. 4.

[71]Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 42; Findley, History, 95. For some biographical details about Marshal, see Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 224n, 226n, 485, 728; and PMHB, 11 (1887), 252.

[72]For Marshal's role, see Brackenridge, Incidents, esp. I: 30-31, 42-43, 67-69, 87, 88-91, 99, III: 18, 150; Findley, History, esp. 95, 103-104, 113-114, 117, 124, 289, 297; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 16-17.

[73]Findley, History, 79-82, 136-137, 183, 327-328; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 14, 16-17, 122, III: 12; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 351.

[74]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 37n, 46; Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, 101-102; Findley, History, 85; Neville to Tench Coxe, 18 July 1794, Neville Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Brackenridge, Incidents, 132-134, 151-152.

[75]Craig to Samuel Hodgdon, 18 July 1794, to James O'Hara, 25 July 1794, and to Henry Knox, 25 July 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B; Craig to Hodgdon, 11 Nov. 1794, Craig Collection, vol. II-C, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. Hodgdon replied to Craig from Philadelphia: "We all lament that so few of the insurgents fell -- such disorders can only be cured by copious bleedings" (27 July 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 1B, Carnegie Library). After the destruction of Bower Hill, Neville advertised for the return of certain papers "if they are fallen into the hands of an honest man." Pittsburgh Gazette, 26 July 1794. For the inventory of buildings and furnishings Neville lost at Bower Hill, see Margaret Moore Felton, "General John Neville" (M.A. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1932), appendix G.

[76]Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 22.

[77]Findley, History, 267-268; Brackenridge, Incidents, II: 34, 36, 44-45, III: 13-15. Brackenridge's concern for his own position and safety stands out throughout his book.

[78]Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 50, 76.

[79]Regarding Pittsburgh's danger from the insurgents, see ibid., esp. I: 15, 28, 43-46, 51, 54, 69, 70-71, II: 11-13, III: 77, 98-99, 102, 114, 120.

[80]Ibid., I: 82, 103-104.

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[81]Findley, History, 106; Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 22-23, 27.

[82]In addition to his discussion of the Pittsburgh leadership (including himself) and of Bradford and Marshal (whom he thought subject to "popular influence" and intimidation), see Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 30-31, for Brackenridge's opinion regarding Edward Cook of Fayette County, Craig Ritchie of Washington County, "and many others."

[83]Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 16-17; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 90-92, 95, 102-103, III: 136-139.

[84]Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 15; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 111.

[85]Declaration of "a meeting of Committees from the several townships of the County of Fayette," 10 Sept. 1794, in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC. See also resolutions of Fayette's standing committee, 4 Sept. 1794, ibid.; Gallatin to James Ross, 16 Sept. 1794, ibid., vol. 2; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, I: 4-12, III: 10-11, 20-22; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 316-320; Pittsburgh Gazette, 22 Mar. 1794, 13 Sept. 1794, 20 Sept. 1794, 4 Oct. and 11 Oct. 1794; Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 136-139.

[86]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 180-190; Findley, History, 304-306.

[87]Craig to Knox, 25 July 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; John Wilkins, Jr., to Col. Clement Biddle, 1 Aug. 1794, Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 81.

[88]Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 46, 75. The manuscript record book of the town's borough government, 1794-1803, is at HSP.

[89]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 165; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 130. See also commissioners to Secretary of State Randolph, 23 Aug. 1794, Bradford and Yeates to Randolph, 5 Sept. 1794, and Bradford to George Washington, 17 Aug. 1794, all in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC.

[90]Hamilton to Craig, 13 Aug. 1794, 23 Aug. 1794, and Knox to Craig, 8 Aug. 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 1C, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[91]Craig to Knox, 17 Aug. 1794, 10 Oct. 1794, 24 Oct. 1794, and Craig to John Neville, 26 Sept. 1794, 20 Oct. 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

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[92]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 358.

[93]Alexander Addison to James Ross, 18 Sept. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 2, LC; Findley, History, 185; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 24. James Ross wrote fellow commissioner William Bradford that although armed insurgency was disappearing, "all will be lost if the army does not come forward -- It is hoped that no representation will retard or stop the necessary measures." Ross to Bradford, 12 Oct. 1794, Wallace Papers, III: 40, HSP.

[94]Findley, History, 168-169; Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, VI: 183-186.

[95]Jackson and Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, VI: 184.

[96]Findley, History, 246-250; Findley to William Bradford, 16 Sept. 1794, Wallace Papers, III: 38, HSP.

[97]Addison's charge to the grand juries of the western counties, Dec. 1794, in Pittsburgh Gazette, 27 Dec. 1794; commissioners to secretary of state, 29 Aug. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC.

[98]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 164-165.

[99]Ibid., 217, 547-548; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 88; William Bradford to Edmund Randolph, 12 Aug. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 85, 99, 118, III: 140-141. Brackenridge contended that David Bradford had no notion of secession, but Bradford's address at the Brownsville meeting in August seems to have pointed in that direction.

[100]Findley, History, 175; William Bradford to George Washington, 17 Aug. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC. See also William Bradford's Aug. 1794 opinion to Washington on the "late combinations in the Western Counties of Pennsylvania," Washington Papers, ser. 4; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 239-242; and Kohn, "Washington Administration's Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion," 578. For some strong expressions of sentiment against Great Britain see contributions to Pittsburgh Gazette of 11 May 1793, 22 Feb. and 1 Mar. 1794, 19 Apr. 1794, 3 May 1794, 6 Sept. 1794. See also Foner, ed., Democratic-Republican Societies: Sourcebook, 131-135. There were also some strong pro-French sentiments in the region which did not accord well with a union with Great Britain; for an example see the celebratory toasts of the Washington Mechanical Society, Pittsburgh Gazette, 16 Feb. 1793.

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[101]Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 86, 99-100; Findley to William Bradford, 16 Sept. 1794, Wallace Papers, III: 38, HSP; Findley, History, 182-183.

[102]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 217, 262; Bradford to Secretary of State Edmund Randolph, 10 Aug. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; Craig to Henry Knox, 15 Aug. 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[103]Addison charge to grand juries, Pittsburgh Gazette, 27 Dec. 1794; Findley, History, 53-55, 300-301; Brackenridge, Incidents, II: 9-10; declarations of Fayette County committee, 10 Sept. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC.

[104]Coxe to H. H. Brackenridge, 26 Aug. 1794, published anonymously in Pittsburgh Gazette, 20 Sept. 1794. For identification of the letter as Coxe's see Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 96n, and Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 301-303.

[105]Rowe, "Alexander Addison," 221-250.

[106]Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 33-34; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 11, 16; Findley, History, 136-137, 187-189, for use of the phrase. These authors all adhered to the view that the insurgents worked to expand the conflicts at Neville's into a wider movement. See also Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, VII: 249, for David Bradford's use of the phrase "common cause" and Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 112, for a close variant, as well as his urging that those who were at Neville's not be allowed "to fall a sacrifice to Federal prosecution."

[107]Minutes of Presbytery of Redstone, 111; Pierce, "Associate Reformed Churches," 100-101; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 17, II: 20; Findley, History, 86, 97, 182, 272; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 446; Clunn, "March on Pittsburgh," 59; Pittsburgh Gazette, 9 May 1795. See also Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 111, 116, and Findley, History, 125-126, regarding the address made at the Brownsville (Redstone) meeting by James Edgar, an influential Presbyterian elder who spoke to counter Bradford's inflammatory speech. John Canon and James Marshal were prominent Presbyterians associated with the insurgent side.

[108]Findley, History, 269-270; Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 136-139 (Gallatin testimony).

[109]For Addison's Sept. charge to the grand jury see Pittsburgh Gazette, 6 Sept. 1794, or Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 237-247.

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[110]Addison's charge to grand juries, Pittsburgh Gazette, 27 Dec. 1794.

[111]Findley, History, 94-106; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 40-41, 122, II: 63-64; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 342.

[112]Quotations from Bradford to John McCally et al., 6 Aug. 1794, in Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, VII: 249, and to Monongalia inhabitants, 6 Aug. 1794, Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 111-112. See also Findley, History, 107-109, and Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 10-11.

[113]There is information about opposition to the excise in Pennsylvania's counties outside the far southwestern corner of the state in Rawle Papers, vol. I, HSP, and Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV. In August 1794 the U.S. government heard rumors that people from western Pennsylvania were "busy" in Mifflin and Huntingdon counties; William Bradford to Edmund Randolph, 10 Aug. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC.

[114]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 231-233, 249-250, 262-263, 266-267; Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, VII: 297, 323-324; Pittsburgh Gazette, 18 Oct. 1794. Maryland's Gov. Thomas Sim Lee believed that these discontented Marylanders were in communication with western Pennsylvania.

[115]Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, VII: 265-268, 279, 289-290, 294, 298, 303, 304, 324, 337, VIII: 306-307, 430; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 163, 182, 201-203, 205-206, 208, 269-271; Findley, History, 320-321; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 13-14; Pittsburgh Gazette, 13 Sept. 1794; U.S. commissioners to secretary of state, 29 Aug. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; Rawle Papers, I: 23, 24, 60, HSP.

[116]Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 14. For liberty poles, slogans, and the six-barred flag see: Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 99, 102, II: 5-6, III: 107, 137; Findley, History, 205; William Bradford to Edmund Randolph, 15 Aug. 1794, and Bradford and Jasper Yeates to Randolph, 5 Sept. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC.

[117]Clunn, "March on Pittsburgh," 56. For a similar comment see Israel Shreve to George Washington, 27 Oct. 1794, Washington Papers, ser. 4.

[118]John McGill "to the Marshal" [n.d.], Rawle Papers, I: 135, HSP.

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[119]Findley, History, 127-128, 136-137, 145.

[120]For example, see the explanations given by John Corbly to John and Presley Neville, 19 Nov. 1794, Neville Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh, and by Alexander Fulton to George Washington, [n.d.], in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC. For Fulton see also Findley, History, 96.

[121]See Findley, History, 32-33, for a confrontation between a Pennsylvania excise collector and "Belzebub," accompanied by "a number of other devils," at Greensburg during the 1780s. A notice posted by the rioters during the Sideling Hill affair of 1765 named the rioters' headquarters "Hells Town"; there the usual conventions of society were dropped and there was to be "free toleration for Drinking Swearing Sabath breaking and any out Rage wath we have a Mind to do." This notice was also similar to those of Tom the Tinker in 1794 in that it was an attempt to bolster the membership and cohesiveness of the "Loyal Volunteers" of the Sideling Hill area. "Advertisement," 25 May 1765, copy enclosed in John Reid to Thomas Gage, 1 June 1765, Gage Papers, WLCL.

[122]Pittsburgh Gazette, 26 July 1794, 13 Sept. 1794; Findley, History, 62-63; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 78-79, II: 8-9, 10-11. John Holcroft, an officer of the Hamilton's District society and leader of the first foray to Neville's house in July, was commonly reputed to be the original Tom the Tinker, but denied the accusation; see ibid., III: 148.

[123]Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 42, III: 133, 135.

[124]Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 14.

[125]Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 153.

[126]Henry Knox to George Washington, 4 Aug. 1794, and Edmund Randolph to Washington, 5 Aug. 1794, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Henry Lee to James Wood, 19 Sept. 1794, in Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers, VII: 318.

[127]Pittsburgh Gazette, 9 Aug. 1794; William Bradford to Edmund Randolph, 10 Aug. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 142, 172; Isaac Craig to Henry Knox, 3 Aug. 1794, in Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 66; Findley, History, 98; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 13.

[128]Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 148; Findley, History, 217. On 31 Oct. Alexander Hamilton reported that "it does

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not appear that any great numbers have fled" (Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 352). Whether Hamilton's information was any better than Brackenridge's, and whether more may have left early in November, is difficult to ascertain.

[129]For the political context of Washington's decision to join Pennsylvania in sending special commissioners while beginning preparations to mobilize the militia, see Kohn, "Washington Administration's Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion."

[130]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 186-187, 191-193. The federal commissioners' minutes and reports are in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC.

[131]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 204-206, 211-212, 215; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 103-120; Findley, History, 116-129; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 17-20.

[132]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 212-215, 233-237; federal commissioners to secretary of state, 2 Sept. 1794, and Wm. Bradford and Jasper Yeates to secretary of state, 5 Sept. 1794, both Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC. The federal commissioners' final report is in Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 348-359; for the complete process of negotiation between the committees of conference and the state and federal commissioners in August and September, see ibid., 110-111, 136-139, 163-166, 180-181, 182-193, 194-206, 208, 210-219, 233-237, 258-261; federal commissioners' papers in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; and Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, ch. 10.

[133]Findley, History, 130-131; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 236.

[134]John Wilkins, Jr., to James Ross, 11 Sept. 1794, Wallace Papers, III: 55, HSP.

[135]Brackenridge, Incidents, II: 15-23; Wallace Papers, III: 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, HSP; David Philips to John Wilkins, Jr., 22 Sept. 1794, George Smith and James Montgomery to James Ross, 15 Sept. 1794, and Ross' note on the reverse of Michael Rough's list of those submitting in Franklin Twp., Westmoreland Co., 13 Sept. 1794, all in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 2, LC; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 343.

[136]Reports of meetings at Uniontown, 4 Sept. and 10 Sept. 1794, in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 1, LC; Gallatin to James Ross, 16 Sept. 1794, ibid., vol. 2; Pittsburgh Gazette, 20 Sept. 1794; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 316-320; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, I: 4-12.

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[137]Statements of meetings of Franklin Twp. (Washington Co.) and Salem, Washington, Fairfield, and Wheatfield Twps. (Westmoreland Co.), 11 Sept. 1794, and John [Meater?] to James Ross, 16 Sept. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 2, LC. General statements about township submissions in this paragraph are based on those returns found in ibid.; there are also some submission returns in Neville Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[138]See for example the submission returns from Smith, Cross Creek, Donegal, and Cecil Twps. (Washington Co.), and the district of Plum and Versailles Twps. (Allegheny Co.), in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 2, LC.

[139]Submission returns, 11 Sept. 1794, Fayette Twp., Allegheny County, ibid.

[140]Derry Twp. return, ibid.

[141]The lists of signers certified by John Wilkins and Adamson Tannehill in Pittsburgh include several men who were residents of other Allegheny County townships; see their submission returns, the list of Allegheny Co. taxables, and Wilkins' letter to James Ross, [19 Sept. 1794], in ibid.

[142]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 297-299, 355-359 (quotations p. 358).

[143]Brackenridge, Incidents, II: 20.

[144]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 65-66, 342-344; Findley, History, 135-136; Isaac Craig to John Neville, 12 Sept. 1794, 19 Sept. 1794, and 26 Sept. 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[145]Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 23; Findley, History, 120, 135; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 343 (Wm. Jack to Gov. Thos. Mifflin, 22 Sept. 1794); William Findley to William Bradford, 16 Sept. 1794, Wallace Papers, III: 38, HSP.

[146]Findley, History, 131-132, 172-173.

[147]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 380-381, 389, 393, 421-424, 435-439; Charles Campbell to Gov. Thomas Mifflin, 27 Oct. 1794, Rawle Papers, I: 59, HSP; Pittsburgh Gazette, 4 Oct. 1794 (jury reply to Addison), 18 Oct. 1794, 25 Oct. 1794; Findley, History, 137-139, 169-199; Brackenridge, Incidents, II: 31-35, 46-49.

[148]This fact was strongly asserted by staunch friends of government such as Isaac Craig, who insisted that the government use its troops to ensure that the last vestiges

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of rebellion were gone; but it was also admitted by more moderate politicians such as David Redick, who tried to convince Washington that the full force of the militia army was unnecessary. See Craig to John Neville, 26 Sept. 1794 and 20 Oct. 1794, both Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh, and Redick to Washington, 22 Oct. 1794, in Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 2, LC.

[149]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 438.

[150]Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 361, 372-373, 391.

[151]Findley, History, 200-237; Brackenridge, Incidents, II: 50-84; Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, 240-258, 262-264; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 447-449, 472-474, 479-480, 498, 500-502, 533, 535-536, 539; Irvine Papers, XII: 108, 109, 110, HSP; Rawle Papers, I: 57, 71, 111, HSP.

[152]Bradford to William Rawle, 11 May 1795, Rawle Papers, I: 108, HSP. See also Cook to U.S. attorney general, 4 May 1795, in ibid., I: 107; James Ross to Bradford, 12 Oct. 1794, Wallace Papers, III: 40, HSP; Albert Gallatin to Ross, 16 Sept. 1794, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, vol. 2, LC; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 485; Brackenridge, Incidents, I: 31, 59, 66-69; Findley, History, 99-102. Cook, in his mid-fifties in 1794, served in the Pennsylvania convention in 1776 and as a justice and county lieutenant during and after the Revolution.

[153]For references to "the Insurgent Counties" see Washington to Edmund Randolph, 11 Oct. 1794, 16 Oct. 1794, Washington Papers, ser. 4; Washington to Daniel Morgan, 8 Oct. 1794, in Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXXIII: 523.

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Notes to Chapter 10

[1]Pittsburgh Gazette, 17 Jan. 1795.

[2]Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 153.

[3]Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 133. For one account of discontent in Kentucky on the eve of the Whiskey Insurrection, see Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 104-105.

[4]Daniel Leet et al. to George Washington, 3 Dec. 1795; _____ to Leet et al., 24 Apr. 1796; Charles Lee to Washington, 18 Apr. and 25 Apr. 1796, all in vol. 2, Whiskey Rebellion Collection, LC.

[5]See for example William Findley to Alexander Addison, 6 May 1796, Addison Papers, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh.

[6]Pittsburgh Gazette, 25 Apr. 1795.

[7]Ibid., 15 Nov. 1794, 27 Dec. 1794, 21 Feb. 1795, 11 Apr. 1795, 2 May 1795; William Meetkerke to John Neville, 13 Oct. 1796, Neville Papers, group I, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; John Webster to Neville, 16 Dec. 1794, 30 June 1795, 13 July 1795, ibid., group II; Neville to Henry Miller, 28 Apr. 1797, ibid., letterbook; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 364-365, 376-377; Findley, History, 323.

[8]Isaac Craig to John Neville, 12 Sept. 1794, Craig Transcripts, vol. 2B, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Presley Neville to John Neville, 3 Mar. 1795, Neville Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[9]Findley, History, 324.

[10]Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 545-550; Pittsburgh Gazette, 23 Aug., 25 Oct., 1 Nov., 8 Nov. 1794.

[11]Findley, History, 140-167, 178-180, 187-189, 215, 219-220; Brackenridge, Incidents, II: 46-84, III: 62; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV: 330, 416-420, 457-458; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 315-318, 331-336, 353; Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings of Washington, XXXIV: 8, 159-160; Jackson and

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Twohig, eds., Diaries of Washington, VI: 186; Clunn, "March on Pittsburgh," 60, 62; Pittsburgh Gazette, 8 Nov. 1794, 15 Nov. 1794; Henry Lee to William Irvine, 19 Nov. 1794, and Jonathan Hughes to Gen. Proctor, 20 Nov. 1794, Irvine Papers, XII: 110, 111, HSP; appraisal of damages suffered by D. Young of Fayette County, dated 1 Aug. 1796, Neville Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

[12]Brackenridge, Incidents, III: 30-32, 37-39; Findley, History, 321-322; Pittsburgh Gazette, 18 Apr. 1795; Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., II: 480-481.

[13]Depositions of Col. Stephen Stephenson (30 May 1795), Capt. Isaac Levan (4 June 1795), Capt. John Grubb (4 June 1795), and Lt. Calvin Morgan (4 June 1795), in Neville Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh. Also [Alexander Addison?] to Gen. Daniel Morgan, 5 June 1795, ibid., and Morgan to Alexander Addison, 8 June 1795, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh. Addison, the presiding judge of the region's county courts, had been a strong advocate of order during the crisis in 1794, but was also a firm believer in civil over military power and state rather than federal judicial authority, and so did not endear himself to Morgan when such instances arose. For an earlier assertion of civil v military authority by Addison, see Addison to Anthony Wayne, 16 Feb. 1793, Wayne to Addison, 1 Mar. 1793, Addison to Wayne, 6 Mar. 1793, and Lt. Samuel Andrews to Wayne, 11 Mar. 1793, Wayne Papers, XXV: 42, 60, 66, 78, HSP.

[14]Pittsburgh Gazette, 10 Jan., 24 Jan., 7 Feb., 14 Feb. 1795; Adams, ed., Writings of Gallatin, III: 1-67 (Gallatin's Jan. 1795 speech to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives); William Findley to Alexander Addison, 9 Jan. 1795, Addison Papers, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh; Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels, 262. Of the 11 representatives and 4 state senators ousted by the measure, all were re-elected in February 1795 except for one senator who chose not to run again.

[15]Pittsburgh Gazette, 17 Jan. 1795, 21 Feb. 1795, 21 Mar. 1795; see also the "John Fling" pieces poking fun at local political aspirants in ibid., 31 Aug. 1793, 11 Oct. 1794.

[16]Ibid., 11 Oct. 1794, 13 June 1795, 12 Sept. 1795, 24 Oct. 1795, 31 Oct. 1795.

[17]Findley to Alexander Addison, 6 May 1796, Addison Papers, Darlington Library, Pittsburgh. For an eastern conservative's biting views of the western insurrection, see Charles Nisbet to Alexander Addison, 29 Oct. 1794, 13 Jan. 1795, 20 Feb. 1795, ibid.

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[18]This fact was recognized by those in the region who met to form tickets of candidates as early as the 1780s. See the letter of "A German" of Westmoreland County, in Pittsburgh Gazette, 11 Oct. 1794, for recognition that without cooperation among themselves and agreement on candidates the voters of Westmoreland would lose to Fayette the control of the state senatorial district shared by the two counties.

[19]Benjamin Stokely to David Redick, 13 Apr. 1795, Washington and Jefferson College Historical Collections.

[20]Cooke, "Whiskey Insurrection: Re-evaluation," 338-339n, is correct in his criticism of Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, which attempted to explain regional politics through this period in terms of two opposed parties whose membership, interests, and outlooks remained largely consistent from the late 1780s through the 1790s. There was no such simple and constant bipolar alignment of politics in the region. Anyone who doubts this assertion need only attempt to follow the political alignments of Hugh Henry Brackenridge, which were influenced by personal pique, competition for office, the specifics of individual issues, and Brackenridge's own distinctive notions of the political system, through the 1790s.

[21]Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 455.

[22]Ibid., 2nd ser., IV: 50.

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NOTE ON SPECIAL MAP SOURCES

Map 3, Fort Pitt

Based on the military plans of Fort Pitt by Bernard Ratzer (1761) and Elias Meyer (1762), reproduced in Stotz, "Defense in the Wilderness," facing pp. 157 and 158.

Map 4, Economic Development (1770s)

Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book," 526, 527, 531, 532, 534, 537, 539, 545, 550, 554, 561; Crumrine, ed., "Yohogania Minute Book," 94, 105-106, 116, 227, 236, 252; Crumrine, ed., "Ohio Minute Book," 48, 56; Westmoreland County Quarter Sessions Docket, 1773-1783; Thornely, ed., Cresswell Journal, 64, 66; Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, 442; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 313n, 415n; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 151; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 71n; George Swetnam and Helene Smith, A Guidebook to Historic Western Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh, 1976), 141, 224, 240, 244; Pa. Arch., 1st ser., IV: 564; Hening, ed., Virginia Statutes at Large, IX: 546-547; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, X: 471-472, XI: 232-233; Williams, "Fort Pitt and the Revolution," 264; Butterfield, ed., Washington-Irving Correspondence, 284n; Crumrine, ed., Washington County, survey following p. 192; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 562-563 (Howell map); Pittsburgh Gazette, 19 Apr. 1788, 27 Dec. 1794; Gibert Simpson to George Washington, 3 Apr. 1775, Washington Papers, ser. 4; George Morgan to Mr. Anderson, 5 Feb. 1777, Morgan Letter Book I, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh; Hand Papers, I: 14, 38, HSP; Daniel Brodhead to Archibald Lochry, 30 Apr. 1779, Lochry Letters (MG 276), PHMC.

Map 5, Justices of the Peace, 1773-1776

Pa. Arch., 3d ser., XXII: 21-53, 443; lists of Bedford Co. and Westmoreland Co. justices' commissions, [1775], in Records of Pennsylvania's Revolutionary Governments, 1775-1790 (RG 27), PHMC; Crumrine, ed., Washington County, 147, 148, 193, 224n, 228n, 238n, 483, 790, 868, draft of survey following 192; Lacey, "Journal of a Mission," 105; McClure,

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Diary of David McClure, 49, 102-103, 107; John McMillan Journal (transcription), HSP; Swetnam and Smith, Guidebook to Historic Western Pennsylvania; Col. Recs., X: 168; Buck and Buck, Planting of Civilization, 148, 562-563; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 196n, 221n; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 152n, 165-166n, 303n, 360-361n; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 58n, 397-398n, 421n; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 57n, 190n; Rice, Allegheny Frontier, 67n; Crumrine, ed., "Ohio Minute Book," 19; Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, 45-46; WPHM, 60 (1977), 270-271.

Map 6, Virginia Counties, 1777 to Resolution of Boundary Dispute, and Map 7. Westmoreland County (Penna.), before Resolution of Boundary Dispute

Adapted from map following p. 518 in Crumrine, ed., "West Augusta Minute Book."

Map 8. Revolutionary War

Swetnam and Smith, Guidebook to Historic Western Pennsylvania, 134, 152, 153, 158, 221, 225, 228, 229, 232, 251, 252; Williams, "Fort Pitt and the Revolution," 418; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Advance, 148n, 164n; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Frontier Defense, 23n, 41; Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 200-201n; Kellogg, ed., Frontier Retreat, 415n; Burgess, "Evangelical Lutheran Church of Western Pennsylvania"; Mitchell and Flanders, eds., Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, IX: 199-120.

Map 10. The Whiskey Insurrection

Swetnam and Smith, Guidebook to Historic Western Pennsylvania, 30-31, 224-225; Syrett et al., eds., Papers of Hamilton, XVII: 205n.

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